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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Takim, Liyakat, 1957- author.
Title: Shi‘ism ‘revisited : ijtihad and reformation in contemporary times / Liyakat Takim.
Description: 1. | New York : Oxford University Press, 2022. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021037364 (print) | LCCN 2021037365 (ebook) | ISBN 9780197606575 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197609002 (epub)
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021037364
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021037365
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197606575.001.0001
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To my grandchildren Alisha, Ariana, Aliyah, Haydar, Sakina, Layla, and Ayana
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Acknowledgments
The present study is the result of an intellectual journey that began in 2011, when I spent my sabbatical leave in Qum, Iran. Inevitably, a book that takes nine years to complete requires input and assistance from many institutions, scholars, and friends who help facilitate the research. While writing this book, I have greatly benefited from assistance extended to me by many people and institutions.
A research fund from McMaster University helped me toward my travels to many countries, conferences, and seminars. I traveled extensively and engaged in countless discussions with scholars in workshops and conferences. During my sojourn in Qum, I spent a lot of time discussing various pertinent issues with prominent scholars. I am very grateful to all of them. Special thanks go to my dear friend Alireza Asghari, who made my stay in Qum comfortable and facilitated my research work. In summer 2011, despite the scorching summer heat and the month of Ramadan, Shaykh Ahmad Amini, son of the late ‘Allama Amini, spent countless hours discussing my observations and guiding me in my research work as we went through various genres of texts together. In him, I found not only an erudite scholar but also a very close and sincere friend.
I owe immense gratitude to Sayyid ‘Ali Tabataba’i Yazdi, who granted me full access to the Muhaqqiq Tabataba’i library in Qum. I spent countless hours working through various texts there. I am also indebted to various figures whose assistance was critical to this study. I thank Ayatullahs Ahmad Madadi, Yusuf Sane‘i, Bayat Zanjani, Hadi Tehrani, Mohaghegh Damad, ‘Ali Doost, Muhsin Sa‘idzadeh, Shaykh Mahdi Mahrizi, ‘Ali Reza Madadi, Dr. Kumail Rajani, and Sayyid Hossein Qazwini in Kerbala for their assistance.
I have also benefited considerably from the comments and advice of many other scholars. Professor Hamid Mavani read my entire work and offered many incisive comments. Professors Abdulaziz Sachedina, Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Zackary Heern, Abu’l-Qasim Fanaei, and Ali-Reza Bhojani all made valuable suggestions for improving various parts of this work. I am also grateful to the reviewers for their incisive feedback.
Many other figures have also helped me with this study, too many to mention. However, I feel that I should mention the following figures who, in various capacities, helped in the completion of this work. Dr. Leila Chamankhah, Dr. Adel Hashemi, Mohammed Hozourbakhsh, and Rashida Makwana were also very generous with their time and effort. A special mention for my research
x Acknowledgments
assistant, Hasan Doagoo, who was extremely helpful at various stages of my research work.
My parents encouraged me to pursue knowledge. Their legacy and love for knowledge inspired me to undertake the present study. Finally, I am eternally indebted to my wife, Fatima, and our children, who made great sacrifices to enable me to complete this work.
Wa ila Allahi-l-masir, Liyakat Takim
August 2021
Introduction
My interest in an Islamic reformation was first triggered in 2011 during a sabbatical sojourn in Qum, Iran. It was during that period that I engaged in extensive conversations with Iranian youth, many of whom spoke passionately about the topic and expressed their disappointment at how Shi‘i jurisprudence was seemingly out of touch with the sociopolitical realities in Iran. It was also at this time that I engaged in extensive debates and conversations with some prominent jurists in Qum. The result of my research work and deliberations with various groups of students and jurists are in the book in front of you.
To be sure, topics such as religion and gender equality, the inalienable rights and dignity of all human beings, the rights of gays and lesbians, transgender surgery, cloning, and ecology are now some of the most important and pressing questions of our age. As I read through the writings and views of jurists in the seminaries like Ayatullahs Yusuf Sane‘i, Fadlallah, Bujnurdi, Muhaqqiq Damad, Mohsen Kadivar, Kamal Haydari, Shaykh Muhsin Sa‘idzadeh, Edalatzadeh, and Mahdi Mahrizi, I felt that it was important to make the ongoing debates and conversations in Iran known to other scholars, especially those in the West. The lack of a centralized learning system and financial independence from the political entity offer an opportunity for reformist scholars in the seminaries to challenge and critique the works of other scholars, engendering, in the process, a dynamic intellectual environment. As I discuss later, some reform-minded seminarians have vigorously challenged the epistemological foundations and genre of rulings issued by the religious elite. Contrary to what is reported in the popular and social media, I found that some of the most intellectually stimulating discussions were conducted in the seminaries in Qum. Not only are the discussions invigorating but also it would not be an exaggeration to say that there is an ongoing intellectual struggle between the conservative and reformist scholars in the seminaries.
In this work I demonstrate that engaging the Islamic sacred sources is essential so as to revitalize Islamic thought and that the reformists’ engagement with juridical and textual hermeneutics have generated an increasingly liberal interpretation and appraisal of Islamic juristic literature. In the process, I analyze the intersections of law, hermeneutics, and modernity in Shi‘i Islam. In my analysis, I highlight reformist ideas that emerge from both inside and outside the traditional Shi‘i seminaries in Qum and Najaf. However, this should not be construed
as implying that all jurists subscribe to the reformist agenda. On the contrary, many jurists, especially the senior ones, are critical of any reformation in Islam. Ideas surrounding reformation, diversity, and changes in legal rulings are not alien to Shi‘ism. In fact, given the changes in juristic rulings over the course of centuries, it could be argued that they are as old as Shi‘i jurisprudence itself. What is novel about the current reformist discourse is the call for revisions in the fundamental foundations and epistemology that undergird Islamic legal theory (usul al-fiqh). My aim in this study is therefore to examine, analyze, and contribute to the ongoing debate on a Shi‘i understanding of reformation. More specifically, I explore and analyze how Shi‘i jurists have reacted to the nexus of Islamic law and modernity. The study seeks to move beyond theoretical questions revolving around reformation to address important issues such as how Islamic law is being revisited and revised by jurists on a wide range of topics ranging from women’s testimony and inheritance, their right to divorce, and freedom of conscience, to bioethics and the challenges facing diasporic Muslims. Such questions have required legal scholars to apply ijtihad (independent reasoning) so as to provide solutions to the pressing questions in the religious and social fields. The absence of a central authority in Islam means that the interpretations and edicts of erstwhile scholars have frequently been challenged, resulting in diversity and plurality in Islamic laws. This suggests the critical importance of examining not just the theory of Islamic law but also its application.
By examining the principles and application of usul al-fiqh, as well as the current discourse on juristic hermeneutics and the basis of a new ijtihad, it is my hope that this research will generate great interest in and contribution to the field of Islamic reformation. More importantly, since this topic has been largely neglected by Western scholarship, I hope that my study will provide a groundbreaking perspective on ijtihad and reformation in the Shi‘i world. My exploration of ijtihad and Islamic reformation is divided into five chapters, introduced in the following sections.
The Concept of an Islamic Reformation
Before I introduce the chapters of this book, a word of caution is in order. Some readers might find the second chapter, with its technical details and legal jargon, to be abstract, tedious, and, at times, heavy reading. For those who feel that way, I suggest they skip the sections that contain technical details and proceed to chapters 3 and 4, which, in the words of one of the reviewers, are “path-breaking.”
The first chapter defines reformation and examines what it means in a specifically Shi‘i context. It compares reformation in Islam and Christianity and argues that an Islamic reformation has to be an indigenous exercise, one that does not
have to capitulate to the demands of a secular or exogenous religious tradition. The chapter also considers why reformation in Shi‘ism started much later than it did in Sunnism.
For most reformers, ijtihad is the primary interpretive tool in the process of reforming Islamic jurisprudence. Ijtihad is connected to reformation precisely because it furnishes a jurist with indispensable interpretive tools and principles to help him revise earlier edicts or devise newer ones. I argue that the current form of ijtihad in Shi‘ism is not capable of addressing some of the most pressing moral and ethical issues that have arisen as a consequence of changes in times and circumstances.
Since an Islamic reformation is interwoven with an understanding and reinterpretation of textual sources, the first chapter also discusses the concept of hermeneutics and its effects on the reading of sacred texts. I argue that a hermeneutical approach is important to a discussion of Islamic reformation because of its insistence that the meaning of a text depends on various textual, contextual, and intertextual factors. Invoking hermeneutical theories postulated by various scholars also means that legal precepts and interpretations issued by eminent jurists over the centuries can be challenged and modified based on the needs of contemporary times. This is because textual hermeneutics is an endless exercise.
A discourse on Islamic reformation requires a detailed analysis of ijtihad. This is because the latter is an essential interpretive tool that jurists use in the derivation of legal injunctions. Rather than detailing the intricacies and complexities of usul al-fiqh, chapter 2 traces the genesis and development of both ijtihad and usul al-fiqh in Shi‘i intellectual history and then explicates some of the principles that jurists employ in extrapolating legal prescriptions. The chapter argues that the concern for knowledge and certitude, which characterized much of Shi‘i juristic literature in its formative period, was displaced with a recognition and acceptance of doubt as an inalienable feature of the law. While the transition from certitude to conjecture was a development that took place over centuries, the critical phase of this movement can be located in the lifetime of the scholars of Hilla in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. They elaborated and definitively developed a specific Shi‘i theory of ijtihad. Whereas earlier scholars had ruled on areas where there was probability or certainty that their judgments indicated the wishes of the Lawgiver, Shaykh Ansari (d. 1864) constructed and methodically explored the epistemological categories of certainty, speculation, and doubt. I argue that this was another important transitional period in Shi‘i legal history, because it empowered jurists to issue rulings on many spheres of law that had hitherto remained beyond their realm, broadening, in the process, the scope of Islamic law and the possibilities of its revision.
Besides the textual sources and procedural principles, jurists can employ other rationally derived tools and devices to either modify earlier legal enactments or
formulate new ones. These are key components in the Islamic reformation process. Chapter 3 considers the application of some principles and legal devices and their capability to shape new rulings or revise earlier ones. I argue that, at best, these devices can provide only partial and temporary amendments to existing legal injunctions. This is because they are motivated primarily by pragmatic and often short-term considerations. Notions like ethics, reason, justice, the function of local custom in the interpretation and application of the law, and the practices of the people of sound mind (sira al-‘uqala’) have, so far, played limited roles in juridical decision-making, as they are predicated on rational and hermeneutical strategies rather than on prescriptions in the textual sources.
An important segment of chapter 3 examines the role of custom (‘urf) in juristic interpretive enterprises. I contend that, in the absence of well-defined procedures and stipulations on deriving and instituting laws, the Qur’an presumes that its legal rulings will be understood based on prevalent customary practices and values. A consequence of this observation is that current jurists who insist on enforcing edicts issued in the past need to be cognizant of the fact that they are, in effect, frequently validating eighth-century and pre-Islamic Arabian cultural values and imposing them on contemporary Muslims.
The chapter also demonstrates that engaging in ijtihad today entails a bifurcation of laws and values from the cultural accretions in the early period of Islam. It also means that since the law is inveterated in and responds to cultural exigencies, some of the laws that were instituted in a distinct cultural context will have to be revised especially when they interact with a different cultural framework. I argue that just as pre-Islamic custom (‘urf) was endorsed by the early generation of Muslims, the local ‘urf that Muslims encounter today can be approbated and sanctioned on the same basis. Chapter 3 also explores how local custom that is endorsed by people of sound mind (‘uqala’) can legislate laws in today’s context.
Chapter 4 argues that the Shi‘i claim that the moral value of an act can be known objectively without scriptural validation accentuates the role of reason in perceiving moral values and simultaneously, enables a jurist to deduce new injunctions based on moral rationalist considerations, especially if a particular topic is not addressed in the revelatory texts. By emphasizing the rational character of fiqh, reason becomes a cogent hermeneutical tool in Islamic jurisprudence, and an important component in the reformation of the law. In the process, reason also becomes a principle for the construction of a moral framework of the law.
The chapter also argues that legal determinations based on rational and ethical considerations can empower a jurist to legislate on topics that are congruent with the views of the people of sound mind. In principle, such proclamations can even override laws that are derived from the textual sources when necessary. However, most fuqaha’ (jurists) have undermined
the ethical-moral vision of the Qur’an in favor of a neatly defined textually documented legal process. I demonstrate that disregarding the role of ethics in legal deliberations has led to the inference and issuance of iniquitous statements by the very scholars who uphold the Islamic ethical and legal tradition. The chapter also argues that in order to make Islamic jurisprudence more ethical, Muslim scholars will have to incorporate principles like justice, dignity, and judgments of reason (‘aql) in their legal deliberations so that these principles play more central and decisive roles in determining how the sources are interpreted and applied.
Given the deficiencies of traditional ijtihad highlighted in the previous chapters, chapter 5 seeks to evaluate and reconsider some of the interpretive strategies and epistemological foundations of the current form of ijtihad. The basic thesis here is that, in the context of the present discourse on an Islamic reformation, the moral rationalist presuppositions of Muslim reformers are diametrically opposed to the traditional jurists’ text-centered epistemological assumptions.
I also contend that the current form of inferential jurisprudence (al-fiqh alistidlali) should be replaced by what I call neo-ijtihadism and that, should this transition occur, it will engender major paradigmatic shifts in the genre of rulings pronounced. More specifically, I contend that an Islamic reformation necessitates a re-examination and revision of the epistemological and methodological foundations that undergird the current Islamic legal system. These are the key principles and procedures that guide a jurist in his interpretation and application of the information he deduces from the sources. I postulate different exegetical and hermeneutical strategies that neo-ijtihadism could adopt and propose solutions that synthesize hermeneutical strategies with current exigencies so as to make ijtihad more moral, rational, and practical.
Methodology and Approach
To some degree, this work is a study of the history and evolution of juristic constructs, ideas, and heuristic tools. However, it also presents variegated ways of interpreting religious texts and examines the relationship between the author, the text, and its readers. I have used various approaches and strategies in my study of an Islamic reformation. Primarily, my work applies textual, phenomenological, chronological, rationalist, and hermeneutical methods to the study of juridical, theological, historical, and other genres of literature. While my methodology primarily involves textual analysis, I also discuss and critique the juristic usage of various hermeneutical and epistemological tools in constructing a proper Shi‘i legal system.
Scholarship to Date
A number of works have discussed aspects of reformation in Shi‘ism. However, none have examined or discussed the subject as extensively as I have in my monograph. Thus, it is my hope that this book will fill a major vacuum that currently exists on the discourse on reformation in Shi‘ism. Ali Rahnema’s Shi‘i Reformation in Iran: The Life and Theology of Shariat Sangelaji1 examines a Shi‘i jurist’s challenge to certain popular beliefs in his time. His reformist discourse is framed from a purely theological and traditional point of view. The book deals with some of the key debates in Iran in the 1940s, especially those pertaining to issues related to dogma that Sangelaji challenged and attempted to revise. Besides being outdated, the book is primarily concerned with challenging certain doctrinal theories rather than critiquing and reforming Islamic legal theory and its epistemology.
Mehran Kamrava’s Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions2 comprises a series of essays by a multidisciplinary group of scholars and their analysis of the history, causes, and impediments to an Islamic reformation. The book barely touches on reformation in the Shi‘i world. Collectively, the various essays in the book provide a broad introduction into innovation in Islam. Similarly, Kamrava’s other book, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution, 3 focuses on the internal politics and foreign relations in Iran. It contains only one chapter on the reformist discourse in Iran. The brief discussion on reformation is limited to an examination of the views of Iranian intellectuals like Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, and Mojtahed Shabistari.
Hamid Mavani’s Religious Authority and Political Thought in Twelver Shi‘ism4 provides a detailed and theoretical discussion of the doctrine of leadership in Shi‘ism from different perspectives. Although he discusses aspects of Shi‘i legal reformation and the hermeneutical strategies of some reformers, his work is more concerned with religious and political authority than with reform in the Shi‘i legal tradition.
Shireen Hunter’s edited work Reformist Voices of Islam5 explores the development of Islamic reformist discourses among various social and intellectual groups. Hunter’s work demonstrates that these groups advocate an Islamization program that is more embracing and universal, and that they adopt a more
1 ‘Ali Rahnema, Shi‘i Reformation in Iran: The Life and Theology of Shari‘at Sangelaji (Ashgate: Burlington, 2015).
2 Mehran Kamrava, ed., Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).
4 Hamid Mavani, Religious Authority and Political Thought in Twelver Shi‘ism: From ‘Ali to PostKhomeini (New York: Routledge, 2013).
5 Shireen Hunter, ed., Reformist Voices of Islam (London: Sharpe, 2009).
rational and hermeneutical approach in understanding religious texts. Her work includes only one essay that deals with reformation in Shi‘ism. The essay focuses on reformist thinking in Iran and explores political concepts such as democracy and freedom.
Ali Akbar’s recent work Contemporary Perspectives on Revelation and Qur’anic Hermeneutics6 examines the views of four major proponents of a humanist theory of Islamic revelation. His study demonstrates the consequences of adopting a humanist approach to the understanding of revelation and interpreting Qur’anic sociopolitical precepts. Although the work is important in that it opens up a new horizon in contemporary Islamic discourse, it does not explore or discuss the topic of an Islamic reformation extensively.
Ashk Dahlen’s Islamic Law, Epistemology and Modernity: Legal Philosophy in Contemporary Iran7 analyzes the philosophical debate on the shari‘a and the discourse on epistemology, methodology, and hermeneutics in contemporary Iran. Initially, the work describes and examines the methodological, hermeneutical sources and principles of Shi‘i law. Dahlen also explores the main legal-theological discourse and engages in a semantic analysis of the main legal terms employed by Abdolkarim Soroush. Dahlen’s work also examines some of the hermeneutical theories that I discuss in chapter 1 of the present study.
Although valuable in their own ways, none of these works engages the classical and contemporary literature on the subject of reformation in Shi‘ism as I do. As a contribution to comparative debates about religious reformation, it is my hope that the present study will address and resolve the assiduous tension and conflict between those who view the interpretation of Islamic canonical texts as immutable and perduring and those who claim that these texts were directed for a specific time and place and are therefore subject to revision and reinterpretation. This study also aims to provide a hermeneutical and comparative perspective of transformations in Islamic law in spheres that have so far been largely untreated in Western scholarship on Islam.
It is my hope that this book will encourage scholars to conduct further research on the role of textual hermeneutics in responding to questions raised by the interaction of religion and modernity. At the same time, my work challenges scholars in both the seminaries and universities to review and contribute fresh perspectives on reformation at both the level of theory and detailed research. This study should stimulate them to continue efforts that I have begun in a variety of research projects to undertake conversations around the thematic issues surrounding law and reformation in modern times.
6 Ali Akbar, Contemporary Perspectives on Revelation and Qur’anic Hermeneutics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020).
7 Ashk Dahlen, Islamic Law, Epistemology and Modernity: Legal Philosophy in Contemporary Iran (New York: Routledge, 2003).
A number of issues that I deal with in this study are designed to address the general public and to enrich public discourse through debate and discussion in the media. I seek to engage policymakers and informed citizens around critical themes of reformation in the law regarding the rights of women, minorities and human rights, and the role of Muslim minorities in the West.
In closing, I would like to make it clear that I do not claim to write as a dispassionate scholar who merely critiques and analyzes religious traditions and texts. While I do observe the academic standards of engagement with canonical texts and take a critical approach to the study of an Islamic reformation, I also write as a concerned Muslim who is consciously aware of the current social and religious upheavals in the Muslim world. Therefore, I sometimes advocate certain prescriptive and nonacademic positions by proposing possible solutions for revising or reforming certain aspects of Shi‘i law. Hence, I cannot pretend that my stance is always a historical or neutral one. Sometimes, it is unashamedly more prescriptive than descriptive or analytical. For those who do not agree with my stance and views, I hope we will agree to disagree agreeably.
1
The Concept of an Islamic Reformation
Contemporary Muslims face the task of defining and navigating the relationship between a legal edifice that was conceptualized and constructed in the classical period of Islam (the eighth and ninth centuries) and its response to the multitudinous challenges that present-day Muslims encounter. They have to deal with issues such as how a religion, which they believe is immutable and Divinely revealed, can engage with and respond to the needs of a modern and vibrant Muslim community. How can they avoid the pressures of secularism and live in the context of a minority group in the West while adhering to the religious system that they have inherited? Should contemporary Muslims engage in an Islamic reformation? If so, where should the reformation process begin, and what form or path should it take? These and other related issues are just some of the topics that I intend to explore in this work.
To examine whether there is a need for and the process of reformation within Islam, it should be noted from the outset that contemporary Muslims depend on a legal system that was initially conceptualized by the fuqaha’ (jurists) in the classical period of their history. It was during this period that some Muslims are reported to have acquired proficiency in legal matters. In formulating a system of jurisprudence, they tried to delineate and articulate an Islamic legal system to respond to issues that impacted them, especially on matters that pertained to rituals, inheritance, commercial transactions, spousal relationships, slavery, and so forth. Guided by Qur’anic precepts and Prophetic practices, customary laws, and their own understanding of the sources, the scholars systematically constructed a legal structure that came to be known as Islamic jurisprudence.1 Where necessary, they also incorporated a wide array of interpretive strategies to respond to the challenges and questions they encountered. In the process, they developed and deployed various principles like those of maslaha (implementation of a ruling that is conducive to public welfare), qiyas (analogy), ra’y (personal opinion), istihsan (juristic preference), and other hermeneutical strategies to respond to different challenges and requirements.2
1 See Liyakat Takim, The Heirs of the Prophet: Charisma and Religious Authority in Shi‘ite Islam (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), chapter 1, for more details.
2 As I discuss in the following chapters, Shi‘i jurists rejected some of these principles and stratagems.
With time, the shari‘a, as formulated by the fuqaha’, evolved into a welldefined and comprehensive legal system that was supposed to regulate every aspect of a believer’s life. Usage of various exegetical devices, exposure to and under the influence of various cultures, and a variegated interpretation of the revelatory texts and Prophetic practices led to major disparities between the schools of law (madhahib) and impinged on the juristic opinions issued. Significantly, due to the disparate methodologies and legal tools devised by the jurists, there was no unified or monolithic legal system that was acknowledged and accepted by all Muslims. The law was, in fact, open to a multiplicity of interpretations. Therefore, no jurist could impose his rendition of the law on others.
Contemporary reformers, whether Sunni or Shi‘i, have argued that the opinions of the classical jurists are not always germane or applicable to the modern world.3 They also contend that for Muslims to respond to the various sociopolitical challenges in present times, there is a need to revisit, and where necessary revise, the Islamic legal tradition based on present-day requirements. In this chapter, I propose to deal with some of these issues that have, so far, received little attention by Western scholarship on Islam. I should make it clear that my study is confined to an examination of reformation that pertains to Islamic jurisprudence. More specifically, I intend to examine the current debate on reformation in the Shi‘i legal system. Hence, I do not intend to discuss transformations in political institutions and structures or to engage in debates on democracy and human rights. Nor do I intend to explore the contentious topic of the various forms of political governance that Muslim communities should embrace.
The Protestant Reformation and Islam
Conceptually, the term “reformation” can refer to a wide array of concepts ranging from a transformation of prevalent religious and political institutions and structures to the adoption of disparate ritual practices and alternative forms of religious authority. It can also mean engaging the sacred sources by examining their relevancy in contemporary times involving, at times, fresh interpretations of its teachings or of those of the founder of the religion. Reformers often seek a change in the religious tradition by advocating for a break with
3 There is no consensus as to what “modernity” means. Generally speaking, the process of modernization refers to replacing old patterns of thought, action, association, and belief with new ones. It can also include aspects such as increasing urbanization, political participation, and the ability to control nature via modern technology. See Nader Hashemi, Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 27–28. For others, modernity means continuous change in which reason plays a central role. Others understand it as an era in which tradition is not upheld and is often challenged. For a more detailed discussion on the different understandings of modernity, see Kamrava, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution, 179–80.
the past or replacing the conventions and regulations within their traditions. Whatever form it takes, reformation has major social, religious, and structural ramifications. Initially, at least, a reform movement is neither coherent nor monolithic. On the contrary, it is often diffuse and amorphous, with a heterogeneous vision of what should be transformed and what a revised version of a religious tradition should look like.
Reformation also entails a new way of interpreting or looking at an issue and involves some form of inversion (taqlib) of the old. In other words, it amounts to a questioning and revising of the structure of epistemological basis of a mode of reasoning or ways of inferring a legal judgment.4 Reformation also leads to a reinterpretation of religious ideas and can accommodate principles that had been previously abjured, like those pertaining to women, minorities, human rights, secularization, freedom of conscience, and liberal democracy. Significantly, for reformation to be genuine, it cannot be haphazard or arbitrary; rather, it should be anchored on specific principles and guidelines.
Within Muslim circles, ideas regarding an Islamic reformation have circulated especially since the eighteenth century, when Muslim military, political, and economic ascendancy began to decline in the midst of emerging European encroachment and the onset of colonialism. Muslim political leaders like Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha (d. 1849), the Ottoman ruler in Egypt, saw the expansion of European power and the diffusion of new ideas and technology as a challenge to which they had to respond by initiating changes within their own societies. Reformers embarked on various administrative, military, cultural, and religious projects to reform their nations.5 A common theme that characterized the Muslim reformers’ agenda was an attempt to appropriate and assert many features found in European democratic political systems within their countries. The reformers, who originated from various parts of the Muslim world, advocated the appropriation of Western traits like democracy, greater women’s rights in Islamic law and their access to and participation in the public realm, human rights, and fresh interpretations of Muslim sacred texts. The concept of an Islamic reformation was therefore, at least initially, a response to an external threat that postulated the European model as normative in the relationship between religion, society, and state formation.6
Discussing the concept of reformation in the Islamic world inevitably raises comparisons with the Protestant reformation in sixteenth-century Europe. In
4 Wael Hallaq, Reforming Modernity: Ethics and the New Human in the Philosophy of Abdurrahman Taha (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), 38.
5 On some of the changes that Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha instituted, see Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798–1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 52–53.
6 Mohammad Nafissi, “Reformation as a General Ideal Type: A Comparative Outline,” Max Weber Studies 6, no. 1 (2006): 69–110.
The Future of Islam, Wilfrid Blunt states unequivocally that Islam needs to “work out for itself a Reformation” resembling that which transpired in Europe. He calls for a Muslim Martin Luther so that the prevalent religious authority can be pressured to introduce newer ideas and laws.7 Blunt’s call for a Western-style reformation in the Muslim world smacks of Western cultural and intellectual hegemony. He was not the only one to call for reformation in the Muslim world. Several Muslims thinkers have also maintained that Islam needs a Luther-like figure. Even ‘Ali Shari’ati (d. 1977), the Iranian thinker, “urged Muslims to embrace an Islamic Protestantism similar to that of Christianity in the Middle Ages.”8
Whereas notions of Christian and Islamic reformation may bear some resemblance, their specific arguments and distinct forms are very different.9 For example, Martin Luther (d. 1546) started his critique of the Church by nailing ninety-five theses to a door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg, Germany. He was critical of the Church’s abuse of the sale of indulgences and the extensive authority wielded by the pope. Luther also accused the Church of widespread misuse of authority. His accusations and the movement that ensued were understood as attacks against the pope and his infallibility. He was able to challenge and undermine the established religious authority and alter the Church’s dogma held for centuries. Luther also maintained that the scripture must be its own interpreter. In fact, he is reported to have asked his students to disregard the notes and commentaries transmitted from the early Church figures and to begin a new history of interpretation.10 Luther’s ideas and demands for changes within the church establishment precipitated a religious movement that drastically transformed European societies forever.
While the Reformation is commonly agreed to have begun on October 31, 1517, when Luther posted his theses on the doors of the church, Luther was not a political figure. Rather, he probably saw himself as a reformer within the Catholic Church. As Luther’s ideas began to circulate widely in Europe, particularly in its northern regions, many of the ruling kings and princes saw Lutheranism as a valuable tool for augmenting their political power and increasing land and taxes within their territories. The princes and kings of Europe used religious figures such as Luther, John Calvin (d. 1564), and Ulrich Zwingli (d. 1531) and the movements they founded to free themselves from the financial and political control of the Catholic Church and the power of the papacy. Eventually, this led to
7 Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, The Future of Islam (Cairo: n.p. 1882), 133.
8 Michaelle Browers and Charles Kurzman, eds., An Islamic Reformation? (Lanham, MA: Lexington Books, 2004), 4–6.
9 For some of the similarities between the two forms of reformation, see Rahnema, Shi‘i Reformation in Iran, 2.
10 Michaelle Browers, “Islam and Political Sinn: The Hermeneutics of Contemporary Islamic Reformists,” in Browers and Kurzman, An Islamic Reformation? 55.
the bifurcation of the church and state and the emergence of secularism in the West.11
Christian and Islamic Reformation: A Comparison
In their calls for changes, reformers in the Christian world were reacting to the abuse of clerical authority of the church and the extensive powers of the pope. Such a line of thinking is clearly alien to Islam, in which concepts such as the papacy, a church, an official creed, and the problem of accessing normative sacred texts do not exist. Unlike Christianity, Islam did not develop a priestly class that could act as an intermediary with the Divine or produce an order capable of authoritatively defining and delineating the parameters of a sacred canon. In fact, Islamic revelation did not envisage a central figure or a hierarchical authority against whom reformers could dissent or form the object of reformation. Hence, it is difficult to use the term “orthodoxy” in an Islamic context. This is because Islam has never created a legal mechanism or an authoritative council that could articulate or enforce the “right doctrine” or practices or excommunicate a purported heretic.
Since there was no official church or priesthood in Islam that could demarcate and impose normative beliefs and praxis, it was the juristic interpretive community that could and did define the law. Using the sacred sources and hermeneutical principles and tools they created, classical Muslim jurists proffered a wide array of legal opinions on issues like a woman’s right to adjudicate in legal matters and to bear testimony, forms of punitive measures, whether a girl can marry without the consent of her guardian, and whether the testimony of slaves is acceptable.
With no central authority to challenge, Islam is, and has been since its inception, “Protestant” in its structure and organization. Like Protestantism, all believers are theologically on the same level, and each believer is responsible for understanding God’s revelation and implementing it in his/her life. The scholars in both Islam and Protestantism have no superior standing or claim to special status. Their authority is premised on the charting and delineating of a morally upright form of life, erudition and specialization in navigating through the sacred sources, their interpretive skills, and the ability to provide religious guidance to members of their community. Hence, it is correct to state that Islam is inherently discursive and open to a multiplicity of interpretations, with no church or priesthood to define a singular or authoritative binding “Islamic position” on any issue.12
11 I explore the connection between reformation and secularism in what follows.
12 Browers and Kurzman ed., An Islamic Reformation?, 4–6.
Differences between Christian and Islamic concepts of reformation become more apparent when we bear in mind that Muslim reformers have called for renewed interpretations of the revelatory sources rather than challenging the authority of a nonexistent central papal figure or overthrowing Muslim religious institutions. They have questioned the validity of the juridical rulings of classical jurists and the applicability of their pronouncements in modern times. As we shall see, reformers have invoked the revelatory sources to advocate and legislate for religious tolerance and equal gender and minority rights, emphasizing, in the process, values such as the intrinsic dignity of all human beings, justice, freedom of conscience, and the equality of all beings.
Reform in an Islamic context should not be construed as reforming the revelatory sources or as questioning the Divine nature of the Qur’an; rather, it refers to revisiting, reinterpreting, and applying a fresh understanding of the sacred texts. Stated differently, an Islamic reformation attempts to rekindle the spirit of the revelation through a new understanding rather than imitating or imposing previous readings of the sacred texts. It also challenges some of the exegetical and epistemological foundations that undergird the Islamic legal system.
An important denouement of the Christian reformation was the development of a multiplicity of views—even more pronounced within the reform movement itself. Similarly, in the absence of an ecclesiastic body that could issue normative or official pronouncements for the entire umma (community), heterogeneity and a multiplicity of scholarly views have been perduring features of Islam throughout the ages. Hence, on controversial issues like human cloning or a woman’s right to abortion following rape or incest, one finds a wide spectrum of divergent and, at times, conflicting opinions issued by Muslim legists. It is correct to state that most reformation discourse in Islam is centered on challenging juristic opinions given by previous and contemporary scholars and proffering newer ones instead.
Muslim reformers have also challenged the rigidity of the Islamic legal system, the superstitions prevalent in Muslim practices, the slavish imitation of the past, and the lack of the application of reasoning.13 The Islamic reformist agenda has also advocated for a rereading and revision of religious texts, a hermeneutical process based on different epistemological bases, an insertion of rational and ethical components in juristic decision-making, and a revamping of its legal system so that reason (‘aql) and ethics can play more significant roles in valorizing traditions.14
13 For other examples, see Rahnema, Shi‘i Reformation, 10; Browers, “Islam and Political Sinn,” 55–56.
14 On this, see Abdelwahab El-Affendi, “The People on the Edge: Religious Reform and the Burden of the Western Muslim Intellectual,” Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 8 (2009): 19–50.
Although there are some similarities between Christian and Islamic thinkers, reformers in both faith traditions accentuate the peculiarities within their own belief system and cite references to specific discourses within their faiths, rendering their respective ideas and solutions unique and specific to their own creed. Thus, whereas both traditions challenge the endemic superstitions predominant in their communities and the popular intermediaries between human and the Divine in their traditions, the notion of salvation “by grace alone” is completely alien to Islam. For example, the twentieth-century Shi‘i thinker Shariat Sangelaji (d. 1944) rejected the notion that a Shi‘i would be automatically redeemed because of his/her religious affiliation.15 Contrary to the Protestant reformers who argued for justification by faith, Muslim thinkers maintained that righteous acts and correct faith are indispensable for salvation. Moreover, unlike the Christian reformation movement, in the Islamic reformist discourse there is no discussion of the sale of indulgences, the legitimacy or authority of priests, or the authority of the church, points that were highly contentious and divisive in the reformation movement in Christianity. Hence, in many ways, the Christian experience of religious reformation is alien to its Muslim counterpart.
Unlike Christianity, the major grievance of proponents of an Islamic reformation like Rifa‘a al-Tahtawi (d. 1873), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), Rashid Rida (d. 1935), and Mustafa ‘Abd al-Raziq (d. 1947) was that a culture of rigidity and stagnation had been instilled in the Muslim psyche. They sought to free the Muslim mind from what they termed as the chains of imitation (taqlid). Their arguments centered on the need for a Muslim awakening in response to Western intellectual, military, economic, and political encroachment. As a matter of fact, Muslim reformers were more concerned with reawakening and rejuvenating the Muslim mind and reforming aspects of their legal system than with challenging the authority of the ‘ulama’ (scholars) and fighting against institutional structures like mosques and the schools of learning (madrasa) or the sale of indulgences. They also challenged the idea of an official “Islamic position” on any topic. These reformers were also reacting to challenges engendered by colonization and the imposition of Western values on Muslim lands.
This does not mean that the ‘ulama’ were immune to criticism or rebuke. Reformers like al-Afghani, ‘Abduh, and Rashid Rida excoriated them for their lack of innovative thinking and apish imitation of and reliance on the views of erstwhile scholars. These thinkers were reacting to the paucity of (re)interpretation of the sacred scriptures in modern times and to the reliance of the ‘ulama’ on, and imposition of, previous rulings and scholarly consensus.16 Reformers
15 Rahnema, Shi‘i Reformation, 6.
16 See, for example, Rashid Rida’s attacks against the ‘ulama’ cited in Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 73.
