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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Stoner, Kathryn, 1965– author.
Title: Russia resurrected : its power and purpose in a new global order / Kathryn Stoner, Stanford University.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020040284 (print) | LCCN 2020040285 (ebook) | ISBN 9780190860714 (hardback) | ISBN 9780190860738 (epub) | ISBN 9780190054571
Subjects: LCSH: Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations—21st century. | Russia (Federation)—Politics and government—1991– | Russia (Federation)—Economic conditions—1991– | Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, 1952—Influence. | Russia (Federation)—Forecasting. | International relations—Forecasting.
Classification: LCC DK510.764 .S76 2021 (print) | LCC DK510.764 (ebook) | DDC 327.47—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020040284
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020040285
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190860714.001.0001 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
For my parents, Joan Boyd and Norman Stoner, with gratitude for inspiring a love of learning in me “In just 30 years, we have undergone changes that took centuries in other countries.”
Vladimir Putin, March 1, 2018, Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly
Acknowledgments ix
List of Figures xiii
List of Tables xvii
Note on Transliterations xix
CONTENTS
SECTION I: RUSSIA AND THE DIMENSIONS OF STATE POWER
1. Is Russia Resurrected? 3
SECTION II: THE GEOGRAPHIC DOMAIN AND POLICY SCOPE OF RUSSIAN POWER
2. Where Does Russia Matter? 31
3. Where (Else) in the World Is Russia? 69
SECTION III: THE MEANS OF RUSSIAN POWER
4. The Unsteady Economic Basis of Russian Power 119
5. Russian Society as Power Resource or Constraint? 155
6. Russian Hard Power 181
7. Russian Soft and Sharp Power Resources 216
SECTION IV: THE PURPOSES BEHIND RUSSIAN POWER PROJECTION ABROAD
8. The Domestic Determinants of Russia’s Resurrection 235
Notes 269
Index 303
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book began on a bus in Novgorod Oblast (province) in Russia in September 2013. I was at a conference and as part of the program, our hosts took us to a monastery as part of a cultural break from our meetings. I had the pleasure of sitting next to a Russian colleague on the bus, a younger specialist in Russian foreign policy. We chatted amicably about the conference and the surrounding countryside, and eventually the conversation turned to the emerging hostility between our two countries. “What,” I asked him, “is the point of Putin’s foreign policy these days?” His reply both surprised and amused me: “Oh, that’s easy!” he said “To beat you.”
I was amused because he evidently didn’t know that I am actually Canadian by birth, although I do hold dual citizenship with the United States. As an international power, Russia surely outpaced Canada at the time. But his reply also surprised me because in the United States, Russia was not seen as a “peer power” at the time, and it struck me that policy makers back in Washington would not have considered Russia a particularly capable global challenger in 2013.
I returned to the United States a few days later intent on seeing exactly where and how Russia could “beat us” in international politics. As my research progressed, and as I attended seminars at Stanford University, my home base, and conferences in Washington, DC, I came to realize that American political and military leaders I spoke with mostly dismissed Russia as either a regional power or, as one prominent member of the intelligence community said, “like North Korea; that is, Russia’s at the ‘little table’ but it wants to be at the ‘big table’ with us and Europe and China. Problem is, it’s just not there.” My research, however, was beginning to demonstrate already that this sort of assessment of Russian capabilities was outdated. It would also prove calamitous as subsequent events demonstrated – not least of which was Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential elections. But beyond that, since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, Russia appeared to outfox the West at every turn.
I wondered how and why, and this study of Russia’s resurrection as a global power is the result. The sober assessment it provides aims to convince the reader that under Putin’s autocratic regime, Russian capabilities are beginning to approach its global aspirations.
This study could not have been completed without the opportunities that I have gained from my position as a Senior Fellow and Deputy Director at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University. The intellectual environment in our seminars, and the brain trust in our building, Encina Hall, proved invaluable to bringing this project to completion. I am particularly indebted to Ambassador Michael McFaul, the Institute’s Director, for his patience in listening to me talk about this book for several years, providing me with the time to actually write it, and his insightful comments on the draft manuscript. Thanks also to my other Stanford colleagues Chip Blacker, David Holloway, Stephen Krasner and Larry Diamond for attending and commenting upon various presentations that I gave on the book here at Stanford. I owe a great deal of gratitude too to my colleague Francis Fukuyama for helping me to think more deeply about the concept of power, as well as to John Dunlop, and Anna Grzymala-Busse for their careful reads of the manuscript, occasional corrections and vital suggestions for improvement. Condoleeza Rice and Sheri Berman (at Barnard College) read the prospectus for this book and I am grateful for their enthusiasm for the project and encouragement. Secretary Rice also generously shared some of her insights into the younger Vladimir Putin and her experiences as Secretary of State with a few other members of his foreign policy apparatus. Rose Gottemoeller, former deputy secretary general of NATO generously reviewed chapters 3 and 6. Colleagues in Russia like Dmitri Trenin, Andrei Kortunov, and Fyodor Lukyanov (among others) were extremely patient in explaining the Russian perspective on global politics.
Back at Stanford, Tiffany Zhu provided outstanding research assistance in the final stages of research and Alice Underwood provided fantastic editing and thoughtful suggestions as well as good cheer as the project finally came to conclusion. My students in POLISCI 213C “Understanding Russia” in the winter quarter of 2020 were among the initial readers of the manuscript and their feedback made for a more comprehensible book to be sure.
Finally, on the home front, my deepest thanks to my wonderful husband, Paul Oyer, who was a constant source of encouragement and irrepressible humor. Thank you as well to our children (David Oyer, Lucy Oyer, Adam Weiss and Abby Weiss) for their patience as I wrote this book. They learned far more about Russia than they probably ever wanted to know! The COVID-19 pandemic brought Abby and Lucy even closer to this project at the bitter end as they were forced to come home to shelter in place. I owe them a special thanks for their
provision of coffee (both hot and iced) from our favorite place to keep me tapping away at the keyboard happily.
Finally, I am particularly grateful to David McBride, possibly the most patient editor in the world, for sticking with me for the years it took to bring this project to fruition! Holly Mitchell saw it through production efficiently and with good cheer.
While all of these kind people helped me with various aspects of this project, any errors and omissions are mine alone.
Stanford California, October, 2020.
FIGURES
1.1 The Multiple Dimensions of State Power in International Relations 17
1.2 Changes in Vladimir Putin’s approval rating 1999–2020 (Question: “Do you approve of the activities of V. Putin as President (Prime Minister) of Russia?”) 25
2.1 Freedom House Map of Freedom in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, 2019 37
4.1 GDP of Russia vs. BRICS, EU, and the US, 1990–2019 (at Purchasing Power Parity) 129
4.2 National GDP as a Percent of World Total, 1992–2018 130
4.3 GDP per capita of BRICS, EU, and the US, 1990–2018 (at Purchasing Power Parity) 131
4.4 Russian GDP and Global Crude Oil Prices 134
4.5 Unemployment Rates in BRICS, EU, and the US, 1991–2019 136
4.6 Percentage of Russians Living below Federal Subsistence Minimum, 1992–2018 137
4.7 Volume of National Welfare Fund and National Reserve Fund, 2008–2019 138
4.8 Foreign Reserves in Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa, the US, and European Central Bank, 2000–2019 139
4.9 External Debt Stocks as a Percent of GNI (Gross National Income) 139
4.10 Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a Percent of GDP in BRICS, the EU, and the US 141
4.11 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into and out of Russia as a Percent of GDP, 2005–2018 142
4.12 Economic Complexity of BRICS, the US, and Germany 143
4.13 Crude Oil, Refined Oil, and Petroleum Gas Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports in BRICS, the EU, and the US, 1995–2016 144
4.14a and 4.14b Structure of Russian Exports in 2013 and in 2017 145
4.15 Research and Development Spending as a Percentage of GDP in BRICS, the EU, and the US, 1996–2017 149
4.16 Total Patent Grants (Direct and PCT National Phase Entries) Originating from BRICS, the EU, and the US, 1992–2018 150
4.17 World Governance Indicators (WGI): Control of Corruption in Russia, 1996–2018 151
4.18 World Governance Indicators: Rule of Law in Russia, 1996–2018 152
5.1 Trends in the Russian Federation’s HDI Component Indices, 1990–2017 158
5.2 Life Expectancy of Men and Women in Russia, 1960–2018 159
5.3 Life Expectancy at Birth in Russia and Selected Countries of Comparison, 1960–2018 160
5.4 Age- Standardized Death Rates for Russia and EU Members, 1980–2016 161
5.5 Total Fertility Rate in Russia and Selected Countries of Comparison, 1950–2010 162
5.6 Russia’s Population Structure by Sex and Age, 2017 163
5.7 Russia’s Population Structure by Sex and Age, 2030 (Predicted) 164
5.8 Total Migration into Russia from Foreign Countries, 1990–2016 167
5.9 Top 10 Origin Countries for Immigrants to Russia, 2017 168
5.10 Total Immigration to Russia and Emigration from Russia, 1997–2017 169
5.11 “Would you like to move abroad for permanent residence?” (the sum of the answers “Definitely yes” and “Rather yes” in %) 170
5.12 Distribution of Income among Top 10%, Middle 40%, and Bottom 50% of Russians 172
5.13 Gini Coefficients for BRICS, EU, and US, 1988–2014 172
5.14 Distribution of Wealth among Top 1% and Bottom 50% of Russians, 1995–2015 173
5.15 Poverty Heаdcount Ratio in BRICS Countries, 2000–2017 174
5.16 Higher Education Spending as a Percentage of GDP in Brazil, Germany, Russia, and the US, 2000–2015 176
5.17 Percent of University Graduates with Degrees in STEM Fields in BRICS, the US, and United Kingdom 178
6.1 Russian Defense Effort 2000–2018 as Measured in Trillions of Rubles 187
6.2 Military Spending as Percentage of Government Spending, 1998–2018 188
6.3 Russian Military Expenditure in Comparison to US and China, 1988–2018 (in millions of US dollars at 2017 standardized dollar) 190
6.4 Russian Military Expenditures vs. Others 1992–2018 (US dollars) 191
6.5 Military Expenditures in Russia vs. World’s Highest Defense Spenders (Market Exchange Rate) 193
6.6 Military Expenditures in Russia vs. World’s Highest Defense Spenders (Purchasing Power Parity) 193
TABLES
2.1 Russia in Comparison to Other Former Soviet States 35
2.2 Remittances from Migrant Workers to Former Soviet States, 1995–2017 56
6.1 Total Personnel (All Services) and Key Land Forces (Some Comparisons) as of 2018 195
6.2 Sea Forces (Key Selected Systems) as of 2018 198
6.3 Air Forces (Key Selected Systems) as of 2018 202
6.4 Russia’s Nuclear Weapons vs Other Nuclear Powers, 2019 206
6.5 Russian and American Strategic Nuclear Forces 210
6.6 Russian Non- Strategic Nuclear Weapons, 2019 213
NOTE ON TRANSLITERATIONS AND SOURCES
Throughout this book, I use the Library of Congress transliteration system from Cyrillic to Latin scripts. In some cases, where there is a familiar spelling for a word, however, I employ the more familiar spelling (thus, Yeltsin rather than El’tsin, for example).
I have tried to use the most recent available sources and data for what follows. Still, at the time of writing, there was variation in this regard for some of the economic and demographic data. As a result, the reader will find one or two cases where the most recent data available was 2015 as opposed to 2019 or 2020. In all cases, links to where data sources can be found are provided, so that a reader may go to look for updates.
Is Russia Resurrected?
Assessing State Power and Its Domestic Determinants
“Russia was never so strong as it wants to be, and never so weak as it is thought to be.”
Vladimir Putin, May 20021
If after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was widely dismissed by the international community as nothing more than a regional power whose global influence had died with communism, then its flexing of its international muscle slightly more than a mere twenty-five years later has shown that reports of Russia’s death were greatly exaggerated. From the sudden seizure of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in 2014 and the rapid military deployment in Syria in 2015 to cyber interventions in Western democracies, most notably interference in the US election in 2016, under Vladimir Putin’s long rule, Russia has reasserted itself, taking many professional and casual observers by surprise.
A common argument among many analysts has been that Russia has a weak hand in international politics, but plays it well. This book argues instead that Russia’s cards may not be as weak as we in the West have thought. The realist approach to power sees a world organized by interests, in which states are capable of exercising influence according to their material capacities alone. Viewed through this lens, a simple tally of Russia’s importance in the global economy, its human capital, and the size of its military would hardly convince an observer of its disproportionate power over other countries’ decisions in international politics. After all, just over twenty-five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had a 3.17% share of global gross domestic product (GDP), compared to 15.49% for the United States, 17.76% for China, and 7.23% for India, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).2 With an estimated 144.48 million people (excluding the annexed Ukrainian territory of Crimea), Russia’s population size was less than half that of the United States (321.4 million), only a
tenth of China’s (1.39 billion) and India’s (1.35 billion), and with flat to negative growth prospects.3 Russia also spent about a tenth (at $61.4 billion) of what the United States (at $611 billion) spent on its military, and about a quarter of what China spent (at $250 billion).4
Yet the focus on these sorts of metrics of power has led scholars and policymakers alike to discount Russia’s actual ability to influence international politics in the twenty-first century. Undeniably, contemporary Russia does not compare in realist terms to the power resources of the United States or China. Nonetheless, Russia has developed an outsized ability to exercise considerable influence abroad. I argue that under Vladimir Putin’s long rule, Russia has developed and deployed both traditional and novel means of influence abroad, and on a variety of dimensions. Putin’s Russia demonstrates that a state does not have to be a great power that is at parity in all realms with the United States, Europe, or China—but it can be good enough to dramatically alter the balance of power in a new global order.
How and why has this happened? Is contemporary Russia strong or weak? What does Russia’s evident resurrection as a global power tell us about the actual determinants of state power in the international politics of the twenty-first century? These are the questions at the foundation of this book. I offer two major corrections to the ways in which analysts and policymakers understand Russia’s role in the world today. First, I present a multidimensional understanding of Russian power resources that goes beyond the traditional means of power— things that can be counted, like comparative population and military size, and the amount of money in the economy of a country. Second, I link the willingness and ability of the contemporary Russian leadership to use its power resources abroad to the nature of the domestic political regime that has evolved under Vladimir Putin’s long rule.
In important ways, Russia is distinct from the former Soviet Union and from other globally powerful states today. Under Putin’s leadership, Russia has re-established itself on the global stage as a great disrupter rather than as a traditional great power, with a much higher tolerance for risk than its international competitors or its Soviet predecessor. Under Putin’s leadership, contemporary Russia has proved willing to assert itself against its regional neighbors, but has also moved far outside of its traditional sphere of geographic influence abroad, while on paper lacking many of the traditional means of power of its competitors—particularly the United States and China.
In a metaphor that aptly characterizes how Putin’s Russia has managed to resurrect itself in international power projection, David Baldwin emphasizes the importance of understanding the game being played, rather than just judging a player’s ability to win based on the face value of the cards she holds:
Discussions of the capabilities of states that fail to designate or imply a framework of assumptions about who is trying (or might try) to get whom to do what are comparable to discussions of what constitutes a good hand in cards without specifying which game is to be played . . . a good hand at bridge is a bad one at poker.5
Perhaps, then, a misunderstanding of Russia’s purposes and motivations abroad (the game Russian policymakers are playing) has led to an underestimation of its ability to project power and the resources it has amassed to do so. Policymakers in the West have declared in public and in private that Russia is not an equal as a global power, so there is no need to bow to its complaints about containment or the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Undoubtedly, it is partly in response to this belittling perspective from rivals that Russia under Vladimir Putin has sought to reassert itself as deserving of global respect. History demonstrates that Russia also has undeniable geostrategic interests in its immediate neighborhood that any Russian leader might want to protect. It is important to consider, however, whether a Russian president other than Vladimir Putin would have made the same foreign policy choices. That is, is Putin pursuing Russia’s global strategy as any leader of a fallen “great power” would do, or is he more narrowly pursuing the interests of his own, increasingly autocratic regime?
In what follows, I argue that grand strategy under Putin has been a choice and not the natural destiny of Russia’s role in international politics as antagonist to the West. Russia has not been historically, nor is it inevitably, an enemy of Europe or the United States. Rather, the new global rivalry is a strategic choice for Putin’s regime to “make Russia great again”—most importantly in the eyes of the Russian people. Even though Russia today is an autocracy, the regime still fears the potential instability that comes from the Russian street more than it fears NATO.
A “Normal” Country?: The Extent of Russia’s Revival
On December 25, 1991, the red hammer-and-sickle flag of the Soviet Union was taken down over the Kremlin, and the Russian tricolor flag was raised triumphantly. This moment marked the definitive end to a vast communist empire that stretched from Europe’s borders in the west to Japan’s in the far east, and from the Arctic Ocean in the north to Afghanistan in the south. Its demise brought about the simultaneous end to the Cold War between East and West
