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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Ismail, Raihan, author.
Title: Rethinking Salafism : the transnational networks of Salafi ʻulama in Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia / Raihan Ismail.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021012730 | ISBN 9780190948955 (hardback) | ISBN 9780190948979 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Salafīyah—Political aspects. | Ulama—Political activity. | Islam and politics—21st century.
Classification: LCC BP195.S18 I76 2021 | DDC 297.8/3—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021012730
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190948955.001.0001
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America
Acknowledgments
I could not have completed this book without help. I thank the Australian Research Council for awarding me a Discovery Early Career Researcher Fellowship (DE190100230) to fund my completion of the project that underlies much of the book. I would also like to acknowledge the Australian National University for the support I have received in making the project happen.
This book was written during a difficult time. There are many people whose support during that period was crucial to keeping me on track to finish it. There are various reasons why I cannot name all of those people, but I can and must publish my gratitude to Huda al-Tamimi, Penny Brew, Matthew Gray (Waseda University), Liyana Kayali, Anita Mack, Michelle McGuinness, France Meyer, Jessie Moritz, Kirill Nourzhanov, Katja Theodorakis, and Stephanie Wright. I am also most appreciative for the guidance of Professor William Christie, Professor George Lawson, and Professor Bronwen Neil.
I would also like to thank Aidan Parkes for his help as my research assistant and the work he invested in this project.
I am grateful to Oxford University Press—Cynthia Read and her team— for their assistance in bringing this work to publication. Thank you also to the anonymous reviewers for their time and comments.
To my parents, Ustaz Ismail Din and Iman Ibrahim El-Shenhab, my eternal gratitude is in order. Their faith in me never fades and their sacrifices shaped the person I am today.
I am thankful to Andrew Chapman, who is my rock, my best friend, and my love. And to my daughter, Laila Ismail Chapman, who makes me proud and inspires me with her resilience, wit, and passion to make this world a better place.
A Note on Conventions
I have employed a simplified transliteration system for Arabic words, with gh for ghayn, dh for dhal, etc. I have used diacritical markings only for ayn and hamzah, except for the word ʿulama, where hamzah is not added.
I have kept Anglicized spellings for names that are commonly found in the English dictionary and non-Arabic sources. For example, Mecca (instead of “Makkah”) and Saddam Hussein (as opposed to “Saddam Husayn”) are used.
Nouns and Adjectives
I have utilized the term “Shiʿa” freely, without differentiating between the word as a noun (e.g., Bahraini Shiʿa) and an adjective (e.g., Shiʿa identity, instead of Shiʿi identity). However, exemptions are made in quotations to ensure that other people’s words are not changed.
Introduction
The first two decades of the twenty-first century saw renewed political, media, and academic focus on radical Islam and violent extremism. This focus extended to the Salafi movement as the ideological foundation for many radical and violent groups. There is now a significant corpus of literature discussing transnational jihadi networks and the radicalization of Salafi thought by jihadi theoreticians and ʿulama. However, as scholars in the field have noted, Salafism is not a monolith: it contains numerous streams, and an examination of all such streams is crucial to understanding the sociopolitical dynamics of the Muslim societies that Salafism influences. Besides jihadi Salafis—those who sanction violence—there are two other broad trends of Salafism: quietists and activists. Quietist Salafis endorse an apolitical tradition, believing that political activism is unacceptable in any form. Activist Salafis, also known as harakis, advocate peaceful political change. Subject to debate around where exactly to draw the lines between these categories, the two groups have been identified as largely representative of the non-jihadi aspect of Salafism.1
The quietist and activist movements are each led by ʿulama, seen as the preservers of Salafi traditions. Scholarly work examining the ʿulama tends to be grounded in country-specific research, including studies of Egypt,2 Kuwait,3 Lebanon,4 Saudi Arabia,5 and Yemen.6 These studies present extensive scholarship on the influence and the nature of Salafism. Some works explore the development of Salafi movements, the religious institutions that promote Salafi ascendancy in Muslim societies, and the transnational activities of Salafism. However, more work is needed to assess the origins, interactions, and dynamics of the transnational networks of Salafi clerics in the region, and how quietist and activist ʿulama work across borders to preserve and promote what they see as “authentic” Salafism. Similarly, the competition and cooperation between the two streams are often explored within the framework of domestic concerns rather than transnational interactions.
This book explores the transnational networks of Salafi ʿulama in and involving the clerics of three countries: Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Although Salafi ʿulama from other countries will occasionally appear in this book, greater emphasis will be given to ʿulama from these countries. The Salafi ʿulama in these countries are more prominent than those of others. On one popular Salafi website, Islamway, which stores the works of ʿulama and preachers, Salafi ʿulama of both activist and quietist persuasions are classified according to their country of origin. Saudi Arabia is ranked first with 617 ʿulama, followed by Egypt with 441 clerics. Kuwait, a country much smaller in population, has 53 clerics consulted. A study of transnational Salafism that extended too broadly beyond the movement’s core would risk being falsely representative.
Saudi Arabia is obviously the central country. Its regime has long been an advocate of Salafism and is responsible for the spread of Salafi ideals throughout the Muslim world. Egypt is different: Salafism enjoys no state sponsorship or even significant social influence; however, the movement’s clerics are widely respected in the region, especially among their fellow Salafis, as the statistics mentioned in the preceding paragraph illustrate. Finally, Salafi ʿulama in Kuwait, although fewer in number, are highly active in the region and are known for their financial support for other Salafi movements, including in Lebanon.7 The selected countries are the centers of Salafism in the region and thus important loci for a study of transnational Salafism.
Transnationalism in Discussion: Rethinking Salafism
The purpose of this book is threefold. First, it examines the nature of the transnational networks of Salafi ʿulama in the selected countries. Transnationalism has many definitions, but it generally refers to “exchanges, connections and practices across borders, thus transcending the national space as the primary reference point for activities and identities.”8 Based on this definition, this book describes transnational networks as formal or informal, incorporating material and ideational ties between the Salafi clerics, developed through traveling, various forms of communications, religious education, international conferences, and shared resources.9 Although these networks are vibrant and long-standing, and remain strong contemporarily,
there remains limited research about them. What makes the contemporary manifestations of transnational networks different, articulated by Madawi Al-Rasheed, “is the increasing speed, intensity and time-space compression brought about by post-modernity.”10 Quoting Hannerz, “in the transnational arena, the actors may now be individuals, groups, movements, business enterprises, and in no small part it is this diversity of organisation that we need to consider.”11 Salafi ʿulama are actors who foster Salafi ideals (theological, political, and social) that transcend national boundaries in their attempt to sustain an imagined Salafi community.
A second concern of this book is the impact of changing local and regional circumstances on the attitudes of Salafi ʿulama toward various issues. It looks at how the clerics are influenced by local conditions, as well as external circumstances, in their interpretations of Salafism, theologically, socially, and politically. It further examines the recalibration of their views toward Salafi thought as they respond to these conditions Transnational theory goes far toward emphasizing connectedness across borders, but in many of its formulations the domestic context retreats into the background.12 It cannot be denied that transnational networks are affected by local circumstances: transnational actors, despite pursuing values that transcend national boundaries and engaging in transnational activities, are also local actors who are influenced by local concerns. The literature on the interconnectedness of the “local and global”13 will be utilized to understand the attitudes of Salafi ʿulama (quietists and harakis) on sociopolitical issues and the extent to which they are influenced by ever-changing local and external conditions. This in turn influences the way Salafi ʿulama interact with each other.
Finally, this book looks to reassess critically existing Salafi typology, arguing that the categorization of quietists and activists reflects accurately the attitudes of the ʿulama toward the state but not concerning other issues, including the Sunni-Shiʿa divide or social issues.
Four broad themes will be examined to achieve the purposes set out here: political Islam; Sunni-Shiʿa relations; jihad and Salafism; and social issues.
Transnational Networks of Salafi ʿUlama: The Politics of Islamism
Salafi ʿulama have long fostered transnational connections. Rashid Rida (d. 1935) and ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Ibn Muhammad Al Saud, also known as Ibn Saud
(d. 1953), formed a foundational transnational relationship that encouraged the development of the cross-border networks of the ʿulama in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Egyptian ʿulama were employed in Saudi Arabia as imams and teachers while maintaining their links to Salafis back home. Rida’s magazine, Al-Manar (est. 1898), circulated the works of Saudi Salafi ʿulama. The later Egyptian magazine Al-Tawhid (est. 1973) became a vehicle for the distribution of the rulings of Saudi ʿulama and helped foster a collective Salafi identity in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
The first Gulf War, the result of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, contributed to the fragmentation of Salafism. Some Saudi ʿulama opposed the Saudi state’s decision to allow US troops to be stationed in the kingdom. These ʿulama became identified as harakis. Salafi ʿulama in Kuwait were divided along similar lines: some maintained support for the Saudi state, while others were critical of the presence of US troops in the land of tawhid (monotheism). The quietist ʿulama questioned political activism, arguing that “authentic” Salafi norms found it disruptive, that it propagated dissension, and that it was ideologically motivated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Haraki ʿulama, on the other hand, questioned the commitment of Muslim rulers to implementing Islamic law and doubted the loyalty of quietist ʿulama to Islamic ideals, considering them stooges of un-Islamic rulers. The quietist/haraki dichotomy in relation to the state transcends national boundaries. The Egyptian quietist ʿulama, through Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyyah, a Salafi association established in 1926, endorsed the Saudi religious establishment for its support of Saudi policy during the first Gulf War.14 The Qatar crisis in 2017 witnessed quietist ʿulama supporting a Saudi-led regional coalition’s decision to isolate Qatar. The quietist Kuwaiti, Salim al-Tawil, retweeted a lecture given by the Egyptian quietist Said Raslan, denouncing Qatar and supporting the economic boycotts imposed on Qatar, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.15
The ʿulama utilize Twitter, Salafi satellite channels, and other modes of communication to publicize their views, to support ʿulama of similar political outlook and to network with other ʿulama. However, as this book contests, local circumstances of the ʿulama place limits on transnationalism. For example, the 2011 Egyptian revolution saw some Egyptian Salafi ʿulama, who previously promoted political quietism, embrace the post-Mubarak Egypt by participating in elections. The shift attracted criticism from Saudi and Kuwaiti quietist ʿulama. Here, the “local” complicates cross-border solidarity, although in the political sphere, existing Salafi typology, which
broadly divides the ʿulama along quietist and haraki lines, remains accurate and useful.
Sunni-Shiʿa Relations
Salafi ʿulama are known for their anti-Shiʿa rhetoric. This rhetoric is grounded in core Salafi doctrine. According to most Salafi ʿulama, the Shiʿa sect adheres to a deviant understanding of Islam, such as the belief that the leadership of the Muslim community should be confined within Muhammad’s family, with ʿAli as the first imam. These ʿulama often criticize Shiʿa believers for accepting the infallibility of Shiʿa imams and accuse Shiʿa of engaging in acts that amount to infidelity. These acts include intercession and shrine visitations. The narratives are long-standing, extending back to Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) and Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab (d. 1792). The transnational networks of Salafi ʿulama enabled these ideas to be fostered, shared, and reinforced on an international scale. Rashid Rida’s close relations with Ibn Saud, and his mission to legitimize the Wahhabis as Salafis, saw Rida republishing the works of Najdi ʿulama in his magazine, Al-Manar. Rida and his ʿulama defended the Najdi ʿulama against Shiʿa detractors.
The frequent sectarian crises in the Middle East, following the Iranian revolution, in post-Saddam Iraq, and during the Syrian uprising, caused Salafi ʿulama in Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia to invest significant efforts to highlight Shiʿa “deviance” and “treachery.” Salafi websites, personal YouTube accounts, official rulings, Salafi magazines, international conferences, and Salafi satellite channels have all been used to bring attention to the “Shiʿ a question.”
Despite the perceived uniformity of attitudes toward the Shiʿa “other,” Salafi ʿulama on Sunni-Shiʿa matters are also governed by domestic limitations and pressures. When the Saudi government initiated rapprochement efforts with its Shiʿa population in the early 1990s, the Saudi Grand Mufti ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Ibn Baz participated in dialogue with Shiʿa leaders, reversing years of sectarian invective. The local and regional circumstances of the ʿulama equally influence the intensity and frequency of the anti-Shiʿ a discourse that they propagate. Contentious geopolitical events, including the Syrian civil war, tend to see increasing numbers of articles, religious rulings (fatawa), sermons, conferences, and lectures discussing the Shiʿ a threat.
This study questions the usefulness of the existing Salafi typology of quietist/haraki in relation to the Sunni-Shiʿa divide (perceived or real). Some ʿulama take a more compromising approach when dealing with the Shiʿ a sect, and these ʿulama are not necessarily divided along quietist/haraki lines. The Saudi quietist Sulayman al-Maniʿ is a member of the Board of Senior ʿUlama, and has been for many years relatively more tolerant in his views regarding the Shiʿa. His approach is similar to that of the Kuwaiti haraki, Hakim al-Mutayri. On the other hand, the ardent Kuwaiti quietist ʿUthman al-Khamis is very similar to the Saudi haraki, Safar al-Hawali, in his abhorrence of the Shiʿa. This study proposes a new categorization, which is borrowed from my previous research on the Saudi ʿulama and their attitudes toward the Shiʿa: traditionalists versus progressives. Salafi ʿulama are divided into two categories: traditionalists and progressives. Traditionalists can further be understood as either mild or passive rhetoricians, or as aggressive. As an example of the sub-classification within traditionalists, Ibn Baz and Shaykh Nasir al-ʿUmar are of almost identical opinions on Sunni-Shiʿa matters, but the latter is far more provocative in his rhetoric. The progressive ʿulama are more accommodating toward some Shiʿa communities and desist from demonizing Shiʿa believers as well as Shiʿa religious traditions. This is not to suggest that the progressives are accepting of Iranian interferences (real or imagined) in the region, or that they are sympathetic toward the Assad regime. These ʿulama simply refuse to utilize inflammatory sectarian rhetoric, unlike their traditionalist colleagues.
Engaging and Countering Jihadi Ideals
Salafi ʿulama, quietist and haraki, struggle to disassociate themselves from jihadi Salafism. Salafism is often blamed for providing the ideological and theological justification for a violent struggle in the name of Islam and its community of believers. Yet quietist and haraki ʿulama largely denounce jihadi associations, including those that claim themselves to be Salafi. This denunciation is transnational in nature. The siege of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979, orchestrated by Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi and his followers, was unequivocally condemned by Saudi ʿulama. The Egyptian Salafi magazine Al-Tawhid also condemned the siege and in particular questioned the theological justification for killing Muslim bystanders and bringing weapons into the holy mosque.16 Kuwaiti Salafis offered their disapproval as well. The
ʿulama are governed by the circumstances of the region as well as conditions at home. The Saudi state encouraged jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviet army. Saudi clerics were then free to consider it a legitimate jihad. Kuwaiti Salafis similarly encouraged jihad with the endorsement of the Kuwaiti government.
These collective efforts turned in the other direction with the later jihadi exploits of al-Qaeda and ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). Quietist and activist Salafi ʿulama utilized social media outlets, Salafi satellite television, and other means to undermine the ideological foundations of jihadi Salafism and absolve themselves of blame for jihadi groups. Salafis have been on the defense concerning twenty-first-century terrorism given the claims of terrorist groups to be propagating authentic Salafi creed. This defense has spawned an internal Salafi blame game. Quietist ʿulama accuse harakis of subscribing to Islamist ideals alien to Salafi creed that cause dissension. A particular accusation is that haraki ʿulama adopt Sayyid Qutub’s ideology of takfir, which involves declaring fellow Muslims apostates and which is enthusiastically embraced, even if distorted, by terrorist groups.17
This book finds that the Salafi quietist/haraki categorization is reinforced when dealing with the subjects of jihad and jihadi Salafism. The ʿulama of both persuasions emphasize their manhaj (method of action) as different from that of jihadi Salafis, who endorse a violent struggle and the overthrow of corrupt and un-Islamic rulers. Salafi-based concepts such as al-walaʾ wal baraʾ (approval and disavowal) and tawhid al-hakimiyyah (God’s sovereignty on earth), which jihadi groups deploy, are discussed, reassessed, and contested. Transnational relations between quietist and haraki ʿulama on this subject involve cooperation as well as contestation. But local circumstances of the ʿulama limit their transnational interactions as the ʿulama navigate treacherous geopolitical fields.
Social Issues: Salafi Theology and Jurisprudence
Salafi ʿulama are known for their social conservatism and actively promote it on a transnational basis. There is a determination to establish a collective Salafi identity, resulting in an intense focus on appropriate clothing for men and women, the status of women in Islam, perceived social ills due to westernization and the permissibility of social engagement with non-Muslims.
The Kuwaiti Salafi magazine Al-Furqan has long incorporated the views of Salafi ʿulama on social issues. These ʿulama include Ishaq al-Huweiny from Egypt and the Saudi ʿalim, Salih al-Fawzan. In more recent times, social media and Salafi satellite channels have become tools for the purposes of proselytization of a collective Salafi religious identity. For example, although only Saudi Arabia of the selected countries banned women from driving until recently, Salafi ʿulama in Egypt and Kuwait actively supported the ban, resulting in an example of transnationalism trumping affiliation to domestic government policy.
Despite the efforts by many Salafi ʿulama to perfect religious practices and preserve the purity of Islam according to their understanding, a minority of ʿulama destabilize Salafi norms in promotion of a more progressive position on Islam. The Saudi Hatem al-ʿAwni challenges existing interpretations of Salafi thought, taking the view that women should be able to drive, and that all Muslims should be able to listen to music and participate in non-Muslim celebrations.
The Salafi dichotomy of quietist/haraki has almost no relevance to the social sphere. This book proposes a new category for social matters, just as it does for sectarian matters: progressives and conservatives. Socially progressive ʿulama take a more liberal position on some social, creedal, and jurisprudential matters. The socially conservative ʿulama, who are very much the majority, maintain a traditionalist outlook. Although socially progressive ʿulama are small in number, their views have not been ignored by conservative ʿulama. The determination of conservatives to promote a consistent Salafi identity causes them to engage in often heated attempts to rebut their progressive counterparts. These debates destabilize the quietist/activist typology; socially progressive ʿulama hail from both trends, as do the conservatives.
Research Approach
For the origins of the transnational networks of Salafi clerics, I have referred to Salafi magazines and publications and compilations of religious rulings. Official and unofficial biographies of Salafi ʿulama are also analyzed to examine the transnational connections of Salafi clerics, including their education and employment backgrounds. For example, one key way in which Egyptian and Kuwaiti Salafi clerics have established transnational
connections is by receiving funding from the Saudi government and Salafi institutions in Saudi Arabia to pursue their higher education in the kingdom.
Cyber-ethnography is the most effective form of research into Salafi trends in recent years. Nearly all prominent Salafi clerics have their own Twitter and Facebook accounts to promote themselves and build networks with other clerics of similar political persuasions. They comment and retweet the works of other clerics with whom they align politically, while clerics of opposing political views are criticized. Many clerics have their own YouTube accounts to which sermons, lectures, and television interviews are uploaded instantaneously. Other clerics will then comment on, endorse, or upload these videos as a demonstration of solidarity. Many have their own websites to store their own publications, sermons, lectures, and religious rulings. Those who do not, especially clerics of older generations, have their works stored on Salafi websites, often sponsored by their respective governments, Salafi associations, or former students.
This book examines specific fatawa, lectures, sermons, social media posts, and publications in a manner that draws from approaches taken by other scholars. Kate Zebiri looked at the works of Mahmud Shaltut by analyzing his utilization of the Qurʾan, the Sunnah, and the classical sources of fiqh. She also analyzed Shaltut’s exercise of ijtihad (independent reasoning) and ijmaʿ (consensus).18 According to Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, the work of Andreas Kemke, who examined the fatawa produced by Muhammad ʿAbduh on awqaf (endowments), is comparable to the approach used by Zebiri, though it is focused solely on one mufti, one issue, and within a six-year period.19 Similarly, Muhammad Al Atawneh examined the fatawa and other works produced by Dar al-Iftaʾ in Saudi Arabia, specifically the research conducted by the Board of Senior ʿUlama (BSU) and the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Iftaʾ (Al-Lajnah al-Daʾimah lil Buhuth al-ʿIlmiyyah wal-Iftaʾ) . He grouped the fatawa according to their subject matter: “(1) traditional social and religious norms; and (2) modern innovations.” He analyzed the sociopolitical circumstances in which these fatawa were published. As he argues, “texts have no inherent meaning in and of themselves, but must be approached in context, in light of the ongoing ideological debate.”20 This method was initially used by Skovgaard-Petersen in his study of Dar al-Iftaʾ in Egypt, with an emphasis on contextualizing the fatawa. He further explored other issues that need to be considered when analyzing a fatwa, including the particular ʿalim’s worldview, motivations, approaches, and the strains inflicted on him by various actors.21
The methodological approaches utilized by Al Atawneh and SkovgaardPetersen are also used in this book. However, it should be noted that these academics examined Dar al-Iftaʾ in general in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, respectively, and their research included fatawa on different topics. Therefore, their methodology did not incorporate the collection of related fatawa and how they were produced. On this subject, another method is taken. The primary sources of the Salafi ʿulama (inclusive of fatawa, publications, sermons, and lectures) are compiled based on the title and relevance to the research. The sources are analyzed in their sociopolitical context; however, unlike other works of fatawa, this work provides no analysis of the technical elements of the sources. Zebiri, Atawneh, and Skovgaard have all critically examined this, looking at the employment of the Qurʾan, the Sunnah, the ijmaʿ , and so on, in explaining fatawa decisions. This study strictly focuses on the substance of the sources, with limited analysis of the proof or material used by the ʿulama to justify them.
Chapter Overview
Chapter 1 of this book discusses, for background purposes, the emergence of Salafi ideals and their historical evolution. It analyzes the various trends within the movement, and traces those trends through to contemporary Muslim societies. Chapter 2 examines the history of transnational networks of Salafi ʿulama. It looks at the emergence of Salafi cross-border connections, which began as apolitical but later encompassed the development of the overtly political haraki trend. The chapter then examines how both haraki and quietist ʿulama forged regional alliances to endorse other ʿulama of similar views. These interactions cross national boundaries and take place within the framework of domestic, regional, and global political circumstances. Chapter 3 examines the transnational networks of ʿulama with respect to Sunni-Shiʿa matters. The chapter examines how local and external circumstances influence the intensity and frequency of the anti-Shiʿa positions propagated by the ʿulama, and the cooperation between the ʿulama in the promotion of their interpretations of Shiʿa theology and activities. It asks whether the haraki/quietist dichotomy is relevant to understanding the positions of the Salafi ʿulama on Sunni-Shiʿa matters.
Chapter 4 shifts to an issue of great contemporary significance in the development of the networks of Salafi ʿulama: jihadi Salafism. It examines
the internal debates within each trend (haraki and quietist) as the ʿulama struggle to disassociate themselves from jihadi Salafis. It further analyzes how the transnational networks of Salafi ʿulama along haraki/quietist lines are fostered or destabilized in dealing with jihadi Salafism, while also taking into consideration the local circumstances of the ʿulama. Chapter 5 focuses on how contentious social issues are debated and negotiated within Salafi circles. The ʿulama may be politically united, along haraki/quietist lines, but these boundaries largely fall apart on social matters. The conclusion makes general observations and analyzes the findings of this research.
Overall, the aim of this book is to examine the nature of the transnational networks of Salafi ʿulama in Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia and how the ʿulama cooperate to foster a collective Salafi identity based on their political, theological, and jurisprudential positions. It reveals that the local and external circumstances of the ʿulama influence their views on various subjects of importance.
1 Salafism
This chapter tracks the origins and historical development of Salafism.1 It assesses the various Salafi movements and trends and examines existing academic categorizations of Salafis, focusing on the major Salafi centers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait.
The Origins of Salafism
The term “Salafi” derives from al-Salaf al-Salih, meaning “pious ancestors” and referring to the first three generations of Muslims. Salafism holds that the pious ancestors are to be emulated, as they were the closest to the Prophet and belong to the “Golden Age of Islam.”2 Once the Prophet’s immediate companions had died, the second generation of Muslims inherited their knowledge of the faith. They were considered preservers of the authentic tradition and the followers (tabiʿ un) of the first generation of Muslims. By 750 ce, when most of them had died, the third generation of Muslims, identified as the followers of the followers (atbaʿ al-tabiʿ un), became the reliable sources for the authentic way of living as a Muslim.3
Bernard Haykel traces the term “Salafism” to the Ahl al-Hadith movement that emerged during the Abbasid period and set out to purge “corrupt” practices from Islam. Salafism advocates a return to the reliable sources of Islam, most prominently the Qurʾan and hadith (the Prophet’s sayings).4 Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780–855) influenced the development of Salafism. He rejected the kalam (speculative theology) propagated by the Muʿtazilites,5 in which philosophy and Aristotelian logic were used to understand the names and attributes of God. In the words of Henri Lauzière, Salafis argue that the pious ancestors “never used such devious techniques: they merely described God as He described Himself in the revelation.”6
The doctrines of the Ahl al-Hadith were refined, defended, and communicated by Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328), a prolific Hanbali scholar who witnessed the Mongol invasion that contributed to the demise of the
Abbasid caliphate. Ibn Taymiyyah propagated Salafi thought as a theological endeavor, and disciples of the Hanbali school adopted the term “Salafi.” The precise time at which they did so—at some point during the tenth to twelfth century—is not clear.
Salafi Appeal and Creed
Doctrinally, the Salafi creed focuses on preserving tawhid (oneness of God). The stress on emulating the pious ancestors means that Salafism extends beyond the doctrinal and into personal characteristics. These characteristics act as markers to determine one’s commitment to following al-Salaf al-Salih
As pointed out by Haykel: “A Salafi is immediately recognisable to others through distinctive dress, social and religious habits, prayer postures, and the content and form of his speech.”7 For example, Salafis, although not universally, treat it as obligatory for men to keep their beards and for women to cover their faces. Salafis emphasize the importance of the Arabic language, which, in their view, brings them closer to divine sources. This extends as far as practicing classical Arabic and valuing oratory perfection, while ridiculing those who speak in colloquial modern Arabic. The Egyptian Salafi ʿalim Saʿid Raslan, for example, has delivered sermons criticizing colloquial Arabic as unacceptable, especially for Islamic preachers. He argues that colloquial Arabic leads to the contamination of religious knowledge.8
Salafism is not a modern construct developed for the purpose of appealing to disenfranchised Muslims; rather, the Salafi tradition is deeply rooted and was propagated by scholars well before the late nineteenth century. The appeal of Salafism can be explained by understanding its purported authenticity. It ties in with, and is strengthened by, the Salafi construction of a defined Muslim identity, safeguarded by religious purity and legitimacy. This identity is reinforced by the aggressive rejection by Salafis of other religious traditions as impure and corrupt. The serious charges leveled at some fellow Muslims, such as Sufis and Shiʿa, include being removed from Islam for engaging in “deviant” practices which amount to infidelity.9
Salafis condemn whatever they construe to be violations of tawhid, which they divide into three categories. The first category is tawhid al-rububiyyah (the oneness of Lordship). To Salafis, the oneness of Lordship affirms that God is the only creator and supreme provider. In other words, there is no other Lord. The second is tawhid al-uluhiyyah (the oneness of Godship),
which forbids Muslims from worshipping anyone or anything other than God. It is in this branch of tawhid that one can find the genesis of the condemnation, not exclusive to Salafis, of Muslims who pray to saints and imams directly or who use them as intermediaries. The third category is tawhid alasma ʾ wa-l-sifat (the oneness of Names and Attributes). Tawhid al-asmaʾ wal-sifat upholds the uniqueness of the characteristics and attributes of God that are featured in the Qurʾ an.
Salafis feel obligated by their commitment to tawhid to combat kufr (nonbelief), especially practices that amount to shirk (deifying other than Allah).10
The Salafi creed speaks against shirk in the strongest terms. Ibn Taymiyyah denounced shirk in a number of publications, including Minhaj al-Sunnah alNabawiyyah 11 He focused his criticism on movements, including the Jahmis and Murjiʾis, and philosophers of his time, denouncing their thoughts in defense of Salafi orthodoxy. Salafis since Ibn Taymiyyah have cited his works widely and without scrutiny, and in doing so have tended to rely upon what they perceive as Ibn Taymiyyah’s theological victory over his opponents.12 Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and his descendants and disciples cite Ibn Taymiyyah in their treatises as an authority. Modern sympathetic commentaries on Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s Kitab al-Tawhid and Kashf al-Shubuhat equally emphasize the importance of tawhid and its preservation.13
The religious practices that Salafi theoreticians classify as bidʿah (innovations) include shrine visitations, praying to saints, and celebrations of particular religious events and holidays. The oft-invoked justification for these classifications comes from a Prophet’s hadith, kull muhdathah bidʿah wa kull bidʿah dalalah wa kull dalalah fi al-naar (Every novelty is an innovation, every innovation is a misguidance and every misguidance belongs to hellfire). This hadith is featured in nearly every Salafi treatise concerning tawhid, and continues to be cited in sermons, publications, and religious rulings.14 Salafi theoreticians, both classical and contemporary, also quote Qurʾanic verses, including the following from the chapter Al-Anʿam, to support the foundation of Salafi theology:
Say, “Come, I will recite what your Lord has prohibited to you. (He commands) that you not associate anything with Him, and to parents, good treatment, and do not kill your children out of poverty; We will provide for you and them. And do not approach immoralities—what is apparent of them and what is concealed.”15
A commentary on Kitab al-Tawhid by Salih al-Fawzan, a member of the Board of Senior ʿUlama (BSU) of Saudi Arabia, states that this verse is a command from Allah to his servants “not to associate any object or false deity with him. The prohibition here is so exclusive and general that it includes the forbiddance of worshipping any false deity or object and the avoidance of any ritual offered to them as well.”16
Salafism advocates ijtihad (independent reasoning) to ensure that Muslims do not blindly follow accepted doctrine and that they instead seek to emulate al-Salaf al-Salih. Ibn Hanbal articulated ijtihad in rejection of taqlid, the blind imitation of the existing schools of law. According to Wagemakers, Ibn Taymiyyah and his pupil, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (1292–1350), proposed ijtihad, which called for the Qurʾan and Sunnah to be interpreted directly and independently, as opposed to reliance upon the existing interpretations of scholars.17 Haykel acknowledges Ibn Qayyim’s role in verbalizing the need for need for Muslims to be freed from the shackles of taqlid of the four madhahib; Ibn Qayyim also argued that ijtihad could be practiced only by a scholar with sound knowledge of the faith. However, Haykel is not convinced that Ibn Taymiyyah disallowed Muslims from following existing schools of law that differed from his disciples’ positions. Ibn Taymiyyah’s biographer, al-Dhahabi, noted:
He was well-informed of the legal views of the [Prophet’s] companions and their followers, and he rarely engaged an issue without mentioning the four schools. He did, however, contradict the four schools in well-known matters and about which he has written and has argued from the Qurʾan and the Sunna. . . . For several years now, he does not issue fatwas in accordance with the opinions of a specific school, rather he bases these on the proof that he ascertained [himself]. He has made victorious the pure Sunna and the Salafiyya way.18
Other early champions of ijtihad included Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim Ibn al-Wazir (d. 1436), Muhammad Ibn Ismaʿil al-Sanʿani (1688–1768), and the Yemeni scholar Muhammad ʿAli al-Shawkani (d. 1834).19 Al-Shawkani proposed a simple solution to avoid taqlid: Muslims must seek the evidence (dalil) for a legal ruling issued by a jurist before blindly following it. AntiSalafi scholars questioned the rationale for empowering lay individuals untrained in Islamic jurisprudence to decide religious matters for themselves.
The Salafis responded to this criticism by arguing, as Ibn Qayyim had, that only a qualified mujtahid can practice ijtihad. 20
The Wahhabi movement, named after Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), equally preached ijtihad against taqlid, drawing from classical Salafi sources.21 Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab was committed to ridding Islam of corrupt practices influenced by customs over time.22 He forged a political alliance with Muhammad Ibn Saud, the founder of the first Saudi state. The alliance would endure and contribute to the establishment of the modern Saudi state in 1932. During the first Saudi state, Al Saud’s army sought to eradicate practices that they considered to have been added to Islam, targeting in particular the Sufis and the Shiʿa.23
Salafis, especially modern Salafis, do not identify themselves as adherents of the Hanbali madhhab, although they still invoke the works of Ibn Hanbal as a credible source of reference. As mentioned earlier, Salafi ideals preach the rejection of madhahib and emphasize the need to return to original Islamic sources. Technically, following Hanbali jurisprudence amounts to taqlid, as it involves observing the interpretation of another individual and not relying on the original sources said to support it. Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab himself was criticized for failing to be a mujtahid (a practitioner of ijtihad), as he merely followed Hanbali jurisprudence. In fact, his brother Sulayman Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, who was one of his ardent opponents, wrote a treatise, Fasl al-Khitab, offering a comprehensive refutation of Wahhabi theological principles. Sulayman criticized his brother for not comprehending the codes of ijtihad. He was not the only detractor: modern Salafi scholars, including Muhammad Nasser al-Din alAlbani (d. 1999), have similarly criticized Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab for ignoring ijtihad in his treatises, including Kitab al-Tawhid and Kashf al-Shubuhat. Al-Albani is a heavyweight in the modern Salafi movement. He developed a reputation within Salafi circles as the foremost expert on the sciences of hadith and was influenced by al-Shawkani.
Are Wahhabis Salafis?
Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s movement was, to its detractors within Islam, associated with the Khawarij, a breakaway group of extremist Muslims responsible for the assassination of the fourth caliph, ʿAli Ibn Abi Talib. Opponents derogatorily identified Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s followers as Wahhabis. The
pejorative implication in the term’s use is that “Wahhabis” were merely the followers of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, and not the followers of the pious ancestors that they purported to be. David Commins notes that Wahhabi sympathizers in Iraq in the late 1800s were motivated to rehabilitate the Wahhabis’ standing because they shared similar ideals on the issues of shrine visitations and veneration of saints. These earlier Iraqi defenders identified Wahhabis as Sunnis, not Salafis, despite the fact that the Iraqi defenders were themselves attracted to Salafi ideals. The move to legitimize the Wahhabis by calling them Sunnis was politically motivated, as the Ottomans associated Sunni Islam with religious authenticity.24 Salafism, on the other hand, “represented a challenge to established authority.”25 Among the Iraqi backers was Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi, a leader of Salafis in Baghdad. He was highly critical of Sufi practices, associating them with innovations (bidʿah), and as a result was accused of disseminating Wahhabi thought.26 The Ottomans treated al-Alusi with suspicion for two reasons. First, the Ottomans suspected that he was supportive of and involved in reviving Al Saud’s ascendancy in Najd. Second, his meeting with the self-proclaimed Salafi, Rashid Rida, a reformer and disciple of Muhammad ʿAbduh, aroused concerns as Rida was known for his support of an Arab caliphate.27
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the entrenchment of European colonialism, Al Saud acquired a reputation, envied in the region, as independent of foreign control. As Chapter 2 will demonstrate, the Egypt-based Rashid Rida, a reformer and disciple of Muhammad ʿAbduh, and ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Ibn Saud, the founder of the modern Saudi state, fostered connections between the Saudis and Egypt. Rida became an avid Saudi sympathizer and bestowed the term “Salafis” upon Ibn Saud and his ʿulama. The founder of the Egyptian Salafi association Ansar alSunnah al-Muhammadiyyah, Hamid al-Fiqi, was equally fond of Ibn Saud. He commended Saudi rulers for their dedication to securing the stability of Hijaz. In the words of Commins: “The tendency for Muslims outside Saudi Arabia to frame Wahhabism in terms of Salafism was partly a token of the incorporation of Al Saud’s domain into the cosmopolitan Muslim sphere.”28
Saudi Wahhabi scholars began to embrace the term “Salafi.”29 Saudi Arabia’s policy of welcoming Salafi scholars from other parts of the Muslim world, as well as Muslim Brotherhood scholars who fled crackdowns on Islamists in their homelands, became an opportunity for the kingdom to develop Saudi Arabia’s education system. The country’s new religious
institutions embarked on building Saudi Arabia’s Salafi credentials by reproducing and renaming classical Najdi treatises and generating publications that promoted “authentic” Salafi ethics. The titles of these publications are telling. In the 1980s, works of classical scholars were published under the title: Creed of the Pious Ancestors. A monograph distributed in 1999 bore the title The Call of Imam Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al- Wahhab: Salafi, not Wahhabi. The Saudi religious tradition was remodeled to ensure its wider acceptability and legitimacy; key to this was the adoption of the Salafi mantle.30
The term “Salafi” is also attached to Muslim reformers of the late nineteenth century, including Jamaluddin al-Afghani (d. 1897) and Muhammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905). Some writings classify Afghani and ʿAbduh’s Salafism as al-Salafiyyah al-Tanwiriyyah (Enlightened Salafism). Enlightened Salafis preached ijtihad against taqlid. However, they departed significantly from Ibn Taymiyyah’s Salafi rhetoric and Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s propagation of ijtihad. They were not literalists, but promoted a rationalist approach to interpreting the Qurʾan and hadith. Although they were anti-colonialist, they welcomed Western technologies, especially in the sciences.
These enlightened Salafis were not preoccupied with identifying true Muslims and separating them from deviant ones. ʿAbduh was critical of the Wahhabis and made no attempt to cultivate them. However, his disciple, Rashid Rida, as mentioned earlier, fostered relations with Ibn Saud and published the works of Najdi and classical Salafi scholars in his magazine, al-Manar. His views on religious issues arguably evolved, adopting a social conservatism that differed from ʿAbduh’s modernist aspirations. Haykel highlights Rida’s relations with Hamid al-Fiqi, the founder of Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyyah, as a factor explaining his ideological shift.31
Lauzière points to ideological tensions between traditional Salafis and enlightened Salafis, arguing that although Rida was closer to traditional Salafis, he “remained at heart an Islamic modernist or ‘balanced’ reformer.”32 This exposed him to criticism from some traditionalists. Despite the fact that Afghani and ʿAbduh are referred to as Salafis, Lauzière emphasizes, contrary to common reports, that neither Afghani nor ʿAbduh ever discussed Salafism in their works or identified themselves as Salafis.33 Enlightened Salafism as a movement faded away with the death of ʿAbduh and with Rida’s flirtation with the Wahhabism that came to be identified with traditional Salafism.34
Salafi Manhaj
The notion of manhaj, which means for Salafis the method of living and execution of one’s beliefs, preoccupies modern Salafi thought. Manhaj is a modern construct, traced back to al-Albani, who deployed it to develop an argument against any form of affiliation or involvement with political parties (hizb) or community-based associations (jamʿiyya). The correct manhaj, according to al-Albani, was one shunning “all organised forms of political life.” Al-Albani sourced this conviction to the statement in the Quran (5.48) that: “To each of you we prescribed a law and a way.”35
The concept of manhaj does not relate to political engagement alone. According to al-Fawzan, the Salafi manhaj encompasses theology, ʿibadah (personal acts of worship), society, and other spheres.36 Although al-Albani forbade political parties and gave the impression that civic associations were equally condemnable as they may lead to hizbiyya (partisanship) or bidʿah (innovation), he was more forgiving when it came to establishing charitable groups. Al-Albani issued a fatwa responding to a questioner who asked about the legitimacy of Al-Hikmah al-Yamaniyyah Association for Charity, a Salafi charity group in Yemen. He stated: “Any association that operates within the framework of the correct foundations of Islam, based on the Qurʾ an, the Prophet’s tradition and Salaf al-Salih’s practices should not be rejected or accused of partisanship.”37 He spoke of cooperation as an obligation for Muslims, and noted that the ways to ensure cooperation differed from one period to another and from one place to another. He stated that it was not permissible to accuse charitable civic associations of committing bidʿah (innovation). This is because, according to al-Albani, these modern charitable organizations are motivated to help other Muslims, which in principle makes their acts similar to those of the pious ancestors.38
Al-Albani argued that charitable organizations may permissibly use modern methods, referring to modern organizational structures, without deviating from the Salafi tradition. He gave the analogy of the recording of religious lectures: although this was a new method for disseminating religious truths, the method did not deviate from the shariʿah. Despite this, al-Albani held some reservations about the organizational structures of charitable associations, concerned that they may contribute to religious deviance.39 This issue continues to create confusion among some Salafis. Some prefer to propagate Salafi ideals without being part of any groups at all, including non-political associations.40
Al-Albani’s influence is crucial to providing an understanding of the development of both political and apolitical Salafism. Al-Albani was born in Albania in 1914 but moved to Damascus in 1923. He studied Arabic and took up watchmaking as a profession. He was a voracious reader and would spend hours in the first Syrian public library, Maktaba Zahiriyya. He rose to prominence in the 1950s as a highly knowledgeable scholar of hadith ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Ibn Baz, later the mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1993 until 1999, recommended him for a teaching post at the University of Medina. The two men shared a similar interest in the revival of the studies of hadith Al-Albani’s presence in Saudi Arabia was not well received by everyone within Salafi circles. The mufti of Saudi Arabia at that time, Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh, was not pleased with al-Albani’s critical assessment of ijtihad. As mentioned earlier, al-Albani argued that Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab was not a mujtahid in fiqh, as he blindly followed the Hanbali school of thought.
The Saudi religious establishment during this time was, in the words of Lacroix, “still under the sway of unacknowledged partisans of the Hanbali madhhab.”41 Al-Albani’s criticism of Wahhabi traditions and strong emphasis on ijtihad threatened to undermine the influence of the Saudi ʿulama. He began to issue fatawa that contradicted official Saudi positions. His teaching contract was not renewed; he returned to Syria in 1963, and traveled to Saudi Arabia only in 1975 as a measure of “symbolic rehabilitation.”42 Al-Albani’s popularity and insistence upon inquiring into the authenticity of hadith continued to plague the Saudi religious establishment. Clerics would be interrupted when giving sermons or lectures by questions from students demanding the verification of hadith cited. They would even ask: “Has alAlbani authenticated it”?43
Despite al-Albani’s disdain for politics, he inspired the Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia, which would later challenge the religious establishment and the Saudi state. Al-Albani’s conception of ijtihad and its revival appealed to the Sahwa, as their own application of ijtihad legitimized political activism. Al-Albani himself was nonetheless critical of those who did not apply what he considered to be the correct manhaj and who engaged in political activism. He argued that “one cannot be a Salafi in aqidah while applying manhaj of the Ikhwani Salafi,” referring to the Muslim Brotherhood’s political orientation and activities.44 He may have been an inspirer of activist Salafism, but he was not a supporter.
Quietist Salafis
The most common classification of Salafis is threefold: purist, activist, and jihadi. Other labels include “quietist” for purist and “politico” for activist.
Wiktorowicz classifies Salafis who preach non-engagement with politics as “purists.” He argues that purists focus on propagating Salafism through nonviolent means, including scholarly endeavors and educating others about the correct way of Muslim life. Purists are critical of political activism, both peaceful and violent, considering it to be an unacceptable innovation.45
Wiktorowicz identifies al-Albani, Ibn Baz, Muhammad Salih al-ʿUthaymeen (d. 2001), who was a prominent member of the Board of Senior ʿUlama in Saudi Arabia, and Rabiʿ Ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, who will be discussed later, as purists. These ʿulama argue that the Prophet did not engage in protests, elections, or revolutions against the ruling elites; he instead advised them discreetly. As Al Atawneh has demonstrated in his works on the Saudi religious bureaucracy, this position dominates the Saudi religious establishment for whom quietism is mandatory even if the ruler violates the shariʿah. The ʿulama are obligated to advise rulers in private and not embarrass them. This is justified in the name of avoiding fitnah (dissension) and chaos. Salafis of similar persuasions in other countries embrace these views.46
The categorization of only some Salafis as purists is helpful, although it is neither comprehensive nor fully accurate. Joas Wagemakers argues that all Salafis identify themselves as “purists” because Salafism, to them, is an authentic form of Islam. He recommends “quietist” as a more accurate label. The quietist group “consists of those whose manhaj towards politics is one of quietism: they do not believe in engaging in parliamentary participation, want to refrain from political debate and activism in society and do not want to develop policies on either domestic or foreign issues.”47 Wagemakers acknowledges that quietist Salafis may have their own political views and do not necessarily shy away from articulating them. However, quietists are of the conviction that political views should be discussed within the framework of religion and, more importantly, as Al Atawneh realized in his discussion of the Saudi religious establishment’s official stance, political concerns should be relayed to the ruler only in private.48 The ideological justification for quietism is as follows. First, politics contributes to divisions between men and to legislation created by men: both of these tend to corrupt and undermine the authenticity of Islam. Second, politics divides attention and captures
