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RationalRules

TowardsaTheoryofMoralLearning

SHAUNNICHOLS

GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom

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ForSarahandJulia

Preface

My ﬁrstbookinmoralpsychology, SentimentalRules,emphasizedtherole ofemotionsinmoraljudgment.ButIneverthoughtemotionsexhausted moraljudgment.Therearenumerousfeaturesofmoraljudgmentthatare hardtoexplainjustbyappealingtoemotions.Whydowetendtothinkthat it’swrongtoproduceabadconsequence,butnotwrong(ornotaswrong)to toleratesuchaconsequencehappening?Howdowecometothinkthat someevaluativeclaimsareuniversallytruebutothersonlyrelativelytrue? Whatkindsofrulescanbelearned?Howdowedeterminewhethersome novelactispermittedorprohibited?

Thesearequestionsthatariseformoralpsychologistsandexperimental philosophers.Mostworkintheseareasaimstouncovertheprocessesand representationsthatguidejudgments.Thisistheagendaindiscussions aboutwhetherpeopleareincompatibilistsaboutfreewill(e.g.,Murray& Nahmias2014),whethermoraljudgmentisdrivenbydistortingemotions (e.g.,Greene2008),andwhetherjudgmentsaboutknowledgearesensitiveto irrelevantdetails(e.g.,Swainetal.2008).Muchlessattentionhasbeenpaid to historical questionsabouthowweendedupwiththerepresentations implicatedinphilosophicallyrelevantthought.Therearedifferentkindsof answerstothesehistoricalquestions.Onemightofferdistalanswersthat appealtothemoreremotehistoryoftheconcept.Forinstance,anevolutionarypsychologistmightarguethatsomeofourconceptsarethere becausetheyareadaptations.Oraculturaltheoristmightarguethatsome ofourconceptsaretherebecausetheyplayedanimportantroleinfacilitatingsocialcohesion.Onthemoreproximalendofthings,wecanattemptto determinehowtheconceptsmighthavebeenacquiredbyalearner.Those proximalissuesregardingacquisitionwillbethefocusinthisbook.¹Iwill arguethatwecanexplainmanyofthefeaturesofmoralsystemsintermsof

¹Ofcourseproximalanddistalissuesarenotunrelated.Foranevolutionarypsychologist, theproposalthataconceptisanadaptationwilltypicallybeaccompaniedbytheexpectation thatthecharacteristic(proximal)developmentoftheconceptisnotexplicableintermsof domain-generallearningmechanisms(see,e.g.,Tooby&Cosmides1992).

rationallearningfromtheevidence.Tolocatethisincontemporarymoral psychology,abitofbackgroundisinorder.

Innaturalisticmoralpsychology,sentimentalismisthedominantview (e.g.,Blair1995;Greene2008;Haidt2001;Nichols2004c;Prinz2007),and thereisconsiderableevidencethatemotionshavenumerousinﬂuenceson ourmoralpsychology.Emotionsseemtoimpactourjudgmentsaboutmoral dilemmas(e.g.,Bartels&Pizarro2011;Koenigsetal.2007).Emotionsseem toinﬂuencetheresilienceofcertainmoralrules(Nichols2004c).Emotions seemtomotivateprosocialbehavior(Batson1991).Emotionsseemto motivatepunishmentforcheaters(Fehr&Gächter2002).Sentimentalists havedrawnontheseresultstoargueforphilosophicalconclusions.Totake whatisperhapsthemostprominentexample,theimpactofemotionon certainkindsofmoraljudgmentshasbeenusedtochallengetherationality ofthosejudgments(e.g.,Greene2008;Singer2005).

Ihavecountedmyselfamongthesentimentalists,butI’vealsoarguedthat emotionalreactionsdon’tprovideacompleteexplanationofmoraljudgment.Inparticular,I’vearguedthatrulesplayanessentialroleinourmoral psychology(Nichols2004c).However,Ihadnoaccountofhowwecometo learntheserules.Manymoralrulesseemtotradeonsubtledistinctions.For instance,fromayoungage,childrentreatharmfulactionsasworsethan equallyharmfulomissions.Childrenalsojudgethatit’swrongtoharmone persontosave ﬁveothersfromharm.Childrenareneverexplicitlytaught thedistinctionstowhichthesejudgmentsconform.

Theprevailingexplanationforhowwecometohavesuchsubtledistinctionsisnativist.Contemporarymoralnativistsholdthatthebestexplanationfortheuniformityandcomplexityofmoralsystemsisthatmoral judgmentsderivefromaninnatemoralacquisitiondevice(e.g.,Harman 1999;Mikhail2011).Suchviewsholdthatthemoralsystemswehaveare partlyconstrainedbyhumannature.Justaslinguisticnativismproposes constraintsonpossiblehumanlanguages,moralnativismimpliesthatthere areconstraintsonpossiblehumanmoralities(Dwyeratal.2010).Although nativistaccountshavebeenwidelycriticized(e.g.,Nichols2005;Prinz2008; Sterelny2010),therehasbeennosystematicalternativeexplanationforhow childrenacquiresuchapparentlycomplexmoralsystems.

MycollaboratorsandIhavebeendevelopingsuchanalternativeexplanationfortheacquisitionofmoralsystems.Theinspirationcomesfroman unlikelysource statisticallearning.Recentcognitivesciencehasseenthe ascendanceofaccountswhichdrawonstatisticallearningtoexplainhowwe endupwiththerepresentationswehave(Perforsetal.2011;Xuetal.2012).

I’vecometothinkthatstatisticallearningprovidesapromisingavenuefor answeringcentralquestionsabouthowwecometohavethemoralrepresentationswedo.

Iwillarguethatarationallearningapproachcanexplainseveralaspects ofmoralsystems,including(i)howpeoplelearntodrawtheact/allow distinctiongivenlimitedevidence,(ii)howpeoplecometohaveabiasin favorofact-basedrules,and(iii)howpeopleuseconsensusinformationas evidenceonwhetheramoralclaimisuniversallytrue.

Thepicturethatemergesrevealsastarklydifferentsideofmoralsystems thantraditionalsentimentalism.Thelearningprocessesinvokedare,by standardaccounts,rational.Thisinsulatesmoraljudgmentfromimportant chargesofirrationality.Forinstance,ifourdeonticjudgmentsdependon rules,andtheserulesareacquiredviarationalinference,thenwecannot faultthe process bywhichthejudgmentismade.Thisdoesn’tinsulatethe judgmentsfromeverycritique.Forinstance,therulesthemselvesmightbe defective.Butthatchallengerequiresadeeperinquiryintotheepistemic credentialsoftherules.

Theresultingaccountalsocontrastssharplywithnativism.Thelearning processesthatIwilldrawonarenotspeciﬁctothemoraldomain.Indeed, statisticallearningaffordsthemoralpsychologistadiverseempiricisttoolkit.Moreover,therationallearningaccountsuggeststhathumansare ﬂexiblemorallearners,withnoinnateconstraintsonthekindsofrules thathumanscanlearn.

TheviewthatIdefendisobviouslyrationalistinimportantways.Butthat doesn’tentailarejectionofthesignificanceofemotionsformoraljudgment. Indeed,Icontinuetothinkthatmuchofthesentimentalistpictureiscorrect. Emotionsplayacriticalroleinamplifyingtherulesofmorality.This plausiblyholdsforonlinedecision-making rulesthatresonatewithstrong emotionswillenduphavingagreaterinfluenceinourdecision-making.The emotionalampli ficationofrulesalsolikelyexplainstheculturalresilienceof certainmoralrules.Toignoretheseinfluencesofemotionsistoignore fundamentalaspectsofhumanmorality.Apersistentcommitmentofsentimentalistsdowntheagesisthatwithouttheemotions,wewouldhave radicallydifferentnormativesystemsthanwedo.Icertainlydon’tmeanto retreatfromthatsentimentalistcommitment.However,thefactthatemotionsarecriticaltoourmoralsystemsdoesn’tmeanthattheroleofrationalityisnegligible.Onthecontrary,I’llargue,rationallearningprovidesa muchbetterexplanationthanemotionsforhowweacquirenormative systemsinalltheircomplexity.Theultimateview,Ithink,mustbesome

formofrationalsentimentalism,whererationallearningandemotionsboth contributeinkeywaystoourmoraljudgments.Butinthisvolume,Iwantto emphasizetherationalsideofthings.Althoughmoraljudgmentanddecisionmightbedistortedinmanyways,there’sreasontobeoptimisticthatthe fundamentalcapacityforacquiringmoralrulesisrationaland ﬂexible.The waywelearnrulesisplausiblyresponsivetotheevidenceinappropriate ways,and,atleastatsomedevelopmentalstages,suppleenoughtoadjustto newrulesinthefaceofnewevidence.

Acknowledgments

First,I’dliketothankmycollaboratorsontheempiricalstudiesthatform thecenterofthisbook:AlisabethAyars,Hoi-YeeChan,JerryGaus,Shikhar Kumar,TheresaLopez,andTylerMillhouse.IowespecialdebtstoTheresa, Alisabeth,andJerry.Theresa’sdissertation(Lopez2013)isthe ﬁrstworkthat maintainedthatBayesianapproachestocognitionmightprovideanalternativetoChomskyanaccountsofmoralcognition.Ifithadn’tbeenforTheresa’ s insightfuldissertation,Ineverwouldhavestartedaprojectonmorallearning. Alisabethworkedextensivelyontheprojectwhenshewasagraduatestudent inpsychologyatArizona.Shehadseveralkeyexperimentalideas;shewasalso incisiveonthetheoreticalissues(asevidencedinAyars2016).Thisproject wouldhavebeenmuchworsewithouthercontributions.Finally,Jerrywasan idealcollaboratorontheempiricalworkthatwedidtogether.Moregenerally, Jerryhasbeenanintellectuallyinvigoratingcolleagueandfriend.Itwasmy goodfortunetobeinthesamedepartmentwithhim.

Manyfriendsandcolleagueshaveinﬂuencedmythinkingonthese mattersthroughconversations,discussionsinQ&A,andcommentson someofthechapters.Inparticular,I’dliketothankMarkAlfano,Ritwik Agrawal,CristinaBicchieri,ThomasBlanchard,SelmerBringsjord,Mike Bruno,StewCohen,JuanComesaña,FieryCushman,JustinD’Arms,Colin Dawson,CalebDewey,JohnDoris,LouAnnGerken,JoshGreene,Steven Gross,HeidiHarley,TobyHandﬁeld,DanJacobson,JeanetteKennett,Max Kleiman-Weiner,JoshKnobe,MaxKramer,TamarKushnir,SydneyLevine, JonathanLivengood,DonLoeb,TaniaLombrozo,EdouardMachery, BertramMalle,RonMallon,EricMandelbaum,JohnMikhail,Adam Morris,RyanMuldoon,ScottPartington,ÁngelPinillos,DavePizarro, JessePrinz,HannesRakoczy,PeterRailton,SarahRaskoff,Chris Robertson,ConnieRosati,DavidRose,AdinaRoskies,RichardSamuels, HagopSarkissian,SukhvinderShahi,DaveShoemaker,DavidSobel,Tamler Sommers,KimSterelny,JustinSytsma,JoshTenenbaum,JohnThrasher, HannahTierney,MarkTimmons,BasVanDerVossen,SteveWall,Jen Wright,JonathanWeinberg,DavidWong,andFeiXu.

Alloftheempiricalstudiesforthisprojectwerefundedinpartbythe U.S.Of

toPaulBello,whowastheONRprogramofﬁcer,forsupportingthework,as wellasfornumeroushelpfuldiscussionsaboutit.

Chapter6drawssubstantiallyonmaterialfromAyars&Nichols(2020), Rationallearnersandmetaethics, Mind&Language,35(1),67–89.Ithank thejournalforpermissiontoreprintthatmaterialhere.

Ispentacademicyear2017–18onfellowshipattheCenterforHuman ValuesatPrinceton.I’mgratefultotheCenterandtotheUniversityof Arizonaforaffordingmetheopportunitytofocusonwritingthebook.In additiontofreeinguptimetowrite,Igotexcellentfeedbackfrommany peopleattheCenter,includingStephanieBeardman,MitchBerman,Liz Harman,DylanMurray,DrewSchroeder,AmySepinwall,PeterSinger, MichaelSmith,MoniqueWonderly,andespeciallyMarkvanRoojen.Mark readandcommentedonmuchofthebookwhileIwasthere,andhe’sbeena tirelessandwonderfulcorrespondentabouttheseissueseversince.

WalterSinnott-Armstrongarrangedtohavehisresearchgroup, Madlab, readthe ﬁrstdraftofthemanuscript.Thiswasincrediblyhelpful.I’ m gratefultoallthelabmembersfortakingthetimetoreadandthinkabout themanuscript.I’dliketosingleoutseveralpeopleinthegroupwhose commentsledtochangesinmanuscript:AaronAncell,JanaSchaichBorg, ClaraColombatto,PaulHenne,J.J.Moncus,SamMurray,Thomas Nadelhoffer,GusSkorburg,RitaSvetlova,andKonstantinosTziafetas. MikeTomaselloalsoparticipated,whichwasadelight.AndofcourseI’ m especiallyindebtedtoWalter,bothfororganizingtheeventandforbeing characteristicallyconstructiveandindefatigable.DanKellyalsoreadand gaveterriﬁccommentsontheentiremanuscriptatalaterstage.Hiscareful attentionledtonumerousimprovementsinbook.

IhadthebeneﬁtofthreeexcellentrefereesforOUP,oneofwhomwas HannoSauer(theothertworemainedanonymous).Thankstoallofthem,and toPeterMomtchiloffforhischaracteristicallyexcellentstewardshipatOUP.

VictorKumar ﬁrstencouragedmetowritethisbook.Thebookturned outtobealotmoreworkthanIexpected,butIstillthankVicforprompting metowriteit,andforexcellentcommentsalongtheway.MichaelGilland Ihavebeendiscussingissuesattheintersectionofmoralphilosophyand cognitivesciencefortwentyyears,andhisinﬂuenceandencouragementhas beencentraltothiswork.Finally,I’mluckytohavebeenabletotalkwith RachanaKamtekarabouteverystickyphilosophicalprobleminthebook, andeverythingelsebesides.

PARTI

RATIONALITYANDRULES

1 RationalityandMorality

SettingtheStage

“Moraldistinctionsarenotderivedfromreason.” ThusdoesHumebeginhis discussionofmoralityinthe Treatise .Rather,Humesays,moraldistinctions comefromthesentiments.Contemporaryworkinmoralpsychologyhas largelyfollowedHumeinpromotingemotionsratherthanreasonasthe basisformoraljudgment(e.g.,Blair1995;Greene2008;Haidt2001;Nichols 2004c;Prinz2007;cf.May2018;Sauer2017).WhileIthinkmoraljudgment istiedtoemotionsinmultipleways,inthisbookIwanttoexplorethe rationalsideofmoraljudgment.I’llarguethatrationalprocessesplaya criticalandunderappreciatedroleinhowwecometomakethemoral judgmentswedo.Inthischapter,I’lldescribethebasicphenomenathat Iwanttoilluminatewitharationallearningaccount,andIwillexplicatethe primarynotionofrationalitythatwillbeinplay.

1.ThePhenomena

Don’tlie.Don’tsteal.Keepyourpromises.Theseinjunctionsarefamiliar andcentralfeaturesofhumanmorallife.Theyformpartofthecore phenomenatobeexplainedbyanadequatepsychologicalaccountof moraljudgment.Whydowemakethejudgmentthatit’swrongtolieor steal?

Inadditiontothesespeciﬁcjudgments,anadequatemoralpsychology mustalsoexplainimportantdistinctionsthatseemtoberegisteredinlay moraljudgment.Forexample,peopletendtothinkthatproducingabad consequenceisworsethanallowingtheconsequencetooccur.Muchofthe workattemptingtoteaseoutanimplicitunderstandingofthesedistinctions isdoneusingtrolleycases(Foot1967;Greeneetal.2001;Harman1999; Mikhail2011;Thomson1976,1985).Forinstance,peopletendtosaythatin thefollowingcase,whattheagentdoesisnotpermissible.

Footbridge:IsitpermissibleforFranktopushamanoffafootbridgeand infrontofamovingboxcarinordertocausethemantofallandbehitbythe boxcar,therebyslowingitandsaving ﬁvepeopleaheadonthetracks?

Bycontrast,peopletendtosaythatwhattheagentdoes(orratherfailstodo) ispermissible:

Footbridge-Allow: IsitpermissibleforJeffnottopullaleverthatwould preventamanfromdroppingoffafootbridgeandinfrontofamoving boxcarinordertoallowthemantofallandbehitbytheboxcar,thereby slowingitandsaving ﬁvepeopleaheadonthetracks?

Peoplealsotendtosaythatwhattheagentdoesinthefollowingcaseis permissible:

Bystander: IsitpermissibleforDennistopullaleverthatredirectsa movingboxcarontoasidetrackinordertosave ﬁvepeopleaheadonthe maintrackif,asaside-effect,pullingtheleverdropsamanoffafootbridge andinfrontoftheboxcaronthesidetrack,wherehewillbehit?(Cushman etal.2006:1083–4)

Thesecaseshavebeentakentosuggestthatpeoplearesensitivetosurprisinglysubtledistinctionsintheirnormativeevaluations.

Ifpeoplereallyaresensitivetothesedistinctionsintheirmoraljudgments,thesearerelativelyhigh-levelpsychologicalphenomena.Ataneven higherlevel,we ﬁndthatpeopleseemtohavesystematicjudgmentsabout thenatureofmoralityitself.Forinstance,peopletendtothinkthatmoral claimshaveadifferentstatusthanconventionalclaims.Thishasbeen exploredextensivelywithquestionslikethefollowing:

Authoritydependence:Iftheteacherdidn’thavearuleagainsthitting, woulditbeokaytohitotherstudents?

Foractionslike hitting,people,includingpre-schoolchildren,tendtosay thatit’swrongtohiteveniftheteacherdoesn’thavearule.Butforactions liketalkingduringstory-time,peoplearemorelikelytosaythatifthe teacherdoesn’thavearuleonthematter,it’sokaytotalkduringstory time(e.g.,Nucci2001;Turiel1983).Morerecently,peoplehaveexploredthe

extenttowhichpeoplethinkmoralclaimsareuniversallytrue,using questionslikethefollowing:

Disagreement: IfJohnandMarkmakedifferentjudgmentsaboutwhether it’sokaytorobabank,doesoneofthemhavetobewrong?

Foractionslikebankrobberyandassault,peopletendtosaythatiftwo peoplemakedifferentjudgments,oneofthemhastobewrong,buttheydo nottendtosaythiswhenitcomestoaestheticclaimsormattersoftaste (Goodwin&Darley2008;Nichols2004a;Wrightetal.2013).

ThesearethephenomenathatIwanttoinvestigate.Notethatmuchof ourmorallivesisnotincludedhere.Iwon’ttrytoexplainouraversionto sufferinginothers,ourpropensitytoguiltandshame,orouruseofempathy andperspectivetakinginmoralassessment.NorwillItrytocharacterizethe ethicalabilitiesenjoyedbynon-humananimals.Themoralcapacitiesthat I’mtargetingare,asfaraswecantell,uniquelyhuman.Howdowearriveat thesesophisticatedjudgments,distinctions,andmeta-evaluations?

2.AChallengetoCommon-SenseMorality

Beforesettingoutmypositivestory,Iwanttoaddressbrieﬂytheprevailing skepticismaboutmoraljudgment.Moralpsychologistsoftencastlaymoralityascritically ﬂawed.Thereisevidencethatmoraljudgmentiscompromisedbyincidentalemotions,misleadingheuristics,andconfabulation. Philosophershaveusedsuchevidencetodevelopdebunkingarguments accordingtowhichkeyareasofcommon-senseethicaljudgmentareepistemicallyrotten theyarebasedonepistemicallydefectiveprocesses(see Sauer2017fordiscussionofdebunkingarguments).Debunkingarguments havebeendevelopedforbothcommon-sensenormativeethicsand common-sensemetaethics.

2.1DebunkingNormativeEthics

Perhapsthemostfamiliardebunkingaccountsdrawondualprocesstheories, accordingtowhichtherearetwobroadclassesofpsychologicalprocesses.System 1processestendtobefast,effortless,domainspeciﬁc,inﬂexible,insensitiveto newinformation,andgenerallyill-suitedtoeffectivelong-termcost

reasoning.System2processesare ﬂexible,domaingeneral,sensitivetonew information,andbettersuitedtolong-termcost–beneﬁtanalysis,buttheyare alsoslowandeffortful.

OnGreene’sdualprocessaccountofmoraljudgment,whenweare presentedwiththeoptionofpushingoneinnocentpersonoffofa Footbridgetosave ﬁveotherinnocentpeople,thereiscompetitionbetween aSystem1emotionalprocess(screaming “don’t!”)andaSystem2process thatcalculatesthebestconsequence(saying “5>1,dummy”).Theproposal isthatcaseslikeFootbridgetriggerSystem1emotionsthatsubvertSystem2 utilitariancost–beneﬁtanalysis.

AcloselyrelateddualprocessmodelcomesfromJonathanHaidt(2001). OnHaidt’ s socialintuitionist account,ourmoralreactionstendtobedriven bySystem1affectivelyvalencedintuitions.System2playsasubsidiary role itprimarilygeneratesposthocjustiﬁcationsforouraffectiveintuitions(2001:815).OneofthekeystudiesthatmotivatesHaidt’sview suggeststhatpeoplewillholdontotheirmoralviewsevenwhentheyare unabletoprovideajustiﬁcationforthem.Forinstance,participantswere presentedwithavignetteinwhichsiblingsJulieandMarkhaveaconsensual andsatisfyingsexualencounter,usingmultipleformsofbirthcontrol:

JulieandMark:JulieandMarkarebrotherandsister.Theyaretraveling togetherinFranceonsummervacationfromcollege.Onenighttheyare stayingaloneinacabinnearthebeach.Theydecidethatitwouldbe interestingandfuniftheytriedmakinglove.Attheveryleastitwouldbe anewexperienceforeachofthem.Juliewasalreadytakingbirthcontrol pills,butMarkusesacondomtoo,justtobesafe.Theybothenjoymaking love,buttheydecidenottodoitagain.Theykeepthatnightasaspecial secret,whichmakesthemfeelevenclosertoeachother. Whatdoyouthinkaboutthat?WasitOKforthemtomakelove?

Whenpresentedwiththisvignette,mostparticipantssaidthatitwasnot okayforJulieandMarktomakelove.Whenaskedtodefendtheiranswers, participantsoftenappealedtotherisksoftheencounter,buttheexperimentereffectivelyrebuttedthejustiﬁcations(e.g.,bynotingtheuseof contraceptives).Nonetheless,theparticipantscontinuedtothinkthatthe actwaswrong,evenwhentheycouldn’tprovideanyundefeatedjustiﬁcations.Atypicalresponsewas: “Idon’tknow,Ican’texplainit,Ijustknowit’ s wrong ” (Haidt2001:814).Haidtinterpretsthispatternasamanifestationof

twoprocesses:themoralcondemnationisdrivenbyanaffectiveintuition (ratherthanreasoning)andtheprofferedjustiﬁcationcomesfromposthoc rationalizing confabulation.

AsGreeneandHaidtcharacterizeSystem1processes,thejudgmentsthat issuefromthoseprocessesareunlikelytoberesponsivetoevidence.Greene arguesthatifSystem1isindeedwhatleadspeopletojudgethatit’swrongto pushincaseslikeFootbridge,thisprovidesthefoundationforanargument thatchallengestherationalproprietyofnon-utilitarianjudgment.Greene suggeststhatdeontologicaljudgments,like “it’swrongtopushtheguyin frontofthetrain,” aredefectivebecausetheyareinsensitivetorational considerations,insharpcontrastwithconsequentialistevaluations:

[T]heconsequentialistweighingofharmsandbeneﬁtsisaweighing processandnotan ‘alarm’ process.Thesortsofemotionshypothesized tobeinvolvedheresay, ‘Such-and-suchmattersthismuch.Factoritin.’ Incontrast,theemotionshypothesizedtodrivedeontologicaljudgmentare ...alarmsignalsthatissuesimplecommands: ‘Don’tdoit!’ or ‘Mustdoit!’ Whilesuchcommandscanbeoverridden,theyaredesignedtodominate thedecisionratherthanmerelyinﬂuenceit.(Greene2008:64–5)

Greenemaintainsthatsinceourdeontologicaljudgmentsderivefromemotionalreactionsthatarenotresponsivetorationalconsiderations,weshould ignoretheminnormativetheorizing(2008;seealsoSinger2005:347).¹

Althoughthereisadiversearrayofevidencesupportingtheviewthat emotionsplayaroleinjudgmentsaboutFootbridge(e.g.,Amit&Greene 2012;Bartels&Pizarro2011;Koenigsetal.2007),emotionscannotprovide acompleteexplanationforthebasicphenomenonofnon-utilitarianmoral judgment.Manydilemmasthatpeoplerateasgeneratingverylittleemotionalarousal e.g.,thoseinvolvinglying,stealing,andcheating elicit non-utilitarianresponses(see,e.g.,Dean2010).Consider,forinstance, casesofpromisebreaking.Peopledon’tgetemotionallyworkedupby vignettesthatinvolvepromisebreaking,buttheystillmakenon-utilitarian judgmentsaboutpromisebreaking.Forinstance,inonestudy,participants wereaskedwhetheritwasokayforonepersontobreakapromiseinorderto preventtwootherpeoplefrombreakingpromises;inthiscasepeople maintainedthatitwaswrongforthe ﬁrstpersontobreakapromiseeven ¹Fordirectresponsestothisargument,seeBerker(2009)andTimmons(2008).

thoughitwouldminimizepromisebreakingoverall(Lopezetal.2009:310). Soemotiondoesn’tseemtoberequiredtomakenon-utilitarianjudgments. Indeed,theasymmetrybetweenFootbridgeandBystanderisfoundeven whenthepotentialhumanvictimsarereplacedby teacups (Nichols& Mallon2006).²

Thefactthatpeoplemakenon-utilitarianjudgmentsintheabsenceof signiﬁcantaffectindicatesthattheremustbesomefurtherexplanationfor theseresponses.Thisundercutsdebunkingargumentsthatdependonthe viewthatnon-utilitarianjudgmentsareprimarilyproducedbyarational emotionalreactions.Thefactthatwe ﬁndnon-utilitarianjudgmentswithout concomitantaffectalsoexposestheneedforadifferentexplanationforthe patternofnon-utilitarianjudgmentthatpeopleexhibit.

2.2DebunkingMetaethics

Asnotedabove,peopletendtothinkthatatleastsomemoralclaimsare universallytrue,andtheytreataestheticclaimsasonlytruerelativetoan individualorgroup(Goodwin&Darley2008,2012).Whyisthis?Whydo peoplebelieveofsomemoralclaimsthattheyareuniversallytrue? Philosophershaveofferedseveralexplanationsforthebeliefinuniversalism, andthebest-knownproposalsserveasdebunkingexplanations.Inhis inﬂuentialtreatment,Mackie(1977)proposesanumberofnon-rational explanationsforthebeliefinuniversalism.Oneideaisthatmotivational factors,likethedesiretopunishorcompete,playadistortingrolein generatingmetaethicaljudgments(see,e.g.,Mackie1977:43;seealso Fisheretal.2017;Rose&Nichols2019).AnotherofMackie ’ssuggestions isthatthebeliefinuniversalismderivesfromthetendencytoprojectour moralattitudesontotheworld.Relatedly,ouremotionalreactionstoward ethicalviolationsmaypersuadeusthatmoralwrongsareuniversallywrong. Themostdirectattackontheproprietyofmetaethicaljudgmentscomes fromastudybyDarylCameronandcolleagues(2013).Theypresented subjectswithbriefdescriptionsofpracticesinothercultures(e.g., “Marriagesarearrangedbythechildren’sparents”).Insomecases,these descriptionswerepresentedonabackgrounddisplayingadisgustingpicture (unrelatedtothecontentofthedescription);inothercases,thebackground

²Inaddition,recentworkindicatesthatBystanderisjustasemotionallyarousingas Footbridge(Horne&Powell2016).

wasemotionallyneutral.Cameronandcolleaguesfoundthatwhenthe descriptionwasaccompaniedbyadisgustingpicture,participantswere morelikelytogiveuniversalistresponses.³Suchaninﬂuenceisplausibly epistemicallydefective.Cameronandcolleaguesmakethisclearbydrawing onthedistinctionbetweenincidentalandintegraleffectsofemotions:

Integralemotionsmaycontaininformationthatshouldappropriately influencemoraljudgments:guiltmaysignalthatyouhavebehavedbadly towardsothers,andangermaysignalthatothershavebehavedbadlytowards you(Frank1988).Incontrast,incidentalemotions areconceptually unrelatedtosubsequentjudgments, andsoareethicallyirrelevant (Doris&Stich2005).Whereasin cidentalemotionsmayinfl uencemoral judgments,theyarenotappropriatelycitedasevidenceinthejusti fication ofthesejudgments(719).

Ifyouaremoreuniversalistaboutarrangedmarriagesbecauseyouare seeingarevoltingpictureofworms,thenyou’rebeingswayedbyanepistemicallydefectiveprocess.

IfocusonthestudybyCameronandcolleaguesbecauseithasaclean experimentaldesign,anditprovidessomeofthemostdirectevidencefor theroleofanepistemicallydefectiveaffectiveprocessinjudgmentsof universalism.However,thereisapressinglimitationofthestudy. Althoughtheresultsindicatethatthereis some influenceofepistemically defectiveprocesses,theextentofinfluenceis,fordebunkingpurposes, trivial.Themeandifferenceinuniversalistjudgmentsproducedbyinducing disgustwasonly0.1ona5-pointscale. ⁴ Thus,thestrongestdebunking conclusionthisstudycanfundis: “Tosomeslightextent,peoplearenot justifiedintheirbeliefthataclaimisuniversallytrue.” Clearly,wecannot taketheseresultstoshowthatpeople’sbeliefinmoraluniversalismislargely basedonadefectiveprocess.Theresultssimplydon’texplainmuchofwhy peoplethinkmoralclaimsareuniversallytrue.Asaresult,theydon’tdo muchbywayofdebunkingthebelief.

³Cameronandcolleaguesusedaslightlydifferentuniversalismmeasurethanthestandard disagreementmeasure(Section1).Theyaskedparticipantstoevaluatewhetheranactivity practicedinothercultures(e.g., “Marriagesarearrangedbythechildren’sparents”)iswrong regardlessofthecultureinwhichitispracticed.

⁴ Moregenerally,itturnsoutthattheimpactofoccurrentemotiononmoraljudgmentis quiteweak(e.g.,Landy&Goodwin2015;May2014,2018).

I’vearguedthatsomeofthemostprominentdebunkingargumentsare inadequate.Obviouslythisisalimitedselectionofthedebunkingarguments thathavebeenmade.Thereisabroaderlessonhere,though.Themost prominentkindsofargumentsthatpurporttodebunklayethicaljudgments appealtothedistortingeffectsofoccurrentemotions.Butmanyoftheethical judgmentsthatwewanttounderstanddonotseemtobeexplainedby occurrentemotionalprocesses(seealsoLandy&Goodwin2015;May2014, 2018).SoIthinkthereisgoodreasontobeskepticaloftheattacksonlaymoral judgment.However,skepticismabouttheseaccountshardlyconstitutesa positivedefense.Eveniftheextantdebunkingargumentsfail,thatdoesn’t meanlaymoraljudgmentisingoodrepair.Themainworkofthisbookisto promoteadetailedpositivedefenseoftherationalityoflaymoraljudgment.

3.Rationality

3.1TheManyRationalisms

“Rationalism” isusedinseveralstrikinglydifferentwaysinphilosophy.For muchofthisbook,thenotionofrationalityinplaywillbeanevidentialistone onwhichaperson’sbeliefisrationalorjustiﬁedjustincaseitissupportedby theirevidence.Iwillarguethatseveralkeydistinctionsincommon-sense moralityareacquiredthroughaprocessofrationalinferencebasedonthe evidencethatthelearnerreceives.Iwillsetouttheevidentialistnotionof rationalityinabitmoredetailbelow,but ﬁrst,Iwanttochartseveraldifferent notionsofrationalismwhichcontrastwithevidentialisminimportantways.

Inmetaethics, “rationalism” isoftenusedtorefertoaviewaboutthe relationbetweenmoralrequirementsandreasonsforaction.Thisactionfocusedversionofrationalism(sometimescalled “moral/reasonsexistence internalism ”)holdsthatitisanecessarytruththatifitismorallyrightfora personto Φ thenthereisareasonforthatpersonto Φ (Smith1994;van Roojen2015).⁵ Thisviewofrationality,unlikeapureevidentialistview,ties

⁵ MichaelSmithdistinguishestwoversionsofthisrationalistthesis.Theconceptualrationalistthesisholdsthat “ourconceptofamoralrequirementistheconceptofareasonforaction;a requirementofrationalityorreason.” Thesubstantiverationalistthesisholdsthatthisconceptualclaimbearsoutintheworld.Thatis, “therearerequirementsofrationalityorreason correspondingtothevariousmoralrequirements” (1994:64–5).