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PurposeandProcedureinPhilosophy ofPerception PurposeandProcedure inPhilosophyof Perception Editedby HEATHERLOGUEANDLOUISERICHARDSON
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Acknowledgements vii ListofContributors ix
1.Introduction1
HeatherLogueandLouiseRichardson
2.PerceptualParadigms23 WilliamFish
3.BridgingtheGap?NaïveRealismandtheProblemof Consciousness43 KeithAllen
4.ExperientialPluralismandMentalKinds63 MajaSpener
5.TheTractabilityoftheDebateonRelationalism85 RobertaLocatelli
6.NeopragmatismandPhilosophyofPerception107 JoshuaGert
7.PerceptualExperienceandPhysicalism127 LauraGow
8.High-LevelPerceptionandMultimodalPerception147 DanCavedon-Taylor
9.WhatCanPredictiveProcessingTellUsabouttheContent ofPerceptualExperience?174 SamWilkinson
10.WadingintheShallows191 PaulNoordhof
11.NaturalismandtheMetaphysicsofPerception215 ZoeDrayson
12.PhenomenologyasRadicalReflection234 DaveWard
13.Merleau-Ponty:PerceptionandMethodology258
KomarineRomdenh-Romluc
14.SensationandtheGrammarofLife:Anscombe’sProcedure andHerPurpose276
ClareMacCumhaillandRachaelWiseman
Acknowledgements ThispublicationwasmadepossiblethroughthesupportofagrantfromtheJohn TempletonFoundation(viatheCambridgeNewDirectionsintheStudyofthe Mindproject).Theopinionsexpressedinthispublicationarethoseoftheauthors anddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheJohnTempletonFoundation.
Wealsogratefullyacknowledgethepeerreviewingeffortsoftheothermembers oftheSensePerceptionintheNorthresearchnetwork KeithAllen,ClareMac Cumhaill,andPaulNoordhof.
ListofContributors KeithAllen isSeniorLecturer,UniversityofYork
DanCavedon-Taylor isLecturer,TheOpenUniversity
ZoeDrayson isAssistantProfessor,UniversityofCalifornia,Davis
WilliamFish isProfessor,MasseyUniversity
JoshuaGert isLeslieandNaomiLegumDistinguishedProfessor,William&Mary
LauraGow isLecturer,UniversityofLiverpool
RobertaLocatelli isAlexandervonHumboldtPostdoctoralAssociateResearcher, UniversityofTübingen
HeatherLogue isAssociateProfessor,UniversityofLeeds
ClareMacCumhaill isAssociateProfessor,DurhamUniversity
PaulNoordhof isAnniversaryProfessorofPhilosophy,UniversityofYork
LouiseRichardson isSeniorLecturer,UniversityofYork
KomarineRomdenh-Romluc isSeniorLecturer,UniversityofSheffield
MajaSpener isLecturer,UniversityofBirmingham
DaveWard isSeniorLecturer,UniversityofEdinburgh
SamWilkinson isLecturer,UniversityofExeter
RachaelWiseman isSeniorLecturer,UniversityofLiverpool
Introduction HeatherLogueandLouiseRichardson
1.Background Consensusishardlythenorminanyareaofphilosophicalinterest,but contemporaryphilosophyofperceptionisdominatedbydebatesinwhichconsensushasprovenparticularlyelusive,anddiscussionmoreheatedthanonemight expect(given,forinstance,thelackofobviouspoliticalorpolicy-relatedconsequences).Forexample,TylerBurgegoessofarastoaccuseJohnMcDowellof holdingaviewthat ‘ ...exhibitsignoranceofthemostelementaryaims,claims, andmethodologyofthescienceofperceptualpsychology’ (2011,66).Onemight reasonablyworrythatsomedebatesinthissubfieldhavedeterioratedintoirresolvableimpasses.
Onecentralcaseisthedebateoverthemetaphysicalstructureofperceptual experience.Aswewillsee,thereisnoclearconsensusonwhatexactlythisdebate isabout,butfornow,letusidentifyitasthemany-sideddebatebetweensensedatumtheorists,adverbialists,representationalists,andnaïverealists.Forthesake ofspace,wewilljustfocusonthetwomostpopularsidesinthecontemporary debate:representationalism(sometimescalled ‘intentionalism’,e.g.,Tye2000) andnaïverealism(sometimescalled ‘relationalism’,e.g.,Campbell2002).¹
Accordingtonaïverealism,veridicalperceptualexperience anexperiencein whichasubjectperceivesthingsinherenvironmentastheyare simplyconsists inthesubjectperceivingthingsinherenvironmentastheyare.Moreprecisely, naïverealistsholdthatsuchexperiences ‘areessentiallyrelational:[they] “extend out” intotheworld,andconsistintheobtainingofaconsciousrelationof awarenessoracquaintancebetweenperceivingsubjectsandmind-independent objectsandpropertiesintheirenvironment’ (Allen,thisvolume,43).Forexample, themetaphysicalstructureofaveridicalexperienceinwhichasubjectseesa bananaanditsyellownessisjust thesubjectseeingthebananaanditsyellowness. Sincethesubjectofa totalhallucination doesn’tperceiveanythinginherenvironment,naïverealismleadsnaturallyifnotinexorablyto disjunctivism about perceptualexperience:theviewthatthereisadifferencebetweenatleast
¹Althoughadverbialismmaybemakingacomeback seeGert’sandGow’scontributionstothis volume.
HeatherLogueandLouiseRichardson, Introduction In: PurposeandProcedureinPhilosophyofPerception. Editedby:Heather LogueandLouiseRichardson,OxfordUniversityPress(2021).©OUP.DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198853534.003.0001
hallucinationandveridicalperceptionthatconstitutesasignificantdifferencein mentalkind.²Bycontrast,representationalismoffersaunifiedaccountofveridical andhallucinatoryexperiences,intermsofthesubject’srepresentingherenvironmentasbeingacertainway(e.g.,ascontainingayellow,crescent-shapedobject). Thedebatebetweentherepresentationalistandthenaïverealisthaslargelybeen focusedontwoquestions.First,doesperceptualexperiencehaverepresentational content?Thatis,doesitinvolvethesubjectrepresentingtheworldasbeinga certainway?Anaffirmativeanswerisentailedbyrepresentationalism,butmost naïverealistsanswerinthenegative.Second,isdisjunctivismtrue?Mostnaïve realiststhinkthattheirviewentailsit,andsodefendittothehilt,whilepretty mucheveryoneelse findsitutterlyimplausible.³
Mostofthecontributionstothisvolumefocusonthedebateoverthemetaphysicalstructureofperceptualexperience.Thisisplausiblybecausethisiswhere consensusseemsfurthestaway.However,itisnottheonlydebateinphilosophyof perceptionthatcarriesawhiffofirresolvableimpasse.Anotherthatarguablyfalls inthiscategoryconcernsthe ‘admissiblecontents’ ofperception(see,e.g.,the2009 specialissueofPhilosophicalQuarterlyandthe2013specialissueofPhilosophical Studiesdevotedtothistopic).⁴ Thecoreissueconcerns whatkindsofpropertieswe canperceive:isitjustwhataretypicallycalled ‘low-level’ properties(properties likecolours,shapes,sizes,locations,distances,pitches,volumes,textures,smells, tastes,etc.),ordowealsoperceiveso-called ‘high-level’ properties(e.g.,natural andartifactualkindproperties,semanticproperties,causalproperties,mental states,andevaluativeproperties)?Furthermore,therehasbeenexceptionally vigorousdebateamongstphilosophersofperceptionabouthowtoindividuate thesenses(see,e.g.,Macpherson2011).Someholdthatthetraditionaltaxonomy ofsight,hearing,touch,smell,andtasteisatleastbroadlycorrect,whileothers insistthatempiricalconsiderationsgiveusreasontoradicallyreviseit.(Thisisnot anexhaustivelistofdifficultdebatesinthephilosophyofperception;we’vejust highlightedthosethat figureprominentlyinthecontributionstothisvolume.)
Itisourcontentionthatthethreatofirresolvableimpasseislargelydowntotwo things.First,aswewillillustratebelow,thereismuchdisagreementabouthowwe shouldsetaboutansweringthequestionsthatdominatethe field(the procedure of
²Noteverydifferencebetweenexperiencesconstitutesasignificantdifferenceinmentalkind(see Spener,thisvolume,section4).Also,notethatthereisadifferenceofopinionamongnaïverealists aboutwhetherillusions roughly,perceptualexperiencesinwhichasubjectperceivessomethingin theirenvironmentbutmisperceivesatleastoneofitsproperties shouldbeclassifiedwithveridical experiencesorwithhallucinations(seeByrneandLogue2008,69).
³Thisismostlikelybecausetheprinciplesdiscussedinsection2.3aretypicallypresupposedinmost people’sintroductionstothephilosophyofperception(e.g.,Descartes’ Meditations(1641/1993)).For non-disjunctivistviewsthatareinthevicinityofnaïverealism,seeJohnston(2004)andSethi(2020).
⁴ Manyparticipantsinthisdebatepresupposethatperceptionhasrepresentationalcontent hence theframingoftheissueintermsofwhich contents areadmissible but(atleastprimafacie)thecore issueisindependentofthispresupposition. 2
philosophicaltheorizingaboutperception),andwhichofthesequestionsare worthpursuing(the purpose ofphilosophicaltheorizingaboutperception). Second,muchofthisdisagreementisunspoken:therehasn’tbeenenoughexplicit discussionofthesemethodologicalissuesinphilosophyofperception.
Wedon’twanttooverstatethecase therearecertainlyinstancesofmethodologicalreflectionintheliterature.Forexample,SusannaSiegelarticulatesand arguesforamethodofphenomenalcontrast(Siegel2011,ch.3.3),andher interlocutorshavesubjectedthismethodtocriticalscrutiny(seeHelton2016 foranoverview).Butexchangesofthissortseemtobetheexceptionratherthan therule.Evenwhenacontributortoadebateinphilosophyofperceptionis explicitabouttheirpurposeortheirprocedure,theiropponentsmoreoften engagewith first-orderissuesratherthanmeta-level,methodologicalones.
Thegoalofthisvolumeistomovesuchmethodologicalquestionsfromthe backgroundtothefore,inthehopeoffacilitatingprogresswheredebatesthreaten tostagnateintoimpasse.Wemakenoclaimtocomprehensivecoverageinthis volume;itdoesnotrepresentallpointsofview.Rather,ourintentionisjustto kick-startatrendofmoreexplicit,systematicdiscussionofmethodologyin philosophyofperception.Notethatthisneednotinvolvecalling ‘timeout’ on first-orderdebatestofocusexclusivelyonmethodologicalissues.Itwillalsobe fruitfultoengagein first-orderdebatesinawaythatisexplicitlyattentivetosuch issues mostofthecontributionstothisvolumeareofthissort.Creatingspace forsuchmethodologicalreflectionisjusta firststepinmakingprogress:not necessarilyingettingallpartiestoagree,ofcourse,butinidentifyingwhere progressis andisnot tobemade(e.g.,newlinesofenquiry,orplaceswhere ‘talkingpast’ hasinadvertentlyoccurred),andwhere andwhy differencesare potentiallyirreconcilable,perhapsbecauseofbroaderdifferencesinapproach.
2.PurposeandProcedure Inordertogetasenseofwhatthechoicepointsare,wewillframephilosophical theorizingaboutperceptionintermsofajourney:anorigin,adestination,andthe routewetakefromtheformertothelatter.Theoriginconcernstherelativestatus ofcompetingtheoriesattheoutset(e.g.,doesaparticulartheoryhavedefault status?).Thedestinationhastodowiththequestionofwhatthevariousphilosophicaltheoriesofperceptionaretryingtoaccomplish.Theroutefromtheorigin tothedestinationinvolvesatleasttwoquestions.First,weshouldconsiderwhich ‘routes’ arepermissible:whatprinciplesshouldbeheld fixedaswetheorize? Second,weshouldconsiderappropriate ‘mode(s)oftransportation’:which method(s)shouldweemployintheorizing?Theaimofthissectionisnotto takeastandonanyoftheseissues rather,itistobegincataloguingthem,tohelp readerstothinkthroughwhattheirownstandsareinanexplicit,systematicway.
Itwillbehelpfultoconsiderthejourneyinreverse,sinceourconceptionof wherewewanttoendupwillinformourconceptionofhowbesttogetthere.
2.1Destinations Whatisthetargetofphilosophyofperception,exactly?Theanswer,ofcourse,is perception.Butthatanswerleavesmuchunsettled.Afterall, ‘perception ’ is polysemous:itcanrefer,amongstotherthings,tothe consciousexperience of perceiving,oritcanrefertosomethingelse,suchasthatwhichachievesthetask thatwetakeperceptualprocessingtoaccomplish.Forexample,Schellenberg writesthatperception ‘convertsinformationalinput ...intorepresentationsof invariantfeaturesintheenvironment’ (2018,1).Aphilosopherofperception whoadoptsthelatterastheirtargetislikelytoinclude unconsciousperception withinit,unlikeonewhoistargetingtheconsciousexperienceofperceiving.⁵ One importantissueiswhetheritislegitimatetorestrictthetargetinthisway;given thatunconsciousperceptionisagenuinephenomenon,thiscouldaffectthe plausibilityofwhatsomephilosopherswanttosayaboutconsciousperception (BergerandNanay2016).Inanyevent,it’stypicallyassumedthatthephilosopher ofperception’stargetatleastincludesconsciousexperiencesofperceiving. ⁶ Sofor thepurposesoftherestofthisintroduction,we’llfocusonconsciousperceptual experience(omittingthe ‘conscious’ foreaseofexpositionfromhereonout).⁷
Whatisitaboutperceptualexperiencethatphilosophersofperceptionare tryingtoexplain?Oneanswerthat figuresprominentlyintheliteratureis perceptualphenomenalcharacter—‘whatitislike’ tohaveaperceptualexperience(the distinctivecharacterofseeingayellowthing,smellingabanana,etc.).Butthis answerraisesthefurtherquestionofwhatitisaboutperceptualphenomenal characterwe’retryingtoexplain.Oneaimistospecify(certainkindsof)factsin virtueofwhichperceptualexperiencehasphenomenalcharacter.⁸ Thevarious theoriesofthemetaphysicalstructureofperceptualexperienceofferdifferent accounts:forexample,anaïverealistholdsthatphenomenalcharacterconsists inperceivingmind-independententities,whereasarepresentationalistholdsthat itconsistsinrepresentingone’senvironmentasbeingacertainway.Anotheraim
⁵ AlthoughseePhillipsforthcomingforreasonstodoubtthatunconsciousperceptionisagenuine phenomenon.
⁶ Pacescepticsaboutconsciousness(see,e.g.,Frankish2016).
⁷ Afocusonperceptualexperienceraisesthequestionofwhatkindofthingitis.Thatis,are perceptualexperiencesstates,episodes,dynamicprocessesinvolvingaction,orsomethingelse?An importantissuethatfallsthroughthecracksofthisvolumeconcernstherelationshipbetweenthe ontologicalcategoryperceptualexperiencefallsintoandthequestionswe’reaskingaboutit(see,e.g., Soteriou2013).
⁸ Arguably,notallthefacts,sincesomeofthemwon’tbeaccessiblebytypicalphilosophical theorizing thekindsoffactsthatthemetaphysicianofperceptionseemstohaveinvieware personal-levelpsychologicalfacts(Logue2013a). 4
istoexplain phenomenalcontrasts betweenexperiences e.g.,thecontrastinwhat itislikeforatree-spottingexpertandanovicetoseeapinetree.SusannaSiegel (2011)hasarguedthatwecanexplainsuchcontrastsonlyifwecanperceptually experience ‘high-level’ propertieslikebeingapinetree.(Inthisvolume(154), Cavedon-Taylorexpressesscepticismthatphenomenalcontrastsarefruitful explanandabywhichtomeasurecompetingphilosophicaltheoriesofperceptual experience,onthegroundsthatitisdifficulttoruleoutalternativeexplanations ofthecontrastcompatiblewithrivaltheories.)Moreambitiously,someholdthat atheoryofthemetaphysicalstructureofperceptualexperienceshouldgo somedistancetowardsaddressingtheperceptualcomponentofthe ‘hardproblem’ ofconsciousness(Chalmers1995):thatis,towardsexplainingwhyperceiving (e.g.)ayellowbananahasthespecificphenomenalcharacteritdoes,andwhyit comeswithanyphenomenalcharacteratall(seeFish2009,75–9andAllen,this volume,44;seeGert,thisvolume,121foracaseagainstthisproposed explanandum).
Anothercommonanswertothequestionofwhatatheoryofperceptual experienceissupposedtoexplainisits epistemicrole.Aswithphenomenal character,thisexplanatoryprojectcomesinmoreandlessambitiousversions. Themoreambitiousprojectsseektoexplainhowperceptualexperienceaffords knowledge;forexample,knowledgeofone’senvironment(McDowell1986,2008; Schellenberg2018),orknowledgeofthereferenceofdemonstrativeterms (Campbell2002).Bycontrast,alessambitiousprojectistoexplainthefactsin virtueofwhichperceptualexperienceaffords (mis)information aboutone’senvironmentandgenerates beliefs aboutit(Logue2014).
Whilephenomenalcharacterandepistemicrolearetheexplanandathatloom thelargest afactreflectedbyFish’smetaphorofphenomenologicalandepistemological ‘hats’ thatatheoryofperceptualexperienceissupposedto fit (2010,2) thereareotherthingswemightwantaphilosophicaltheoryof perceptualexperiencetoexplain.Forinstance,thereareexplanandarelatedto theroleperceptualexperienceplaysinaction.Inthisvolume,MajaSpenerargues thatatheoryofperceptualexperienceshouldexplainhowitgroundssituationdependentabilities(e.g.,theabilitytopickupacatonesees).Furthermore,the mereoccurrenceofacertainkindofperceptualexperiencecouldbeanexplananduminitsownright.DanCavedon-Taylor(thisvolume)arguesthatthe occurrenceoftheRubberHandIllusionisexplicableonlyifwecanvisually experiencethe ‘high-level’ propertyofbeingahand.
Thisisnotanexhaustivelistofthepotentialexplananda;theaimhereisjustto givethereaderasenseofthepossibilities.Andofcourse,theseexplanandaaren’t mutuallyexclusive;onemightthinkthataphilosophicaltheoryofperceptual experienceisinthebusinessofexplaining all ofthem.
However,onemightthinkthatsomeoftheseallegedexplanandadon’tactually helpusdecidebetweenrivaltheories.Thismightbebecauseoneholdsthatthe
allegedexplanandumdoesn’texist forexample,ascepticaboutphenomenal characterisnotgoingtosetaphilosophicaltheoryofperceptionthetaskof explainingit.Alternatively,onemightthinkthatagivenexplanandumexists,but thatit’snotthejobofaphilosophicaltheoryofperceptualexperiencetoexplainit. Forinstance,onemightinsistthattheepistemicroleofperceptualexperienceis notexplainedbyitsmetaphysicalstructure,butratherbyepistemologicaltheories (e.g.,reliabilism)thatareinprinciplecompatiblewithanymetaphysicsofperceptualexperience.Oronemightagreethatagivenexplanandumexists,andthat itisthejobofaphilosophicaltheoryofperceptualexperiencetoexplainit,but holdthateachofthetheoriesonthetabledoanequallygoodexplanatoryjob(e.g., seeLogue’s(2013b)suggestionthatwemightbeabletoexplaineverythingthat needsexplainingregardlessofwhetherweexperience ‘high-level’ properties).
Furthermore,theAnscombianviewarticulatedinMacCumhailland Wiseman’scontributiontothisvolumeisoneonwhichexplainingtheaforementionedexplanandaisn’tinthephilosopherofperception ’sjobdescription. AccordingtotheirinterpretationofAnscombe,thejobisto describethelinguistic mastery ofperceptualverbs,suchas ‘tosee’.Forexample:
Armedwiththeterm ‘objectofsight’ thephilosopherofperceptioncannow proceedtodescribethislinguisticcompetencebyaskingwhatpatternstheverb ‘tosee’ imposesonits(grammatical)objects.Onelineofinvestigationwillask whichputative ‘ x ’ insentencesoftheform ‘Maryseesx’ or ‘Iseex’ areintelligible (whatarethepossibleobjectsofsight).Anotherwillinvestigatewhether,where some ‘ a ’ isanobjectofsight,linguisticcompetencecommitsustoacceptingother objects, ‘b’ , ‘ c ’ , ‘d’.Forexample,whether ‘Iseearabbit’ commitsaspeakerto,e.g. ‘Iseeamammal’ , ‘Iseeagrey fluffyshape’ ,or ‘Iseealivingthing’ (whatarethe relationsbetweenobjectsofsight).(thisvolume,281)
Thisconceptionofphilosophyofperception,whichMacCumhaillandWiseman callthe grammaticalapproach,contrastswithwhattheycallthe ontological approach,onwhich ‘atheoryofperceptionshouldtellusthefundamentalnature ofperceptualexperience’ (thisvolume,277).Giventhatthepointofdiscerningthe fundamentalnatureofperceptualexperienceistoprovidemetaphysicalexplanationsofthephenomenamentionedabove,theontologicalapproacharisesoutof theideathatatheoryofperceptualexperienceshouldprovidesuchexplanations. Thegrammaticalapproachoffersanalternativeconceptionofwhatphilosophers ofperceptionshouldbegettingupto.
JoshuaGert’scontributionalsoinvolvesafocusonouruseofperceptual language,buthisconceptionofphilosophyofperception’spurposeisimportantly different.LikeMacCumhaillandWiseman’sAnscombe,Gert’sneopragmatist eschews ‘positiveexplanationsofthefundamentalmetaphysicalnatureofthe basicentitiesorrelations’ inthisdomain,andholdsthat ‘themaintypeof
question ...thephilosopher[ofperception]oughttobeansweringis “Howdo Iexplainthetalkthatgivesriseto[thepuzzleofperception]?”’ (thisvolume,108). ButakeypointofcontrastbetweenthetwoapproachesisthatGert’ sneo pragmatistoffersametaphysicaltheoryalongsidehisresponsetothisquestion. Thatis,althoughGertholdsthatitisnotthepointofphilosophyofperceptionto offermetaphysicalexplanationsoftheexplanandalistedabove,hestillthinksthat thereisatheoryofthenatureofperceptualexperience(viz.,adverbialism)that fits betterthanotherswiththedemystificationofperceptualtalkofferedbytheneo pragmatist.
AnotheralternativepurposeissuggestedbyRomdenh-Romluc’scharacterizationofMerleau-Ponty’smethod.Onthispicture,thedestinationisnotan explanationofanyofthephenomenamentionedabove,butrathertherevelation ofthe essence ofperceptualexperience.ForMerleau-Ponty, ‘theessenceofsome phenomenonisameaningthatunifiesdisparateexperiencesofthatphenomenon. Itissomethingoverandabovethoseexperiencesinsofarasitcannotsimplybe reducedtoacollectionofsuchexperiences.Yetitdoesnotexistintheabsenceof thoseexperiences.’ (Romdenh-Romluc,thisvolume,265).Thisprojectisakinto familiarendeavourswithinanalyticphilosophy.Justasanepistemologistmight aimtoidentifywhatunifiesinstancesofknowledge,whatallandonlythese instanceshaveincommon(e.g.,justifiedtruebeliefplus...),aphilosopherof perceptionmightaimtoidentifywhatunifiesinstancesofperceptualexperience (see,e.g.,Martin2004,48–52).
Insummary,webeganthissubsectionbysuggestingthatthepurposeof philosophyofperceptionmightbetoexplainitsphenomenalcharacter,its epistemicrole,itsroleinfacilitatingaction,ortheoccurrenceofcertainkindsof experiences.Severalquestionsariseatthispoint.Isitthejobofphilosophyof perceptiontoexplain all ofthesephenomena?Areanyoftheexplanandamore importantthantheothers?Orshouldweinstead,likeMacCumhailland Wiseman’sAnscombe,focusondescribingourlinguisticcompetencewithperceptualverbs,orlikeGert’sneopragmatist,focusondemysti ficationofperceptual talkinordertodissolvephilosophicalpuzzles,orlikeRomdenh-Romluc’ s Merleau-Ponty,focusondiscerningtheessenceofperceptualexperience?Or shouldwebedoing all ofthesethings?
2.2Origins Letusnowturnourattentiontothestartingpointofthejourney,whichconcerns therelativestatusoftheavailabletheoriesatthebeginningofinquiry.Onone view,thereisnoprivilegedstartingpointfortheorizingaboutperception.Any comerisjustasmuchacontenderasanyoftheothersattheoutset.Butthisview isnotcompulsory.Forexample,onRomdenh-Romluc’scharacterizationof
Merleau-Ponty’smethod(thisvolume),thestartingpointoftheorizingabout perceptualexperienceshouldbehalfwaybetweenan ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ conception ofit.Sometheoriesofperceptioncharacterizeitas ‘aninnercontentofconsciousnessthatcanremainjustasitis,regardlessofthenatureorexistenceoftheworld itseeminglypresentstoitssubject’,butMerleau-Pontythinksthisisintension withthewayexperiencestrikesusasbeing,namely,as ‘animmediateopennessto theworld’ (Romdenh-Romluc,260).Ontheotherhand,we’renotjustifiedin assumingthat ‘experiencepresentsthatworldasitis,in-itself ’ (RomdenhRomluc,260).Soasensible,middle-groundstartingpointistheideathat ‘when wedescribeperceptualexperience,whatwearedescribingaretheworldlyobjects ofperceptionastheyareexperienced’ (Romdenh-Romluc,260) thatis,boththe mind-independentobjectsofperceptualexperienceandthesubjectiveresponses tothem figureinitsmetaphysicalstructure.Thisstartingpointleavesopenthe possibilitythatwecouldargueourwaytoeitherextreme(‘inner’ or ‘outer’),but thepointisthatwehavetoearntherighttooccupyoneofthesepositions. Similarly,M.G.F.Martinhasarguedthatdisjunctivismaboutperceptualexperiencehasadefaultstatus;thedisjunctivist’sopponentcouldinprincipleargueher wayoutofthedefaultview,buttheburdenisonhertomakethecase(2004, 47–52).
Inthisvolume,KeithAllenarguesthatnaïverealismhasaprivilegedstatusthat ismuchstrongerthanjustbeingthedefault.Onhisview,it’snotthatnaïve realismhasaninitialadvantagethatcouldbeinprincipleoutweighed.Rather,just asStrawsonarguedthatdeterminismistheoreticallybutnotpracticallyintelligible,Allenholdsthatthesameistrueofalternativestonaïverealism.Very roughly,theideaisthatjustaswecannotbringourselvestogenuinelybelievethat determinismistrue,andthusthatinterpersonalinteractionsarenotastheyseem (e.g.,warrantingreactiveattitudessuchasgratitudeandresentment),wealso cannotbringourselvestogenuinelybelievethatnaïverealismisfalse,andthus that ‘perceptualexperiencemightbeotherthanitappears’ (59) namely,a consciousrelationofacquaintancetothingsaroundus.⁹
Inshort,yetanothermethodologicalquestionforthephilosopherofperception toanswerconcernswhethertheavailabletheoriesstartoffonanequalfooting,or whetheranyofthemenjoysomekindofprivilegedstatus.
⁹ AlthoughseeGert,thisvolume: ‘supposeforamomentthatexperienceis contrarytothenaïve realist’sview merelyamatterofvariousmodificationstoanexperiencer’sconsciousness:modificationscaused,butnotconstituted,byexternalobjects.Evenifthisweretrue,wewouldstillendup learningtousesuchphrasesas “rightthere” , “present”,and “directlybeforeus” inthesamewaywe wouldifnaïverealismweretrue ...whatIamarguingisthatevenifnaïverealismisfalsethe phenomenologyis not misleading.’ (115)
2.3OntheWay:FixedPoints Aswesawintheprevioussubsections,theexplanandaandstartingpointsofa philosophicaltheoryofperceptualexperienceplaceconstraintsonourtheorizing. Forexample,assumingthatpartofthepointofgivingatheoryofperceptual experienceistoaccountforitsphenomenalcharacter,failingtodosoisamark againstatheory.Andifaparticulartheoryhasadefaultstatus,itsrivalshavea steeperhilltoclimbinordertowinacceptance.Buttheexplanandaandstarting pointsarenottheonlysourcesoftheoreticalconstraints philosophersofperceptiontypicallyappealtootherkindsof fixedpointsinarguingfortheirown theoriesandobjectingtorivals.Toleanonthejourneymetaphoryetagain,we mightthinkofthese fixedpointsas ‘guardrails’ thatdeterminepermissibleroutes tothedestinationexplananda.
Someguardrailsarerathergeneral,inthesenseofbeingbig-picturetheoriesor worldviews.Forexample,aphysicalistworldview roughlyspeaking,theclaim that everythingisphysical isregardedasa fixedpointbysome(see,e.g.,Gert’ s andGow’scontributionstothisvolume),butnotbyall(see,e.g.,Allen’scontribution).Otherguardrailsareveryspeci fic,inthattheyareclaimsrestrictedtothe particularphenomenonunderinvestigation principlesspecificallyaboutperceptualexperience.Andsomeguardrailsfallsomewhereinthemiddle forexample, principlesaboutmentalstatesmoregenerally.¹⁰
Providinganextensivelistof fixedpointsthat figureinphilosophyofperceptionistoobigataskforthisintroduction.Instead,wewillillustratehowsome relativelyspeci fic fixedpointsfunctioninourtheorizingthroughacasestudythat concernsthedebatebetweennaïverealistsandtheiropponents.Thisdivide roughlytracksattitudestothefollowingprinciples:
LocalSupervenience: ‘thephenomenalcharacterofa[perceptual]statelocally supervenesonneuralactivity’ (Locatelli,thisvolume,86);thatis, ‘iftheproximal neuralconditionsthatoccurredwhenoneperceivedanobjectwerecreatedinthe absenceofthatobject,thesubjectwouldhaveanexperiencewiththesame phenomenalcharacterastheoriginalperceptualexperience’ (Fish2009,41).
TheIndistinguishabilityPrinciple: ‘whenevertwophenomenalcharactersareindistinguishable,theyarequalitativelyidentical’ (Locatelli,thisvolume,85).According tothisprinciple,atotalhallucinationandaveridicalexperiencefromwhichitis subjectivelyindistinguishablehavethesamephenomenalcharacter.
¹⁰ To flagacouplethatcropupinthisvolume:Berkeley’sLikenessPrinciple,ortheclaimthatan ideacanbelikenothingbutanotheridea(Gow,thisvolume,140),andtheclaimthatmentalstatesare entirelyinternaltotheirsubjects,inthesensethattheycannothaveobjectsoutsidethesubject’sskullas constituents(seeGert,thisvolume,116).
Theseprinciplesformthebasisofargumentsfor:
TheCommonKindAssumption: ‘theideathatwecouldhavetheverysamekind ofexperienceinveridicalandhallucinatorycases’ (Gert,thisvolume,113,see alsoMartin(2004,40)).Thisclaimis,ofcourse,incompatiblewithdisjunctivism aboutperceptualexperience.
Naïverealists(byandlarge)rejecttheseprinciples,whereastheiropponents acceptthem.Butthereisn’tmuchdiscussionintheliteratureofwhichattitude towardstheseprinciplesiscorrect;todate,neithercamphasinvestedmucheffort inpersuadingtheotherthattheirattitudetowardstheseprinciplesistherightone (althoughtherearesomeexceptions e.g.,Fish2009,ch.5).
Proponentsoftheseprinciplesoftenseemtothinkthatthenaïverealistswho denythemaredeeplyandperhapsevenhopelesslyconfusedaboutthesubjectat hand.Inthisvolume,RobertaLocatelliseekstobreakthiskindofimpasseby identifyingcommonground.Sheproposesthatwecan findsuchcommon groundin
TheSuperficialityConstraint: ‘Itisnotpossiblethatanexperienceseemsthrough introspectiontohaveacertaintypeofphenomenalcharacter,whileitdoesn’t actuallyhavethatphenomenalcharacter,andthereisnodisablingorinterfering conditioninplacethatpreventsonefromintrospectivelyrealizingthatthe experiencedoesn’t,infact,havethattypeofphenomenalcharacter’ (Locatelli, thisvolume,97).
Theideaisthatthereisaverytightconnectionbetweenthephenomenalcharacter ofperceptualexperienceandintrospectionofit sotightthat(infavourable conditions,atleast)certainkindsofintrospectiveerrorsaboutitareimpossible. Locatellisuggeststhatthisprinciple,unliketheothersjustmentioned,isa neutralstartingpointthatshouldbeacceptedbyallpartiestothedebate(this volume,98).
However,inprinciple,onecouldaccepttheSuperficialityConstraintwhile denyingthatatotalhallucinationwouldbesubjectivelyindistinguishablefroma possibleveridicalperception.Thatis,onecoulddenyananalogoftheLocal Supervenienceprincipleconcerningthesubjectiveindistinguishabilityoftotal hallucinations,namely:iftheproximalneuralconditionsthatoccurredwhen oneperceivedanobjectwerecreatedintheabsenceofthatobject,thesubject wouldhaveanexperience thatissubjectivelyindistinguishablefrom theoriginal perceptualexperience.Now,itistruethatalmosteveryone includingnaïve realists acceptsthisprinciple.Thisisreflectedbythefactthatmostpartiesto thedebateholdthatametaphysicsofperceptualexperienceowesanaccountof totalhallucinationsthataresubjectivelyindistinguishablefromapossibleveridical
perception.However,thisprincipleisnotbeyondquestion.Afterall,ifonedoesn’t takeitforgrantedthattherelevantsortofneuralactivityissufficientfor perceptualphenomenalcharacter,thentheresultingstatemaywellbesubjectively distinguishable fromapossibleveridicalperception.Plausibly,theneuralactivity issufficientfor something psychological,e.g.,adispositiontobelieveacertain propositionaboutone’senvironment(Fish2009,143).But,ifonehasgonesofar astoquestionwhethertherelevantsortofneuralactivityissufficientforperceptualphenomenalcharacter,it’snolongerclearwhythat ‘something ’ wouldbe subjectivelyindistinguishablefromapossibleveridicalperception.
Rejectingthelocalsupervenienceprinciplesleadsnaturallytotheapproachthat Romdenh-RomlucattributestoMerleau-Pontyinhercontributiontothisvolume (261–2):focusingonexperiencesthatweknowtobepossiblebecausethey’ re actual,andnotworryingaboutcreaturesofscience fictionliketotalhallucinations. Forifonedoesn’tacceptthelocalsupervenienceprinciplesjustsketched,itisan openpossibilitythatthementalstateresultingfromdirectlystimulatingthe relevantpartsofasubject’sbrainis notaperceptualexperience,andhencenota statethatametaphysicsofperceptualexperienceoughttocover.Themoralofthis particularcasestudyconcernstherelationshipbetweenthe fixedpointsone acceptsandwhatonecountsasatargetfortheorizinginthe firstplace.In particular,ifonedoesn’tregardthelocalsupervenienceprinciplesas fixedpoints fortheorizing,then(arguably)oneneednotacceptthatthattherearetotal hallucinationsthataresubjectivelyindistinguishablefromveridicalperceptions thatone’stheorymustaccountfor.
Atthispoint,thequestionariseswhetheroneshouldregardthelocalsupervenienceprinciplesas fixedpoints.Andmoregenerally,whichprinciplesshould weregardas fixedpointsfortheorizing?
2.4OntheWay:Methods Wehaveseenthatthereismuchvariationindestinations,originsand fixedpoints inphilosophyofperception.Istherealsovarietyinthemethodstheyusetogetto theirchosendestinations?Itmightseemthattheansweris:no.Acommon conceptionofphilosophicalmethodisthatofcost–benefitanalysis(CBA). Appliedtothedebateoverthemetaphysicsofperception,thismeansthatthe choiceofatheoryofperceptionwillultimatelybesettled ifatall bydeterminingwhichgivesthegreatestbenefits,atthesmallestcost.InferencetotheBest Explanation(IBE)isalso,asDraysonarguesinhercontributiontothisvolume,a commonformofargumentinphilosophyofperception.This fitsnaturallywith theprimacyofcost–benefitanalysis:forexample,thatsomeaccountofperception providesthebestexplanationofsomepertinentphenomenonwillbeabenefitof thataccount.
Severalofthepapersinthisvolumeillustratethesecommonargumentative strategies:assuch,theirinnovativenessliesnotintheirmethod,butelsewhere.For example,Spenerintroducesthepossessionofsituation-dependentcapacitiesas somethingwhichatheoryofperceptionshouldexplain,whichshearguesnaïve realismdoesbest.Thusnaïverealismhasapreviouslyunnoticedbenefit,tobe weighedagainstitscosts.Cavedon-Taylorarguesthatinthedebateoverthe admissiblecontentsofperceptualexperience,weneedtoprovideexplanations ofmulti-aswellasunimodalexperience:certainmultimodalexperiences,he argues,arebestexplainedbyaviewonwhichcertainhigh-levelpropertiescan figureinthecontentofperceptualexperience.Locatelliintroducesthe Super ficialityConstraint,andholdsthatfailuretoaccommodateitisanadditional costtobeweighedinone’schoiceofatheory.
Thisisonlya near consensusonbroadmethodology:many,butnotall philosophersofperceptionareengagedinCBAandIBE.Asdiscussedinsection 2.2,Allenarguesthatnaïverealismhasaspecialstatusamongstphilosophical theoriesofperception,andthusisnottobeassessedonthebasisofCBAor IBE.Onthisview,thedefenceofnaïverealismshouldbeunderstoodaspartofa ‘transcendentalprojectofexplaining howitispossible thatperceptualexperience’ hascertaincharacteristics[thisvolume,56].Onemightthinkthattheuseof transcendentalargumentswouldbethedistinctivefeatureofthisproject.Allen demurs,pointingoutthatsuchargumentsaresubjecttodifficultiesandcaninany casebeunderstoodas ‘limitingcasesofinferencetothebestexplanation,inwhich thepurportedexplanationisthebestbyvirtueofbeingthe only explanation’ (this volume,59).
Beneatheventhisnearconsensusaboutbroadmethodologyisanunderlying pluralityofmorespecificmethods.Thesearenotnecessarilyinconsistentwithone another,butthereisdisagreementabouttheirusefulness.Thisdisagreementsometimesshowsupindifferencesinhowcostsandbenefitsareweighed,andthusalsoin viewsofwhetheranexplanationisreally ‘thebest’.Forexample,thereisdisagreementoverwhatweightweshouldgivetoaccommodatingthephenomenologyof perceptioninourtheorizing.Introspection reflectiononexperience isthe methodbymeansofwhichtherelevantphenomenologicalfactsarediscovered. Thosewhodonotgivemuchweighttoaccommodatingphenomenologyareoften, also,disparagingofthemethodofintrospection.Gert,forexample,suggeststhat fromhisneopragmatistperspective,weshouldbecautiousaboutthismethod becausewhatmotivatesphilosophicalinterestinperceptionshouldnotbeour firstpersonunderstandingofperceptionbuttheparadigmaticallythird-personcontexts inwhichwetalkaboutit.Inthisheisstarklyatoddswiththeapproachof phenomenologistswho,asRomdenh-Romlucputsit, ‘startwithexperienceasitis undergonefromtheperspectiveofitssubject’ (thisvolume,259).
Gert,then,thinksgreatweightshouldbeputonthecapacityofatheoryto accommodatehowwe talk aboutperception.Morespecifically,hismethodisto
explainawaycertainpotentialworriesbylocatingtheirsourceinwaysinwhichwe talkaboutperception,andidentifyingthefunctionofthesewaysoftalking.Mac CumhaillandWisemanalsoendorsereflectionontalkaboutperceptionasa centralmethod intheircase,inordertoidentify ‘complexpatternsofspeechand actionthatmanifestanindividual’ sgrasp ’ ofperceptualconcepts(thisvolume, 278).Thesephilosophersputattentiontolanguagetoquitedifferentwork,and theirmethods(aswellastheiraims,asmentionedinsection2.1),thoughbothin somesense ‘linguistic’,areimportantlydifferent.
AsWardmakesclearinhiscontribution,thereisalsoconsiderablevariationin methodsthatinvolvereflectiononexperienceorintrospection:methodsthatare broadly ‘phenomenological’.Inhisterminology,a ‘Humean’ phenomenologistis onewhoholdsthatallthat’srequiredtouncoverphilosophicallysignificantfacts aboutexperienceistoattendtoit.Phenomenologists(thoseworkinginthe phenomenologicaltradition)haverarelybeenHumeaninthisway.Wardsets Merleau-Pontianphenomenologyincontext,comparingitwithHumean, Kantian,andHusserlianapproachestoreflectiononexperience.Onethingthat characterizesMerleau-Pontianphenomenologyisakindofcriticalattentionto ourownreflectivecapacities.Romdenh-Romlucdrillsdownintothedetailsof Merleau-Ponty’smethod,especiallyasappliedtoperception.Forexample,MerleauPontythinksthatthereareaspectsofexperiencethatareinasense ‘hidden’ from us,andwhichthusrequireaspecialmethodtobebroughtintoview:onesuch methodisthatofthepainter,abstracting ‘fromthefullnessofperceptualexperience ’ toidentifyitscomponents(thisvolume,272).Anotherisreflectingona rangeofexperiences,includingthoseassociatedwithpathologies.Acommonway ofunderstandingtheroleofreflectiononexperienceinanalyticphilosophyof perceptionisasprovidingdata:factstobeexplainedorfedintoacost–benefit analysis.Perhapssomeofthemethodsofthephenomenologicaltraditioncouldbe employed byanalyticphilosophersofperception inthisway,toprovidericher andmoreaccuratedescriptionsofexperienceagainstwhichwemighttestour theories.Forthephenomenologiststhemselves,however,explanationoranalysis tooktheformofuncoveringthe ‘ essences ’ ofexperience essentialfeaturesor structures.
Historyofphilosophyhasitsownmethods forexample,exegesisand interpretation andthesearesometimesendsinthemselves.Historiansofphilosophyworkingonperceptionmaybeinterestedprimarilyinprovidingan accurateaccountofahistorical figure ’sideasaboutperception.Othersattempt torelateahistorical figure ’saccounttocontemporarywork;forexample,by arguingthattheiraccountcommitsthemtonaïverealism,orbyidentifying overlookedargumentsforaccountsofperceptionintheirwork(see,e.g.,Gomes 2017;Kalderon2017;Allen2020).AsMacCumhaillandWisemanillustratein theircontribution,themethodsofhistoryofphilosophycanalsobeputtomore radicaluse:theyemploycarefulexegesistoAnscombe’sworkonperceptiontoput
forwardadistinctive,non-metaphysicalconceptionoftheaimofphilosophyof perception.
Insummary,whilstIBEandCBAarecommon ‘modesoftransportation’ toour destinationsinphilosophyofperception,thereisonly near consensusabouttheir use.Andthereisroomfortheuseof andfordisagreementabout other methodstoo,includingtranscendentalarguments,introspection,linguistic methods,andthemethodsofthehistoryofphilosophy.
3.PhilosophyandtheScienceofPerception Differencesinpurposeandprocedurecanseemespeciallyprofoundwhenit comestotherelationshipthatthephilosophyofperceptionstandsintothe scienceofperception differingconceptionsofthisrelationshiparewhatlead Fishinhiscontributiontoconstruethesubfieldasdividedintoincommensurable researchprogrammes.Thus,featuresofthejourneyrelevanttothisrelationship warrantseparatetreatment.
3.1Destinations Amajorpointofdisagreementiswhe therthephilosopherofperception ’starget isthesameasthatofthescientist.Thatis,aretheperceptualstateswithwhich muchphilosophyofperceptionisconcernedtobeidenti fi edwiththerepresentationalstatesoftraditionalcognitivescienceofperception?AsFishdiscussesin hiscontribution,some,likeTylerBurge,thinkso,andalsothatitiswithinthe remitofsciencetoestablishthatthisisso.Others mostnotablyJohn McDowell arguethatwhilstthestateswithwhichscientistsofperceptionare concernedarestatesofperceptualsystems,philosophersareconcernedinstead withstatesofperceivers:adifferentthingaltogether(seeBurge2005,2011; McDowell2010,2013).Thisdifferenceinviewsoverphilosophyofperception ’ s targetexplananda,discussedbyFish,Drayson,andNoordhofinthisvolume, hasadisruptiverippleeffectonensuingdebate:forthosewhotakeperceptual statestobeidenticaltothestatesdiscussedinthecognitivescienceofperception,theresultsofthelatterhavedirectandobviousimplicationsforthedebate overthenatureofperception.Forthosewhodon ’t,theimplicationswillneverbe quitesodirectandobvious.Mostsigni fi cantly,theBurge-ianviewhasbeen thoughttostraightforwardlyentailthef alsityofdisjunctivism,ortoforcethose whoacceptthisviewtoeschewconsistencywithsciencealtogether.However, Campbell(2002,120)providesausefulmetaphorforhowphilosophersof perceptionwhoseviewsentaildisjunctivismmightbestunderstandtheresults
ofvisionscience.Onhisview,weshouldseetherepresentationalstatesinvolved inperceptionnotasidenticaltoperceptualexperiences,butasstatesofperceptualsystemsthatfunctiontokeepawindow-likemeansofaccessingtheworld clearortransparent.Perceptionisouraccesstotheworldwhentheserepresentationsperformtheirtasksuccessfully itisnottobeidenti fi edwiththe representationsthatmakeitpossible.Noordhof(thisvolume,section3.2)argues thatthenaïverealist ’sattempttopushrepresentationstothisexplanatorylevel putstheminaprecariousposition.
Adifferentdimensionofvarianceconcernsnotwhatistobeexplained,butthe kindsofexplanationsitistheaimofphilosophyofperceptiontoprovide,andhow theyrelatetothosetobefoundinperceptualscience.Ononekindofview,the differenceisfairlyminimal:philosophersofperceptionmayofferexplanations thatareatadifferentlevelofabstractiontothoseprovidedbyscientistsworking onperception,buttheseexplanationsarenotdifferentinkind.Onthisconception oftheaimsofphilosophyofperception,itcanbeseenasakindoftheoretical or, touseFodor’sterm speculativepsychology:asubdisciplineconcernedwith constructingempiricaltheories,butwhichneverthelessisn’tquitescientificpsychologyineschewingtheuseofexperiments(Fodor1975,vii).
Whilstphilosophersofperceptionarerarelyexplicitonthispoint,itseems thatmanyeschewthisFodorianconception:talkofperception’ s ‘ metaphysical nature ’ orwhatperception ‘fundamentally ’ issometimessuggestsadifferent kindofexplanatoryproject.Forexample,ononeconceptionoftheaimsof philosophyofperception,thejobofthe philosopheristoexplainhowperceptionisnecessarily,andnotmerelyhowithappenstobeimplementedor instantiatedinus,evenatareasonablyhighlevelofabstraction.Inhercontribution,Draysonarguesthatweshouldnotunderstandphilosophicaltheoriesof themetaphysicsofperceptioninthisway,andthattheyarenotdifferentinkind toscienti fi ctheoriessuchastheecologicalorconstructivisttheoriesofperception.Atleastsomeofthisvarianceconc erningtheaimsofphilosophyofperceptionisrelatedtothefactthatworkinthisareacanemergefromquite differentphilosophicalsubdisciplines.Ontheonehand,muchphilosophyof perceptionisassociatedwithphilosop hyofmind,whichbordersepistemology andmetaphysics.Assuch,suchphilosop hyofperceptionisnaturallyconcerned withthemetaphysicsofperceptualstatesasaspeci fi cquestioninthemetaphysicsofmind,andwithexplaininghowperceptioncouldamounttocontactwith andthusknowledgeoftheworld.Morerecentlythough,somephilosophers workingonperceptionwouldbemorecomfortabledescribingthemselvesas philosophersofpsychology.Muchphilosophyofpsychologyis asBermudez putsit —‘ concernedprimarilywiththenatureandmechanicsofcognition, ratherthanwiththemetaphysicsandepistemologyofmind ’ (2005,15).As such,itsaimsoverlapwiththoseofcognitivescienceitself.
