Acknowledgments
Ididn’tsetouttobecomeanepistemologist,butstumbledintoitasaresult ofteaching,eventuallydiscoveringthatrecentdevelopmentsinsocialepistemology,inparticular,couldprovideanexcellentplatformforbringing togethermyinterestsinlanguage,communication,cognition,andsocial philosophy.Soitseemsappropriatetobeginbythankingstudentsand colleaguesintheDepartmentofPhilosophyatSimonFraserUniversityfor providingsuchafun,stimulating,andhospitableworkenvironmentover thelasteightyears,encouragingjuniorfacultytofollowtheirphilosophical whimswherevertheymightlead.(TheonequestionI’veneverheardat anyoneaskatSFUis, “sohowisthisphilosophy?”)
FromearlydaysIhavebeenfortunatetoworkwithmentorswhowould notonlyprovidegentleguidancetomy firstfalteringstepsinphilosophybut wouldalsoprovidemodelsofthekindofscholar-personImightaspireto become.TheseincludeBjørnT.RambergandKristinGjesdalattheUniversity ofOslo,HenrikSyseandGregoryReichbergatthePeaceResearchInstitute, Oslo(PRIO),and finally,JohnMcDowell,TedMcGuire,andJimBogenatthe UniversityofPittsburgh.
Indevelopingthisproject,HollyK.Andersenhasbeenthereeverystepof theway:discussionswithherhaveledtoimprovementsinvirtuallyevery paragraphofthebook.NicFillion,likewise,haspatientlyenduredcountless attemptsatdevelopingtheideasandgettingtheargumentsright.
Forfurtherdiscussionand/orwrittenfeedback,IamindebtedtoKathleen Akins,BrianBall,RimaBasu,ErinBeeghly,SamBlack,ElisabethCamp,Yan Chen,ChrisCopan,KatieCreel,JoshDiPaolo,CatarinaDutilhNovaes, MahanEsmaeilzadeh,AriannaFalbo,WillFleisher,DannyForman, SanfordGoldberg,MartinHahn,MichaelHannon,EmilyHodges, JonathanJenkinsIchikawa,IanKahn,ThomasKelly,GabrielLariviere, MariaLasonen-Aarnio,ClaytonLittlejohn,MattMaxwell,MattMcGrath, RobinMcKenna,RichardMoore,SarahMoss,DanaNelkin,ThiNguyen, VarshaPai,KatherinePuddifoot,SusannaSiegel,JuliaStaffel,EvanTiffany, KelseyVicars,CarolinevonKlemperer,JeremyWanderer,variouscontributorstotheSocialEpistemologyNetworkandBoardCertified EpistemologistsFacebookdiscussiongroups,audiencesatVUAmsterdam
(May2015),theWesternCanadianPhilosophicalAssociation(Edmonton October2016),thePacificAPA(SeattleApril2017,SanDiegoApril2018, VancouverApril2019),UMassBoston(May2017),theBerlinSchoolof MindandBrain(July2017),theUniversityofOslo(May2018),King’ s CollegeLondon(May2018),andtheCentralAPA(Denver2019),aswellas PeterMomtchiloff,forexpressingearlyenthusiasmfortheprojectandfor seeingitthroughtocompletion,andtwoexternalrefereesatOUP,whose detailedcommentshelpedsetthe finalrevisionsontherighttrack.Iwould alsoliketoextendmysinceregratitudetothealwaysfriendlystaffatClub Ilia(Burnaby)andTamburenPub(Fredrikstad),wherelargeportionsofthis bookwere firstdrafted.
Someoftheargumentsinthisbookhaveappearedindifferentform elsewhere.IamgratefultoWiley-Blackwellforpermissiontoreusematerial from “TheEpistemologyofPrejudice” (Thought 2013)inchapters4–5and “EvidentialPreemption” (PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch 2020) inchapter6,andtotheUniversityofArkansasPressforpermissiontoreuse materialfrom “DoxasticMorality:AModeratelySkepticalPerspective” (PhilosophicalTopics 2018)inchapters9–10.
Inwritingthebook,Ihavebenefitedfromthe financialsupportofthe SocialSciencesandHumanitiesResearchCouncilofCanada(Insight DevelopmentGrant43020160460, “TheEpistemologyofPrejudice”).
Onamorepersonalnote,Iwouldliketothankmyparents KariHåheim andOlavBegby whohavealwayssupportedmyacademicendeavors (a firstinmyfamily)andhavenevercomplainedaboutthefactthatasa resultofthoseendeavors,Ihavenowspentalmosthalfmylifelivingabroad. Finally,thankstomymanyfriendsbackhome,whohaveneverfailedto providemewithananchoringpointandasenseofbelonging,evenafterall theseyears.
ThisbookisforHolly,Annika,andErik,formakingitallworthwhile.
EndreBegby Burnaby,September2020
Introduction
Prejudiceisendemictohumanlife.Itisacontributingcausetomanyofthe persistentillsthatbesetoursocieties:warandconflict,repressionand marginalization,harassmentandbullying.¹Wecanspeculatethatitsorigins maylaydeepintherecessesofthehumanmind,maybeinsomeprimitive urgetomarkadistinctionbetweenselfandothers or,incollectiveterms, betweenusandthem,in-groupandout-group andtoimbuesuchdistinctionswithsignificance.Mostoften,thesedemarcationscometosettleon contingentlysalientmarkers,suchasskincolor,gender,religion,orethnicity.Butitisquitepossiblethattheseserveascommonanchoringpointsof prejudiceonly because theyhappentobesalient.Inprinciple,itseems, prejudicecouldcometofocusonanyoddproperty:afterall,whenitcomes todeterminingaperson’svalueasahumanbeing,whatcouldbemore arbitrarythantheirgenderorskincolor?
Ifprejudiceweremerelyafoibleofindividualminds,wemightnotbeso concernedaboutit.Butitisnot:instead,ittendstospreadoutwards, permeatinglargefeaturesofsociety,consolidatingitselfininstitutional andpara-institutionalstructures,regulatingaccesstosocialopportunities connectedtowork,leisure,education,healthcare,andmore.²Itmustfallto sociologists,economists,andotherstodocumenttheseconsequencesof prejudice.Whatcanphilosopherscontributetoourunderstandingofthis phenomenon?Asmoralphilosophers,our firstinstinctisnodoubtto condemnit.Afterall,itpredictablyleadstoahostofunwarrantedharms. Butprejudicedbeliefalsofallswithinthepurviewofanothernormative vocabulary,namelythatofepistemology.Epistemologistsroutinelyclassify beliefs(andtheepistemicprocessesbywhichweformourbeliefs)as goodorbad,justifiedorunjusti fied,warrantedorunwarranted.And whenphilosophersattempttoviewprejudicethroughthenormativelens ofepistemology,theirconclusionistypicallyswift,clear,andlikewise
¹Foranoverviewofawiderangeof “consequencesofprejudice,” seeHanes,Hanes,and Rudd(2007:chapter11).
²Cf.thenotionof “institutionalracism” developedinCarmichaelandHamilton1967.
negative:noonecanbeepistemicallyjustifiedinholdingaprejudiced belief;prejudicedbelief,wheneveritoccurs,isasymptomofsomekindof breakdownofepistemicrationality.
Thisbookarguesthatthisconclusionisoverhastyandinanimportant senseundulyoptimistic:aswemovetowarda “non-ideal” formofepistemologicaltheorizing emphasizingtheintrinsiccapacitylimitationsof thehumanmind,aswellastheparticularandhighlycontingentinformationalconstraintsthatordinaryagentsareforcedtooperateunder we might findthatthereisnogoodgroundsforsayingthatprejudicedbelief, simplyinvirtueofbeingprejudiced,lacksepistemicwarrant,andthat prejudicedbelieversarealwaysmanifestingsomeformorotherofepistemic irrationality.Inbrief,werelyonothersforinformationinformingour beliefs,andcouldnotdootherwise,giventhekindsofmindsthatwehave. Oursocio-epistemiccontextstherebylimit(forbetterorforworse)the epistemicopportunitiesthatareopentous.Insuf ficientlywarpedsocioepistemiccontexts,theremayjustbenorationalpathtotruebelief:even whenourcognitivecapacitiesareoperatingattheircriticalbest,evenwhen wearedoingeverythingweshould(epistemicallyspeaking),theremaybeno guaranteethattheresultisnotprejudiced.³
Epistemologyissimplytooslenderareedfromwhichtoweaveacomprehensiveaccountofthewrongsofprejudice.Itisimportanttounderstand thattheremaybemanyroutestoprejudicedbelief:whileprejudicemay certainlyarisefromindividualepistemicpathology,itcanalsoarisein rationalresponsetosociallysanctionedandinstitutionallysupported information-structures.AsIwillargue,thisinsightisimportantnotonly inimprovingourconceptualgraspof whatprejudiceis;itcanalsoguide usindevelopingnewinroadsonremedialaction,ultimatelyprovidinganew platformonwhichtovindicatethemoralandlegalstandingofthosewho arevictimizedbyprejudice.
0.1Chapter-by-ChapterOverview
Intheopeningchapter,Ibeginbyprovidingaworkingdefinitionof prejudiceintermsofanegativelychargedstereotypetargetingsomegroup
³Notealsothat,althoughthebookfocusesonprejudicedbelief,thisisessentiallyacase studyonly,a “proofofconcept” oftheviabilityandimportanceofthebroaderframeworkofnonidealepistemology.This frameworkcanalsobemodifiedtoapplytoarangeofotherproblematic socio-epistemicphenomena,suchasconspiracytheoriesandtherecent “fakenews” phenomenon.
ofpeople,andderivatively,theindividualswhocomprisethisgroup.Ithen turntosituatingmyapproachinthelargerlandscapeofcontemporary epistemologicaltheory.Inchapter2,Idrawondevelopmentsinsocialand cognitivepsychologyforinsightintothestructureandfunctionofstereotypes,thecentralcomponentofourdefinitionofprejudice.Inparticular, Iarguethatstereotypesareafundamentalfeatureofhumansocialcognition. Inchapter3,Imakemycasefora “non-ideal” approachtoepistemology. Weneedtoconsiderconstraintsarisingfromdistinctivecapacitylimitations ofthehumanmind(whatIcall “endogenousnon-ideality”)aswellasthose arisingfromspeci ficlimitationsontheinformationenvironmentsthat epistemicagentsareforcedtooperatewithin(“exogenousnon-ideality”). Takinganon-idealapproachtoepistemologydoesnot,however,mean givinguponepistemicnormativityaltogether:tothecontrary,Iarguethat non-idealepistemologyprovidestheonlywayforsuchnormstoprovidea genuinecriticalgriponhumancognitionatall.
Chapters4and5jointlydevelopthecoreofthebook’sargumentthat prejudicedbeliefcanverywellbetheresultofhumancognitivefaculties operatingattheirbestintheirinformationenvironment.Ifthisargumentis successful,itshowsthatnogoodcasecanbemadethatprejudicedbeliefis alwayssymptomaticofsomekindofbreakdownofepistemicrationality. Chapter4considerstheprobleminlightofthe acquisition ofprejudiced belief.Iarguethatcanonsofinductiveinferenceaswellasconsiderations fromtheepistemologyoftestimonystronglysupporttheviewthatindividualscancometoacquireprejudicedbeliefwithoutcompromisingtheir epistemicrationality.Infact,giventheinformationenvironmentsthey findthemselvesin,thesemightwellbethebeliefsthatthey should form, epistemicallyspeaking,inthesimplesensethattheyarethebeliefsthatare bestsupportedbytheirevidence.Thisinsightnaturallyleadsustoconsider thequestionofprejudice maintenance:howcouldanyonebeepistemically rationalinretainingtheirprejudicedbeliefsinthefaceofthesignificant amountsofcontraryevidenceconfrontingthemintheireverydaylives? Inchapter5,Iarguethatmuchofthisevidencecanbeeasilyabsorbed byprejudicedbelievers,inkeepingwithourbestcanonsofepistemic rationality.Drawingonrecentworkongenericgeneralizations,Iargue thatprejudicedbeliefsareinnosensefalsifiedbysinglecontraryinstances, orevenlargerswathsofthem.Evenwhensubjectsarerationallyrequiredto recognizetheseasprovidingcontraryevidence,thecorrectresponsemay simplybetoreduceone’scredenceintherelevantproposition.Theresult maybethattheyaresomewhatlessprejudicedthanbefore.Buttheyarestill
prejudiced,evenas,byhypothesis,theyhaverespondedcorrectlytotheir evidence.(Itwouldbetoosimplistic,then,todismissprejudicesimplyasan instanceof “affectedignorance” (Moody-Adams1994)or “activeignorance” (Medina2013).⁴ Sometimes,tobesure,peopleholdprejudicedbeliefs despitetheirevidenceortakeactivemeasurestoshieldthemselvesfrom relevantevidencenotyetintheirpossession.Butinothercases,itmayjust bethattheirevidentialsituationissetupinsuchawaythateven flawless epistemicrationalitywillleadtoprejudicedbelief.)
Chapters6–8addsignificantlymoredetailtothisbasicaccountofthe epistemologyofprejudice.Sofarwehaveworkedontheassumptionthatthe confrontationwithcontraryevidencealwaysrequiresrationalbelieversto reducetheircredenceintherelevantpropositions.Inchapter6,Iintroduce thenotionof “evidentialpreemption, ” whichoccurswhenatestifier,in additiontoofferingtestimonythat p,alsowarnsthehearerthatotherswill trytopersuadethemofcontraryviews.Iarguethatwheneveritisrational forsomeonetoacceptthe “ground-level” testimonyonoffer,itisalso rationalforthemtoacceptthewarningaboutwhatotherswilltellthem. Now,whentheysubsequentlyareconfrontedwiththiscontrarytestimony, itsevidentialforcehaseffectivelybeenneutralized.Itis,essentially,informationthesubjecthasalreadyconditionalizedon,andwhichwilltherefore notrequiresignificantrevisionofbelief.Inthisway,evidentialpreemption canserveasatoolfor “epistemicinoculation,” allbutensuringthatsubjects cannotmakerationaluseofthecontraryevidencetocorrecttheirbeliefs.
Chapter7introducesadifferentperspective,outliningawaytostudythe socialdynamicsofprejudiceevenintheabsenceof “prejudicedbelievers.” Istartbypointingouthowstereotypes includingprejudicialstereotypes cangovernoursocialinteractionsbywayofprovidinguswith “social scripts.” Iarguethatweoftenhaveincentivestocomplywiththesesocial scriptseveninsituationswherewedon ’tendorsetheircontent.Thisis becausewehavereasontobelievethatothersendorsethesescripts,and becausetherearetypicallysanctionsassociatedwithraisingquestionsabout theirvalidity.Butofcourse,theseothersmaybeinexactlythesame situation.Sowecould findourselvesinapositionwhere noone endorses thestereotypesencodedinoursocialscripts,evenasthesescriptscontinue togovernourmutualinteractionstomuchthesameeffectasthough everyonebelievedthem.Revertingtonotionsof “collective” or “shared” ⁴ Or “whiteignorance” (Mills2007)ifwewereconcernedspecificallywithracialprejudice.
epistemicresponsibilityprovidesnorealtractionwiththesekindsofsituations,nordoesitprovideanynovelperspectivesonremedialaction.Asa casestudy,Ioffertheparadoxof “perceivedelectability,” whereI and presumablymanyothers refrainfromcastingmyvoteforapreferred minoritycandidate,justbecauseIbelieveotherswillnotvoteforher.
Inchapter8,Iaddressrecentconcernsabout “algorithmicbias,” specificallyinthecontextofthecriminaljusticeprocess.Thethreatofalgorithmic biasisinsidiousinthesensethatprejudicedreasoningnowcomestotakeon thesheenofobjectivityandimpartiality.Startingfromarecentcontroversy abouttheuseof “automatedriskassessmenttools” incriminalsentencing andparolehearings,whereevidencesuggeststhatsuchtoolseffectively discriminateagainstminoritydefendants,Iarguethattheproblemhere hasnothinginparticulartodowithalgorithm-assistedreasoning;nor,more surprisingly,isitinanyclearsenseacaseofepistemicbias.Instead,giventhe datasetthatwehavetoworkwith,thereisreasontothinkthatnoimprovementtoourepistemicroutineswoulddeliversignificantlybetterresults. Instead,thebiasiseffectivelyencodedintothedatasetitself,viaalong historyofinstitutionalizedracism.Thispointstowardadifferentdiagnosis oftheproblem,whichIdub “Gendler’sDilemma” (withanodtoGendler 2011):indeeplydividedsocieties,theremayjustbenowaytosimultaneouslysatisfyourmoralidealsandourepistemicideals.
Thisdiagnosis finallybringstotheforethemoral(andsocio-political) dimensionofprejudice,whichoccupiesusinthelasttwochaptersofthe book.Untilthispoint,theargumenthasoperatedontheassumptionthat moralnormativityandepistemicnormativityrunonseparatetracks,steadfastlyfocusingonthelatter.Thisassumptionhasrecentlycomeunder pressurefromdevelopmentssuchas “moralencroachment” and “doxastic morality.” Atstakehereistheideathatincertainmorallycharged scenarios forinstancewherewestandtoimpartunwarrantedharmson othersbyformingcertainbeliefsaboutthem ourepistemicrequirements change:beliefsthatwouldbejustifiedbytheevidenceinamorallyinert scenariomaynolongerbejustifiedoncethe “moralstakes” aretakeninto account.Inthissense,moralitycanactasaconstraintonrationalbelief formation.Afterarguingthatnoneoftheseapproachescanquitecarryout thetasksetforthem,Iturninchapter10toconsideringthepossibilitythat therelationbetweenmoralityandepistemologyinfactrunsintheopposite direction:thattherangeofourepistemicresponsibilityconstrainstherange ofourmoralresponsibility.Thismayinitiallyseemlikeanunwelcomeand inmanywaysdefeatistresolutiontoourinquiry.Tothecontrary,Iargue
thatthisinsightmayinfactputvictimsofprejudiceinabetterpositionto seekredress.Toseehow,considerthatmoralresponsibilityisamultidimensionalconcept:whileitisplausiblethatascriptionsofmoral blame trackascriptionsofepistemicresponsibility,itmayyetbethatotherformsof moralliabilitydonot.Drawingoninsightsfromtortlawanddiscrimination law,Iarguethatthereareimportantformsofmoralresponsibilitywhichcan attacheventoepistemicallyblamelessagents.Iarguethatthisisapotentially liberatinginsight:victims’ claimstohavebeenwrongedshouldinnoway dependontheirabilitytodemonstratethattheirvictimizerswereina positiontoknowthattheiractionswerewrong.Thisfreesvictimsof prejudicefromthesubstantialburdenofhavingtoshowthatprejudiced believersare universally,orinanyspecificcase epistemicallyirrationalin believingastheydo.Quitesimply,thepresumptivelinkbetweenprejudice andepistemicwrongdoingisanextraneousconceptualassociationplacing additionalobstaclesinthepathofremedialaction.
PrejudicefromanEpistemological
PointofView
Aswehavenoted,prejudicedbeliefraisesbothmoralandepistemic concerns.Thereisacleartendencyinthephilosophicalliteraturetoassociatethetwo:somehowthemoralwrongofdiscriminatorytreatment(for example)isgroundedintheepistemicwrongofholdingprejudicedbeliefs againstpeopleinthe firstplace.Theycouldknowbetterandtheyshould knowbetter.Itisinvirtueofcommittingsuchblameworthyepistemicerrors thatprejudicedbelieversmakethemselvesmorallyaccountableforthe harmsthattheirbeliefscause.Ibelievethisisamistake:minimally,we wanttobeinapositiontoclaimthatvictimsofdiscriminationhavebeen wronged longbeforeweareinapositiontoassesstheepistemicsituationof thosewhoperpetratedthediscrimination.Accordingly,wewillbeginby firmlydissociatingthesetwostrandsofthought theepistemicandthe moral soas firsttoinvestigateonitsowntermsthewidespreadsupposition thatprejudicedbeliefmustinvolvesomemannerofepistemicwrongdoing orcognitivepathology.However,wewillreturntothemoralproblemof prejudiceinthebook’sclosingchapters.
Thisbookisprimarilyintendedasacontributiontosituated(or “applied”)socialepistemology.WhatIcall “situated” epistemologyisnot tobeconfusedwiththe “standpointepistemology” familiarfromcontemporaryfeministepistemologyandphilosophyofscience.AsElizabeth Andersonexplains(2015:section2),standpointepistemologyinvolves claimsto “representtheworldfromaparticularsociallysituatedperspective thatcanlayaclaimtoepistemicprivilegeorauthority. ” Alongtheselines, theoppressedworkingclass(followingMarx),women,disabledpersons, andotherrelativelymarginalizedsubjects,arepositionedto know certain thingsthatothers,wholackthesamestandpoint,cannot.Whilethese subjectsaresociallymarginalizedinvariousways,theymaynonetheless therebypossessacertainkindof epistemic privilege,whichgivesthemthe authoritytospeak,speci fically,aboutthenatureandconsequencesoftheir
marginalization.¹VirtuallytheoppositewillbethecaseforwhatIcall “situatedepistemology.” First,andmostobviously,Imakenosupposition thatthesubjectswhoseepistemicsituationweareconsideringaregenerally sociallymarginalized.Second,andmoreimportantly,thereisnowayin whichtheirsituationshouldgiverisetoanyspecialkindofepistemic privilege,speci ficallythatofbeinginaspecialpositionto know (and thereforetospeakto)acertainrangeoftruths.²Ihavenoproblemaccepting theclaimthatprejudicedpeoplearegenerallyignorant(i.e.,thereare certaintruthsthateludethem).Mypointisnotaboutknowledge:instead, Iarguethattheycanverywellbe justifiedinbelieving thethingsthatthey don’tknow.
Asacontributiontosituatedsocialepistemology,itispartofthebook’ s designthatitbecomparativelythinontheorybutrichinapplication.That said,anumberoftheoreticalchoicesandsuppositionsmustgointoshaping theargumentnonetheless.Manyofthesechoiceswillbecontroversial,if onlybecausethetheoreticalfoundationsofepistemologyarecontroversial. Ithinkallthesechoicescanbedefendedasindependentlymotivatedandas jointlyprovidinganaturalandproductivestartingpointforthesortof integrativeperspectiveonsituatedsocialepistemologythatthisbookseeks todevelop.Inthisopeningchapter,Iwillclarifythecentraltheoretical commitmentsthatshapethisperspective,inorder(hopefully)toavert confusionsandobjectionsatlaterstages.Idonotintendanyofthese clarificationsas “knockdownarguments” againstalternativetheoretical approaches.Inothercontextsofinquiry,otherchoicesmaywellbeappropriate.Mycontentionissimplythatthesearegoodchoicestomakeforthe particularorientationofthisbook.(Readerswhoarenotparticularlyinterestedinrecenttheoreticaldiscussionsinepistemologyshouldfeelfreeto skipfromsection1.2tosection1.6.)
1.1DefiningPrejudice
Wewill finditusefultodefineaprejudice,atleastforworkingpurposes, asa negativelychargedstereotype,targetingsomegroupofpeople,and,
¹Forfurtherperspectives,see,e.g.,Medina2013;Toole2019. ²AsMillsargues(2007:15), “[the]ideaofgroup-basedcognitivehandicapis[ ...]a straightforwardcorollaryofstandpointtheory:ifonegroupisprivileged,afterall,itmustbe bycomparisonwithanothergroupthatishandicapped.”
derivatively,theindividualswhocomprisethisgroup.Itisworthnotingfrom theoutsetthatwewilltherebybeapproachingtheconceptofprejudiceina ratherdifferentmannerthan,say,KateMannehasrecentlyapproachedthe conceptofmisogyny.Mannewrites(2017:66):
whenitcomestocallingan agent amisogynistonthewhole,thereare reasonstobecautiousabouttheriskofoverplayingourhandandengaging insomeoftheverymoralismthatattendingtomisogynyteachesustobe waryof.And,ofcourse,therearealsorelevantconsiderationsoffairness. Onegenerallydoesnotwanttoattachashaminglabeltosomeoneinvirtue ofanear-universaltraitofcharacter,attitude,orbehavioraldisposition. Ihencesuggestthattheterm ‘misogynist’ isbesttreatedasa threshold concept,andalsoa comparative one,functioningasakindof ‘warninglabel,’ whichshouldbesparinglyappliedtopeoplewhoseattitudesandactions are particularly and consistently misogynisticacrossmyriadsocialcontexts.
PreciselybecauseIamproposingtodivesttheconceptofprejudiceofits moralisticand “shaming” tone,Ihavenoqualmsabouttreatingprejudiceas a “low-thresholdconcept,” onwhichmostofus,mostofthetime,willbe prejudicedtosomedegreeorother.Thisisnotinanywayacriticismof Manne’sapproach,ofcourse,butratheranillustrationofthefactthat differentapproachesarewarrantedindifferentkindsofinquiry.
Additionalclari ficationsarerequired.First,thisworkingdefinitionidentifiesprejudiceintermsofanunderlyingpsychologicalgeneralization,viz.a stereotype.³Iwilldefendthischoicemorefullyinthenextchapter,with referencetodevelopmentsinpsychologicalresearch.Butfornow,wecan notethatthisentailsthatIcannotreallybesaidtobeprejudicedagainstyou qua individual.Ican,however,beprejudicedagainstyou qua tallperson, slovenlyshaver,SteelyDanfan,etc.Ithinkthisistherightresult:itis importanttodistinguishbetweenprejudiceinthesensethatworries
³Onemightwonder:ifprejudicedbeliefsjustarestereotypesandweroutinelytalkabout positiveaswellasnegativestereotypes,whydowesorarelyheartalkabout “positiveprejudices”?Theanswer,presumably,isthatwesurely could talkaboutpositiveprejudices,evenifwe usuallydon’t:therestrictionshereareentirelyterminologicalratherthanmetaphysical.Butasa matteroffact,theextantliterature(whetherinphilosophy,psychology,orsociology)is primarilyconcernedwithnegativestereotypes,totheextentofgroupingthemtogetherunder adistinctlexeme(i.e., “prejudice”).Myapproachinheritsthisfocus(aswellastheassociated terminology).Butastheargumentsthemselveswillhopefullyservetomakeclear(see,in particular,sections4.1.2–4.1.3),whiletheremaybemoralreasonstofocusonthenegative casesinparticular,thereisnonethelessaclearsenseinwhichthepositiveandnegativecasesare entirelysymmetricalfromanepistemologicalpointofview.
psychologistsandphilosophers,whichisalways filteredthroughsomesort ofgroup-levelgeneralization,andthenegativeattitudesonemightcometo harboragainstparticularindividualsasaresultofhavinghadrepeated, irksomeinteractionswiththem(“oh,no,nothimagain!”).
Anotherissueconcernsthesuppositionthatthestereotypesthatunderlie prejudicedbeliefsmustbenegativelycharged.Thisisarguablyanoversimpli fication,butonethatIthinkcanbedefendedongroundsofexpediency.Theover-simplificationcomestothis:itispossiblethatthereisno comprehensiveclassi ficationofascribablepropertiessuchthatallofthem willbeuniversallyeitherpositive,negative,orneutral.Ofcourse,some propertiesprobablyareuniversallyconsideredasnegative(e.g.,duplicity). Butothersaremoredifficulttoclassify.Thereareahostofproperties frequentlyascribedinsocialcognitionwhich,broadlyspeaking,wewould wanttoclassifyaspositiveorevenadmirabletraits,butwhentheyare deployedinparticularcontextstheymayturnouttobenegativeand “prejudicial.” Oneexamplewouldbethepropertyof “beingcaring,” stereotypicallyascribedtowomen.Thisisgenerallypresumedtobeapositive property.Butitcanclearlybeprejudicialincertaincontexts,suchasasearch foraCEO,whereacertainkindofruthlessnessmightbetakentobeajob qualification.(Conversely,ofcourse,wecanimaginethatthestereotypical imageofmenas “competitive” or “ruthless”—apparentlydesirabletraitsina CEO canlikewiseprejudiceone’schancesofbeinginvitedtocoachone’ s daughter’ssoccerteam.)So,whenIdefineaprejudiceasa “negatively charged ” stereotype,Iamnotsupposingthatallpropertiesonemight ascribeinsocialcognitionareeitherpositive,negative,orneutralwhen consideredintheirownright.Rather,whatIhaveinmindisthatthe propertywouldbegenerallyseenasnegativeintherelevantcontextof deployment.
Finally,avexedquestioniswhetherourworkingdefinitionshouldalso includethesuppositionthatprejudicedbeliefsarefalse.Manyphilosophers whohavewrittenonprejudiceandassociatedphenomenahavetakenthis route.⁴ See,forinstance,LawrenceBlum(2004:256): “Thefalsenessofa stereotypeispartof,andisanecessaryconditionof,whatisobjectionable aboutstereotypesingeneral.”⁵ ButasMirandaFrickerpointsout(2007: 32–3),evenifitshouldturnoutthatprejudicedbeliefsarefalse(simplyin virtueofbeingprejudiced),itisnotclearwhatbearingthisshouldhaveon
⁴ Includingmyself:seeBegby2013.
⁵ Forimportantcriticism,seeBeeghly2015,forthcoming,MS.
theirepistemology.Quitesimply,whetherabeliefistrueorfalsetellsus nothingaboutitsepistemicstanding.⁶ Sowhileitmaybecorrecttosaythat prejudicedbeliefsarefalse,thisadditionalspecificationcarriesnoreal weightinanepistemologicalinquiry.⁷ Wemightnonethelesswantto knowwhetherit is correct.Ifitis,itcanhardly,Ithink,be truebydefinition. (Forinstance,wemaynotethatthereiscurrentlyanemergingbodyof researchclaimingtosupporttheideaof “stereotypeaccuracy ”—i.e.,the notionthattruthpredominatesoverfalsityinstereotypereasoning.⁸ This notionwillplaynocrucialroleinmyownargument,andIcontinueto harborconcernsabouttheunderlyingresearch.(Seesection2.1forabrief discussion.))
Myreasonfornotincludingfalsityinaworkingdefinitionofprejudiceis different.Itstemsfromtherealizationthatstereotypescomeindifferent degreesofabstractness:atsomelevelofabstraction,astereotypemightwell betrue,evenasitiscontextuallydeployedinawaythatsolicitsincorrect inferences.Asacaseinpoint,considertheclaimthatimmigrantpopulations areoverrepresentedincrimestatistics.Inmanyjurisdictions,thisisfactually correct.Theproblem,however,isthatitcontextuallyelicitstheinference thatimmigrantsthereforehavelessrespectforthelaw.Thisinferenceseems tofollownaturally.Butinmanycases,itisactuallydeeplymisguided: immigrantpopulationstend,forinstance,tobesignificantlyyoungerthan overallpopulations;whenthestatisticsarenormalizedwithrespecttoage andotherrelevantdemographicfactors,thecrimeratediscrepancieswill tendtodwindle,oftenfallingbelowthethresholdofstatisticalsignificance.⁹
⁶ Thisis,ofcourse,oneofthemanycontroversialchoicesthatinformthebackgroundtheory ofthisbook.Formoreonthisparticularpoint,seesection1.2below.
⁷ Perhapsonemightthinkthattheclassificationofprejudicedbeliefasfalsebeliefcould mattertoourassessmentofthe moral consequencesofprejudice,ontheassumptionthatnoone couldbewronged(andtherebysufferunwarrantedharm)byatruebelief.Butthiswould, Ithink,beanextremelynaïveview.Inparticular,evenifaprejudicedstereotypeweretrue,in thesenseoftrackingthedemographicdistributionofacertainproperty,itdoesn’tfollowthatit wouldbecorrectlyappliedtoaparticularindividual.Thisiscentraltothelineofargument consideredinchapter9.
⁸ See,inparticular,Jussimetal.2009;Jussim2012.
⁹ ThisexampleisinspiredbyadiscussioninNorwayafteranumberofpoliticiansandmedia organizationsattemptedtoframethepolicydebateonimmigrationintermsofnon-adjusted numbersoncrimeratedisparitiessuppliedbytheNorwegianStatisticsBureau.Onthissee, https://www.faktisk.no/artikler/By/innvandrere-langt-mer-kriminelle-skrev-listhaug-og-viste-tilujusterte-tall.Thisdiscussionbringstomindthe “referenceclassproblem,” oftenrelevantin statisticalresearch.(SeeHajek2007foranoverviewofitsphilosophicalconsequences.) Essentially,thereferenceclassproblemarisesbecauseeveryindividualsimultaneouslybelongs toanumberofdifferent “referenceclasses”:e.g.,young/urban/male/immigrant/Muslim. Significantlydifferentstatisticalprojectionswillbemadeifweidentifyasubjectasbelonging
Butitcanstillbetruetosaythatimmigrantpopulationsareoverrepresented incrimestatistics.
Finally,whatisperhapsmostconspicuouslyabsentfromourworking definitionisthesuppositionthattheprejudicedbeliefbeirrational,held contrarytoevidence,orinsomeotherwaylackinginrelevantepistemic credentials.Thisisregularlytakentobepartofwhatconstitutesabeliefas prejudicial,anditistheburdenofthisbooktoarguethatthisisnotcorrect. Certainly,some possiblymany prejudicedbeliefswillbeirrational.This canhardlybeasurprise:beliefsofvirtuallyanystripecanbeirrationalinthis sense,evenwherethereisampleevidencetosupportthem.¹⁰ Meanwhile,it willbeshownthatrecognizablyprejudicedbeliefscanconstituteaperfectly rationalresponsetoone’sevidenceinmanysocio-epistemiccontexts (onanynotionofepistemicrationalitythatcanusefullyserveinaninquiry suchasthis).
1.2EpistemicNormativity
Epistemologyadoptsanormativeapproachtobelief.Wedorightorwrong informingourbeliefs.Whatconstitutesbeliefsasrightorwronginthe
toonecategoryratherthananother.Awarenessofthesequestionsiskeytoresponsiblepolicymaking.Butthisdoesnotchangethefactthatitmaynonethelessbe true tosaythingsthat aren ’t,ultimately,particularlyexplanatoryorparticularlypredictive.
¹⁰ Cf.thefamiliardistinctionbetweenpropositionalanddoxasticjustification:subjectscan holdavarietyofbeliefs(e.g.,scientificbeliefs)forwhichamplejustificationis available;butthey mightstillnotbejustifiediftheyfailedto avail themselvesofit,orotherwiseprocessedthe evidenceincorrectly.ConcernedreadersmightwanttoknowwhetherIdoinfactholdthatmost (ormany)prejudicedbeliefsareepistemicallyjustifiedinthissense.Ifthequestionweremeant simplytoelicitanempiricallyinformedhunchastowhethermostpeople’sbeliefsinthis particulardomainwerejustified,Iwouldprobablysay “ no. ” Buttofastenonthisanswerwould betomissthelargerpointofthebook,whichistodiscouragephilosophers(andpsychologists, etc.)frommakingsuchbroad-swatheclaimsaboutwhatparticularpeoplewouldbejustified(or not)inbelievingbasedsimplyon our assessmentoftheevidencethatbearsonthequestion,and withoutconsidering their evidentialsituation,andhowtheyprocesstheevidenceattheir disposal.Ifthethesisunderconsiderationisthatthereissomethingintrinsicallyepistemically irrationalaboutprejudicedbelief,arebuttalshouldn’thavetodomorethanpointoutthat,given plausiblesocio-epistemiccontexts,therewouldbeplentyofpossibleroutestojustifiedprejudicedbelief.Modalityiscrucialhere:thequestioniswhetherthey could bejustified,notwhether theyare.Quitegenerally,andwithregardto any typeofbelief,philosophersshouldsimply refrainfromansweringthequestion, “arepeople(generally)justifiedinholdingthesebeliefs?” Withrespecttothequestion, “couldthisparticularpersonbejustifiedinholdingabeliefofthis sort?”,theyshouldcommittoanansweronlyafteracarefulexaminationofthatperson’ s epistemicsituation.
relevantsenseisnot,forinstance,whethertheyareconducivetoamicable socialrelationshipsorincreaseourbiological fitness.Rather,theideaisthat asepistemicagents,wearebeholdentoadistinctiveepistemicnorm roughly,andtobeelaboratedfurtherbelow,thatoneshouldbelievein accordancewithone’sevidence.¹¹Whenweviolatethatnorm,thatis, whenwebelieve withoutevidence or contrarytoourevidence,weopen ourselvesuptoadistinctivesortofsanction:epistemicblame.¹²Asinthe caseofmoralresponsibility,onemightbeinapositiontoclaiman excuse evenincaseswhereoneviolatesthenorm.Butonecouldneverbe “inthe right”—morallyorepistemically whenviolatingtherelevantnorm.
Whilethereareinterestinganalogiesbetweenepistemicandmoralnormativity,thetwodomainsofnormativeassessmentareclearlyseparate. Nonetheless,theycancometogetherinavarietyofways,givingriseto puzzlesaboutwhatone oughttobelieve,allthingsconsidered.Insuchcases, moralandepistemicconsiderationsappeartopullincontrarydirections. Forinstance,formingacertainbeliefmightcauseonetoactinawaythat risksviolatingsomeone’smoralrights.Accordingly,questionsariseasto whethertherearespecialepistemicdutiesofcircumspectionthatapplyin caseswhereone’sbeliefsmightaffectotherpeopleinmorallyimportant ways.Moreradicallystill,wemightwonderwhethertherearecertainthings oneshouldjustresolve onmoralgrounds nevertobelieve,whatever one ’sevidencesays.Wewillhaveoccasiontoexploresuchissuesinmore detailinchapter9.
Theassumptionthatepistemicnormsattachtotherelationbetweenone’ s beliefsandone’sevidencesuggeststhatepistemicnormativityisbestunderstoodasa “process-notion” andnota “product-notion.”¹³Thatis,thenorms applyprimarilytotheprocessbywhichoneformsone’sbelief,andonly derivativelytothebeliefsthatconstitutetheproductofthisprocess.This suppositionleadsnaturallytotherecognitionthatpeoplecanhavefalse beliefswhicharenonethelessinperfectlygoodepistemicstanding.By contrast,somephilosophersinsistthattheepistemicnormdictatesthat oneshouldonlyhavetruebeliefs.Butthiswouldput,forinstance,our ancientancestors(thoughnot only ourancientancestors)inanimpossible position.Presumably,inmanycases,theyjustdidn’thaveaccesstoevidence
¹¹Foraclassicstatement,seeClifford1877.
¹²Fordiscussion,see,forinstance,Lackey2007,Peels2016,Brown2018,andBoult(forthcoming).
¹³Assuch,myapproachhascertainaffinitieswiththe “processreliabilism” associated,for instance,withGoldman1979.Iwillreturntothispointshortly.
thatwouldsupporttruebeliefs.Shouldthey,then,justrefrainfromforming anybeliefsaltogether?¹⁴ Tomymind,thisisunacceptable.First,beliefshave anintimateconnectionwithrationalagency.Andasrationalagents, weoften findourselvesinsituationswherewearerequiredtoactevenon scarceandhighlyuncertainevidence.¹⁵ Butmoreimportantly,they have evidence,evenifthatevidenceisultimately “misleadingevidence,” i.e., evidencethatdoesn’tsupporttruebeliefs.Andfromthepointofviewof epistemicnormativity,oneshouldformthebeliefsthatarebestsupported byone’stotalevidence,includingevidencethatwould withmore knowledge turnouttobemisleadingevidence.Simplyrefrainingfrom forminganybeliefisnotanoption.¹⁶
Inanutshell,then,myviewisthatwecancriticizeaperson’sepistemic standingtobelieveacertainpropositiononlyifwecanmakethecasethat thepropositionisnotsupportedbytheirevidence,orevidencethatthey shouldhavetakenintoconsideration.Thishelpsrefocusourdiscussionof theepistemologyofprejudice,awayfromsomepresumptivemorbidityin thebeliefitself forinstance,itsbeingfalse,orsimplyitsbeingprejudiced andovertowardthesensethatprejudicedbelieversmustbe doingsomething wrongwiththeirevidence inordertoendupbelievingastheydo.
Finally,onemightintuitivelyfeelthatpursuinga “non-ideal” epistemologyofthesortthatIaimtodoheremustriskseriouslycompromisingthe
¹
⁴ Note,then,thatthisisnotaquestionofwhethertheycouldbe excused (afterthefact)for formingfalsebeliefs.Thequestionisrather,giventheirevidencesuchasitwas,whichbelief(s) should theyhaveformed,accordingtoourbestconceptionofepistemicrationality?
¹
⁵ Ofcourse,somephilosophers(e.g.,FeldmanandConee1985;Dougherty2014;Maguire andWoods2020)mightobjecttotheideathereisanyinterfacebetweenournormative conceptionofepistemicrationalityandthenormsofrationalagencymorebroadly.Needless tosay,thisisnottheconceptionthatIhaveinmind:inanyformofsituatedepistemology,we wantourconceptionofepistemicrationalitytointerfaceinproductivewayswithnormsof rationalagencyandreflection.
¹
⁶ Differentlyput,epistemicnormativityisnotinthebusinessofgranting permissionsto believe,only obligationstobelieve:onceanepistemicsubjecthasdeterminedthattheirevidence supports p to n degree,theyfacenofurtherquestionaboutwhattheyshouldbelieve,orevenif theyshouldbelieveanythingatall.(Notethatthisdoesnotentailanyparticularstanceonthe questionof “permissivism” v. “uniqueness” inepistemology(cf.White2005).Thequestionat stakeinthatdebateiswhether,foranybodyofevidence,thereisauniquecredencewhichis the rationalcredencetoadopt,orwhetheravarietyofcredencesarerationallypermissible,solong astheyfallwithinacertainrange.Theargumentsinthisbookdonotdependinanywayon assumingapermissivestanceonepistemicrationalityinthissense(see,e.g.,Schoenfield2012). Evenassuminguniqueness,therewilltypicallybeenoughvariationinpeople’sbackground beliefs(etc.)toexplainwhyitcanberationalforthem,evenastheyupdateonthesame evidence,toendupwithverydifferentcredences.Inanimportantsense,thisisjustwhatis meantbytakinga “situated” approachtoepistemologyandepistemicrationality.(Wewilllook ataspecificexampleofthisinchapter5.))
veryideaofanormativestanceonepistemology.Butitneednotbeso.In chapter3,Iwilldescribetwodistinctdimensionsofnon-idealityinepistemology,whichIwillcallendogenousandexogenousnon-ideality.My pointisthat relative tothesedimensionsofnon-ideality,webothcanand shouldretainanormativeperspectiveonsubjects’ epistemicperformance. Onthisview,thereneedbenothingintrinsicallywrongaboutthenorms discussedintraditional “idealizing ” epistemology.It’sjustthatthesenorms areextremelyabstract.Forthesenormstobeofanyreal,criticalusetous, theymustbecontextualized.Butwhentheyhavebeenappropriatelycontextualized,theycanserveasbenchmarks andquiteexactingonesat that forevaluatingindividualsubjects’ epistemicperformance.Ithinkof non-idealepistemologypreciselyasatemplateforsupplyingthatkindof contextualization.
1.3JustifiedBeliefandEpistemicRationality
Abeliefisjustifiedonlyifitisonethatisrationallyheldinlightofone’ s evidence.We’lltalkinmoredetailaboutevidenceinthenextsection.But evenpendingaclari ficationofwhatonemightmeanby “evidence,” itwill seemthatwearealreadycourtingcontroversyhere,byadoptingan “evidentialist” stanceonepistemology.Someofthesecontroversies,Ibelieve, canbemollifiedifweadoptasuitablyirenicconceptionofevidence.Wecan allow,inparticular,thatevidencecomesinavarietyofheterogeneousforms, forinstance,directobservation,reflection,testimony,andperhapsmost perplexingly,evidenceaboutother(sourcesof)evidence.Whenallofthese formsofevidencearegatheredtogether,Ithinktherealconcernhereshould benotwhetherevidentialismistrue,atsomelevelofabstraction,butrather whetherallthesevarioussourcesofevidencecanbebroughttogetherand calibratedinawaythatwoulduniquelysingleoutonehypothesisoverits manycompetitors.¹⁷ Butthatisachallengethatanyapproachtoepistemologymustcontendwith.
Accordingtosomephilosophers,anepistemicallyrationalbeliefissimply anepistemicallyblamelessbelief.¹⁸ Othersobjecttothisviewby
¹⁷ Notetheconnectionwithdebatesaboutuniquenessandconciliationismintheepistemologyofdisagreement(cf.Elga2007;Christensen2010;Kelly2010).
¹⁸ See,forinstance,Steup1999,aswellasBoothandPeels2010,respondingto Weatherson2008.
emphasizing,asIdidabove,thenotionofanepistemicexcuse.Epistemic excusesattachtounjusti fiedbeliefswhicharenonethelessblameless.Iagree thatjustificationsandexcusesareimportantlydifferentcategories.But Idisagreewiththemotivationsomehaveofferedfortakingthisview. ConsiderStewartCohen’ s “NewEvilDemon” scenario.¹⁹ Asubjectwhich isdupedbyanevildemonintothinkingthattheworldisasitappearstobe mayhavedoneeverythingrightbytheirevidence,saysCohen.Insofaras weviewjustificationasanormativenotion,weoughtalsoholdthat thedupedsubjectisepistemicallyjustifiedinbelievingasshedoes(cf. Cohen1984:282).So-called “epistemicexternalists” (e.g.,Williamson 2000;Littlejohn2012,forthcoming)rejectthisintuitionbutofferinits steadtherecognitionthatthedupedsubjectisofcourseinpossessionofa “cast-ironexcuse” forbelievingasshedoes(Williamsonforthcoming:18). Nonetheless,beingblamelessinbelievingthat p doesnotentailbeingepistemicallyjustifiedinbelievingthat p.
Wewilllookmorecloselyatassociatedexternalistideasinthenext section.Butbriefly,Iseenocompellinggroundsforholdingthatthesubject inthisscenarioisnotjustifiedinbelievingasshedoes.Inparticular,ifshe isn’tsojustified,weoweanexplanationofwhat,then,she should dowiththe evidence(orapparentevidence,pendingclarificationinthenextsection) thatsheisinpossessionof.Accordingtoourbestconceptionofepistemic normativity,shecan’tsimplydisregardit.Weneedtomakeadistinction betweenthepersonwhoformsherbeliefsinaccordancewithwhatshehas reasontobelieveisgoodevidence(evenifitisn’t),andthepersonwho doesn’t.Presumably,thatdistinctionshouldcenterontheideathatthe personwhotakesthe(apparent)evidenceintoaccountinherforming herbeliefsis doingsomethingright,epistemicallyspeaking,thattheother personisnot.²⁰ Andthatnotionof “doingsomethingright” isclearlya
¹⁹ ConsiderationoftheNewEvilDemonmightseemoutofplaceforabooklikethis,and Iagree.ButnotethatwewillbeforcedtoconsiderarebootedandrechargedversionoftheNew EvilDemon,muchmorerelevanttoourpresentconcerns,inchapter3.
²⁰ Onewaytomeetthisobjectionwouldbetoreverttoadistinctionbetween “prescriptive norms ” and “evaluativenorms” (cf.Simionetal.2016).Thisviewessentiallycedesthepoint aboutwhatthesubjectshoulddowiththeirevidence,whileinsistingthattheresultingbeliefs should also beevaluatedaccordingtoaseparatenorm,whichnofalsebeliefcouldsatisfy. Essentially,then,wewouldhavedistinctnormsforprocessandproduct.Ihavenoobjectionto thisviewperse,but findnousefortheputativeevaluativenorm.(Imightalsoaddthatifthe evaluativenormisgenuinelynotprescriptive,thenitpresumablycannotgiverisetoanykindof “epistemicdilemma” forasubjectwhoisfacingevidencestronglysupportingafalseproposition.Whatshe shoulddo issimplytoformherbeliefsinaccordancewithherevidence.Ifthe
process-notion,andcannotthereforebedependentontheproductofthe processconformingtosomeexternalstandard,e.g.,beingtrue.
Importantly,though,thisisnottosaythatthenotionofjustifiedbelief collapsesintothatofblamelessbelief.Itakeadifferentapproachhere.The normsbearingonepistemicagencyarepotentiallyveryexacting;theycanbe drainingbothintheirownright,andespeciallysowhencombinedwith othercircumstantialpressures.Inbrief,Ithinkwecanmakegoodsenseof theideaofexcusableperformanceerrorsasmarkingadistinctionbetween justifiedandblamelessbelief.Ifsomeoneisfacingseriousfatigueoris runningupagainstthelimitsofcomputationalcomplexity,weroutinely forgivethemcertainepistemiclapses.Thisisinnowaytosay,however,that theyarejustifiedinbelievingastheydo.(Iwillreturntothispointin chapter2.)
1.4Evidence,Truth,andKnowledge
Ifevidenceiswhatjustifiesbelief,whatthenisevidence?Thisturnsouttobe asurprisinglydifficultquestiontoanswerinanyilluminatingway. Nonetheless,here’sanattemptthatIfavor:evidenceisanybitofinformationthatincreasesordecreasestheprobabilityofahypothesisunder consideration.²¹Onsuchanapproach,itshouldbeclearthattherewillbe alot ofevidenceintheworld,andthattherelationshipbetweenevidence andhypothesiscanbeverycomplexindeed.
A firstthingtonoteisthatevidenceprovidesdifferentdegreesofsupport forahypothesis.Forinstance,hearingyourneighborsshoutingwithjoyis evidencethatthelocalteamjustscoredagoal.However,itisweaker evidencethanwatchingthegoalhappenvialivetransmission.
Evidentialsupportcanalsobesurprisingandindirect.Forinstance, supposewehaveadeckoftenrandomlydrawncards.Weturnoneover theaceofspades.Thisisevidenceforthehypothesisthatnoneofthecards inthedeckisajack.But,ofcourse,itisevidenceonlyinthecircumstantial sensethatthehypothesis noneofthecardsisajack is “leftstanding” even evaluativenormisnotprescriptive,thenthereisno “should” accordingtowhichsheshould onlyformtruebeliefs.)
²¹ThismirrorsthestandardBayesiandefinitionofevidence,onwhichEisevidenceforHiff theprobabilityofHgivenEisgreaterthantheprobabilityofHalone(P(H│E)>P(H)),and converselyforE’sbeingevidenceagainstH.Onthis,seeforinstance,Kelly(2006/2014).
