Acknowledgments
I spent summer of 2015 in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Indonesia, exploring materials for a project on transnational capital in Asia. On a very hot day in June, I crossed the border for a long day of meetings and took a break for lunch with a very wealthy entrepreneur in Shenzhen. During lunch, as I was freezing in an overly air-conditioned restaurant, my companion was sweating with increasing unease, watching his three phones as stock markets in Shenzhen and Shanghai were in free fall. He told me he had lost a considerable sum as we were eating, and I offered to get the bill. He said something along the lines of “No worries; this is basically a casino for me, and anyway I am sure the government won’t let important firms really collapse.” His comment did not seem surprising at first, but I returned to it again and again while watching the financial turmoil unfold over the next couple of years. I did end up writing a book somewhat about transnational capital in Asia, but not the one I expected to write. By the time of the book’s completion, as the Chinese Communist Party was turning on capitalists once again and financial scandal contributed to political turmoil in Malaysia, I knew it was the right project.
The set of questions that would motivate this book emerged during my years as an assistant and associate professor at Harvard Business School. I would like to say the questions were all my own, but, alas, I cannot. Scholarly life in an interdisciplinary department and interaction with practitioners confront me with large, comparative, and temporally expansive questions about China. My students and colleagues puzzle over the long-term sustainability of debt in China, why firms look the way they do, and why Chinese entrepreneurs even bother when they can theoretically be expropriated by the state at any moment, to name a few. The more I tried to answer these questions, the deeper they revealed themselves to be. The ideas in this book would have never come to fruition without the general education I get (and try to give) in the classroom and the hallways of campus. I am grateful to my current and former co-teachers, including Rawi Abdelal, Rafael DiTella, Kristin Fabbe, Jeremy Friedman, Peter Katzenstein, Akshay Mangla, Vincent Pons, Sophus Reinert, Dante
Roscini (who taught me how to read a bank balance sheet at some predawn hour), Gunnar Trumbull, Matt Weinzierl, and Eric Werker, who were all part of a mutual aid society of sorts. I have also been enriched by conversations with Alberto Cavallo, Matts Fibiger, Reshma Hussam, Charlotte Robertson, Marco Tabellini, Marlous van Waijenburg, and Jaya Wen. Several of my colleagues read parts of this book in progress. I thank Rawi Abdelal, Caroline Elkins, Kristin Fabbe, Charlotte Robertson, Gunnar Trumbull, Marlous van Waijenburg, Matt Weinzierl, and Jaya Wen for their critical help. Matts Fibiger not only read the work but also helped with sources for Indonesia. Sophus Reinert provided critical feedback and camaraderie. I owe a special debt to the late Julio Rotemberg, whose improbable intellectual mentorship enriched my life immensely. He told me that working on how businesspeople behave would be fun; as with most things, he was right.
Rick Doner introduced me to political economy and Southeast Asia when I was much younger and has encouraged me in the decades since. I will always be grateful to Elizabeth Perry for my training in Chinese politics and her good judgment and support; I will always be her student. It is my great fortune to be part of the larger Harvard China and Asia community. I am grateful to Bill Alford, Nara Dillon, Dinda Elliott, Mark Elliott, Bill Hsiao, Iain Johnston, Bill Kirby, Dan Murphy, Bill Overholt, Dwight Perkins, James Robson, Tony Saich, Michael Szonyi, Karen Thornber, Mark Wu, and Winnie Yip for engaging my ideas or helping me socialize them. I am especially delighted to benefit from a younger generation of Harvard China comrades: Arunabh Ghosh, Li Jie, Daniel Koss, Ya-Wen Lei, Yuhua Wang, Mark Wu, and David Yang. Roderick MacFarquhar and Ezra Vogel were sources of support and constructive challenge. I was lucky to learn from them as a student and be treated graciously as a colleague. We all miss them dearly. Warren McFarlan has been a booster, a mentor, and a mensch. Having his name on my card has elicited admiration from people I have met all over Asia, and it is a privilege to take on the mantle.
The research for this book took many years and spanned several countries. A leave year in 2016–2017 enabled me to spend time in at the Asia Research Institute at the National University of Singapore and in Shanghai. ARI was a terrific home in Singapore, and the NUS Southeast Asia and Chinese collection librarians were wonderfully helpful. Singapore was a great base for travel to Malaysia and Indonesia, where I was grateful to the many businesspeople, political elites, and bureaucrats who tolerated my slow education in Southeast Asian politics and business. I especially appreciate Essie Alamsyah, Khazanah
Nasional Berhad, Li-Kai Chen, George Hendrata, George Hendropropriyono, Jomo KS, Tom Lembang, Ray Pulungan, and Datuk Othman Yusoff for help in Indonesia and Malaysia. In China, I thank Nancy Dai, Huang Jingsheng, Dawn Lau, Lin Shu, Wang Yi, and especially Bonnie Cao at HBS’s Asia Pacific Research Office, as well as scholars from the China Academy of Social Sciences, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Fudan, East China Normal, Peking, Tsinghua, Renmin, and Nanjing Universities for invaluable discussions and help in the field. The names of scholars, businesspeople, regulators, and citizens in China who helped me do not appear here, but I could not have written most of the other words without them.
My own collaborators over the last several years have contributed immensely to my own intellectual growth and to the research in this book. Chen Hao has been a thoughtful interlocutor and friend, and the research in the chapters on China would not have been possible without him. Margaret M. Pearson and Kellee S. Tsai have been mentors, partners, and inspiring examples in a great many things during an especially challenging time. Li Yihao literally traveled the earth with me, and it is a miracle his patience survived.
Harvard Business School invested considerable resources in this project. I thank the Department of Faculty Research and Development and especially the school’s Global Research Fellowship for support on research and travel. Victoria Liublinksa and Christine Rivera from Research Computing Services lent their talents to this work, and the Baker Library team was professional, patient, and always helpful. I thank Alex Caracuzzo, Katy McNeill, Linda Rosen, Rhys Sevier, and James Zeitler for help in accessing, organizing, and visualizing data in these chapters. Lin Poping introduced me to the world of Chinese bond prospectuses. Richard Lesage and Ma Xiao-He from Harvard’s libraries provided critical help in acquiring sources. Nancy Hearst did that and also read every single word of this book and cleaned up my mess of footnotes. I am so grateful for her editorial skills in addition to her wonderful library.
A small army of overqualified research assistants spent their valuable time helping me. These include Essie Alamsayah, Jamie Chen, Nathan Cisneros, Galit Goldstein, Irene Guo, David Hicks, Alexa Jordan, Yihao Li, Elizabeth Lively, Paul Sedille, Jing Shang, Mike Shao, Zhiming Shen, Leticia Smith, Seth Soderborg, Kaitlyn Sydlowski, Yuhao Wang, and Zhiying Xie. I am terrifically grateful to Angelin Oey and Liu Jingyu for their time and patience with Indonesian and Chinese materials respectively.
Many people read parts of this book and provided helpful feedback, though they surely do not agree with all of what follows. I thank Ling Chen,
Nara Dillon, Martin Dimitrov, Yue Hou, Chang-Tai Hsieh, Roselyn Hsueh, Yasheng Huang, Diana Kim, Arthur Kroeber, Doreen Lee, Maggie Lewis, YiMin Lin, Kristen Looney, Eddy Malesky, Dan Mattingly, Sean McGraw, Jonas Nahm, Barry Naughton, Jean Oi, Lynette Ong, Jen Pan, Tom Pepinsky, Maria Repnikova, Scott Rozelle, Tony Saich, Victor Shih, Yeling Tan, Ashutosh Varshney, Andrew Walder, Jeremy Wallace, Carl Walter, Saul Wilson, and Logan Wright. I also appreciate Tom Remington, who initially prodded me to focus on finance, and Adi Sunderam, who did his best to make sure I did not make mistakes on finance. Needless to say, he is not to blame if I did. I am especially grateful to Dan Slater and John Yasuda for engaging with the whole project so constructively. My special thanks to Stacy Tan for educating me about intricacies of China’s financial regulation and, again, preventing me from making mistakes. David McBride from Oxford University Press supported this project from the very beginning and was patient with all my delays. Lyndsey Willcox and Sarah Antommaria provided invaluable logistical help on this and many things. Dave Barboza and Lin Zhang read the work, provided helpful feedback, and kindly contributed rich data.
For a book largely about dangerous and fragile relationships, I am fortunate to have strong ones. I am certain I taxed them all in writing this book. Jill Bolduc, Veronica Herrera, Ryan and Tammy Hickox, Brad Holland, Nia Maya James, Phil Jones, Rita Kraner, Didi Kuo, Kristen Looney, Sean McGraw, Jonas Nahm, Kang-Kuen Ni, Ann Owens, Christine Pace, and Annie Temple all helped me stay afloat and reminded me to play outside. My husband, Dave Hampton, left his job as a public interest lawyer for a year to allow us to spend time in Asia. Thank you for coming on this ride and for your patience with me as I did this work. My mother, Maxine Rithmire, mother-in-law, Betty Ford Hampton, and my brother-in-law, Jeff Hampton, took turns helping Dave while I was traveling. Dave and I are lucky to have this family. We lost my father, Jack, in 2020. He was the kind of man happy to watch the women around him shine, and his belief in me motivates me still.
My children, Theo and Maxine, actively impeded the completion of this book, but of course that is their job, and it is my absolute privilege to watch them do it so well. Raising them, especially in a pandemic, would not have been possible for us were it not for the community of people who care for them. These people also taught me how to parent and cared for me, too. For this, I will always be grateful to Peabody Terrace Children’s Center, Ariela Weinbach, Grace Foster, and especially Amelia Kraus. I dedicate this book to them; my work is only possible because of theirs.
Abbreviations
1MDB Malaysia Development Berhad (state-owned investment fund)
AFC Asian Financial Crisis
BCA Bank Central Asia
BDNI Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia
BEE Bumiputera Economic Empowerment program
BEJ Bursa Efek Jakarta (Indonesia Stock Exchange)
BERITA British Malaysian Industry and Trade Association
BI Bank Indonesia
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BKPM Investment Coordinating Board
BLBI Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia
BMA British Malayan Administration
BN Barisan Nasional (National Front, Malaysia)
BPK Supreme Audit Agency
BPPN Badan Penyahayan Perbankan Nasional (Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency)
BRI Bank Rakyat Indonesia
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BTN Bank Tabungan Negara (State Savings Bank)
BTO bank takeover
CBE commune and brigade enterprise (China)
CBRC China Regulatory Banking Commission
CCDI Central Commission on Discipline Inspection (China)
CDRC Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (Indonesia)
CEFC China Energy Company, Ltd.
CFWC Central Financial Work Commission (China)
CIC Capital Issuance Committee (Malaysia)
CITIC China International Trust and Investment Corporation (中信)
CMIG China Minsheng Investment Group
CSRC China Securities Regulatory Commission
DAP Democratic Action Party (Malaysia)
DTC deposit-taking cooperative
ECRL East Coast Rail Link (Malaysia)
EPF Employees Provident Fund (Malaysia)
FDI foreign direct investment
FELDA Federal Land Development Authority (Malaysia)
FI financial institution
FYP five-year plan
GLC government linked corporation (Malaysia)
GLCT Government Linked Companies Transformation Programme (Malaysia)
GLIC government linked investment company
IBRA Indonesia Banking Restructuring Agency
ICA Industrial Coordination Act (Malaysia)
ICIJ International Consortium of Investigative Journalists
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOI property development and palm oil plantation conglomerate (Malaysia)
JKSE Jakarta Composite Stock Index
JSX Jakarta Stock Exchange
KKN corruption-collusion-nepotism
KLSE Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (now known as Bursa Malaysia)
KMT Guomindang, Nationalist Party (China)
KNB Khazanah Nasional Berhad (Sovereign Wealth Fund) (Malaysia)
KPB Konsortium Perkapalan Bhd (Malaysia)
KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (anticorruption commission, Indonesia)
KWAP Retirement Fund Incorporated (Malaysia)
LGFV local government financing vehicle (China)
LTAT Armed Forces Savings Fund (Malaysia)
LTH Pilgrim’s Savings Fund (Malaysia)
M&A merger and acquisition
MARA Majlis Amanah Rakyat
MCA Malayan Chinese Association
MCP Malayan Communist Party
MIC Malayan Indian Congress
MIDF Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Berhad
MLB Ministry of Land Resources (China)
MoF Ministry of Finance (China)
MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce (China)
MPAJA Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army
MUI Malaysia United Industries
NEAC National Economic Advisory Council (Malaysia)
NEM New Economic Model (Malaysia)
NEP New Economic Policy (Malaysia)
NOC National Operations Council (Singapore)
NPL nonperforming loan
NUS National University of Singapore
OCBC Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation (Singapore)
Abbreviations
OFDI outward foreign direct investment
P2P peer-to-peer lending
PAP People’s Action Party (Singapore)
PAS Islamic Party of Malaysia
PBoC People’s Bank of China
PCMA Perak Chinese Mining Association (Malaysia)
PERNAS Perbadanan Nasional Berhad
PETRONAS Malaysia’s National Oil Company
PGRM Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People’s Movement Party)
PKI Parti Kommunist Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia)
PKP anticorruption commission
PKR People’s Justice Party (Malaysia)
PNB Permodalan Nasional Berhad (Malaysia)
PPP People’s Progressive Party (Malaysia)
PRC People’s Republic of China
PSP Soehargo Gondokusumo’s Bank (Indonesia)
RHB financial services group and bank (Malaysia)
RIDA Rural Industrial Development Authority (Malaysia)
RoC Republic of China
SAFE State Administration of Foreign Exchange (China)
SASAC State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (China)
SDR Special Drawing Rights
SEDC State Economic Development Corporation
SEZ special economic zone
SIP Singapore-Suzhou Industrial Park (新加坡苏州工业园区) (China)
SME small- and medium-sized enterprise
SOE state-owned enterprise
TNI Indonesian Republican Military Forces
TVE town and village enterprise (China)
UEM engineering company (Malaysia)
UI Universitas Indonesia
UMNO United Malay National Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
YTL construction company (Malaysia)
1 The Foundations of State-Business Relations in Authoritarian Asia
For most authoritarian regimes, whether political elites are able to control economic elites is a fundamental factor in the regime’s survival and achievement. For all economies save those in which the state plans production and consumption, authoritarian rulers face the dilemma of needing to discipline but also to cultivate the business class. They must ensure that capitalists, who have substantial access to economic resources, do not organize against the regime, but excessive control of economic elites precludes them from investing in growth. For the past half-century at least, the vast majority of nondemocratic regimes have been in developing countries with at least partial market economies. As a result, political elites have faced demands to generate economic growth, but they have not entirely controlled whether and how their investments are allocated. Failing to strike a balance between disciplining and courting the business class can have catastrophic results for authoritarian rulers, either by generating political dissent, by precipitating economic crisis through capital flight, or through the kind of slow-churning economic stagnation that leaves one generation no better off than the last.
Capitalists in late-developing countries have not, in general, been agents of political liberalization.1 Although a classical literature in social science credits the bourgeoisie with agitating for political democratization in the past, more contemporary portraits of the business class in authoritarian regimes have settled in the opposite direction, focusing on capitalists as a source of “authoritarian resilience.” State-business relations in most developing countries are more often viewed as “money politics” or “crony
1 Eva Bellin, “Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in LateDeveloping Countries,” World Politics 52, no. 2 (2000): 175–205; Eva Bellin, Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor, and the Paradox of State-Sponsored Development (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).
Precarious Ties. Meg Rithmire, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197697528.003.0001
capitalism” than as “no bourgeoisie, no democracy.”2 Scholars have focused on the roles of capitalists in corruption networks, enriching rulers and their families and securing privileged access for themselves at the expense of the society at large rather than their role in challenging political elites. I argue in this book that the empirical reality is somewhere in between. Although capitalists have not marched in the streets to take down autocratic regimes, they have contributed indirectly to many cases of regime change and collapse, either by precipitating economic crisis or by eroding regime legitimacy through extensive crony networks. In essence, business elites have generally been tied to autocrats, but those ties have been precarious.
This book answers a series of theoretical questions about the delicate relationship between capitalists and autocrats. What strategies do authoritarian political elites adopt to manage the business class? What kinds of strategies succeed, for example, to secure political stability and economic growth, and what kinds fail, either by stymieing economic growth or by generating regime instability? In pursuing these questions, I posit an additional empirical and theoretical puzzle: Why do elite relationships in authoritarian regimes so often begin as partnerships for growth but then disintegrate into corruption, authoritarian decay, and, frequently, regime collapse?
I explore these questions and this puzzle in the context of three authoritarian regimes in developing Asia: Indonesia under Suharto’s New Order, Malaysia under the Barisan Nasional (BN), and China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The political and economic experiences of these three Asian authoritarian regimes present numerous empirical puzzles. China under the CCP—the same regime that sought to exterminate the capitalist class between the 1940s and 1960s—has experienced dramatic economic growth and political stability since the market reforms began in 1978.3 The BN in Malaysia, a coalition held together by a shared commitment to capitalism and fear of Communist movements and national disintegration, executed a decades-long policy of radical economic redistribution with relative success, all the while sustaining its monopoly on political
2 This is Barrington Moore’s famous statement. See Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996). As Kellee S. Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 5, points out, this statement is most frequently taken out of context; Moore is characterizing past roles rather than predicting a general role for capitalists.
3 The 1989 Tiananmen protests can be considered the only time the CCP’s monopoly on political control was challenged.
power. Meanwhile Suharto’s Indonesia, a regime founded in part on a “beautiful friendship” between Suharto—the “father of development”—and a politically marginal but economically dominant group of Chinese capitalists, survived for over thirty years and did not collapse until following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–98, when the beautiful friendship unraveled rapidly with disastrous consequences for all.4 Despite their different origins and orientations toward the business class, all three regimes have been characterized as facilitating a kind of “crony capitalism,” or, in China’s case, “crony communism.”5
Why have regimes supposedly founded on alliances between autocrats and capitalists witnessed dramatic betrayals? Why has the regime with the most punitive history toward business elites outperformed others in both economic growth and political stability? Why did business-state relations in all three regimes come to be seen as “crony,” and why do some crony arrangements generate growth and political stability, whereas others generate stagnation or crisis?
The answers to these questions, I argue, are uncovered by examining how different patterns of state-business relations come about and how, in turn, these patterns affect political stability and allocation of economic resources. Specifically, I show how political trust between groups of capitalists and autocrats, established during the regime-formation phase, and the coherence of those regimes’ control of financial resources, which changes over time, generate different patterns of state-business relations. In addition to developing a theory on the origins of the patterns of state-business relations, this book offers conceptual development in characterizing state-business relations. I move beyond the blunt characterization of “co-optation” or cronyism to develop two models of relationships between capitalists and authoritarian regimes—mutual alignment and mutual endangerment— and generate hypotheses about their respective political and economic outcomes.
4 The term “beautiful friendship” comes from Liem Sioe Liong, aka Sudono Salim, Suharto’s top Chinese crony. Nancy Chng and Richard Borsuk, Liem Sioe Liong’s Salim Group: The Business Pillar of Suharto’s Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014), 2.
5 On China, see Bruce J. Dickson, Wealth into Power: The Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s Private Sector (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Minxin Pei, China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Andrew Hall Wedeman, Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012).
The Limits of “Co-optation” and “Cronyism”
The issue of the power relations between capitalists and states has animated debates among social scientists and public intellectuals for centuries. Social theorists, especially those working in the Marxist tradition, have long argued that the capitalist class controls the state, but they have differed in their articulation of the mechanism by which this has occurred. A classic debate between Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas in the pages of the New Left Review in the 1960s over the means of bourgeois state capture laid the foundation for a more contemporary debate among social scientists about the relative importance of structural and instrumental power. Miliband, like C. Wright Mills, endeavors to show that members of the ruling class come from and share extensive social ties with economic elites, therefore compromising the autonomy of the state apparatus. Poulantzas’s critique is that it does not matter who actually participates in governing the state apparatus because the function of the state in a capitalist system is to facilitate capital accumulation regardless of the articulation of interests.6 Democratic and authoritarian regimes alike are alleged to be constrained by this “structural power” of capital, forced to capitulate to the interests of capital-holders or face the consequences of the withholding or withdrawal of investment.7 With some exceptions, the focus on structural power has waned, in part because hypotheses about structural power are difficult to falsify and conceptions of power are overly blunt and predominantly unidirectional.8
An older literature on the instrumental or network power of business and capitalists has found a modern iteration in research on oligarchs. Mancur Olson predicted that capitalists would collude with political allies to form “distributional coalitions” to divert resources toward themselves and away
6 Nicos Poulantzas, “The Problem of the Capitalist State,” New Left Review, no. 158 (1969): 67; Ernesto Laclau, “The Specificity of the Political: The Poulantzas-Miliband Debate,” Economy and Society 4, no. 1 (1975): 87–110, https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147500000002; Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969).
7 For a recent review, see Pepper D. Culpepper, “Structural Power and Political Science in the Postcrisis Era,” Business and Politics 17, no. 3 (2015): 391–409, https://doi.org/10.1515/bap-2015-0031; Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World’s Political Economic System (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, “Structural Dependence of the State on Capital,” American Political Science Review 82, no. 1 (1988): 11–29, https://doi.org/10.2307/1958056
8 Culpepper, “Structural Power.” See also David Vogel, “Political Science and the Study of Corporate Power: A Dissent from the New Conventional Wisdom,” British Journal of Political Science 17, no. 4 (1987): 385–408.
from more socially beneficial uses, a phenomenon Jagdish Bhagwati calls “directly unproductive profit-seeking” and others may refer to more casually as “cronyism.”9 Indeed, social science research has substantiated the idea that political connections benefit firms. In contexts from Egypt to Indonesia and China, firms with identifiable political connections appear to be rewarded with greater profitability or greater access to resources when their friends are in power and they are punished by markets when their political connections are jeopardized.10
With a few exceptions, it is this particularistic power of capitalist elites, rather than the generalized structural power of capital, that has been the focus of political economy scholars in their attempts to explain why some authoritarian regimes in the developing world manage to generate growth and investment as well as variation in regime stability and longevity.11 Unsurprisingly, a greater concentration of wealth in the hands of a small elite is argued to have a deleterious effect on both economic growth and political freedom and equality. A rich literature in economics has demonstrated that what is described broadly as “cronyism”—corrupt and personalistic connections to political leaders—diverts important resources and decreases efficiency in ways that reduce overall economic growth.12 For their part, political scientists have examined the role of economic inequality and wealth concentration on political equality in democracies, arguing, as Jeffrey Winters has in the case of contemporary democratic Indonesia,
9 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Jagdish N. Bhagwati, “Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities,” Journal of Political Economy 90, no. 5 (1982): 988–1002.
10 Ishac Diwan and Marc Schiffbaue, “Private Banking and Crony Capitalism in Egypt,” Business and Politics 20, no. 3 (2018): 1–20, https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2018.1; Raymond Fisman, “Estimating the Value of Political Connections,” American Economic Review 91, no. 4 (2001): 1095–102, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.4.1095; Rory Truex, “The Returns to Office in a ‘Rubber Stamp’ Parliament,” American Political Science Review 108, no. 2 (2014): 235–51; Yue Hou, The Private Sector in Public Office: Selective Property Rights in China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Simon Johnson and Todd Mitton, “Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from Malaysia,” Journal of Financial Economics 67, no. 2 (2003): 351–82, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00255-6.
11 For one such exception, see Jeffrey A. Winters, “Power and the Control of Capital,” World Politics 46, no. 3 (1994): 419–52 and Jeffrey A. Winters, Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
12 Anne O. Krueger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review 64, no. 3 (1974): 291–303, https://doi.org/10.2307/1808883; Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel, Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty of Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Ishac Diwan, Adeel Malik, and Izak Atiyas, eds., Crony Capitalism in the Middle East: Business and Politics from Liberalization to the Arab Spring (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). For a constructivist take, see Leonard Seabrooke, The Social Sources of Financial Power: Domestic Legitimacy and International Financial Orders (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).
