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Pragmatics Pragmatics ASLIMGUIDE BettyJ.Birner
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Acknowledgments Thanksareduetomanypeople,butespeciallythese:
IamgratefultoLarryHornandGregoryWardforhelpfulcomments anddiscussion,andespeciallytoJeffKaplanforextensive,thorough,and deepcommentsoneverychapter.IamgratefultoJeffEinbodenfor discussionsthatremindmehowmuchfunresearchcanbe.Ithank ShahrzadMahootianbothforhelpfuldiscussionsandcomments,andfor savingmysanityoninnumerableoccasions.
Ithanktwoanonymousreviewersforcommentsthathavevastly improvedthisbook especiallyReviewer1’stwelvepagesofsinglespacedcomments.Idon’tknowwhoyouare,butI’mgrateful.
Finally,andalways,IthankAndyandSuzanne,myhusbandanddaughter,whoputthejoyinmylife.
1 Introduction Ifyou’vegivenitanyseriousthought,youknowthattherecanbeabig differencebetweenwhatyousayandwhatyouactuallymeanbyit.To takeasimpleexample,peoplerarelystaterequestsforthrightly;instead, theyhedgetheirrequestsinavarietyofways:
(1)a.Givemethatbook.
b.Canyougivemethatbook?
c.Wouldyoumindgivingmethatbook?
d.Ineedthatbook.
e.I’dappreciateitifyouwouldgivemethatbook.
Insteadofstatingtherequestoutright,asin(1a),speakerswillfrequently askaboutthehearer’sabilitytofulfilltherequest(1b)orhowthey’dfeel aboutdoingso(1c),orthey’llcommentontheirownneedfortherequest tobefulfilled(1d)orhowthey’dfeelifitwere(1e).Butamoment’ s thoughtwillshowthatonly(1a)isliterallyarequestforthebook.It’ sa curioussituation:We’vedevelopedawiderangeofwaystomakesomeoneunderstandusashavingaskedthemforabookwhenwehaven’t literallydonesoatall.Whatonearthisgoingon?
What’sgoingon,simplystated,ispragmatics.Pragmaticsisthe field oflinguisticsthatstudiesmeaningincontext specifically,howa hearerunderstandsanotherperson’sintendedmeaningbasedonwhat they’vesaidandthecontextinwhichthey’vesaidit,andhowspeakers crafttheirutteranceswiththatinmind.Inshort,pragmaticsisthestudy oftherelationshipbetweenwhatissaidandwhatismeant,andbetween whatismeantandwhatisunderstood.
AsReddy(1979)observes,theEnglishlanguagehasapervasivemetaphorinwhichwesimply ‘putourmeaningintowords’,then ‘conveyit’ tothehearer,who ‘getsit’ (ordoesn’tgetit,ormaybeit ‘goesrightpast them’ orgoes ‘overtheirhead’).ReddycallsthistheConduitMetaphor. But,hepointsout,themetaphorismisleading:Mymeaningisnever conveyedoutofmyheadandintoyours;instead,communicationisa complicatedandcollaborativeprocessbywhichaspeakerencodes meaningintoaseriesofsounds(orsigns,insignedlanguages,orwritten symbols),whichinturnserveessentiallyasinstructionstothehearerfor buildingacorrespondingsetofideasintheirownmind.Andbecausethe hearer’smentalworldisinevitablydifferentfromthespeaker’smental world,themeaningthatgetsconstructedwillinevitablydifferslightlyas well.(ImagineItellyouIhaveacat.Thecatyouimaginewilldifferin innumerablewaysfromthecatbeingimaginedbyanyotherperson readingthisbook,andfromthecatthatIhaveinmind.)
Aswehavenoted,pragmaticsisa fieldoflinguistics.Linguistics,in turn,isthescientificstudyoflanguage.The ‘scientific ’ partisimportant: Becauseit’sscientific,linguisticsis descriptive whichmeansthat linguiststrytodescribetherulesthatgovernourlanguageuse.You maybefamiliarwithruleslike ‘don’tuseadoublenegative’ and ‘don’t endasentencewithapreposition’,butthoserulesare prescriptive, notdescriptive;theyprescribewhatsomeonethinksyou should do. Adescriptiveruledescribeswhatyouinfactdo.Adescriptiveruleof Englishmightsay,forexample,thatadeterminerlike the goesinfrontof anounlike cat toresultinaphraselike thecat. NoEnglishspeakerwould eversay*catthe.(Theasteriskindicatesthatit’sungrammaticalinthe descriptivesensethatspeakersdon’tdoit notintheprescriptivesense thatteacherstellyounottodoit.)Linguistsdescribetheworkingsof languageanditspartsinmuchthesamewaythatbotanistsdescribethe workingsofplantsand flowers,andgeologistsdescribetheworkingsof mineralsandtectonicplates.
Linguisticshasvarioussubfields:syntax,forexample,isthestudyof sentencestructureandexplainsfactssuchaswhyyoucan’tsay *catthe in English.Semantics,whichwe’lltalkaboutbrieflyinthischapter,isthe studyofliteral,conventionalmeaning forexample,themeaningofthe
word cat.It’stheaspectofmeaningthatspeakersofalanguageshare, moreorless;forexample,althoughwe’llallpictureaslightlydifferent cat,Englishspeakersingeneralagreeonwhattheword cat means.That meaningisconventional;weshareitbytacitlyagreed-uponconvention. Pragmatics,ontheotherhand,coversthevastamountofmeaningthat goesaboveandbeyondsemantics.It’swhatgetsusfrom Wouldyou mindgivingmethatbook? totheinterpretationthatthespeakeris requestingthebook.It’swhattakesusfromwhatthespeakerhassaid towhatwethinktheyactuallymeantbysayingitrighthere,rightnow,in thissharedcontextbetweenthesepeople.It’sthedifferencebetween conventionandintention.
Forstarters:Somebasicterminology Oneconceptthatiscrucialtothelinguisticstudyofmeaningis truth.To statetheobvious,somethingistrueifitaccuratelydescribestheworld.Is ‘all dogshavetails’ true?Well,checktheworld.Ifthere’sadogwithoutatail, thenit’snottruethatalldogshavetails.Butthatmeans ‘truth’ isrelativetoa world.Andwhileweliveinaprettygreatworld,therearecertainlyother waystheworldcouldhavebeen.Itwouldhavebeenpossibletohavea worldinwhichalldogshavetails;aworldthat’sexactlylikeoursexceptthat alldogshavetailsisa possibleworld.Anotherpossibleworldisonein whichdogsnormallyhavetwoheads.Infact,justaboutanyfactaboutthis worldcouldbechanged,andaslongasitdoesn’tcreatealogicalinconsistency(say,aworldinwhichI’mbothalinguistandnotalinguist),that’ sa possibleworld.Thereareaninfinitenumberofpossibleworlds,andwe happentoliveinoneofthem.(Theworldweliveinisnotonlypossible,but actual.Luckyus!)Soastatementlike ‘alldogshavetails’ willbetrueinsome possibleworldsbutnotinothers.Somethingthatcanbeeithertrueorfalse inagivenworldiscalleda proposition.It’snotthesameasasentence,since thetwosentencesin(2)expressthesameproposition.
(2)a.KristyistallerthanJamal. b.JamalisshorterthanKristy.
Howdoyouknowtheyexpressthesameproposition?Becausethey’ re bothtrueintheexactsamesetofworlds.(Thisholdsgenerally,butnot entirely;sentencesthataretrueinallpossibleworlds,like Allbluedogs areblue and Allcatsarefeline,can ’treasonablybesaidtoexpressthe sameproposition,andsimilarlyforsentencesthatarefalseinallpossible worlds.)Sototheextentthatthesemanticmeaningofasentencecorrespondstothepropositionitexpresses,it’sreasonabletosaythatthemeaning ofasentenceisafunctionfrompossibleworldstotruth-values whichisa fancywayofsayingthatthemeaningofasentenceiswhattellsuswhether it’strueorfalseinsomeworld.Thatsoundsabitabstract,butitmakes sense:Presumably,theonepropertythatissharedbyallandonlythe worldsinwhich Alldogshavetails istrueisthat,well,allofthedogsin themhavetails.
Whetherornotapropositionistrueinagivenworldiscalledits truth-value inthatworld.Theconditionsunderwhichaproposition countsastrueinagivenworldareits truth-conditions.(Sofor ‘alldogs havetails’ tobetrueinagivenworld,allthedogsinthatworldmusthave tails.)Anda truth-conditional theoryofsemanticsisoneinwhich semanticmeaningisdefinedasanyaspectofasentencethataffectsits truth-conditions.Thesemanticmeaningoftheword ‘taller’ in(2a) obviouslyaffectsitstruth-conditionsbecauseifyoureplaceitwith ‘thinner’ itwillbetrueinadifferentsetofworlds.Insuchatheory, I needthatbook istrueifandonlyifIneedthatbook,regardlessof whetherI’msayingitasarequest.Somyneedforthebookispartofthe semanticmeaningofthesentence,whereasthefactthatI’musingitasa requestisn’t,sincethatdoesn’taffectitstruth-conditions.Ifyourheadis spinningabit,don’tworry;we’llreturntothisissuelater(andoften).
Astwoormorepeopleconverse,eachofthembuildsupamental inventoryofwhatthingshavebeentalkedabout,whatotherthingsallof theparticipantsintheconversationareassumedtoalsoknowabout (like,say,theexistenceofthemoon),andwhatpropertieshavebeen assignedtothoseobjects.Thismentalinventory,ormodel,iscalleda discoursemodel.SoonceI’vetoldyou KristyistallerthanJamal,wecan assumethatoursharedmodelofthediscoursecontainsKristy,Jamal, andthefactthatKristyisthetallerofthetwo.Thisisanidealization,of course;we ’vealreadyseenthatthere’snotreallyasharedmodel.You
haveyourmodelofourdiscourse,whichincludeswhatyoubelieveabout mymodel,andIhavemymodelofit,includingwhatIbelieveaboutyour model.Andyes,whatyoubelieveaboutmymodelinevitablyincludes whatyoubelieveIbelieveaboutyourmodel,andalsowhatyoubelieve IbelieveaboutwhatyoubelieveIbelieveaboutyourmodel,andsoon,in atheoreticallyinfinitespiral.Nonetheless,wemanagetoleapnimbly overthatinfinitelydeepchasmandcommunicatereasonablywell,justas thoughourdiscoursemodelwereinfactshared.Soaslongaswekeepin mindthatit’sanidealization,theshareddiscoursemodelisahandyway tothinkaboutthebuilding-upofadiscourse.Inreality,ourdiscourse modelsaredistinct,butusually hopefully similarenoughtoenablethe conversationtoproceed.
Semantics Ifby ‘semantics’ wemeananyaspectofmeaningthatcontributestothe truth-conditionsofasentence,thenthemeaningofawordlike cat is thoseaspectsofitsmeaningthatcouldaffectwhetherasentencesuchas (3)istrueinagivenworld:
(3)Sammyisacat.
IfSammyiscanineratherthanfeline,(3)isnottrue;therefore, ‘feline’ is anaspectofthesemanticsof cat.However,havingatailisn’tanecessary aspectofbeingacat,sincetherearecatswithouttails;therefore, ‘tail’ is notanaspectofthesemanticsof cat.Inthissense,wecouldsaythatthe meaningof cat ispreciselythatsetofpropertiesrequiredforsomething tobeacat.
Theproblemisthat,whilethisworksfairlystraightforwardlyfora wordlike cat,thereareplentyofwordsforwhichitdoesn’tworknearly aswell.Therehasbeenasurprisingamountofargumentationlatelyover whatdoesanddoesn’tconstituteasandwich whichistosay,overwhat theword sandwich means.AMassachusettsjudgein2006hadtoruleon thequestionofwhetheraburritocountedasasandwich,becausea stipulationintheleaseofaPaneracaféstatedthatnoothersandwich
shopcouldopeninthesamestripmall;thequestionatissuewaswhether aQdobaoutletsoldsandwiches,intheformofburritos.Fortherecord, thejudgeruledthataburritoisnotasandwich butthenwhatabouta hotdog?Orahamburger?Oragyro? TheAtlantic rananarticlethat purportedtodecidethequestiononceandforallbyofferingfourcriteria necessaryforsandwich-hood:Asandwichmusthave(a)twoexterior pieceswhichare(b)carbohydrate-based,andthewholeobjectmusthave a(c)primarilyhorizontalorientationandbe(d)portable.Butifyou presentthesecriteriatoagroupofEnglishspeakers,you’llimmediately getpush-back;forexample,whilecriterion(c)excludeshotdogs(which pleasessomepeoplebutdispleasesothers),italsoexcludesItalianbeef sandwiches(displeasingmost).
Atheorythatlooksforaclearsetof criterialfeatures bywhichaword isdefinedfaltersinmanycasesbecausetheresimplyisn’talwaysaclear setofsuchfeatures.Instead, PrototypeTheory (Rosch1973,1975) arguesthatmanycategoriesaredefinedintermsofaprototype,the centralmemberofagradientsetwithunclearor ‘fuzzy’ boundaries(cf. Zadeh1965).Thereisaprototypicalmemberoftheset(so,fora sandwich,theprototypemightbetwoslicesofbreadwithmeatorcheese inbetween),buttherearealsoobjectswhosemembershipinthesetis lessclear.TheuncomfortableresultofadoptingPrototypeTheorywithin atruth-conditionalsemantics,ofcourse,isthatitraisesthequestionof whathappenstothetruth-conditionsofasentencelike(4)inacontext inwhichBriannaateahotdog: (4)Briannaateasandwich.
IfBriannaateahotdog,thentheextenttowhich(4)istruepresumably correspondspreciselytotheextenttowhichahotdogisasandwich (whichinturnraisesthetrickyproblemofhowtodealwithgradations oftruth).
Thestudyofwordmeaningis lexicalsemantics,whereasthestudyof sentencemeaningis sententialsemantics.Muchoftruth-conditional sententialsemanticshasitsbasisinformallogic.Forexample,the meaningofasimplewordlike and istakentobeafunctionfromthe truthoftwopropositionstothetruthofacomplexproposition
combiningthemwiththeword and. Yes,thatsoundsunnecessarily complicated.Butit’seasytoseewithanexample:
(5)a.BriannaateasandwichandCelesteatepizza.
b.Briannaateasandwich.
c.Celesteatepizza.
Sentence(5a)consistsof(5b)and(5c)conjoinedbytheword and. And (5a)istrueinagivenworldpreciselywhen(5b)and(5c)arebothtruein thatworld.Ifeither(5b)or(5c) orboth wasfalse,then(5a)wouldbe false.Sothetruth-valuesof(5b)and(5c)aretheinputsintoafunction that and performs,andthatfunctionreturnsanothertruth-value.Ifboth oftheinputsaretrue,thefunctionreturns ‘true’.Ifeitherorbothofthe inputsarefalse,thefunctionreturns ‘false’ .
Formallogicdefinesasetof logicaloperators thatserveas ‘functions’ inthisway,andtheycorrespondroughlytocertainwordsorexpressions inEnglish.They’regivenherewiththesymbolstypicallyusedforthem:
• ¬ Negation.ThiscorrespondstoEnglish not,andreversestruthvalue;if p representssomeproposition, ¬p istruewhenever p is false,and ¬p isfalsewhenever p istrue.
• ∧ Conjunction.ThiscorrespondstoEnglish and.Sothecomplex proposition p∧q istrueifbothofitscomponentpropositions p and q aretrue,andfalseotherwise.
• ∨ Disjunction.ThiscorrespondstoEnglish or.Thecomplexproposition p∨q istrueifeitherorbothofthecomponentpropositions p and q aretrue or,toputitanotherway, p∨q isfalseifboth p and q arefalse,andtrueotherwise.
• ! Conditional(alsocalled ‘implication’).Thiscorrespondsto English if...then; p!q (‘if p then q ’)isfalseif p istrueand q is false,andtrueineveryothercircumstance.
• $ Biconditional(alsocalled ‘bidirectionalimplication’).This correspondstoEnglish ifandonlyif; p$q istruewheneverthe truth-valuesof p and q arethesame,andfalsewhenevertheyare different.
Youmayfeelabituneasyaboutthesedescriptions,onthegroundsthat theydon’talwaysmatchthewayweusethecorrespondingtermsin English.Forexample, p∨q (‘p or q ’)istruewhen p and q arebothtrue (what’scalled inclusive or),butinnaturallanguageweoftenuse or as thoughit’sfalseifbothofthecomponentpropositionsaretrue(what’ s called exclusive or).Forexample,consider(6):
(6) “You’llbeinthisplayoryou’llgetacloutandthenI’llspeaktoThe Parents.” (McEwan2003)
Here,thespeakerismakingathreat:Ifyou’renotinthisplay,you’llgeta cloutandI’llspeaktoTheParents butpresumablyifyouAREinthis play,thosethingswon’thappen.Thatis,either ‘ you ’llbeinthisplay’ or ‘ you ’llgetacloutetc.’ butnotboth.Likewise,whenIsay I’llbuybread todayortomorrow,IusuallymeanthatI’llbuybreadeithertodayor tomorrow,butnotboth.This ‘notboth’ readingistheexclusivereading. Aswe’llseeinthenextchapter,pragmaticsoffersawayofgettingfrom theinclusive-or readingtotheexclusive-or readingwithouthavingto abandontheinclusive,formal-logicinterpretationof or.Otherdiscrepanciesofthissorthavearisenwithrespecttotheotherlogicaloperators, andagainpragmaticswillofferawayofunderstandingthedifference betweentheirformal-logicinterpretationandthenatural-languageuseof thecorrespondingwords.
Ourdiscussionofformallogicandtruthtablessofarhasfocusedon propositionallogic,whichistosay,logicalrelationshipsamongpropositions.Oursymbols p and q representfullpropositions,regardlessof whatthosepropositionsare.Anotherpieceofsemanticmachinerythat willbeimportantforourdiscussionofpragmaticsis predicatelogic, whichoffersawayofrepresentingtheinternalstructureofaproposition.
Apropositionismadeupofa predicate andoneormore arguments. Theargumentsrepresententities,andthepredicaterepresentsproperties,actions,orattributesofthoseentities:
(7)a.BriannametSam.MET(b,s)
b.JenhiredHarold.HIRED(j,h)
c.Glendaistall.TALL(g)
d.Wilmaisadoctor.DOCTOR(w)
Youcanusethetoolsofpropositionallogicandpredicatelogictogether:
(8)Glendaistall,andWilmaisadoctor.TALL(g) ∧ DOCTOR(w)
Thelastbitofformalmachineryyouneedtoknowaboutis quantifiers. Thetwowe’llworryaboutarethe existential quantifier(9),meaning essentially ‘atleastone’ andusuallyreadas ‘thereexists ...suchthat’,and the universal quantifier(8),meaningessentially ‘all’ andusuallyreadas ‘forall... ’ Quantifiersareusedwith variables. Unlikea constant argumentrepresentingaspecificentity(likethoserepresentingBrianna,Sam, etc.,in(7)),whatavariablerepresentscanvary.Wetypicallyuse x, y,and z asvariables.Toseehowallthisworks,considertheexamplesin(9):
(9)a.Someoneistall. 9x(TALL(x))
‘thereexistsan x suchthat x istall’
b.Allstudentsaretall. 8x(STUDENT(x) ! TALL(x))
‘forall x,if x isastudent, x istall’
Thereasonforallthisnotationalmachineryistogiveusanunambiguousmetalanguagefortalkingaboutlanguage.Withaclearwayof representingsemanticmeanings,wecancomparethemwithpragmatic meanings,andwecanalsousethemasareferencepointfortalkingabout whichmeaningsinlanguagearesemanticandwhicharepragmatic.
Sincethissystemhasitsrootsinformallogic,itwillcomeasno surprisethatitcanbeusedtorepresentlogicalargumentsandconclusions.Forexample,if(10a)istrue,then(10b)isnecessarilyalsotrue:
(10)a.TALL(g) ∧ DOCTOR(w)
b.TALL(g)
Thisisarelationshipof entailment:(10a)entails(10b),whichtechnically meansthatanyworldinwhich(10a)istrueisalsoaworldinwhich(10b) istrue.StatedinplainEnglish:Ifit’struethatGlendaistallandWilmais adoctor,thenit’snecessarilytruethatGlendaistall.
Conclusion There’salotmorethatcouldbesaidaboutsemantics,butthisisjust enoughtogiveusthenecessarybackgroundforourstudyofpragmatics. InChapter3,we’llseehowH.P.Grice’sseminalCooperativePrinciple aroseoutofthediscrepancieswehavementionedbetweenthesemantic treatmentofthelogicaloperatorsandthewaythey’reusedinnatural language.Thisprinciplewillgiveusawayofseeinghowahearerinfers thespeaker’sintendedmeaningbasedonwhathasbeenliterally(i.e., semantically)statedandthecontextinwhichithasbeenuttered.We’ll alsoseehowlaterresearchershaveattemptedtoimproveonorstreamlinetheCooperativePrinciple,butalloftheseeffortsareaimedat answeringthissamequestionofhowwedecidewhataspeakerislikely tohavemeantbywhattheysaid.Withthesetoolsinhand,wewillgoon inlaterchapterstoexaminesuchphenomenaasindirectspeechacts (e.g.,requeststhataren’tphrasedasrequests),definiteness,wordorder, andothers,allwithaneyetowardsolvingthepuzzleofhowspeakersand hearersareabletounderstandeachotherwhensomuchofwhatwe meanisleftliterallyunsaid.
2 Literalvs.non-literalmeaning InChapter1,wesaidthatthedifferencebetweensemanticsandpragmaticswasessentiallythedifferencebetweenconventionandintention: Semanticmeaningisconventionalmeaning,themeaningthataword takeswithitwhereveritoccursandwhoeverisusingit.Theword chair hasaconventionalmeaningthatspeakersofEnglishhavemoreorless agreedonimplicitly,evenifwemightdisagreeaboutthedetails for example,whetherathree-leggedstoolcountsasachair.Andfromthis conventionalmeaningarisearangeofmetaphoricalmeanings,suchas the chair ofacommitteeoranendowed chair inauniversity.Butthese tooareconventional,andappearindictionaries.Whenweuseoneof theseconventionalmeaningsinaparticularcontext,however,ourintentionaddsanotherrangeofmeaning:IfIaskyoutobringmeachair, whetherornotastoolisappropriatemightdependonwhetherIneedto killaspiderontheceiling(andneedachairtoreachit),orwhetherI’ m goingtositdowntoplaytheguitar(inwhichcaseastoolmightbejust therightthing),orwhetherI’vebroughtinanelderlyguestandwanther tofeelcomfortable(inwhichcaseastoolisnottherightthingatall). Thisintentionalmeaningispragmatic.Butthelinebetweenconvention andintentionisnotatallclear-cut.Inthischapterwewilllookatseveral waysofdistinguishingbetweentypesofmeaning,allwithaneyeto narrowingdownwhatwemeanwhenwetalkaboutmeaning and whatitiswe’retalkingaboutwhenwetalkaboutpragmatics.¹
¹SeealsoRecanati2004foracriticaldiscussionoftheconceptofliteralandnon-literal meaning.
Naturalandnon-naturalmeaning PhilosopherH.P.Griceestablishedanimportantdistinctionbetween twotypesof ‘meaning’ (Grice1957).Considerthefollowingexamples:
(1)a.Thathightemperaturemeansshe’ssick.
b.Darkcloudsmeanastormiscoming.
c.Thosetermitesmeantrouble.
d.Smokemeans fire.
e.Thatloudnoisemeansyourmuffler ’sshot.
(2)a.Theword brusque means ‘abrupt’ .
b.Aredoctagonmeans ‘stop’ .
c.Thegreenlightmeansyoucaninsertyourcreditcard.
d.InGerman, Kopf means ‘head’ .
e.InAmerica,makingacirclewithyourthumbandforefinger means ‘okay’ .
Ineachoftheexamplesin(1),the ‘meaning’ inquestionisnatural, unintended,andnonconventional.By ‘nonconventional’ Imeanthat thereisnoagreed-upon,prearrangedconventionbymeansofwhich societyhasdecidedthat,forexample,hightemperatureswillindicate illness;it’sjustafactaboutthewayourbodieswork.Thereisno conventionbywhichdarkcloudsinformusofcomingstorms,termites informusoftrouble,smokeindicatesthepresenceof fire,oraloudnoise intheexhaustpipeindicatesabadmuffler.Itissimplynaturalforclouds toindicatestorms,forsmoketoindicatethepresenceof fire,andsoon.
In(2),ontheotherhand,conventionisinvolved.By ‘convention’ , Imean(there’sthatwordagain!)arelatively fixed,albeittacit,societal agreement apracticeorviewpointthatmembersofasocietyshare simplybyvirtueofbeingmembersofthatsociety.SoforEnglish speakers,aconventionexistsbywhichtheword brusque means ‘abrupt’ ; andwhileyoumightcertainlychoosenottofollowthisconvention,it limitsyourabilitytoparticipateinthissociety.Recallthewell-known encounterbetweenAliceandHumptyDumpty:
(3)
“There’sgloryforyou!”
“Idon’tknowwhatyoumeanby ‘glory,’” Alicesaid. HumptyDumptysmiledcontemptuously. “Ofcourseyoudon’t tillItellyou.Imeant ‘there’saniceknock-downargumentfor you!’” “But ‘glory’ doesn’tmean ‘aniceknock-downargument,’” Alice objected.
“When I useaword,” HumptyDumptysaid,inratherascornful tone, “itmeansjustwhatIchooseittomean neithermorenorless.”
(Carroll1871)
Thehumorinthispassage,ofcourse,comesfromhowverywrongHumpty Dumptyis.Thesemanticmeaningofawordhasitsbasisinconvention ratherthaninindividualintention.Wordsonlyworkforpurposesof communicationbecauseweagreeontheirbasicmeanings;we’renotfree toassignthemanymeaningwewish.Theonlyintentionhereisthedefault intentiontoshareinasocietywhichhasadoptedEnglishasitsprimary meansofcommunication.Theremainingexamplesin(2)aresimilar:Our societyhasadoptedconventionsbywhicharedoctagonmeans ‘stop’ anda greenlightonacreditcardreadermeansthatthemachineisreadytoaccept thecreditcard;Germansocietyconventionallyusestheword Kopf tomean whatEnglishspeakersmeaninusingtheword head; andinAmerica,the thumb-to-forefingergestureconventionallymeans ‘okay’.Theexamples in(1)illustratewhatGricecalled naturalmeaning,whereasthosein (2)illustratewhathecalled non-naturalmeaning. Sofar,sogood.Butthenthingsgetmurky.Considertheseexamples:
(4)a.Herbrightsmilemustmeanshewontheprize!
b.Thathightemperaturemeansweshouldcalladoctor.
c.Thered flashinglightmeansthepowerhasgoneout.
d.IfInudgeyou,itmeansIwanttoleave.
e.Ididn’tmeantohurtyourfeelings.
Onecouldarguethat(4a)isactuallyambiguous,dependingonwhetherthe smileisanautomatic,uncontrolledresultofthehappinessresultingfrom winningoranintentionalsmilemeanttoconvey,essentially, ‘Hey,Iwon!’
In(4b),there’snoautomatic,naturalconnectionbetweenhightemperaturesandcallstodoctors;butneitherisitquiteaconvention.Ifpressed,I’d havetosaythatthehightemperaturenaturallymeansthepersonissick,as in(1a),andsicknessinturnnaturallymeansaninterventionisneeded;and thatneedforinterventionconventionally(hencenon-naturally)means thatacalltothedoctorisinorder.Example(4c)issimilarlyamultistep relation;it’sconventionalfor flashingredlightsoncertaindevicestomean thepowerhasgoneout,andoncethatconventionisinplace,thefactthat thelightis flashingredatthismomentmeansnaturally(automatically)that thepowerhasgoneout.In(4d)and(4e)wehavecasesof ‘meaning’ thatare directlyintentionalonthepartofthespeaker.In(4d),thespeakerissetting upanonceconventionbetweenspeakerandhearer.In(4e)theword mean couldinfactbereplacedbytheword intend.
Conventionalandintentionalmeaning Sowe’veseenthat ‘meaning’ canbeanautomaticrelationshipwith neitherconventionnorintentionbehindit(aswith cloudsmeanrain), oritcanbeaconventionalrelationshipinwhichsomegrouphasagreed thatonethingwillstandforanother(aswith thewordbrusque means ‘abrupt’),oritcanbesimplytheintentionofanindividualinacontext (aswith Ididn’tmeantohurtyourfeelings),oritcanbesomecombinationofthese.Wehavemadea firstcutbetweennaturalmeaningsofthe firstsortandthenon-naturalmeaningsinvolvedintherestofthecases. Withinthesenon-naturalmeanings,however,thereisobviouslyatleast onemoredistinctiontobemade:Weneedtodistinguishbetween conventionalandintentionalmeanings.
Now,atonelevelyoucouldobjectthatconventionalmeaningisalso intentional:LikeHumptyDumpty,IcouldperfectlywelldecidethatI’ m goingtousetheword glory fromnowontomean ‘aniceknock-down argument’.Soatsomelevel,byusingtheword glory tomeanthesame thingeverybodyelseusesittomean,I’mintentionallyparticipatingin thenormsofoursociety.Butatanotherlevel,itisn’tmyownintention thathassetuptherelationshipbetweentheword glory anditsmeaning
(roughly, ‘magnificence ’).Sothere’sadistinctiontobemadebetweena speaker’sintentiontouseawordintheconventionalway,andthe historicalprocessesbywhichithascometohaveitsconventional meaning,whichusuallyaren’ttheresultofanyoneperson’sintentions. Inthislattersense,then,myusing glory tomean ‘magnificence ’ isn’ta matterofintention;it’samatterofconvention.
Atthispointweapproachthedistinctionbetweensemanticsand pragmatics.Asa firstpass,wecouldsaythatsemanticmeaningisconventional,whilepragmaticmeaningisintentional.Mostofourutterances havebothaconventionalandanintentionalcomponent.Recallthe testimonyofJamesComeybeforetheSenateIntelligenceCommitteein Juneof2017,concerningaconversationbetweenhimandPresident DonaldTrump,whenhewasDirectoroftheFBI.Asreportedinthepress:
(5)Inhispreparedtestimony,Comeyrecalledthat,atthatOvalOffice meeting,thepresidentsaid: “Ihopeyoucanseeyourwayclearto lettingthisgo,tolettingFlynngo.Heisagoodguy.Ihopeyoucan letthisgo.”
“Itookitasadirection,” ComeytoldtheSenatehearingThursday. “Imean,thisisapresidentoftheUnitedStateswithmealone saying, ‘Ihopethis.’ Itookitas,thisiswhathewantsmetodo. Ididn’tobeythat,butthat’sthewayItookit.” (www.cnbc.com/2017/06/08/comey-to-senate-committee-trumpwanted-me-to-drop- flynn-probe.html)
HerewecanseeclearlythedistinctionbetweenwhathasbeenconventionallystatedandwhatComeybelievestohavebeenintended.Note,of course,thatotherssawtheintentiondifferently:
(6)...oneofthe firsttospringtothePresident’sdefensewashisson DonaldTrump,Jr.,whotooktoTwitterandparsedthereported encounterinhisownfashion. “Ihear ‘Ihopenothinghappensbut youhavetodoyourjob,’” hewrote,describingthePresident’ s wordsas “veryfarfromanykindofcoercionorinfluenceand certainlynotobstruction!” (Lane2017)
Theconventional,societallysharedmeaningofthephrase IhopeX is roughlythatthespeakerwouldpreferXtosomealternative.Andthisis themeaningthatTrumpJr.isrelyingoninsaying “Ihear ‘Ihopenothing happens.’” Thesecondhalfofhisinterpretation, ‘butyouhavetodoyour job,’ goesbeyondthistotheassumedintentionofthespeaker:TrumpJr. isclaimingthatthisstatementfromthePresidentoftheUS,inthis context,wouldnaturallyincludetheintentionthatComeydohisduty; noneofthatisstatedconventionally,butTrumpJr.isarguingthatit’ s contextuallyevident.Comeyexplicitlyarguesforaquitedifferentpragmaticmeaning: “Itookitasadirection...Imean,thisisapresidentof theUnitedStateswithmealonesaying, ‘Ihopethis.’” Comeyissaying thatthisstatementfromthePresidentoftheUS,inthiscontext,would naturallyincludetheintentionofdirectingComeytodowhatthe Presidenthassaidhehopeshe’lldo:letFlynngo.Comeyisessentially arguingthatwhenthePresidentoftheUnitedStatesprivatelytellsa subordinate IhopeyoucandoX, theclearlyintendedmessageis ‘doX’ .
Majornewseventsdon’talwayshandussuchaclearanalysisof distinctpragmaticinterpretationsofasinglesemanticmeaning.Note alsothatwhatmakesthedifferenceinthiscaseisaspecificaspectofthe context:thespeakeroftheutteranceinquestion.Comeyarguesthat becausethespeakeristhePresident,whoisaparticularlypowerful individual(nottomentionComey’sboss),whenhesays Ihopeyoucan doX itcarriestheforceofadirectivetodoX.TrumpJr.,ontheother hand,emphasizestheintegrityoftheofficeinhisinterpretation:Because thespeakeristhePresident,hereasons,hewouldnotissueadirectiveto doanythingunethicalorillegal,hencetheinterpretation ‘youhavetodo yourjob’.Allofwhichistosaythatachiefdifferencebetweenwhat’ s conventionalandwhat’sintentionalistheroleofcontext.
Context-dependentandcontext-independent meaning Thecontextforanutteranceincludeseverythingaboutthesituationin whichtheutterancetakesplace:notjustwhereandwhenithappens,but
alsotheidentitiesofthespeakerandthehearer(s),theirsharedbackgroundandbeliefsabouteachother(andabouteachother’sbeliefs,etc., adinfinitum),theassumedgoalsoftheinteraction,andsoon.Becauseof theimportanceofcontextinhelpingahearertointerpretaspeaker’ s meaning,wemakeadistinctionbetweena sentence andan utterance. Asentenceisanabstractlinguisticobjectthatexpressesoneormore propositions,anditmayormaynoteverbeuttered.Anutteranceisthe useofalinguisticexpression(word,phrase,sentence,etc.)inacontext. TherulesoftheEnglishlanguagemakeitpossibletoconstructaliterally infinitenumberofdistinctsentences,whichmeansthatnotallofthem caneveractuallybeuttered.Withamoment’sthought,youcaneasily constructasentencethathasneverbeenutteredbefore.Hereareafew sentencesthathaveprobablyneverbeforeinthehistoryoftheuniverse beenuttered:
(7)a.MyfavoritepenguinlivesonasofainGlasgow.
b.Ifseventimeseightequalstwenty-two,I’lleatthatwholeplateof sauerkrautbybedtime.
c.VeryfewofmysistersarenamedEgbert.
d.Paperclipsdon’tsmellasleafyaspineapplesdo.
Icanbefairlysurethesehaven’tbeenutteredbeforebecausethey’reabit silly(andinanycase,they’veNOWbeenuttered,sinceonewayof ‘uttering’ asentenceistowriteit),butifyoupaycarefulattentionto thesentencesyouencounterinagivenday,you’llrealizethatafairly largeproportionofthemhaveprobablyneverbeenutteredbefore(like, forexample,thisone).Thecrucialthingaboutlanguageis,ofcourse,the factthatyoucanunderstandnever-before-utteredsentenceslikethese andthereasonyoucandosoisthatyousharetheconventionalrulesand vocabularyofEnglishandknowhowtheserulesandvocabularyareused forputtingtogethermeaningfulsentences.
Thereare,then,anin finitenumberofsentencesofEnglish;someof themhavebeenuttered,somehaven’t,andsomehaveneverevenbeen thoughtofandneverwillbe.Asentencethathasneverbeenuttered stillhasmeaningbyvirtueoftheconventionsofgrammarandvocabularythatEnglishspeakersingeneralshare.Thismeaningisgenerally
