Abbreviations WritingsofHobbes
DC OntheCitizen (DeCive),ed.andtrans.RichardTuckandMichael Silverthorne(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998).Citedby chapterandparagraphnumberexceptforTheEpistleDedicatory,which iscitedbythepagenumberoftheEnglishtranslation.
EL TheElementsofLawNaturalandPolitic,ed.FerdinandTönnies,2ndedn (London:FrankCass,1969).Citedaccordingtopart,chapter,and paragraphnumber.
CEW TheCollectedEnglishWorksofThomasHobbes,ed.SirWilliamMolesworth (London:Routledge/ThoemmesPress,1997).Citedbyvolumeandpagenumber.
L Leviathan,Volume2: TheEnglishandLatinTexts(i),ed.NoelMalcolm (Oxford:ClarendonPress,2012).Citedbychapternumberandoriginal pagination.
WritingsofRousseau
CGP ConsiderationsontheGovernmentofPoland,inTheSocialContract and otherlaterpoliticalwritings,ed.andtrans.VictorGourevitch(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1997).Citedbysectionandparagraphnumber.
DI DiscourseontheOriginandFoundationsofInequalityAmongMen,in The Discourses andotherearlypoliticalwritings,ed.andtrans.Victor Gourevitch(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1997).
GM From oftheSocialContract or EssayabouttheFormoftheRepublic (KnownastheGenevaManuscript),inTheSocialContract andotherlater politicalwritings,ed.andtrans.VictorGourevitch(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,1997).Citedbybook,chapter,andparagraphnumber.
LM LettersWrittenfromtheMountain,in LettertoBeaumont,LettersWritten fromtheMountain,andRelatedWritings (TheCollectedWritingsofRousseau, Vol.9),eds.ChristopherKellyandEveGrace,trans.ChristopherKellyand JudithR.Bush(Hanover:UniversityPressofNewEngland,2001).
OC Œuvrescomplètes,5vols,eds.BernardGagnebinandMarcelRaymond (Paris:Gallimard,BibliothèquedelaPléiade,1959–95).Citedbyvolume andpagenumberexceptinthecaseof DuContratSocial and DuContrat Social (PremièreVersion,ManuscritdeGenève),bothofwhicharecited bybook,chapter,andparagraphnumber,and Considérationssurle GouvernementdePologne,whichiscitedbysectionandparagraphnumber.
PF PoliticalFragments,in SocialContract,DiscourseontheVirtueMostNecessary foraHero,PoliticalFragments,andGenevaManuscript (TheCollectedWritings
ofRousseau,Vol.4),eds.RogerD.MastersandChristopherKelly,trans.Judith R.Bush,RogerD.Masters,andChristopherKelly(Hanover:UniversityPress ofNewEngland,1994).Citedbypagenumber.
RSW ReveriesoftheSolitaryWalker,trans.PeterFrance(London:Penguin,2004).
SC OftheSocialContract,inTheSocialContract andotherlaterpolitical writings,ed.andtrans.VictorGourevitch(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,1997).Citedbybook,chapter,andparagraphnumber.
SW TheStateofWar,inTheSocialContract andotherlaterpoliticalwritings,ed. andtrans.VictorGourevitch(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1997).
WritingsofKant
AA Kant’sgesammelteSchriften, ed.KöniglichePreußische(laterDeutsche) AkademiederWissenschaften(Berlin:Reimer/deGruyter,1900–).
CBHH ‘ConjecturalBeginningofHumanHistory’,in Anthropology,History,and Education,eds.GünterZöllerandRobertB.Louden(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,2007).
CF TheConflictoftheFaculties,in ReligionandRationalTheology,eds.Allen W.WoodandGeorgediGiovanni(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1996).
CJ CritiqueofthePowerofJudgment,trans.PaulGuyerandEricMatthews (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000).
E ‘AnAnswertotheQuestion:WhatisEnlightenment?’,in Practical Philosophy,trans.anded.MaryJ.Gregor(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,1996).
GMM GroundworkoftheMetaphysicsofMorals,in PracticalPhilosophy,trans.and ed.MaryJ.Gregor(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996).
IUH ‘IdeaforaUniversalHistorywithaCosmopolitanAim’,in Anthropology, History,andEducation,eds.GünterZöllerandRobertB.Louden (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007).
R ReligionwithintheBoundariesofMereReason,in ReligionandRational Theology,eds.AllenW.WoodandGeorgediGiovanni(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1996).
TPP ‘TowardPerpetualPeace’,in PracticalPhilosophy,trans.anded.Mary J.Gregor(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996).
TheabovewritingsareallcitedaccordingtotheAA(Akademieausgabe)volumeandpage numbers,whichareprovidedintherespectiveEnglishtranslations.
WritingsofHegel
EL EnzyklopädiederphilosophischenWissenschaftenimGrundrisse(1830) ErsterTeil:DieWissenschaftderLogik,in Werke,ed.EvaMoldenhauerand KarlMarkusMichel(Suhrkamp:FrankfurtamMain,1969–71),Vol.8.
Englishtranslation: TheEncyclopaediaLogic:PartIoftheEncyclopaediaof
PhilosophicalScienceswiththeZusätze,trans.T.F.Geraets,W.A.Suchting, andH.S.Harris(Indianapolis:Hackett,1991).Citedaccordingtoparagraph (§)number.RindicatesaremarkthatHegelhimselfaddedtotheparagraph, whileAindicatesanadditionderivedfromstudentlecturenotes.
LPWH LecturesonthePhilosophyofWorldHistory,Volume1: Manuscriptsofthe IntroductionandtheLecturesof1822–3,ed.andtrans.RobertF.Brownand PeterC.HodgsonwiththeassistanceofWilliamG.Geuss(Oxford: ClarendonPress,2011).
PhG PhänomenologiedesGeistes,eds.Hans-FriedrichWesselsandHeinrich Clairmont(Hamburg:FelixMeiner,1988).
PR GrundlinienderPhilosophiedesRechtsoderNaturrechtund StaatswissenschaftimGrundrisse,in Werke,ed.EvaMoldenhauerandKarl MarkusMichel(Suhrkamp:FrankfurtamMain,1969–71),Vol.7.English translation: ElementsofthePhilosophyofRight,ed.A.W.Wood,trans. H.B.Nisbet(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991).Cited accordingtoparagraph(§)number.RindicatesaremarkwhichHegel himselfaddedtotheparagraph,whileAindicatesanadditionderivedfrom studentlecturenotes.TheonlyexceptionisthePreface,whichiscitedbythe pagenumberoftheGermaneditionfollowedbythatoftheEnglish translation.
PR1819/20 PhilosophiedesRechts.DieVorlesungvon1819/20ineinerNachschrift,ed. DieterHenrich(FrankfurtamMain:Suhrkamp,1983).
PR1821/22 DiePhilosophiedesRechts.Vorlesungvon1821/22,ed.HansgeorgHoppe (FrankfurtamMain:Suhrkamp,2005).Citedbyparagraph(§)number.
PS PhenomenologyofSpirit,trans.A.V.Miller(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1977).Citedbyparagraph(¶)number.
VPW1 VorlesungenüberdiePhilosophiederWeltgeschichte,Berlin,1822–23, transcribedbyKarlGustavJuliusvonGriesheim,HeinrichGustavHotho, andFriedrichCarlHermannVictorvonKehler,in Vorlesungen: AusgewählteNachschriftenundManuskripte,Vol.12,ed.Karl-HeinzIlting, KarlBrehmer,andHooNamSeelmann(Hamburg:FelixMeiner,1996).
VPW2 VorlesungsmanuskripteII(1816–31),ed.WalterJaeschke,in Gesammelte Werke,Vol.18(Hamburg:FelixMeiner,1995).
VRP VorlesungenüberRechtsphilosophie1818–1831,ed.Karl-HeinzIlting,4vols. (Stuttgart:Frommann-Holzboog,1973–4).Citedbyvolumeandpage number.
WritingsofMarx
EW EarlyWritings,trans.RodneyLivingstoneandGregorBenton(London: Penguin,1992).
Cap.1 Capital:VolumeI,trans.BenFowkes(London:Penguin,1990).
Cap.3 Capital:VolumeIII,trans.DavidFernbach(London:Penguin,1991).
G Grundrisse,trans.MartinNicolaus(London:Penguin,1993).
GI TheGermanIdeology,ed.C.J.Arthur,2edn(London:LawrenceandWishart, 1974).
HF TheHolyFamily, orCritiqueofCriticalCriticism.AgainstBrunoBauerand Company,inKarlMarxandFriedrichEngels, CollectedWorks,Vol.4 (London:Lawrence&Wishart,1975).
LA ‘MarxtoPavelVasilyevichAnnenkov. 28December1846’,inKarlMarxand FriedrichEngels, CollectedWorks,Vol.38(London:Lawrence&Wishart, 1982).
LPW LaterPoliticalWritings,ed.andtrans.TerrellCarver(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1996).
MEGA Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe,ed.InstitutfürMarxismus-Leninismusbeim ZentralkomiteederKommunistichenParteiderSowjetunionandInstitut fürMarxismus-LeninismusbeimZentralkomiteederSozialistischen EinheitsparteiDeutschlands/InternationaleMarx-Engels-Stiftung Amsterdam(Berlin:DietzVerlag/DeGruyter,1975–).Citedbysection (Romannumeral),volume(Arabicnumeral),andpagenumber.
MEW Marx-Engels-Werke,ed.InstitutfürMarxismus-Leninismusbeim ZentralkomiteederSozialistischenEinheitsparteiDeutschlands(Berlin: DietzVerlag,1956–90).Citedbyvolumeandpagenumber.
MP Misèredelaphilosophie:réponseàlaPhilosophiedelamisèrede M.Proudhon (Paris:A.Frank,1847).
QFT ‘SpeechontheQuestionofFreeTrade’,inKarlMarxandFriedrichEngels, CollectedWorks,Vol.6(London:Lawrence&Wishart,1976).
PP ThePovertyofPhilosophy.Answertothe PhilosophyofPoverty by M.Proudhon,inKarlMarxandFriedrichEngels, CollectedWorks,Vol.6 (London:Lawrence&Wishart,1976).
WhatyouwillhaveI’llgive,andwillingtoo; Fordowemustwhatforcewillhaveusdo.
Shakespeare, RichardII,3.3.204–05
1.TheConceptofPracticalNecessityand theQuestionofFreedom
Theideathatfreedomconsistsintheabsenceofconstraintsandthequestionof whatcountsasaconstraintonfreedomarecentralthemesinsocialandpolitical philosophy.Thereis,forexample,thedebatebetweenliberalsandneorepublicans.Neo-republicansaccuseliberalsoffocusingonactualunjusti fiable interferenceinthelivesofothers.Thisliberalfreedomispurely ‘negative’ inthatit consistsonlyintheabsenceofsuchinterference.Protectingthisfreedomwill requiretheremovalandpreventionofconstraintsoftherelevanttype,leaving individualsfreetodowhattheydesiretodo,eventhoughtheymaylacktheability orpowertodoit.¹Neo-republicans,incontrast,claimthatthemerethreatof arbitraryinterferencebyanagentwiththepowertointerfereinthelivesofothers countsasaconstraintonfreedom,sothatitisnotonlyamatteroftheremovalor preventionofactualunjustifiableinterferenceinthelivesofothers.²Thefreedom inquestionisneverthelessalsoanessentiallynegativeone,thoughthistimethere istheabsenceofpotentialaswellasactualunjusti fiableinterference.Moreover, boththenegativeliberalideaoffreedomandtheneo-republicanideaoffreedom asnon-dominationassumethatthereisaclearlyidentifiableagentthatisthe sourceofanyunjustifiableactualorpotentialinterferenceinthelifeofanother agent.Thusonlythenatureofthatwhichmustbeabsentifanagentistobe classedasfreedistinguishestheneo-republicanideaoffreedomfromtheliberal one,inthatneo-republicansextendtheconstraintsonfreedomtoincludepotentialunjusti fiableinterferenceinthelivesofothers,whereasclassicalliberalism restrictsthemtocasesofactualunjusti fiableinterferenceinadditiontolegal
¹ThisunderstandingoffreedomisdefendedinIsaiahBerlin’ s TwoConceptsofLiberty,inwhich negativefreedomissaidtorepresenttheonlygenuineideaoffreedom,andwearethereforewarnednot toconfusefreedomwiththelackofopportunitytodosomethingbecauseofeconomicorsocialcauses.
²SeePettit, Republicanism andSkinner, LibertybeforeLiberalism,82ff.
PracticalNecessity,Freedom,andHistory:FromHobbestoMarx. DavidJames,OxfordUniversityPress(2021). ©DavidJames.DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198847885.003.0001
constraintsthatarenecessarytosecurepersonalfreedomandsocialorder.Inthis book,Iextendthenotionofconstraintbyfocusingonpracticalconstraintsother thanonesgeneratedbyactualphysicalorlegalconstraintsorthethreatof arbitraryinterferenceinthelivesofotherswhosesourceis,ineachcase,aclearly identifiableagent.
Ontheonehand,thisextensionofthenotionofconstraintwillshowthat,ifa conditionofgenuinesocialandpoliticalfreedomistobeestablished,theconcept offreedomitselfmustbeextendedbeyondapurelynegativeone,whetherit concernsonlytheabsenceofactualunjusti fiableinterferenceorpossibleunjustifiableinterferenceaswell,toincludetheideaofself-determination.Thisis becausetheexerciseofthecapacityforself-determinationbyindividualsand collectivesocialandpoliticalagentsisrequiredtogaincontroloversocialand historicalconditionsandforcesthatgenerate avoidable practicalconstraintson humanagencythatdoormayinterfereinpeople’slives.Ontheotherhand, althoughtheextentorintensityoftheseconstraintscanbereducedthroughthe exerciseofthecapacityforself-determination,manyoftheconstraintsthemselvescannotbeentirelyremoved.Thisisbecausetheyaregeneratedbybasic featuresofthehumanconditionasweknowandexperienceit.Subjectionto theseconstraintsisthereforeaninescapableelementofhumansocieties.These featuresofthehumanconditionincludethefactsthathumanbeingshave materialneedsthattheycantypicallysatisfyonlybycooperatingwithone another,thatthedesiretogainandcontrolaccesstogoodsandresourcesisan actualorapotentialsourceofsocialconflict,andthatwarisanactualora potentialevilforhumankind.
Inadditiontosuchfeaturesofthehumancondition,thesourcesofthetypeof practicalconstraintthatIhaveinmindincludesocialandhistoricalprocessesin whichagentsarecaughtup.Theseprocessesare,orappeartobe,beyondthe controlofindividualagents.Actualorpotentialinterferenceinthelivesofothers neednot,therefore,bedirectlyattributabletoaclearlyidentifiablesocialor politicalagent.Atthesametime,however,thesesocialandhistoricalprocesses areshapedbythedecisionsandactionsofindividualandcollectiveagents.Thus, althoughthemostobviousthreattohumanfreedomisthetypeofconstraint associatedwiththeuseofforceorthethreatofitsuse,ascapturedbyRousseau’ s statementthat ‘Toyieldtoforceisanactofnecessity,notofwill;atmostitisan actofprudence’ (OC3[SC]:1.3.1),thisstatementcanbeextendedtoincludeless obvious,butnolessfreedom-endangering,waysinwhichagentsaremadetoact contrarytohowtheymightotherwisehaveacted.Thesewaysincludehowan agentmightactfrom ‘prudence’,inthesensethatheorsheactsonthebasisofan immediate,overridinginterestbutnotinthewaythatheorshewouldhave chosentoactifothermeaningful,suitablyattractiveoptionshadbeen,orhad appearedtobe,availabletohimorherintherelevantsituation.Thisbringsmeto
theconceptofpracticalnecessity,whichIshall firstexplainandthenrelatetothe conceptoffreedom.
Theconceptofpracticalnecessityconcernsthenotionofbeingconstrainedto dosomethingbecauseonehasreasonablegroundstobelievethatthereareno othermeaningful,suitablyattractiveoptionsavailabletooneasanagentina particularsituation.Atthesametime,afundamental,overridinghumaninterest motivatesanagenttoactinconformitywiththerelevantconstraints.If,however, theagentconcernedhadbelievedthatanothermeaningful,suitablyattractive optionwasavailabletohimorher,thisagent would inalllikelihoodhaveacted differentlyfromhowheorshedidinfactact,whereas,asitstands,anagentis constrainedtodothatwhichheorshewouldprefernottodobecauseheorshe findsitunattractive(e.g.contrarytohisorhermaingoalsinlife,incompatible withhisorherhighestvalues,degrading,humiliating),asopposedtosomething thatismerelylesspreferabletothatwhichheorshereallydesirestodo.Theagent neverthelesshasacompellingreasonforpursuingtherelevantcourseofaction andacceptingtheconstraintsthatitimposesonhimorher.Reasonsofthe relevantkindwouldincludethedesiretoavoidharmandthedesiretosatisfy one ’sbasicmaterialneeds.Indeed,theconceptofpracticalnecessityimpliesthat theendinquestionwillbeonethatanagentcannotrenounceexceptatgreatcost tohim-orherself.Althoughself-preservationandthedesiretoattainthemeansto itareobvioussourcesofpracticalnecessityinthisregard,weshallseethatitcan havesourcesotherthanstrictnaturalnecessity.
Theremight,however,havebeenotheroptionsavailabletotheagentconcernedwithouthimorherbeingawareofthem.Giventhepossibilityof unrecognizedoptions,theremaynot,infact,beanyabsolutepracticalnecessity. Theimportanceofanagent’sbeliefsherebecomesevident.Althoughanagent’ s beliefsconcerningtheoptionsavailabletohimorhermaynotbetrueones,his orhersituation,togetherwiththeroleplayedbyotheragentsandpowerful socialforcesincreatingit,mayexplainhowheorshecametoholdthesebeliefs, whichinthisrespectcanbeclassedasjustified,ifnottrue,beliefs.Sincethe conceptofpracticalnecessitythatIhaveinmindconcernsnotonlytheabsence ofothermeaningfulandmoreattractiveoptions,butalsopotentiallymistaken beliefsaboutwhatoptionsareinfactavailabletoanagentinaparticular situation,determiningthetrueextentofwhatispossiblewillbekeytoexplaining howhumanbeingscanliberatethemselvesfromavoidableconstraints,thatisto say,onesthatarenotimposedonthembyfundamental,inescapablefeaturesof thehumancondition.Ishallnowuseanexampledrawnfromaworkof literatureinordertoexplainwhatImean.
InBertoltBrecht’splay MutterCourageundihreKinder (MotherCourageand HerChildren),theeponymousheroine,asutlerduringtheThirtyYearsWar, explainsinthefollowingwayhowshegothername:
Courageheißich,weilichdenRuingefürchtethab,Feldwebel,undbindurchdas GeschützfeuervonRigagefahrnmitfünzigBrotlaibimWagen.Siewarenschon angeschimmelt,eswarhöchsteZeit,ichhabkeineWahlgehabt.³
IamcalledCouragebecauseIfearedbeingruined,sergeantmajor,anddrove throughthegunfireatRigawith fiftyloavesofbreadinthewagon.Theywere alreadymouldy,itwasabouttime,Ihadnochoice.
AlthoughtheremayappeartobesomethingcomicalandirrationalaboutMutter Courage’sdecisiontoriskherlifeinordertosellmouldyloavesofbread,sheisin factcompelledbythesituationinwhichshe findsherselftoundergothedangers towhichshesoclearlyexposesherself,becauseherlivelihooddependsonselling herwaresatthesametimeaswarragesaroundher.Wecanthereforesaythat MutterCourageisgenuinelysubjecttopracticalnecessityintheintendedsense becausenoothermeaningful,suitablyattractiveoptionswereavailabletoher, evenifshewasnotliterallyforcedtopursuethecourseofactionfromwhichher namederives.WemaythereforealsosaythatMutterCourage’sbeliefsconcerning thepracticalnecessitytowhichshewassubjectweretrueones.Nevertheless,there isasenseinwhichthispracticalnecessityisnotabsolutethatgoesbeyondhow MutterCouragehadachoicebetweensuffering financialruintogetherwithits consequencesandriskingbeingkilledbygunfireinanattempttoreachaplace whereshecouldsellherloaves.Fortheultimatecauseofthelackofother meaningful,suitablyattractiveoptionsisastateofwar,whichdeterminesand structuresthechoicesavailabletotheagentscaughtupinit.Thisisanexampleof howpracticalnecessityhasitssourceinforcesthatremainexternaltotheagents whoaresubjecttotheconstraintsontheiragencythatsuchforcesgenerate.If, however,warisnotconsideredtobeaninescapablefeatureofthehuman conditionbecauseonecanconceiveofwaysinwhichhumanbeingsmightprevent itbymeansofcollectiveaction,thenitwouldbepossibletoremovethepractical constraintstowhichsomeonelikeMutterCourageissubjectbecauseofwar.
Theconceptofpracticalnecessitycanthenbethoughttooccupyagreyarea betweenthefollowingtwonotionsofpracticalnecessity.Ontheonehand,thereis thenotionofthatwhichone ‘ought’ todo,inthesensethatitisadvisableforone todoit,givenanendorinterestthatonehas.Thisnotionofpracticalnecessity doesnotexcludethepursuitofother,potentiallymorecostly,options.Onthe otherhand,thereisthenotionofsomethingthatoneabsolutely ‘must’ dobecause nootheroptionsareavailableandtheendorinterestisonethatnohumanbeing couldreasonablybeexpectedtorenounce.⁴ Since,asindicatedabove,theconcept ofpracticalnecessitythatIhaveinmindiscompatiblewiththeconceptof
³Brecht, MutterCourageundihreKinder,9.
⁴ Foramoreonhowan ‘ought’ or ‘must’ isrelativetoanagent’sreasonsandmotives,seeWilliams ‘PracticalNecessity’ .
possibility,itcannotbecompletelyreducedtoa ‘must’ ofthiskind.Yet,givenhow itisequallyamatteroffundamentalhumanendsandinterestsandanobjective lackofother meaningful optionsorthejustifiedbeliefthattherearenosuch options,itwouldalsobeinappropriatetospeakofacourseofactionthatismerely ‘advisable’.Moreover,evenifitisnotamatterofstrictnaturalnecessity,these endsandinterestsmaybeonesthatagentslivinginacertaintypeofsocietyduring aparticularhistoricalperiodcannotreasonablybeexpectedtoignoreorrenounce, sothat,fromthestandpointofthesesocialandhistoricalagents,therelevant constraintswillappeartobeveryrealones.Insuchcases,itwouldstillmakesense toclaimthatanagentisforced,orbelieveshim-orherselfforced,todosomething atthesametimeasheorsheisnotliterallyforcedtodoitbecauseatleastone other,lessattractiveor,asinthecaseofMutterCourage,equallyunattractive optionisinfactavailabletohimorher.InthewritingsofThomasHobbes,JeanJacquesRousseau,ImmanuelKant,G.W.F.Hegel,andKarlMarx,weshall encounterformsofpracticalnecessityoftherelevantkindthatareboundup withhistoricalandsocialprocessesinwhichagentshappentobecaughtup.Ishall nowsummarizethekeyfeaturesoftheconceptofpracticalnecessitybyturningto amuchearliertextinwhichitexplicitlyplaysacentralrole.
Thetextinquestionis TheHistoryofthePeloponnesianWar,inwhichthe ancientGreekhistorianThucydidesemploystheconceptofnecessity(anankē)to explainthedisputebetweenAthensandSpartathatresultedinthesetwostates andtheirrespectivealliesgoingtowarwitheachother.Theproximatecauseof thisdisputeisthewayinwhichthegrowthofAthensasanimperialpower ‘broughtfeartotheLacedaemoniansandforcedthemtowar[anankasaiesto polemein]’ . ⁵ Inrelationtotheconceptofpracticalnecessity,thisstatementis relevantforanumberofreasons.
Tobeginwith,itdrawsattentiontothesubjectiveaspectofpracticalnecessity, whichconcernshowindividualsorgroupsviewasituationinwhichthey find themselves,andespeciallywhattheythinkthissituationrequiresofthem,given theirendsandinterests.Thissubjectiveaspectalsoconcernsemotionalandpsychologicalresponsestoasituation,suchasfearorconfidence.Theagentsthemselvesbelievethatobjectivefeaturesofasituationpresentthemwithalimitedrange ofoptionsandperhapsnogenuineoptionsatall.Theextentofthepractical necessityexperiencedbyanagentwillthereforeinpartdependonhisorherbeliefs concerningtheoptionsavailabletohimorherinaparticularsituation.
Anagent’sappraisalofthesituation,togetherwiththeemotionalorpsychologicalresponsesthatitproducesinhimorher,canberightorwronginsofaras theydoordonotcorrespondtoobjectivefeaturesofthesituationandtheoptions thatareinfactavailabletohimorher.Evenwhenanagentiswrongabouthow
⁵ Thucydides, HistoryofthePeloponnesianWar,i.23.
limitedornon-existenttheoptionsare,thefalsebeliefsaboutthemcanneverthelessbeexplainedintermsofobjectivefeaturesofthesituation,suchas asymmetriesinpower,whetherrealorimagined,thatenableoneagentto influencethebeliefsofanotheragent,ortheimpossibilityofgainingtheknowledgerequiredtoarriveatacorrectassessmentofthesituation.Forexample,each memberofthegovernmentofanationmayfeelcompelledtogotowarwith anothernation,resultinginadeclarationofwar,whereasthethreatposedbythis rivalnationhasinfactbeenoverestimatedbecauseofhowithasbeenableto createtheillusionofgrowingmilitarypowerandanincreasingpreparednessfor war.Thismeansthattherewas,ineffect,nogenuinepracticalnecessitytogoto war.Themembersofthegovernmentofthenationthatdeclaredwarmay neverthelesshavegenuinelyfearedtheperceivedthreatandtheremayhave beensome primafacie reasonsinfavouroftheirassessmentofthesituation, suchasmisleadingreportsprovidedbyotherwisereliablesources.Agentscanthen becomesubjecttofurtherconstraintsasaresultofactionsbasedonfalsebut partiallyjustifiedbeliefsaboutthesituationconfrontingthem.Thucydidesstates inthefollowingpassagehowwarhasconsequencesthatgenerateconstraintsthat leadpeopletoactdifferentlyfromhowtheymightotherwisehaveacted:
[I]npeaceandprosperitybothstatesandindividualshavegentlerfeelings, becausemenarenotthenforcedtofaceconditionsofdirenecessity;butwar, whichrobsmenoftheeasysupplyoftheirdailywants,isaroughschoolmaster andcreatesinmostpeopleatemperthatmatchestheircondition.⁶
Thucydides’ explanationofthecausesoftheoutbreakofthewarbetweenAthens andSpartaandtheirrespectivealliesrelatestoanotherkeyfeatureoftheconcept ofpracticalnecessity.Thisconcernsthewayinwhichpracticalnecessity figuresin the reasons thatagentscangiveothersfortheiractions.Thisisofparticular significanceinconnectionwithThucydides ’ historicalmethod,whichpartly consistsinpresentingvariousspeechesoftenwithonespeechfollowedbyanother speechwhichseekstoconvinceothersoftherightnessofanopposingclaim.The appealsmadetopracticalnecessityinsomeofthesespeechesareinstructive becausetheyalertustothesignificanceofaspeaker’sintentionsandthebackgroundagainstwhichcertainclaimsaremade.OneexampleistheAthenians’ appealtothenecessityofestablishinganempireandundertakingtheharsh measuresassociatedwiththistasksoastopreservethepoliticalindependence andpowerofAthens.⁷ Thisexampleofwhatisallegedtobeamatterofobjective practicalnecessityimpliestheconceptofpowerandmakesplaintherelevanceof existingpowerrelations,forThucydideshasanAthenianclaimthat ‘youknowas
⁶ Thucydides, HistoryofthePeloponnesianWar,iii.82.
⁷ SeeThucydides, HistoryofthePeloponnesianWar,i.75–76,vi.18.
wellasweknowthatwhatisjustisarrivedatinhumanargumentsonlywhenthe necessityonbothsidesisequal,andthatthepowerfulexactwhattheycan,while theweakyieldwhattheymust’ . ⁸ Thusitisassumedtobecommonknowledgethat humanbeingswholacksufficientpowertendtobecomeresignedinthefaceof thatwhichtheybelievethemselvesunabletoresistorchange,howeverunjustthey mayconsiderittobe.Fromthisitfollowsthatgettingotherstobelieveinthe practicalnecessityofsomethinginthatanyattemptontheirparttoresistitwould befutilerepresentsareliablemeansofmakingthemdowhatyouwantthemtodo orstoppingthemfromdoingwhatyoudonotwantthemtodo.
Thefollowingkeyclaimsconcerningtheconceptofpracticalnecessityhave nowbeenidentified:
1.Practicalnecessityhasbothanobjectiveaspectandasubjectiveaspect.The objectiveaspectconcernsobjectivefeaturesofasituationwhich,inconjunctionwithanagent’sendsandinterests,limittheoptionsavailabletothis agent.Thesubjectiveaspectconcernsbothanagent’sbeliefsaboutthe practicalconstraintsgeneratedbyasituationinwhichheorshe finds him-orherselfandtheemotionalandpsychologicalresponsesthataccompanythesebeliefs.
2.Anagent’sassessmentofthepracticalconstraintsthatasituationgenerates canhaveemotionalandpsychologicaleffectsthatresultinactionsthatheor shewouldnototherwisehavechosentoperformandmayservetoprevent effectiveactionaltogether.
3.Anagentcanberightorwrongwithregardtotheobjectiveaspectof practicalnecessity.Thesubjectiveaspectmaythereforeinvolvefalsebeliefs whoseemotionalandpsychologicaleffectsconstrainthisagent.Despitethe ultimatefalsityofthesebeliefs,theexistenceofthemmaybeexplainedin termsofcertainobjectivefeaturesofthesituation,suchasasymmetrical powerrelationsthatexistwithinasocietyorbetweenstates.Inthisrespect, thebeliefsaretosomeextentjustifiedones.
4.Inasituationinwhichtherearesignificantdifferencesinpower,yieldingto thedemandsofthestrongerpartymaybeamatterofpracticalnecessity becauseitis,orseemstobe,theonlyrealoptionavailabletotheweaker party.Thusthepracticalconstraintstowhichanagentissubjectwillin manycasesdependonhowmuchpower,whetherrealorimagined,this agentpossessesrelativetootheragents.
5.Itmaywellbeinoneagent’sinteresttomakeanotheragentbelieveinthe practicalnecessityofdoingornotdoingsomething,evenwhenitisnota caseofgenuinepracticalnecessitybecauseothermeaningfuloptionsdoin
⁸ Thucydides, HistoryofthePeloponnesianWar,v.89.
factexist,thoughtherelevantagentremainsunawareofthem,orismadeto believethatthechancesofsuccessfullypursuingtheseoptionsareminimal orthatthepursuitofthemislikelytoprovetoocostly.Convincinganagent ofthepracticalnecessityofacourseofactionmaythendeprivethisagentof thewilltoresistone’sowndesignsandleadhimorhertoactinone’ sown interestsratherthaninhisorherinterests.Inshort,appealstopractical necessitymayperformanideologicalfunction.
Features(1)and(2)concerntheconceptofpracticalnecessityingeneral.The subjectiveaspectofpracticalnecessityshowstheimportanceoftakinginto accountthe first-personstandpointofagentswhoare,ormerelybelievethemselvestobe,subjecttoconstraintsthatare,orareperceivedtobe,generatedby objectivefeaturesofthesituationconfrontingtheminconjunctionwiththeir overridingendsandinterests.Features(3),(4),and(5)showwhybecoming clearerabouttheextenttowhichagentsaregenuinelysubjecttopracticalnecessity,andthusalsoaboutunderwhatconditionstheybecomeso,isrelevanttothe questionoffreedom.Foranagent’sfailuretojudgecorrectlytheextenttowhich heorsheisgenuinelyconstrainedtodosomethingortoavoiddoingsomething willpreventawarenessofthetrueextentofhisorherfreedomofactioninagiven situation.Inthisrespect,theconceptofpracticalnecessityisrelevanttothe negativeliberalideaoffreedom.Moreover,oneagentmaybeabletodominate anotheragentindirectlybymakingthisagentbelievethatheorshemustaccept objectivefeaturesofagivensocietyandadapthim-orherselftothem,whereas thereare,infact,othermeaningful,lessunattractiveoptionsavailabletothe dominatedagent,ofwhichheorsheremainsunaware.Thereisherenoneed forthedominatingagenttointerferedirectlyinthelifeofthedominatedagent. Rather,thedominatedagentspontaneouslymakeschoicesthatcorrespondtothe choicesthatthedominatingagentwantshimorhertomake.Thusthereisastate ofaffairsinwhichoneagenthasthepotentialtointerfereinthelifeofanother agentanditislefttothe firstagent’sdiscretionhowmuchandhowoftenheorshe choosestoexploitthissituation.Inthisrespect,theconceptofpracticalnecessity isdirectlyrelevanttotheneo-republicanideaoffreedomasnon-domination.
Fromwhathasalreadybeensaidabouttherelationbetweentheconceptof practicalnecessityandtheconceptoffreedom,thelattercanstillbeunderstoodin negativeterms,thatis,astheabsenceofpracticalconstraintsoftherelevantkind. Theimportanceofthisnegativeaspectshouldnotbeunderestimated,forboththe liberalandneo-republicanideasoffreedommustnowbesupplementedbyan accountofatypeofconstraintonfreedomwhoseabsenceisrequiredifagentsare tobegenuinelyfreeeveninapurelynegativesense.Moreover,incaseswhereitis possibletoremovethistypeofconstraintonfreedombecauseitisnotgenerated byfundamental,inescapablefeaturesofthehumanconditionasweknowitand theconditionsoftheremovalofitarealreadypresent,wemayspeakof ‘surplus ’
practicalnecessityinsofarasthispossibilityremainsunrealized.Thisnegative viewoffreedomthenpointsbeyonditselfbecausetheremovalofsurpluspractical necessity,andthustheextensionoffreedominthenegativesense,canbethought todependonthehumancapacityforself-determinationandtheexerciseofthis capacity.Foronlyinthiswaycanwemakesenseoftheideathathumanbeingsare collectivelyabletoshapetheirconditionsoflifeinthefaceofthematerial,social, andhistoricalconstraintsconfrontingtheminsuchawayastoremovethis surpluspracticalnecessityandtherebyactualizeexistingpossibilities.Forexample, wehaveseenhowThucydidesdrawsattentiontothewaysinwhichdifferencesin powermayproduceasituationinwhichtheweakerpartyhasnorealchoicebutto yieldtothedemandsandinterestsofthestrongerparty.Ifthepracticalconstraints towhichagentsaresubjectsignificantlydependonhowmucheconomicorsocial powertheypossessrelativetooneanother,thentheextenttowhichhumanbeings aresubjecttopracticalnecessity,orbelievethemselvestobeso,couldbereduced bycreatingasituationinwhichindividualsenjoysimilardegreesofeconomicand socialpowerinrelationtooneanother.Inordertocreateasituationofthiskind, however,humanbeingswouldhavetoreformtheeconomic,social,andpolitical conditionsoftheirlivesinassociationwithoneanother,ratherthanallowingthese conditionstoemergespontaneously,therebylettingthemostpowerfulsocialand politicalagentsdeterminewhattheyare.Thisisnottosaythatpracticalnecessity woulddisappearaltogetherwiththecreationofasituationinwhichtheamountof surpluspracticalnecessityinagivensocietyissignificantlyreducedorthistypeof practicalnecessityisabolishedaltogether,fornaturalnecessitywillensurethat humanbeingsremainsubjecttopracticalconstraints.Thistime,however,they wouldbesubjecttopracticalconstraintsinsuchawaythatonemightspeakofa reconciliationoffreedomandnecessity.
Ishalldevelopanaccountofhowthehumancapacityforself-determination hasthepotentialtoaltertheextenttowhichhumanbeingsaresubjecttopractical necessitybybeginningwithHobbes’saccountoftheallegednaturalnessand practicalnecessityofcolonization.Thecapacityforself-determinationandits emancipatorypotentialareherenotrecognized.Ishallthencontrastthisneglect oftheemancipatorypotentialofthecapacityforself-determinationwithkey elementsofaphilosophicaltraditionthatcanbethoughttobeginwith RousseauandculminateinMarx’saccountofhowfreedomandnecessityare reconciledincommunistsociety.HobbesadoptsaThucydideanpictureofthe humanconditionandhumanaffairsbyexplainingcolonizationintermsofcertain naturalfactsabouthumanbeingsandhowthesefactsinteractwithobjective materialandsocialfactors.Rousseau,incontrast,showshowhumanbeings becomevictimsofsurpluspracticalnecessitybecausetheysubjectthemselvesto constraintsthattheycouldinfacteliminateoratleastreducebyexercisingtheir capacityforself-determination.Kant,Hegel,andMarxallfollowRousseauby seekingtoexplainhowitispossibletoreconcilefreedomandpracticalnecessityin
suchawayastoexpandthesphereoftheformerattheexpenseofthelatter.⁹ To illustratethisfundamentaldifferencebetweenthemandHobbes,Ishallnowturn toanotherexampledrawnfromtheachievementsofancientGreekculture.
In PrometheusBound,theancientGreektragedianAeschylusdescribesthe eponymousheroassomeonewhoisboundtoarockonamountainsideas punishmentforrevealingthesecretof firetohumankind,andwhoresignshimself tohisfateandthesufferingthatitcauseshimpreciselybecauseheknowsthatthe powerofnecessitycannotbechallengedandconquered(totēsanankēsest’ adēritovsthenos).¹⁰ Atthesametime,thelegendthatPrometheusrevealedthe secretof firetohumankindallowshimtobeviewedassomeonewhomadeculture possiblebygivingaccesstooneofitsmaterialpreconditions.Inthisway, Prometheusenabledhumanbeingstobegintofreethemselvesfromconstraints imposeduponthembynature.Theyarenowinsteadinthepositiontoexercise somecontrolovernature,evenifhumankindcanneverhopetofreeitself completelyfromtheconstraintsgeneratedbynaturalnecessity.Letusnowmodify thisstory.
Nolongerisitagodwhoisboundtoarockaspunishmentforproviding humanbeingswitharesourcethatenablesthemtobegintoexercisecontrolover thematerialconditionsoftheirlives:itishumanityitself.Norarethefettersthat bindhumanitytotherocktobeunderstoodinliteralterms:theyareinsteadtobe understoodmore figurativelyassocialandhistoricalforcesthatconstrainhuman beingsbylimiting,orappearingtolimit,theoptionsavailabletothem,withthe extentandtheintensityoftheconstraintsvaryingaccordingtotheamountof socialpowerthateachagentpossessesrelativetootheragents.Finally,itisnotthe
⁹ ThekeyelementsoffreedomthatIidentifybroadlycorrespondtokeyelementsofaliberaltheory ofautonomythatidentifiesthefollowingthreeconditionsofautonomy,the firstofwhichisonly impliedbytheaccountoffreedomthatIhavesofarprovided,butwillneverthelessbecomeexplicitin duecourse:(1)thepossessionoftherelevantabilities,suchasthementalabilitiesrequiredtoform intentionsandplantheirexecution;(2)anadequaterangeofoptionscoupledwithawarenessofthem; and(3)independenceinthesenseoffreedomfromcoercionandmanipulation.SeeRaz, TheMorality ofFreedom,372ff.Inadditiontoshowingthattheseconditionsofautonomyarealreadyidentifiedby thephilosophicaltraditionextendingfromRousseautoMarxwhichformsthefocusofthisbook, Iwouldarguethatthistraditionconcernsitselfwithimportantissuesthattheliberalmodelof autonomyneglects.Thismodelfocusesonpersonalautonomy,andalthoughitrecognizesthatthere aresocialandpoliticalconditionsofautonomy,itdoesnotexplainhowtheseconditionscanbe establishedonthebasisofongoingsocialandhistoricalprocessesinwhichagentsarecaughtup,and whichlimittheoptionsavailabletothematanygiventime.ThetraditioninwhichIaminterested,in contrast,mostcertainlydoesrecognizethisproblemanditalsoattemptstoaddressit.Indeed,aswe shallsee,itinvokesthenotionofpracticalnecessityinordertoexplaintheestablishmentofthe conditionsofsocialandpoliticalautonomy,whicharetherebyunderstoodashistoricalconditions,as opposedtopurelytheoreticalones.Thisrequiresthinkingofautonomyitselfinmorecollectiveterms, becausethehistoricalconditionsofautonomyarenotsomethingthatindividualscansingle-handedly establishorexpectothersdisinterestedlytoestablishontheirbehalf.Theideaofautonomycannot, therefore,bereducedtoamatterofpersonalautonomy.Finally,theneedtoexplaintheemergenceof theconditionsofautonomy,andthustheessentiallyhistoricalcharacterofautonomyitself,may generateatheoryofsocietythatcannotmeaningfullybedescribedasliberalevenifitdoescontain elementsoftheliberalideaofautonomy.
¹⁰ Aeschylus, PrometheusBound,l.105.
possessionofthesecretof firethatenableshumanbeingstoexercisecontrolover thematerialconditionsoftheirlives:itistheircapacityforself-determination, whichuntilnowhasremainedmerelylatent.Giventhathumanbeingsnow possessthemeanstoexerciseeffectivecontroloverthematerialconditionsof theirlives,theyarealsoinabetterpositiontodevelopthemselvesinvariousways andtoshapethesocialandpoliticalconditionsoftheirlives.Thefollowing questionthenarises:howfarmightthisprocessoffreeingthemselvesfrom practicalconstraintstowhichtheywouldotherwiseremainsubject,butwhich havenowbeenshowntobeamatterofsurpluspracticalnecessity,extend?¹¹This adaptedversionofthestoryofPrometheusandthequestiontowhichitgivesrise relatetoimportantfeaturesofthewritingsofRousseau,Kant,Hegel,andMarx thatIshallemphasizeinconnectionwiththeconceptofpracticalnecessity,¹² includingtheirdevelopmentalaccountsofhumanagencyandtherolethatthey assigntoself-determinationinthecreationofthesocialandpoliticalconditionsof astateofaffairsinwhichfreedomandnecessityarereconciled.Theyalsobringme toanothercentralthemeofthisbook:theconnectionbetweentheconceptof practicalnecessityandtheideaofhistoricalnecessity.
2.PracticalNecessityandHistoricalNecessity
Therearetwodistinctsensesofhistoricalnecessitythatfeatureinthisbookin connectionwiththeconceptofpracticalnecessity.The firstone,foundin Hobbes ’swritings,concernsacausalnecessity.Ifalltherelevantcausalfactors
¹¹Theideathathumanbeingsshouldnotevenattempttofreethemselvesfromsuchconstraintsin theeconomicrealmisimpliedbyF.A.Hayek’sclaimthat ‘Freedommeansthatinsomemeasurewe entrustourfatetoforceswhichwedonotcontrol’ (Law,LegislationandLiberty, Vol.2,30).Foritlooks asifsubjectiontoimpersonalmarketforcesandadaptationtothemisnot,afterall,detrimentalto freedom,eventhoughpeoplearebeingcounselledtoaccept,andaccommodatethemselvesto,these forcesinawaythatresembleshowtheywouldhavetoacceptthedecreesoffate.Moreover,anyattempt onthepartofthestatetointerveneintheoperationoftheseforceswiththeaimofinfluencing outcomesissaidtobeunjustified,becauseitwouldconstituteaviolationoftheprincipleofpersonal freedom.Resignationandadaptationthereforerepresentthemostappropriateresponsestothe objectiveforcesofthemarketandthepracticalconstraintsthatitgeneratesevenforthosepeople whoseoptionsarelimitedbythesesameforcestosuchanextentthattheirlivesaregovernedby practicalnecessityinwaysthatthelivesofother,morefortunateindividualsarenot.Theassumption hereisthateconomicforcesareindeedbeyondhumancontrol,atleastbeyondaformofhuman controlthatiscompatiblewiththepersonalfreedomofindividualssubjecttotheseforces.Iintendto shownotonlythatgenuinefreedomisincompatiblewiththeideaofallowingourselvestobesubjectto economicandsocialforcesoverwhichwelackanyeffectivecontrol,butalsothatsuchstatementsare essentiallyideologicalincharacter,inthattheyaimtoblindustopossibilitiesthatarenevertheless availabletous,andeventostopusthinkingthattheremightbeanysuchpossibilities.
¹²MarxusestheexampleofPrometheustoillustratethesituationofworkersinthefaceofthe allegedlawwherebytheaccumulationofcapitalproceedsinequilibriumwiththecreationofan ‘industrialreservearmy’,whichreinforcescapital’sdominationoflabourbecausethoseworkerswho demandhigherwagesandbetterworkingconditionscanthenbeeasilyreplacedbyothersfromthis industrialreservearmy(MEGAII/8:606;Cap.1:799).
arepresent,oneparticularoutcometotheexclusionofallotherswillbetheresult. OnesuchoutcomethatHobbeshimselfidentifieswillbeanattemptonthepartof statestoestablishcolonies,theultimateresultofwhichwillbeaconditionof globalwar.Thecausalfactorsarefeaturesofhumannatureinconjunctionwith certainmaterialconditionsandtheirsocialeffects.Theothersenseofhistorical necessity,whichwe firstencounterinKant’sideaofuniversalhistory,concernsa historicalprocessdeterminedbya finalendtowardswhichhistorymustbejudged tobetending.Practicalnecessityhereplaysthekeyroleofexplaininghowthe endinquestionisgraduallyrealized.Practicalnecessityplaysthesamerolein Hegel’sandMarx’sunderstandingofhistory,whereitservesastheinstrument bymeansofwhichadesiredoutcome,thereconciliationoffreedomandnecessity, isproduced.
Theconceptofpracticalnecessityfavourstheideaofhistoricalnecessityinthat itmakeshistoricaldevelopmentslargelyindependentofthewillsofthoseagents whoareconstrainedbytheirsituationincombinationwiththeirendsand intereststoactinwaysthatcontributetowardstheproductionofoutcomesthat theseagentsthemselvesdonotdirectlyintend.InthewritingsofKant,Hegel,and MarxthatIshallexamine,itisimpersonalhistoricalandsocialforcesorprocesses thatconstrainagentstoactinwaysthatcontributetowardstheproductionofa desirableoutcomethattheseagentsthemselvesdidnotoriginallyintend,although theymaysubsequentlyendorsethisoutcome.Theseagentsareconstrainedby practicalnecessitytodosomethingthat,itisassumed,theywouldnothavechosen todoifother,moreimmediatelyattractiveoptionshadbeenavailabletothem,or ifthecostsofpursuingotheroptionshadnotbeenprohibitivelyhigh.Morerecent examplesofthistypeofexplanationofhistoricaldevelopmentcanbefound,as whenitisclaimedthattheirreversibilityofthe ‘growingdependenceofnation statesonthesystemicconstraintsofanincreasinglyinterdependentworldsociety ’ entails ‘thepoliticalnecessityofextendingdemocraticproceduresbeyondnational borders’,becausethispoliticalnecessityis ‘alogicalimplicationoftheideaofa democraticcivilsocietyinfluencingitsownconditionsofexistence’.¹³Forthis advocateoftransnationalpoliticalunion,thepracticalconstraintsgeneratedby thelogicofthesituationinquestionwilleventuallycompelpoliticianstodo somethingthattheywouldotherwisehavelackedthepoliticalwillortheinclinationtodo,eventhoughitistherightandrationalthingforthemtodo.Inthis way,practicalnecessityisheldtotracksomekindofrationalnormativenecessity.
KantandHegelinparticularwillbeshowntoemploytheideathatpractical necessitytrackssomekindofrationalnormativenecessity.Theroleofpractical necessityinKant’sandHegel’saccountsofahistoricalnecessitythattracksa rationalnormativenecessityallowsustothinkofthemasadoptinganelementof
¹³Habermas, TheCrisisoftheEuropeanUnion,16.
thenotionoffate,namely,theideathatthroughtheiractionshumanbeings cannothelpbutbringabouteventsorstatesofaffairsthatcontributetowardsa predefinedoutcome.Themajordifferenceisthatheretheoutcomeproducedis heldtobeadesirableone,ifnotfortheagentswhoareconstrainedbypractical necessitytoproduceitthroughtheiractions,thenatleastforlatergenerations whocanenjoythebenefitsofasocietyinwhichfreedomandnecessityare reconciled,whereastheoutcomesdecreedbyfatearenotnecessarilyonesthat theagentsconcernedorthosewhocomeafterthemcouldreasonablyendorse.
Thisinvitesanothercomparisonwiththemythical figureofPrometheus,who possessedthegiftofprophecy.ThenecessitywhichPrometheuscouldnotchallengeandconquerisasmuchthenecessityoffateasthenecessityofresigning himselftothephysicalconstraintsthatbindhimtotherockandthephysical sufferingthathissituationcauseshim.Fateordains,however,thatfreedomwill eventuallyresultfromthissubjectiontonecessityandthesufferingthataccompaniesit,thoughinthiscaseitisfreedomonlyinthenegativesenseoftheabsence ofphysicalconstraintsandthefreedomofactionthatitallows.Yetthisfreedomis somethingthatPrometheusispowerlesstobringaboutanysoonerthanfate ordains.Liberationmust,therefore,comeatthepriceofcontinualsuffering: ‘onlyafterbeingrackedbycountlesspainsandtormentsamIatlasttoescape thesebonds.CraftisfarweakerthanNecessity[technē d’anankēsasthenestera makrō]’.¹⁴ ThisisalsotrueofhumanityinKant’s,Hegel’s,andMarx’saccountsof history,inthatapainfulhistoricalprocess,whoseinstrumentispracticalnecessity,mustbecompletedbeforehumanbeingscanenjoythefreedomwhichisan outcomeofthisprocess,thoughthistimethefreedominvolvesself-determination aswellasapurelynegativefreedom.
IshallidentifyproblemsthatstemfromtherolethatKant,Hegel,andMarx accordtopracticalnecessityintheiraccountsofthetransitiontoasocietyin whichfreedomandnecessityarereconciled.Theseproblemsincludedoubtsabout whetherpracticalnecessityisinfactsuf ficienttobringaboutthedesiredoutcome, whetheritis,intermsofitseffects,compatiblewiththetypeoffreedomthatitis meanttomakepossible,andwhetheritisgenuinelytheproductofahistorical necessitythatlimitstheoptionsavailabletoagentsataparticularstageofhistory andthusconstrainsthemtoactincertainways.Inthelastcase,onemayask whetherwedonotherehaveacaseofsurpluspracticalnecessityaccompaniedby unnecessaryhumansuffering,thatistosay,sufferingthatcannotbejustifiedin termsoftheestablishmentofasocietyinwhichfreedomandnecessityare reconciled,assumingthatajustificationofthiskindwouldbevalid.Although, forthesakeofargument,Ishallassumethatsuchajustificationisvalid,it presupposesthatcertainfundamentalhumangoodscanbeachievedinthecourse
¹⁴ Aeschylus, PrometheusBound, ll.512–14.
