ForNaomi,Alexandra,andLeonora
Preface
Iamapessimist.AlthoughIexpectIwillnever findoutwhy.Iampessimistic abouttheexistenceofconclusiveargumentsinphilosophy,thatdecisivelyestablishthetruthorfalsityofparticulartheories.Iampessimistictoo,aboutthe existenceofperfectlyconciseandperspicuousformulationsofthosetheories.This pessimismcutsbothways.ThisbookdefendsatheoryIcall ‘practicalexpressivism’.But ‘defence ’ mustnotbereadtoostrongly.ForthoughIthinkthatthere arenoconclusiveargumentsagainstpracticalexpressivism,Ialsothinkthat therenoconclusiveargumentsinitsfavour.Thus,whilethebookspendsmuch ofitstimeelucidatingpracticalexpressivism,thegoalisnottoshowthatitis betterthanallothercontenders,butjusttoshowthatit is acontender.IfIwas forcedunderoathtoplumpforonetheoryinthisareaitwouldhavetobe agnosticism withpracticalexpressivismoneamongseveraleligiblecandidates. Butwhatispracticalexpressivism andthisbook about?Firstandforemost, theyareaboutmorallanguage.Second(and,asitturnsout,alsoforemost)they areaboutthecreaturesthatusethatlanguageandthewaysinwhichtheyuseit. Theoriesthatexaminethemeaningofmorallanguage,ratherthanuseittopusha moralstance,aresometimescalled ‘metaethical’.So,thisbookisaboutmetaethics. Itisalsoconstructive,ratherthancritical.Itdoesnotbeginwithataxonomyof existingtheories,beforelistingtheirstrengthsandweaknessesandplottinga coursethatdeliversthemaximumnetbalanceofstrengthoverweakness.It doesnotdwelloncomparisonswithalternativeformulations.Rather,itbegins withatheory-neutralelucidationofthephenomenontobeexplainedanddefends desideratafortheoriesofthatphenomenon.Itthenelucidatesthetheoryof practicalexpressivismandarguesthatitmeetsthesedesiderata.The finalchapter arguesthat,giventheseearlierelucidations,therearenogroundsforanargumentativepresumption against practicalexpressivism,asisoftensupposed.If Iamright,theconclusionisnotthatpracticalexpressivismhaswontherace,but thatithasreachedthestartinglineonequalterms.
Here’showmydefenceofpracticalexpressivismproceeds.Inchapterone Ielucidatethesubjectmatterofalltheoriesinthisarea:moralpractice.This practicehasmorallanguageatitscore,butalsoinvolvesthewayhumansusethat languageinthought,discussion,andguidingaction.Thischapterconsidersthe questionsaboutmoralpracticethatmetaethicaltheorieshopetoanswerand defendstwodesiderataonsuchanswers.Regardingtheformer,Iarguethat metaethicaltheoriesarebestviewedasmakingmetasemantic,ratherthansemantic,claims.Regardingthedesiderata,Iarguethatacoredesideratumisthat
metaethicaltheoriesbeabletoaccommodatetheformsandassumptionsofour moralpractice,aswe findthem(althoughwithinimportantlimits).Ourpractice assumes,forexample,thatmoraldisagreementsaregenuine.Accordingtothis desideratum,anytheoryofmoralpracticeneedstoaccommodatethisassumption,thatis,vindicatethephenomenonofmoraldisagreement.Sincetheforms andassumptionsofmoralpracticearelegion,accommodatingthemisanextensivetask.Chaptersfourtoeightattemptthistaskforthepracticalexpressivist. Butbeforethisaccommodationprojectcanbegin,chapterstwoandthreeset outthecommitmentsofpracticalexpressivism.Chaptertwobeginstomakethe casethatexpressivismisundersoldifitispresentedasanarrowlinguistictheory aboutwhatgoesonwhenweuttersentencessuchas ‘Murderiswrong’.The explanatorypowerofthetheoryinfactresideselsewhere,initsaccountofthe practicalpurposeoftheseutterances,andthewaytheyhelphumanbeingslive together.Accordingtopracticalexpressivism,theseutterancesexpressmoral attitudes(notmoralbeliefs).But,asexpressivistssuchasCharlesStevenson haveemphasized,thisexpressionisnotmere ‘soundingoff ’.Ratheritisan essentialpartofacomplexinterpersonalcoordinationdevice,wherebyhumans attempttolineuptheirreactions,oratleast findacceptabletolerances,formutual advantage.Iarguethatthewaysinwhichmorallanguageisused,andthenorms appropriateforthatuse,cannotbeunderstoodinisolationfromthiswider coordinatingpurpose.Practicalexpressivismisthereforenotjustatheoryof morallanguage,butatheoryoftheroleofthatlanguageinourwiderhuman interactions,and,relatedly,atheoryofwhatmakesmoralattitudesdistinctive.Itis partlytoemphasizetheseaspectsthatIcallthetheory ‘practical’.Oneoftheaims ofthisbookistoprovideacounterpointtorecentdiscussionsofexpressivismthat tendtounderplaythisaspectofthetheory inmyview,muchtoitsdetriment.
Chapterthreefurtherelucidatespracticalexpressivismbyprovidinganovel accountofasurprisinglyneglectedissue:theexpressionrelation.Thepractical partofthetheoryagaindoesservicehere,since Iargue toexpressanattitude typeistopushitintoapublicdiscursivearenaasacandidateforacceptanceor rejection.Thisexpressionplaysakeyroleinthewayinwhichhumanbeings discuss,refine,andregulatetheiractionsandreactions.Subsequently,Ioutlinethe well-knownprojectof ‘quasi-realism ’.Thisistheproject popularizedbySimon Blackburn ofshowinghowfeaturesofmoralpracticewhichmanysupposecan only beaccommodatedbyrealistscan,infact,beaccommodatedbyexpressivists.
Theprojectisto ‘gorealist’ byaccommodatingthefeaturesbut ‘remainquasi’ bybeingexpressivistinthedetailsofthisaccommodation.Thisprojectismethodologicallyinterestinginsofarasitputspressureontheideathatsomeof theformsandassumptionsofourmoralpracticeare ‘intrinsically’ realistor ‘realist-seeming’.Theargumentinchapternineistheculminationofthis project:forifnoneoftheimportantformsandassumptionsofmoralpractice
arerealist-seemingafterall,realistscannotbeatastartingadvantageinaccommodatingthem.
Chapterfourbeginstheprojectofaccommodationforpracticalexpressivism.It focusesonthephenomenaofmoraldisagreement,reason-giving,anddiscussion. Itprovidesthe firstexampleofthe ‘domesticating’ strategyofquasi-realism.This isthestrategyofshowingthatnotionssometimesfeltthesolepreserveofrealist accountscanalsoapplytomoralpracticeunderstoodexpressively.Theresultisa potentialreappraisalofsuchnotions,sothattheyarenolongerunderstoodin waysthatmandaterealistfoundations.Oneofthemostinterestingfeaturesofthe quasi-realistprojectisthatitsuggestssuchreappraisals.Thischapterandthefour thatfollowthereforefocusnotjustonunderstandingmoralpractice,buton providingaperfectlygeneralunderstandingofthesenotions,consistentwith theirapplicationtothemoralcaseunderstoodexpressively.Crucially,understandinghowthesephenomenacanapplytomoralpracticerequiresawider appreciationofthepractical,coordinatingfunctionofthatpractice,asemphasized by practical expressivism.
Chapter fivetakesonthethornytopicofmorallogic,otherwiseknownasthe Frege–Geachproblem.Oneofthemosttalked-aboutformsofmoralpracticeis theabilityofmoralsentencestosensiblyembedincomplexsentences,especially logicalsentencessuchasnegationsandconditionals.Theinitialproblemisthat suchcontextsarenaturallyunderstoodintermsoftruth-conditions,butaccording topracticalexpressivismmoralutterancesareunderstoodnotthroughthetruthconditionstheybringtobear,butthroughtheattitudesexpressed.Thischapter developsaquasi-realistresponsetothisproblem aviewIlabel ‘compositional commitmentmetasemantics’.Thisholdsthat,forexample,moralconditionals expresstree-tyingcommitmentsthatinvolvetheendorsementofcertaincombinationsofmorebasicattitudesandbeliefs.Iarguethatthisaccountprovidesan explanationoflogicalinconsistencywithoutappealingtotruth-conditions.Ialso arguethatitisconstructive,doesnotsimplyhelpitselftonotionsthatitis requiredtoexplain,andprovidesagenuinealternativetorecentexpressivist accountsofmorallogic.
Chaptersixisadetourinsidethemoralsentence,suggestingexpressivist explanationsofcertainsubsententialparts suchaspredicates,quanti fiers,and tenses thatallowmoralsentencestotakemorecomplexformsthanthesimple ‘Murderiswrong’.Ishowhowthepracticalexpressivisttreatmentofthese expressionsisbothunivocalanddomesticating,thatis,thesametreatmentapplies regardlessofwhetherthemeaninginquestionismoralornon-moral,thereby demonstratingthatthesesubsententialformsareperfectlycompatiblewithan underlyingexpressivistmetasemantics.IntheprocessIgivethepracticalexpressivistaccountofmoral ‘properties’ anddemonstratetheconsistencybetween practicalexpressivismand ‘truth-conditionalsemantics’ .
Chaptersevenbuildsonthetheoryoutlinedinchapters fiveandsixtoaccommodatephenomenaconcerningmoraltruth,belief,andfact.Itisapotentially embarrassingobservationforexpressiviststhatordinaryengagementinmoral practiceseemsperfectlycomfortablewithtalkofmoral beliefs,moral truth,and moral facts.Theseseemtoberealistnotions parexcellence .Itthereforeseemsasif practicalexpressivismmustturnrevisionaryatthispoint,urgingthattheeveryday propensitytodeploythesenotionsinmoralpracticeisamistake.Butthis revisionaryapproachwoulditselfbeamistake,Iargue,sincethereareperfectly serviceable ‘minimalist’ notionsoftruthandbeliefthatarecompatiblewith practicalexpressivism.Iarguethatthisapproachdoesnotrequirethatminimalismistheonlywayofunderstandingthesenotions,justthatitissufficientfor understandingthewaytheyaredeployedineverydaymoralpractice.
Chaptereightcontinuestheprojectofaccommodatingtheformsandassumptionsofmoralpracticebyconsideringthephenomenaofmoralmindindependenceandcategoricalmoralreasons.Iarguethatbothcanbeaccommodatedbypracticalexpressivism.Crucialtothisaccommodationistheplaceof moralconceptsinthewidercoordinatingroleofmoralpractice.Hence,once again,thepracticalpartofpracticalexpressivismisnotmerewindow-dressing, butavitalpartoftheexplanationofmorallanguage’scorefeatures.
Idonotclaimthatchaptersfourthrougheightprovideanexpressivistaccommodationof all theformsandassumptionsofmoralpractice(thereareholesin mypropositionalclothing,sotospeak).Thisisdeliberate:Ihavebeenexclusive partlybecausethereareverymanyfeaturesthatneedaccommodating,andpartly becausesomeoftheaccommodationshavebeencarriedouteffectivelyelsewhere. Insteadthesechaptersfocusontheformsandassumptionsofmoraldiscoursethat seemeitherthehardestforexpressiviststoaccommodate(morallogic,moral truth),themostcentraltomoralpractice(moraldisagreement,categoricalmoral reasons),orthatbestdemonstrategeneralexpressiviststrategiesforaccommodation(moralmind-independence).Bydrawingoutthesestrategies,andsummarizingthematthestartofchapternine,Ihopetoprovidelicenceforoptimism regardingfutureexpressivistaccommodations.Furthermore,theaccommodationsthatIdocoversufficetodemonstratethatmoralpracticeunderstood expressivelycaninvolveapracticallyrewarding,complex,nuanced,andargumentativelyrichmodeofdiscourse.Practicalexpressivismdoesnotconsignmoral practicetoan ‘inertnon-cognitivescrapheap ’ (asWarrenQuinnoncesuggested).
Chapterninealsoconsiderstheimpactsoftheforegoingonthedialecticallandscapeinmetaethics.Itisoftenassumedthat evenif expressivistscouldaccommodatetheformsandassumptionsofmoralpractice,theirpositionwouldstillbe atadisadvantageincomparisonwithrealistrivals,becausetheseaccommodations wouldbeunnatural,forced,excessivelycomplex,theoreticallydisunified,or otherwiseunappealing.Thissupposeddisadvantagehas,onoccasion,beenused byopponentstoduckengagementwiththedetailsofexpressivistapproaches:for
whydealwithdetails,iftheprogrammeisdevilish?Thischapterresiststhis ‘presumptiveargument’ againstexpressivism.Iftheforegoingaccommodations havebeensuccessful,thereisnoreasontoconsiderpracticalexpressivismtobeat aninherentdisadvantageinexplainingthenatureofmoralpractice.
Finally,theconclusionprovidessomespeculativethoughtsabouthow metaethicsmightproductivelyproceedoncethepossibilityofaviablepractical expressivismisrecognized.AndAppendixAprovidesadirectcomparison betweenpracticalexpressivismandtwohigh-profileexpressivistalternatives: MarkSchroeder’ s ‘beingfor’ expressivismandMichaelRidge’shybrid expressivism.
Acknowledgements
Forthosewhoworkinmetaethics,myintellectualdebtswillbeobvious.Butfor thosewhodonot,andtogivethanks,Inotethemhere.Thefourthinkerswhose viewsaremostcontiguouswithmineareStevenson,Blackburn,AllanGibbard, andRidge.Stevensonwasaproto-quasi-realist,butitwasBlackburnwhopopularizedtheprojectandmadeclearitsramifications.Thename ‘practicalexpressivism’ isborrowedfromGibbard anothercard-carryingquasi-realist although theviewIdevelopismostsimilartoBlackburn’ s ‘non-descriptivefunctionalism’ . RidgeadoptsaversionofhybridexpressivismthatIreject,buthisviewsof semantics,metasemantics,andexpressionaresimilartothoseadoptedbypracticalexpressivism.
Twothinkerswhoadoptviewsopposedtoexpressivism,butwhosewritings havetaughtmemostaboutwhatsortofviewpracticalexpressivism needs tobe(if itistobeplausible)areRussShafer-LandauandSchroeder.Shafer-Landauisthe foremostdefenderofmoralrealism.Thesystematicandpowerfulwayinwhichhe defendsrealismhastaughtmewhattheexpressivistisupagainstiftheywantto overturnanysupposedpresumptionagainsttheirview.Schroederhasshown expressiviststhechallengestheyfaceinordertodevelopacompleteandconstructiveaccountofthemeaningofmorallanguage,inparticularanaccountthat canexplaininconsistency.AlthoughIrejecttheversionofexpressivismwhich Schroederdevelops(as,ultimately,doeshe),hisrigorouspresentationofithas beeninvaluableinhighlightingtheconstraintswithinwhichasuccessfulexpressivisttheorymustwork.SoimportantisSchroeder’sworktocontemporary expressivism,thatAppendixAislargelydevotedtoit.
Finally,thethinkerwhosehonest,insightfulstylehasdonemorethananyone toinfluencethewayIapproachphilosophicalquestions,isPhilippaFoot.One cannotunderestimatehowencouragingitistoseeone’seldersandbettersfreely admit,inprint,thingssuchas: ‘Idonotunderstandtheideaofareasonforacting, andIwonderwhetheranyoneelsedoeseither’ (1978:156).Foot’sopen-endedand inquisitiveapproachtometaethicstaughtmethatoneneednotpropoundan earth-shattering,paradigm-shifting,revolutionarytheoryinordertohavesomethingworthsaying.
Iowealargernumberofdebtstothefriendsandcolleagueswhohave commentedonearlierdraftsoraskedinsightfulquestionswhenIhavepresented papersonthesetopicsatconferences.Theyinclude:ZachHoskins,Chris Woodard,StefanoPredelli,StephenBarker,JonRobson,HaroldNoonan, PenelopeMackie,UriLeibowitz,JamesChamberlain,AndyFisher,MarkJago,
StephenMumford,GregCurrie,PeterGibson,MarkDimmock,LukeTaylor, KiprosLofitis,DavidJudd,JessicaLeach,JimmyAltham,RogerCrisp,David Liggins,JamieDreier,MarkvanRoojen,IsabelGois,DonLoeb,StephenFinlay, DebbieRoberts,BartStreumer,JonasOlson,MarcusLee,AlexGregory,Lee Walters,JamesLenman,ConorMcHugh,BenCurtis,EdwardHarcourt,Krister Bykvist,AlexMiller,SebastianKöhler,ChristineTiefensee,SimonKirchin,Teemu Toppinen,JaneHeal,RafaelD’Aversa,DanielElstein,PekkaVäyrynen,Guy Fletcher,CarrieJenkins,JackWoods,LewisBrooks,StephenIngram,Graham Bex-Priestley,BradHooker,AdrianMoore,JamesDoyle,JustinClarke-Doane, KomarineRomdenh-Romluc,VladVlaovic,andEzraMacDonald.Thisbook wouldnothavebeencompletedwithouttheongoingsupport,bothintellectual andmoral,ofmyone-timePhDsupervisor,HallvardLillehammer.Itwouldnot havebeenpublishedwithoutthebelief,patience,andguidanceofPeter MomtchiloffatOxfordUniversityPress.Anditwouldnothavebeenhalfas interestingwithouttheexceptionallydetailedandinsightfulcommentsprovided bythreeanonymousreferees youknowwhoyouare;youknowI’mgrateful. Someoftheideasdefendedherehaveappearedinpreviouspapers.Some elementsofchapter five(§§2and5.3)appearedasSinclair2011.Elementsof chaptersevenappearedasSinclair2006.Elementsofchaptereightappearedas Sinclair2008and2016a.Thelatersectionsofchapternineareanupdatedversion ofSinclair2012a.Inallcasesmythinkinghasdevelopedgreatlysincetheseearlier forays.
8.Mind-IndependentMoralTruthsandCategoricalMoralReasons191
9.PracticalExpressivistStrategiesandPresumptiveArgumentsfor
TheproperstudyofMankindisMan. AlexanderPope,AnEssayonMan
TheSubjectMatterofMetaethics
Moralityisahumaninstitution.Inonesense,thisispurelystipulative by ‘morality’ Imeanthatdistinctivepracticewherebyhumanbeingstalk,think, feel,andargueinwaysthatdeploymoralconcepts.Inanothersense,thisclaim expressesasubstantivetruthwhichitisthepurposeofthisbooktodefend:that thisinstitutioncanbeadequatelyunderstoodasanaturalisticallyexplicable coordinationdevice,wherebyhumanbeingsworktowards,sustain,andrefine mutuallybeneficialpatternsofactionandreaction.Further,thismoralityowes nothingtoanethicalrealitythatexistsoutsideofhumaninclination:moral judgementsandargumentdonot(attemptto)discover,describe,orcognizea robustrealmofmoralfactsorproperties.Rather,suchjudgementsexpress affectiveorpracticalstatesofmind,similartopreferences,desires,policies,or plans.Thelocatingofthisexpressionwithinthewidercoordinatingpracticeof moralityprovides(Iargue)anattractiveexplanationandpartialvindicationofthe formsandassumptionsofthisuniquelyhumaninstitution.
ThethesisIwishtodefendisthereforeaversionof ‘expressivism’,theviewthat thesemanticfunctionofmoraljudgements(thatis,thefunctionthatexplains theirdistinctivemeaning)isnottooffermoraldescriptions,buttoexpress practicalstatesofmindforapracticalpurpose.Hintsofexpressivismhavebeen aroundatleastsinceBerkeley,whonotedthat:
ThecommunicatingofIdeasmarkedbyWordsisnotthechiefandonlyendof language....Thereareotherends,astheraisingofsomePassion,theexcitingtoor deterringfromanAction,theputtingtheMindinsomeparticularDisposition... (Berkeley1710Introduction§20)
Theideathatseeminglyfact-statinglanguagemayhavenon-descriptivefunctions canalsobefoundintheworkofHobbes,Locke,andHume.¹Aroundtheturnof thetwentiethcenturyMooreofferedhintsofexpressivismandWittgenstein suggestedasimilarviewofsomepsychologicaljudgements.²Later,Wittgenstein alsoexpoundedanexpressivist-friendlytheoryofmeaning,accordingtowhichan adequateunderstandingofourtermscomesnotfromarmchair-basedanalysesof
¹Hobbes1640:ch.13,1651:ch.6,Locke1689:bk.III,Hume1777b:§1,andAppendixI. ²Moore1903:181,185–6,and1922:297.
PracticalExpressivism:AMetaethicalTheory. NeilSinclair,OxfordUniversityPress(2021).©NeilSinclair. DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198866107.003.0001
theircontent,butfromthestudyofhowtheyareusedinlinguisticexchange.³But theclaimthatmorallanguagemightbeusedinnon-descriptiveways,andthatthis isfundamentaltoexplainingitsmeaning,ismoststronglyassociatedwiththe twentieth-centuryworkofAyer,Stevenson,Reichenbach,Urmson,Nowell-Smith, Hare,Blackburn,andGibbard,andthetwenty-first-centuryworkofBarker, Schroeder,andRidge.⁴ Opposedtoandhistoricallypre-datingthistraditionis thedescriptivistviewaccordingtowhichmoraljudgementsexpressbeliefsabout andtherebyofferdescriptionsof adomainofmoralentities.Descriptivists differentiateamongsttheirownnumberconcerningthenatureofthisdomain, and,latterly,whetherornotitexists.⁵ Roughly,accordingtodescriptivistsmoral judgementsaremapsofmoralreality;accordingtoexpressiviststheyarepractical flagsofallegiance.
Inordertoassessthesetheoriesandultimatelydefendexpressivism,weneedto knowthreethings.First,whattheyaretheoriesof theirsubjectmatter.Second, whatsortofquestionsaboutthatsubjectmattertheyattempttoanswer.Third,the desiderataforsuccessfulanswerstothosequestions.Thischapteraddressesthese tasks.Indoingso,itprovidesthemethodologicalframeworkbyreferencetowhich Idefendmyversionofexpressivism.
1.MoralPractice
Expressivismanddescriptivismaretheoriesofmoralpractice.Whatisthis?
Wecanstartbynoticingthatmosthumancultureshaveadistinctivemoral terminology,whichinstandarduseservestoprivilegecertainpracticaloptions,or
³Wittgenstein1973§§43,139,244,304,and421.SeealsoAyer1973:50.Fortheconnection betweenexpressivismandWittgenstein,seeBlackburn1981,1998b,Boisvert2015,andHudson1970: 44–54,107–13.
⁴ Ayer1936ch.6,1949,Stevenson1937,1944,1963,Reichenbach1951,Hare1952,1963,NowellSmith1954,Urmson1968,Blackburn1984,1993a,1998a,Gibbard1990,2003,2011,Barker2006, 2007,Schroeder2008b,andRidge2014.BetweenMooreandAyer,expressivism(as ‘emotivism’)was discussedatCambridgebyOgdenandRichards1923,Braithwaite1927:137,Broad1933(who attributesittoAustinDuncan-Jones);Barnes1934,Ross1934,andRussell1935:ch.9.Hudson (1970:113–14)providesahistorywhichalsoincludesStebbing1965andBritton1939.
⁵ Descriptivistswhoholdthatthereisamoraldomainthatsomemoraljudgementscorrectly describeincludeMoore1903,Lewis1989,Harman1977,McDowell1985,1987,Jackson1998, Sturgeon1985a,Brink1989,Boyd1988,Railton1986,Shafer-Landau2003,Cuneo2007,Wedgwood 2007,Schroeder2007,andEnoch2011.Descriptivistswhodenytherealityofthemoraldomaininclude Mackie1977,Joyce2001a,2006,Streumer2013,andOlson2014.Descriptivismissometimesalso referredtoas ‘representationalism’ (e.g.Gross,Tebben,andWilliams2015,Price2013,Köhler2017a, Tormey1971:68,andSimpson2018),whichinonesenseismoreaptsincearepresentationalterm, suchas ‘Shakespeare’,canrefertoanobjectwithoutdescribingit.NeverthelessIavoidtheterm ‘representationalism’ becauseevenexpressivistsacceptthatmoraljudgementsarerepresentationalina ‘directive’ sense(seechaptertwo§2).Similarly,descriptivismissometimesreferredtoas ‘cognitivism’ butIavoidthislabelduetothesenseof ‘minimalbelief ’ elucidatedinchapterseven.Inprevious decadestheterm ‘descriptivism’ wasalsousedtorefertoaparticular ‘neo-naturalist’ subsetofwhat Iamcallingdescriptivistviews:seeHudson1970:249–329.
attitudes,overothers.⁶ Forexample,declaringamilitaryinvasion ‘ wrong ’ marks outasubsetofthetotalpracticaloptionsavailable namely,thosethatdonot involveinvasion astheonestogofor,morallyspeaking.Withintheclassof moraltermsitispossibletodistinguishbetweenpractical,deontic,orverdictive terms suchas ‘right’ and ‘ wrong’—andevaluativeoraxiologicalterms suchas ‘good’ and ‘bad’.Theformerapplytoactionsandgiveanoverallassessmentof whetherthatactionisrequired,prohibited,oroptional.Thelattercanbeapplied toarangeofobjects,characters,events,actions,situations,orfactsandtheir applicationgivesorsuggestsaconsiderationfororagainstapathofactionor attitude,whichmaynotbedefinitiveandcanvarybydegree.Forexample, sometimesagoodaction,oranactionthatproducessomewhatgoodconsequences,canbewrong.⁷ Anotherdistinctionisbetweenthinandthickmoral terms.Theformerclassincludesbothdeontictermslike ‘right’ andevaluative termslike ‘good’,whilstthelatterincludesevaluativetermssuchas ‘callous’ , ‘humane’ , ‘merciful ’ , ‘selfish’ , ‘treacherous’,and ‘just’.Onewayofmakingthis distinctionisthatalthoughtheuseofathintermlike ‘right’ saysorimpliesthat theobjectbeingjudgedhassomenon-moralpropertiesinvirtueofwhichitis right,thisusedoesnotsayorimplyanythingaboutwhatthosepropertiesare. Thintermsare ‘[p]ureintheirnormativity...likethoselittlegoldstarsyoucan stickonanything’ . ⁸ Ontheotherhand,theuseofthicktermsseemstobothgive anevaluationandsaysomethingaboutthenon-moralpropertiesinvirtueof whichthatevaluationis fitting.So,forexample,tolabelanactioncallousisnot justtocallitbad:itistosaythatitinvolvesanindifferencetosuffering,and that is whyitisbad.⁹ Apartfromthesedistinctions,whatmoraltermsseemtohavein commonisthattheyservetorecommend(toagreaterorlesserdegreeandwith moreorlessspecificity)certainattitudes,policiesorpathsofaction.Moralterms arethereby ‘fraughtwithought’.¹⁰ Further,moral ‘oughts’ aredistinctfromother ‘oughts’.Onecommonviewisthatthisdistinctivenessresidesintherecommendatoryforceofamoral ‘ought’ beingindependentofboththejudgerandtheagent towhomthe ‘ought’ isaddressedhavingany(contingent)desirethatwouldbe servedbyfollowingit.Forexample,ifinvasioniswrong,thisisnotbecause Iadviseagainstit,orbecausethoseinpowerwantaninvasion.Ifso,Kant’ s remarksaboutreasonseemtoapplytomoralconsiderations:they ‘ ...issue[their] preceptsunremittingly,withouttherebypromisinganythingtotheinclinations’.¹¹
⁶ Ayer1949:241,Boehm1999,Gibbard1990:3,andStevenson1963:16.ThoughIwillsometimes refertomoralpracticeas ‘morality’,itmustbesharplydistinguishedfromsetsofclaimsaboutmoral rightness,wrongness,andsoon.
⁷ Ross1968:37–8,Williams1985:143andWiggins1987b:95. ⁸ Korsgaard1996:17.
⁹ Wiggins1987b:95.
¹⁰ Thisphrase,frequentlyusedtocharacterise ‘thenormative’,isoftenattributedtoSellars,butas Gibbard(2011)notes,itishardto findinSellars’ publishedworks.
¹¹Kant1785§4:405.Seechaptereight§5.Attemptstocapturethisdistinctivenessarelegion.See, forexampleFinlay2014:176–8,Mackie1977,Foot1972,Joyce2000,2001a:42,2006:62,Hampton
Notethattalkofadistinctivemoralterminologymustbeunderstoodas shorthandfortalkofterminologyinitsdistinctivelymoraluses.¹²Mosttermsin Englishthathavemoralusesalsohavenon-moraluses(theterm ‘immoral’ is perhapsoneexception).Forexample,thereareevaluativebutnon-moralusesof theterm ‘good’ inwhichitappliestothingsbelievedtomeasuresuf ficientlyhighly onsomecontextuallysalientstandard(‘Thisisgoodsoil’ , ‘Thekickforanextra pointwasgood’)orbesuitableforsomecontextuallydefinedpurpose(‘Barrettisa goodpinch-hitter’ , ‘Shehadagoodlookround’).¹³Therearealsonon-evaluative usesof ‘good’,asin ‘Annettewasagood fiftyyardsfromthescene’.Inaddition, sometimes ‘good’ isusedasshorthandfor ‘whatpeoplegenerallyconsidertobe good’.¹⁴ Suchusesarenottheprimaryconcernofthisbook.Ifocusonthemoral case,wherethenotionofdesire-independentrecommendatoryforceelucidated aboveisthebeginningofanaccountofwhatmakesthisusagedistinctive.
Asecondaspectofmoralpracticeistheuseofmoralterminologyinmoral discourse,thatis,argumentanddebateconcerningwhichobjects,characters, events,actions,situationsorfactsdeservetheseappellations.Thisdiscourse infusesmuchpublicandphilosophicaldebate:Whatisthe appropriate scopeof afederalgovernment?Atwhatstagedoesabortionbecome morallywrong?What value isthereinthenaturalenvironment?Canthe right toprivacybesacri ficedin timesofnationalemergency?Isit permissible tohuntnon-humananimalsfor pleasure? Should wealthynationsprovidedebtrelieftopoorernations(andat whatlevel)?Underwhatconditions,ifany,canagentsbeheld morallyresponsible fortheirimplicitbiases?Andsoon allquestionsthatkeepinternetsitemeters tickingover.Butmoralterminologyalsofeaturesinmoreparochialdebates. Should CharlenetellDarlenethatDarren ’sbeencheatingonherwithSharon? WasRose right tolietoJeff,giventheliesavedhimfromanguish? Should Iletmy bossknowwhostolefromthepettycash,givenhispropensityforgrossoverreaction?Thesoap-operatichueoftheseexamplesdemonstratesthatmoralityis notmerelyconcernedwithextremeorlarge-scalepracticalproblemsbutpervades muchofourlives.
Third,onanindividuallevel,termsintheirmoralusagecorrespondtomoral concepts,andthoseconceptsfeatureinthought,inparticular,inpracticaldeliberation.(Whereastermsarelinguisticconstituentsofsentences,conceptsarethe psychologicalconstituentsofthethoughtssuchsentencescanexpress.)Inweighingupwhattodo,moralconsiderationsoften figurelarge.Takingmoneyfromthe
1998:105,Olson2001,2014:118,Williams1981,1985:177,Cuneo2014:12,Schroeder2007:106, Lillehammer2003:568,Mameli2013:908–9,Miller2003:199,andMacheryandMallon2010:20.
¹²Moore1903:3–5,Stevenson1963:117,133,Ridge2014:18–21,andTormey1971:64–6.
¹³SeeWittgenstein1965:5andRawls1971:350–1.Forfurtherdiscussionofnon-moralusesof ‘good’ seeFinlay2014:ch.2.
¹⁴ Ayer1936:108.
abandonedwalletwouldensureagoodnightoutforall,butcouldyoulivewith yourconsciencefordoingso?Anotherbottleofwinewouldgodownwell,buton theotherhandisitinmybestinteresttodrinksomuch?Protectingthe environmentforfuturegenerationsisimportant,butanewer,bigger,carwould besomuchmorefuntodrive.Infavourablecircumstances,themoralconsiderationspresentinourdeliberationsmayevenholdsway.Insuchcasesmoral thinkingcomestoaffectouractions.Naomimayresisttheurgetobuyanewcar basedonaconcernforfuturegenerations.Hermoraldeliberationhasprompteda moralaction.
Fourth,moralpracticeincludesthephenomenonwherebymoralterminology andconcepts,throughtheirdeploymentindiscourseanddeliberation,cometo affecttheactionsofthosemakingmoraljudgements,andthosetargetedbythem.
Naomi’smoraldeliberationaffectedheractions.Engagementinmoraldiscourse canbesimilarlyaction-guiding.AfterdiscussingtheethicsofsufferingwithPeter, ImaycometobelievethatIoughttogivetenpercentofmyincometocharityand actaccordingly.Inbothcasesmoralterminologyandconceptsservenotmerely theoreticalinterest.Theyaredeployedwhenwearedecidingwhattodoandhow tofeel,andtheirdeploymentoftenaffects(andisexpectedtoaffect)howweend upactingandfeeling.Wemaycallthisloosely-describedphenomenon, ‘moral action-guidance’.¹⁵
Thewayinwhichmoraltermsandconceptsaffectactionhighlightsanother featureofmoralpractice:thehaving,encouraging,anddiscouragingofparticular moralemotions,suchasguilt,regret,blame,shame,resentment,orpride.¹⁶ Often whenwejudgethatwehaveactedwronglywefeelguilty,orjudgethatguiltwould beappropriate,orboth.Thisguiltisaparticulartypeofnegativefeelingbasedona perceptionthatone’sactionshavetransgressedsomenorm:asHumenoted,itis aninternalizationofthemoralcondemnationofothers.¹⁷ Sometimesguilt,orthe desiretoavoidit,canhelppushustowards(whatwejudgetobe)betteractionsin thefuture.Conversely,sometimeswhenwejudgethatwehaveactedrightly(and sometimeswhenwedonot),wefeelproud,orjudgethatpridewouldbe appropriate,orboth.Andsometimespride,orthethoughtofit,canhelppush ustoactinwayswejudgetobemorallyright.Thesedistinctiveemotionsareone mechanismwherebymoralterms,discourse,andthoughtinfluenceouractions. Besidestheserelativelyuncontroversialfeaturesthereareotherdisputedphenomenathatatvarioustimeshavebeenconsideredpartofmoralpractice.For example,sometakemoralpracticetoincludeaunifiedphenomenological ‘feel’ , possessedbyallandonlymoraljudgementsorexperiences.¹⁸ Othershaveheld
¹⁵ Sometimesdescribedasthecapacityfornormativeguidance.SeeFitzPatrick2014:§1and MacheryandMallon2010.
¹⁶ Stevenson1963:59andBlackburn1998a:14–21.¹⁷ SeeTangneyandFisher1995.
¹⁸ FordiscussionseeSinnott-Armstrong2008,HorganandTimmons2005,Kriegel2008,andGill 2008.
moralitytoinvolveadistincttypeofmoralperception,understoodasdirect cognitionofanindependentmoralreality.Sometakethisperceptiontoengender adistincttypeofmoralmotivation, flowingfromsuchperceptions.¹⁹ Butthough therearenodoubtgenuineexperientialphenomenainneedofexplanationhere (forexample,thefactthatwesometimesexperiencetheworldasmakingcategoricaldemandsofus)onemustbecarefulnottodescribethesephenomenain controversialways.Inparticular,onemustnotdescribetheminwayswhich prejudgethedebatebetweenexpressivistsandtheiropponents asdescription intermsofperceptionofindependentmoralfeaturesseemstodo.Whatis required,atleastinitially,isasetofphenomenawhichallsidescanagreestand inneedofexplanation.
Anotherphenomenonexcludedfrommycharacterizationofmoralpracticeis theperformanceofmorallyrightorpraiseworthyactions.Wemustdistinguish betweenmoralbehaviour,understoodasactionsyouandImightagreetobe morallycommendable(e.g.helpingstrangers,deferringpleasures)andmoralizing behaviour,understoodasengagementinthetypeofmoraltalk,thought,and action-guidancedescribedabove.²⁰ Tosaythatsomeoneactedmorallyistomake amoraljudgement,whereastosaythatsomeonemoralizedistomakean interpretativeclaimaboutthetypeofconceptsorterminologytheydeployed. Nodoubtthereareinterestingconnectionsbetweenthetwo(onmanyviews,for example,moralizingisawayofpromotingmoralbehaviour)butitisdoubtfulthat anysuchconnectionsarenecessary:afterall,onecanimagineawell-brought-up nihilistwhoeschewsmoraljudgementwhilecontinuingtohelpothers.Inwhat followstheprimaryfocusisonmoralizing,notmoralbehaviour.Notealsothat ‘moralizing’ hereshouldnotbeconfusedwiththederogatorysensewhichinvolves sententiousness,dogmatism,orpomposity.²¹
Moralpractice,then,involvestheuseofadistinctivemoralterminologyin discourse,thought,andaction-guidance,oftenviamechanismsinvolvingemotionssuchasguiltandpride.Thisisnottogiveanaccountoftheconceptually necessaryandsuf ficientconditionsforapracticetobemoralpractice,orto suggestthatthesefeaturesalwaysoccurtogether.Inparticular,weshouldbe opentothepossibilitythattheexplicituseofmoralterminologyisjustone way perhapsarelativelyuncommonway inwhichasocietycanmanifestits morality.²²Thepresentaimismerelytopointtoanempiricallyidentifiableand apparentlyunifiedhumanphenomenoninordertoprovideaprovisionalsubject matterforinquiry.Inotherwordsthischaracterizationofmoralpracticeisnot derivedfromthearmchairofapriorispeculation,butfromthegardenchairof
¹
⁹
E.g.McDowell1985,McNaughton1988,andPlato Republic 517c.
²⁰ E.g.Hudson1970:1andJoyce2006:3.²¹E.g.Baier1958:3. ²²SeeDreyfusandDreyfus1991.
cautiousobservationofhumanpractices,including sinceweourselvesengagein thosepractices ourownexperiences.²³
Unlikegardening,however,moralpracticeisnotreservedfordesignatedtimes andplaces.Itpervadesmuchofourlinguistic,deliberative,andactivelives. Neverthelessitcanbeusefultoabstractthephenomenonfromitsentangled context,inordertobetterunderstanditsnature.Thisispreciselywhatexpressivismanddescriptivismhopetodo.
2.MetaethicalQuestions
ItappearstomethatinEthics,asinallotherphilosophicalstudies,the difficultiesanddisagreements,ofwhichitshistoryisfull,aremainly duetoaverysimplecause:namelytotheattempttoanswerquestions, without firstdiscoveringpreciselywhatquestionitiswhichyoudesire toanswer.
G.E.Moore, PrincipiaEthica,Preface
ThetheoriesofmoralpracticewithwhichIamconcernedaresometimescalled ‘metaethical ’.Broadlyspeaking,ifmoralpracticeisconcernedwithwhatwe morallyoughttodoorwhatismorallyvaluable,metaethicsisconcernedwith whatwearedoingwhenweasksuchquestions.Ifeverydaymoralizersareakinto footballplayersthenmetaethicistsarethecommentators.²⁴
Thefundamentalquestionofmetaethicsis:Whatisthecorrectsystematic accountofthesemantics,metaphysics,epistemology,andpsychologyofmoral practice?
Toelaborate.Moralizingplays,orseemstoplay,animportantpartinour practicalandintellectuallives.Soonemaybeinclinedtoseekadeeperunderstandingofit,perhapsinordertoclarifyitsconceptsandmethods,sothatits questionsmightbemoreeasilyanswered.Thisistoperformtheroleof ‘under labourer ’ forethics,muchasLockesoughttofulfilthisroleforscience.Howmight sucharolebecarriedout?
2.1.SemanticandMetasemanticQuestions
Inthe firstcase,onemightaskaboutthedistinctivemeaningsoftheterms involvedinthepractice.Whenwedescribeanactasmorallywrongorcruel,a
²³ItakethemetaphorofthegardenchairfromLillehammer2016 althoughputittodifferentuse.
²⁴ Anotherwayofmarkingthisdistinction(e.g.Brink1989:1andTimmons1999:10–11)isto distinguish first-ordermoralquestionsfromsecond-orderdiscourseaboutthe first-orderpractice.
