PopulismandLiberalDemocracy:AComparativeand TheoreticalAnalysisTakisS.Pappas
https://ebookmass.com/product/populism-and-liberaldemocracy-a-comparative-and-theoretical-analysis-takis-spappas/
Instant digital products (PDF, ePub, MOBI) ready for you
Download now and discover formats that fit your needs...
Populism and Civil Society: The Challenge to Constitutional Democracy Andrew Arato
https://ebookmass.com/product/populism-and-civil-society-thechallenge-to-constitutional-democracy-andrew-arato/
ebookmass.com
Populism and Civil Society: The Challenge to Constitutional Democracy Andrew Arato
https://ebookmass.com/product/populism-and-civil-society-thechallenge-to-constitutional-democracy-andrew-arato-2/
ebookmass.com
Democracy Unmoored. Populism and the Corruption of Popular Sovereignty Samuel Issacharoff
https://ebookmass.com/product/democracy-unmoored-populism-and-thecorruption-of-popular-sovereignty-samuel-issacharoff/ ebookmass.com
High Culture: Drugs, Mysticism, and the Pursuit of Transcendence in the Modern World Christopher Partridge
https://ebookmass.com/product/high-culture-drugs-mysticism-and-thepursuit-of-transcendence-in-the-modern-world-christopher-partridge/ ebookmass.com
Nutrition for Dental Health: A Guide the Professional Third Edition
https://ebookmass.com/product/nutrition-for-dental-health-a-guide-theprofessional-third-edition/
ebookmass.com
CCISO Certified Chief Information Security Officer All-inOne Exam Guide Steve Bennett
https://ebookmass.com/product/cciso-certified-chief-informationsecurity-officer-all-in-one-exam-guide-steve-bennett/
ebookmass.com
Bears Behaving Badly (BeWere My Heart Bk 1) Maryjanice Davidson [Davidson
https://ebookmass.com/product/bears-behaving-badly-bewere-my-heartbk-1-maryjanice-davidson-davidson/
ebookmass.com
IBC International Building Code (International Code Council Series) 2018 1st Edition International Code Council
https://ebookmass.com/product/ibc-international-building-codeinternational-code-council-series-2018-1st-edition-international-codecouncil/ ebookmass.com
The Terraformers 1st Edition Annalee Newitz
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-terraformers-1st-edition-annaleenewitz-2/
ebookmass.com
Spanish for the Rest of Us 1st Edition William C. Harvey Ms
https://ebookmass.com/product/spanish-for-the-rest-of-us-1st-editionwilliam-c-harvey-ms/
ebookmass.com
POPULISMANDLIBERALDEMOCRACY PopulismandLiberal Democracy AComparativeandTheoreticalAnalysis TAKISS.PAPPAS GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries
©TakisS.Pappas2019
Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted
FirstEditionpublishedin2019
Impression:1
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove
Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer
PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2018962711
ISBN978–0–19–883788–6
PrintedandboundinGreatBritainby ClaysLtd,ElcografS.p.A.
LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork.
ToGiovanniSartoriandhisgeneration forthesparks,the flame,andthelight. AndtoZina,Antigone,andStefanos forenlightenment,truelove,andthereallife.
Preface Truthbetold,Ihavelivedmostofmylifeunderpopulistrule.Inthelate 1970s,asayoungstudentoflawinGreece,Iexperiencedtheirresistibleascent ofthe(deceivinglylabeled)PanhellenicSocialistMovement,PASOK,whichin 1981,undertheleadershipofmaverickAndreasPapandreou,becamepostwar Europe’ s firstpopulistpartytowinofficebyalandslide.Iwitnessedthemass rallies,thespeechesfrombalconies,theenthusiasmofthecrowds,theseductiveslogans,theaccumulatedsocialresentmentandthepolarizationitbred, thepoliticalslanders,thedisrespectforinstitutionallegality,theexuberanceof promises,theirresistiblepromiseofunfoundedhopeaboveall,whichleftme withanindelibleimpressionofhowliberalpoliticscangoawry.WhenI first leftmycountryintheearly1980s,populismwas firmlyestablishedinpower andalreadyhardatworkonproducingtheimmensepoliticalandsocial changesthatwouldlatercausesocialmisery,nationalpoliticalhavoc,and lotsofinternationaldrama.
Meanwhile,IfoundmyselfagraduatestudentatliberalYale,studyingparty politicsunderthesupervisionofJuanLinz,butatthetimealsobeingfascinatedbytheworkofsuchscholarsasGinoGermani,GuillermoO’Donnelland TorcuatoDiTellaonLatinAmericanpolitics,especiallyJuanPerón’smobilizationistpopulism.LittledidIknowbackthenthatpostwarArgentinaand post-authoritarianGreecewouldbethetwocasesbestapproximatingthe “idealtype” ofpopulismwhen,severalyearslater,populismbecamethe majortopicofmyacademicresearch.NorcouldIhaveeverimaginedduring myearlierdecadesthatIwouldhappentoliveandworkinseveralcountries wherepopulismdevelopedpoliticallyandelectorallystrong,including (besidesofcourseGreeceandtheUnitedStates),Italy,France,andHungary. Itisperhapsbecausepopulismbecamesuchanunwelcomehappenstancein mypersonalandprofessionallifethatIdecidedtosummonthedemon.This volumeismytestimonytothateffort.
Idealtwithpopulismasaresearchtopicforthe firsttimein2010atan ECPRconferenceatMünster,Germany,organizedbyAnn-CathrineJungar andKevinDeegan-Krausse.Alreadyunhappywiththeconceptualconfusion surroundingthetopic,Ipresentedinthatmeetingapaperthatreconceptualizedpopulismas “democraticilliberalism”*andproposedstudying
*Atthetime,therewereonlytwonotableprevioususesoftheterm “democraticilliberalism.” The firstwasmadebyCollierandLevitsky(1997:438)fordescribinga “diminishedsubtypeof democracy” withoutcivilliberties,forwhichtheauthorsofferedGuatemalaastheirsole example.TheseconduseofthetermbelongstoFareedZakaria,who,ratherthandealingwith
Preface
itdynamicallyas “the flipsideof[postwar]politicalliberalism.” Alas,such heterodoxnoveltiesanythingbutsatisfiedthereviewersofthejournalsto whichIsubsequentlysubmittedthepaper,which,afteracoupleofrejections, eventuallyappeared,ratherunceremoniously,inoneoftheWorkingPaper seriesoftheEuropeanUniversityInstituteinFlorence(Pappas2012;the quotationsabovearefromthiswork,p.2).NexttimearoundIwas,however, luckier.AnewpaperIwrotecomparingthegrowthofpopulisminpostauthoritarianGreeceandpost-communistHungary inwhichInotonlyused mythennoveldefinitionbutalso floatedtheideaofpopulismcausingparty systemiccontagionthatcouldpotentiallyleadto “populistdemocracy”—was publishedinarespectablejournal(Pappas2014b; firstonlinepublicationin July2013).Notlongthereafter,inthesummerof2014,Iwasastonishedto hearthesince-famousspeechbyHungary’spopulistPrimeMinisterViktor Orbáninwhichheopenlyproclaimedhisintentiontoturnhiscountryintoan “illiberaldemocracy.” Andthen,aspopulismgrewstrongerinseveralnations andbecamemorewidespreadgeographically,theterm “democraticilliberalism” gainedrapidtractionamongacademics,politiciansand,ofcourse,the press.Butscholarshiponthetopic,albeittremendouslyexpansive,remained hopelesslystuckwitholdconceptsandfuzzycaseclassifications.Ibelieved then,andstillbelievetoday,thattheproblemhasbeenourneglectofsolid empiricalresearchatcountry-levelforproducingbook-lengthstudieson particularpopulisms.
Byreasonofmycountry’scontinuingmisfortunes,thatcouldnotbemy case.Alreadybytheearly2010s,whatwassoontobecomeknownasthe “Greekcrisis” wasinfullanddramaticswing,andthereasonforitwasthe inabilityoftheoldpopulistpartiestomakeatransitiontoliberalism,especiallyasnewpopulistpartiesgrewinthemeantimestrongandpower-hungry. Forasecondtimeinherpost-authoritarianhistory,Greecehadbecomea “crucialcase” (inHarryEckstein’s(1975)sense)forstudyingoldandnew,left andrightpopulismshardatwork.Fascinatedbytheevolvingeventsinmy country,Itookabreakfrommymoretheoreticalruminationsaboutpopulism ingeneral,andwrotearelativelyshortmonographfocusedontheGreekcase withthepurposeof empirically testingmyup-and-comingtheory.For,as notedinthatbook’sintroductorypages,Greece “offersnearlaboratoryconditionsforstudyingallpossiblefacetsandsuccessivephasesofpopulist development,includinginitialemergence,subsequentdevelopment,ascent topower,andpolitycontamination” (Pappas2014a:6).Therewassomething
orevenspecificallyreferringtopopulism,pointedtoanassortmentofregimesaroundtheglobe “thatliebetweenconfirmeddictatorshipandconsolidateddemocracy,” thoseincludingEthiopia, SierraLeone,Pakistan,Belarus,Bangladesh,thePhilippines,andHaitiamongothers(Zakaria 1997).Noneofthosestatesfallswithinthescopeofthisbook.Forafurtherdiscussionof Zakaria’snotionofilliberaldemocracy,seePappas(2018b).
evenmoreimportanttothat.Post-authoritarianGreeceoffereditselfasaclear caseofapoliticalsysteminwhichliberalismandpopulismclashedviolently, withpopulismbeingtheultimatewinner withfatefulconsequences.But Greecewasnottheonlycaseofrisingpopulismand,whenlookingatsuch casescomparatively,apatternbegantoemerge.Itwasearlyautumnof2015 whenIdecidedtotakethechallengetowriteatheoreticalbookoncomparativepopulism.
Whileworkingonthepresentvolume,Ioftenthoughtofitastheclosest onecangettoanacademicstartup.Ithasbeenalargelyself-financedand externallyunassistedenterprise,whichsetabouttosolveamajorpolitical problemdevelopingcontemporaneouslywithmyresearchandwriting,trying asolutionthatattimesseemedoff-beatandratheroutlandish,andwith successanythingbutguaranteed.Aswithanyotherstartup,ithashadits badtimesanditsgoodtimes.Thankfully,thereweremanymoregoodtimes thanbadones,andtheywereimmenselyfulfilling.Whileworkingonthis project,IenjoyedthepleasuresoffamilylifeinStrasbourg,France,digressed forsometimetowriteabookinGreekonadifferenttopic,andheldvarious teachingandresearchpostsinanumberoffantasticacademicandresearch institutionsacrossEurope.Ihadtwogreatadvantages.The firstwastime plentyoftime,myonlydifficultybeinghowtomanageitcleverly.Often enough,Iwentthroughseveralperiodsof “slowhunch” (Johnson2010) duringwhichmanyearlyinsightsbecameclearerandclearer.Insomeof thoseperiods,whichcoincidedwithlongstaysinGreeceandHungary,Ihad theopportunityonceagaintowitnesspopulistpoliticsinrealaction,and experienceitsdeleteriouseffectsuponsociallifeandpoliticalcultureinboth places.MysecondadvantagewasthegreatopportunitiesIhavehadinrecent yearstogivelecturesorparticipateinmanyaworkshopinvariousplaces aroundtheworldthankstoexcellentcolleaguesandpreciousfriendswhowere generousenoughtoofferinstitutionalhospitalityandintellectualstimulation.
Forthemostpart,Iwrotestandingontheshouldersofgiants.Ireadily acknowledgethetransformationalinspirationonanumberofkeytopicsin thisvolumethat,overyears,Ihavereceivedfromthefollowingbooks,citedin theirauthors’ alphabeticalorder:RobertDahl’ s Polyarchy;AlbertHirschman’ s ThePassionsandtheInterests;EricHobsbawm’ s, PrimitiveRebels;Daniel Kahneman’ s ThinkingFastandSlow (withhisearlyarticlesco-authored withAmosTrevskyasanextrabonus);DavidLaitin’ s HegemonyandCulture; WilliamH.Riker’ s LiberalismAgainstPopulism;GiovanniSartori’ s Parties andPartySystems;andMaxWeber’ s TheSociologyofReligion.Atacritical turnduringthiswork,JohnRawls’ notionof “overlappingconsensus” became thegoldenkeytoopenquiteafewrustydoors.Myunderstandingofliberal democracyisquitesimilartoDahl’ s “polyarchy.” FromWeber,Itookinspirationfromhisdistinctionbetween “communal” and “associative” socialrelationships,and foralongtime grappledwiththenotionofcharisma.
Preface
AnotherdistinctionthatmadeanearlyimpressiononmewasMichel Oakeshott’ s “politicsofskepticism” againsthis “politicsoffaith.” Ifound veryusefulMaxScheler’snotionof ressentiment,whichalsofondlyreminded meofatimelongpastatYale,whenJuanLinzhad firstbroughtthisconceptto myattentionandinsistedonitsexplanatoryvalue.Asusual,hewasspoton! RichardThaler’ s “endowmenteffect” wasvaluableformeinmakingbetter senseoftheoriesofrelativedeprivationandthinkingaboutmassmobilization thresholds.ItookveryseriouslyBryanCaplan’srecommendationtohisfellow economistswhoseideasarenotquiteinaccordwithconventionalwisdom: writemorebooks,heurged,otherwise “youseemconfusingatbest,andcrazy atworst” (Caplan2007:xii).Itwasapreciouspieceofadvice,whichIsincerely wanttoextendtomyfellowpoliticalscientists.Onlyinabookdoyouhavethe time,space,andopportunitytoexplainyourwholepositionlengthily,candidlyand,ifyouareluckyenough,convincingly.
IprofitedenormouslyfromaworkshoponmyearlydraftchaptersthatPaul KennywaskindenoughtoorganizeformeinCanberra,Australia.Hanspeter KriesiorganizedasimilarworkshopinFlorence,Italy.Thankstoallparticipantsinbothworkshopsforpreciouscommentsandideas.InJanuary2017, whileattheCentralEuropeanUniversityinBudapest,Iwasluckytoattenda publictalkbyMichaelIgnatieffentitled “OpenSocietyanditsNewEnemies” andgetgreatinspirationfromthelivelyQ&Asessionthatfollowed.Ispent mostofJanuaryandFebruary2018attheUniversityofHelsinki,Finland,asa visitingscholar,whereIreworkedmostofthebookchapters.Itwasa particularlycoldwinter,whichmademyappreciationfortheirhospitality andgeneralsupportfromNiiloKauppi,JuriMykkänen,andEmiliaPalonen evenwarmer. Kiitos!Also,thanksgotoBrunodePaulaCastanhoeSilva,Will Freeman,KostasGemenis,DaphneHalikiopoulou,BálintMadlovics,Andreas Schedler,andArisTrantidisforcommentsandsupportatvariousstagesof thiswork.IamindebtedtoRobertoFoa,MichaelFreeden,andIvanKrastev fortheirimportantinsightsandencouragementatthe finalstages.PaulKenny readandgraciouslycommentedonseveralmanuscriptversions,whilemy goodoldfriendHouchangChehabireadandeditedtheentiremanuscript duringasojourninTurkey.Iwasbothluckyandprivilegedtohavethe constantsupportandassistanceofDominicByatt,myeditoratOxford UniversityPress,andhisteamwholookedafterthetypescriptthroughto publication.BrianNorthtookcareofthe finalstylingandcopyediting.Thanks toall.Thereare,tobesure,severalerrorsremaining.Theseareallmine.
PARTI.POPULISMINTHEORY 1.WhatisPopulism?
1.1TheEpistemologyofPopulism14
1.2DealingwithDeficientPremises24
1.3TheMinimalDefinition31 1.4TheOverallFrameworkofAnalysis36
2.HowtoDistinguishPopulistsfromNon-Populists?
3.WhatCausesPopulism?
3.1The “Ordinary” People80 3.2ExtraordinaryLeadership93 3.3SymbolicPolitics106 3.4TheCausalModel123
PARTII.POPULISMINACTION 4.HowandWhereDoesPopulismThrive?
4.1PopulismAscendant:SevenPositiveCases134
4.2PopulismEvaded:TwoNegativeCases159 4.3NewKidinTown:UnitedStates,2016174
5.HowdoPopulistsGovern? 189 5.1PowerSeizure190
5.2TheIlliberalProject:ARationalization210
6.WhoisthePopulistVoter? 215
6.1InsidethePopulistMind216
6.2AnEmpiricalIllustration:Greece,2015222
ListofFigures AllFiguresareauthor’sowncompilation.
1.1.Populismpergenusetdifferentiam34
2.1.Liberalism’spolicynexus53
2.2.Populism’spolicynexus53
2.3.Autocracy’spolicynexus56
2.4.Thecoreclassificatoryscheme58
2.5.Unpackingthecorevariables60
2.6.Classifyingpartiescontestingdemocraticelections62
2.7.Spotthepopulists62
2.8.ClassifyingGreece’smainpartiesafterthe2012 partysystemrestructuring63
3.1.The “littlepeople” inpopulism(EuropeandLatinAmerica)91
3.2.The “averagepeople” inpopulism(UnitedStates)92
3.3.The “nativepeople” innativism93
3.4.Typesofdemocraticleadership95
3.5.Modelingthecausallogicofpopulistemergence124
ListofTables Unlessotherwiseindicated,allTablesareauthor’sowncompilation.
1.1.Populism’snecessary-and-sufficient-conditionsconceptstructure34
1.2.Theoverallframeworkofanalysisforpopulistpartiesandtheir (coreandvariable)properties37
2.1.Postwarliberalismcontrastedwithpopulism(Yes/No)43
3.1.Typesofdemocraticleadershipaccordingtonatureofruleand ruleaims95
3.2.Indexof “extraordinary” leadership99
3.3.Populistpartyleaders,withyearofrisetopowerandpreviousprofession102
3.4.Corepopulismfeaturesandtheircorrespondingpopulistnarrative themes115
4.1.PASOK’selectoralperformance,1974–81140
4.2.MajorpartiesinPeru’spresidentialelections,1980–90142
4.3.Italy’spartysystemtransformation,1992and1994elections148
4.4.Venezuela’sevolutionoftwo-partysystem,1958–93(selectedyears)149
4.5.ParliamentaryelectionsinHungary(selectedyears)158
6.1.Populism:Coreconceptcomponentsandpopulistvoters’ mindsetelements217
6.2.Liberalism:Coreconceptcomponentsandliberalvoters’ mindset elements217
6.3.Greekgeneralelections,2009–15225
Argentina
ListofPoliticalParties PJJusticialistParty
PLLaborParty
Austria
FPÖFreedomPartyofAustria
ÖVPAustrianPeople’sParty
Belgium
VBVlaamsBlok(renamedVlaamsBelang)
Bolivia
MASMovementforSocialism
Brazil
PMDBPartyoftheBrazilianDemocraticMovement
PSDBBrazilianSocialDemocraticParty
PTWorkers’ Party
Denmark
DFDanishPeople’sParty
Ecuador
APPAISAlliance
PREEcuadorianRoldosistParty
Finland
PSFinns(formerlyTrueFinns)
France
FDGFrenchLeftFront
FNNationalFront(renamedNationalRally,NR)
UDCAUnionfortheDefenseofTradersandArtisans
Germany
AfDAlternativeforGermany
CDUChristianDemocraticParty
DieLinkeTheLeft
NPDNationalDemocraticParty
SEDSocialistUnityParty
SPDSocialDemocraticPartyofGermany
Greece
ANELIndependentGreeks
DIMARDemocraticLeft
EPNationalFront
GDGoldenDawn
KKECommunistPartyofGreece
LAEPopularUnity
LAOSPopularOrthodoxRally
NDNewDemocracy
PASOKPanhellenicSocialistMovement
POTAMIRiver
SYRIZACoalitionoftheRadicalLeft
Hungary
FideszFederationofYoungDemocrats/HungarianCivicParty
FKGPIndependentSmallholders’ Party
JobbikHungarianMovementforaBetterHungary
KDNPChristianDemocraticPeople’sParty
MDFHungarianDemocraticForum
MSzPHungarianSocialistParty
SzDSzAllianceofFreeDemocrats
Italy
ANNationalAlliance
DCChristianDemocracy
FIForzaItalia!
LNNorthernLeague(currentlyTheLeague)
M5SFiveStarMovement
MSIItalianSocialMovement
PCICommunistPartyofItaly
PdLPeopleforFreedom
PDSDemocraticPartyoftheLeft
UQCommonMan’sFront
Mexico
PRIInstitutionalRevolutionaryParty
TheNetherlands
LPFPimFortuynList
PVVPartyforFreedom
VVDConservativeLiberals
Norway
FrPNorway’sProgressParty
Peru
APPopularAction
APRAAmericanPopularRevolutionaryAlliance
Cambio90Change90
FREDEMODemocraticFront
Slovakia
LSNSPeople’sPartyOurSlovakia
SNSSlovakNationalParty
Spain
CiUCatalanConvergenceandUnion
CPECommunistPartyofSpain
IUUnitedLeft
PDCDemocraticPactforCatalonia
PNVBasqueNationalistParty
PODEMOSWeCan
PPPopularParty
PSOESpanishSocialistWorkers’ Party
UCDUnionoftheDemocraticCenter
Sweden
SDSwedenDemocrats
Switzerland
SVPSwissPeople’sParty
Turkey
AKPJusticeandDevelopmentParty
UnitedKingdom
BNPBritishNationalParty
SNPScottishNationalParty
UKIPUKIndependenceParty
Venezuela
ADDemocraticAction
COPEISocialChristianParty
MBR200BolivarianRevolutionaryMovement200
MVRMovementoftheFifthRepublic
PSUVUnitedSocialistParty
FourotherOystersfollowedthem, Andyetanotherfour; Andthickandfasttheycameatlast, Andmore,andmore,andmore Allhoppingthroughthefrothywaves, Andscramblingtotheshore. TheWalrusandtheCarpenter Walkedonamileorso, Andthentheyrestedonarock Convenientlylow: AndallthelittleOystersstood Andwaitedinarow.
“Thetimehascome,” theWalrussaid, “Totalkofmanythings: Ofshoes andships andsealing-wax Ofcabbages andkings Andwhytheseaisboilinghot Andwhetherpigshavewings.” LewisCarroll,ThroughtheLooking-Glass andWhatAliceFoundThere
Introduction Although “populism” hasbecomethebuzzwordinalmostanydiscussion about,oranalysisof,contemporarypolitics,andwasevenannouncedasthe CambridgeDictionary2017WordoftheYear,itisstill,asoneofitsstudents has flatlyputit, “farfromobviousthatweknowwhatwearetalkingabout.We simplydonothaveanythinglikeatheoryofpopulism,andweseemtolack coherentcriteriafordecidingwhenpoliticalactorsturnpopulistinsome meaningfulsense” (Müller2016a:2).Facedwithsuchatheoreticalvoid,itis perhapsworthbeginningbyaskingtheobvious:Why,despitethemassive growthinthe fieldofstudiesonpopulism,istherestillnogeneraltheoryof populism?Thereason,Isubmit,issimplythatourresearchendeavorsare defeatedbyconceptualmuddinessandlackofcomparativesophistication.The conceptualmorasshashelpedcreatemassesofempiricalandpseudotheoreticalstudieswhichadduptoverylittle,ifanythingatall.Ideology, discourse,style,symbolicpolitics,inclusion,exclusion,mobilization,charisma,anti-politics,anti-liberalism,thepeople,themasses,theelites,political polarization,socialresentment,symbolicframing,voters’ irrationality these areallconceptsthataresurelycentraltothestudyofpopulism.Butunlesswe areabletoclarifytheseconceptsandincorporatethemintoaunifiedand internallyconsistenttheoreticalframework,weareboundtoproducemore wastefulresearchandperpetuatefuzzinessandincomprehension.
Sincetherestisstilltocome,IshouldbrieflystateherewhereIstandwith respecttopopulismanditstheory.Atthesimplestlevelofanalysis,Isee contemporarypopulismasanemerginghistoricalphenomenonoflatedemocraticmodernitythatopposespoliticalliberalism.Itseekstoinstituteanovel indeed,innovative formofmoderndemocraticpoliticsthatisantagonistic towardsestablishedliberaldemocracy.Takingitforgrantedthateachofthese formsofdemocracyputsforwarditsownsetofideas,politicalprograms,and policyagendasofhowtoconstitutesociety,myanalysisofpopulism whether explicitlyor,attimes,lessso isinconstantjuxtapositiontotheproblems facedbycontemporaryliberaldemocracyand,conceivably,itspresent-day decay.Evidently,Iassumepopulismandliberalismtobedependentvariables, whichalreadysuggestsmyconcernforexploringthefactorsthatcause
populismtoriseand,occasionally,solidifyinpower.Ithereforeintenda theorythatspecifiesthecausalfactors includingcontext,agency,and micro-mechanisms thatmaypropelpopulismtopower,aswellasaccount fortheimpactofpopulismoncontemporary,andfuture,democraticpolitics. Withoutdoubt,currentinterestinpopulismisdriven, firstandforemost,by growingdisquietaboutdemocracyandliberalism,theirdelicateinterplaysand possiblefailures.Therefore,andsincethesetermswillbeinconstantuse throughoutthebook,letmeclarifytheirmeaningandusagerightfromthe outset.(Ahelpfulglossaryisprovidedattheendofthebook,listingallkey termsusedinthetext.)
“Democracy,” first,willbeusedinaminimalist,empirical,andnonnormativefashionassimply “asysteminwhichincumbentsloseelections andleaveofficewhentherulessodictate” (Przeworskietal.2000:54).This conceptionissimilartoJosephSchumpeter’s(1942)notionofdemocracyseen asamechanism,orinstrument,ofselectingone’srulersincompetitive elections,aswellasKarlPopper’sidea(1945)ofdemocracyastheonlysystem inwhichcitizenscanoverthrowtheirrulersbypeacefulelectoralmeans(see, forfurtherinsights,Przeworski1999).Moreover,sinceinthisrespectwe dispensewithnormativity,wealsograntthatdemocraciesmayoccasionally giverisetopartiesorgovernmentsthatare “inefficient,corrupt,shortsighted, irresponsible,dominatedbyspecialinterests,andincapableofadoptingpoliciesdemandedbythepublicgood” (Huntington1991:9).Itis,however, importanttounderline,asHuntingtongoesontoexplain,thatalthoughsuch negativequalitiesmakethosepartiesorgovernments “undesirable,theydonot makethemundemocratic.” Poor-qualitydemocraciesare still democratic. Despiteitssimplicityandstraightforwardness,suchanunderstandingof democracystillleavesunansweredthefollowingquestion:Whathappensif electionsfailtochangegovernments?Inotherwords:Howdemocraticare “democracies” inwhichanelectedgovernmentstaysinpowerforlengthy periodsas,forinstance,isthecaseincontemporaryHungaryinwhichthe samepartyhasenjoyedsince2010threeconsecutiveelectoralvictories?Here, obviously,wearedealingwithso-calledpredominant-partysystems(nottobe confusedwithsingle-partynondemocraticsystems),inwhichonepartyisable tocommand,aloneandovertime,theabsolutemajorityofseatsinparliament (Sartori1976:192–201).Barringtheexistenceofviolenceandopenvoter intimidation,bothsubjecttoempiricalinvestigation,thosesystemswillstillbe consideredtobelongintheclassofpluralistcompetitivedemocracytothe extentthattheyallowforanopenpartymarketwithenoughopportunitiesfor dissent,aswellastheoptionofhavingthepredominantpartytoppledbyballot.
Incontrasttotheforegoinginstrumentaldefinitionofdemocracy, Iunderstandthesecondkeyanalyticalconcept, “liberalism,” inadistinctly normativefashion.Itrevolvesaroundtheideaofindividuallibertybeing supreme,aswellastheneedtoinstitutionallyprotectitwithincomplex
politicalsocieties.Accordingly,whenitcomestodemocraticallyrunnations,a liberal democracyisthepolitythatacknowledges,andisbuiltupon,the followingprinciples:Societycomprisesapluralityofconflictinginterests which,lestthepolityregresstoaHobbesiannightmareofpolarizationand generalizedsocialstrife,mustbesubjecttooverarchingcommonlyagreed institutions,theruleoflaw,andtheprotectionofminorityrights.Giventhe interdependencyofsuchconditions,thepolityceasestoqualifyasaliberal democracyevenifonlyoneofthemisviolated.
Althoughamoredetaileddiscussionofpoliticalliberalismalongtheforegoinglineswillfollowinamoreappropriateplace,wehavealreadyswitched towhatwillbethesumandsubstanceofthebook,namely,populismqua democraticilliberalism.Itscentralpropositionisthat,whilepostwarpolitical liberalismcanonlybeconceivedasdemocratic,theoppositeisnottrue.That istosay,notalldemocraciesareliberal;someofthem,andincreasinglyso,are illiberal.¹Assummarizedbyoneprominentpopulistleader, “justbecause somethingisnotliberal,itstillcanbeademocracy” (Orbán2014).This,in turn,raisestheveryquestionsthatthisvolumeaddressesandwilltryto answer:Howcanliberaldemocraciesdrifttoilliberalism?Whathappens whenilliberaldemocratswinstatepower?Canthepopulistwavebereversed? Toprovideanswerstothesequestions,weneedtodevelopageneraltheory ofpopulismcouchedinwhatisbroadlyknownas “democraticstudies” and guidedbyasimpleinsight,namely,thatmodernpopulism whetherseenasa setofideas,apoliticalleaderactingonsuchideas,aparticularpartychampioningthem,orevenanentirepoliticalsysteminwhichsignificantparties promoteitsessence isfundamentallydemocraticbutinoppositiontothe liberalcanon.Hence, democraticilliberalism becomesasynonymfor populism andassuchitwillbetreatedinthechapterstofollow.Theimplicationfor democraticstudiesisnowquitestraightforward.Nomatterwhatthelevelor unitofanalysisonemaywanttoexamineitat,populismasamodern historicalphenomenonpertainstoatypeofdemocracythatstandsmidway betweenliberalismandautocracy.Itisimportantthatwebecomeawareofthis fundamentalcontradiction,for,sincepopulismcannever findapointof politicalequilibriumandstability,ittendstotiltateithersideofthespectrum, attimestowardsrepairingliberalism,atothertimestowardsexperimenting withautocracy.Thisshouldserveasaclearwarningforpoliticiansand policymakersalike:Removeitsdemocraticethosandpopulismwillturn intoauthoritarianism,butreverseitsilliberaldispositionandwhims,and
¹Thedistinctionbetweendemocraticnessandliberalismisencapsulatedeloquently,albeit slightlyparaphrased,inthisquotation: “Ademocracyisdemocraticinsofarasitinvolves governmentbypopular,competitiveelection,therebyprovidinglegitimationtothe polity....Ademocracyisliberalinthatitlimitsgovernmentalauthorityandprotectsindividual rights,constructingdikes,asitwere,againstthesupposedlysovereignpeople” (Peeler2009:1).
