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OxfordStudiesinPhilosophyofMind
OxfordStudiesin PhilosophyofMind
Volume1
Editedby URIAHKRIEGEL
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
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IV.HISTORYOFPHILOSOPHYOFMIND
Preface
Thisistheinauguralvolumeof OxfordStudiesinPhilosophyofMind,anew annualpublicationdedicatedtothephilosophyofmind.Doweneed anotherphilosophyjournal?Itdependsonwhat “need” means,but Oxford StudiesinPhilosophyofMind willhavecertainuniquefeaturesthatseparate itfromotherjournals.
First,eachvolumewillcombineinvitedarticlesandarticlesselectedfrom submissions.Writingaphilosophypaperofteninvolvesafamiliartradeoff betweenrigorandcontrolontheonehandandboldnessandinnovationon theother.Theblind-reviewprocessnotoriouslybiasestowardtheformer. Thepurposeofinvitedarticlesistooffercontributorsthefreedomtofashion theirownoptimumpointforthistradeoff.Atthesametime,thepurposeof allowingsubmissionstothejorunalistoensureaccesstoyoungerscholars, perhapsfromlesser-knownuniversitiesorworkinginpartsoftheworldof whichtheEnglish-speakingworld,includingthisjournal’seditors,maybe lessaware.
Second,andrelatedly,formostofus,whenwestartreadingaphilosophy paper,ourdeepesthopeisnotthatthepaperwillturnouttobe flawless; rather,wehopeitwillcontainsomeinsightthatwilltriggerbreakthroughs inourownthinkingonthetopic,orlureustostartthinkingaboutitifwe havenotyet.Yetwhenwewearourrefereecapswetendtoautomatically slideinto flaw-detectionmode. OxfordStudiesinPhilosophyofMind will consciouslytrytoskewtowardtheinsightfulattheexpenseofthe flawless.
Third,eachvolumeof OxfordStudiesinPhilosophyofMind willhighlight twothemes,butwillalsopublisharticlesoutsidethosethemes.Thepurpose ofthehighlightedthemesistogenerateclustersofideassurroundingasingle topic,withthethoughtthatthejuxtapositionofperspectivesononeissue willintensifyinterest.Atthesametime,theopennesstosubmissionsfrom outsidethesethemeswillservetwopurposes.Oneistoallowthemesthatare organicallygatheringmomentuminthephilosophy-of-mindcommunityto bubbleuptothejournal’sawareness.Theotheristocreatespacefortalent anditsintellectualidiosyncrasies.Manytopicsthatmagnetizemuchacademicactivityatonepointstartoutadecadeearlierascomparatively isolatedspurtsofideas,typicallybyyoungerscholars.
Fourth,thephilosophyofmindhasforatleasthalfacenturybeentorn betweenatraditional,armchair-ledapproachandanaturalistic,empirically drivenapproach.Themostprestigiousgeneralphilosophyjournalstendto favorthetraditionalapproach,whilejournalsdedicatedtothephilosophyof mind,suchas Mind&Language and PhilosophicalPsychology,tendtofavor thenaturalisticapproach.Meanwhile,the history ofphilosophyofmindgets noplayinphilosophy-of-mind-dedicatedjournals,andispublishedmostly inhistory-of-philosophyjournals. OxfordStudiesinPhilosophyofMind will publishworkfromallthreesectors:armchairphilosophyofmind,empiricallydrivenphilosophyofmind,andhistoryofphilosophyofmind.
Fifth,asfarasinvitedcontributionsareconcerned, OxfordStudiesin PhilosophyofMind willobserveastrictgenderbalance,withexactlyhalfof theinviteesbeingwomenandhalfmen.Itdoesnotcontrol,ofcourse,the ultimatedeliveryofmanuscriptsbytheinvitees,northequantityandquality ofsubmissionsfromeachgender.(Thiscombinationoffactorsaccountsfor theunfortunatepaucityofchaptersbywomenintheinauguralvolume.)
Sixth,theprocessingofsubmissionswillfollowadifferentprocedure.All submissionswithoutexceptionwillreceiveaverdictwithinafortnight, pending forcemajeure .Anonymousrefereeswillcomeintothisprocess onlyatthisstage,andwillbeinvolvedeven after apaperhasbeenaccepted forpublication.Theideaistotreatanonymousinput,bycarefullyselected referees,asameanstoimproveapaperratherthanawaytopushauthorsin directionstheyarenotintrinsicallyinterestedin.
Seventh,thejournalispairedwithanannualconference,hostedbyRice University’sSchoolofHumanities,featuringacombinationofforthcoming andprospectivepapers.Justlikeanonymousreview,presentationtoawide audienceofspecialistscanbeinvaluableinimprovingapaper;thisisone moretooltopusharticlesappearingin OxfordStudiesinPhilosophyofMind towardexcellence.
Wehopethatthesepeculiaritiesof OxfordStudiesinPhilosophyofMind willresultinanexcitingpublicationthatwillbeofinteresttoallpartsofthe philosophy-of-mindcommunityandbeyond.Inthisinauguralvolume,the twohighlightedthemesare “thevalueofconsciousness” and “naturalism andphysicalism,” whilefourarticlesconcernissuesoutsidethesetwo themes.
The firsttheme thevalueofconsciousness garneredmoreattention amongsubmissions,andsixofthevolume’sthirteenchaptersconcernit.It featuresalongfoundationalarticlebyaseminalthinkeronthistopic, CharlesSiewert;adefense,byRogerCrisp,ofthestarkthesisthatabsolutely
allvalueisgroundedinthephenomenologyofpleasureandpain;aphenomenologicalanalysisoftheexperienceoffulfillment,whichHyunseop Kimtakestoground(when fitting)ameaningfullife;anargument,developedbyDianeO’Leary,thatmedicineisbetterframednotasconcerned with fixingthebodybutratherastargetingimprovingone’sbodilyphenomenology;andtwoarticles,byMattDuncanandChrisRanalli,offering twodistinctperspectivesonthesingularepistemicvalueofconscious experience(forDuncan,experience is knowledge,thoughknowledge-byacquaintanceratherthanpropositionalknowledge;forRanalli,experience providesuswithanintrinsicepistemicgoodthatgoesbeyondtruth,namely cognitivecontactwithreality).
Regardingthesecondtheme naturalismandphysicalism thevolume includesaninnovativeanalysisoftheessenceofnaturalismbyLok-Chi Chan,whichhighlightstheroleofcontingenthistoricalpathsinwhatwe considerintuitivelyas “naturalisticallykosher,” aswellastwoimportant articlesonphysicalismbyJonathanSchafferandKarenBennett:Schaffer leveragesthenotionofgroundtogenerateatwentieth-centuryversionof functionalism,Bennettdevelopsanew,explanatoryargumentagainst dualism.
Threeotherchaptersinthevolumebundlesomewhatorganicallyaround theissueofcontent:AnilGomesandMatthewParrottseekaworkableway todrawthelinebetweeninternalismandexternalismaboutcontent,Antti Kauppinenoffersanovelaccountoftheintentionalityofpain,andAdam Pautztriestogenerateatotaltheoryofcontentfromthecombinationof phenomenalintentionalityandLewis ’stheoryofinterpretation.Thelast chapterinthevolumeisbyPeterAdamsonandishistorical,examiningthe roleofcertaindualistargumentsinmedievalIslamicphilosophy.
ListofContributors
PeterAdamson Ludwig-MaximilianUniversityofMunich
KarenBennett RutgersUniversity
Lok-ChiChan NationalTaiwanUniversity
RogerCrisp StAnne’sCollege,UniversityofOxford
MattDuncan RhodeIslandCollege
AnilGomes TrinityCollege,UniversityofOxford
AnttiKauppinen UniversityofHelsinki
HyunseopKim SeoulNationalUniversity
Diane O’Leary WesternUniversity
MatthewParrott StHilda’sCollege,UniversityofOxford
AdamPautz BrownUniversity
ChrisRanalli VreijUniversiteitAmsterdam
JonathanSchaffer RutgersUniversity
CharlesSiewert RiceUniversity
I THEVALUEOF CONSCIOUSNESS
1 Consciousness
Value,Concern,Respect
CharlesSiewert
1.WhatGoodDoesExperienceDoUs?
Morespecifically:doesitbringavalueofitsowntous?Isitgoodforusinits ownright?Ishouldbeclearrightoff:I’mnotaskingwhatgoodwegetjust fromhavingsomeexperienceorother(nomatterwhatkind).Iamhappyto concedesomeexperiencesdousnogoodatall.¹Butifthat’ sso,youmay thinktheansweralltooobvious. “Soyou’reaskingwhetherthereis some experiencethat’snicetohavejustinitself?Sure,thereis.Forexample: tastingchocolate that’ sone orfeelingthereliefoftakingoffmyshoes, that’sanother.Nextquestion! ”
Butbearwithme.WhatIwantisnotjusttosecureacknowledgementthat thereissometypeofexperienceintuitivelygood “initself” forustohave. Iwanttoclarifywhatitmeanstosayexperiencehasthissortofvalue,andby doingsoleadusto findit notjustinthisorthatobviouscaseofsensory pleasureorrelief butinformsofexperiencethatpervadeourlives.Ithen wanttoshowhowtousethisrecognitiontoplaceexperienceattheheartof whatmakesourlivesworthlivingtous.AndthisIwanttodo,without discountingourdesirethatwenotmerelyhaveexperience,butthatitreveal toustheworldbeyonditselfandengageuswithothers.Finally,Iwantto showhowitcan figurefundamentallyinourconcernandrespectforeach other,andintheirreplaceablevalueweaccordaperson’slife.Carryingout thisagendafullycallsforamoreelaboratetreatmentthanIcannowprovide. ButIdoaimheretomakeenoughofacasetomeritseriousconsideration andinspirediscussion.
¹ThusIaminbasicagreementwithLee’s(2018)position(thoughhetheretakesmyearlier worktomaintainthecontraryview).
2.WhatIMeanby “Experience ”
Iusetheword “experience” topickoutwhatotherwisemightbecalleda “stateofconsciousness ”—whatissometimesmarkedbythequali fication subjective experience.AndIwillbedrawingonafairlyliberalviewofwhat thatencompasses.IrealizetheconceptionIemploywouldnotbegrantedby all.However,therejustisnostandardviewofwhatconsciousnessis,and whatformsittakes,bothfreeofcontroversyandmeatyenoughtohelpus dealextensivelywithquestionsaboutitsvalue.Soitwon’tdotodiscussthese matterswithoutbeingupfrontaboutone’sstartingpoints,evenifImust hereoffloadadetaileddefenseofminetootherventures,pastandfuture.
TheuseIwillmakeoftheword “experience” istobedistinguishedfrom othersthatarecommon.Ifsomeonesayssomethingwas “anexperience” for them,wemightordinarilytakethemjusttomeanitwassomethingthey wereaffectedbyinawaylikelytoseemremarkableorsalient.Forexample, youmaydescribeeitheranairplane flightormeetingyourin-lawsas “ an experience” inthissense.ButIamusingtheterm “experience” for statesof consciousness andIwouldnotputplanetripsorin-lawencountersinthat category.Note,however,thatthe “salientwaysofbeingaffected” senseof “experience” doesleadtotheother,consciousnesssense.Forthewaysof beingaffectedwetypically findsalientincludewhatI’dcallsubjective experiences.Forexample:your feelingasyoudid whentheplanesuddenly lostaltitude,orwhenyourin-lawsaskedaboutyourreligion.Andthese feelingsareexperiencesinthe “subjective,” andnotjustthe “affected-by” sense.Whatmakesthatso?Iwouldsay: these “experiences,” thesefeelings, coincide withyourfeelingthem thatis,withyourexperiencingthem. There’sasenseinwhichyou “experience” afeelingjustincaseyoufeelit, andthefeelingitselfisnothingapartfromexperiencing/feelingit.(By contrast:neithertheairplane flightnorthein-lawencounter coincides withsomeone’ s experiencingit,inanysense.)
Attention towhatyoufeelwhenyoufeelpain,nausea,elation,anxiety, fatigue,giddiness,restlessness,andsoon,providesagoodplacetostartin clarifyingwhata “subjectiveexperience” is.Butthecategoryisnotconfined tostatesnaturallydescribedas “feelingsthatyoufeel.” Forwhensomething looks tomelocated,colored,litinacertainway,whenit sounds, tastes, smells somehowtome,orwhenanobject feels tomesomehow(slippery,bumpy, smooth,rough) Ialso experience theseappearancesandfeelingsinthis “coinciding ” sense,evenifitwouldbeoddtosayI “feel” them.Forexample, howIexperiencethevisualappearanceofawordonthispagealters,
dependingonwhetherIamlookingrightatitoratthewordjustnexttoit. ThisisnotjusttosayIamdifferently affected byitslookingtomeasitdoes: forthere’sadifferenceinhowIexperiencetheappearancethat coincides with(andisn’taneffectof)itslookingtomeasitdoes.Thislooking,this visualappearing,isalsothena “subjectiveexperience.”
Ifollowawidespreadpracticeinsayingthatstatesconsciousinthissense arestateswith “phenomenalcharacter.” Howyourfeelings feeltoyou,and moregenerally,howyour experiences are experienced byyou thatconstitutestheir “phenomenal” (or “subjective”)character.Iwillalsospeakof “phenomenalfeatures” inthiscontext asfeaturesyouhavejustwhenyou experienceexperiencesinthis “coinciding” andnotjust “affected-by” sense. AndItakeaconsciousstate/experiencejusttobeaninstanceofaphenomenalfeature.
Ialsoendorsethewidespreadnotionthatforastatetobe “subjectively experienced” or “phenomenallyconscious” isfortheretobe “somethingit’ s like” foronetobeinit,inacertainsense.Forinstance, mytastingdurian fruit isasubjectiveexperienceinasmuchas thereissomethingit’slikeforme totastedurian.Whatistherelevant, “conscious-marking” senseofthis phrase?Iregardtwopointsasessential.
(1)WhenIwonder, “Whatwoulditbelikeformetotastedurian?,” Iwant tounderstandwhatitwouldbeformetotasteit,andtounderstandthisinthe wayIcouldclaimtoacquirethroughtastingitmyself,andcouldseektohave bytryingtoimaginetastingit.Thustosaythereis “somethingthatit’slikefor someone ” tohaveafeatureintherelevantsenseistosaythatitis suitable foryoutoclaimordesiretounderstand whatitisforthemtohaveitinaway thatis foundorsoughtin “takingupthesubject’spointofview. ” Tosaythe understandingisfoundorsoughtthrough “takingupthesubject’spointof view” means:itisfoundinself-attributionofthefeature,orsoughtin imagininghavingit.Wherewhatitistohaveafeatureissuitedforthetype ofunderstandingorcuriositythatis,inthissense, “subjective,” thereis somethingit’slikeforitspossessortohaveit.
(2)Somethingisa phenomenal feature(afeaturewhoseinstancesare experiencesorconsciousstates)justincasethereis unconditionally somethingit’slikeforonetohaveitthesensejustexplained.Consider:theremay sometimesbesomethingit’slikeforsomeoneorsomethingto eat durian butnot unconditionally.Fortheremightbeadurian-eaterforwhomthere was nothingthatwaslike.Maybethisisthecasewithcaterpillarsthatinfest
durianorchards,forexample.(Thatis,maybe their ingestionofdurianoffers nothingforsubjectiveunderstandingorcuriositytotarget.)Bycontrast,there is always somethingit’slikeforoneto taste durian nomatterwhoorwhat tastesit,orwhentheydoso.That’swhy tasting durian is (but eating durianis not)aphenomenalfeature.
So,thereare featuresthereisunconditionallysomethingit’slikeforoneto have.This,onmyaccount,means featureswhosepossessionisunconditionallysuitedforsubjectiveunderstandingorcuriosity.Thosearethe phenomenal ones andtheirinstancesareconsciousstates,subjectiveexperiences. Byappealtothisconception,wehaveanotherwayofexplainingwhat’ s meantby “phenomenalcharacter.” Experiencessounderstooddifferin phenomenalcharacter justwhentheydifferwithrespecttowhatit’sliketo havethem.Andthatmeanstheydifferwithrespecttowhatmakestheir possessionsuitedforasubjectiveunderstandingorcuriosity.Thisaligns withthepreviousaccountofphenomenalcharacter:forsuchstatesdiffer withrespecttowhatit’sliketohavethemjustwhentheydifferin howthey aresubjectivelyexperienced.
Ihavesofarillustratedsubjectiveexperiencewithexamplesofsensory (e.g.,visual)appearances,andoffeelings.ButIwillassumearicherconceptionofwhatallsubjectivecharacterincludesorencompassesthanthis makesclear.So,forexample,wherevisualexperienceisconcerned,Iwill takeitthatwesubjectivelyexperiencenotjust “colorsensations, ” butvisual appearancesof depthandobjectconstancy,whichmakeitpossibleforthe locationofthingsinoursurroundingstobecomeapparenttous:we experience “locationalappearances.” Moreover,thecharacterofmyexperiencenotonlymakesapparenttome wherethingsare,itmakes what they are apparenttomebymakingthem “appearrecognizable” tomeasofthisor thatkind.Whatit’slikeforsomethingto “lookrecognizabletomeasahat,” forexample,differsfromwhatit’slikeforsomething(perhapsthesame thing)to “lookrecognizabletomeasabasket.”²
AsIseethis,somethingmaylookrecognizabletosomeoneasan FwithouttheirbeingfullycompetentinusingtheconceptofanF.Ido alsothink,however,thatwhen,onsomeoccasion,Iunderstandaphrasein certainway(asImayin different waysunderstandtheexpression “Heisa manofmanyhats”), howIunderstandthephrase isnotremovablefrom how
Iexperiencetheepisodeofthoughtorunderstanding.(Thinkofwhatit’slike foryoutoswitchunderstandingofthisandotherambiguousphrases.) Thereis,onmy “inclusive” view,nosenseinwhichwecanholdconstant whatit’slikeforustohavetheexperiencesofunderstandinghadin thinking,speaking,reading,andlistening,whileoccurrentunderstanding isitselfutterlyswitchedoff,orsubstantiallyswitchedaround.Conceptual activityisincludedinthecharacterofourordinaryexperience.
Iwouldarguefurtherthatwhataresometimestermeddifferencesin thought “mode” or “attitude” areinherenttothephenomenalcharacterof cognitiveexperience.Consider:thereissomethingit’sliketo “havesomethingtosay” inthemidstofconversation andtounderstandvariousways ofcompletingorcontinuingyourpartinadialogueasconstituting “saying whatyouhadtosay”—evenifyoudidnot(asnearasyoucantell)forma priorintentiontosaythatverything.Forexample,thinkofwhatit’slikefor youwhenyoupauseto findtherightwaytoexpresswhatyouhavetosay, andsomeoneelsejumpsinwithasuggestion.Youareinapositiontojudge (astheyarenot)whetherthatwasanaptwayto finish,tocompletewhatyou startedtosay,soastoconstitute sayingwhatyouhadtosay,thoughyou havenoawarenessofapriorintentiontosayitwhosesatisfactiondictates thisdetermination.Whatitisforustoexpressourselvesinthismanner (withorwithoutassistance)issuitedforsubjectiveunderstandinginthe sensethatimpliessubjectiveexperience.Andthis,Imaintain,makes attitude inherenttothephenomenalcharacterofunderstanding.Forwhatitis tosay(orrealizesomeoneelsehassaid)whatyouhadtosayabout somethingconstitutesa “wayofunderstandingwhatissaid” thatalso can ’tbeextractedfromexperiencewhileleavingitscharacterintact.And thisisn’tjustamatterofwhatyoutookthewordstomean.It’samatterof whatyouare doing withthem:whetherornotyouare endorsingwhatissaid, andifyouareendorsingit,whetherthisis merelyagreeingwithaproposal, orwhetheritconstitutesagenuinecaseof self-expression .³
Letmementionjustonemorerespectinwhichmineisarelativelyrichor “inclusive” conceptionofexperience.Thinkofwhatit’slikeforyouwhen youhavesome affectiveexperience inconnectionwithadesire ’ssatisfaction ordissatisfaction.Forexample,you feelsomesatisfaction inmycheerfuland promptcompliancewithyourrequesttopassthesalt.Oryou feel dissatis fied
³Formoreonmyconceptionoftheexperienceofself-expression,theinclusionofunderstandinginexperience,andtheissueof “cognitivephenomenology” generally,seeSiewert (2020).
thatIignoreyou.Iregardthesetwocategories ofaffectivesatisfactionand dissatisfaction asdiverselymanifestedinthesubjectivecharacterofexperience,asfollows:
AffectiveSatisfaction :subjectivelyexperiencingorfeelingjoy,pleasure, delight,orcomfort;feelingglad,gratified,relaxed,orrelieved;experiencing enjoymentof,oraffectionfor,somethingorsomeone.
AffectiveDissatisfaction:feelingbothered,annoyed,irritated,uncomfortable,frustrated,distressed,disgruntled,ordisturbed;experiencingrevulsion, discomfort,orsuffering.
Tobeclear,Iwouldincludeinsubjectiveexperiencenotonlysuch “affective states” asthese,butalsoexperiencesofmerelyimaginingoranticipating (dis)satisfaction andfurther,affectscorrespondingtonodefinitedesire whose(dis)satisfactionisexperienced,imagined,oranticipated for example,feelingsilly,irritable,gloomy,orlostinromanticinfatuation.
Tosummarize,onmyconception,ordinaryhumanexperiencebrings withitasubstantialsortofmind.Fortherightsortofconsciousness experiencewiththerightphenomenalcharacter,akindthatourown experienceordinarilyhas entailsthepossessionofhighlyvarious locational, recognitional, conceptual-attitudinal,and affectiveexperience.And havingthecapacityforthisexperiencesufficesforhavingamindwhose possessorhashighlyvariousandcomplexabilitiestoperceiveitssurroundings,torecognizewhatit’sinthem,tothinkaboutthem,andtocarewhat theyoffer.Thisistheviewofwhatconsciousnessis,andwhatitcanbring withit,onwhichIwilldraw.
3.WhatIMeanby “IntrinsicBenefit”
LetmenowexplainwhatImeanbysayingsomeexperiencehasforyoua “valueofitsown”—or,toputityetanotherway thatithassomehas “intrinsicvalueforyou.” BysayingthisImeantosay first,thathavingit benefits you(itisbetter foryou tohaveitthanlackit) andsecond,thatthis benefitis notduesolely toitsaffordingyousome other feature(s)you’ re betteroffhavingthannot.Thismeansthattherearesomephenomenal featuresithasbeenorwillbemorebeneficialforyoutohaveratherthan lack,andnotjustforsomepayoffinwhatelsethatbrings.
Thisuseof “intrinsicvalue” isquitedetachedfromthehistorically prominentusebyG.E.Moore(1903).Idonotassumethatsomeexperience canbebeneficialforyou “initsownright” onlyinvirtueofits “intrinsicor non-relational” properties,whateverthosemightbe.Iprobablyneedn’t dwellonthis,sinceethicistswritinginrecentdecadesaboutintrinsicvalue tendtoshedtheseMooreanassumptions.ButwhileIcertainlydon’ttakemy useof “intrinsicvalue” tobreaknewgroundinvaluetheory,thereisasetof relativelysubtledistinctionsintheareaIwanttoinvestigate,andtheirlack ofstandardterminologicalregimentationsuggestsIshouldbeveryexplicit aboutmymeaningheretoavoidmisunderstanding.
WhenIsaysomethingis “intrinsicallyvaluable(orbeneficial)forsomeone ” thisdoesnotentailthatitis “intrinsicallygood” inChristine Korsgaard’s(1983,p.171)senseofretainingits “goodnessinanyandall circumstances”.Imaybebetteroffwithacertaintypeofexperiencethan withoutit(thoughnotsolelyforfurthergoodsitaffordsme),butitdoesn’t followthatitwouldmakemebetteroff nomatterwhat,or unconditionally thatis,regardlessofwhat’sbundledwithit.NorcanwhatI’mafterhere exactlybeidentifiedwithwhatshereferstoasa “finalgood.” Forthatshe takestobesomethingthatis “valued foritsownsake” (1983,p.170).Butitis notsimplybuiltintosomething ’sprovidingyouwithbene fitsofitsownthat youyourselfvalueitforitsownsake(orindeedthatyouvalueitatall).
NotealsothatIamnowspeci ficallyconcernedwithgoodsthatare benefitsforsomeone.Andwecannotjust assume thatthisisthesameas whatisgood,fullstop:what “makestheworldabetterplace,” whatis “simplyagoodthinginitsownright.” SowhenIsaythatsomethingis intrinsi callybeneficialforaperson,thisdoesn’tentailthatithaswhatShelly Kagan(1998,p.285)calls “intrinsicvalue” or “valueasanend”—forhe seemstoassumethatmeansitenhances “thevalueoftheworldassuch.” AndIwanttoleaveroomforthepossibilityMichaelZimmermanandBen Bradley(2019,p.8)describewhentheysaybeinghealthymightbe “good for John,” evenwhen his beinghealthyisnotanintrinsicallygoodthing,full stop becauseJohn,asithappens,issuchanoxiousblightontheworld.Nor shouldweforecloseonthepossibilityGwenBradford(2015,pp.6–7) describesbysayingsomeone’sachievementsmighthave “intrinsicvalue,” eveniftheylackvalue totheachieverherself and,accordingly,donothing toenhance her well-being.Soletmebeclear:Idonottakeitforgrantedthat “beingintrinsically bene ficialfor someone ” entails,orisentailedby,something’sbeing “intrinsicallygood,” period.Initially,Ileavetheirrelationship
anopenquestion thoughIwillmakesomecommitmentsonthisfront below,inSection7.
OnemightbetemptedtorephrasewhatI’mafterbysayingthatsome experiencehasakindofvalueforusnot “derivative” fromothervalue.But weneedtobecareful.Onemightthinkofnon-derivedvalueaswhatliesat theterminusofaone-waychainofmeanstoends:otherthingsaregoodfor thesakeofaffordingX,thoughXisnotitselfvaluableforaffordingany ofthesegoods thusitsvalueisinnowayderivedfromthem.Butthatis notwhatImean.Solet’sbeclear:a “proprietary” or “intrinsic” benefitas Iunderstandthisisnottobeconstruedasonewhosevalueis whollynonderivative.Rather,it’ssimplyabenefitthatis notwhollyderivative .
AnexamplefromShellyKagan(1998,pp.284–5)willhelpillustrate.He observesthatwemightseeaskillatgourmetcookingassomething valuable “foritself”—butonlyontheconditionthatitisalso useful inproducinggood food.Similarly,wemightregardcertainkindsofvisualexperienceas beneficial tousintheirownright,eventhoughwe’dtakethebenefitto evaporate,iftheexperiencecouldfurnishusnofurthergoods(suchas informingusofoursurroundingsorfacilitatingaction).Forsupposethe payoffsderivedfromsomeexperienceyouhadweresecuredinitsabsence, butthisexperientiallossstillinvolved some lossofbenefittoyou.That wouldseemtoindicatetheexperiencehadbenefitsofitsowntooffer and itwoulddoso,whetherornottheycouldalsosurvivetheadditionalpayoff ’ s completedisappearance.Orsupposethisisthecase:thefurtherbenefitsone takesanexperiencetoaffordarethemselvesvaluedpartlybecausethey involvehavingthatveryexperience.Thenagain,theexperientialbenefit wouldnotbe wholly derivative evenifitcouldnotberetainedinthe absenceofitsderivedbenefi ts.Allthatisstrictlyrequiredforsomething toprovidemewithabenefit “ofitsown” isthatthegooditgivesmenotbe exhausted bywhateverfurther(“de rived ”)benefitsitaffords.Inother words:thegooditdoesmeisnot entirely duetoothergoodsitmakes availabletome.⁴
⁴ IdeploybasicallythesameconceptioninSiewert1998,pp.313–15 thoughhopefully withsomeimprovementhere.Forclarity,ImightalsonotethatwhileIhavehereusedthis (cooking)examplefromKagan,myclaimisnotjustthesameashis,whenhesaysweshould “allowforthepossibilitythatintrinsicvalue[thatis,value ‘asanend’]candepend,inpart,on instrumentalvalue[valueasameans]” (Kagan1998,p.285)Partlythat’sbecause,again,he doesnotuse “intrinsicvalue” tomeanwhatIcall “intrinsicbene fit” tosomeone,andpartly becausemypointdoesnotrequirethatwealwaysconstruethedependenceofintrinsic bene fi tsonfurthergoodstheymakeavailablespecifi callyin instrumental terms,asinstances of “meanstoends.”
4.HowtoFindIntrinsicBenefitinExperience
OnceIseethequestionofthevalueofexperienceinthewayjustexplained, I find,throughreflectiononcases,thatthereareindeedmanyformsof experiencewhosepossessionIregardasintrinsicallybene ficialtome.For Iconsiderthesortsofsensory,cognitive,andaffectiveexperiencesIhave had,oranticipatehaving,and,ofthese,IdiscovermanythatIthinkitbetter formetohaveorhavehad butnotjustforsomefurtherreward,distinct fromhavingthem,whichIthinkthatbringsme.ExplaininghowIreachthis conclusionwillshowhowyoumightreachitforyourself,andhelpfurther clarifythekindofbenefitatissue.
Oneformthisreflectioncantake:thereareexperiencesIdeemgoodfor methatariseandpassawaybutyieldmenobenefitordetrimentbeyond themselves,asnearascantell.Iopenthedoorandsmellthewetearthy freshnessoftheairaftertherainthatbrokeahotdryspell;Ihearthesnatch ofatuneoutofawindowasI’mpassingby;anamusingthoughtoccursto meIsharewithnooneandtakenofurther.It’snothardformetocontrast whatit’slikeformetohavetheselittlefortuitousexperienceswithhow Ithinkitlikelythingsmighthavebeenwithoutthem.Thingsmightwell haveotherwisebeenmuchthesame.IconfidentlyjudgeIwas,nonetheless, betteroffforhavingthem.
Wecanalsohighlightsubjectiveexperiencesthatwedeemhavevalueof theirownforus,notbyseeingwhetherwevaluethemevenwhennothingelse comesofthem,butwhetherwewouldstillvaluethem,werethederivedgoods theyseemtoprovidetakenaway.Forinstance,IconsiderthecasewhereItake myafter-the-rainexperiencetohavehadsomebeneficialresult suchas nudgingmythoughtsawayfromgrimpreoccupations.Orthecaseinwhich theamusingthoughtgavemesomepleasantrytosharelaterwithafriend. Wouldtheseexperiencesstillhavedonemesomegoodeveniftheyhadn’t affordedthesebonuses?Ifso,thenagain,theybenefitmeintheirownright.
Mightn’tIbroadentherangeofcasestoembraceexperienceswhich unlikethosejustconsidered seemunavailableintheabsenceoftheir derivedbenefits?Yes,thoughit’sabitmorecomplicated.Considerthis example.ManytimesIhavegoneforabikeridealongthebayounear whereIlive.Now,Idoindeedthinkitwasbetterformethatthingsthen lookedandfelttomeastheydid(andthatIfeltasIdid),andthat Isubjectivelyexperiencedthethoughtsthisoccasioned,ratherthanfor nothingtohavelookedorfelttomeanywayatallthen,andtohavebeen experientiallyvoidofthought.AndIdothinktherewassomething else for
thesakeofwhichitwasgood formetohavehad thoseexperiences.Forone thing,IassumethatnormallyIneedthingstoappeartome,invisionand touch,ifIamtonavigatetheworldaswellasItypicallydo.AndIregardthis resultasabenefit.ButIseenoreadilyavailablemeansofgetting,inthe completeabsenceofsuchresults, experiences oftheverysamecharacter deemedbeneficial.
However,Icanatleast conceive ofaperfectedvirtualreality “bike-ride simulator” experiencehadthoughstimulationtomybrainwhileIam immobilized.Thiswouldindeedomitallthederivedbene fitsI findinthe actualbayouride.WoulditentirelykillthegoodItaketheexperiencetodo forme?IfIsayno,thenclearlyIshouldconcludeit’snot only duetoits affordingmefurthergoods(suchasI’dloseinthesimulator)thatI findit’ s betterformetohavetheexperiencesIhadthannot.Andtherewillbeat least some caseslikethis evenifIputlimitsonhowmuchmerely virtual realityIwoulddeemgoodforme.
It’struethatIoftenwouldprefertoactuallygotoaconcert,and experienceseeingandhearingtheperformanceby fleshandbloodmusicians inacertainbrickandmortarvenueinthecompanyofotherpeople,rather thantoslipintosomevirtualrealitysimulationthatduplicatedthesubjectivecharacterofthatexperience.Still,thelatteroptionmightstrikemeas prettygood,andsometimes,evenpreferable.(ForthatmatterImighteven prefertojustwatchtheconcertonTV.)AndImightwelljudgetheperfected virtualcyclingexperiencetobebettertohavethannot,ifpermanent physicalincapacitykeptmefromtherealthing.Imightdrawsimilar conclusionsfromthinkingaboutactivities(fromskydivingtogourmandise) whoseattendantrealworldhazardsI’djustassoonavoidwhilekeepingthe subjectiveexperienceinvolved.Suchconvictionsindicatethatitcan’tbe entirelyfortheirderived,extra-phenomenalbenefitsthatIthinkI’mbetter offwiththeexperiencesinquestion.
Butweneedn’trelyonsatisfactionwithabitofmerelyvirtualrealityto securethemainpoint.Hereisanotherway.Idon’tjustthinkit’sbetterfor metohavethecyclingexperienceduetoitsenablingthejourney.Ialsothink itbettertotakethejourney,duetotheexperienceitinvolves.Here,and whereverthispatternholds,it’sevidentthatthebenefitsofanexperience can ’tlie entirely insomethingfurtheritgivesme,sincethebenefithadfrom thatfurtherthingistobeunderstoodpartlyintermsofthebenefitofthe experienceitgivesme.Thisfurtherconfirms(andhelpsclarify)myjudgmentthatitisbetterformetohavetheexperiencethanlackit,butnot solely due toitsprovisionofsomeseparablepay-offs.
Topressthepoint:Icanstillseethisisso,evenwherethefurtherbenefits areboundtotheexperienceinquestionbynecessity.Forexample,one benefitofhavingcertainexperiencesmightbethe memories theyaffordme. Anothermightbethe understanding ofwhatitislikeformetohavethose typesofexperiences.AndIcouldgetneitherwithouttheexperience. Consider firstthememorycase:certainexperiencesaregoodformeto lookbackon.AndIcouldnotget that benefitintheabsenceofthe experiencerecalled.However,insuchcasesImayask:isit also truethat Ithinkitbettertohave thoseexperience-derivedbene fits ratherthannot, becausetheyinvolvemyhavingthe experience IthinkI’mbetteroffhaving? InmanycaseswhereIwoulddeemrecollectionoftheexperiencebeneficial tometohave,partofwhatmakesthememoriesgoodonesisthattheyareof experiencesIwasbetteroffforhaving.
Wecanrecognizeanalogouspointswhereexperienceisdeemedvaluable forthe subjectiveunderstanding ofexperienceitaffords.IfIwanttoknow whatitwouldbeliketosmellsandalwood,theexperienceofsmellingitwill benefitmebysatisfyingmycuriosity.Butitwasgoodtoslake that curiosity partlybecausedoingsoinvolvedhavingexperiencegoodformetohave.So thegoodtheexperiencedidmewasnotexhaustedbythegoodsIderivedfrom gettingthingsdistinctfromit.Thiscontrastsevaluativelywithacasewhere thesatisfactionofcuriositydoesseemtobeallthegoodanexperiencedoes me sinceapartfromthisbenefitI’dhavebeenbetteroffwithoutit.(Suppose I’mcurious,notaboutthesmellofsandalwood,butaboutthesmellofdeath.)
Thislastpointconcernsexperiencewithnogoodofitsowntoprovide, enduredjustforthesakeofitsderivedbene fits.Butaretherenotalsocases inwhichwe findtheexperiencebeneficial inspiteofitsderiveddetriments? Forexample,casesinwhichwetastedsometainted(ormerelyunhealthy) foodordrink,orfellintosomeultimatelyill-advisedromance.Ifyouthink therewas something goodforyouabouthavingsuchexperiences(atleast “at thetime”),thoughwhattheybroughtintheirtrain,distinctfromthemselves (thenausea,thehangover,theanxietyordepression),onlymadeyouworse off,thenitseemsyoumustthinkwhatevergoodtheydidholdforyoucame fromsomevaluetheyhadforyouinthemselves.Relatedly,supposeyou thoughttheexperienceinquestiondidhaveatleast some derivedbenefits (hard-wonwisdom?),aswellasdetriments,thoughthedetrimentswere decidedly greater.Orsupposeyouarequiteunresolvedabouttheirrelative weight.Andyetstillyouregardedtheexperienceasonthewhole “worthit.” Thenagain,youmustbeaccordingsomeintrinsicbenefittotheexperience thattipsthe finalassessmentinitsfavor.
Nowfora finalwayto findproprietarybenefitsinourexperience.Recall thebikingtrip.Imightask,regardingthefurthergoodsbroughtmebythe experienceIhad,isitatleast conceivable Icouldgetthem without the experiencesinquestion?Forexample,isitconceivableIcouldnavigate onmybikejustasadroitlywithoutvisualexperience,byunconscious perception inthiscase,by “blindsight”?Ifthatwerethecase,would Istillregardmyselfasbetteroffforhavingthesubjectiveexperiencethan Iwouldbewithoutit?Thisscenario,howeverunlikely,isnotsohardto conceiveof,andonceconceived,yieldsareadyanswertotheevaluative question:yes,Iwouldstilldeemitbetterformetohavethefull-blown cyclingexperiencethannegotiatetheterrainbyunconsciousvision.But then,ifIsupposeallthederivedbenefitsItakesomeexperiencestoyield couldbehadwithoutthem,andyetstillIwouldthinkitbettertohavethe experienceaswell,thenclearlyItaketheexperiencetobegoodformeinits ownright,notjustforthederivedbenefits.Sohereisyetanotherwayto isolateintrinsicbenefits.⁵
Toreview:I’veidentified fivewaysinwhichwecandiscoverthatwe accordproprietarybenefittoourexperiences.
(1)Therearecasesinwhichexperientialbenefitsaccrueintheabsenceof whatwetaketobeactualderivedgoods.
(2)Wemaydiscoverexperientialbenefitsthatwouldremainwhenthe derivedgoodswethinkactuallypresentaresubtracted.
(3)Wecan findcasesofexperiencewithapparentderivedbenefitswhose valuedependsforuspartlyonthebenefitofthatveryexperience.
(4)Thereareexperienceswecanthinkhadsomegoodtoofferus, thougheitherallfurthervaluetheybroughtuswasnegative,orthe goodhadfromthemwasenoughtohavemadethemworthwhilein theend,despiteitsbeingunclearthattheirderivedbenefitoutweighedtheirderiveddetriment.
(5)Wecan findcaseswherewewouldthinkourselvesbetterofffor havingagiventypeofsubjectiveexperiencethannot,evenwhen supposingwehadtheoptionofgettingitsderivedbenefitswithoutit.
⁵ Formoreaboutthis fifthway,seemyearlierdiscussionof “selectivepheno-ectomy” in Siewert1998,pp.322–5.TheformofargumentisstructurallyanalogoustothatBradford(2015, pp.94–9)employstoarguethat difficulty ispartofwhatgivesachievementsintrinsicvalue:the valueoftheprocessofacquiringtheirproductwouldbediminishedifitbecamemagicallynear effortless.
