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NotInTheirName

NEWTOPICSINAPPLIEDPHILOSOPHY

SeriesEditor :KasperLippert-Rasmussen

Thisseriespresentsworksoforiginalresearchonpracticalissuesthatarenot yetwellcoveredbyphilosophy.Theaimisnotonlytopresentworkthatmeets highphilosophicalstandardswhilebeinginformedbyagoodunderstandingof relevantempiricalmatters,butalsotoopenupnewareasforphilosophical exploration.Theserieswilldemonstratethevalueandinterestofpracticalissues forphilosophyandviceversa.

TheInheritanceofWealth Justice,Equality,andtheRighttoBequeath

DanielHalliday

NotInTheirName AreCitizensCulpableForTheirStates’ Actions?

HollyLawford-Smith

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Acknowledgements

ThisresearchwassupportedbyaMarieCuriegrantfromthe EuropeanCommission(2014–16).Iworkedonthisbookwhile beingemployedattheUniversityofShefﬁeldandtheUniversityof Melbourne,andspendingtimeonresearchleaveattheAustralian NationalUniversityandtheUniversityofEdinburgh.Iamgratefulto allofthoseuniversitiesfortheirsupport,andtotheirfacultyandgraduate studentcommunitiesfortheirgenerousengagementwithmywork.

ThepersonIowethegreatestintellectualdebttoforthisworkis StephanieCollinsattheAustralianCatholicUniversityinMelbourne, withwhomIhaveworkedonseveralpapersontopicsrelatedtothis book,anddiscussionswithwhomhavereallypushedmeandhelped metodevelopandclarifymythoughtsonthistopic.

AnearlierversionofthisbookwontheGRIPP2018Annual MontrealPoliticalTheoryManuscriptAward,andIowehugethanks totheGRIPPcommunityforafantasticallyhelpfulmanuscriptworkshopinMay2018atMcGillUniversity.Iamparticularlygratefulto thecommentatorsAmandineCatala,PabloGilabert,VictorMunizFraticelli,CatherineLu,DanielWeinstock,andPeterDietsch;andto RichardHealeyandAngiePepperfordiscussion.

IwasluckytobeabletovisitthePhilosophyDepartmentatthe AustralianNationalUniversityforafewmonthsineveryyearthat Iworkedonthisproject,andbeneﬁtedimmenselyfromdiscussions withthefacultyandgraduatestudentsthere.Iamespeciallygrateful toChristianBarryforalwaysmanagingto ﬁndwaystohelpmespend timebackinAustralia,duringtheperiodthatIwaslivingintheUK.

Forextraordinarilydetailedandconstructivecommentsonthefull manuscript,IamgratefultoKenShockley.Thesecommentsmadea bigdifferencetothe ﬁnalmanuscript,andIcountmyselfverylucky thathewaswillingtobesogenerouswithhistime.

FordiscussiononthevariouschaptersinthisbookIamgratefulto audiencesattheAustralianNationalUniversity,theUniversityof Otago,WaikatoUniversity,theUniversityofAuckland,Princeton University,theUniversityofAarhus,theUniversityofBristol,the UniversityofNottingham,andtheUniversityofEdinburgh;andin particulartoChrisBennett,Jens-ChristianBjerring,DavidBloch, LarsChristie,StephanieCollins,NiallConnolly,RyanCox,Luara Ferracioli,SarahHannan,JohannesHimmelreich,RachelJolly,James Jordan,R.J.Leland,KieranOberman,JenniferPage,MikeRobillard, WolfgangSchwarz,DanielViehoff,andNancyYang.

Finally,abigthankstothetwoanonymousreviewersfor,andthe commissioningeditorof,OxfordUniversityPressforalltheirhelp andsupport.

1 Introduction

Therearemanyactionsthatweattribute,atleastcolloquially,to states.Forexample,between2008and2015Norwaydonated $1billiontoprotecttheAmazonrainforestinBrazil.Brazil,inturn, reduceddeforestationintheAmazonbymorethan75percent (Reuters2015).Turkey,Egypt,Iraq,Lebanon,andJordanhave togethertakeninmorethan ﬁvemillionrefugeesoftheSyrianCivil War;Turkeynearlythreemillion,andothercountriestwomillion betweenthem(UNHCR2017).Theseexamplesarepositive,butthere arealsonegativeexamples.Forexample,thefailureofCOP15,the 2009UnitedNationsClimateChangeConference,toreachabinding globalagreementonclimateactionwasattributedtostonewallingby China,India,andSudan(Lynas2009;Rappetal.2010).TheIraq War,regardedbymanyatthetimeandmanymoresinceasunjust, wasinitiallywagedbyacoalitionofstatesleadbytheUnitedStates, includingtheUnitedKingdom,Australia,andPoland.Australia routinelyviolatesthehumanrightsofasylumseekers,andstandsin violationofinternationallaw,byturningbackboatstoprevent asylumseekersfrommakingclaims,andbysendingasylumseekers toNauruandManusIslandforindeﬁnitedetentionandeventual offshoreresettlement.Moregenerally,statescanharmbothother statesandtheirownpopulations.Betweenstatesthereisandhasbeen warandcolonization;withinstateshistoricallytherehasbeengenocide,oppressionofminoritygroups,humanrightsviolations,andthe insidiousformsofharmthatcomefrominstitutionalisedracism, misogyny,heterosexism,ableism,andsoon,andfromtheideology ofconservativepolitics.

Buthowshouldwethinkaboutculpabilityforthesekindsof actions,ormoregenerally,aboutresponsibilityforthem?When statesact,whoexactlyisimplicatedinthoseactions,andwhohas theabilitytosteertheminadifferentdirection?Toanswerthis question,severalstepsarenecessary.First,whatis ‘thestate’?Assumingthatthisthingperformsthekindsofactionswetendtoattribute tostates,canwenonethelessmakethestrongerclaimthatitisan agent?Atleastinthecaseofindividuals,thereasonwetendtothink thereisresponsibilityforactionsisbecauseagencystandsbehind thoseactions.Infact,whenitdoesn’t,wetendtodenythatthereis responsibility,forexamplewhenagencyiscompromisedbypsychosis,orsleepwalking,orcoercion,orhavingbeendrugged,andsoon. Ifthereisnoagencybehindwhatwethinkofasstates’ actions,where doesthisleaveculpabilityforstates’ actions?

InChapter2,Ipresentarangeofdifferentmodelsofthestate, arguingthattwoareparticularlyplausibleandwillbeusefulforour purposes.The ﬁrstmodelincludescitizensaspartofthestate (orsomethinglikecitizens;Ireﬁnethisinthesubsequentdiscussion, althoughforeaseofreferenceIuse ‘citizens’ asaplaceholderthroughoutthebook),whilethesecondmodelexcludescitizens.InChapters 3and4,Itakeeachofthesemodelsupinturn,workingthrough whethereithercanbevindicatedasanagentbyarangeoftheoriesof collectiveagency.Iarguethatonthecitizen-inclusivemodeldiscussedinChapter3,thestateisnotanagent,andsothatmodel cannotgetusculpabilityforwhatwethinkofasthestate’sactions.

Still,thisisnottheendofthestoryforcitizens’ responsibilityfor whattheirstatesdo,becausetherearemultiplepathstoresponsibility andculpabilityisonlyone.InChapter5,Iexploresomeofthese alternativepathways.InChapter6,Ireturntothecitizen-exclusive modeldiscussedinChapter4,andfocusonthequestionofwhatthe culpabilityofagrouplikethatmightmeanforitsmembers.Thiskind ofgroupisinterestingandchallengingbecauseitisdifferentin importantwaysfromthekindsofgroupsonwhichtheoristsof collectiveobligationandcollectiveresponsibilityhavefocused.The preferredcitizen-exclusivemodelofthestatedefendedinChapter4

featuresbothhierarchicalrelationsbetweenmembers,andnested agency,whichexistswhenacollectiveagenthascollectiveagents asitsparts(andsoon,allthewaydowntoindividualhuman agents).Idefendaparticularaccountofthedistributionofculpability betweenmembersofthesekindsofgroups.Chapter6isconcerned withthe ‘internal’ questionofwhatthecollectiveculpabilityofastate mightmeanformembersofastate.

IshouldacknowledgethatIamcomingatthissetofquestions fromtheperspectiveofaninterestinsocialmetaphysics.Whilethere isasubstantialvolumeofworkonthepossibilityofcollectivebelief, collectiveintention,andcollectiveaction,andsomeworkoncollectiveagency,collectiveobligation,andcollectiveresponsibility,thereis littleworkonhowtheseconceptsapplyto large-scale groupsand groupsthatdon’thaveanegalitarianinternalstructure.Tobeclear, thatdoesn’tmeanthereisn’tatheoryabouttheresponsibilityof corporationsorstatesfortheiractions,itjustmeansthatthattheory doesn’tusuallyconnectupwiththeworkinsocialmetaphysics.This isaprojectaimedatbridgingthatgap.Whenitisarguedthatcitizens ofastateshouldpayforthehistoricinjusticescommittedbytheir state,forexample,towhatextent(ifatall)canthisconclusionbe justiﬁedbythinkingaboutthecitizensaspart-authorsofthestate’ s actions,ormembersofthesamecollectiveagentthathaspersisted overtimesincetheauthoringoftheinjustices,orinsomeotherway? Ifitcan’t,thenisthereanyotherwaytoreachtheconclusionthat citizensshouldpay,orarewesimplywrongingcitizensbymaking thempay?

In ‘Collectives’ andIndividuals’ Obligations:AParityArgument’ , StephanieCollinsandIincludedstatesamongthegroupsthatwe thoughtcouldbeagentsintheirownright:

Wewillassumethattheformal,long-lastinggroupsthatstructureoursocial, politicalandeconomicworld suchasstates, ﬁrms,churchesandinternationalorganisations beargroupagency.Tomotivatethis,considerthat groupslikestatesand ﬁrmsarehighlyorganised,witharangeofintricately relatedroles.Theyhavecomplexdecisionprocedures,whichsystematically producearangeofdecisionsandadistributionofyetmorerolesforenacting

thosedecisions.Theresultoftheseprocesseswithinthecollectiveisaset ofdecisions,asetofindividualrolesforenactingthosedecisionsanda distributionoftherolesamongindividuals:resultsproducednotbyone member orbytheconjunctionofeachmember’sindependentprocessing butbythememberstakentogetherasasystem.Theactionsofmembers partlyconstituteactionsofthegroupwhenthemembersactwithinand becauseoftheirrole.

(CollinsandLawford-Smith2016a:42[myemphasis])

Insteadofsimplytakingthatforgranted,Chapters2,3,and4are dedicatedto ﬁguringoutwhetherstatesdeservetheirplaceamong thoseothergroups;indeedwhetheranysuch ‘formal,long-lasting groups ’ deservetheirplaceamongthesmall-scaleegalitariangroups thataresooftenthesubjectsofanalysisinsocialmetaphysics.

Thisbookfocusesinparticularon democratic states.That’snot becausetheyaretheeasycase;rathertheopposite,it’sbecausethey arethehardcase.Inadictatorshiporamonarchy,solongasthe dictatorormonarchisanagent(whichtheyusuallywillbe)we simplyidentifythestatewiththatpersonandcanbeconﬁdentthat itisanagent.Actionsbythedictatoraretheactionsofthestate,but thatdoesn’timplicateanyonefurtherthanthedictator,andculpabilitywillusuallyrestwiththedictatoralone althoughothersmay yetbecomplicitinwhatheorshedoes.Democraciesareharder becausethereisobviouslyanexplanatoryrelationshipbetweenwhat thecitizenryvotesfor,andevenwhatpollingrevealsaboutwhatthe citizenry wants,andwhatthestatedoes.Butthisconnectionisnot determinate;otherfactorsarealsorelevant.Directdemocraciesare differentfromrepresentativedemocracies,andidealdemocracies (whichdon’texist)aredifferentfromactual(non-ideal)democracies. Oneconclusionofthebookwillbethatthereisnoactualdemocracy forwhichthestateisacollectiveagentthatincludesthecitizensas members.Thatmightbeasurprisingconclusionforsome.

Beforewebegin,anoteaboutthepoliticsofwhatIamarguing forhere.Thetitleofthebookis ‘NotInTheirName’.Iamarguing throughoutthatwhenthedemocraticstateacts,itdoesnotactinthe citizenry’sname,atleastnotifthatmeansthatthecitizenryisany

partofwhatacts.Citizensarerarely,ifever,implicatedintheirstates’ actions.Thismayappeartohavetheunpalatableimplicationof lettingcitizensoffthehookforholdingtheirstatestoaccount.After all,ifwhatherstatedoeshasnothingmuchtodowithJanecitizen, whyshouldshegotoanytroubletogetittododifferently?Butifall JaneandJoecitizensthoughtthisway,wouldn’tthatjustleadto widespreadpoliticalapathyandthestaterunningevenfurtheramok?

Andisn’tittruethatallJaneandJoecitizenstogetherhavecontrol overwhatthestatedoes,becausewhatthestatedoesdependsatleast inpartonwhattheydotogether?Iwillexplainwhatiswrongwith movingfromJanealonetoalltheJanesandJoestogetherinChapters 3and4.HereIjustwanttomakethepointthatcitizens’ notbeing culpableforthestate’sactionsdoesn’tprecludetheirtakingresponsibilityforthestate’sactions;indeedthisisthefocusofthediscussion inChapter5.

Somemightwonderwhyweshouldbeconcernedwithculpability, solongasthere’sresponsibilityofsomeformorother.Culpabilityis importantbecauseitisthestrongestjustificationofresponsibility, andproducesthemostdemandingobligations.Thosewhoareculpableinproducinginjusticearethe ‘ideal’ bearersofobligationsto repairthesituationinordertocreatejustice.Theycannoteasily appealtothecostlinessoffulfillingthoseobligationsinorderto escapefulfillingthem.Whentheyareunableorunwillingtobear thoseobligations,onlythendowelookto ‘non-ideal’ bearersof obligations,suchasthosewhohavebenefitedfromtheinjustice,or standinrelevantassociativerelationshipswithitsvictims,orwho haveasignificantcapacitytoassistitsvictims.Butsuchbearerscan moreeasilyappealtocostlinessinordertoescapetheirobligations.If citizenstogetherareculpableforwhattheirstatesdothenwedon’t haveadifficultjobtodoinjustifyinghowcostscanbepassedonto citizenswhenstatesmustrectifyinjusticestheyhaveperpetrated,and ifcitizenstogetherknowthey’reculpableforwhattheirstatesdothey arelikelytobemoreengagedintheexerciseofcollectiveoversight,so thatsuchinjusticeswillbeminimized.Inshort,citizens’ culpability forstates’ unjustactionswillbeagoodthing,ifwecangetit.

Ifwecan’tgetcitizens’ culpabilityforstates’ unjustactions,asIwill argueisthecase,weareleftwithtwochoices.Eitherwesaysomething false thatcitizensareculpable inthehopeofitbringinggood politicaloutcomes,orwedon’t,andtacklehead-onhowtogetthe politicaloutcomeswewant.Whatwoulddemocracyhavetobelikein orderforcitizenstobepartoftheagencyofthestate,andtherefore potentiallyculpableforwhatitdoes?Ifourcurrentdemocraciesare too ﬂawedtoincorporatecitizenswithintheagencyoftheirstates,we shouldbetalkingaboutwaystostrengthendemocraciessothatthey do.Iamallforworkingtowardsafutureinwhichthestateacts ‘inour name ’,afutureinwhichclaimsaboutwhat ‘we,thepeople’ wantare trulyreﬂectiveofthecitizenry.Thesoonerweadmitthatwe’renot thereyet,thesoonerwecanstartworkingonhowtogetthere.

2 WhatisTheState?

To figureoutwhoisculpableforwhatstatesdo(andinsome cases,failtodo),andtounderstandhowstatesmightbebroughtto dodifferently bothintermsofhowtheytreattheircitizensandin thecontextofinternationalagreements wehaveto first figureout whatthestate is.Inthischapter,Iwillpresentarangeofdifferent characterizationsofthestate,drawnfromacrosspoliticalscience, internationalrelations,politicalphilosophy,andinternationallaw. Iwillpresentthemotivationforfocusingononeofthesemodels inparticular.

Twoquestionsneedtobekeptseparateinthisdiscussion.The ﬁrst ishowtodrawtheboundaryofthegroup,assumingthatthestate is a groupandnotmerelyanindividual(Iwillpresentonemodelthat deniesthis).Thesecondishowtodeterminemembership.Wemay beabletogivethenecessaryandsufﬁcientconditionsforagroup’ s beingastatewithoutthereforerevealingwhatitwouldtakeforan individualtobeamemberofthestate.Theconditionsformembershipmaybequiteseparatefromtheconditionsforstatehood.

The firstquestionisconceptuallyprior,soIwilladdressit first,but thesecondquestionisimportantforwhenitcomestothinkingabout culpability,soIwillreturntoit.Therewillbeareflectiveequilibrium betweenourconceptionofthestateandourconceptionofcollective agency(the firstofwhichisthefocushere,andthesecondofwhichis thefocusofChapter3).Tobecharitabletothequestionofwhether thestateisacollectiveagentweneedtobeopenaboutboththe conceptionofthestateandtheconceptionofcollectiveagency,and workforanintuitivebalancebetweenthetwo.

Furthercomplicatingmatters,itislikelythattherearemultiple conceptionsofthestatewhichsuitthemultiplepurposeswemight havefortheorizingaboutit.Iwillpresentarangeofdifferent characterizationsofthestate,makingadistinctionbetweenthose thatmakethestateaunifiedagentandthosethatfragmenttheagency ofthestate.By ‘unified’ Imeanthatthereisoverarchingcoordination suchthatthemembersofthestatearenotstuckincooperation problemswithoneanother,andby ‘fragmented’ Imeanthatthere isnosuchoverarchingcoordination.Iwillgivethemotivationfor focusingonacitizen-inclusivecharacterization,andthenreturnto giveanaccountofmembershipinthestateonthatcharacterization. Finally,Iwillsaywhichoftheremainingcharacterizationsisthemost plausibleshoulditnotbepossibletodefendacitizen-inclusivecharacterizationasbeingaunifiedagent.

I.TheOptions

LetusstartwithwhatIcallthe ‘exclusive’ endofthespectrumof characterizationsofthestate,onwhichtherearefewerratherthan greaternumbersofindividualagentswhomakeupthestate.Fiona McGillivrayandAlastairSmith(2000),andBruceBuenodeMesquita (2002),haveindependentlyarguedthatweshouldconceiveofinternationalrelationsintermsofpoliticalleaders,whichistosay,single individualslikeapresidentorprimeminister.1 BuenodeMesquita arguesthatthischaracterizationhasgreaterpredictivepowerthan alternativecharacterizationsofthestate,thatstates’ actionscanbe betterpredictedbylookingatwhatisinthepoliticalsurvivalinterests oftheleaderthanbywhatisintheinterestsofthosetheleadersare meanttobegoverning(2002:7).

1 Itaketheclaimthatinternationalrelationsisrelationsbetweenindividualpolitical leaderstobecloseenoughtotheclaimthatstatesarepoliticalleaders(international relationsisrelationsbetweenstates,andrelationsbetweenstatesarerelationsbetween politicalleaders),butforthosewho ﬁndthisanunwarrantedreadingofthoseauthors,it cansimplybeunderstoodthatIborrowfromtheircharacterizationofinternational relationsandapplyittothecharacterizationofstates.

If ‘Australia’ justisMalcolmTurnbull,2 thentherearenoteven primafacieissuesofagencyandmoralresponsibilitytoresolve. Turnbullisanindividualhumanagent,andpresumingheisnota sociopath,alsoamoralagent.Thatmeanswhatisinhispolitical survivalinterestasanindividual(herewhatwouldkeephiminthe roleofprimeministerofAustralia)canstandintensionwithwhatis intheinterestofalltheindividualpoliticalleadersoftheworldtaken asagroup.Forexample,itcanbeinTurnbull’sinteresttofailto accomplishtheemissionsreductionsAustraliapledgedatCOP21and ratiﬁedintheParisAgreement,whileitisinthegroupofpolitical leaders’ interestthatTurnbullaccomplishorevensurpasstheemissionsreductionsthatwerepledged.

Furthermore,ifmakingalowemissionsreductionpledgeat COP21wasanintentionalactionofTurnbull’s(ratherthan,say,an accident,anunintendedsideeffectofanotherintentionalaction,or anactionforwhichTurnbullhasanexcuse sayamistakeincommunication),andmakingalowpledgecaused(orwillcause)harm (injustice,wrong),thenhecanbeheldresponsibleforthis.Understandingstatesaspoliticalleadersmakestheagencyquestioneasy. Thequestion,ofcourse,iswhetherwe’resatisﬁedwithanunderstandingofthestatethatexcludes everyone elseinvolvedinpolitical actionfromthatagency.WhataboutthoseinTurnbull’scabinet? Whataboutallthepublicservants?Whataboutordinarycitizens, whoseinterestssuchleadersareapparentlychargedwithpursuing? Alternativemodelsofthestatebringthesepeoplein,butatthecostof makingtheagencyquestionmuchmorecomplicated.

Asecondalternativekeepsthestateuniﬁed,butextendsinclusion tothenationalgovernment,acting as anindividualagentwould.This isknownastheUnitaryActormodel(seee.g.Allison1969;1971). Heretheindividualmembersofgovernmentmakeupacollective agent,whichisabletoactrationallyinthepursuitofitsgoals.Onthis modelitisnotTurnbullwhodecidesnottomeetAustralia’sCOP21 pledge,itistheAustraliangovernment.TheAustraliangovernment

2 TurnbullwasPrimeMinisterofAustraliaasatJuly2018.

includesallindividualswhohaverolesintheparliament(theQueen, representedbytheGovernorGeneral,150membersofparliament, and76senators);theexecutive(theprimeminister,thecabinet,and eighteengovernmentdepartmentsadministeredbytheseniorministerswhoaremembersofcabinet);orthejudiciary(sevenjusticesin theHighCourt;agreatmanymoreinthesubsidiaryFederalCourts, FamilyCourts,andFederalCircuitCourt).Onthischaracterization ofthestate,wehaveacollectiveagentmadeupofhundredsof individuals,allwithdifferentialstatusandinﬂuence,actingtogether.

Athirdalternativesimilarlykeepsthestateunified,butextends inclusionevenfurther.Thisisadefinitionofthestategivenin internationallaw,inparticularthedefinitiongivenintheMontevideo Convention(1933),accordingtowhich:

Thestateasapersonofinternationallawshouldpossessthefollowing qualiﬁcations:a)apermanentpopulation;b)adeﬁnedterritory;c)government;andd)thecapacitytoenterintorelationswiththeotherstates. (InternationalConferenceofAmericanStates1933)3

StayingwiththeexampleofAustralia,(c)givesusallthehundredsof individualsmentionedaboveinthesecondalternative,theUnitary Actormodel;butratherthanmakingthiscollectiveofindividualsthe state,itmakesthestatethethingthat has agovernment,aterritory,a population,andthecapacitytoenterrelationswithotherstates.We canmakesenseofAustraliainthisway,ashavingadeﬁnedterritory (namelythelargecontinenttothenorth-westofNewZealand), apermanentpopulation(namelyAustraliancitizensandpermanent residents),agovernment(namelythemembersoftheexecutive, legislature,andjudiciaryasoutlinedabove),and ﬁnally,thecapacity toenterintorelationswithotherstates(forexample,thecapacityto ratifytheCOP21ParisAgreementandbeoneofmanystatestogether boundbyinternationallawtothatagreement).

Thereisafurtherquestionabouthowtounderstandtheconditions.Aretheyconjunctive,suchthatwhenallfourhold,wehavea

3 SeealsothediscussioninCollinsandLawford-Smith(2016b:158).

state?Ifthatisthecase,moreneedstobesaidabouttherelation betweeneachelement.Forexample,wecannotjusttakeanyoldterritory (e.g.thenorthandsouthislandsofNewZealand)togetherwithanyold government(e.g.thegovernmentof Singapore),andanyoldpopulation (e.g.thepopulationofSamoa).Butisitsufﬁcientthat(a)thepopulation and(c)thegovernmentbelocatedwithin(b)theterritory,andeither(c) thegovernment,or(c)togetherwith(a)thepopulation,bewhat enable(d)thecapacitytoenterintorelationswithotherstates?

Thatistosay,ifthepopulationofAustraliaandthegovernmentof AustraliaarebothlocatedwithintheperimeteroftheAustralian continent,anditisthegovernmentofAustraliaorthegovernment togetherwiththepopulationthatgiveAustraliathecapacitytoenter relationswithotherstates,isthatenoughtomakeAustraliaastate?

Reflectingonthecaseofstatelessnesscausedbyocean-levelrise helpstoadjudicateonthismatter(seee.g.AlexanderandSimon 2014).IftheMaldivesaresubmergedasoceanlevelsriseduetoglobal warming,thenthepeopleoftheMaldiveswillbetakeninbyother statesasrefugees,andtheirterritorywillbelostundertheocean.Still, wecanimaginethegovernmentreconveningelsewhere,perhapsin ordertoadvocatefortherefugeeclaimsoftheMaldivianpeople. Allfourelementsareseparable;theMaldivesisastateonlyaslongas (a)–(d)cometogether(lackinganyoneissufficienttostatelessness), andthereforetheconjunctiveviewissufficient.

Thealternativewouldbetolookforanentitythatitselfhaseachof thesefourelements,forexampleasovereignthathascontrolovera populationandaterritory,operatesthroughagovernment,andis (thereby)abletoenterintorelationswithotherstates.Onthis interpretation,inordertobeastatethesovereignmustmeetthese conditions,butthatdoesnotmakethestateequivalenttothose conditionsorsomesubsetofthem.Theprimaryexerciseofagency mightstillbeattributabletothesovereign,ratherthantothegovernmentthroughwhichthesovereignacts,ortothepeople.Thisis plausibleinthecaseofauthoritariansovereigns,butitalsoequates thesovereignwiththepermanentpopulationinthecaseofdemocracies,becausethesovereignisthepeopleasawholegoverning

themselves,andthissovereignhascontroloverapermanentpopulation,namely,itself(thisisdemocraticself-governance).

Noticethat,morebroadly,ifweareinterestedindemocraciesthen thesovereignviewandtheconjunctiveviewamounttothesame thingwhenitcomestoagency.Ontheformer,thesovereignis thepopulationtakenasawhole,soexercisesofagencyareattributabletothepopulationasawhole(i.e.areinclusiveofthecitizenry); onthelattertherelationbetweenthepopulationandthegovernment isthatthegovernmentistheapparatusthroughwhichthepopulation exercisesitswill,soexercisesofagencyarestillattributabletothe populationasawhole.(Fornon-democracies,theconjunctiveinterpretationisinclusiveofthecitizenryandthesovereigninterpretation isexclusive,andthismaybetterreﬂectourintuitionsaboutthemoral responsibilityofthepopulationfortheactionsofthestateinthose cases.ThiswillbeimportantforthediscussioninSectionII.)

Afourthalternativewhichkeepsthestateuniﬁedisalsoinclusive ofcitizens,andcomesfromclassicalpoliticaltheory.Jean-Jacques Rousseau(1792)famouslydefendedtheideaofthewholesocietyas sovereign,distinctfromagovernmentchargedwithdealingwith applicationsofthelawwithinthesociety.Onthismodel,again,the citizensareincludedwithinthestate,infactitisthecitizenstaken togetherthatarethemostimportantelementofthestate,itssovereign.Thegovernmentactsindependently,soastopreserveboththe generalityandlegitimacyofthesovereign.Becausethismodelagrees withtheMontevideoConventionmodelinitscentralcommitments (i.e.societyassovereign,plusgovernment),Iwillsimplytreatthese twomodelstogetherinwhatfollows.

Itisworthnotingthatsomeversionofthismodeliswidespreadin classicalpoliticaltheory,wherecitizens’ collectiveself-governanceis atthecentreofthepicture.RobertWolff,writingondemocracyasa solutiontotheconﬂictbetweenauthorityandautonomy,proposedthat Democracyattemptsanaturalextensionofthedutyofautonomytothe realmofcollectiveaction.Justasthetrulyresponsibleman[ person ] giveslawstohimself,andtherebybindshimselftowhatheconceivesto beright,soasocietyofresponsiblemen[ people ]cancollectivelybind themselvestolawscollectivelymade,andtherebybindthemselvestowhat

theyhavetogetherjudgedtoberight.Thegovernmentofademocraticstate isthen,strictlyspeaking,nomorethanaservantofthepeopleasawhole, chargedwiththeexecutionoflawswhichhavebeencommonlyagreedupon.

(Wolff1970:Sec.II.1,15)

Wolffthinksthatautonomyalwaystrumpsauthority.Justasa personshouldalwaysdecideforherselfwhatshewilldo,sotoo shouldthepeopleofademocraticstatedecideforthemselveswhat theywilldo.Thegovernmentcanexecutethosedecisionsonthe people’ sbehalf.Onthismodel,thegovernmentdoesnotlead,isnot autonomousfrom,andcertainlydoesnotexerciseauthorityover, thepeople.

Thereareadvantagestousingoneofthecharacterisationsofthe stategivensofar.The firstisthatalltheaccountsgivensofarpresent thestateasaunified(ratherthanfragmented)entity,andsovindicate ourordinaryunderstandingofthestateasthesoleagentofdomestic politicalaffairs,andoneamongothersuchagentsininternational politicalaffairs.ThenexttwocharacterisationsIwillgiverevisethat understanding,fragmentingthestateintomultiplecompetinglociof agency.Thesecondadvantagebelongstotwoaccountsinparticular (namely,theaccountfrominternationallaw,andtheaccountfrom classicalpoliticaltheory),anditisthattheyincludecitizenswithinthe understandingofthestate.Thisgivesusashotatvindicatingboth ordinaryintuitionsaboutdemocraticresponsibilityforstates’ actions, andordinarypracticeonwhichcitizenspaytaxesthatfund,inpart, theirstates’ liabilities,andonwhichcitizenstake flakabroadforthe politicalsituationintheirhomecountries(i.e.areheldtoaccountby othersfortheircountry’spolitics).Still,itisinterestingifwe can ’t vindicateamodelwithoneormoreoftheseadvantages,becauseit showsthatarevisionofourordinaryunderstandingofdemocratic responsibilityisnecessary.(Notealsothatpartoftheinstincttohold citizensresponsibleforwhattheirstatesdomightbevindicatedby thekindofnon-culpableresponsibilitythatIwilldiscussin Chapter5).Iwillbrieflypresenttwofragmentingaccountsbefore movingontoconsiderwhetheranyofthesecharacterizationsofthe stateisevenaprimafaciecandidateforbeingacollectiveagent(or,as inthecaseofthenexttwoaccounts,asmultiplecollectiveagents).

Therearetwofurthermodels:OrganisationalProcesses,andBureaucraticPolitics(Allison1969).Bothofthesemodelsfragmentthe agencyofthestate,denyingthatthereisauniﬁedstateandsuggesting thatinsteadtherearemultipleagentsthemselvesengagedincoordinationandcooperationproblems,theoutcomesofwhicharewhat wethinkofasthestate’sactions.TheOrganisationalProcessesmodel seesagencyaslocatedingovernmentalorganisations(departments), forexampleinAustraliatheDepartmentofForeignAffairsand Trade,theDepartmentofDefence,ortheDepartmentofImmigrationandBorderProtection.InAustraliatherearesomeeighteen departments(andthatistoleaveasidethemuchgreaternumberof governmentagencies).WhatiscrucialtotheOrganisationalProcessesmodelisthatthereisnoleaderwithoverarchingpowerto coordinatetheseorganisations,noraformalprocedureforresolving disagreementbetweenthem(iftherewere,wemightthinktherewasa uniﬁedagentafterall).

Similarly,theBureaucraticPoliticsmodelfragmentstheagencyof thestate,butinthiscasenotbetweenorganisationsbutbetweenkey individualpolitical figuresintheadministration,theresultsofwhose bargainingswethinkofastheactionsofthestate.Forexample,there isongoingbargainingbetweentheMinisterforForeignAffairs(in Australia,JulieBishop),theMinisterforHealth(inAustralia,Greg Hunt),theMinisterforJobs&Innovation(inAustralia,Michaelia Cash),andsoon.4 (Notethatifwearetoaccepteitheroftheselatter twomodels,thequestionwillbewhethergovernmentdepartments, andkeypolitical figures,arecollectiveagents.Forgovernment departments,thequestionwillhavetobeworkedthroughinthe samewayasIgoontodoinChapter3.Forkeypolitical figures, theanswerisstraightforward,andthesameasitwasfortheunified modelonwhichstatesarepoliticalleaders:theyareagentsbecause theindividualisanagent,andtheyaremoralagentssolongasthe individualisnotasociopath).

4 CorrectasofJuly2018.

Ofcourse,thesearenottheonlyplausiblewaysofthinkingabout whatthestateis.Somethinkthatculpabilitycanbedeterminedon thebasisofcausationof,orcausalcontributionto,harm(injustice, wrong).Ifwewereinterestedonlyinthe causes ofactionscommonly attributedto ‘thestate’ (oraparticularstate,like ‘Australia’),that mightgiveusreasontolookatamuchmorediffusegroupofpeople. Bothactionsandomissionscanbecauses,evenifpeopletendtohave differentmoralintuitionsaboutthestatusofeachascauses(seealso discussioninHenneetal.2016;LivengoodandRose2016).Citizens havecausalinfluencetogetheronwhichpartyendsupingovernment,evenifnocitizenhasthatkindofinfluencealone.Thepublic servicehascausalinfluenceonwhatthegovernmentdoes,bothasa wholeandbywayofindividualdepartments,evenifnoemployeeof thepublicservicehasthatkindofinfluencealone.Governmentitself hascausalinfluenceonbothdomesticandinternationalpolicy,and theprimeminister(orchancellor,president,headofstate,etc.)has perhapsthegreatestinfluenceofall.

Butthesearenottheonlypeoplewithinfluence.Withinagiven country,thereisalsothedomesticmedia,whoseinfluenceisoften significantandwhosecontentcanvaryalotdependingonwhetherit isprivatelyorpubliclyfunded.Therearepoliticallobbygroups,such ascoalminers’ unions,andtherearetherepresentativesofparticular companiesandcorporations.Thelatterwilltendtohavegreater influenceonelectionsinplaceswhereelectionsareprivatelyfunded andwithoutspendingcaps,andlessinfluenceonelectionsinplaces whereelectionsaretaxpayerfundedandspendingiscapped,butthey maystillhaveinfluencebetweenelectionsif,forexample,theycan makecrediblethreatsofmovingbusinessabroad.Similarly,therecan beinfluenceonwhatstatesdofromoutsidethecountry,through theirrelationshipswithotherstates,internationalandmultinational companiesandcorporations,internationallobbygroupsandsocial movements,andtheforeignpress.

Whilethereisplausiblycausalinfluenceinallofthesecases,there aretworeasonstoresistusingamodelof ‘thestate’ whichunifiesall ofthesecausalphenomena.The firstreasonisthatdoingsowould

putseriouspressureontheideaofthe(atleastpartial)sovereigntyof states.AustraliahassomeinfluenceoverNewZealandandviceversa; butwestillwanttobeabletosaythatNewZealandisNewZealand andAustraliaisAustralia,ratherthanbeingforcedtosaythatthey arebothpartoftheagencyoftheother.Thesecondreasonisthat approachesbasedoncausationorcausalcontributionaloneare insufficienttounderstandingthecollectiveagencyofstates.Many thingscanbecauses:astrongwindcancauseapileofpapersto scatter;avolcaniceruptioncancausethegroundformilesaroundto becoveredwithpumice;abiggroupofpeopledrivingcarsand flying cancausetemperatureincrease;anangryprotestcancausethe disruptionofameeting;acouplecancauseadeliciousmealtobe cooked;Icancausemyco-authortohaveanexpensiveglassofwine placedinfrontofherincelebrationofourpaperbeingaccepted.Only someofthesethingshaveagency. Thelistofpeopleandgroupswith influenceoveractionscommonlyattributedto ‘thestate’ istoo disparatetocountasanagent.

Wemightstillbeinterestedinthemoralstatusoftheinﬂuence eachindividualorgrouphasoverthestate,butthiswouldbehandled betterbytakingthemoneatatimeandthinkingabouttheirrelation tothestate.Forexample, ‘themedia’ ishighlydisparate,sowemight wanttoseparatedifferentmediacompaniesandoutlets,andthen thinkabouttherelationtheystandintothestate.Iftheyhave encouragedorfacilitatedthestate’swrongdoing,forexample,they maybemorally(orlegally)complicitinwrongdoing. Iwillsetthis understandingofcausalinﬂuencealoneasideasacandidatefor understandingthestateasacollectiveagent,andfocusonthemodels outlinedearlierinthissection.

II.Citizen-InclusiveStates

Thereissomethingappealingaboutallofthesecharacterisationsof thestate.ButasIhavesaidalready,twoinparticularcomewitha highpayoffintermsofvindicatingordinaryintuitionsandpractices. Thosearethetwocitizen-inclusivemodels:theonethatfollowsthe

MontevideoConvention,andtheonethatfollowsRousseau,which Ihavesuggestedwecantreatasone.Therearefourconsiderations thatspeakinfavourofthismodel.Citizenspaytaxes,bothontheir incomesandviagoodsandservicestax(GST)ontheirpurchases,and thesetaxesarepartlyusedtofundtheliabilitiesoftheircountries.For example,ifAustraliaweretodecidetoaddapackageof ﬁnancial reparationstosupplementits2008apologytoAboriginalpeoplefor historicalcrimes,thispackagewouldbepaidforbythecombined taxesofmanydifferentAustralians.Thisfundingiswhatmakesit possibleforAustraliatomakereparations.5 IfAustralianstogether payforthemistakestheircountriesmake,isn’tthatsomesortof evidencethattheyare ortheyareatleastpartof thestate?The citizen-inclusivemodelsmakesenseofthis.Citizensshouldpay, becausetheyarepartof(orevenallof)theagentthatdidthewrongs thatneedtobepaidfor.

Secondly,whenAustraliaimplementsapolicythatviolatesits obligationsininternationallaw,thereareatleastsomeAustralians whoexperiencefeelingsofguiltorshameinresponse.Prominent theoriesofthesocialpracticeofblamingmaintainthatitisappropriateforthesubjectofblametoexperiencefeelingsofguiltand shame,atleastwhensheacceptsthelegitimacyofthejudgement beingmadebythosewhoblameher(Fricker2016).Australiansmay feelthatoutsidersblamethemforparticulardomesticorinternationalpolicies(e.g. ‘Europeansdespiseusforourimmigration policy’),theymayevenfeelthattheyareblamingthemselves(e.g. ‘weshouldhaveelectedadifferentgovernment’),orthatonesubgroupamongthemisblaminganother(e.g. ‘weontheleftshould havedonemoretostoptheascendancyoftheright’).Forthisto occur,theremustbe(orAustraliansmustbelievetheretobe)asource ofblame.Theymustseethemselves(eithereachindividualalone,or somesubsetofindividualstogether)asthesubjectsofthatblame,and theymustacceptthelegitimacyofthejudgementthattheyare

5 Strictlyspeakingtheseliabilitiescouldalsobefundedthroughinternational borrowing.