Introduction
SaraBernsteinandTyronGoldschmidt
Wearesurroundedbythingsthatexist,likechairs,tables,phones,andpeople.But wearealsosurroundedbythingsthatdon’texist,likeholes,shadows,omissions, andnegativeproperties.Wereadstoriesofnon-existentunicornsandmagical creatures.Wereasonaboutscenariosthatdon’texist,fromthesmall(“whatifI’d havestudiedanhourlonger?”)tothelarge(“whatifWorldWarIIhadn’t occurred?”).Werefertonon-existents(“thatpaperdoesn’texistyet”).Andwe holdpeoplemorallyresponsibleforthingsthattheydon’tdo(“youshouldhave rescuedtherabbit!”).
Non-existenceisubiquitous,yetmysterious.Thisvolumeofnewessayscovers someofthetrickiestquestionsaboutnon-beingandnon-existence from Could therehavebeennothingatall? to Whatareholes? alongsideanswersfromdiverse philosophicaltraditions.Theessaysexploreanalytic,continental,Buddhist,and Jewishphilosophicalperspectives,andrangefrommetaphysicstoethics,from philosophyofsciencetophilosophyoflanguage,andbeyond.Whileeachessay standsalone,theyareorganizedinthefollowingnaturalgroupings.
The firstfouressaysareaboutfundamentalquestionsofnon-being:
Chapter1bySaraBernsteinarguesthattherearedifferent modes ofnon-being, drawingfromthecontemporarydebateaboutmodesofbeing.Shedefends ontologicalpluralismaboutnon-being,theviewthattherearemultiplekindsof non-being,andshowshowtheviewappliestovariousmetaphysicalproblems abouttime,absencesand fictionalobjects.
Chapter2byGrahamPriestarguesthatnothingnessisfundamentaltoreality. DrawingonworkbyHeideggerandNishida,Priestcontendsthateverything(the totalityofallobjects)andnothing(theabsenceofallobjects)caneachbedefined asacertainmereologicalsum.Theabsenceturnsouttobeacontradictoryobject, andthiscontradictoryobjectisthegroundofallreality.
Chapter3byRoySorensenaimstoansweranoldriddleofThales:whatisolder, dayornight?Drawingonearlyinsightsaboutthestabilityofnightandday as wellasLewisCarroll Sorensenarguesthatnightisolderthandayandolder thantheEarthitself.
Chapter4byFatemaAmijeearguesthatsomenegativeexistentialfactsare fundamental.Shearguesthattotalityfacts,factssuchthattheirinstancesexhaust therelevantdomain,arefundamental,andthattheusualreasonsforrejecting negativefactsatthefundamentalleveldonotapplytototalityfacts.
Thenextfouressaysconcernsparseontologies,includingtheideathatnothing exists:
Chapter5byFilippoCasatiandNaoyaFujikawarespondtoMarkusGabriel’ s viewthattheworlddoesnotexist.TheysummarizeandformalizeGabriel’ s argument,showhowitdoesnotsucceed,andengagewithGrahamPriest’ s contributiontothisvolumealongtheway.
Chapter6byKojiTanakaexploresaBuddhistviewthatdeniestheexistenceofall truthsandfacts,andhowBuddhistshavesupportedthisdoctrine.Heclarifiesthe meaningofthedoctrine,objectionsagainstit,andhowBuddhistscanengage withtheobjections.
Chapter7byBryanFrancesarguesforanovelviewofhowordinaryobjects reducetopluralitiesofpluralities.Thepredicate ‘isatree’ failstoapplytoreality inthefamiliarway,as ‘isanelectron’ does: ‘isatree’ istrueofrealitybecause, roughly,thereare “tree-unified” pluralitiesofpluralitiesoftinybitsthatmakeup atree.Butinasense ‘isatree’ failstoapplytoanyobject,singularorplural.
Chapter8byEddyKemingChenarguesthatthereisnothingmuchintimeor space.Drawingfromworkontime’sarrowandquantummechanics,hedepictsa fundamentalcosmicvoid,makessenseofappearancestothecontrary,and answersphilosophicalandscientificobjectionsalongtheway.
Thenexttwochaptersconcerntheinfluenceofnegativeentities:
Chapter9byRobertoCasatiandAchilleVarziarguesthatholesareinfluential immaterialobjects.TheyexplorehowtheUSpresidentialelectionof2000was ultimatelydecidedbycriteriaforidentifyingholes nottheirmaterialsurroundings,whicheveryonecoulddetect,buttheholesthemselves.
Chapter10byAaronSegalarguesthatit’spossibleforsomethingtobebrought intoexistencebysomethingthatisnon-actual.Hedistinguisheshisargument fromargumentsforcausationbyomission,andconnectsthetopictoJewish mysticaltraditions.
Thenexttwochaptersareonnon-beingandmodality:
Chapter11byTyronGoldschmidtandSamLebensarguesthatvariousmodal metaphysicsruleoutthepossibilityoftherebeingnothingatall.Theyconclude thatthemostprominentpicturesofthenatureofpossibilityentailtheexistence
ofsomething,andthusmightanswerthequestionofwhythereissomething ratherthannothing.
Chapter12byCraigWarmkeexploresthedebateovermerelypossibleobjects, clarifiesthedistinctionbetweenactualismandpossibilism,andreconcilesactualismwiththerealityofpossibilitiesandnon-existents.Focusingonlateworkby DerekParfit,Warmkeproposesanddefendsan “ostrichactualism” thatpermits evenactualiststoquantifyovermerepossibilities.
Thenexttwochaptersfocusonlanguageandthought:
Chapter13byLorraineJuliano-KellerandJohnKellertreatsthecaseofnonsense thatappearstomakesense.TheyarguefortheexistenceofwhatGarethEvans termed ‘illusionsofthought’,andreplytoseveralarguments,withafocusonthoseof HermanCappelen.
Chapter14byArifAhmedisaboutthemeaningandimportanceofourcounterfactualthoughts.PursuingaQuineanassumption,heexploreswhywethink andcareaboutwhatmighthaveexistedbutdoesnot,evenwhilethereareno non-existentthings.
The finalthreechaptersfocusontheintersectionofnon-beingwithbroadly normativetopics:
Chapter15byJacobRossclarifiesthetraditionalmoraldistinctionbetween actionsandomissions.Helevelsvariousobjectionsagainstcounterfactualand causalwaysofdrawingthedistinction,andproposesinsteadanexplanatoryview thatavoidstheobjectionswhilecapturingourmoraljudgmentsaboutcases.
Chapter16byCarolinaSartoriocontinuesonthetopicofactsandomissions, andexploreswhetherandhowquestionsaboutnon-existenceandethicsget entangled.Focusingonresponsibilityforomissions,sheshowshowmetaphysics mattersmorallyinsomecases,butnotothers.
Chapter17byDanielRubiodefendsEpicurus’sfamousargumentthatdeath cannotharmusbecausewenolongerexistafterwedie.Focusingonthe deprivationistaccountoftheharmofdeath,Rubiocontendsthatdeathisnot especiallyharmfulinthewaysthatareoftensuggested.
Theessaysbearoneachotherinwaysnotcapturedbytheirorder,andtheyalso bearonarangeofotherimportantphilosophicaltopicsnotwithinthedirectscope ofthevolume,includingcausation,actiontheory,moralresponsibility,andlogic, tonamejustafew.Questionsaboutnon-existenceandnon-beingareofinterestin themselves,andareconnectedtomyriadphilosophicaldebates.Wehavemade muchadoaboutnothing,andwehopethatthebreadthanddepthofthevolume willappealtoawideaudience.
Theeditorsowethankstomanypeopleforaidinginthecreationofthisvolume, includingYaelGoldschmidt,KrisMcDaniel,PeterMomtchiloff,andDaniel Nolan.WealsowishtothankMackSullivanforcompilingtheindex.Finally, thankstotheThomasJ.andRobertT.RolfsProfessorshipforitscontinued researchsupport.
OntologicalPluralismaboutNon-Being
SaraBernstein
Neithersquarecirclesnormannedlunarstationsexist.Butmighttheyfailto existindifferentways?Acommonassumptionis “ no ”:everythingthatfails toexist,failstoexistinexactlythesameway.Non-beingdoesn’thavejointsor structure,thethinkinggoes itisjustavast,undifferentiatednothingness.Even proponentsof ontologicalpluralism,theviewthattherearemultiplewaysofbeing, donotentertainthepossibilityofmultiplewaysofnon-being.
Thispaperisdedicatedtothelatteridea.Iarguethat ontologicalpluralism aboutnon-being,roughly,theviewthattherearemultiplewaysofnon-being,is bothmoreplausibleandmoredefensiblethanit firstseems,andithasmanyuseful applicationsacrossawidevarietyofmetaphysicalandexplanatoryproblems.¹
Hereistheplan.Insection1,Ilayoutontologicalpluralismaboutnon-beingin detail,drawingonprinciplesofontologicalpluralismaboutbeing.Iaddress whetherandhowthetwopluralismsinteract:somepluralistsaboutnon-being aremonistsaboutbeing,andvice-versa.Idiscusslogicalquanti ficationstrategies forpluralistsaboutnon-being.Insection2,Iexamineprecedentforpluralism aboutnon-beinginthehistoryofphilosophy.Insection3,Idiscussseveral applicationsofpluralismaboutnon-being.Isuggestthattheviewhasexplanatory poweracrossavarietyofdomains,andthattheviewcanaccountfordifferences betweennon-existentpastandfuturetimes,betweenomissionsandabsences,and betweendifferentkindsof fictionalobjects.
1.OntologicalPluralism
Ontologicalpluralism,theviewthattherearemultiplefundamentalwaysofbeing, hasenjoyedaresurgenceofpopularityinrecentyears.Accordingtotheontologicalpluralist,entitiescanexistdifferentlythaneachother:anumber,forexample, existsinadifferentwaythanachair.Accordingtotheontologicalpluralist,there areseveralfundamentaldifferentways,modes,orkindsofbeing:somethings existindifferentwaysthanotherthings.Thesetypesofbeingarefundamentaland
¹Ontologicalpluralismaboutnon-beingholdsthattherearefundamentaldifferencesintypesof non-being,notjustdifferencesinthecharacteristicsofnon-existents.
SaraBernstein, OntologicalPluralismaboutNon-Being In: Non-Being:NewEssaysontheMetaphysicsofNon-Existence. Editedby:SaraBernsteinandTyronGoldschmidt,OxfordUniversityPress(2021).©SaraBernstein. DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198846222.003.0001
irreducibletoeachother.Forsomeontologicalpluralists,thereisnounivocal category, being,towhichallthingsbelong.Rather,thereisbeing₁,being₂,etc.²For otherontologicalpluralists,thereisaunivocalcategoryofbeingthatisless fundamentalthantypesofbeing.Iwillremainneutralonthesedifferentpluralist strands.
Ontologicalpluralismsuggestsaconnectionbetweensomething’sexistenceand itsessence:thereisarelationshipbetweenwhatkindofbeingsomethinghasand theparticularsortofthingthatitis.Anumbercanexist ₁,forexample,butcannot exist₂:anumbercanneverbeachair,nomatterhowmuchitchanges.Speci fically, thereisarelationshipbetweenathing’ s strict essence whatitistobethatthing andthekindofbeingthatithas.Ifwhatitistobeachairistohavefourspatially extendedlegsandaseat,forexample,thenbeingachairimpliesthatthechairisa concretum.Forthepluralist,questionsaboutanentity’sbeinganditsessence overlapheavily.³
Iftherearemultiplewaysofbeing,thentakinganexhaustiveinventoryof realityrequiresmorethanlistingwhatthereis.AsCameron(2018)putsit, ontologicalpluralismmeansthatthereismorestructureintheworldthanwe thoughttherewas:anextradimensionofexistentialsortingforwhichwemust account.DrawingontheQuineanconnectionbetweenexistenceandexistential quantification,contemporaryfriendsofontologicalpluralismlikeTurner(2010; forthcoming)andMcDaniel(2009)takeseriouslytheideathatanytheorythat accuratelydescribesrealitymakesuseofmorethanonesingular first-order existentialquanti fierinordertorepresentthisextrastructure.Forsomepluralists, thesemultiplerestrictedquanti fiersaremore “natural” thanthesingularunrestrictedexistentialquanti fier theydescriberealityinamoreaccurateand finergrainedway.
Supposethatapluralisttakestheretobeafundamentaldifferencebetween abstracta and concreta.Whenshesaysthattherearenumbersandtherearechairs, shemeansthatthereare₁ numbersandthereare₂ chairs.Bothexistentialquantifiers, ∃₁ and ∃₂,carvenatureatthejoints:theexistentialquanti fiers ∃₁ and ∃₂ are morefundamentalthan ∃. ⁴ Ifoneistakinganinventoryofeverythingthatthereis, thepluralist’ s “is” isambiguousbetween ∃₁ and ∃₂,andtheitemsinbeingmustbe sortedintoeithercategory.Thepluralist’sinventoryis finer-grainedthanthelist thatfallsinthedomainofthesingle first-orderexistentialquantifier,sinceit includeseverythingthatthereeitheris₁ oris₂
²Canonicalformsofontologicalpluralismtaketheretobetwoequallyfundamentalwaysofbeing, buttheremightbemorethantwo.
³SeeMcDaniel(2017,chapter9)forahistorically-rooteddiscussionoftherelationshipessenceand existence.
⁴ Thereissomedebateaboutwhetherthepluralistshouldrecognizeagenericquantifierthatranges overallofbeing,withmorefundamentalrestrictions,orsimplydenythatthereisagenericquantifier. Idonottakeastandonthisissuehere,butseeRettler(forthcoming)foraninterestingtake.See Simmons(forthcoming)foradetailedlookatwhetherthepluralistcanacceptagenericnotionofbeing.
Thepluralistaboutbeingismotivatedbyadesiretoaccountformultipleranges ofexistentsthatexhibitverydifferentfeaturesfromeachother.Apluralistmight believethatnumbersexistdifferentlythanchairs,thatGodexistsdifferently thanhumans,orthat abstracta existdifferentlythan concreta ,tonameafew examples.McDaniel(2017)andSpencer (2012)pointtothreeoverlapping maincategoriesofargumentforontolog icalpluralism:theological,phenomenological,andontological.Theological motivationsforpluralisminvolvethe abilitytoexplainGod’sdifferentmodeofexistencefromothernon-Godthings. Godissodifferentfromotherthings, thethinkinggoes,thatshemustexist differentlythaneverythingelse.Thephenomenologicalstrategyusestheapparent experientialdifferencesbetween,forexample,perceivinganumberandperceiving achairasevidenceofmultiplewaysofbeing. Abstracta and concreta aregivenso differentlyinexperiencethatdifferentsortsofbeingarethebestexplanation.The ontologicalstrategyproceedsfromtheideathatdifferentsortsofentitiesbehave differently,andontologicalpluralismisthebestexplanationforthesefundamental differences.
Nowconsiderthattherearemanysortsofnon-existents:omissions,holes, shadows,possibilia,impossibilia,and fictions,tonameafewexamples.Plausibly, therearesomedifferenceswithinandbetweenthesesortsofnon-existents.The pluralistaboutnon-beingsharessomebasicmotivationswiththepluralistabout being:shecanbestexplainontological,phenomenological,andtheologicalphenomenabypositingmultipleformsofnon-being.Theontologicallymotivated pluralistmighttakethedifferencebetweenimpossibleandpossiblenon-existent objects,orthedifferencebetweennon-existentpastandfuturetimes,tobebest modeledbyajointinnon-being.Anotherpluralistmightseektoexplainphenomenologicaldifferencesbetweenthoughtsaboutnon-existentnumbersversus thoughtsaboutnon-existentpeople.Andpluralismaboutnon-beingopensupa heretoforeunderexploredoptionintheologicalspace:atheistcanbelievethatGod doesn’talwaysexist,butcanplausiblycomeintobeingandgooutofbeing.It wouldbenaturalforhertoholdthatGod’snon-beingisdifferentthanrun-of-themillnon-beinghadbymereobjectsandpersons:it’saspecial,divinesortofnonbeing.(Insection2below,Idiscusssomehistoricalprecedentforthisview.)
Withthesemotivationsinhand,weareinapositiontoinvestigatenon-being. Call ontologicalpluralismaboutnon-being theviewthatthereareseveralfundamentaldifferentways,modes,orkindsofnon-being.Non-beinghasstructure beyondthelistofwhatdoesnotexist:thingsthatfailtoexist,failtoexist differentlythaneachother.Ifoneisacertainkindofpluralistaboutnon-being for concreta and abstracta,forexample,non-existentchairsandnumbersdonot shareaunivocalpropertyofnon-being.Ifwewishtospeakofboth,wemustsay thatthechairhasnon-being₁,andthenumberhasnon-being₂.Non-beingisnota univocalproperty:speakingofsomething ’snon-beingisambiguousbetweennonbeing₁ andnon-being₂.
Thepluralistaboutnon-beingmightormightnotembracethesameattitude towardsbeing:shecanbelieveinwaysofnon-beingandbeing,orjustoneor theother.⁵ Calla bilateralpluralist onewhobelievesinmultiplewaysofbeing andnon-being,anda unilateralpluralist onewhobelievesinjustoneorthe other.Suchaunilateralpluralistcouldhold,forexample,thatasquarecircle andanon-existentchairhavedifferentwaysofnon-being,butthatallexistents existthesameway.Thebilateralpluralistneednotbelievethatthejointsin non-beingmirrorthoseinbeing:shemightacceptdifferencesinnon-existence betweenimpossibleandpossibleobjects,butdifferencesinexistencebetween abstracta and concreta . ⁶ Callbilateralpluralistswhobelieveindifferentjointsin beingandnon-being asymmetric pluralists,andthosewhobelieveinequivalent jointsinbeingandnon-being symmetric pluralists.
Thepluralistaboutnon-beingstipulatesthatthereisasortofstructureinnonbeing.Thoughdifferentkindsofpluralistsmightstipulatedifferentkindsof structure,acommonviewofstructureisa “pegboard” model,thusdescribedby Turner:
Ontologicalstructureisthesortofstructurewecouldadequatelyrepresentwitha pegboardandrubberbands.Thepegsrepresentthings,andtherubberbands representwaysthesethingsareandareinterrelated.(Turner2011:2)
Thenon-beingpluralistacceptsa “multiplepegboards” picture,accordingto whichtherearetwodifferentkindsofpropertiedandrelateditemsinnonbeing.Astherecanberelationsacrosskindsofbeing(I,aconcretum,canthink ofanumber,anabstractum),therecanberelationsacrosskindsofnon-being (SherlockHolmesissuchthathedoesnoteatsquarecircles).
Justastheontologistofbeinghasprinciplesfordiscerninghowmanythings exist,sotootheontologistofnon-beingcanaskhowmanythingsdon’texist.The lattertakesthetaskofcreatinganontologicalinventoryonestepfurther:sheasks howmanyentitiesfailtoexistinmorespecificways.Thepluralistaboutnonbeingisasmuchanontologistasthatofbeing,sincesheseeksasortedinventory ofeverythingthatfailstoexist.
Believinginwaysofbeingtransformsquestionsaboutexistenceintoquestions aboutmultipleformsofexistence.McDaniel,forexample,suggeststhatontologicalpluralismsplitsthequestionofwhythereissomethingratherthannothing intomultiplequestions:
⁵ Plausibly,theStoicshadthisview.SeeCaston(1999)forasubtleinterpretationoftheStoicson non-beingandnon-existence.
⁶ BothsymmetricandasymmetricpluralistsmaybewhatCaplan(2011)callssuperpluralists, roughly,thosewhobelieveindifferentwaysofbeinganontologicalpluralist.
Iftherearemodesofbeing,thatis,differentwaystobe,theneitherinaddition toorinsteadofthequestion “whyistheresomething,ratherthannothing?” ,we shouldpursue,foreachmodeofbeing,thequestionofwhythereis,inthatway, somethingratherthannothing.(McDaniel2013:277)
Similarly,thefriendofwaysofnon-beingsplitsthesomething-rather-thannothingquestionintomultiple finer-grainedquestions.Theunilateralpluralist turnsthatquestioninto: “whyistheresomethingratherthannothing₁ or nothing₂?” Thebilateralpluralistwouldask: “whyisthere₁ something ₁ orthere₂ something₂ ratherthannothing₁ ornothing₂?”
Denyingthatsomethingexistsisdifferentthanconveyingthatithasaspecific sortofnon-being.Theformerinvolvesstraightforwardnegativeexistentialquantification,whereasthelatterrequiresstipulationofanentitythathasaspecific kindofnon-being.SupposingIamaunilateralpluralistaboutnon-being,when Isay “ThereisnoTyrannosaurusRexwithpinkfeathersinSouthBend,Indiana” , IdonotnecessarilymeanthatthereisaTyrannosaurusRexwithpinkfeathers thathasnon-being₁.Rather,Iintendtoconveythattherejustisn’tanythingthat correspondstothatdescription.Notethedifferencebetweenthissortofstatement andonethatisintendedtoconveythatanon-existentobjectisinsomesense “out there” inliminalreality,asin “ThereisaGreekgodofwar.”
Thisjunctureiswhereonemightturntoexistentialquantificationinorderto sortthingsout.OneoptionfollowsParsons(1980),Jacquette(1996),Zalta(1988), andPriest(2005)inpositingdifferentnotationsfor “thereis” (∃)and “thereexists” (E!).Dependingonone’ssystem,onecaneitherhaveaspecialquanti fier,oran existencepredicateforonlythingsthatexist.HereIfocusonthepredicatestrategy. Onthisscheme,thelogicalformfor “Thereisanxsuchthatxdoesn’texist” is ∃x(φx&¬E!x). “Thereisasquarecirclebutitdoesn’texist”,forexample,becomes ∃x(SCx&¬E!x).Now,onemightbetemptedtoholdthatthelogicalform foraunilateralnon-beingpluralist’sclaimis ∃x(φx&¬E!₁x),or “Thereisanx suchthatxdoesn’texist ₁”.Thespecificclaimaboutthesquarecirclebecomes ¬∃x(SCx&¬E!₁x),or “Thereisasquarecirclethatdoesn’texist₁”.Theproblem withthislogicalformisthatitisbetterinterpretedasaclaimmadebyapluralist aboutbeingratherthanapluralistaboutnon-being:itdeniesaparticularpositive wayofbeingtothesquarecircle,butdoesnotpostulateaspeci ficwayofnon-being. Withabitoftweaking,however,thedualnotationstrategycanbeeasily adoptedbythefriendofnon-being.Asabove,let ∃ denoteontologicallyneutral “thereis” andE!denoteontologicallycommitted “thereexists”.Subscriptsdenote waysofbeing.Distinguishbetweentwoclaimsthatapluralistaboutnon-being maywishtomake:(i)therearenosquarecircles,and(ii)squarecircleshave non-being₁.Theformerdeniesthatthereisanythinginbeingornon-being meetingthedescription “squarecircle”;thelatteraccordsaspotinnon-being₁ toasquarecircle.The firstclaimcanberepresentedwith ∃x(SCx),tobeinterpreted
as “Therearenosquarecircles.” Thesecond,substantiveclaimaboutnon-being canberepresentedwith(∃₁x)(SCx&¬E!x),or “Thereis₁ asquarecircle,and anythingthatexistsisnotit.” (Amoreperspicuous,lessintroduction-to-logic-y translationis “Thereis₁ asquarecircle,anditdoesnotexist.”)
Hereisonewaytounderstandthelatterclaim.Assumingthatthereisan ontologicallyneutralsenseinwhichthesquarecircleis “outthere”,thatleavestwo optionswithrespecttoheavy-dutyontologicalcommitmenttothesquarecircle: eitherthesquarecirclehasnon-being,orithasexistence.Asquarecirclecan’t haveexistence.Butitcanhavenon-being.Byutilizingboththeneutralquanti fier andthecommittedexistencepredicate,thefriendofnon-beingcanholdthat squarecircleshaveaspecifickindofnon-beingwithouthavingexistence.Whatis distinctiveforthepluralististhatthesubscriptednotation “∃₁x ” speci fiesa particularmodeofnon-being awayofbeing “outthere”—forthesquarecircle, while “¬E!x” deniestheexistenceofthesquarecircle.
Anotheroptionforrepresentingassertionsofpluralisticnon-beingistoimbue logicalnegationsthemselveswithontologicalimport.Let¬₁ mean “thereisnot₁” and¬₂ mean “thereisnot₂. ” Forthepluralistaboutnon-being,¬₁∃ and¬₂∃ carve non-beingclosertothejointsthan¬∃.Notethatthesenotationsaredifferent than¬∃₁ and¬∃₂:theformerrepresentwaysofnon-being,whereasthelatter representnegationsofwaysofbeing.Supposethatapluralistbelievesina fundamentaldifferencebetweenpossibleandimpossiblenon-existents . Ifshe wantstoholdthatasquarecirclehasnon-being₁,shewouldrepresentsucha claimas¬₁∃x(SCx),or “Thereisnot₁ asquarecircle. ” Thisclaimissubstantively differentthan “Thesquarecircledoesn’texist ₁”,whichonlydeniesacertainform ofpositivebeing.Thenotationwiththerestrictedlogicalnegationexplicitly reservesaspotforthechairintheinventoryofnon-being₁.Thefriendofthis strategyincursafewextraexplanatoryburdens:shemustexplainwhatsubscriptednegationis.Shemustalsoreckonwiththemeaningofthesubscripted negationincontextswithlessontologicalimportance.Forexample,sheshould explainwhatitmeanstobenot ₁ hungryornot ₂ red.Nonetheless,itisanoption worthexploring.
Now,anaturalobjectiontoontologicalpluralismaboutnon-beingisthatit overlyreifiesnon-existence.Thethoughtisthatbeinghasakindof oomph that distinguishesitfromnon-being.Thepretheoreticconceptofnon-beingisthatitis ahazy,unstructurednothingness itdoesnotincludenaturaljointsandstructure.Whilebeingenjoysrichstructureandcomplexity,non-beingisjustalabel underwhichnon-existentthingsfall.Beingisontologicallythick,thethinking goes,whilenon-beingisthinandformless.
Acloselyrelatedobjectionholdsthatpluralismaboutnon-beingreifiesspecific non-existents.Considertheatheistwhosays: “Look.WhenIsaythatGoddoesnot exist,Imeanthatshe reallydoesnotexist. Idonotmeanthatthereisan omniscient,all-powerfulbeingsittingaroundinnon-being,withallofthedetails,
properties,andcontoursofanexistent,butinheringinadifferentontological category.Imeanthatthereisn’t anything likethat,inanysense.” Ifthethingsthat havenon-beinghavesubstance,theworrygoes,theybecomeverybeing-like.We shouldbeabletodenythatthingsexist,fullstop.
Thepluralisthasseverallinesofresponsetotheselinesofthinking.Inreplyto theobjectorwhoworriesaboutreifyingnon-existentswithtoomuchspecificity, shecanholdthatnoteverydescriptioncorrespondstoaniteminnon-being. Considerthedescription “beingsuchthatoneisagoldendragonifeachmember oftheBeatleswearsaredhatonaTuesday ”.Evenifnothingofthatdescription exists,oneneednotacceptthatthisdescriptioncorrespondexactlytoanitemin non-being:plenitudinousdescriptionsdonotnecessarilyequatetoplenitudinous itemsinnon-being.
Acceptingreifiednon-existentscanalsobetheoreticallyuseful.Supposethata theistandanatheistdisagreeontheexistenceofGodonCartesiangrounds.The theistthinksthatGodmustexistbecauseexistenceismoreperfectthannonexistence.TheatheistthinksthatGoddoesn’texistbecausenon-existenceisn’t necessarilybetterthanexistence.Here,theatheistwouldbewell-servedbya reifiednon-existent,God,aboutwhosenatureshecanargue.UtilizingstraightforwardnegativeexistentialquantificationislessusefulthangrantingGodakind ofnon-being,butarguingabouthernature.
2.HistoricalPrecedentforPluralismaboutNon-Being
ThepluralistfollowsMeinong(1904)inacceptingtheideathatthingscanhavea kindofbeingwithouthavingexistence.Meinongfamouslydistinguishesbetween objectsthat exist (you,youriPhone,theEiffelTower),thingsthat subsist (the numbertwelve,thepropositionthatsnowiswhite),andimpossiblethingsthat neitherexistnorsubsist(aroundsquare,theproofthat2+2=5).⁷ Pluralismabout non-beingcapturessomeofthespiritofMeinongianisminsofarassomenonexistentthingshavewhatotherstaketobethehallmarksofbeing:properties, relations,andclassi ficationunderdistinctontologicalcategories.Subsistenceisan ontologicallyrichformofnon-beingratherthanahazynothingnesswithout structure.
TherearemanyavailableMeinongianpositionsinlogicalspaceavailabletothe pluralistaboutnon-being.Oneoptionistohewverycloselytotheletterof Meinong’stheory,whileanotheroptionistoabandontheletterandremain closetothespirit.Considertheunilateralpluralistwhobelievesinonewayof being,buttwowaysofnon-being:oneforimpossiblethingsandoneformerely
⁷ HereIfollowReicher(2019)intakingthistobeaplausibleinterpretationofMeinong,though Meinonginterpretationisacontroversialmatter.
non-existentthings.Thissortofpluralistsharesatripartiteontologyofbeing andnon-beingwithMeinong,asthemajorontologicaljointsfallinverysimilar, andpossiblyidentical,places.Otherpluralistsmightembracethespiritof Meinongianismbutfallfartherfromtheoriginalview.Forexample,somepluralistsaboutnon-beingmighttakethedivisioninnon-existentthingstolie between,say,Godandnon-Godthingsratherthanpossibleandimpossiblethings. Thesymmetricpluralistpostulatesjointsinbeinginadditiontothoseinnonbeing.Howmanyjointsthereare,andwheretheyfall,determinewhethera pluralistisMeinongianormerelyneo-Meinongian.Eitherway,acceptingthe substantivityofnon-beinghasastrongwhiffofMeinongianism.
InadditiontoMeinong’sfriendlinesstosubstantivenon-being,thereisscatteredhistoricalprecedentforacceptingdifferentwaysofnon-being.HereIwill discussafewinstances,thoughIexpectthattherearemoreifonesearches forthem.
FollowingMoranandGuiu(2019),IinterpretJohnScotusEriugenaaspositing fivemodesofbeingandcorrelativemodesofnon-being.Therearethingsaccessibletosenses(andthingsthatarenot),ordersofcreatednatures(andtheir differences),actualthings(andpotentialnon-things),thingsperceivedbythe intellectalone(andthosethatarenot),andthoseinfusedwithdivinegrace(and thosethatarenot.)Thejointsinnon-beingmirrorthoseinbeing.Arguably, Eriugenaalsomakesuseofadistinctiveformofnon-beingtomakesenseofGod’ s self-creation.HeholdsthatGodisbeyondbeingandnon-being,butgradually self-createsfrom “divinedarkness” intolight.Such “divinedarkness” isaspecial kindofnon-beingfromwhichbeingstems,andisdifferentthanordinarynonexistence.⁸
SimoneWeil(1952:xxi)makessimilaruseofaspecialformofnon-beingto makesenseofan “absentgod”.AccordingtoWeil,God “withdrew” fromfull existenceinordertomakeroomfortheuniverse.Persons,too,arecreatedfrom thespacewhichGodhasdeserted:adistinctformofnon-beingfromwhence beingarises.
Theologicalmotivationswerenottheonlyunderpinningsofhistoricalpluralismaboutnon-being.TheStoicspositastatus,subsistence,thatcharacterizes somenon-existentobjects,includingtime,place,void,andexpressibles.Following LongandSedley(1987:162–165),IunderstandtheStoicsaspositingthatwhatit istobesomethingistobeanobjectofthoughtanddiscourse.Butcertainobjects likecentaurs,whilebeingproperobjectsofthoughtanddiscourse,donoteven subsist.Theyare “meresomethings” thatdonotexist.(LongandSedleyalso raisethepossibilitythattheStoicsarecommittedtoathirdcategoryofnonexistent,not-somethings,butseeCaston(1999)forobjectionstothisobjection.)
⁸ BosleyandTweedale(2006:573)alsosupportthisreading.
Essentially,therearenon-existent “meresomethings” thataredifferentthanother subsistentnon-existents.ItisclearthattheStoicswerefriendlytodifferentwaysof thinkingaboutnon-being,onLongandSedley ’sinterpretation.
Sartre(1956)affirmstherealityofnothingness(“lenéant”),anddistinguishes betweenatleasttwosortsofnon-beings.Thereisaconcretekindofnothingness asrepresentedbyanabsence forexample,afriendfailingtoshowupfora meal andamoreabstractkindofnothingnessexempli fiedbysquarecircles. Absencesarebroughtaboutbyhumanconsciousnessinsofarastheyareproducts ofexpectations.Sartre’sviewdrawsonhisadmirationofHeidegger ’sworkon nothingness,inwhichheinfamouslyclaimed “Thenothingitselfnothings.” NozicktookupthetaskofontologicallyinterpretingHeidegger’sclaim:
Imaginethisforceasavacuumforce,suckingthingsintonon-existenceor keepingthemthere.Ifthisforceactsuponitself,itsucksnothingnessinto nothingness,producingsomethingor,perhaps,everything,everypossibility.If weintroducedtheverb “tonothing” todenotewhatthisnothingnessforcedoes tothingsasitmakesorkeepsthemnonexistent,then(wewouldsay)the nothingnessnothingsitself.(Nozick1981:123)
WhileNozick’sapproachdoesn’tstipulatepluralismaboutnon-beingorpushus towardssuchaview,suchaconceptionofnon-beingtakesitseriouslyashaving distinctivebehavior.Viewingnon-beingasakindofforceoractorisafoundation fortheideathatdifferentnon-existentsbehavedifferently.⁹
3.WhatOntologicalPluralismaboutNon-BeingCanDo
Ontologicalpluralismaboutnon-beingcanbeappliedtoanumberofissuesin metaphysics.ThereareafewpointstowhichIwillattendbeforeenumerating them.First,onemightwishtodeploydegreesofnon-beingratherthanwaysof non-beingforsomeoftheseissues.HereIdonotfocusonthisview,butitisworth mentioningthepossibility.Second,itshouldbeobviousthatonewouldnotwant toholdallofthesepluralismsaboutnon-beingatonce;thisdiscussionissimply intendedtobeacasestudyofvariousapplications.Finally,thelistisnotexhaustive:therearelikelymanymoreapplicationsofwaysofnon-beingthanIdiscuss inthissection.
⁹ SeeSkow(2010)forananalysisofNozick’sclaiminformedbycontemporaryphysics.
3.1PresentistOntologicalPluralismaboutNon-Present EventsandObjects
Presentists abouttimebelievethatonlythepresenteventsandobjectsexist.They aretobecontrastedwith eternalists,whobelievethatalleventsandobjectsexist, and growingblock theorists,whoholdthatpastandpresenteventsandobjects exist.Forgrowingblocktheorists,existencedistinguishesfutureeventsfrompast andpresentones.Forbothpresentistsandeternalists,therearenoontological differencesbetweenpastandfutureevents:theydon’texistforpresentists,and theydoexistforeternalists.
Oneexplanatoryburdenforontologiesoftimeistoaccountfortheapparent differencesbetweenthepastandthefuture.Forexample,thepastseems fixedand unchangeableinawaythatthefutureisnot.Humansoftenpreferpaintobein theirpastandpleasuretobeintheirfuture.Andthedirectionofcausationseems torunfromthepasttothefuture.
Presentistshaveauniqueexplanatorypossibility,however.Thepresentistcan acceptacertainkindofpluralismaboutnon-being,accordingtowhichthepast andthefuturearefundamentallydifferentkindsofnon-being.Presentistpluralismaboutnon-presenttimeschallengesthedominantassumptioninthepresentistliteraturethatthetwokindsofunrealityarethesamekind.¹⁰ Pastandfuture eventshavedifferentkindsofnon-being,andtheydonotshareaunivocal propertyofnon-being.Considerapastandfutureevent:yourbirthandyour lunchonemonthfromnow.Thepluralistpresentistcanholdthatthebirthhas pastnon-existenceandthelunchhasfuturenon-existence.Thepresentmoment istheontologicalcleavagebetweenthetwofundamentalwaysofnon-being.¹¹ Eventsdonotfailtoexist simpliciter;theyfailtoexistinmorespeci ficways.
Differentwaysofnon-beingcanhelpexplainphenomenologicaldifferences betweenexperiencesofthepastandthefuture:werememberone,butnotthe other.Thepastandthefuturedifferinthewaytheyaregiventousinexperience. Theviewalsosupportsontologicaldifferencesbetweenpastandfuture for example,the fixityofthepastandtheopennessofthefuture.¹²
Accordingtosomeessentialistinterpretationsofontologicalpluralism,somethingthathasonekindofbeingcanneverhavetheotherkindofbeing.Tousean earlierexample,achaircanneverbeanumber.Thepresentistfriendofpluralism shoulddenytheequivalentviewaboutnon-being,sincemomentsthathaveone
¹⁰ Prior(1972:245)hintsatthisview,presumablyunintentionally,inwritingthat “Thepresent simplyistherealconsideredinrelationtotwoparticularspeciesofunreality,namelythepastandthe future.”
¹¹McDaniel(2017:81–6)proposesthatpluralismbeappliedtoontologicaldifferencesbetweenthe pastandthepresent.
¹²Inthisvein,Cameron(2011),ararecontemporaryfriendofpluralismaboutnon-being,argues thattheviewcanhelpreconcilepresentismwithtruthmakertheory.
kindofnon-beingwilleventuallyhavetheotherkindofnon-being:future momentswillbecomepastmoments.
3.2OmissionsversusAbsences
Intuitively,therearedifferencesbetween omissions,roughly,eventsthatareclose tooccurringbutdonotoccur,and absences,roughly,thingsthatarenotcloseto occurringanddonotoccur.Icausedmyplant’sdeathbyomittingtowaterit; Iverywellcouldhavewateredit.IalsodidnotgoshoppingwithAbrahamLincoln lastnight,leavingmetowonderwhetherhewouldhavelikedtheshoesthat Ieventuallypickedout.ButIcouldnothavegoneshoppingwithAbraham Lincoln:suchaneventwasnotevenclosetooccurring.Apuzzleforcausation theoristsishowtodistinguishbetweenomissionsandabsences:bothdonotexist, butoneseemsintuitivelydifferentfromtheother.Omissionscausethingsto happen;mereabsencesdonot,oratleastdonotexertthesamekindofcausalpower. Itmightbeinitiallytemptingtodistinguishbetweenabsencesandomissionson thebasisoftheirpossibility:absencesarenotcausallyefficaciousbecausetheyare impossibleevents,butomissionsarecausallyefficaciousbecausetheyarepossible. ItisimpossibletogoshoppingwithAbrahamLincoln,afterall,whileitispossible tosetanalarmclock.
Butdrawingthelinebetweenomissionsandabsencesonthebasisofpossibility iswrong,forseveralreasons.First,someomissionsareimpossible.Supposethat theassistantprofessorfailstoprovethat2+2=5,andisthusdeniedtenure.In Bernstein(2016),Iargueforthepositionthatsuchomissionsarecausallyefficacious.Supposethatoneacceptsasimplecounterfactualaccountofcausation, accordingtowhich c isacauseof e if e wouldnothaveoccurredhad c not occurred.Thenmanyomissivecausalstatementscomeoutastrue,includingones involvingimpossibleomissions.Thecounterpossible “Ifshehadn’tfailedtoprove that2+2=5,shewouldhavebeenawardedtenure” istrueandnon-vacuous.Such causalcounterpossiblesalsofurnishcorrectpredictionsandexplanations.Insome contexts,impossibleeventsareclosertoactualitythanpossibleones.
Anotherreasonnottodrawtheabsence/omissiondistinctionintermsof possibilityisthatmanyabsencesareintuitivelypossible,butcausallyinefficacious. Thereisnoactual-sizereplicaofthecityofParisintheempty fieldsbetween IndianapolisandChicago,butsuchathingispossible.It’snotevencloseto occurring:it’ssimplynotthere.Withoutaparticularcausalorpredictivecontext, thisabsencedoesn’tcauseanythingtohappen,eventhoughitispossible. Impossibilityandpossibilitydonotcorrectlycarvetheabsence/omission distinction.
Theontologicalpluralistaboutnon-beinghasareadysolution,however:she canholdthatabsencesandomissionshavedifferentwaysofnon-being.Here’ s
