Memory
A Self-Referential Account
JORDI FERNÁNDEZ
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To Zoe and Abby, who help me form beautiful memories every day
4:
PART II. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MEMORY
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PART III. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF MEMORY
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Preface
This book is a philosophical investigation of memory. It is, in a nutshell, an attempt to answer the question of what memory is. There are many philosophically interesting aspects of memory. Memory is interesting, as far as the philosophy of mind is concerned, because memory is a mental capacity; a capacity which is different from introspection, perception, and imagination in ways which are difficult to specify. Memory is interesting for epistemology too because, among other reasons, memory seems to provide us with a special knowledge of the past. Memory is also interesting for metaphysics due, for instance, to the connections between memory and personal identity and between memory and time. Furthermore, memories involve some characteristic feelings and, for that reason, memory is interesting for phenomenology. Moreover, there is a normative dimension to memory. We seem to think that, in some cases, we have the obligation to remember some things and the right to forget others. So, memory has important ramifications into ethics as well. It is, in fact, difficult to find an area of philosophy for which memory is irrelevant.
The fact that memory has multiple aspects which are interesting from a philosophical point of view presents a challenge for the project in this book. For the project is to offer a philosophical account of memory; an account of the philosophically interesting aspects of memory. And this means that the project should ideally have an all-encompassing scope. But there is a certain trade-off between the scope of a philosophical investigation of a mental capacity such as memory and how informative the investigation turns out to be. The broader the investigation, the less informative it tends to be. Thus, in this book, I have tried to select a few philosophical issues concerning memory, and I have attempted to investigate them in some depth. The goal has been to achieve a delicate balance. On the one hand, hopefully the selected issues on memory are all philosophically interesting and sufficiently diverse. On the other hand, hopefully the selection is not so ambitious that one cannot say much, informatively, about each of the issues separately, and about how they are related to each other.
The different issues on memory that I will target for explanation are specified in chapter 1. The book discusses one issue on the metaphysics of memory, one issue on the intentionality of memory, two issues on the phenomenology of memory and two issues on the epistemology of memory. In chapter 1, I also address some methodological matters. I consider different ways in which one could tackle the project of accounting for the metaphysics, the intentionality, the phenomenology, and the epistemology of memory, and I highlight the different assumptions that one would need to make, depending on which of those aspects of memory are taken to be basic and which of those are taken to be more derivative. My own approach, outlined in chapter 1, is to regard the metaphysics and the intentionality of memory as the basic aspects of memory and to try to shed some light on the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory based on my views about those two basic aspects.
Chapter 2 puts forward a view about the metaphysics of memory; a view about the facts in virtue of which a mental state qualifies as a memory. The view is that no intrinsic property of the mental state makes it qualify as such. What makes a mental state qualify as a memory is the functional role of the mental state within the subject’s cognitive economy. Chapter 3 puts forward a view about the intentionality of memory; a view about the content of memories. The view is that memories are self-referential in the following sense. Memories represent the fact that they have a causal origin in the subject’s past experiences. Put together, these two proposals constitute the core of the account of memory offered in this book. These are, in my view, the main elements of the nature of memory.
Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the phenomenology of memory. Specifically, chapter 4 deals with the feeling of pastness involved in memory; the feeling that what one is remembering is in the past. It also deals with a certain feeling of familiarity in memory; the awareness of what it was like for one to experience, in the past, what one is remembering in the present. And chapter 5 deals with the feeling of ownership in memory; the feeling that the memory that one is having, when one remembers something, is one’s own. I try to explain these feelings by appealing to the content that memories have. In all three cases, the thought is that the relevant feeling is the way in which one experiences some of the things that one is representing when one is having a memory. This account of the phenomenology of memory, then, will rest on the account of the intentionality of memory to be offered in chapter 3.
Chapters 6 and 7 are concerned with the epistemology of memory. More specifically, they are concerned with two aspects of the special kind of epistemic justification which is afforded by our memories. Chapter 6 discusses the fact that memory judgments are protected from errors of misidentification, whereas chapter 7 discusses the fact that the epistemic justification enjoyed by some of those judgments is generated, and not merely preserved, by the faculty of memory. I try to explain both epistemic aspects of memory judgments by appealing to the content that memories have as well. Thus, in both cases, the thought is that the key to why memory judgments enjoy the kind of epistemic justification which has the relevant feature is to be found in the contents of the memories on the basis of which those judgments are formed. Once more, then, what we will have is an account of the epistemology of memory which rests on the account of the intentionality of memory to be offered in the first part of the book.
There are a number of directions one could go from there. Perhaps the functionalist view of the metaphysics of memory to be offered in chapter 2 can tell us something interesting about personal identity, and perhaps the explanation of immunity to error through misidentification to be offered in chapter 6 can tell us something interesting about our sense of personal identity over time. Likewise, it is possible that the conception of mental time travel proposed in chapter 4 can shed some light on whether memory needs to be oriented toward the past or, by contrast, it can be oriented toward the future as well. And it may be that the proposal about the feeling of ownership of our memories to be put forward in chapter 5 can be generalized to other mental states in ways which illuminate a variety of mental disorders wherein the subject disowns some of their mental states. By the time we conclude the project in this book, all of these avenues will remain open. Nonetheless, the hope is that, at the completion of the project, we will have achieved a sufficiently comprehensive understanding of what memory is and why it matters to us so much.
This project began 15 years ago, when I was a post-doctoral fellow at Macquarie University, in Sydney. I was very fortunate to be able to discuss various issues on memory with John Sutton and Tim Bayne while I was there. Thanks to those interactions, I was able to put together some ideas about memory which turned out to be the kernel for chapters 3 and 4 of this book. The rest of the chapters in the book originate in more recent work. Chapter 5 is closely related to an article I have written on the sense of mineness; an article for which I received very valuable feedback from Manuel
García-Carpintero and Marie Guillot. Chapter 2 and chapter 6 are based on articles which greatly benefited from Kourken Michaelian’s comments. And chapter 7 is built on an article that I have been able to discuss, very helpfully (for me), with Sven Bernecker. In fact, John, Kirk and Sven belong to a group of philosophers who seem to have been sharing their work on memory informally for the last 10 years or so. This group also includes Felipe De Brigard, Dorothea Debus, Christoph Hoerl, Chris McCarroll, Denis Perrin, Sarah Robins, and Markus Werning, and I am grateful to all of them for their feedback on drafts of the chapters of this book delivered at conferences and workshops over the years. I also want to thank, collectively, my colleagues at the Philosophy Department of the University of Adelaide for the research environment in which the book was written. Many thanks, in particular, to Garrett Cullity, Antony Eagle, and Philip Gerrans for a number of helpful conversations on memory, and to Matthew Nestor and Laura Bottrill for their valuable assistance with various research and editorial tasks.
My editor, Peter Ohlin, and the series editors, Kourken Michaelian and Amy Kind, along with the helpful staff at Oxford University Press, made the process of publishing this book a pleasure, for both their patience and their diligence. Three anonymous referees for Oxford University Press (two of whom turned out to be Sven Bernecker and Sarah Robins) read whole drafts of the book and provided remarkably thorough and insightful comments, for which I am very grateful. I particularly want to thank Uriah Kriegel, who has maintained a keen interest in the project over the years. He provided comments on versions of most of the chapters in the book and, on more than one occasion, those comments allowed me to see the way around some serious objection to my account. Other times, the serious objection actually came in his comments. Either way, the process was always really helpful. Many friends, inside and outside of the profession, provided other kinds of support while this book was written, and I cannot mention all of them here. But I do want to thank my brother and my sister. And most of all, I want to thank my two daughters. They are too little to know it now, but the fact is that, without them, this book would never have been written.
Acknowledgments
My work on this book was supported by a semester’s Special Studies Leave from the University of Adelaide. This research was also funded by two grants from the Australian Research Council for projects DP130103047 and FT160100313 under the Discovery Scheme.
Most of the chapters are based on articles that have appeared elsewhere. Chapter 2 is based on “The Functional Character of Memory,” in (2018) K. Michaelian, D. Debus, and D. Perrin (eds.) New Direction in the Philosophy of Memory. London: Routledge, 52–72. Chapter 3 is based on (2006) “The Intentionality of Memory,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84: 39–57. Chapter 4 is based on (2008) “Memory and Time,” Philosophical Studies 141: 333–356. Chapter 6 is based on (Forthcoming) “Observer Memory and Immunity to Error through Misidentification,” in Synthese, and (2014) “Memory and Immunity to Error through Misidentification,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5: 373–390. Chapter 7 is based on (2016) “Epistemic Generation in Memory,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92: 620–644. I am grateful to the publishers concerned for their permission to make use of material from these pieces.
Scope of the Project
We commonly speak of memory as if it was directed at either facts, events, actions, experiences, objects, or abilities. Thus, we self-ascribe memories with expressions of the form “I remember that p” (where “p” stands for a fact, as in “I remember that team T lost the game”), “I remember e” (where “e” stands for an event, as in “I remember team T’s defeat”), “I remember ψ-ing” (where “ψ” stands for an action, as in “I remember playing with team T”), “I remember what it was like to have P” (where “P” stands for a property, as in “I remember what it was like to lose that game”), “I remember x,” or “I remember some x” (where “x” stands for an object, as in “I remember my team T jersey”), and “I remember how to ψ” (where “ψ” stands for an action, as in “I remember how to play the game”).
For some of these types of memory, the question of whether the relevant type can be reduced to a combination of some other types of memory arises. One might wonder, for example, whether remembering my team T jersey is something over and above remembering a number of facts about that jersey, remembering what it was like to wear it and remembering actions such as my putting the jersey on. Similarly, one might wonder whether remembering playing with team T is just a combination of remembering my team mates, remembering the playing field, remembering some facts about the games in which team T was involved and remembering what it was like to play with the team. The project of determining which types of memory are, as it were, basic and which types can be reduced to other types is a challenging and interesting project. However, it is not a project in which we will engage here. For our discussion of memory will not be concerned with all of the various types of memory just distinguished. In fact, it will only be concerned with two of them. In this discussion, we will concentrate on memory for facts and memory for perceptual experiences.
Memory for facts is the type of memory that we express in propositional form. The account of memory that I will propose below, however, is meant to be neutral on the metaphysics of both facts and propositions. It will be convenient, for expository purposes, to assume that both facts and propositions are identical with sets of possible worlds.2 However, no substantial claim
2 On this view, a proposition is identical with the set of possible worlds with respect to which it is true. For instance, the proposition that my team T jersey is blue and red is identical with the set of possible worlds with respect to which it is true that my team T jersey is blue and red. For this view on the nature of propositions, see (Stalnaker 1976). Since I will be assuming this view, I will speak
in the coming chapters should hinge on this view about the nature of propositions and facts. For the sake of simplicity, we will be mainly concerned with facts involving objects of a particular kind; objects which are perceivable through the sensory modality of vision.3 However, the account of memory to be proposed is meant to have a broader scope. It should equally apply to memory for facts involving objects perceivable through sensory modalities other than vision.
Memory for perceptual experiences, on the other hand, is a type of memory that we express by using locutions of the what-it-was-like form. The account of memory that I will propose will assume that perceptual experiences are properties of subjects; properties with phenomenal, or qualitative, features. The experience of seeing team T’s jersey, for example, will be construed as a property such that, in virtue of having the property, the subject feels in a particular way; a way which is visually characteristic. The account of memory to be proposed here will also assume that perceptual experiences are properties with intentional, or representational, features. The experience of seeing team T’s jersey, for example, will be construed as a property such that, in virtue of having that property, the subject represents certain things (such as the jersey). In what follows, given the emphasis on memory for facts which involve visible objects, the perceptual experiences that we will often find ourselves discussing will be perceptual experiences of the visual kind. However, the account of memory to be proposed is also intended to apply to memory for perceptual experiences associated with sensory modalities other than vision.
Let us specify the scope of the project a bit further. Consider, first of all, propositional memory or memory for facts. Two forms of memory seem to be lumped together into this category. There seems to be a distinction between the type of memory that you have when you remember, for example, that Columbus arrived to America in 1492 and the type of memory that you have when you remember, for example, that the stove in your kitchen was on when you were leaving the house. The distinction is hard to formulate, but it is intuitively clear. In the former case, when you remember, you are having a belief;
of possible worlds as “belonging to” propositions, and I will speak of propositions as “containing” possible worlds. Also, I will be somewhat loose in my use of the terms “possible situation” and “possible world,” which I will use interchangeably. Strictly speaking, talk of a possible situation should be understood as referring to a possible world where the situation is the case.
3 Why “mainly”? In chapter 3, we will see that facts of a different kind will also be important for the account of memory to be developed here. These are facts about the causal histories of memories themselves.
a belief which has been preserved from some time in the past, that is, the time at which you originally learnt the remembered fact. Let us call this form of remembering “semantic memory.” In the latter case, when you remember, you are having an experience; an experience that typically originates in a past perceptual experience of the fact. Memory experiences seem to be similar to perceptual experiences in one respect. Memory experiences have phenomenal features. There seems to be such a thing as what it is like to remember, for example, that the stove was on at the time that you were leaving the house. Memory experiences are similar to perceptual experiences in a different respect too. Memory experiences have intentional features. It seems that, in virtue of having the kind of experience that you have when you remember that the stove was on, you are able to represent certain things. You can, for example, visualize your kitchen, the stove, and the flame in it. Since memory experiences allow you to visualize facts or, equivalently, to picture them in your mind, we can think of those experiences as mental images. Let us call the form of remembering which involves such experiences “episodic memory.”4
It is possible for us to remember a fact by having both an experience of, and a belief about, that fact. Suppose that I ask you, for example, whether Mary was at the party last month, and you have an experience wherein you are able to visualize a scene from the party. You may be able to direct your attention at different objects represented by your experience and eventually find Mary among them. In this case, you are remembering that Mary was at the party in the episodic sense. However, it may also be the case that, at the time that you saw Mary during the party, you formed the belief that Mary was there, and your belief has been preserved up to the time at which I am asking my question. In that case, you are remembering that Mary was at the party in the semantic sense. Thus, it is possible for episodic and semantic memory to be in play at the same time.
It is also possible for the two kinds of memory to come apart. You may remember that Mary was at the party by having an experience which allows you to visualize Mary even though, at the time that you were at the party, your attention was focused on someone else and, as a result, you saw but did not notice (and therefore did not form the belief) that Mary was there.
4 I am borrowing the terms “episodic” and “semantic” from (Tulving 1972) to refer to two sorts of memory. I will also use “episodic memory” to refer to an experience in virtue of which a subject remembers episodically. Notice that the characterization of episodic memory above makes it a type of memory for facts, just like semantic memory is a type of memory for facts as well. What differentiates episodic remembering from semantic remembering is not the sort of entity being remembered. It is an independence from belief that episodic remembering enjoys and semantic remembering lacks.
Conversely, you may remember that Mary was at the party in that, at the time that you were at the party, you formed the belief that Mary was there and your belief has been preserved up to the present time. But you may not have an experience which allows you to visualize Mary. Perhaps you did not see Mary during the party, and you formed your belief that Mary was there because, at some point during the party, someone else told you that Mary was there.
It is hard to tell whether the distinction between semantic and episodic memory cuts across the distinction between memory for facts and memory for perceptual experiences. For, whereas it seems clear that one can remember one’s past perceptual experiences episodically, it is not equally clear that one can remember them semantically. The episodic sense seems to be the sense in which we understand locutions of the form “I remember what it was like to have P.” And, in particular, it seems to be the sense in which we understand those locutions when “P” stands for, specifically, a perceptual experience. When someone claims to remember what it was like to see the sea for the first time, for instance, it seems natural to understand them as saying that they are having an experience which represents their past perceptual experience; their perceptual experience of the sea. But it is also possible to understand their claim as saying that, at the time that they saw the sea for the first time, they formed, reflectively, a number of beliefs about the perceptual experience that they were undergoing (such as the belief that it was an overwhelming experience), and those beliefs have been preserved up to the present time. Would the latter be semantic memory for past perceptual experiences? In this situation, we may be more inclined to think that the subject is remembering certain facts about their past experience, as opposed to the experience itself. And, if this is correct, then there is no such thing as semantic memory for perceptual experiences. In any case, the issue of whether a subject, in the situation described, is having memories for facts about their past experience or, by contrast, they are remembering their past experience semantically will not be of great significance for our discussion in what follows. The reason is that the object of our investigation will be episodic memory and, thus, the scope of semantic memory will not be our concern here. In what follows, we will be concerned with several aspects of episodic memories for facts and of episodic memories for perceptual experiences.5 Let us turn to the relevant aspects of those memories now.
5 As I have assumed that the experiences in virtue of which we episodically remember facts involving visible objects are mental images, I will be assuming that episodic memories for such facts
1.3 Explanandum
We have just seen that remembering facts episodically involves having certain experiences. When the facts being remembered involve visible objects, I have proposed to construe such experiences as mental images. However, the occurrence of mental imagery is not exclusive to memory. When we imagine the fact that the stove is on in the kitchen, for example, we are also capable of visualizing it in much the same way in which we visualize it when we remember it episodically. Similarly, the occurrence of experiences wherein we are able to mentally represent a different experience of ours is not exclusive to memory either. When we imagine having a perceptual experience of the sea, for example, we are capable of representing what it would be like for us to have that perceptual experience, in much the same way in which we represent it when we remember having the experience. An interesting question which arises at this point, then, is what makes certain experiences qualify as episodic memories and what makes other experiences fall outside of the memory domain.
This is a metaphysical question. It is a question about the conditions under which an experience qualifies as an episodic memory and not a question about, for example, how we identify certain experiences as episodic memories. The metaphysics of memory includes other interesting questions as well. It is an area which has been explored in detail in connection, for instance, with the topic of personal identity. Consider the question of what makes you the same person over time. In virtue of what fact is a subject, existing at a time, the same person as a subject existing at an earlier time? One might think that it is in virtue of the fact that the former subject remembers experiences, or actions, which belong to the latter subject. And, for that reason, memory has been thought to be central to the topic of personal identity.6 The metaphysics of memory has also been explored in connection with the nature of time. There is, for example, the issue of whether some views about the nature of time sit more easily than others with certain facts about episodic remembering which are commonly accepted by us. Suppose, for
are mental images. I intend to remain neutral on the nature of episodic memories of other types, other than for the above-made claims that they are experiences with phenomenal and intentional features.
6 The view that memory constitutes personal identity has often been attributed to John Locke based on Locke’s discussion of personal identity in book 2, chapter xxvii, of the Essay (1975). See, however, (Behan 1979) for a different reading of Locke.
example, that there is an ontological difference between the past and the present and, whereas the present is real, the past is no longer real. Then, past facts are not real. But if past facts are not real, then what makes some of our episodic memories true? It seems prima facie plausible to think that our memories are true or false in virtue of, precisely, past facts. For that reason, memory has been thought to be relevant to the nature of time too.7
In chapter 2, we will investigate the metaphysics of memory. However, we will not be pursuing the connection between memory and personal identity. We will not be pursuing the connection between memory and the nature of time either. Instead, we will be concerned with the issue of what conditions an experience must satisfy in order to qualify as an episodic memory. For the sake of simplicity, we will concentrate on memory for facts involving visible objects. (The outcomes of our investigation will easily generalize to memory for perceptual experiences.) Thus, the question which will occupy us while we discuss the metaphysics of memory will be a question about, specifically, mental images. However, the broader formulation of the question that we will try to answer will remain the following:
i. Metaphysics
What are the conditions under which an experience qualifies as an episodic memory?
In section 1.2, we have seen that episodic memories, like perceptual experiences, have intentional features. When we have an episodic memory, we thereby represent certain things. An interesting question which arises, then, is what things we represent in virtue of having episodic memories. This is a question about the intentionality of memory. It is a question about the conditions under which some things are represented by an experience which qualifies as an episodic memory and other things are not. Notice that it is different from the question of how the subject themselves would express their having the relevant experience. Consider, for example, memory for facts. Depending on one’s views about self-knowledge, one might think that if a subject represents that some proposition p is the case in virtue of having an episodic memory, then this is a fact which must be cognitively available to them. And, for that reason, if the subject’s memory represents that p, then they must be able to express their memory with claims of the sort “I remember
7 On memory and the nature of time, see (Le Poidevin 2017).
that p.” Conversely, one might think that if a subject represents that some proposition p is the case in virtue of having an episodic memory, then this is a fact about which they cannot easily be wrong. And, for that reason, if a subject expresses one of their episodic memories with a claim of the kind “I remember that p,” then their episodic memory must represent the fact that p. I will not be making either of those two assumptions here. In fact, I will be assuming that both of those conditional claims are false.8 Admittedly, I will sometimes speak of an episodic memory as a memory that the subject would express by saying that they remember such-and-such. However, by singling out the memory by reference to the claim that the subject themselves would make in order to express it, I intend to leave the question of what the memory represents open. For what a memory represents does not need to be fully, or manifestly, available to the subject for report.
If the notion of representation that we will be employing does not correspond to the claims that the subject would make in order to express their memories, then, one might ask, what will be the operative notion of representation? In chapter 3, we will investigate the intentionality of memory. We will pursue the question of what episodic memories represent or, equivalently, what the content of memories is.9 The relevant notion of content will involve the truth-conditions of memories. For that reason, I will construe the contents of memories as propositions; propositions which capture those truth-conditions. And, as a result, the question that will concern us with regards to the intentionality of memory will be the question of which types of propositions constitute the contents of our episodic memories. What propositions capture the conditions with respect to which our episodic memories are correct and the conditions with respect to which they are incorrect? Let us highlight this aspect of our explanandum now:
ii. Intentionality
What are the contents of our episodic memories?
In section 1.2, we have seen that, in addition to intentional features, episodic memories have phenomenal features. This is another respect in which
8 On the broad topic of the limits of self-knowledge, see (Fernández 2013). On some of the ways in which some contents of memory, more specifically, may not be available in self-knowledge, see (Fernández 2015).
9 Hereafter I will use several expressions equivalently to refer to the intentionality of memory. These include, for any memory M, “the content of M,” “the intentional object of M,” “what M represents,” and “what M is about.”
episodic memories and perceptual experiences are similar. When we have an episodic memory, there is such a thing as what having that episodic memory is like. An interesting question which arises, then, is what it is like for us to have episodic memories. This is a question about the phenomenology of memory. The phenomenology of memory is a particularly interesting and puzzling area. On the one hand, it seems quite clear that, in normal circumstances, having episodic memories feels quite differently from having other mental states, such as perceptual experiences or episodes of imagination. On the other hand, it is quite hard to put one’s finger on the specific aspects of the phenomenology of memory which distinguishes it from the phenomenology of perception, or that of imagination.
One way in which, when we have episodic memories, we feel differently from the way in which we feel when we have perceptual experiences or episodes of imagination seems to involve an experience of time. More specifically, it seems to involve an experience of the past. It is unclear, however, exactly what is being experienced as being in the past in virtue of having an episodic memory. Consider, for example, the episodic memory that I would express by saying that I remember that Mary was at the party last month. Arguably, the presence of Mary at the party is a fact which is experienced by me as being in the past in virtue of having this episodic memory. But is my past perceptual experience of Mary as being at the party also experienced by me in virtue of having the memory? This is an issue that we will need to address in order to clarify the phenomenology of memory.
Another issue that we will need to address is whether (and if so, in what sense) the phenomenology of memory involves some awareness of the self. After all, one might argue that, when I have the episodic memory that Mary was at the party, the presence of Mary at the party is not only experienced by me as being in the past, but it is also experienced by me as being in my past. Relatedly, one might also argue that, when I have the episodic memory that Mary was at the party, the memory at issue is presented to me as being mine, or as belonging to me. These ideas, which seem prima facie plausible, suggest that, in some sense yet to be determined, we are aware of ourselves in memory. This sort of awareness will also need to be addressed while we clarify the phenomenology of memory; a project that will occupy us in the second part of the book. In chapter 4, I will attempt to explain the aspects of the phenomenology of memory which involve the experience of time, whereas in chapter 5, I will address the sense of ownership for our episodic
