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MEASURINGPEACE MeasuringPeace Principles,Practices,andPolitics RICHARDCAPLAN GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries
©RichardCaplan2019
Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin2019
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Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer
PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica
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ISBN978–0–19–881036–0
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ForDaniel Acknowledgements Thisbookhasbeen(too)longinthemaking,andIamverygratefulto manyindividualsandinstitutionsfortheirvaluableinputandsupportalongtheway.
IoweaverylargedebtofgratitudetotheFolkeBernadotte Academy,whichtookakeeninterestinthisprojectfromitsinception andmadesignificantcontributionstoit,intellectualaswellas financial, frombeginningtoend.TheFolkeBernadotteAcademy’scommitment toscholarlyresearchinthe fieldsofpeace-andstate-buildingistruly impressive.
WithoutthebenefitofaBritishAcademyfellowship,Iwouldnever havefoundthetimetoundertaketheinitialresearchthatstartedthe ballrolling.IamgratefultotheAcademyfortakingagambleonme.
TheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentwasvery generousinsupportingtheresearchthatunderpinsChapter4of thisbook.Theyalsotookanactiveinterestintheresearchitselfand madeveryvaluablecontributionstoit.
ManyoftheideasforthisprojectoriginatedwithaconsultancyIdid fortheUnitedNations(UN)PeacebuildingSupportOffice(PBSO)a numberofyearsagoon ‘measuringpeaceconsolidationandmanaging transitions’,whichledtotheproductionofaninternalbriefingpaper thatIhadthehonourtopresenttotheUNPeacebuildingCommission. Iwaspleasedthatoneofmyrecommendations fortheproductionof abenchmarkinghandbook wastakenupbythePBSO,resultingin thepublicationof MonitoringPeaceConsolidation:UnitedNations Practitioners’ GuidetoBenchmarking,expertlywrittenbySvenErik StaveofFafo.Ithasbeenexcitingtoseegreaterandmoreeffectiveuse ofbenchmarkingasaninstrumentofassessmentthroughouttheUN system,asIdiscussinChapter3.
TheideasthatemergedfrommyworkwithPBSOwereexplored furtherinthecontextoftwoconferencesIorganizedthatbrought togetherscholarsandpractitionersatWiltonPark,theglobalforum basedatWistonHouseinthebucolicBritishcountrysideofWest Sussex.The firstconference,onexitstrategiesandpeaceconsolidationinstate-buildingoperations,washeldon13–15March2009.The secondconference,onmeasuringpeaceconsolidation,washeldon
Acknowledgements 15–17October2014.Bothconferencesallowedforanunfettered exchangeofideasandexperiences.IamgratefultoWiltonPark anditsprogrammedirectorIsobelleJaques,inparticular,fortheir assistanceinorganizingtheconferences.FinancialsupportwasprovidedbytheCentreforInternationalStudies,UniversityofOxford; theFafoInstituteforAppliedInternationalStudies;theNorwegian PeacebuildingResourceCentre;theFolkeBernadotteAcademy;the SwissFederalDepartmentofForeignAffairs;theBritishAcademy; theOrganizationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope,Vienna; andthePublicDiplomacyDivision,NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization,Brussels.Iamgratefultoallofthemfortheirgenerous assistance.
IamalsogratefultoLinacreCollegeOxfordforthegrantIreceived fromtheLucyHalsallFundinsupportofmyoverseasresearch expenses.
Fortheirveryvaluableresearchassistance,IamgratefultoNicholas Barker,KateBrooks,andAllardDuursma.
Anumberofindividualsreadallorpartsofthismanuscriptand Iamextremelygratefultothemfortheirinput:NicholasBarker,Alex Bellamy,JaneBoulden,FrancesBrown,JohnGledhill,AnkeHoeffler, LucasKello,LaraOlson,MichaelvonderSchulenburg,andRemco Zwetsloot.IhavealsobenefittedfromthefeedbackIreceivedfrom presentationstotheOxfordInternationalRelationsColloquiumand theOxfordUniversityStrategicStudiesGroup,andfromconversationswithmanyofmyOxfordcolleagues.
AversionoftheIntroductiontothisbookappearedas ‘Measuring PeaceConsolidation’ intheBritishAcademy’ s RethinkingStateFragility (London:BritishAcademy,2015).IamgratefultotheBritish Academyforgrantingmepermissiontousethismaterial.
Chapter4,co-writtenwithAnkeHoeffler,appearedinmodified forminthe EuropeanJournalofInternationalSecurity (Vol.2,No.2, July2017).WearegratefultoCambridgeUniversityPressforgrantinguspermissiontoadaptthisarticleforinclusioninthisvolume. WearealsogratefultoLiseHowardfortheuseofherUNpeacekeepingoperationsdataandtoKateRollforupdatingit.ChrisPerry gaveveryhelpfuladviceontheuseoftheInternationalPeaceInstitute dataonUNpeacekeeping.JoakimKreutzclarifiedtheuseofthe UCDPconflictterminationdata.TheFHI360EducationPolicy andDataCenterprovideddataonhorizontalinequality.Daniel Gutknecht,RonSmith,MånsSöderbom,thesixcasestudyauthors,
Acknowledgements andtheparticipantsintheprojectmeetinginOxfordon6February 2015allprovidedusefulcommentsandsuggestions.
DominicByattatOxfordUniversityPresshasbeenaspatientand encouraginganeditorasonecouldeverhopetohave.Iamgrateful forhissupportofthisandearlierprojectsofmine.OliviaWells providedsuperbeditorialassistance.
Finally,IthankmywifeLuisa,forherforbearanceespecially,and mysonDaniel,towhomthisbookisdedicated.Mayheandhis generationknowmorepeacefultimes.
ListofFigures 1.1.Totalarmedconflictbytype,1946–201416
3.1.ISAFnotionalassessmentsummaryslideforone campaigntask65
4.1.Kaplan-Meiersurvivalestimate85
4.2.Kaplan-Meiersurvivalestimates86
4.3.Kaplan-Meiersurvivalestimates87
0.1.Civilwaronsetandrecurrence3
1.1.Corefeaturesofassessingthestateofpeaceorrivalry betweencountries23
4.1.Armedconflictoutcomes,1990–201384
4.2.Numberofpeacespellssurviving85
4.3.Durationofpeaceandpastconflictcharacteristics90
4.4.Durationofpeace:territorialandethnicconflicts andincome92
4.5.DurationofpeaceandUNPKOs95
4.6.UNpeacekeepingoperations96
4.7.UNPKOsandpeacesettlements(casestudies)102
ListofAbbreviations ACCORDAfricanCentrefortheConstructiveResolutionof Disputes
ACDArmedConflictDataset
AUAfricanUnion
BNUBUnitedNationsOfficeinBurundi
CARCentralAfricanRepublic
COWCorrelatesofWar
DDRdisarmament,demobilization,andreintegration
DPADepartmentofPoliticalAffairs
DPKODepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations
DRCDemocraticRepublicofCongo
ECOWASEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates
FSIFragile/FailedStatesIndex
IEPInstituteforEconomicsandPeace
IMFInternationalMonetaryFund
ISACISAFStrategicAssessmentCapability
ISAFInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce
NATONorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization
NGOnon-governmentalorganization
OECDOrganisationforEconomicCo-operation andDevelopment
OSCEOrganizationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope
PBCPeacebuildingCommission
PBSOPeacebuildingSupportOffice
PCPIPost-ConflictPerformanceIndicator
PCRDPost-ConflictReconstructionandDevelopment
PPIPositivePeaceIndex
PRIOPeaceResearchInstitute,Oslo
PRSPPovertyReductionStrategyPaper
PSCPeaceandSecurityCouncil
UCDPUppsalaConflictDataProgram
UNUnitedNations
UNAMSILUnitedNationsMissioninSierraLeone
UNMILUnitedNationsMissioninLiberia
UNPKOUnitedNationsPeacekeepingOperation
USAIDUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment
Introduction Howcanweknowifthepeacethathasbeenestablishedfollowinga civilwarisastablepeace?
Muchhingesontheanswertothisquestion.Eachyearintergovernmentalorganizations,donorgovernments,andnon-governmental organizationsexpendbillionsofdollarsanddeploytensofthousands ofpersonnelinsupportofeffortstobuildpeaceincountriesemerging fromviolentconflict.TheUnitedNations(UN)aloneattheendof 2017hadnearly93,000uniformedpersonnelinthe fieldandwas slatedtospendsome$6.8billiononpeacekeepingoperationsinthat financialyear.1 Yetdespitethisconsiderablecommitmentof resources,aswellastheaccumulationofextensiveknowledgeand experiencerelevanttopeacebuildinginthecourseofthepasttwo decades,externaleffortstoconsolidatepeaceincon flict-affected countrieshavemetwithmixedresults.
TherecurrenceofviolenceintheCentralAfricanRepublic(CAR) inlate2012isacaseinpoint.CARisoneofsixcountriesonthe agendaoftheUN’sPeacebuildingCommission,theUNbodyestablishedin2005withamandatetosupportrecoveryeffortsincountries emergingfromviolentconflict.2 CivilwarragedinCARfrom2004to 2007untilapeaceagreement,anamnesty,andtheformationofa nationalunitygovernmentlaidthefoundationsforadurablepeace,
1 UnitedNations, ‘MonthlySummaryofMilitaryandPoliceContributionto UnitedNationsOperations’,31December2017,https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/ default/files/msr_31_dec_2017_0.pdf.Formyuseoftheterms ‘peacebuilding’ , ‘ peacekeeping’,andrelatedterms,seetheterminologysectionattheendofthischapter.
2 UNSecurityCouncilResolution1645(2005)andUNGeneralAssembly Resolution60/180(2005),adoptedconcurrentlyon20December2005,authorized theestablishmentofthePeacebuildingCommission.CARwasputontheagendaof thePeacebuildingCommissionin2008attherequestoftheBozizégovernment.
2 MeasuringPeace whichtheUNtookmeasurestoreinforce.Violentconflictre-erupted afterrebelforces,accusingthegovernmentofFrançoisBozizéof failingtoabidebyitscommitments,stagedacoupinDecember 2012.ThefactthatCARsufferedrenewedarmedhostilitiesonthe UN’swatchunderscoresthevolatilityofso-calledpost-conflictcountriesandtheneedtounderstandwhypeacemayfailtoconsolidate despitesubstantialinternationalengagement.3
CARisnotanisolatedcase.Between1946and2013,105countries sufferedcivilwarsofvariousmagnitude.Ofthese,morethanhalf (fifty-ninecountries)experiencedarelapseintoviolentconflict in somecasesmorethanonce afterpeacehadbeenestablished.4 By oneestimate,onaverage40percentofcountriesemergingfromcivil wararelikelytoreverttoviolentconflictwithinadecadeofthe cessationofhostilities.5 AccordingtotheWorldBank,90percent ofallcivilwarsthateruptedinthe firstdecadeofthetwenty-first centurywereincountriesthathadpreviouslyexperiencedacivilwar since1945(seeTable0.1).6 Manyofthesecountrieshavebeenrecipientsofextensivepost-conflictrecoveryassistanceonthepartofthe internationalcommunity.
Peacemayfailforavarietyofreasons,aswediscussbelow,but manyeffortstobuildpeacehavebeenhamperedinoneimportant respect:bythelackofeffectivemeansofassessingprogresstowards theachievementofaconsolidatedpeace.Asaconsequence,peacebuildersareoftennavigatingwithoutacompass.Internationalorganizationsanddonorgovernmentsroutinelyundertakemonitoringand evaluationofthespecificprogrammesthattheysupportincountries recoveringfromviolentconflict,oftentodetermineiffundsarebeing
3 Foranassessmentofthesituationontheeveofrenewedhostilities,see ‘Reportof theUNSecretary-GeneralontheSituationintheCentralAfricanRepublicandonthe ActivitiesoftheUnitedNationsIntegratedPeacebuildingOfficeinThatCountry’ , UNDoc.S/2012/956,21December2012.
4 UppsalaConflictDataProgramandPeaceResearchInstitute,Oslo, ‘UCDP/ PRIOArmedConflictDatasetv.4-2014a,1946–2013’ .
5 PaulCollier,AnkeHoeffler,andMånsSöderbom, ‘Post-ConflictRisks’ , Journal ofPeaceResearch 45:4(2008),465.Differentstudiesyielddifferentestimatesof conflictrelapsedependingonthedata,criteria,andmethodologyemployed.These differencesarenotsignificantforthepurposesoftheanalysispresentedinthisbook, however.Foracriticaldiscussionofthevaryingestimates,seeAstriSuhrkeandIngrid Samset, ‘What’sinaFigure?EstimatingRecurrenceofCivilWar’ , International Peacekeeping 14:2(2007),195–203.
6 WorldBank, WorldDevelopmentReport2011:Conflict,SecurityandDevelopment (Washington,DC:WorldBank,2011),3.
Table0.1. Civilwaronsetandrecurrence DecadeOnsetincountrieswith nopreviousconflicts(%)
Onsetincountrieswith apreviousconflict(%)
Number ofonsets
1960s574335
1970s435744
1980s386239
1990s336781
2000s109039
Source:WorldBank2011
usedasintendedorifprogrammeactivitieshavebeenimplemented asplanned.Rarely,ifever,however,dotheseorganizationsand governmentsconductbroader,strategicassessmentstoascertainthe qualityofthepeacethattheyarehelpingtobuildandthecontributionthattheirengagementismaking(ornot)totheconsolidation ofpeace.
Thisisnottosuggestthatpeacebuildingactorsmakenoeffortto takestockofprogressoverall.Tothecontrary,thereareperiodic reportsfromthe fieldbyhighrepresentativesandtheirequivalents, briefingstoorganizations’ memberstatesandgovernmentministers,andexpertindependentanalysisbyresearchinstitutes,among otherbarometersofchange.Whiletheseassessmentscanbevery insightful,theyareoftenadhoc,impressionistic,ordevisedonthe basisofeitherinexplicitcriteriaorstatedcriteria suchasthe fulfilmentofmandates thatarenotnecessarilysuitablefordetermininghowwellapeacebuildingoperationmaybehelpingtomeet therequirementsforastablepeace.
Thekeyissuetoconsider,then,whichthisbookwilladdress,is canweknow andifso,howcanweknow ifthefoundationsfor sustainablepeaceanddevelopmenthavebeenestablishedsothatthe UNandothermultilateralorganizations,donorgovernments,and non-governmentalorganizationsengagedinpeacebuildingcan decidewhether,when,andinwhatwaystheycanrecalibratetheir engagementinthesecountries.Whiledecisionsofthiskindwill alwaysbepoliticalonesultimately,7 agreaterappreciationofthe qualityofthepeacethathasbeenestablishedwouldarguablyenable
7 Forexamples,seeRichardCaplan, ‘PolicyImplications’,inRichardCaplan(ed.), ExitStrategiesandStateBuilding (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2012),315–16.
4 MeasuringPeace internationalactorsengagedinpost-conflictrecoveryanddevelopment tomakebetterinformedjudgementsaboutappropriatecoursesof action.Tobuildasecurepeace,itwillbearguedhere,itisimportant totakethemeasureofpeace.
MEASURINGPEACECONSOLIDATION Howcanoneassessthedurabilityofapeace?Theprincipaldifficulty inattemptingtoanswerthisquestionisthattherearenohard measuresorindicatorsofaconsolidatedpeace incontrast,say,to theindicatorsofaprosperouseconomy(e.g.,growthingrossdomesticproduct)orahealthypopulation(e.g.,declininginfantmortality rates),contentiousthoughsomeoftheseindicatorsmaybe.8 The ultimatetestofasustainablepeace,incaseswherethirdpartieshave intervened,necessarilycomesafterthefact thatis,onlywhenthe internationalcommunityhasdrawndownsignificantlyorexited. Thisdifficultyiscompoundedbythefactthatthecontinuedpresence ofinternationalpersonnel,evenjustatokenmilitarypresence,can buoyapeaceartificially.ThepresenceofUNpeacekeepingforcesin Liberiain1997,forexample,helpedtokeepthepeacebutitalsogave risetomistakenimpressionsoftherootednessofthatpeace,which theresumptionofcivilwarlessthantwoyearslaterwoulddispel.9 Onemeasureofsustainability,therefore,ithasbeensuggested,isthe survivalofapeacefollowingthe firstelection after peacekeeping forceshavedeparted.10 Yetwhilethisisconceivablyareasonable measure,itisobviouslynotapracticalonefortransitionalplanning purposes.Thirdpartieswanttoknowthatapeaceisstable before theyexit.
8 See,forinstance,thetrenchantcritiqueofgrossdomesticproductasameasure ofeconomicwell-beinginJosephE.Stiglitz,AmartyaSen,andJean-PaulFitoussi, ReportbytheCommissionontheMeasurementofEconomicPerformanceandSocial Progress (2009),http://ec.europa.eu/eurosta t/documents/118025/118123/Fitoussi+ Commission+report.
9 See ‘FinalReportoftheSecretary-GeneralontheUnitedNationsObserver MissioninLiberia’,UNDoc.S/1997/712,12September1997.
10 BarryBlechman,WilliamJ.Durch,WendyEaton,andJulieWerbel, Effective TransitionsfromPeaceOperationstoSustainablePeace:FinalReport (Washington, DC:DFIInternational,September1997),8–9.
Thereisasubstantialbodyofscholarshipconcernedwithcivilwars andpeacemaintenancebutthatscholarshipoffersonlylimited insightintowhetherapost-conflictpeaceisdurable.Oneareaof scholarshipwithapparentrelevancetothisquestionisconcerned withcivilwaronset.Scholarshaveidentifiedawiderangeoffactors intheireffortstoexplaintheincidenceofviolentinternalconflict. Manyofthesefactorscanbegroupedintermsoftheirprimary emphasis:onthe motivation ofcombatantsandtheirsupporters,on the feasibility ofrebellion,andonthe resilience ofnationalinstitutions.Motivationencompassesawiderangeofoftengrievance-based sub-factors,including ‘relativedeprivation’ (Gurr1970)and ‘horizontalinequalities’ (Stewart2008);ethnicinsecurity(Posen1993; WalterandSnyder1999);andpolitical,social,andeconomicdiscrimination(Brown1996).Feasibilitystressestheimportanceofopportunityovermotivation,suggestingthatrebellionismorelikelyto occurwherematerialconditionsfavourit,notablywheretheterrain ismountainous,allowingrebelstohide;wherevaluablenatural resourcesareplentiful,allowingrebelsto financetheiractivities fromtrade;andwhereexternalsecuritycommitmentstogovernmentsareweak,allowingrebelstochallengegovernmentsmoreeasily (FearonandLaitin2003;Collieretal.2009).Resilienceemphasizes thevulnerabilityofthestatetovariousinternalandexternalpressures (e.g.,risingfoodprices,migration)andthecapacityofstatesandtheir institutionstocopeeffectivelywiththesepressures(Zartman1995; Goldstoneetal. 2010;WorldBank2011).Thesefactorsarenot necessarilymutuallyexclusive:anumberofexplanationsforthe outbreakofcivilwarcombineseveralofthem.11
Ifonecanidentifythefactorsthatunderliecivilwars,itseems reasonabletoassume,thenthebasisforanenduringpeacewill arguablyresideinbeingabletoaddressthosefactorssatisfactorily byeliminatingdiscrimination,forinstance,orbybuildingmore representativeinstitutions bearinginmindthedifficultyofeffecting someofthesechanges.Therearetwoproblemswiththisapproach. The firstproblemisthatthereisnoconsensusamongscholarsasto whichcausalfactorsmatterormattermost.Indeed,asCharlesCall observes,thereis ‘tremendousdisparityamongscholarsabout
11 Forareviewoftheliteratureoncivilwarcausationproducedinthemostrecent periodofscholarship,seeLars-ErikCedermanandManuelVogt, ‘Dynamicsand LogicsofCivilWar’ , JournalofConflictResolution 61:9(2017),1992–2016.
6 MeasuringPeace whethercertainfactorsareimportantornot,andaboutthedegreeto whichtheyareimportant’ . 12 Theidentificationofcriticalfactors alone,moreover,isnotsufficienttoaccountforwhyconflictoccurs; thereneedsalsotobeacredibleandverifiableexplanationofwhy theymatter,andscholarsdisagreeaboutthat,too.Forinstance, scholarswhoagreethatpeacekeepingmakesapositivecontribution topeacebuildingmaintainvariouslythatitsucceedsbecauseitmitigatesthesecuritydilemmaamongwarringparties(Fortna2004);or becauseitreinforcesnegotiatedsettlements(CaplanandHoeffler 2017);orbecauseitconstitutesaprojectionofsoftpower(Howard 2019).Thesedifferencesmatterforpeacebuildingstrategies.
Thesecondproblemwiththisapproachtomeasuringpeaceconsolidationisthatitassumesthatthecausesofconflictonsetandthe causesofconflictrecurrenceareoneandthesame.Call’squantitative analysishasshown,however,thatwhileonsetandrecurrencesharea numberofriskfactors includingpoliticalinstability,population size,andrelianceonnaturalresource(notablyoil)exports there arealsosignificantdifferences.13 Foronething, ‘warsaretransformative’,asSusanWoodwardhasobserved;therootcausesofaconflict maynolongerpertainasaconsequenceofchangesthattheconflict mayhavegenerated changesthatincludemajorpopulationdisplacementsandtheemergenceofnewpoliticalormilitaryelites.14 Itisimportant,therefore,totreatcivilwarrecurrence andthe factorsthatgiverisetoit asdistinctphenomena.15
Anotherpossibleapproachistofocusnotonthecausesofcivilwar butonthecausesofpeaceintheaftermathofcivilwar.What measureshavebeenmostsuccessfulinmaintainingthepeaceafter violentconflictandhavetheybeenappliedtothecasesinquestion? Again,therangeofpossibilities andthedifferencesamong scholars isconsiderable.Scholarshavestressedtheimportanceof thenatureofcivilwarterminations(Licklider1993),third-party securityguarantees(Fortna2004),security-sectorreform(Toft
12 CharlesT.Call, WhyPeaceFails:TheCausesandPreventionofCivilWar Recurrence (Washington,DC:GeorgetownUniversityPress,2012),30.
13 Ibid.,ch.2.
14 SusanL.Woodward, ‘DotheRootCausesofCivilWarMatter?OnUsing KnowledgetoImprovePeacebuildingInterventions’ , JournalofInterventionand Statebuilding 1:2(2007),155.
15 Call, WhyPeaceFails,50–9,65.
2010),andinclusivepoliticalsettlements(Call2012),amongother measures.16 Thisapproachwouldappeartobemorepromisinginso farasitdrawsitsanalysisfromexperiencesofsuccess.Butaswiththe previousapproach,thereisalackofconsensusamongscholarsand, mostimportantforourpurposes,thisapproachdoesnotreveal enoughaboutthequalityofthepeacethathasbeenestablishedin anygivencase.
Thisbookproposesadifferentapproach.Theargumentmade here averysimpleargument isthatmorerigorousassessments oftherobustnessofpeaceareneeded.Theseassessmentsrequire clarityaboutthecharacteristicsof,andtherequirementsfor,astable peaceinagivenconflictsituationandcorrespondinglystrongknowledgeabouttheconflictdynamicsspecifictothatconflictsituation. Theobjectives(intendedoutcomes)ofapeacebuildingoperation needtobere-evaluatedcontinually.Dotheseobjectivesstillsupport thebroadstrategicgoalsoftheoperation?Aretheassumptionsthat underpinthoseobjectivesvalid?Haveneworunanticipatedthreatsor impedimentstoastablepeaceemerged(e.g.,externalsecuritychallenges,newpoliticaldevelopments)thatrequirethearticulationof neworalteredobjectives?Hasavailableimplementingcapacity internationallyandnationally changedandwhatimplicationsdoes thishaveforachievingastablepeace?17 Suchassessmentsarefeasible; indeed,aswewillsee,theyarebeingemployedalreadybysome peacebuildingbodiesbutonlytoalimitedextent.Morerigorous assessmentsoftherobustnessofpeace,whilebynomeansapanacea forconflictrecurrence,havethepotentialtomakesubstantialcontributionstoconflictprevention.
ORGANIZATIONOFTHEBOOK Thisisabookaboutmeasuringpeaceconsolidation.Itisnota bookaboutevaluatingpeacebuildingsuccess,onwhichthereis
16 Infairness,notallofthesescholarshavebeenconcernedwithwhetherthe measuresinquestionhavebeenthemosteffectivebut,rather,withhoweffectivethey havebeen.
17 Thesesameconsiderations,Iargueelsewhere,oughttoinformtransitional planningforpeaceoperations.SeeCaplan, ExitStrategiesandStateBuilding,ch.17.
