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Life’sValues Life ’sValues Pleasure,Happiness,Well-Being, andMeaning AlanH.Goldman
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Onour50thanniversary,forJoan,whobringspleasure, happiness,well-being,meaning,anddesiretomylife(along withoccasionalargument)
Acknowledgments AnearlierversionofthechapteronpleasureappearedintheMacmillan InterdisciplinaryHandbook: Philosophy:SexandLove.Partsofthe chapteronmeaningappearedin ATeacher’sLife (LexingtonBooks, 2009).Articlesthatwereexpandedintothechaptersondesireand happinessappearedin PhilosophicalStudies and TheJournalofEthics. Ithankthosepublishersandjournalsforpermissionstousethose materials.NeeraBadhwarreadth emanuscriptandmadedetailed andespeciallyacutecommentsresultinginmanyimprovements.Molly Gardnercontributedusefulcriticalcommentsanddirectedmetorecent sourcesIhadnotseen,resultinginmoreaccuratedescriptionsofrival positions.VariouspartsofthebookwerepresentedatcolloquiaatEast CarolinaUniversityandtheUniversityofMiami.Ithanktheattendees, andespeciallyMikeVeberinsubsequentcommunication,forhelpful comments.Severalearlierversionsofchapterswerediscussedinthe William&Maryreadinggroup:JoshGert,ChrisTucker,ChadVance, TuckerMcKinney,ChrisFreiman,andJonahGoldwater.Oncemorecriticismsresultedinimprovements.Ifanyerrorsweretoremain,Iwouldshare responsibilitywithalltheseearlierrefereesandcommentators.
Introduction Arepleasure,happiness,andmeaningwhatweseekinlifeandwhatwe oughttoseek?Manypeoplewillimmediatelyansweryes,perhapsequatingallthree.Buttheseequations,Iwillargue,areseriouslyconfused. Thisquestionmaybeattheverycenterofareflectiveperson’ sconcerns, butwecannotansweritintelligentlywithoutknowingwhatthesestates areandwhattheirrelationsaretoeachotherandtoourmoregeneral personalwelfareorwell-being.Andwemustfurthermakedistinctions withineachcategoryinordertoknowwhatexactlyweareaimingator oughttopursue.
Wemightrationallypursueany,all,ornoneofthesestates.Itisrarely besttopursueanyofthemdirectly.Theimportantthing,Imaintain,is preciselytomakeourdesires,typicallydesiresforotherthings,rational: thatis,coherentandinformed.Doingsowill,otherthingsbeingequal (orregrettablyhavingtosay,perhapsbetterthanequal),bringpleasure andhappinessinsomeoftheirvariousformsinitswake.Inthechapter onwell-being,Iwillexplainjustwhatitistohavecoherentandrelevantlyinformeddesires.
Thisbookwillclarifyourconceptsofallthesestates.Inabasicor rudimentarysense,tohaveaconceptofsomethingistobeablereliably topickoutinstances.Inthissenseweallknowwhatpleasure,happiness, well-being,andmeaninginlifeare.Weknowwhenwefeelapleasurable sensation,orthatwetookpleasureinthetennismatchyesterday.We knowwhenwefeelhappy,whenthingsaregoingwellforus,andwhen ourprojectsorrelationshipsseemespeciallymeaningful.Buthavinga conceptinthissenseisnotthesamethingasknowingthenatureofits object.Youhaveaconceptofphilosophyinthatyouknowwhenabook isphilosophical;but,evenifyouareaphilosopher,areyouconfidentthat youcanadequatelyde finewhatphilosophyis?Knowingwhenyoufeel Life’sValues:Pleasure,Happiness,Well-Being,andMeaning. Alan H. Goldman, Oxford University Press (2018). © Alan H. Goldman. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198829737.003.0006
happyisnotthesameasknowingwhathappinessis.Thereflective personwhoisatallphilosophicallyinclinedwillsurelywanttoknow thenatureofthesestatesthatareformanypeoplesocentrallydesired,so intimatelyconnectedtoagoodlife.ThatknowledgeiswhatI,afterafull lifetimeinphilosophy(whobutageezertowriteonmeaninginlife?), promisehere.
Thechapterstofollowaresimilarinstructure.Eachwillcritique currentlypopularphilosophicalaccountsofthetopicsaddressed.Each willdefendananalysisthatavoidsobjectionstotheseaccountsandto earlierrelativesofmyaccounts.Eachwillshowtherelationsbetween itstargetconcept pleasure,happiness,well-being,ormeaning and motivationandvalue.Mostofusaremotivatedtopursuepleasure, happiness,andmeaning;wetypicallyvaluethem,butnotexclusively. Well-being,bycontrast,istheall-inclusivecategoryofpersonalvalue, whatbydefinitionwemust,ifrational,bemotivatedtopursue.The complexrelationsbetweenthesefourcategorieswillbeamajortopicof thisbook.
OnecriterionIwillemploytojudgetheacceptabilityofananalysisis thatitcaptureamainuseoftheconceptinsteadofsimplychangingthe subject.Ifwearetold,forexample,thatameaningfullifeissimply avaluablelife,thatdoesnotseemtocaptureanyordinarysenseof meaning:atbest,itquestionablypositsanextensionalequivalence. Asecondcriterionforanacceptableanalysisisthatitrelatetheconcept inrecognizablewaystoothersintheconceptualvicinity.Ifhappiness andpleasure,orhappinessandwell-beingarenotsimplyequivalent,we wanttoknowtherelationsbetweenthem.
Athirdcriterionappliesspecificallytotheconceptsunderdiscussion here:thatananalysisindicatewhyandhowwearemotivatedtopursue thestatesinquestion.Wewanttohavepleasure,behappy,andtorank highinwell-being,butitisnecessarytoclarifytheconceptualconnections,ifany,betweenthesestatesandourmotivations.Iwillclaimthat onlywell-beingexempli fiestheclosestpossiblerelation,inthatwellbeingconsistssimplyinthesatisfactionofourcentralrationaldesires. Theconnectionbetweenpleasureandmotivation,bycontrast,isfar morecomplexthanhedonistsclaim(theclaimthatpleasureisalways our finalend).Correctlydescribingthatcomplexrelation,inpartconceptualandinpartempirical,dependsonmakingtheproperdistinctions withinthecategoryofpleasureitself.
Thesesectionsonmotivationandvalueineachchapterwillserveto unifythistextnotonlyformally,butsubstantivelyaswell,sinceone majorthemeIwillpursueisthesearchforwhathasultimatesubjective valueandwhatwemustrationallybemotivatedtopursue.Asindicated, Ibelieveonlypersonalwelfareorwell-being fitsthisbill,although pleasure,happiness,andmeaningaretypicalsourcesorconstituentsof well-being.SinceIwillargueasasecondthemethatnoneofthesestates isreducibletoanyoftheothers,theaccountstobedefendedwillnot togetherbeasunifiedasreductionistaccountsthatreducehappinessto pleasureorwell-beingtohappiness.
Inthe firstchapter,Iwilldistinguishthreeirreducibletypesorsenses ofpleasure,eachhavingitsoppositeinadistincttypeofpain.Denying thatpleasureandpainareoppositesonthesamescale,asisnow commonamongbothphilosophersandpsychologists,resultsfromcontrastingonesenseofpleasurewithadifferentsenseofpain.Eachofthese irreduciblydistincttypesofpleasurebearsadistinctrelationtotypical motivationordesireandtowell-being.Insomeareasofactivity,especiallyrelatingtofoodandsex,wedirectlydesiresensorypleasures,but, unlessweareDonJuanorFalstaff,thesewillmakeuponlyasmall percentageofourobjectsofdesire.Pleasureinanother(intentional) sense,takingpleasureinvariousobjectsandactivities,orhavingpleasant thoughtsaboutthem,bycontrast,entersconceptuallyasaconstituentof desire.Desiringsomethingisinparthavingpleasantthoughtsaboutit. Thechapteronpleasurewillclarifytheserelations,aswellasdescribe yetathirdirreduciblesenseofpleasurethatismerelyabyproductof satisfyingdesiresforotherthings.Allthreedistincttypesofpleasurecan beverypartialcausesaswellasmoretypicaleffectsofwell-beingor personalwelfare.
Inthechapteronhappiness,Iwillarguethathappinessinitsprimary senseisanemotionhavingamulti-componentstructure,including physicalsymptoms,judgment,sensation,andbehavioral-dispositional components,similartootheremotions.Otherparallelswithotheremotionswillbenotedaswell,includingthephenomenonofadaptation (tendencytoreturntobaselinelevels),borderlineinstances,andthe so-calledparadoxofhappiness(pursuingitdirectlytendstobeselfdefeating),whichagainwillbeseenasoneinstanceofamoregeneral emotionalphenomenon.Recognizinghappinessasanemotioncaptures
whatearlieranalysesgotrightwhilediscouragingthetemptationto exaggerateitsplaceinoverallwell-beingorpersonalvalue.
Likepleasure,happinessisatonceasource,aneffect,andapartial constituent,butcertainlynotthewhole,ofwell-being.Unlikepleasure,it alsocontainsanimplicitjudgmentofthelevelofwell-being.That judgmentcanbemistaken,andthenhappinessandwell-beingwill comeapart.Aself-deceptivepersoncanbemadehappybyoverestimatingherlevelofwell-being,butwemaywellnotwanttobethatperson. Andwearenot,asmanyphilosophersandsocialscientistsbelieve, alwayssomewhereonascaleofhappiness,sincewearenotsooftenin thisemotionalstate,anymorethanwearealwaysexperiencingother emotions.Weare,bycontrast,alwaysatacertainlevelofwell-being sincesomeofourcentraldesiresarebeingsatisfiedandsomefrustrated orpostponedatanygiventime.
Initssecondaryuses “happiness” canalsorefertoamoodortemperament,statesrelatedtoemotionsashigherorderdispositions.Moods aredispositionstobeincertainemotionalstates,whiletemperamentsare dispositionstobeincertainmoods.Emotionsdivideintobasicones, suchasangerandfear,andmorecognitivelyelaboratedones,suchas prideandjealousy,andhappiness.Emotionsmustalsobedistinguished fromrelatedstates,suchasattitudes.Itwillbeimportanttokeepthese distinctionsinmindinordertolocatetheplaceofhappinessinamore generalaccountofwell-being.
Asmentioned,well-beingistheall-inclusivecategoryofpersonal valueorwelfare.Thechapteronwell-beingwilldefendadesiresatisfactionaccountagainstthemainalternatives:hedonism(identifyingwellbeingwithabalanceofpleasure),perfectionism(identifyingwell-being withthefulldevelopmentofhumancapacities),andobjectivelist accounts(specifyingobjectivesourcesofwell-being).Alltheseother accounts,Ishallargue,tendtocollapseintosomeversionofadesire satisfactionaccount.Myanalysisintermsofdesiresatisfaction,by contrast,willavoidcommonobjectionstothistypeofaccount.The objectionsincludereferencetodesireswhosesatisfactiondoesnotadd topersonalwelfare(theclaimthatdesiresatisfactionisnotsufficientfor well-being),andobjectiveswemustpurportedlypursuewhetherwe desirethemornot(theclaimthatdesiresatisfactionisnotnecessary forwell-being).Muchoftheresponsetotheseobjectionsrestsonthe
restrictionofwell-beingtotheknownsatisfactionofcentralrational desires,alongwithanalysesofdepthandrationalityofdesires.
Equatingwell-beingwithhappinessorpleasurefocusesonsourcesof well-beinginsteadofrevealingwhatitis.Anditfocusesononlyone source,ignoringcountlesspossibleothers.Onceweseewhatwell-being is theknownsatisfactionofourcentralrationaldesires weseealso thatpossiblesourcesarealmostlimitless.Sinceindividuals ’ rational desiresdiffer,itisnotpossibletotellthemhowtolivetheirlivessoas tomaximizetheirpersonalwelfareorwell-being(butdon’tstopreading here).Anybookthatpurportstodosoisafraud.Itwilleithertellpeople topursuewhatmostpeoplearealreadypursuing,oritwilltellthemto pursuewhattheydonotdesireandwhatwillthereforenotaddtotheir personalwelfare.And,asJohnStuartMillfamouslyargued,mostpeople knowhowtoachievetheiraimsbetterthandostrangerswhowould interfere.
The finalchapteronmeaninginlifewillarguethatthereisaperfectly commonconceptofmeaninginwhichtocasttheanalysisofmeaningin life,andthatthisconceptoncemorecapturesanimportantelementof well-beingformostpeople.Meaninginthissenseisalwaysathree-term relation:somethingmeanssomethingelsetosomeone.Livesaremeaningfulwheneventswithinthembearsuchrelations,partlytemporaland causal,partlyinterpretive.Eventsbearsuchrelationswhentheycohere withinintelligiblenarratives.Thisaccount,intermsofnarrativelyintelligiblerelationsamongeventsinlives,showswhyindividualspursue meaningbutdifferinthevaluetheyattachtoit.Aspartofthisaccount, Iwillclarifythenatureofnarrativesandthetypeofunderstandingthey provideunderinterpretation,aswellasclarifyingtherelevantdifferences between fictionalandreallifenarratives.
Anappendixonthenatureofdesirebothparallelsmyanalysisof emotionsinthechapteronhappinessandfurtherclarifiestheanalysis ofwell-beingintermsofthesatisfactionofrationaldesires.Theconcept ofdesire,likethatofemotion,isaclusterconcept,definedintermsof criterialpropertiesofparadigms,propertiesthatareneithersinglynecessarynorsufficientforbeingamemberoftherelevantclass,butthat countconceptuallytowardinclusionintheclass.
Thisbriefoutlineisintendedonlytomotivateyoutoreadon.Icannot motivateyoubyclaimingthatyouwilltherebylearnhowtoleadabetter life(althoughreadingaphilosophybookisprobablybetterthansome
otherthingsyoucouldbedoingwithyourtime).Iwillnotadviseyouon whichobjectivestopursueandwhichtoavoid(don’tpursuefameand fortune,astoomanyacademicstellus,butasIwilltellyoualsoonlyif Iassumeit’sazerosumgamebetweenyouandme).Toadviseyouon howtoleadyourlifeIwouldhavetoknowyouandyourpresent motivationsbetterthanyouknowyourself,andI’mguessingthat Idon’tknowyouatall(IhopethatmorethanthoseIknowpersonally arereadingthis).Thereareplentyofpoppsychologyandafewpurportedphilosophybookswithpartiallysimilartitlesthatwillsoadvise you,explicitlyorimplicitly.Thisbookwillnotcompetewiththem,butit mightsaveyouthetimeofreadingthem.
Pleasure MusicalPrelude Kierkegaardon DonGiovanni
SørenKierkegaard,inhisguiseasanaesthetewhoplacesaestheticor sensorypleasuresaboveallothervalues,claimsthatMozart’ s Don Giovanni istheoneperfectworkofart.¹Itisuniqueincompletely satisfyingthegoalofallartworks:theperfectunionofformandcontent. Thecontentcentersaroundthefamous(orinfamous)maincharacter DonJuan,theeroticgeniuswhosesolemotivationissexualconquest,the relentlesspursuitofsensuouspleasure.AccordingtoKierkegaard, Mozart’smusicisuniquelysuitedtoconveyingsuchcontent,which indeedcanonlybeadequatelyexpressedinmusic.Thesensuousaspect oflanguageisalwayssubordinatedtothemeaningsconveyed,whilethe sensuoussoundofmusic,itsimmediatelyfeltsensorypleasure,isits essence.Thisessencegivesmusicakindofdemonicpoweroverus,just asDonGiovanniexercisessuchpoweroverallwithwhomhecomesinto contact(excludingthespiritoftheCommandant,who,aspurespirit, excludesthepowerofthesensuous).
KierkegaardcontrastsDonGiovanniwithtwoothereroticcharacters inMozart’soperas:Cherubinoin TheMarriageofFigaro ,aboycharacter sungbyafemale,inwhomeroticdesireawakensbutisnotyetfocused; andPapagenoin TheMagicFlute,whocheerfullyseeksanethicalsatisfactionofhisdesireinawife.Incontrasttothem,onlyDonGiovanni “istheexpressionforthedemonicdeterminedasthesensuous and theexpressionforDonGiovanniisagainexclusivelymusical.”²Don Giovanni’ssensuouspleasureexistsonlyinthemoment,asdoesthe
FromPhilosophy,1E.©2016Gale,apartofCengage,Inc.Reproducedbypermission. www.cengage.com/permissions
¹Kierkegaard(1959).²Kierkegaard(1959),pp.84,89.
Life’sValues:Pleasure,Happiness,Well-Being,andMeaning. Alan H. Goldman, Oxford University Press (2018). © Alan H. Goldman. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198829737.003.0001
immediatesensuouspowerofmusic,eventhoughboththemusicandthe characteraretemporallyextended.WhatKierkegaardcalls “psychical love” continuesanddevelopsovertime,whileDonGiovanni’sintense immediatepleasuresareevanescentalthoughendlesslyrepeated,an immediacyoncemoreconveyedonlythroughmusic.Whatisperfectly expressedisthemotivatingpowerofsensuouspleasure,thepassionand powerofbiologicallifeitself, “infinitepowerwhichnothingcanwithstand.”³Greatmusic,likeDonGiovanni,hasthisimmediateemotional impact,theirresistibleforceofintensesensuouspleasure,theperfect unionofformormediumandcontentinthisoneperfectworkofart.
Complexities IshallnotdisputeKierkegaard’sevaluationof DonGiovanni here,forItoo knowofnobetteropera,butIwillarguethatmattersaremorecomplex bothwithappreciationofoperaticmusicandwiththenatureofpleasure itself.Inbriefregardtotheformer,appreciationofmusicisonlyvery partiallyconstitutedbytheimmediatesensuouspleasureofthebeauty ofthetonesatanymoment.Thereispleasureindeedinhearingthetone ofLeontynePrice’smagnificentvoiceorJaschaHeifitz’sviolin,⁴ but appreciationofmusicandthepleasureinvolvedinsuchappreciationis farmorecomplexthanthat,farmorethanmerelymomentarypleasant sensations,nomatterhowintenselypleasurablethosesensationsmightbe. Fullengagementwithamusicalpieceincludesappreciationofitsrepeated andvariedextendedmelodicthemesanditstonalstructure,oftenfeltas buildingtensionandreleaseinreturntothetonickey.
Toappreciatemusiconemustcometoitwithexpectationsofauditory progressions,bothnaturalorinnateandderivedfrompriorexperience orknowledgeofparticularstylesandgenres.Theseexpectationsare typicallyfulfilledbytonalpiecesaftervariationanddelay,andpartof thepleasureoflisteningtosuchpiecesliesinsuchanticipationand fulfillment,inhavingsatisfactorilymetthechallengepresentedtoone’ s perceptual,cognitive,andemotionalfaculties.Pleasurableappreciation ofoperainvolves,inaddition,anunderstandingoftherelationofthe wordsordramaticthemestothemusic exemplifiedinKierkegaard’ s
³Kierkegaard(1959),p.105.
⁴ Whenanadmirerpraisedthetoneofhisviolin,Heifitzissaidtohaveheldituptohis earandsaid, “Ihearnothing.” (Ofcoursehewaspointingoutwherethecreditreallylay.)
discussionofMozart’ sopera agraspoftherelationsoftheparticular eventsatanygivenpointtothebroaderdrama,andofthecomposer’ s musictohisotherworksandthoseofothercomposers.Suchfull appreciativeengagementisindeedpleasurable,butnotinthesimple senseofimmediatesensorypleasure,howeverintense thesortofpleasureemphasizedbyKierkegaard(astheaesthetecharacter)andsoughtby DonGiovanni.
NoristhecharacterofDonGiovanni,hissignificanceforus,simply theembodimentofthesuccessfulquestforpleasurablesensations alone.Sensuouspleasureisindeedfundamentaltosex,DonGiovanni’ s mainconcern,asitistofood(noaccidentthecentralbanquetscenesin theopera),butitisnotamatterofrawsensationaloneorindependent ofunderstandingofthebroadercontext.Eventhesensationsthemselves,letalonethepleasurewetakeinthem,dependonthebroader contextandthesubject’scognitivegraspofit.Forusmerehumans,as opposedtoDonGiovanni,itmakesagreatdealofdifferencewhether oursexualpartnersarebeautifulorugly,strangersorourwivesortheir twinsisters.
Acaressfromarapistisnottypicallypleasurable,whetherornotthe sensationinitselfisthesameasacaressfromone’sspouse(aninterestingquestionnevertheless).Itisthesamewiththesimplepleasuresof food(notalwayssosimple,asmanytastesinfoodareacquiredrather thannatural)orthemorecomplexappreciationofartworks.Acutlet madefromwormsmighttastethesameasonemadefromvealtothe uninformed,butcertainlynottoonewhoknowsthesource.Somepeople findthesourceandtasteofrecycledwaternauseating,eveniftolditis perfectlycleanandeveniftheycouldnotdistinguishitinablindtest. ApaintingbyVanGoghcanlookbetterthanaknownforgery,andin anycasewillgivemorepleasureinbeingviewed.The fleshtonesofa TitianorRenoiraremorebeautiful,morevisuallypleasurable,inthe knowledgethattheyare fleshtones.Ona flagtheymightnotbebeautiful atall.⁵
ToDonGiovanni,asopposedtous,itmakesnodifferencewhere orwithwhomhe findshissexualpleasure.His1,003conquestsin Spainalonemakeupeveryconceivablevariationinsexualpartners,as
⁵ SimilarpointsandsomeoftheexamplescomefromBloom(2010).
Leporelloinformsusinhismostfamousaria.Hismasterisafteronly puresensuouspleasure,andtohim,unliketous,thecontextmatters not.Buttheappealofthecharactertousisnotlimitedtoouradmiring hiseroticgeniusandsexualconquests.Equally(ifequallyperversely) appealingishistotalfreedomfromanddisdainforsocialconventionand moralrestraint,hisbravadoandtotallackoffearinfacingevensupernaturalforce.(MozartandDaPontemustreininthisperverseappealby havinghimdraggeddowntohell,muchtothecelebrationoftheother characters,howeveranti-climactic.)Mozart’sgloriousmusicisasreflectiveorexpressiveofthesetraitsasitisoferoticsensuality.
Preview ThemoralweshoulddrawfromthisbriefresponsetoKierkegaard’ s analysisofMozart’sgreatopera⁶ concernsthehintedatcomplexity ofpleasureitself,atleastofourpleasuresasopposedtoDonGiovanni’ s (thecharacter,nottheopera).Ihavealreadyindicatedtwodistinctkinds ofpleasure:thepurelysensorykindandthepleasurewetakeinpleasurablesensationsthemselvesandincountlessotherobjectsandactivities.Thenextsectionwillanalyzeindetailthenatureofthesedifferent typesofpleasure,aswellasathirdyetdistinctkind.Thehistoryof discussionsofpleasurebyphilosophers firstemphasizedthepurely sensorykind,andrecentlytheintentionalkindthattakesanobject, totheextentofdenyingtheformerorfalselyreducingittothelatter. (Anintentionalattitudeisonethatisalwaysdirectedatanobject.Thus beliefisanintentionalattitudebecauseonecannotjustbelieve,butmust believesomething.Similarly,onetakespleasureinsomeobjectoractivity.)Recentdiscussionsbypsychologistsandneuroscientistsdonot clearlydistinguishthesethreetypesthatIwillclaimtobedistinct althoughrelated.InthatsectionIwilldefendanotherclaimthatisnow oftendenied:thatpleasureinitsseveralsenseshasdirectoppositesin pain.Inregardtoallthreetypeswecanplacepleasureandpainat oppositeendsofthesamescale.
Thefourthsectionwillexaminetheroleofpleasureinmotivation. Psychologicalhedonism,apositionwithalonghistoryinphilosophy,
⁶ RememberitisKierkegaard’scharacteroftheaesthete;thephilosopherhimselfis intentionallysuperficialhere.
claimsthatpleasureistheonlythingdesiredforitself,theonlyultimate motivator.Everythingelseissoughtonlyasameanstopleasure.The typeofpleasureprovidedbyandassociatedwithsexhasgiventhis positionabadname,leadingitsdefenderstoviewsuchpleasureasa baserkind,merelybodilyandanimalisticasopposedtothehigher pleasuresofthemind.But,asnoted,thereisanothermajortypeof pleasure,theintentionalkind:takingpleasureinvariousobjectsincludingthesensorypleasuresofsex.Therealquestionhereiswhethereither typeistheultimategoalofalldesire.Itseemsclearfromexamplesin whichwedesireotherthingsthattheanswerisnegative,butitwill remaintoclarifythetruerelationbetweendesireandpleasure.
Clearly,sometimesweseeksensorypleasures,asinsexandfood,but thoseareasmallclassofdesiredobjects.Doweseektheintentionalkind, desiretotakepleasureinthings,orisdesireitselfamatterofbeing motivatedbypleasantthoughts,thoughtsthatwetakepleasurein?These questionswillbeansweredinthesectiononmotivation.Iwillarguethat thereisaconceptualconnectionbetweenpleasantthoughtsanddesires, andbetween findingpleasureandsatisfyingparadigmrationaldesires, althoughpleasantthoughtsareneithernecessarynorsuf ficientforhavingdesires.
The fifthsectionwillturnspeci ficallytotheroleofpleasureinsex. Thatsexisintenselypleasurablehasanobviousevolutionaryexplanation relatingtothemotivationalfunctionofpleasure.Thepleasureofsex leadstomorereproductionandtheresultantsurvivalofthespecies.But thelinkbetweenthebiologyandpsychologyofsexisindirect;wedonot normallydesiresexualpartnersforpurposesofreproduction.Infactthe psychologyofsexreversestheusualrelationbetweendesireandexperiencedpleasure.Whilepleasureisusuallyabyproductofattainingwhat wedirectlydesire,whateverthosedirectobjectsofdesiremightbe,insex whatwedesireispreciselythepleasurethatphysicalcontactwiththe partnerbrings.
Althoughthedesireforsexismainlyadesireforsensuouspleasure, ourbiologyallowsforverywideculturalandindividualvariationin sexualpreferences,inwhatkindsofsexandsexualpartnersindividuals findpleasure.Furthermore,whilesensuouspleasuremaybetheimmediateandmostpressingobjectofsexualdesire,andmostclearlylinkedto itsbiologicalfunction,wetakepleasureinotheraspectsofsexaswell, suchasitsintimacyandcommunicationofaffection.Atthesametime
theremightbebiologicalexplanations,relatingtosurvivalofgenes,for varioussocialandculturalinstitutions,suchasmarriageanddiffering standardsformenandwomen.Perhaps,asFreudthought,allcultures mustbepartiallyrepressiveofsexualdesireandpleasure.Nevertheless, attemptsatexcessiverepressionfromthemajorreligionsmusteitherfail orleadtoveryunwelcomesideeffects.Thedesireforsexualpleasure resistsextinctionorfrustration,evenifitssatisfactioninitselfcontributeslittleoflastingvaluetoaperson’slife.
The finalsectionwilladdressthisquestionofpleasure’svalue.Ethical hedonismholdsthatpleasureistheonlythingweoughttoseekinitself (forothersaswellasforourselves),orinotherversions,thatitistheonly thingthatmakesaperson’slifegoodforthatperson.Thefalsityof psychologicalhedonismcallsbothviewsintoquestion.Ifpleasureis nottheonlythingweseekinitself,itisveryimplausiblethatitisthe onlythingweoughttoseek.If,forexample,weseekknowledgeforits ownsake,howcoulditbethatweoughtinsteadtoseekitonlyforthe pleasureitbrings?
Othermoraltheoriesseepleasureaseitherapartialmeasureofvalue andlegitimategoalofmoralaction,orasathreattomoralaction.It seemsthatthemoral(objective?)valueofthepleasureofanysubject dependsontheworthinessofthesubjecttohaveit,ontheworthinessof theobjecttoprovideit(theindependentvalueoftheobject?),andonthe subject’snotbeingdeceivedaboutthenatureoftheobject.Factoringin theseconsiderationswillmakethemeasurementofsuchvaluesdifficult indeed.Ifinregardtomanypleasureswecannotmeasuretheirvalue, thisagaincallsintoquestiontheclaimsthatweonlyseeksuchvalueor oughttoseekonlyit.
Inregardtothevalueofpleasuretothepersonexperiencingit,Ihave notedthatsensorypleasuremightbeanecessaryingredientinagood lifeforalmostallpeople,butunlesswearespeakingagainofDonJuan, itwillbeonlyaverypartialcomponentofagoodlife.Asforthevalueof takingpleasureinvariousotherobjectsandactivities,ifitisthesatisfactionofone’srationaldesireforpersonalgoodsthatmakesone’slife gowell,andifpleasureintheintentionalsenseisonlyatypical byproductofsatisfyingsuchdesires,thenitseemsbothsuperfluous andagainonlypartialtocountsuchpleasureasthemeasureofpersonal well-being.Theseissueswillbeexaminedindetailinthe finalsectionof thisdiscussion.
TheNatureandTypesofPleasure Sensations Thetraditionalconceptofpleasure,whichcameunderattackfrom twentieth-centurybehaviorist-orientedphilosophers,viewedpleasure asasensation,havingphysicalcausesandlocationsinthebody,but alsobeingamentalstateprivatetothesubjectwhoexperiencesit. Pleasureinthissenseisapleasurablesensationsuchasonefeelson one ’scheekwhenbeingcaressedorkissed,orinone’sbackwhenbeing massaged.Nooneelsecanexperienceone’ssensorypleasures,although theyhavelocationsinvisiblepartsofone’sbody.Whiletheyhave physicalcausesandlocationsaswellasbodilysymptomssuchassmiling orrelaxingone’smuscles,theydonottakeobjects.Theyarenotintentionalstatesaspreviouslydefined.Ifeelpleasureinmybackwhilebeing massaged,butitisnotpleasureatthemassageormasseur.
Suchpleasures,ofthetypeDonGiovanniandweseekinsexandfood, arerelativelyshort-livedandvividonlywhentheyareoccurring.They typicallyincreaseuptoapointandthendecreaseorturnpainfulwith increasedintensityofthestimulus,aswhenacoldshowerturnswarmand thenhot.Asnotedearlier,theymaydependnotonlyontheirexternal causes,butonthestateofthesubjectandherunderstandingofthe broadercontext.Itisplausiblethatfoodtastesdifferent,causespleasurable sensationsornot,dependingonwhetherasubjectishungryornauseated. Itmightbeobjectedthatthesensationsremainthesame,theonly differencebeingwhetherthesubjecttakespleasureinthem(second, intentionalsenseofpleasure),butitismoreplausiblethatthesensations themselvesvary.Toreverttoanearlierunpleasantexample,acaressbya rapistthatsendschillsdownthevictim’sspinefeelsdifferentfromacaress fromawelcomepartner.InanycaseIshallarguethatpleasantsensations arenotsimplythosewetakepleasurein,butformadistinctclassortype.
Asnoted,behaviorist-orientedpsychologistsandphilosophersdeny thatthisclassofpleasuresastraditionallyconstruedexistsatall.Nico Frijda,aprominentpsychologist,recentlyclaimedthatthereisaconsensusthatpleasureisnotasensation,⁷ althoughthisstrongclaimis falsifiedatleastbyimplicationbyotherpsychologists.MichaelKubovy, ⁷ Frijda(2010),p.100.
forexample,distinguishespleasuresofthebodyfromthoseofthemind, asdoearlierphilosopherssuchasMill,whodistinguishedlowerfrom higherpleasures.⁸ Kubovydividespleasuresofthebodyorsensory pleasuresintotonicandrelief,theformerderivingfromexternalstimuli (caresses,icecream,etc.)andthelatterfromreliefofneed,tension,or discomfort.Sexpresumablyprovidesbothkindsofsensorypleasures.If wetakesexualorgustatorypleasuresasourparadigms,thenbodilyor sensuouspleasureswillalsocontinuetobeaparadigm.ForFreud,for example,othersortsofpleasuresresultedfromsublimationofthe erotic lessintensebutofthesamesortandsource.
Philosopherswhodenypleasuresasadistinctclassofsensationsas describedabove⁹ dosofortworeasons.First,theydenythatwecould learnconceptsortermsreferringtopleasuresiftheywerepurelyprivate sensations.Pleasuresmustrefertopubliclyobservablestatesoractivities. Theymustbedefinedadverbiallyasmodifyingcertainpubliclyobservableactivities(apleasurablemassageasoneenthusiasticallyindulgedin) orfunctionallyaswhatfollowsfromcertainphysicalcausesandproducesoraccompaniescertainobservableeffects(sensationsasstatesof thenervoussystemorbrainpositedtoexplaincertainbehavioralreactionsthatfollowcertainstimuli).Withoutsuchconceptualconnections betweenpleasuresandsuchpubliclyobservablephenomena,wecould nevercommunicatetheminacommonlanguage.
Thereisagrainoftruthintheseclaims,butitdoesnotrefutethe characterizationofthistypeofpleasureasasensation,indeedaprivate mentalstate.Itwillbesufficientforteachingandlearningtermsforthese statesifsomearesalienttosubjectsincertainconditions,andifthese sensationshavetypicalcausesandeffects.Thesephysicalcausesand effectsneednotbe,andindeedarenot,asaclassnecessaryorsufficient fortheoccurrenceofthepleasurablesensations.Thus,whenachild tasteschocolateicecreamandsmilesandsays “ yum, ” hisparentscan say, “That’swhatwemeanby ‘pleasure’ . ” Perhapsmoretypicallythe childwill firstlearnthemeaningof “pain” whenhecutshiskneeand cries.Hecanthenbetoldthatpleasureistheoppositesortofsensation. Butinneithercasearetheconditionsthatarenecessaryandsufficientfor learningthetermalsouniversallynecessaryandsuf ficientforhavingthe
⁸ Kubovy(1999),p.135.
⁹ ThemostfamousbeingRyle(1949).RylewasinspiredbyWittgensteinandinturn stronglyinfluencedlaterphilosophers.
sensation.Obviouslyonecanfailto findthetasteofchocolateicecream pleasurableandcansmileforotherreasons.Lessfrequently,aperson underanesthesiacanbecutwithoutpain,andonecanpretendtobein painorexpressfearinsteadbycryingout.Andoncewelearntermsfor sensorypleasuresandpains,wecanreportonthosethathavenotypical knowncausesandeffects,suchasheadachesorpleasurablesensationsin anindividualwithhighlyunusualtastes.
Whatsensorypleasuresandpainshaveincommonacrosspossible worldsisonlythewaytheyfeel:goodorbad.Aliensinotherworldsmight neverfeelpainwhencutorexpressitbycryingout,similarlywith pleasurestheyfeelandtheirtypicalcausesandeffectsinus.Andthe aliensmighteagerlyseekcertainfoodswithoutfeelingthegustatory pleasuresthatwedo,orfeelextremepainwhenbittenbymosquitoes, whichtheyexpressonlybyscratching.Thesepossibilitiesarefullycompatiblewithourbeingabletotellbyitsoutwardsignswhenanother personhasapleasurableorpainfulsensationthatwecannotliterally share.Theseoutwardsignsremaincontingentlyrelatedtothesensations, thatis,wecanhavesignswithoutthesensationsandthesensations withoutthesigns.Howcanwethenknowthatothersfeelthesamesort ofsensationsthatwedoinsimilarconditions?Weareallhuman,biologicallysimilar,sowhyintheworldshouldwethinkotherwise?Alternativeexplanationsfortheirbehaviorwillnormallynotbeforthcoming. Thesecondreasonfordenyingthatsensorypleasuresareadistinct classseparatefrompleasureintheintentionalsense(takingpleasurein variousobjects)isthedenialofaclaimImadeabove thatwhatsensory pleasureshaveincommonisthewaytheyfeel.Thepleasantfeelofvelvet mayseemtohavenothingincommonasarawsensationwiththetaste ofchocolateicecream.Andofcoursenoteveryone findsthefeelofvelvet orthetasteofchocolateicecreampleasurable,althoughitcanbeclaimed thattheyfeelthesamerawsensationsasthosewhodo findthemvery pleasurable.Ilikechocolate,youdon’t;thedifferenceseemstobethat Itakepleasureinthetaste, finditpleasurable,seekitout,andyoudon’t.
Theseconsiderationsleadmanyphilosopherstowanttoreducesensorypleasurestotheintentionalkind:pleasurablesensationsaresimply thosewetakepleasurein.¹⁰ Suchsensationsaresimilaronlyintheway thatthemanyandvariousotherobjectsandactivitiesthatwetake
