NotesonContributors
GiulianaDiBiaseisan AssociateProfessorofMoralPhilosophyattheUniversityofChietiPescara ‘G.d’Annunzio’,Italy.Sheholdsamaster’sdegreeinModernLiteratureand Philosophy,andreceivedherPhDinHistoryandFoundationsofEthicsand AnthropologyfromtheUniversityofSalentoin2002,underthesupervisionofProfessor EugenioLecaldano.DiBiasehasauthoredsixbooksandmadeoverseventycontributions devotedtocontemporaryandearlymodernmoralphilosophy.Herrecentpublications focusmainlyonLocke’smoralthoughtandsheisthefoundingeditor-in-chiefof Studi lockiani.Ricerchesull’etàmoderna,Pisa(2020).
MatteoFavarettiCamposampieroisAssociateProfessorattheDepartmentofPhilosophy andCulturalHeritageoftheCa’ FoscariUniversityofVenice.Hisresearchisdevotedto earlymodernphilosophyfromDescartestoKant.Hispublicationsincludetwobooks,six co-editedvolumes,andseveralarticlesonLeibniz,Wolff,theirsources,andtheirinfluence. Amonghisrecentarticlesare ‘MachinesofNatureandMachinesofArt:ChristianWolff’ s ReceptionofLeibniz’ , RivistadiStoriadellaFilosofia (2019); ‘MereologyandMathematics: ChristianWolff ’sFoundationalProgramme’ , BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy (2019); ‘InfiniteRegress:Wolff ’sCosmologyandtheBackgroundofKant’sAntinomies’ , Kant-Studien (forthcoming).
BarnabyR.HutchinsisaresearchfellowatGhentUniversity,Belgium.Hismainareasof researchareearlymodernmetaphysicsandearlymodernbiology.Amonghispublications are ‘Descartes,CorpusclesandReductionism:MechanismandSystemsinDescartes’ Physiology’ , PhilosophicalQuarterly (2015),and ‘DescartesandtheDissolutionofLife’ , SouthernJournalofPhilosophy (2016).
SusanJamesisaprofessorofPhilosophyatBirkbeckCollegeLondon.Hermainareasof interestareearlymodernphilosophy,feministphilosophy,politicalphilosophy,andthe philosophyofart.Amongherpublicationsare PassionandAction:TheEmotionsinEarlyModernPhilosophy,Oxford(1997); SpinozaonPhilosophyReligionandPolitics:the Theological-PoliticalTreatise,Oxford(2012);and SpinozaonLearningtoLiveTogether, Oxford(2020).SheisaFellowoftheBritishAcademy.
MichaelJaworzynreceivedhisdoctorateinphilosophyatKULeuven.Heisafellowonthe PanentheismandReligiousLifeproject(aresearchcollaborationbetweenKing’sCollege LondonandJohnsHopkinsUniversity),andavisitingfellowattheWarburgInstitute.He istheauthorofarticlesontheearlyreceptionandtransformationofDescartes’ thought, andisparticularlyinterestedintheworkandlegacyofArnoldGeulincx.Hispublications include: ‘CasparLangenhert’sParisian “SchoolofEgoists” andtheReceptionofGeulincx’ s Physics,fromOccasionalismtoSolipsism’ , HistoryofUniversities XXXIII/2(2021)and ‘“Themindismorelikematter,thebodymoreliketheform”:GeulincxagainstDescartes
(andthescholastics)onthesourcesofdifferenceinminds’,in DifferencesinIdentityin PhilosophyandReligion,S.FlavelandR.Manning,eds.(2020).
JulieR.KleinisAssociateProfessorofPhilosophyatVillanovaUniversity.Sheworksin medievalandearlymodernphilosophyandistheauthorofarticlesonGersonides,Spinoza, andDescartes.HercurrentprojectonSpinozanpedagogyconsiderstheepistemic,affective, andsocio-politicaldimensionsofthreekindsofknowingfromadevelopmentalperspective.Herotherinterestsincludecriticaltheory,queertheory,andpsychoanalysis.
StephMarstonisAssociateResearchFellowintheDepartmentofPhilosophyatBirkbeck, UniversityofLondon.Hermainresearchinterestsareinthehistoryofphilosophy,feminist philosophy,andpoliticalphilosophy.
MichaelMoriartyisDrapersProfessorofFrenchattheUniversityofCambridge,anda FellowofPeterhouse.Hispublicationsinclude TasteandIdeologyinSeventeenth-Century France, CambridgeUniversityPress(1988), RolandBarthes, PolityPress(1991), Early ModernFrenchThought:TheAgeofSuspicion,OxfordUniversityPress(2003), Fallen Nature,FallenSelves:EarlyModernFrenchThoughtII,OxfordUniversityPress(2006), DisguisedVices:TheoriesofVirtueinEarlyModernFrenchThought,OxfordUniversity Press(2011),and Pascal:ReasoningandBelief,OxfordUniversityPress(2020).Heisjoint editorof TheCambridgeHistoryofFrenchThought,CambridgeUniversityPress(2019).He isaFellowoftheBritishAcademyandaChevalierdansl’OrdredesPalmesAcadémiques.
UrsulaRenzisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofGraz,Austria,wheresheis SpeakeroftheworkingunitHistoryofPhilosophyandChairoftheAlexiusMeinong Institute.Herresearchfocusistheintersectionoftheoreticalphilosophy(metaphysics, epistemology)andhistoryofphilosophy(inparticular,EarlyModernPhilosophy,nineteenth-andtwentieth-centuryGerman-writtenphilosophy).Herpublicationsincludethe monographs DieRationalitätderKultur (2002)and TheExplainabilityofExperience (2018; originalpublicationinGerman2010),and WasdennbitteistkulturelleIdentität? (2019), severaleditedvolumesincluding Self-Knowledge.AHistory,OxfordUniversityPress(2017) aswellasnumerousarticles.
PieroSchiavoisProfessorinasecondaryschoolinRomeandcollaborateswiththe DepartmentofPhilosophyandCommunication,UniversityofBologna.Hehasworked attheuniversitiesofBolognaandBarcelonaandhasbeenvisitingresearcherattheENSin Paris.HeiswritingamonographonthereceptionofDemocritusinFrenchculturebetween thesixteenthandeighteenthcenturies.Hisrecentpublicationsinclude ‘Immaginidi Democritonelleedizionidelle Vite diDiogeneLaerziodalXValXVIIIsecolo’ , Bruniana &Campanelliana XXIV,2(2018); ‘LamascheradiDemocritonellaletteraturafrancesetra XVIeXVIIIsecolo’ , Intersezioni 3(2019); ‘Démocritedansleshistoiredelaphilosophieà l’aubedesLumières’,in Historiaphilosophica 18(2020).
LisaShapiroisProfessorofPhilosophyatSimonFraserUniversity.Sheistranslatorand editorof TheCorrespondenceofPrincessElisabethofBohemiaandRenéDescartes,Chicago (2007),co-editor(withMartinPickavé)of EmotionandCognitiveLifeinMedievaland EarlyModernPhilosophy.OxfordUniversityPress(2012),andeditorof Pleasure:AHistory OxfordUniversityPress(2018).HerresearchhasexaminedthephilosophyofDescartes
andSpinozathroughtheiraccountsofthepassions,andhasrecoveredthephilosophical worksofearlymodernwomen.Sheiscurrentlyinterestedinhowseventeenth-century philosophersdevelopedaCartesianphilosophyofmindintheirargumentsforwomen’ s education.
PietSteenbakkersstudiedEnglishandPhilosophyinGroningen.HisPhD,Universityof Groningen(1994)wason Spinoza’sEthicafromManuscripttoPrint.Untilhisretirement hewasSeniorLecturerintheHistoryofModernPhilosophyintheDepartmentof PhilosophyandReligiousStudiesatUtrechtUniversity,andholderofthechairof SpinozaStudiesatErasmusUniversityRotterdam.HeisanactiveresearcheratUtrecht University,andintheinternational GroupedeRecherchesSpinozistes.TogetherwithFokke AkkermanandPierre-FrançoisMoreauheproducedthecriticaleditionofSpinoza’ s Ethica, Paris,PressesUniversitairesdeFrance(2020).
TeresaTatoLimaisaPhDstudentinPhilosophyandaResearchAssistantatthe HumanitiesCenter(CHAM)attheUniversidadeNovadeLisboa.Herresearchinterests spanthephilosophyofnature,anthropology,epistemology,andethics,focusingonthe modernandcontemporaryperiods.Amongherpublicationsare ‘TheOriginalContract andtheInstitutionofPoliticalSocietyinDavidHume’ in Nature,CausalityandFormsof Corporeality, Humus (2017)and ‘Thehumanselfandtheapprehensionofharmonyin LeibnizMonadology’ , Philosophica (2011).
SarahTropperisaUniversityAssistantattheUniversityofGraz,Austria.Shereceivedher PhDfromKing’sCollegeLondonandhaspublishedonLeibnizandSpinoza.Hercurrent researchfocusesonearlymodernrationalismanditsrelationtomedievalscholasticism.
CharlesT.WolfeisProfessorintheDepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversitéToulouseII –JeanJaurès.Heworksprimarilyinhistoryandphilosophyoftheearlymodernlifesciences, withaparticularinterestinmaterialismandvitalism.Heistheauthorof Materialism: AHistorico-PhilosophicalIntroduction,Springer(2016); Laphilosophiedelabiologie:une histoireduvitalisme,ClassiquesGarnier(2019); Lirelematérialisme.ENSEditions(2020). Heiseditorof Vitalismandthescientificimageinpost-Enlightenmentlife-science (2013); BrainTheory (2014); Physiquedel’esprit (2018),and PhilosophyofBiologybeforeBiology (2019).Amonghiscurrentprojectsisthe EncyclopediaofEarlyModernPhilosophyandthe Sciences (editedwithD.Jalobeanu).Heisco-editorofthebookseries ‘History,Philosophy andTheoryoftheLifeSciences’ (Springer).
Introduction:ApproachestoLiving andDying
SusanJames
‘Ifnaturehassenseandreasonthenshehasselfmotion;andifnaturehasself motion,thennoneofherpartscanbecalledinanimateorsoulless;formotionis thelifeandsoulofnatureandofallherparts,...therebeingnopartoftheanimate bodyofnaturethatcanbedead.’¹ MargaretCavendish,theauthoroftheselines, belongedtotheeclecticassemblageofearlymodernphilosopherswhoarguedthat everythinginnatureisalive mineralsaswellasplants,snowaswellashuman beings.Writinginthe1660s,shedismissedtheeverydayassumptionofan ontologicaldivisionbetweenlivingandnon-livingthingsandportrayedaworld teemingwithlifeandknowledge.Cavendish’svisionprovidedrichmaterialsfor thefantasiesshedevelopedinher fictionalworks,whereanimal-menconverse learnedlywithhumanbeings.² Butherargumentalsobelongstoawide-ranging philosophicalcontroversyabouttheextentoflife,whichrunsthroughEuropean philosophyoftheearlymodernperiodand findsexpressionintwopersistent questions.Howmuchofnatureisalive?Andislifeboundedbybirthanddeath?
InaculturesaturatedbyChristiantheologyandpolicedbythedemandsof religiousorthodoxy,thenotionofalifespanwasunavoidablyambiguous.Most livingthings,itwaswidelythoughnotuniversallyagreed,areborn,live,anddie, andwhentheydietheyceasetoexist.Forhumanbeings,however,deathisnotthe endofbeing;thesoulsurvivesandwillbereunitedwiththebodyafterJudgement Day.AstheApostolicCreedhasit, ‘Ibelieve ...inthe resurrectionofthebody, andthelifeeverlasting. ’ Birth,whichmarksthestartofourearthlylifespan,hasits doubleinrebirth,thetransitiontoeternallife.Equally,deathisbothanendanda beginning;beforewecanberebornwemustdie,butdyingisasteptowards renewedlife.FormanyauthorsworkingwithinaChristianframework,this narrativeconstrainedwhatitwasacceptabletosayandeventothink;anycredible philosophicalsystemhadtoaccommodatetheNewTestament’spromiseof eternallife.Itcomesasnosurprise,however,thatthisveryconstraintwasalsoa sourceofphilosophicaltroubleandcreativity.Thepolysemicconceptionsoflife
¹ Cavendish2001,I.xvi,72.
² See ‘TheDescriptionofaNewWordcalledtheBlazingWorld’,inCavendish2003.
SusanJames, Introduction:ApproachestoLivingandDying In: LifeandDeathinEarlyModernPhilosophy.Editedby: SusanJames,OxfordUniversityPress.©SusanJames2021.DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192843616.003.0001
anddeathinheritedfromChristianity,andindeedfromothertraditions,notonly provokedahostofdifficultquestions,butseemtohaveservedasacatalystforfarreachingandinventiveanswers.Perhapsautomataarealive,asDescartesseemsto imply;perhapseverythingisalive,asCavendishproposes;perhapsdeathisunreal, asLeibnizclaims;perhapsweremainembodiedafterdeath,asMalebranche speculates;perhaps,asConwayargues,animalsaswellashumansareeligible forredemption;andperhaps,asmanywriterssuggest,itisincumbentonustolive asfullahumanlifeaswecan.Problemsrelatingtolifeanddeathariseacrossthe wholeofearlymodernphilosophyandcalloutforattention.
Thisbookaimstoconveythebreadthofthesephilosophicalconcerns.Itranges overdebatesinmetaphysics,thelifesciences(aswecallthem),epistemology,the philosophyofmathematics,philosophicalpsychology,thephilosophyofreligion, thephilosophyofeducation,andethics.Atthesametime,itaimstoilluminatethe interconnectednessoftheproblemsexploredundertheseheadings.Thecontents ofonecategoryspilloverintoothersasauthorsexaminethemetaphysical implicationsoftheirethicalcommitmentsorwonderabouttheepistemological basisoftheireducationalprogrammes.Needlesstosay,manyoftheseinterconnectionshaveolderroots,andthedesiretorelateoneproblemwithanotheris amplyprefiguredinclassical,medieval,andrenaissancephilosophies.What changes,however,istheintellectualandculturalenvironmentwithinwhich philosophers findthemselvesworking,andtheshiftsinideastowhichthisgives rise.Insomecases,alteredconditionsgeneratenewquestions,aphenomenon illustrated,forexample,inPartsIandVI;inothers,theysuggestnewapproaches toexistingpuzzles,asPartsII,III,IV,andVvariouslyshow;andalongsidethem, asweseethroughoutthebook,oldproblemspersist.Butregardlessofthe trajectoryofanyindividualissue,intercommunicationbetweenonetopicand anothergivesrisetofreshoutlooksandemphases.Muchofthefascinationofearly moderndiscussionsoflifeanddeathliespreciselyintheircomplexramifications inthewayapparentlydisparatecommitmentsmergeintocomprehensivephilosophicaloutlooksthatfrequentlychallengeourown.
Inrecentyearstherehasbeenawaveofinterestintheplaceofthelifesciences withinearlymodernnaturalphilosophy.Howdidthewritersofthiseraview livingorganisms,andhowdidtheyaccountfortheiroperations?Eminent scholarshavestudiedtheseissuesinrelationtoindividual figuressuchas Descartes,³ Leibniz, ⁴ BuffonandKant, ⁵ andhaveexaminedtheoverarching theorieswithinwhichorganismswerestudied.⁶ Indoingso,theyhavebeen unavoidablydrawnintometaphysicalcontroversies,forexampleaboutsubstance, individuation,causation,orinfinity,eachwithitsowntheologicaldimensions. Theresultingtheologico-metaphysical-biologicalnexusconstitutesoneofthe
³ Detlefsen2016,141–172;BrownandNormore2019. ⁴ Smith2011.
⁵ Wilson2017a,53–68;Wilson2017b,256–274. ⁶ NachtomyandSmith2014.
leadingareasofcurrentresearchonlifeanddeath,andformspartofthesubject matterunderdiscussionhere.Butthisbookhasafurtherambition:tolinkthe predominantlytheoreticalpreoccupationsassociatedwiththestudyoforganisms tothepracticalaspectofphilosophybybringingthemintoconversationwitha rangeofbroadlyethicalquestionsaboutlifeanddeath.Ratherthangivingpriority tothemesthatanticipatethepreoccupationsofmodernscience,theorganization ofthevolumeaimstoremindusthatphilosophy,asourearlymodernpredecessorsconstruedit,wasalsoaboutlearninghowtoliveanddie.⁷ Questionsabout ournatureaslivingthingswereexploredintheshadow,asitwere,ofquestions abouthowtoconductandendourownlives.Thesixpartsofthebookare thereforeroughlydividedbetweentheoreticalandpracticalthemes.PartsI,II,and VIdealforthemostpartwithmetaphysical,theological,andepistemological problemsandtracesomeoftheirpsychologicalandbiologicalimplications. PartsIII,IV,andVfocusmainlyonethicalissues,andfollowoutsomeoftheir consequencesforpsychology,education,andphilosophizingitself.Therestofthis Introductiontakesthesesectionsonebyoneandsummarizesthetopicsexamined ineachofthem.
1Feelingalive
Whatisittoknowthatwearealive?Thisquestionisnotoftenexaminedbyearly modernphilosophers,norbytheircurrentcommentators;butasUrsulaRenz arguesinChapter1,changesinphilosophicallanguageduringthecourseofthe seventeenthcenturymakeitpossibletoformulatetheprobleminnewterms.The cruciallinguisticshiftisinthemeaningof ‘consciousness’.InLatin,anoldsenseof conscientia tomean ‘conscience’ comestobecomplementedbyanoveluse,made familiar,forexample,byDescartes: ‘Iusetheterm “thought” (cogitatio)toinclude everythingthatiswithinusinsuchawaythatweareimmediatelyaware(conscius)ofit.Thus,alltheoperationsofthewill,theintellect,theimaginationand thesensesarethoughts.’⁸ Tobeconsciousofsomethingistobeimmediatelyaware ofit,andforDescartestheobjectsofconsciousnessareourthoughts.BothinLatin andotherlanguages,thismodernsenseofthetermtooksometimetoget established,sothatitsappearancesinseventeenth-centurytextsneedcareful interpretation.Asitgainedhold,however,itbecamepossibletoaskwhether
⁷ Hadot1995;Jones2006;James2020.
⁸ ‘Cogitationisnominecomplectorilludomnequodsicinnobisest,utejusimmediateconsciisimus. Itaomnesvoluntatis,intellectus,imaginationis&sensuumoperationessuntcogitationes.’ René Descartes, SecondSetofReplies,ATVII.160;CSMII.113.(Iusethestandardabbreviationsof Descartes’ Œuvres ed.CharlesAdamandPaulTannery,and ThePhilosophicalWritingsofDescartes ed.andtrans.JohnCottingham,RobertStoothof,DugaldMurdochandAnthonyKenny.)
4
weareconsciousofbeingalive,andwhatkindofknowledgethisconsciousness amountsto.
TakingthisquestionasoneofthelegaciesbequeathedbyDescartes,Renztraces thewayitistakenupinthenextgenerationbyadedicatedCartesian,Louisdela Forge,andbySpinoza.Eventheissueatstake,shesuggests,ishardtodiscern. Afterall,weusuallyonlyaskwhetherwearealiveinexceptionalcircumstances suchasout-of-bodyexperiences,andotherwisetakelivingforgranted.Butla ForgeandSpinozaareamongthephilosopherswhorecognizetheneedtoexplain ourfeelingofbeingalive,andtheiranswerstendinametaphysicaldirection.For Spinoza,inparticular,thefeelinggivesusimmediateaccesstoourbeingand yieldsknowledgeofwhatwemostfundamentallyare.
ThemetaphysicalargumentsonwhichRenzconcentratesanalysetheknowledgeofbeingaliveingeneralterms,andstandbackfromitsphenomenology. Here,though,philosophicalenquirymergeswitharangeoftheologicallyand poeticallyinspiredattemptstoarticulatewhatitfeelsliketobealive.ThetheologicalaspectofthisprojectcropsupinPartII;butthegenreinwhichthefeeling ofbeingaliveisperhapsmostdeeplyexploredispoetry.Writingaboutthis developmentintheEnglishcase,TimothyHarrisonsuggeststhatseventeenthcenturyproselackedtheresourcestoportraythe first-personphenomenologyof consciousness,andonlypoetrycouldrisetothechallenge.⁹ Somephilosophers wereinclinedtoagree.Descartes,forexample,resortstoasimiletoexpressthe gulfbetweenprosaicphilosophicallanguageandpoetry’sabilitytomimicthe immediacyofconsciousness. ‘Itseemsamazing’,heobserves, ‘whatprofound thoughtsareinthewritingsofthepoets,moresothaninthoseofthephilosophers.Thereasonisthatpoetswritethroughenthusiasmandthestrengthofthe imagination,fortherearesparksofknowledgewithinus,asina flint:where philosophersextractthemthroughreason,poetsforcethemoutthroughthe imaginationandtheyshinemorebrightly.’¹⁰
Onewaytoisolatethefeelingofbeingaliveinitspurestformistoimaginethe dawningofindividualconsciousness the firstmomentatwhichindividuals becomeawareofthemselves.Condillacwouldlatertrytoreconstructthismoment inprose,¹¹ butintheseventeenthcenturyitwasthepoetswhocaptureditmost vividly.AsHarrisonremindsus,Milton ’sAdamdescribeshis firstawakening: ‘StraighttowardsheavenmywonderingeyesIturned/Andgazedawhilethe amplesky,tillraised/Byquickinstinctivemotion,upIsprung/andthitherwood endeavouring,andupright/Stoodonmyfeet.’¹² Stillmorespeculatively,Thomas Traherneclaimstorememberhisexperiencesasafoetus ‘shutupintheNarrow
⁹ Harrison2020,24–25.
¹⁰ ‘Cogitationesprivatae’,ATX.217;CSMI.4.QuotedinJones2006,27–28.
¹¹ deCondillac1984.
¹² JohnMilton1991, ‘ParadiseLost’ (VIII.257–261)inOrgelandGoldberg,eds,1991;Harrison 2020,107.
ClosetofhisMothersWomb’ . ¹³ ‘ThosepureandvirginapprehensionsIhadfrom thewomb,andthatdivinelightwherewithIwasborn,arethebestuntothisday, whereinIcanseetheuniverse.BythegiftofGodtheyattendedmeintotheworld, andbyhisspecialfavorIrememberthemtillnow.Verilytheyseemthegreatest giftshiswisdomcouldbestow,forwithoutthemallothergiftshadbeendeadand vain ....Allappearednew,andstrange,atthe first,inexpressiblyrare,and delightful,andbeautiful.’¹⁴
ForMilton,Adam’ s firstexperiencesofbeingaliveareafeelingofwonderathis surroundings,butalsoofhisbodyinmotion.Hestandsuprightonhisfeet.For Traherne,consciousnessbeginswithasenseofbeautyanddelight.Whenearly modernphilosophersexaminedourknowledgeofbeingalive,theytookupthe poets’ emphasisonfeeling,alongwithitsconnotationsofembodiment.Intheir ownidiom,theycontributedtoabroaderculturalpreoccupation,shapedbythe emergenceofanewconceptionofconsciousness.
2Immortality
Thefeelingofbeingaliveaswehavesofarencountereditisafeatureofour mortal,embodiedlife,boundedbybirthanddeath.Butforthemajorityofthe authorsdiscussedinthisbook,thereisaparallelquestiontobeaskedaboutour postmortem existence.WhenSpinozaaffirms,forexample,that ‘wefeelandknow byexperiencethatweareeternal’ , ¹⁵ hepromptsustoconsiderhowtheknowledge thatweexisteternallyrelatestotheknowledgethatweexisthereandnow.Isthere adifferencebetweentheembodiedfeelingofbeingalivingbutmortalcreature andthefeelingthatoneexistseternally,andcanwesomehowarticulateit?
Admittedly,Spinoza’sformulationoftheproblemridesroughshodoverthe theologicalnarrativethatconventionallyframesChristiandiscussionsofeternal life:whendeathdestroysourbodies,oursoulsenteranewphaseofexistencein whichtheynolongerexperiencebodilysensationsorperceptions.ButChristian authorsalsoworriedaboutthenatureof postmortem consciousness.
AsMichaelMoriartyshowsinChapter2,ScholasticAristoteliansand Cartesianswereamongthephilosopherswhostruggledtoconceivethealienlife ofthedisembodiedsoul,andtoconfronttheanxietythatalifewithoutsensory pleasurewouldbedisastrouslydiminished.Acknowledgingthatthereisarisk involvedinexchangingthemortalpleasuresweknowforanexistencewecannot imagine,Descartesrespondswithcharacteristiccautionbyassessingthebalance ofprobabilities.Naturalreason ‘teachesthatthoughweshouldnotseriouslyfear
¹³ Traherne2005–2018,3.436.41–42.QuotedinHarrison2020,152.
¹⁴ Traherne2005–2018,5.93.3.1–2.QuotedinHarrison2020,199. ¹⁵ Spinoza1985,VP23s.
death,weshouldequallyneverseekit’ . ¹⁶ Buttheneedtoallaythesuspicionthat theafterlifeisnothingtolookforwardtoalsomotivatedauthorstonarrowthegap betweenembodiedanddisembodiedexperiencebyembodyingthesoul.Henry More,forexample,equipssoulsthatarenolongerjoinedtoahumanbodywith aerialbodiesorvehicles. ¹⁷ InthisvolumeMoriarty’sdiscussionofFrenchdefences ofthepleasuresoftheafterlifeculminatesinMalebranche ’sviewthattheinteractionbetweenoursoulsandourmaterialbodies,andthusoursensoryexperience,ismediatedbyanimmaterialbodythatcaninprinciplesurvivedeath.As longasthesoulremainsunitedwiththissubtlebody,alifethatisnolonger physicallyembodiedisneverthelesscapableofsensorypleasure.
Althoughthestrategyofinvestingthelifeofthedisembodiedsoulwithan analogueofsensorysatisfactionswasinsomewaysphilosophicallytendentious (howcanasoulhaveabody?),itheldoutacomfortingimageoflifeafterdeath. Somephilosophers,however,expressedadeeperresistancetoChristianconceptionsofmortalitybyinsistingthatwearenotonlyeternal,butthatweareeternally embodied.Whilewearebornanddieintheeverydaysense,theseeventsdonot markthebeginningandendofourcorporealexistence.Inrelationtobirth,this convictionisexpressedintheoriesofpreformation.Malebrancheisoneofarange oftheoristswhoholdthateachlivingthing,humanorotherwise,isformedby GodattheCreationandexistsinminiatureformasaseeduntil,inaccordance withmechanicalprinciples,itgrowsinitsmother ’swomb.¹⁸ Anylivingbeingisas oldastheworld.Inrelationtodeath,so-calledimmortalistsdefendedtheclaim thatlivingthingsneverdie. ‘Allanimals ’,Leibnizwrites, ‘arefreefromextinction, fortheyaresimplytransformedbygenerationanddeath.’¹⁹ Immortalism,asMatteoFavarettiCamposampieroexplainsinChapter3,was notuncommon;whenLeibnizespousedit,hejoinedastringofwriters,ancient andmodern,whohaddefendedimmortalistpositions.Nevertheless,thecommitmentremaineddeeplyproblematic,partlybecauseitdemandedaradicalrethinkingofindividualidentity.Ifweburnaninsectandareleftwithapileofash,oneof Leibniz’scriticsasks,inwhatsensedoestheinsectsurvive?Leibniz ’ sresponse,as Camposampieroreconstructsit,ispleasinglysymmetrical:justasananimal’ s bodyunfoldsatthestartofitsmortallife,soitfoldsupagainwhenthatlife comestoanend.Throughoutthesetransformationsitremainsembodiedand retainsitsnumericalidentity.ButevenifLeibniz’scontemporarieshadfoundhis viewpersuasive,whichtheyemphaticallydidnot,immortalismfacedafurther difficulty.Bydenyingthatdeathisreal,itopenedupadisconcertingdivide betweenmetaphysicsandaChristiantheologyinwhichdyingisthepriceof
¹⁶ Descartes,LettertoPrincessElisabeth,3November1645.ATIV.333;CSMIII.277.
¹⁷ More1987,II.15.161.
¹
⁸ Malebranche1997,I.6.1;LastElucidation,38–41.Detlefsen2014,137–156.
¹⁹ LeibniztoWolff,9November1705.QuotedbyFavarettiCamposampierointhisvolume, Chapter3,C3P2.
redemption.Atthispoint,asatmanyothers,theologyimposesconstraints,noton themetaphysicalimagination,butontheextenttowhichnon-orthodoxmetaphysicalviewscanbecomeregularsubjectsofphilosophicalconversationand enterthephilosophicalcurriculum.
3Learningtolive
Immortalismisperhapsthemostextremeoftheattemptstodefydeaththatareso prominentinearlymodernphilosophy,anditseffectsonmetaphysicsareprofound.Sotoo,asPartIIIreveals,areitsimplicationsfortheethicaldimensionsof humanlife.If,forexample,weareimmortal,whatbearingdoesthishaveonhow weshouldlive?Doesitrenderwhatweusuallycalldeathmorallyirrelevant?Oris ourso-called postmortem existencestillshapedbythemoralqualityofourmortal lives?Problemssuchasthesetendtobeaddressedinthecontextofadebateabout whatwecanandshouldaspiretobe.Ashumanbeings,locatedinadivinely ordaineduniverseandinparticularhistoricalsocieties,whatisthebestkindoflife wecanlead?Thephilosophersdiscussedinthissectionagreethatlivingwellisa matterofknowingwhatvirtuesarerequiredofusandhavingtheabilitytoput themintopractice.Tobecomevirtuous,weneedtocultivatebothourunderstandingofthegoodandourpowertoliveasthisunderstandingprescribes. However,theirdiverseapproachestothisprojectreflecttheirindividualtemperamentsaswellastheirphilosophicalcommitmentsandrangefromtherelatively modesttothetransformativelyambitious.
Atthemodestendofthespectrum,Lockeemphasizestheimportanceof acknowledgingwhathecallsourmediocrity:thefactthatourcapacitieslie somewherebetweenimperfectionandperfection.Weneedtoaccept,for example,thattherearemanythingsaboutwhichourknowledgewillalways beuncertain,andmanytalentswedonotpossess.Overweeningambitioninany sphere,whether financial,philosophical,orpolitical,leadstoperplexity,melancholy,andotherformsofunhappiness,andisunsuitedtoourhumanstation.In Chapter4,GiulianadiBiasetracesLocke’saccountofmediocrityasitdevelops fromhisearlynotebookstohis EssayconcerningHumanUnderstanding and relatesittotheclassicalandearlyChristiantraditionsonwhichhedrew.When he firstdiscussesmediocrity,Lockeurgesustobecontentedwithwhatweare;but bythetimeherevisesthe Essay,heisconcernedaboutaninherentrestlessnessin humannature theuneasinessthataccompaniesallourdesires,movesthewill, andgeneratesnewaspirations.Howcanuneasinessandasteadysenseofour mediocritybereconciled?ForLocke,diBiaseshows,uneasinessisyetanother manifestationofmediocrity.Partofourimperfectionliesinourneedtolearnto directouruneasiness,sothatwebecomeabletorefrainfromactingonimprudent
andotherwisedestructivedesires.²⁰ Asmediocrebeings,thisskilldoesnotcome easily.Wehavetoworkatit,andwemakemoreprogressifweareluckyenoughto bewelleducated.Inprinciple,however,learningtolivewellinrelationtoour humanpurposeslieswithinourgrasp.
Locke’semphasisonlearningtorefrainfromactingonone’sdesiresplaysa crucialpartinChapter5,whichfocusesonthemoralroleofvolition.LisaShapiro beginswithDescartes,insomerespectsamoreoptimisttheoristthanLocke insofarashegroundsourmoralcapacitiesontheuntrammelledfreedomofthe will.ButCartesianismisalsoalivetoourmediocrity.Understandinghowtolive wellisdifficult,andweareliabletomakemistakesaboutit.Fortunately,however, wearealwaysfreetoactonourclearestandmostdeterminatejudgements,and thisisasmuchasweshouldaskofourselves.Aslongasweconsistentlydowhat wesincerelyjudgetobebest,wearebeyondreproach.Descartesrecognizes,of course,thatwearenotbornwiththiscapacity;learningtousethewillproperlyisa skillwehavetodevelop.Butwhileheacknowledgesthisfact,hebarelypausesto investigateit.Shapiroarguesthatitismainlythenextgenerationofphilosophical writerswhobegintoenquiremorecarefullyintothekindsoftrainingthatcan equipustousethewilltocontrolourdesires.
Theseexplorationsdrawonearliereducationaltreatiseswhichextollthebenefitsofgentleness.Teachers,PierreCharronwarns, ‘shouldproceednotafteran austere,rudeandseveremanner,butsweetly,mildlyandcheerfully’ , ²¹ using conversationtoengagetheirpupils’ interest.Bythesemeans,educationcan strengthenastudent ’sspiritofenquiryand ‘openthewayattheirownwill’ . ²² Preceptsofthiskindwerestillcirculatinginthelatterhalfoftheseventeenth centuryandwereechoedinLocke’ sreflectionsoneducation. ²³ Bythen,however, asShapiroshows,theywerebeingsubjectedtofreshformsofcriticism.Writers concernedwithwomen’seducationbegantopointtothewayourcapacityto makeandactonclearanddeterminatejudgementscanbeblockedbysocial prejudicesthatarereinforcedratherthandispelledbyeducationalpractice.As PoulaindelaBarrepointsout,anentrenchedbeliefintheinequalityofthesexesis acaseinpoint.Awidespreadbeliefinwomen’sinferiorabilitiescanundermine women ’sfaithintheirownunderstandingandstunttheirabilitytofreelyexercise thewill.Takingupthisproblem,MaryAstellstruggleswiththequestionofhow womencanbetrainedtoabandonthebadhabitofsubmissivenessandexercise theirjudgementforthemselves.
IntheworkofLocke,PoulaindelaBarre,andAstell,moralvirtueisclosely linkedtotheologicalandsocialvalues;wemanifestourvirtueinourlinkswith
²⁰ Humelatermountedafurtherspiriteddefenceofmediocrity: ‘wemayalsoremarkofthemiddle stationoflifethatitisthemorefavourabletotheacquiringofWisdomandAbilityaswellasofVirtu’ . Hume1985,545–551.
²¹ Charron1601,III.2.xiv,443. ²² Charron1601,455. ²³ Locke1989.
Godandthepeoplearoundus,andinordertosustaintheserelationshipswemust learnexerciseourwillsappropriately.ButforDescartes,socialandreligiousvalues flowexplicitlyfromapriorcommitmenttophilosophicalunderstanding.The moreweacquireandactonclearanddistinctideas,themorepowerfulwe become,tothepointwhere ‘wecancontrolourpassionswithsuchskillthatthe evilswhichtheycausearequitebearable,andevenbecomeasourceofjoy’ . ²⁴ As weprogresstowardsthissomewhatStoicgoal,thephenomenologyofourlives alters.Insteadofbeingpreoccupiedbyourfeelingsofvulnerabilityandmediocrity,weturnourattentiontotheircausesandtakepleasureincontrollingthem. Livingwellinthesenseoflearningtoactonourbestjudgementsbringswithita lifeofincreasinglyuninterruptedsatisfaction.
Virtue,thusconceived,dramaticallyaltersthemoralqualityofourlives;buta yetmoreambitiousaccountofthetransformativeeffectsofunderstandingis discussedinChapter6,inwhichJulieKleinexaminesSpinoza’saccountofeternal life.Asweextendourunderstanding,Spinozaargues,webecomebetterableto controlourpassions,andindoingsobecomeabletolivemorevirtuously.We becomemoreinterestedincontrollingthanmerelysubmittingtoouraffects,more concernedwithmanipulatingtheircausestopromotejoyfulnessthaninexperiencingtheaffectsthemselves.However,thisshiftofattentionawayfromourown statestoourrelationshipswiththethingsthataffectusisonlypartofthe transformationthatknowledgebrings.AsthekindofknowledgeSpinozacalls reasoningblendsintothekindhedescribesasintuiting,ourmindsfocuslesson ourrelationshipswithother finiteindividualsandmoreontheeternalstructureof natureofwhichGodistheimmanentcause.Wecometorecognizethatwearenot merely finitebeingswhoarebornanddie,butalsomodesofGodwhoseexistence iseternal.ThechangeSpinozadescribeshereisagradualbutultimatelymassive shiftofattention;aswebecomemoreabsorbedbyourplaceinnatureasawhole, theready-to-handalterationsthatgenerallypreoccupyusbecomelessinteresting. Integraltothisprocess,however,isachangeinourunderstandingofhowto improvetheexperiencedqualityofourlives.Insteadofworryingaboutourown deaths,theprospectofdyingceasestotroubleus,andwebecomeprogressively moreskilfulatactingonourknowledgetopromotejoyfulness.HereKleintakes upathemealsoalludedtoinShapiro’stitle theprojectoflearningtoliveafully humanlife.Alifeorganizedaroundintuition,sheshows,isforSpinozathe pinnacleofvirtue.Themoreourknowledgeempowersus,themorevitalor alivewebecome.Aswellastransformingthequalityoflife,intuitiontransforms lifeitself.
Klein’sanalysisoftheseideasbringsusbacktothethemeofimmortality construedasresistancetodeath.Likesomeofthephilosophersdiscussedin
²⁴ Descartes, ‘PassionsoftheSoul’,AT11.488;CSMI.404.
PartII,Spinozaregardsdeathasatransitioninwhichonekindofthingturnsinto otherkindsofthings,buttheeternalessenceofthemindremains.Thereis,then, nodeathinthesenseofannihilation.Hisdefenceofthisviewismarked,however, byacompleteabsenceofChristiananxietiesaboutbodilyresurrectionortheplace ofpleasureintheafterlife.Asthe finalpartofKlein’sessayreveals,Spinoza’ s exceptionally fluidconceptionofanindividualallowstheseworriestobesetaside.
4Learningtodie
NotmanyphilosopherssharedSpinoza’sviewthatapreoccupationwithdeath anddyingrevealsalackofunderstanding.Accordingtoamorecommonoutlook, dyingwellispartoflivingwell,anditispartofourmoraltasktolearntodie.If,as Cicerohadclaimed,aphilosopher ’slifeisapreparationfordeath,deathisof centralphilosophicalconcerntotheliving.²⁵ Oneconsequenceofthisbeliefwas theemergenceofasetofpracticesknownas meditatiomortis,meditationon death,whichsometimesamountedtonothinglessthanpractisingdying.In propheticstates,intransportsoflove,insomeformsofinsanity,andinprofound philosophicalmeditationthesoulwasheldtoseparatetemporarilyfromthebody, thusenablingthemeditatortoexperienceincorporeality.AsMichaelJaworzyn explainsinChapter7,DutchCartesianswerebothseducedandalarmedbythis possibility.WhileDescarteshimselfhadallowedthatthemindbecomeslessalert tothepromptingsofthebodyduringphilosophicalmeditation,hewascarefulto insistthatitneverwithdrawscompletely;althoughameditatormayforgettoeat, forexample,shewillremainsensitivetointensepain. ²⁶ ButtheDutchCartesian JohannesClaubergwaslesscircumspect.Instatesofdeepcontemplation,he argued,theconnectionbetweenbodyandminddissolvesandthemindexperiencesaformofecstasyakintothepleasuresoftheafterlife.
Clauberg’ssuggestionthatmeditationenablesustomimicdyingandgeta foretasteofimmortalityrepresentsanotherearlymodernefforttotamethepower ofdeathbybringingitunderhumancontrol.Thosewiththeabilitycanpractise dyingasandwhentheywill.However,Jaworzynshows,thiswasadifficult positiontoelucidateandadangerousonetohold.Clauberghadtoworkhard toexplainthesenseinwhichameditatorcanbesaidtodieandyetreturntolife whentheirmeditationends.Howcanthebondbetweenmindandbodybebroken andthenmended?Howcanthemind-bodycompositeceasetoexistandbe reconstituted?AtthesametimeClaubergwasassailedbyothercriticisms.His viewsmackedofPelagianism,construedasthehereticaldoctrinethatsalvation lieswithinourownpower,andhewasimplicitlyaccusedofviolatingthecarefully
²⁵ Cicero1927,75. ²⁶ Descartes,LettertoArnauld,29July1648,ATV.219;CSMIII356.
articulateddivisionoflabourbetweenphilosophyandtheologywithintheDutch universities.Thesuggestionthatphilosophicalunderstandingmightmatchpoetry byendowingitspractitionerswiththepowertomovebackandforthbetweenlife anddeath,andgainknowledgeofwhatitisliketobeadisembodiedmind,was profoundlytantalizing.Butitwasalsothreatening.
Metaphysicallyandtheologically,earlymodernwritersdefendedmanyviewsof death,andthusmanyviewsofwhatadyingindividualconfronts.Butdyingisalso ahumanprocess,subjecttoordinaryvaluessuchasdignityandcheerfulness. Dyingwell,asearlymodernauthorsconceiveofit,embracesboththeseaspects, epistemologicalandethical;butinthecaseofphilosophers,theimportanceof dyingasone’sbeliefsdictateisaccordedaspecialsignificance.PietSteenbakkers illustratesthispointinChapter8,whereheshowshowbystanderswatchedtosee whetherSpinoza,aphilosopheraccusedofatheism,wouldrecantonhisdeathbed. Wouldhisprofessedattitudetodeathholdupashisownendapproached?Would hemanagetoconformtothemodelofthefreemanportrayedinhisphilosophy? Drawingonnewdocumentaryevidence,Steenbakkerstracessomeofthegossip thatcirculatedinthedaysafterSpinozadied.TherumoursSteenbakkersdiscusses wereprobablyfalse;buttheyilluminatetheslightlyprurientinterestthatthe deathsofphilosophersaroused,andinthiscaseconveyamixtureofsuspicionand grudgingadmiration.Spinoza,theyimply,didnottrusthimselftodieinthe companyofotherpeople;butithastobeadmittedthatheprobablydidnot repent.Hediedmoreonhisowntermsthanhisopponentswouldhavewished. Theimageofagooddeathwaspartlyshapedbyanindividualphilosopher’ s beliefs,butalsoconformedtoapatternspelledoutinexemplarycases.From Socratesonwards,agoodphilosophicaldeathwasepitomizedbyparticular figures andelaboratedinquasi-historicalnarratives.Runningthroughthistraditionisthe underlyingthoughtthatfacingdeathcalmlymaybehardestforthosewhoviewit asa finalannihilationandareconvincedthatitgivesusnothingtohopefor. Indeed,thismaypartlyexplainwhythe figureofDemocrituscontinuedtoexcite theearlymodernimagination,asPieroSchiavoshowsinChapter9.Democritus’ s viewthatdeathismerelyarearrangementofatomsandshouldbe ‘nothingtous’ heldoutatemptingifatheisticalreleasefromfearsabouttheafterlifethatwere endemictoChristianityandJudaism. ²⁷ Buttherewas andis somethingunsettlingabouthisreputationformockingeveryoneandeverything.Hisreasonsfor dismissingdeathwerealsogroundsforscorninglife.
Schiavoexploresasequenceofearlymodernreadingsofthelegendof Democritus’sdeath,mostinfluentiallytransmittedtousbyDiogenesLaertius. Democritus,thestoryclaims,managedtousehisknowledgetodelayhisdeathso thathissistercouldenjoyanannualfestival.Onceagain,theanecdotelinks
²⁷ Onseventeenth-centuryJewishdebatesabouttheafterlifeseeNadler2004.
philosophicalwisdomwiththecapacitytodefydeath,athemereiterated,as Schiavoreveals,inspeculationsaboutthepowersoftheso-calledEnglish Democritus,RobertBurton.AlthoughBurtondidnotdelayhisdeath,hewas heldtohavepredictedwhenitwouldoccur.ButthestoryaboutDemocritusisalso takenupinamorescepticalspiritbyBayle,whousesittoillustratehowthe historicalrecordgetsdistorted.Isitlikely,Bayleasks,thatDemocritusdefied deathinthemannerthelegenddescribes?Doesitnotrathershowhowimaginationandthedesiresthatdriveitshapethehistorythatcomesdowntous?Aswell asencouragingamorerobustlycriticalappraisalofnarrativesaboutthedeathsof individualsages,Bayle’sdiscussionispartofamovementinwhichbiography becameincreasinglymarginaltophilosophicalpractice.²⁸ Whilethisprocesstook sometime,itmadespacefortheview(embracedbySteenbakkersbutaliento manyearlymodernthinkers)thatthewayaphilosopherdiesdoesnotconveya deepermessageaboutthevalidityofhisorherideas.
5Suicide
Amongtheaccountsofexemplarydeathsinheritedbytheearlymodernworld weremanydescriptionsofsuicide;theendsofLucretia,Seneca,andBrutus,for example,wererepeatedlyportrayedbypoets,dramatists,andpainters,andraised questionsaboutmanyofthethemesdiscussedsofar.Ifthemoralqualityofone’ s lifeisreflectedinthewayonedies,theexerciseofvirtuemayrequireustotake deathintoourownhands.Infact,controllingthetimingandnatureofone’sdeath bykillingoneselfmaybewhatvirtuedemands.Thisviewcontinuestobe sympatheticallydiscussedbyrenaissanceauthorswho,asSarahTropperpoints outinChapter10,oftenexploreitin fictionalsettingssuchasMontaigne’sIsland ofCeaorThomasMore’sUtopia.Butthereisasharpcontrastbetweentheir evocationsofresolutedeathsassistedbysupportiveonlookersandaChristian imageofsuicideasaculpablerejectionofone’sdutiestoGod,oneself,andthe communitiestowhichonebelongs.WhilebothconceptionsareinplayinPartV, thelatterdominates,asitdidinearlymodernEurope.
Chapters10and11reflectonHume’sdefenceofthemoralpermissibilityof suicide,nowadaysakeytext,butonlypublishedinanunofficialFrenchtranslationduringhislifetime.²⁹ TropperaskswhichcriticsofsuicideHumewas opposingandchallengestheclaimthathewasrespondingtoargumentsdefended byAquinas.Hume’scase,sheshows,isdirectedagainsthisseventeenth-century
²⁸ Levitin2015.
²
⁹ Humesenttheessaytohispublisherin1755forinclusioninavolumetobecalled ‘Five Dissertations’,butwithdrewitforfearofcondemnationorprosecution.Althoughanunofficial Frenchtranslationappearedin1770,theessaywasonlypublishedinEnglishin1777,afterHume’ s death.SeeHume1985,577–578.
predecessors,includingDescartes,Leibniz,Locke,andMalebranche,whoturn theirbacksontheneo-classicaldiscussionsofMontaigneandErasmus,and insteaddevelopnewdefencesofbroadlyThomistconclusions.Withdifferent emphases,theyallrepresentsuicideasanirrationalfailuretounderstandthe divinelyordainedandbenevolentorderofwhichweareapart,alongwiththelaws thatgovernit,anditistheirargumentsthatHumecontests.Wheretheyinsistthat suicideviolatesthenaturalorder,herepliesthatviolatingitisimpossible;where Malebrancheholdsthatsuicidecontravenesourdutytothecommunitiesinwhich welive,Humedisagrees.
WhileTropperlocatesHume’sargumentinitsearlymoderncontext,Teresa TatoLimaconsidersthescopeofitsambitions.WhatdoesHumethinka philosophicaldiscussionofthemoralityofsuicidecanachieve,andhowfarcan ithelpto ‘restoreournativeliberty’?TatoLima’sargumentinChapter11is framedbyherviewthatthislibertyisthefreedomtoactonournaturalas opposedtoourartificialduties.Insofaraswearepersuadedtorefrainfromsuicide bysociallyimposeddutiestoGodorthecommunitiesinwhichwelive,weare subjecttoartificialconstraintsthatmakeusunfree.Here,however,philosophy canhelptoliberateus.Itcanleadustoalterourbeliefs,forexampleby emancipatingusfromfalsesuperstitionsthatreinforcereligiousorsocialtaboos surroundingsuicide.Itcanalsohelpustorefineourmoralsentimentsby improvingourgraspofthepainsandpleasurestowhichobjectsorcoursesof actiongiverise.Bythesemeans,wecanreassessthereasonsnormallygivenfor thinkingthatsuicideisincompatiblewithourreligiousandcivilduties.When Humecomestotheclaimthatsuicidedoesnotviolateournaturaldutiesto ourselves,histonechangesandheconcedesthatphilosophylosesitsgrip.Since reasonisrelativelypowerlessagainstourpassions,itcannothopetoresistthe authenticdesiresthatdrivepeopletosuicide,orinterferewiththisexpressionof theirnaturalliberty.
TatoLima’sconclusiondrawsattentiontoanaspectofsuicidethatisstrikingly absentfromseventeenth-centuryphilosophicaldiscussionsofthetopic:thedespairandisolationoftensufferedbypeoplewhogoontokillthemselves.AsJohn Callananremindsus,suchfeelingsaremorefullyacknowledgedinlate eighteenth-centuryculture,wherethelovelornherowhoputsanendtohislife becomesacommonliterarytrope,andthepopularityofworkssuchasGoethe’ s SorrowsofYoungWerther seemstohaveprovokedarashofromanticallymotivatedsuicides.Thisphenomenon,Callananargues,notonlycausedsocialand politicaldisquiet,butgaverisetophilosophicaleffortstodelegitimizesuicide. Chapter12tracestheevolutionofKant’sthinkingaboutthisproblemthroughhis engagementwithMaupertuisandRousseau,whoare,Callanancontends,thetrue targetsoftheargumentagainstsuicideinthe Groundwork.OneofKant’ sreasons fordevisinganalternativetoamathematicallygroundedmoraltheorysuchas Maupertius’ calculus,andalsotosentimentalism,wastheinabilityofeitherstance
toruleouttheacceptabilityofsuicide.Theurgencyofthisissueishighlightedin the Groundwork,whereKantchoosesthecaseofsuicidetoillustratehisuniversalizationprinciple.Themaxim ‘fromself-loveImakeitmyprincipletoshorten mylifeif,whenprotractedanylonger,itthreatensmoreillthanitpromises agreeableness’ cannot,hetellsus,beuniversalizedwithoutcontradiction.Most commentatorshavedismissedthisargumentasafailure,butCallanansetsoutto vindicateitbyofferinganewinterpretation.Ifwetakeaccountoftheintellectual contexttowhichKantisresponding,heshows,wecanunderstandKant’sclaim andappreciateitscoherence.
Takenasawhole,PartVunderlinesthebreadthandpersistenceofdebate aboutsuicidewithinearlymodernphilosophy.Asthemostunequivocalofour effortstotakecontrolofthetransitionfromlifetodeath,itembodiedatroubling aspirationtousurptheroleofGod,whilealsocastingdoubtonthevalueof humanlife.Perhaps,asMaupertuiswasnotthe firsttosuggest,totalpleasure neveroutweighstotalpainoverthecourseofone’slife,andtherationalresponse istoendit.Butformostphilosophersthiswasanentirelyunacceptable conclusion.
6Aliveornot?
Boundupwiththethemessofarsurveyedwasthedistinctionbetweenanimate andinanimatethings.Atonelevel,peoplesharedanunproblematic,though historicallyvariablegraspoftheboundarybetweenthetwoandcouldposition itemsoneithersideofit.Mineralsandcorpsesareinanimatewhileplantsand animalsareanimate.Itisstriking,however,thatmanyearlymodernphilosophers didnotseemtofeeltheneedtoharmonizetheirmetaphysicaloutlookswiththis everydaypointofview.Onthecontrary,theyoftendrewthelinebetweenthe animateandinanimateinunexpectedplaces,orevenrefusedtodrawitatall. Providingaphilosophicalaccountofwhateverweareappealingtowhen,in everydaypractice,wedistinguishthetwocategorieswasperipheraltotheir concerns.Tousthismayseemstrange.Howcouldsuchacentralfeatureofour experiencefailtobephilosophicallyimportant?Nevertheless,asBarnaby HutchinsandStephMarstonshowinChapters13and14,respectively,writers ofthestatureofDescartesandSpinozasaysurprisinglylittleaboutourcommon orgardensenseofwhatitistobeanimatedoralive.InChapter15,CharlesWolfe suggeststhatearlymoderndebateaboutthedistinctivefeaturesoflivingthings emergedinmedicalcirclesandintensifiedthroughouttheeighteenthcentury.The pressuretomaketheoreticalsenseofoureverydayconceptionoflifegrewstronger aspractitionersoftheemerginglifesciencestried,withonlypartialsuccess,to separatetheirenquiriesfromphilosophybyexplaininglifeinwhattheyconceived asnon-metaphysicalterms.
Betweenthem,thechaptersinPartVIillustratethishistoricaltransition.For Descartes,asHutchinspointsout,locatingourordinarysenseoflifewithinhis philosophicalsystemseemsanurgentproblem.Ontheonehand,theCartesian viewthatlivingbodiesoperateonthesamemechanicalprinciplesasautomata suchasclocksorpumpsseemstoimplyeitherthatclocksandpumpsarealiveor thatwhichweregardaslivingbodiesaredead.Ontheotherhand,Descartes continuestodistinguishlivingfromnon-livingbodiesineverydayterms,without conveyinganysensethatthedivisionisproblematic.Howisthistensiontobe resolved?Contributingtoalivelydebate,Hutchinsarguesthat,inbiological contexts,Descartesconcentratesexclusivelyonexplainingtheoperationsof animalandhumanbodies,andshowsnointerestintheissueofwhatmakes themalive.Indoingso,however,hetacitlyacknowledgestheontologicalcategory oflivingthingsandcannotcompletelyignoreit.Sincethecategorycannotbe conceivedintermsofeitherofthetwoCartesiansubstances,mindorextended matter,itisnoteasytoseehowtoaccommodateit.Buttheprimitivenotionof mind-bodyunionsuggestsasolution.ForDescartes,Hutchinsproposes,lifeis alsoaprimitivenotion.Althoughwedonotneedtoappealtolifetoexplainhow organismsfunction,wehaveametaphysicalgraspofwhatitistobealiveandcan appealtoitinnon-biologicaldomains.
Spinoza’srejectionoftheeverydayoppositionbetweenlivingandnon-living things,examinedinChapter14,seemsyetmoreuncompromising:thereare,he claims,noinanimatethingsinnature.³ ⁰ InMarston’sview,however,Spinozanot onlyrecognizestheeverydaydistinctionbetweenlivingandnon-livingthings,but hastheresourcestogiveametaphysicalaccountofit.Withinhisphilosophical system,organismssuchasplantscanbesystematicallydistinguishedfromnonlivingentitiessuchascrystals.Thecrucialdifferencebetweenthetwocategories liesintherolestheyplaywithinthenexusofcausesandeffectsthroughwhich individualmodesinteract.AllbodieshavewhatMarstoncallstransitiveeffects; theyaresubjecttolawsofmotionandarecontinuallymovingandbeingmoved. Butlivingthingsalsohavewhatshedescribesastransformativeeffects;their survivaldependsontheircapacitytotransformbothotherbodiesandthemselves. Unlessaplanttransformsoxygenintootherproducts,forexample,itwillnotonly failtogrow,butwilldie.
Spinoza,then,canelucidatethedistinctionbetweenlivingandnon-living thingsinhisownmetaphysicalterms.ButneitherhenorDescartesmaketheir conceptionsofoureverydaynotionoflifeexplicit,andneitherseemsto findit relevanttodoso.Foradirectattempttotheorizeourcolloquialgraspofwhat makesathingalive,weneedtolook,soWolfesuggestsinChapter15,toa traditionof ‘immanentvitalism’ thatdevelopedduringtheeighteenthcenturyas
³⁰ Spinoza1985,E2p13s.
physiologistsandotherlifescientistsfocusedonpreciselythisproblem. ParticularlyintheMedicalFacultyatMontpellier,immanentvitalistsdebated theprosandconsofthreeapproachestotheoperationsoflivingthings:explaining themmechanically;explainingthembyappealtothesoul;or(theirpreferred stance)explainingthemintermsofanindependentlife-givingprinciple.In developingthisthirdapproach,themembersoftheMontpellierSchoolaimed todistancethemselvesfrommetaphysics fromanyappealtosubstances,includingsouls.Somecontinuedtolocatelifeinadistinctiveforce,construedasan experimentalhypothesisratherthanarealthing.Othersworkedwiththeideathat lifeisanemergentfeatureofthestructureoflivingorganisms.Although,asWolfe pointsout,metaphysicscontinuedtodogtheirfootsteps,theyneverthelessbegan toestablishamoreempiricalexplanatoryidiomwithwhichtoaddressthe questionofwhatmakesathingalive.Indoingso,theyde finitivelyleftbehind thecosmologicalvitalismofCavendishorSpinoza,forwhomeverythingisaliveor animated,andestablishedaquitedifferentkindofresearchprogrammefocused onaneverydayconceptionofalivingorganism.
ThevitalistsoftheMontpellierSchoolembodyasomewhatmodernaspiration tomakethedistinctionbetweenlifeanddeathmanageable.Inrejectingmetaphysics,theywererejectingaseriesofphilosophicalworldviewsthathadspawned awildvarietyofhighlyspeculativeideasabouttheextentoflifeanddowngraded so-calledcommonsense.Oneoftheiraspirations,perhaps,wastosidelinepositionssuchasimmortalismorpan-animation,alongwiththecontentiousand sometimesdangerousdisputesthataroseintheirwake.Atthesametime,their approachintroducedaseparationbetweentheprincipallyphysiologicalissueof whatmadeathingalive,andthemoralaspectsoflifeanddeathdiscussedinthis book.Toworkoutwhatisinvolvedinlivinganddyingwell,onemust,itseems, takeaccountofwhateverwecanknowaboutourplaceinnature.Ifeverythingis alive,forexample,weneedtoconsiderwhatdutieswehavetothingsofother kinds.Ifthekeytolivingwellliesincontrollingthewill,weneedto findoutwhat obstacleswehavetolearntodealwith?Again,thesequestionscanmainlybe fencedofffromamoreorlessscientificexplanationoftheeverydaydifference betweenlivingandnon-livingthings.Itisenoughtotrytosaywhatmakesathing alivewithoutbranchingoutintotherealmsofeitherpracticalortheoretical philosophy.Thegainsassociatedwiththistransitionarebalancedbyitslosses. Theholisticearlymodernapproachtolifeanddeathdiscussedthroughoutthis volumeisexceptionallyrichfromaphilosophicalpointofview,andrefusestolose sightoftheinterconnectionsbetweenoneformofenquiryandanother.Perhaps wemightevensaythatthedisciplinaryseparationanticipated,forinstance,bythe MontpellierSchool,hasinsomewaysimpoverishedourexplorationsoflifeand death.
