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Kant’sRevolutionaryTheoryofModality
Kant’sRevolutionary TheoryofModality
UygarAbacı
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
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ToBedriyeandKathleen
PartI.ModalThoughtPriortoKant
1.OntotheologyandModalityI:TheClassicalVersion
1.1.OntotheologyastheContextofModalThought
2.OntotheologyandModalityII:TheModalVersionofthe
3.1.TheFirstLineofObjection:Gaunilo,Aquinas,Caterus,Crusius
3.2.TheSecondLineofObjection:Gassendi?
’sThesesonExistencetotheOntologicalArgument
3.6.TheNoveltyofKant’sTheses:RevisionistorRevolutionary?
4.Kant’ s ‘OnlyPossibleArgument’,PossibilityandNecessity104 4.1.DistinctionsinModality
PartIII.KantianModality:CriticalandRevolutionary
5.TheRevolutionaryShiftinKantianModalityPriortothe
6.1.AllJudgmentsHaveaModality
6.3.ModalityofJudgmentasthe
6.4.ModalityofJudgmentasSyllogisticTopology
7.ModalCategoriesandKant’
7.1.TransitiontotheCategoriesofModality
7.2.TransitionfromLogicaltoRealModalities
7.3.TheTranscendentalSchemataoftheModalCategories
8.Kant’sRadicalCritiqueofOntotheology208
8.1.TheFateofthe ‘OnlyPossibleArgument’ afterKant’sModalRevolution
8.2.Kant’sCriticalRefutationoftheOntologicalArgument
9.AbsoluteRealModalityandKant’sAmodalismRegardingNoumena249
9.1.ABlanketArgumentfortheMereSubjectivityofAllCategories?
9.2.Kant’sRevolution:ModalityasIrreduciblyRelational,Subjective, andDiscursive
PrefaceandAcknowledgments
ThelastdecadehaswitnessedanexplosionofinterestinKant’sviewsonmodality, which,valuableexceptionsinGermansuchasGuidoSchneeberger(1952)and BernwardGrünewald(1986)notwithstanding,hadnotpreviouslybeenintensively studiedinthevastliteratureonKant.ThankstoanewgenerationofKantscholars includingIanBlecher,AndrewChignell,ToniKannisto,JessicaLeech,Tobias Rosefeldt,TimothyRosenkoetter,NicholasStang,andReedWinegar,different aspectsofKant’stheoryofmodalityhaverecentlybeenbroughttotheattentionof theKantcommunityaswellasthewiderphilosophicalaudience.Stang’sexcellent book(2016)wasthe firstbook-lengthstudydedicatedsolelytoKantianmodalityin English.Iintendthisbooktocomplementmyownworkonthesubjectand contributetotheongoingeffortsofthisdynamicgroup.
IhavebeenworkingonKant’streatmentofmodalnotionsformorethanadecade. My firstfascinationwiththesubjectgoesbacktomygraduatestudiesatBoğaziçi University, İstanbul. İlhan İnanwas firsttodirectmyattentiontotheintriguing questionofwhatitmeanstoexist,andStephenVossandLucasThorpehelpedme refinemyinitialthoughtsonKant’sthesesonexistencethatresultinmy first publication(2008).MygradualrealizationthatKant’sthesesonexistenceconstitute thecruxofamuchmorecomprehensivetheoryofmodalitycametomotivatemy doctoraldissertationattheUniversityofPennsylvania.Animportantportionofmy ideasinthisbookarerootedinmydissertationinonewayoranother.Iamforever gratefultomydissertationsupervisorPaulGuyer.Hemasterfullyguidedmyvoyage throughthestormyoceansofKant’sphilosophytothesafeshoresofinterpretive clarityandtruth.Myotheradvisors,KarenDetlefsenandCharlesKahn,providedme withgeneroussupportandinsightfulfeedbackonmynarrativeregardingthebroader historyofmodalthoughtinWesternmetaphysics.AndrewChignellhelpedme immenselyasmyexternalreader.WithoutAndrew’scriticismsandsuggestions, IwouldnothaverecognizedsomeoftheimportantintricaciesofKant’saccountof realmodalityinmydissertation.IwouldalsoliketothankTheWoodrowWilson NationalFellowshipFoundationforgenerouslyawardingmetheNewcombeFellowshipinsupportofmydissertationproject.
I firstconceivedtheideaofdevelopingmydissertationintoabookduringmytwo yearsofteachingattheUniversityofBritishColumbia.Thewritingprocesstook placeduringmythreeyearsattheUniversityofRichmondandtwoyearsatthe PennsylvaniaStateUniversity.Ibenefitedfromthegeneroussupportofthesethree institutions,theinputofmycolleagues,andtheinsightfulquestionsofmystudents whotookmygraduateandundergraduateseminarsonKant’stheoreticalphilosophy.IamespeciallythankfultomycurrentdepartmentatPennStateforhostingand fundingamanuscriptreviewworkshopinOctober2017.Theparticipants,Amy Allen,BradyBowman,ChristopherMoore,EmilyGrosholz,MarkSentesy,and TimothyRosenkoetter,providedmewithextremelyhelpfulsubstantial,organizational,andstylisticfeedbackonacompletedraftofthisbook.BenRandolph,Reed
Winegar,andMikeNancehavealsobeengenerousenoughtoreadandcommenton thedraftsofvariousindividualchapters.
IamindebtedtoPeterMomtchiloffofOxfordUniversityPressforbelievinginthis projectfromtheverybeginningandnavigatingmethroughasmoothreviewand publicationprocess.Thanksalsototwoanonymousreadersfortheirmeticulous notesandconstructivesuggestionsonthewholeofthemanuscript.Ibelievethe revisionsmadeasaresultofthereaders’ reportssubstantiallyimprovedthemanuscript.Iwouldalsoliketothankthefollowingpublishersforpermissiontoreuse somematerialfrommypreviouslypublishedpapers:thankstoCambridgeUniversity Pressfor ‘Kant’sOnlyPossibleArgumentandChignell’sRealHarmony’ (Kantian Review 19(1):1–25,2014)usedinchapter4;thankstoJohnWileyandSonfor ‘The CoextensivenessThesisandKan’sModalAgnosticisminthe “Postulates”’ (European JournalofPhilosophy 24(1):129–58,2016),usedinchapter8;andthankstoJohn HopkinsUniversityPressfor ‘Kant,TheActualistPrinciple,andTheFateoftheOnly PossibleProof ’ (JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy 55(2):261–91,2017),partsof whichappearedinchapters4and8.
Finally,Iwouldliketoexpressmygratitudetotheveryspecialpeopleinmylife. IamsoluckytohavetheparentsIhave,BedriyeandAliAbacı,whounderstoodand supportedmyratherdrasticandriskycareershiftfromengineeringtophilosophy. Thisbookwouldnothavebeenreallypossiblewithouttheemotionalandintellectual inspirationofKathleenHarbin.Shehasgivenmeherconstantandlovingpatienceat everysinglestageofthedevelopmentofthisproject,fromanearlydissertationdraft toacompletebookmanuscript,andkeptmegoingevenattimesofdeepfrustration withmyownwriting.Theentireprocessofwritinginthelast fiveyearshasalsomade merealizeonceagainthatIhavesuchgreatfriendsasSanemSoyarslan,Gaye ÇankayaEksen,KeremEksen,Aslı SilahdaroğluBekmen,andAhmetBekmen. Thougheachwasdeeplyengagedintheirownscholarlyprojects,theyhavebeenso kindastoputupwithmyceaselesspreoccupationwiththisprojectthroughout.
Introduction
AlthoughinterestinKant’sviewsonmodalityhassurgedonlyrecently,Kanthada greatdealtosayaboutmodalnotionsthroughouthislongphilosophiccareer,from hisearlyworksofthe1750sand60stohiscriticalworks.Whiletheremayalsobe variousreasonstobeinterestedinKant’srecurrentdiscussionsofmodalityfromthe viewpointofcontemporaryepistemologyandmetaphysicsofmodality,asJessica Leechand,tosomeextent,NickStangdemonstrateintheirworks,theydeserve particularlyspecialattentionfrombothbroaderhistoricalandKantscholarship pointsofview.Fornotonlydothesediscussionsconstituteagenuineturning pointinthehistoryofmodalthought,buttheyalsoprovideaframeworkfora novelinterpretationofKant’sphilosophicaltrajectory.
ThisbookwillapproachthesubjectofKantianmodalityfromthesebroadand narrowhistoricalangles.IaimtoofferacomprehensivestudyofKant ’sviewson modalitybyi)locatingtheseviewsintheirbroaderhistoricalcontext;ii)establishingtheircontinuityandtransformationacrossKant ’sprecriticalandcriticaltexts; iii)determiningtheirroleinthesubstanceaswellasthedevelopmentofKant ’ s philosophicalproject.Imaketwooverarchingclaims.First,Kant ’ sprecriticalviews onmodality,whicharecriticalofthetraditiononlyfromwithinitsprevailing paradigmofmodalityandarethusrevisionistincharacter,developintoahistoricallyrevolutionarytheoryofmodalityinhiscriticalperiod.Second,thisrevolutionarytheoryofmodalityisnotonlyacrucialcomponentofKant ’scritical epistemology,simplyasoneamongitsothermajordoctrines,butitisinfact directlyconstitutiveofthecriticalturnitself.Thus,tracingthedevelopmentof Kant ’sconceptionofmodalityprovidesuswithanalternativereadingofKant ’ s overallphilosophicaldevelopment.
Kantpresentshisprecriticalviewsonmodalnotionsmostlyinthecontextofhis critiqueoftheontologicalargumentfortheexistenceofGod.Westernmetaphysics ingeneral,andtheontotheologicaltraditioninparticular,withitsdifferentversions oftheontologicalargument,construedexistenceandmodalnotionsasfundamental ontologicalpredicatesexpressingdifferentmodesorwaysofbeingofthings.The Kantoftheearly1760sshowssomesignsofbreakingwiththetradition,forinstance, whenhefamouslyclaimsin TheOnlyPossibleArgument (1763)that “existenceis notapredicateordeterminationofathing ” (Ak.2:72),and,evenmorestrongly, whenhedefi nesexistenceasapredicate “notsomuchofthethingitselfasofthe thoughtwhichonehasofit” (Ak.2:72).Yet,thesere flectionsonexistenceare orientedtowardrevisingtheontologicalargumentandthustowardrevivingrather thandismantlingtheontotheologicalprojectofprovingGod’sexistencefrommere concepts.Therefore,despitehisimmenselyimportantdiscoverythatexistenceshould bereinterpretedasafeatureofourrepresentationalrelationtoobjects,theprecritical
Kantmostlyneglectsthegroundbreakingimplicationsofthisdiscoveryformodalityingeneral.Ultimatelyheremainswithinthetraditionalparadigm,conceiving modalnotionsinontologicalterms.
However,inthemidtolate1760s,Kantstartsrealizingthetrulynovelcharacter ofhisdiscoveryanditsradicalimplicationsforallmodalnotions.Hebeginstolaythe groundforarevolutionarytheoryofmodalitythatwill finditsfullestandmost systematicarticulationonlyinthe CritiqueofPureReason (CPR).Thistheoryof modalityprimarilyconsistsinbreakingwiththetraditionalparadigmbyrede fining modalnotionsasfeaturesofourconceptualrepresentationsofobjectsratherthanas featuresofobjectsthemselves.Thus,onKant’srevolutionaryparadigm,themodality ofanobjectinvolvesacertainreferenceorrelationtothecognitivesubject.Possibility,actuality,andnecessityallexpressdifferentmodesormannersinwhichour conceptualrepresentationsofobjectsarerelatedtoourcognitivefaculty.Accordingly,themodalassertionofanobjectdoesnotspecifyapredicateofthatobjectbut ratherassertsor ‘posits’ itsrepresentationinrelationtotheconditionsofour cognitionofobjectsingeneral.Themodaldifferencesbetweenpossibility,actuality, andnecessitythereforeamounttodifferentwaysinwhichthisrelationholds,andnot tothedifferencesinthecontentsofourrepresentationsofobjects.
ThisrevolutionarytheoryofmodalityisindeedcentraltoKant’soveralltheory ofknowledgeinthe CPR,despitethetendencyamongclassicalcommentatorsto diminishoraltogetherignoreitsimportance.Morecrucialandevenmoreneglected, however,isthatKant’smodalbreakthroughisindispensabletotheoriginationand developmentofthecriticalprojectitself.TherevolutionaryshiftinKant’sconception ofmodalitybeginstounfoldearlierthan,andindependentlyof,hisearliestformulation oftheveryideaofacriticalturninphilosophyinhisfamouslettertoMarkusHerzof 1772.Thus,theformercannotbeexplainedasalogicalconsequenceofthelatter.On thecontrary,theshiftinKant’sconceptionofmodalityisconstitutiveofthecritical turn.Kant’sradicalideathatmodalnotionspertaintoourrepresentationsofthings andthusinvolveanineliminablereferencetothecognitivesubjectiswhatforceshimto transformtheguidingquestionofhisphilosophyfromtheontologicalquestion, ‘what doesitmeantobepossible?’,intothetranscendentalquestion, ‘underwhatconditions canobjectsberelatedtoourcognition?’,ashearticulatesitinthelettertoHerz. Moreover,bythelate1760s,theshiftinKant’sconceptionofmodalityhasalready initiatedthecriticaltransformationinhisunderstandingofrationaltheologyaswellas metaphysicsingeneral atapointintime,therefore,beforeanyclearannouncement ofthecriticalturnitself.Theradicalcritiqueandreconstructionofmetaphysicsand theologyintheTranscendentalIdeal,bywhichKantreplacesthemorerevisionistand immanentcritiqueofontotheologyheespousedintheearly1760s,extendsfromthis transformationandturnsonhisrevolutionaryconceptionofmodality.Thelatter,then, canbereadasamotorforceofKant’soverallcriticalproject.
I.1BreakdownofChapters
Thebookiscomposedofthreeparts,devoted,respectively,tothehistoryofmodality beforeKant,Kant’sprecriticalviewsonmodality,andhiscriticalandrevolutionary theoryofmodality.
PartIpresentsanaccountofmodalthoughtinWesternmetaphysicspriortoKant, withparticularemphasisontheearlymodernperiod.The ’ontotheologicaltradition,’ thatis,thehistoryofthevariousversionsoftheontologicalargumentplaysthecentral roleinthisaccount.Thistraditionhasadirectimpactonthedevelopmentofmodality inthatittreatsquestionsaboutthemeaningsandinterrelationsofmodalnotionsas subsequenttothequestionofGod’sexistence.Moreover,especiallyinhisprecritical period,Kanthimselfoftensituateshisdiscussionsofmodalnotionsinthecontextof hiscritiqueoftheontologicalargument.InPartI,Ithereforeaimtoteaseoutthe conceptionsofmodalityunderlyingthevariousversionsoftheargumentinorderto attainabetterunderstandingofthenoveltyofKant’sownviewsonmodality.
Chapter1 firstoffersageneralframeworkforreadingontotheology,accordingto whichanyversionoftheontologicalargumentconsistsoftwologicalsteps.First,it introducesexistenceintotheconceptofGodinonewayoranother;second,itinfers theexistenceofGodfromtheconceptofGodandassertsidentitybetweentwo distinctnotionsofGod,viz.asthemostrealbeingandasthenecessarybeing.With thisframeworkinplace,thechapterthenexaminestheclassicalversionofthe ontologicalargument,introducedbyStAnselmandpopularizedbyDescartes. IwilldemonstratethatwhileKant’sprimaryobjection,namelythatexistenceis notarealpredicate,appliesequallytobothAnselm’sandDescartes’ arguments, DescartesimportantlyanticipateswhatIwillcallthe ‘actualistprinciple’,i.e.,facts aboutpossibilitymustbegroundedonfactsaboutactuality.Thiswillcometobea majorinsightandturningpointinKant’stheoryofmodality.
Chapter2primarilyexaminesthemodalversionoftheargument,propoundedby Kant’smoreimmediatepredecessorsintheGermanrationalistschoolsuchas Leibniz,Wolff,andBaumgarten.YetIalsolookatthese figures ’ accountsofmodality inothermetaphysicalcontextswithaviewtopresentingamoreaccurateand comprehensivepictureofwhereKant’sviewsstandinrelationtotheprevalent conceptionofmodalityintheschooltradition.Itakeissuewithtwoclaimsconcerningtheschoolmetaphysiciansputforthbyahistoricalnarrativethatisfavoredinthe literature:(i)theywerecommittedtoalogicistaccountofmodality,accordingto whichclaimsaboutpossibilityandnecessitycanbeexhaustivelyexplainedthrough formal-logicalprinciples,whileKantintroducedarealormetaphysicalaccountof modality,involvingextra-logicaltruth-makersofmodalclaims;(ii)theywerecommittedtoaviewofexistencetowhichKantvehementlyobjected,namelythat existenceisarealpredicateordetermination.IarguethatespeciallyLeibnizand Wolffhadrobustconceptionsofrealpossibilityandnecessity,irreducibletological principles,andintheirmaturemetaphysicalworks,theycarefullyavoidedcommittingtotheconceptionofexistenceasadistinctdeterminationofthingsandeven anticipatedKant’spositiononexistenceinsigni ficantways.This,ofcourse,raises importantquestionsaboutwheretolocatethehistoricalnovelty(suchasitis)of Kant’sviewsonexistenceandmodalityingeneral.
PartIIaddressesKant’sprecriticalviewsonmodality,withafocusonthequestion oftheirnoveltyvis-à-visthebackgroundprovidedinPartI.Chapter3examines majorhistoricalobjectionstotheontologicalargument.Therearetwomainlinesof objection.The first,pursuedbyGauniloandAquinasagainstAnselm,Caterus againstDescartes,andCrusiusagainstWolff,aimstoblocktheargument’ssecond
logicalstep,inferringtheexistenceofGod qua objectfromtheconceptofGod.The secondlineofobjection,originatedbyKanthimselfin TheOnlyPossibleArgument (OPA)(1763)(andnotbyGassendiasisoftenclaimed),aimstoblocktheargument’ s fi rststep,byarguingthatsinceexistenceisnotapredicateordetermination,itis fallacioustointroduceexistenceintotheconceptofGodinthe fi rstplace.Onone prominentinterpretation,thisthesismeansthatanyobjectthatinstantiatesa conceptnecessarilyalsoinstantiatesthepredicate “ exists,” presumablybecause existenceisapreconditionofbeinganobjectatall,implyingtherebythatexistence isa fi rst-orderpredicatethatuniversallyorunrestrictedlyappliestoall(andnota subsetof)objects.This,Iargue,isexactlyGassendi ’ sview,butnotatallKant ’ s. TheupshotofKant ’ snegativethesisisratherthatexistenceisnotapredicateof anyobjectandthuscouldnotbecontainedintheintensionorcontentofany conceptofanobject.ThisseparationofexistencefromtheintensionsofconceptualrepresentationsofthingsisthemostconsistentlyrecurringaspectofKant ’ s re fl ectionsonexistence.However,givenLeibniz’ sandWollf ’ seffortstode fi ne existenceasanextrinsicdenomination,Ia rguethatthehistoricalnoveltyofKant ’ s conceptionofexistencedoesnotlieinthisnegativethesis.Instead,thenoveltyis tobefoundinhistwopositivetheses, “Existenceisapredicatenotsomuchofthe thingitselfasofthethoughtwhichonehasofthething” ( OPA ,Ak.2:72),and “Existenceistheabsolutepositingofathing” ( OPA ,Ak.2:73).Thesethesespoint toaradicaldiscovery:existenceistobereinterpretedasafeatureofconceptual representationsofthings,i.e.,thefeatureofbeinginstantiatedbyanobjectoutside therepresentation;evenmoreimportantly,existenceshouldbereinterpretedin termsofacognitiveact,i.e.,thecognitiveactthroughwhicharepresentationis assertedbythecognitivesubjectasinsta ntiatedbyanobjectoutsideordistinct fromthatrepresentation.Unfortunately,however,theKantof1763doesnot pursuethegroundbreakingimplicationsofhispositiveaccountofexistencefor modalityingeneral.Instead,hisearlycr iticismsofthetraditionalunderstanding ofpossibilityandnecessityremainrevisionist,fortheyareprimarilyoriented towardrevisingtheontologicalargum ent,ratherthantowardputtingade fi nitive endtotheontotheologicalprojectofprovingGod ’ sexistence apriori.Consequently,eventhoughKantstronglycommitshimselftothenegativethesisthat ‘ existenceisnotapredicateordeterminationofathing,’ hestillremainswithin thebroadconceptionofmodalnotionsas expressingfundamentalontological featuresormodesofbeingofthings.
Chapter4offersareconstructionandanalysisofKant’sreformulatedontological argument,whichmovesfromthe ‘actualistprinciple’ (AP),thateveryrealpossibility mustbegroundedinactuality,totheconclusionthatthereexistsauniquereally necessarybeing,i.e.,the ensrealissimum,whichgroundsallrealpossibility.This argumentturnsonKant’srigorousdistinctionbetweenrealmodality,i.e.,possibility andnecessityofexistence,ontheonehand,andlogicalmodality,i.e.,possibilityand necessityofthought,ontheother.Theliteratureonthisargumentusuallyfocuses onthefactthattheargument’spremisesdonotwarrantthesingularityoftheground ofallrealpossibilitybutallowapluralityofgrounds,aproblemKantseemstofail toaddress.WhileItooaddressthisproblemofsingularityoftheground,Iraisea furtherquestion:whatgroundstheAPitself?TheAPcanbeinterpretedasan
ontologicalprinciple,expressingtheconditionsofrealpossibility perse,orasan epistemologicalprinciple,expressingtheconditionsofourcognitionofrealpossibility.IarguethatKantendsupadoptingtheontologicalinterpretationoftheAP despite flirtingwiththeepistemologicalinterpretation,andyetdoesnotprovidea justificationfortheformer.
PartIIIillustrateshow,inKant’scriticalperiod,arevolutionarytheoryofmodality emergesfromtheradicalbutinitiallyunexploredcoreideainhisearlypositivetheses onexistence atheorythatredefinesallmodalnotions(possibility,existence,and necessity)asvariousmodesorwaysinwhichtheconceptualrepresentationsof thingsarerelatedtothecognitivesubject.Thistheorymarksahistoricbreakfrom thegeneralconceptionofmodalitiesasbasic,genuine,andabsoluteontological featuresofthings,aconceptionheldnotonlybyKant’simmediaterationalist predecessorsbutalsobythegreatermetaphysicaltradition.
Chapter5examinesthetrajectoryofthisdevelopmentinthetransitionalperiod betweenthepublicationofthe OPA (1763)andthatofthe CPR (1781).Fromthe mid-1760son,weobserveaconsistenttrendinKant ’ sre fl ectionsonmodality: heinterpretshiscoreradicalideathatexistenceinvolvesarelationtothecognitive facultymorebroadly,applyingittotheconceptsofpossibilityandnecessity.Inthe late1760s,wealsoobserveaclearshiftinhisconceptionoftheAP,whichheceases totreatasanontologicalprincipleconcerningtheconditionsofrealpossibility, andbeginstounderstandasanepistemologicalprincipleconcerningtheconditionsofourcognitionofrealpossibility.Thisveryshiftplaysanessentialrolein Kant ’srealizationoftheneedfora ‘criticalturn ’ inphilosophy,explicitlystated firstinhis1772lettertoHerz,whereKantformulatesitintermsofaproblemthat willprovefundamentaltohiscriticalproject: ‘ Howdowecognizethatour conceptualrepresentations,especiallythepureonesthatdonotderivefromour experienceofobjects,doindeedrepresentreallypossibleobjectsorthattheyare objectivelyvalid?’ Forwhatproblematizestheobjectivevalidityofpureconceptsis theepistemologicalinterpretationoftheAP,statingthatcognitionofactualityisa prerequisiteofanycognitionofrealpossibility.ThisstronglysuggeststhatKant ’ s emergingrevolutioninmodalityshouldbeconstruedasconstitutiveofhiscritical turnratherthanasamerelogicalconsequenceofit.
Chapters6,7,and8reconstructKant’stheoryofmodalityaspresentedinthe CPR Hereatleastfourstepsaretobedistinguished.(i)The firstsystematicdiscussionof modalityappearsintheMetaphysicalDeduction,whereKantpresentsthe ‘modality ofjudgments’ asoneofthefourclassesoflogicalfunctionsofjudgmentfromwhich hethenderivesthe ‘categoriesofmodality’ (A74–6/B100–1).(ii)IntheSchematism, Kantprovidesaninitialaccountofrealmodality,definingthetemporalconditions underwhichthecategoriesofmodalitycanbeempiricallyapplied(A144–5/B184). (iii)InthePostulatesofEmpiricalThinkinginGeneral,heprovidesthefullaccount ofrealmodalitybygoingontospecifythecompletesetofsuchconditions(A218/ B266).(iv)IntheIdealofPureReason,Kantutilizeshiscriticaltheoryofmodalityto reframehis ‘onlypossibleargument’ asdemonstratingmerelythesubjectivenecessity oftheideaofGodandtoconstructhissystematicrefutationofthetraditional variantsoftheontologicalargument.Idiscuss(i)inchapter6,(ii)and(iii)in chapter7,and(iv)inchapter8.
Chapter6offersanalternativetotwocurrentstrandsinthereadingofKant’ s accountofthemodalfunctionsofjudgmentsintheliterature.The firstunderstands themodalityofagivenjudgmentintermsofthejudger’sattitudetowarditscontent basedontheirepistemicorpsychologicalstates.Thesecondunderstandsthemodalityofajudgmentsolelyintermsofitslocationinaformalsyllogismorrational inference.Iargueforathirdalternative:Kantconstruesthemodalfunctionsof judgmentsasinstantiatingrelativelogicalmodalitiesandexpressingthelogical coherencerelationsofajudgmentwithanotherbackgroundjudgmentorsetof judgments,i.e.,whetherajudgmentislogicallycompatiblewiththebackground, logicallygroundedbyit,orlogicallygroundedbyitthroughlawsoflogic.This interpretationnotonly fitsverywellwithKant’soverallprogramofredefining modalityintermsoftherelationsbetweentheconceptualrepresentationsofthings andthesubject’scognitivefaculties,butalsocapturestheformal-logicalinfrastructureofKant’saccountofrealmodalityintherestofthe CPR. Chapter7comprisesadetaileddiscussionofKant’saccountofrealmodality relativetothedomainofexperience,thatis,relativetothebackgroundofthe conditionsofourempiricalcognitionofobjects.Thisaccount,whichunfoldsin theSchematismandthePostulates,markstheculminationofKant’slongstanding revolutionaryprograminmodality.Herewe findhisprecriticalthesesonexistence, bothnegativeandpositive,transformintoastrong ‘peculiarity’ thesisaboutmodal categoriesingeneral: “asadeterminationoftheobjecttheydonotaddtotheconcept towhichtheyareascribedintheleast,butratherexpressonlytherelationtothe facultyofcognition ” (A219).Accordingly,possibility,actuality,andnecessityareall instancesofabsolutepositing.Eachpositstheconceptualrepresentationofanobject asawholeinadifferentrelationtothebackgroundoftheconditionsofourempirical cognitionorexperienceofobjects,eitheraslogicallycompatiblewiththem,oras logicallygroundedbythem,oraslogicallygroundedbythemthroughthelawof causality.Eachsuchactofpositingconstitutesapeculiar,i.e., ‘subjective,’ typeof syntheticjudgment,wheretheintensionofthesubject-conceptisnotatallenlarged, butarelationwithadistinctcognitivefaculty(i.e.,withunderstanding,perception, andreason)isaddedtoit.Kant’semphaticrejectionoftherationalistcontentionthat theextensionofpossibilityisgreaterthanthatofactuality,whichinturnisgreater thanthatofnecessity,isinfactanexpressionofhisrefusaltodefinemodal differencesintermsoftheintensionsofconceptsofobjectsandhiscorresponding rede finitionofmodaldifferencesintermsofhowconceptsofobjectsarepositedin relationtothecognitivesubject.
Chapter8showshowKant’srevolutionarytheoryofmodalityradicalizeshis critiqueofontotheologyintheTranscendentalDialectic.Whatmakesthiscritique radical,asopposedtoKant’sprecriticalrevisionistcritique,isthatitclaimsto demonstratetheimpossibilityofontotheologyassuchandreframesitintermsofa natural,butonlysubjectivelyvalid,procedureofpurereason.IexamineKant’ s radicalcritiqueofontotheologyintwoparts.First,Ifocusonsections2and3of theIdealofPureReason,whereKantprovidesasubtlecritiqueofhisownprecritical ‘onlypossibleargument. ’ IarguethatwhatleadsKanttodowngradehisprecritical argumentfromanobjectivelyvaliddemonstrationoftherealnecessityofthe existenceofGodasthegroundofallrealpossibilitytoasubjectivelyvalid
demonstrationofthenecessityofassumingtheideaofsuchabeingishisaforementionedshiftinhisconceptionoftheAPfromanontologicaltoanepistemological principle,ashiftthatstartsinthelate1760sbutisonlyfullyarticulatedinthe Postulates.Second,Idiscusshisrefutationofthetraditionalontologicalargumentin section4oftheIdeal.IarguethatKantfollowsamultilayeredstrategyagainstthe ontologicalargument,consistingofacombinationoftwohistoricallinesofobjection, onlythesecondofwhichpresupposeshisnegativethesisthatexistenceisnotareal predicate,aswellasanadditional,thirdobjectionbasedonhisfurtherthesisthatall existentialjudgmentsaresynthetic,albeitinapeculiarsense.
Finally,Chapter9focusesonthequestionoftheabsolutemodalityofthingsas theyareinthemselvesinlightofthetwostrikingmodalcommitmentsKantmakes in§76ofthe CritiqueofthePowerofJudgment.First,Kantstatestheepistemicthesis thatwhileitisanecessaryfeatureofourdiscursiveunderstandingtodistinguish betweenthemerelypossibleandtheactual,anintuitiveunderstandingwouldnot makemodaldistinctionsandcognizeonlyactualobjects.EntailingaSpinozistic notionofGod,whocouldnotrepresentmerepossibilitiesandcouldnothave broughtaboutaworldotherthantheactualworld,theepistemicthesisseemsto underminedivinefreedom.Second,Kantstatesthemetaphysicalthesisthatthe modalcategoriesaremerelysubjectivelyvalidforhumandiscursiveunderstanding andthusnoumenadonothavemodalproperties.Themetaphysicalthesisseemsto underminehumanfreedom,acentralcommitmentofKant’spracticalphilosophy, forifournoumenalselvesdonothavemodalproperties,ournoumenalvolitions couldnothavebeenotherwise.Iarguethatboththemetaphysicalandepistemic thesesarerootedinKant’srevolutionarytheoryofmodalityasreconstructedin earlierchaptersofthebook.Themeresubjectivityofmodalcategoriesdirectly followsfromthepeculiarstatusthatKantconsistentlyassignstothemodalcategories throughoutthe CPR.Accordingly,modalcategoriesaredistinctfromothercategories inthatinsteadofpurportingtoexpressthemostfundamentalwaysthingsare,they expressthevariouswaysinwhichtherepresentationsofobjectsarerelatedtothe cognitivesubject.Thispeculiarityiswhatmakesmodalizationanexclusivefeatureof adiscursivemindtowhichrepresentationsofobjectscanberelatedinmultipleways andwhosecognitionthereforedisplaysaprogressivestructureofgradualincorporationofindividualrepresentationsintoawhole.Thisbringsustotheessenceof Kant’srevolutionarytheoryofmodality:modalityisirreduciblyrelational,subjective, anddiscursivebyitsverynature.Finally,Ishowthatthiswayofunderstanding§76 astheultimatearticulationofKant’srevolutionarytheoryofmodalitypresentsa frameworkfortheresolutionofthetensionsbetweentheepistemicandmetaphysical theses,ontheonehand,anddivineandhumanfreedom,ontheother.
PARTI
ModalThoughtPriortoKant
1
OntotheologyandModalityI
TheClassicalVersionoftheOntological Argument
1.1.OntotheologyastheContextofModalThought
WhilethesubjectofmodalityrecursinawiderangeofcontextsacrossKant’ scorpus, thesinglecontextinwhichKant firstintroducesasystematicapproachtomodal notionsandcontinuestoprovidehismostlucidexpositionsofthesenotionsisthatof theontologicalargumentforGod’sexistence.Fromtheprecriticalwritingssuchas the NewElucidation (1755), TheOnlyPossibleArgument (1763),and Inquiry (1764), tothe CritiqueofPureReason (1781/1787)andthe LecturesonthePhilosophical DoctrineofReligion (1783–84?),Kantremainsengagedwithacritiqueoftheclassical versionoftheontologicalargumentaswellaswiththeideaofdevelopingan alternativeversionwhilealsonourishingskepticismwithregardtotheverypossibilityoftheontotheologicalproject.AsIhopetoshowinthisbook,Kant’stheoryof modalityismuchmorethanaby-productofhislongstandingengagementwiththe ontologicalargument,asitgoesfarbeyondKant’sconcernwiththequestionofGod’ s existenceandcomestoplayasubstantiveroleinthedevelopmentofhisoverall maturephilosophy.YetKant’schoiceoftheontologicalargumentastheprimary contextforhisdiscussionofmodalityisbynomeanstrivial;indeed,itissuggestivein twohistoricalrespects.
First,theparticularcontextoftheontologicalargumentconnectsKant’sdiscussionsofmodalitywiththoseofhisimmediatepredecessorsintherationalistschoolin eighteenth-centuryGermany.ForitisindeedacharacteristicoftheLeibnizianWolffianschoolmetaphysicstodiscussthesignificanceofmodalconceptsinthe contextoftheontologicalargument,someversionofwhichisastandardcomponent ofanyworkinrationaltheologyinthistradition.ThatKantisindirectconversation withtheschool’smetaphysicsofmodalityisobvious,ifnotalwaysfromhisexplicit references,fromthemodalterminologyheusesinLatinandGerman,thespecific examplesheprovides,thespecificdistinctionsandallegedcorrectionshemakes,and hispolemicaltone,allofwhichseemtopresupposeanawarenessinhisaudienceof whatwaspreviouslysaidonthesubject.ThisispartlywhyKant’sprecriticalaccount ofmodalityremainsanimmanentorrevisionistcritiqueof,orperhapsbetter,a contributionto,anongoingdiscussionofmodalityatthetime.Kant’srevolutionary break,orhisparadigmshift,asitwere,fromtheprecedingconceptionsofmodality inhiscriticalperiodcanonlybefullyunderstoodbyrecognizingtheexactplace
ofKant ’sprecriticalandrevisionistcritiqueoftheseconceptionsfromwithinthe saidongoingdiscussion.For,asIwillargueinthisbook,Kant ’ srevolutionin modalityspringsfromaradicalideathathediscoversthroughhisprecriticalefforts torevisetheontologicalargumentbutfailstodevelop,perhapsalsoduetohis revisionistagenda.
Second,theontologicalargumentconnectsKant’streatmentofmodalitytoa muchbroaderhistoricalcontext.ThiscontextisprimarilywhatKanthimselfcalls ‘ontotheology,’ atraditionrepresentedintheeighteenthcenturybytheLeibnizWolffianschool.OnKant’saccount,ontotheologyisthekindofspeculativetheology that “considersGodmerelyintermsofconcepts” (Th.Pölitz ,Ak.28:1003),proceedingfromthemerelypossibletotheexistenceofGodastheprincipleofallpossibility.¹ Ontotheologyisthusapurely ‘transcendentaltheology’,differingfrom ‘cosmotheology ’ and ‘physicotheology,’ bothofwhichproceedfromexperiencedexistencetothe existenceofahighestbeingasthegroundofallexistence.SinceKantcallsthegeneric formofargumentsaimingtoinferGod’sexistencefromhismereconcept ‘ontological, ’ theontotheologicaltraditionconsistsforhiminthehistoryofthevarious versionsoftheontologicalargument,whichcanbetracedasfarbackasAnselmof Canterbury(1033–1109).Infact,thisbroaderhistoricalcontextcomprisesalsoa counter-traditionofobjectionstotheontologicalargument.Thishistoricalbackand forthrevolvesaroundalternativewaysofunderstandingmodalnotions,andthus comestoformafertilegroundforthe flourishingofmodalthoughtinWestern metaphysics.Themajorphilosophicalappealofthisdebateisthatitprovidesuswith achancetotakeacloserlookatthehistoricalevolutionofthenotionsofpossibility, existence,andnecessityandtheirinterrelations.²
Kantholdsauniqueplaceinthehistoryofontotheology.Firstofall,thoughless widelyknownthanhiscritiqueoftheargument,Kantmakesapositivecontribution tothetraditionastheoriginatorofaversionofanontotheologicalargument. Introducedanddevelopedinhisprecriticalworks, NE (1755)and OPA (1763), thisversionoftheargumentpresentsanalternativethatisimmunetotheobjection Kantlevelsagainsttheclassicalversion,namelythethesisthat ‘ existenceisnotareal predicate.’ Yet,intheIdealofPureReasonofthe CPR (1781),Kantwillcometo acknowledgetheimpossibilityofdemonstratingGod ’sexistence.Alongsidehis explicitrefutationsofthethreeclassicalkindsofarguments(ontological,cosmological,andphysico-theological),heprovidesasubtlecritiqueofthemodalfoundationsofhisownversion ironically,theveryversionheoncepresentedasthe onlypossibleargumentwithachanceofsuccess.Thus,Kant’sunderstandingof modalityundergoesacriticalshift,leadinghimtoabandontheontotheological projectaltogether.Oneofmycentralclaimsinthisbookwillbethatthisshiftmarks bothanimportantpointinthedevelopmentofKant ’ scritiqueofspeculative theologyandarevolutionarybreakwithtraditionalconceptionofmodalityin
¹Seealso OPA (Ak.2:156).
²ForGod,conceivedasthemostperfectofallbeings,wouldbetheexemplarybeing,theonethatbest exemplifiesthemodesofbeingandthusmostsuitableforsuchaninvestigationintomodalconcepts.As Heideggersuggests,thehistoricallysignificanceofontotheologywaspurelyphilosophicalandconsistedin “theorientationofontologytowardstheideaofGod.” SeeHeidegger(1982),29.
general.Therefore,acarefulscrutinyofthehistoryoftheontologicalargumentis crucialbothtounderstandingKant’smodaltheoryandrecognizingitshistorically revolutionarycharacter.MyaiminPartIwillbetoprovideanaccountofthechief historicalversionsoftheargumentwithaviewto fleshingouthowtheirproponents conceivedmodalnotionsingeneral.
However,beforefocusingonthelogicalmechanicsoftheontologicalargument,it isimportanttorecognizethattheargumentpresupposesacertainconceptionof deity,philosophicalreflectionsonwhichplayanindispensablerolenotonlyinthe evolutionofmodalthoughtbutalsointheveryemergenceofmodalityasadistinct philosophicaltheme.Thedeityinquestionisthe ‘GodofAbraham,’ agodwho createdeverythingelse exnihilo,andwhoseverynameis ‘HeWhoIs’ (Yahweh).This conceptionofdeityentailsanontologicaldifferencebetweenGodandtheWorld,the Creator,andtheCreated:whileGod’sessenceisidenticaltohisexistence,forall otherbeingsexistenceisanovelty,agift,anadditionbestoweduponthembyGodat creation,andisthusinsomeimportantsensedistinctfromtheiressences.This ontologicaldifferencerequiresametaphysicsthatcouldaccountfortheidentityand distinctionbetweenessenceandexistenceintermsofdifferentmodesofbeing.Such modalmetaphysicsisabsentfromAncientGreekontology.ForsincetheAncient Greekshavetoaccommodateneitherthedoctrineofcreation exnihilo nor,consequently,thenotionofaworldthatmightnothavecomeintoexistence,theytakethe essenceor ‘what-is-it’ ofanexistentthingasthestartingpointoftheirmetaphysical inquirywithoutproblematizingeitherthenotionofexistenceassuchoritsidentity withordistinctionfromessence.³
Theontologicaldifferenceanditsmodalexpositionbecomesasignificanttheme laterinscholasticontology.Theearliestmodalformulationoftheessence–existence relationisfoundinAvicenna’ s Metaphysics. ⁴ AvicennaarguesthatGod,sincehis essenceor ‘quiddity’ (mahiyya)isnootherthanexistence(aniyya/wujud),isthe “NecessaryExistent” (wajibal-wujud).⁵ OnlyGodhastheprivilegeofhavinghis existencefollowfromHisessence.Inthecaseofallotherthings,essenceisdistinct fromexistence;inotherwords,theyare “contingent” (mumkin).Therefore,existence,inthecaseofcontingentbeings,issomething “occurringtothemexternally,” andisthus “accidental” (aradi)toessence.⁶ Theessencesofcontingentbeingsare ‘possibleinthemselves’ (bi-dhatihi),buttheybecomeactual(maujud)onlyby receivingexistencefromthe ‘NecessaryExistent. ’
³SeeKahn(1976),326;(2003),x.
⁴ The Metaphysics ofAvicennathatwasbetterknownbythescholasticsandreferredtobyThomas Aquinasinhis DeEnteetEssentia,isthe Metaphysics (or Al-Ilahiyat,the Theology)ofhis Al-Shifa (The Healing).
However,Avicenna’sformulationsoftheessence/existencedistinctionandthemodalitiesissuingfrom thisdistinctionareclearerinthe Metaphysics (Ilahiyyat)ofhishistoricallylesssignificantwork, Danish nama-iala’i (TheBookofScientificKnowledge).Iwillthusbereferringtobothtextshere,respectivelyas Shifa and Danishnama.ThereareimportantscholarlyobjectionstotheclaimthatAvicennawasthe first tointroducetheessence/existencedistinction.Mostnotably,seeGoichon(1969),34.Myclaimhereis ratherthatAvicennawasthe firsttoexplicitlythematizethisdistinctionasacentraldoctrineinhis philosophy.
⁵ Shifa,8.4.(3); Danishnama,§24. ⁶ Shifa,8.4.(12); Danishnama,§38.
WhileAvicenna’smodalaccountoftheontologicaldifferencebetweenGodand createdthingshaswideimpactonlatescholasticontology,itleavesopenquestions regardinghowtounderstandthenatureoftherelationshipbetweenessenceand existenceincreatedthings.Isthedistinctionbetweenessenceandexistenceareal, mind-independentdistinction,orisitamerelyconceptual,mind-dependentdistinction?Aretheyseparableinrealityoronlyinthemind?Eitherway,thefurther questionremains,whatexactlydoesexistenceaddtothemereessenceofathing? Mostimportantly,shouldthisadditionitselfbeconstruedattheleveloftheessence or ‘quiddity’ ofthething,asthoughitenlargesthelatter?
Forinstance,accordingtotheviewcommonlyattributedtoThomasAquinas,the distinctionbetweenessenceandexistenceisrealinthattheyaremutuallyseparable, likeadistinctionbetweenathing(res)andanotherthing(res),whereexistencehasits ownquidditativecontent.⁷ This,ofcourse,entailsthattheactual(essence)contains more(realityorquidditativecontent)thanthemerelypossible(essence).The difficultyofthisstrongviewoftherealdistinctionisratherobvious:ifexistence hasitsownessence,thenthedistinctionappliesonceagaintoexistenceitself, openingthedoortoaninfiniteregress.TheThomisticviewthereforeprovokestwo majorreactions.
DunsScotustakesthemoderatepositionthatwhileessenceandexistencearenot reallyseparableinanyconcreteindividualandthatthedistinctionisthereforenot comparabletothatbetweenathing(res)andanotherthing(res),whereeithercan occurwithouttheother,thedistinctionisstillmind-independentandnotmerely conceptual.AccordingtoScotus,thedistinctionbetweenessenceandexistence shouldbeunderstoodasa ‘modaldistinction.’ Certainformsornaturesinreality comeindegreesthatareinseparablyattachedtowhattheyreallyare.Scotuscalls suchadegreeofintensitythe ‘intrinsicmode’ oftheentitytowhichitbelongs. Acolor,forinstance,isnecessarilyinstantiatedashavingacertainshadeordegreeof intensity,amode.Thus,althoughacolorcannotbeontologicallyseparatedfromits degreeofintensity,thetwoarestill ‘modally’ distinctinthesensethattheformercan beconceivedordefinedwithoutthelatter(butnotviceversa).Scotussuggeststhat “Onecansaythattheessenceandexistenceincreaturesarelikequiddityandits mode.Thereforetheyaredistinct.”⁸
ThemoreextremereactiontotheThomisticviewistodemotethedistinction betweenessenceandexistencetoameredistinctionofreason,imposedonthings throughintellectualactivity.ThisistheviewdevelopedbyFrancisSuárez.Suárez insiststhatthedistinctioninquestionistoapplyonlytocreatedandthusactual entities.Theessenceofanactualentity(ens)isthenanactualessencethatisalready inactasopposedtoanessenceinmerepotency.⁹ Introducingadistinctionbetween anactualentity’sactualessenceandactualexistenceisnotmerelymetaphysically superfluous,butdownrightimpossible,becausethetwoexpressoneandthesame
⁷ Wippel(1982a,1982b)arguesthatthisattributiontoAquinasisnotaccurate,andthatthishistorical conflationisbasedonthemisinterpretationoftherealdistinctionbyanearlyThomist,GilesofRome,as betweentwothings(duaeres),whichunfortunatelycametobeviewedastheofficialThomistpositionon distinctionfromthelatethirteenthcentury.OnthesamepointseealsoGilson(2005),99.
⁸ QuodQs,q.1,add.1:11,485. ⁹ Disputationes,d.31,sec.1.13,52.
thing: “Existentmanandamanarethesamething,” asAristotlestates.¹⁰ Onthis view,then,anytalkofexistence ‘adding’ anythingnewtoacreatedentityisentirely misguided.AccordingtoSuárez,itmakesmoresensetometaphysicallydistinguish betweentheactualessenceandthepotentialessence,whichistantamounttoa distinctionbetweenbeingandnon-being.Fortheessencesofcreatedbeings, althoughtheyareknownbyGodfrometernity,haveneitherreality(res)norbeing (ens),butareabsolutelynothing(nihil)priortoGod’sactofcreation.¹¹Amerely possibleessenceinpotencyisnottobeconstruedassomethingrealorpositivein itself.Therefore,thereisnosuchthingasactualizationofoncepotentialessences,but onlycreationofactualbeingsoutofabsolutenothingness.Neitherexistencenor essenceisanontologicallyfundamentaliteminitsownright.Instead,whatis ontologicallyfundamentalistheactualindividualcreatedbeing(ens)itself.The distinctionbetweenessenceandexistenceisthereforemerelyconceptualandpertainstoourunderstandingofanactualbeingunderdifferentsignifications.Nonetheless,thisconceptualdistinctionisnotarbitrarybuthassomebasisinreality:the factthatwecanconceiveoftheessencesofcreatedbeingsinabstractionfromtheir actualizedbeingornon-being,whilewecannotsimilarlyabstractGod’sessencefrom hisexistence,reflectsthecontingentexistenceoftheformerandthenecessary existenceofthelatter.¹²
ItwouldthereforebefairtosaythatonecentrallocusofthelateScholasticdebate isthequestionwhetherexistenceshouldbeconstruedasamountingtoagenuine constituentofanactualindividual’squidditativecontent,orinotherwords,whether theactualcontainsmorerealityorquidditativecontentthanthemerelypossible. ThisquestionwillassumeimmenseimportanceinKant’scritiqueoftheontological argumentbasedonthethesisthatexistenceisnotarealpredicate.Foronemajor implicationofthisthesisisthatexistencedoesnotaddanythingquidditativetothe merelypossible.Ofcourse,Kant’scritiqueisvalidonlytotheextentthatthe ontotheologicaltraditionreallyemploysaconceptionofexistenceashavinga quiddityofitsown.Whetherthelatteristhecaseisthefocusofthisandthefollowing chapter.
1.2.TheFrameworkofOntotheology
Despitesignificantdifferencesintheinterpretationoftheessence/existencedistinctioninnon-divinebeings,theprevalentcontentionregardingthemetaphysical constitutionofGodremainsthesamefromAvicennathroughSuárez:essenceand existenceareidenticalinGod.ThisdivineprivilegeiswhatisimpliedbytheBiblical characterizationofGodasonewhoseverynameis “IAMWHOIAM” (Yahweh),a godwhose ‘ essence ’ isnothingbutexistence.¹³Theontotheologicaltraditionis inspiredbythisfundamentalinsight.TheidentitybetweenGod’sessenceand existenceoughttowarranthisexistenceandreduce ‘Godexists’ toamerestatement ofthatidentityorlogicalnecessity.However,sincetheontologicalargument
¹⁰ Metaphysics 1003b27.¹¹ Disputationes,d.31,sec.2.1,57.
¹² Disputationes,d.31,sec.6.23,102.¹³Exodus3:14(NewRevisedStandardVersion).
