Introduction Life
ThemainpubliceventsinButler’sfairlyuneventfullifecanbedelineatedreasonablyquickly.Ofhisprivatelifeoropinionsweknowlittle,sinceheorderedallhis paperstobeburnedonhisdeath.¹Bornon18May1692intoaPresbyterian familydwellinginWantage,Berkshire,hewaseducated firstatthelocalgrammar schoolandlaterattheDissentingAcademyinGloucester,probablywiththe intentionofenteringthePresbyterianministry.ThecurriculumincludedGreek andLatin,logic,mathematics,geography,andbiblicalstudies.Itwasherethat ButlermetThomasSecker,latertobecomeArchbishopofCanterbury,andbegan hiscorrespondencewithSamuelClarke.Theearlierpartoftheircorrespondence coverssuchtopicsasdivineomnipresenceandnecessity(reprintedinthisvolume);thelatercorrespondenceconcernsethicalquestions.
By1714,however,ButlerhaddecidedtoconformtotheEstablishedChurchof Englandandwasthuseligibletoentertheancientuniversities,whichwerethen closedtonon-conformists.HeenteredOrielCollege,Oxfordin1715where,as wasnotuncommonintheeighteenthcentury,hefoundtheeducationhereceived deficient.Hewrotethathehadto ‘mis-spendsomuchtimehereinattending frivolouslecturesandunintelligibledisputations’.²ButlertookhisB.A.inOctober 1718,andwasordainedtothepriesthoodinDecemberofthatyear.
ThefollowingyearhewasappointedpreacherattheRollsChapel,bySirJoseph Jekyll,MasteroftheRolls.Thechapel,locatedinChanceryLane,London,served bothasarepositoryforlegalrecords(preservedonrollsofparchment hencethe name)andasaplaceofworshipforthelawyersandclerkswhoworkedinthe CourtofChancerywhichdealtwithmattersofequityratherthanwithcommon law.The FifteenSermons , firstpublishedin1726,wereoriginallypreachedtothis especiallywell-educatedaudience.
In1721ButlerobtainedhisBachelorofCommonLawdegreefromOxfordand inthefollowingyearwaspresentedwiththelivingofHaughton-le-Skerne,near Darlington,whichhecombinedwithhisdutiesattheRollsChapel.Thiswas shortlyexchangedforthebeneficeofStanhopeinCountyDurham,oneofthe
¹Forthefullestmodernaccountofhislife,seeCunliffe2008,towhichIammuchindebtedinwhat follows.
²LettertoClarke,30September1717(Works (ed.Bernard)I.332).
richestinthecountry.³HisincomenowallowedhimtoresigntheRollspreachershipandheresidedentirelyatStanhopeuntil1733,workingonthe Analogyof Religion.
Secker,fearingthatButlerwasbecomingtooisolatedinStanhope,⁴ recommendedhimtoQueenCaroline. ⁵ Sheexpressedsomesurprise,havingsupposed himdead.TheArchbishopofYorkisreputedtohavequipped: ‘No,Madam;but heisburied.’⁶ InNovember1733CharlesTalbotbecameLordChancellorand,at Secker’ssuggestion,madeButlerhischaplain;thearrangementbeingthathe shouldcontinuetospendhalftheyearatStanhope.⁷ Inthefollowingmonth ButlerproceededtothedegreeofDoctorofCommonLawatOxford.In1736the Analogy waspublishedandtheQueenappointedButlerasherClerkoftheCloset. HisdutiesincludedattendanceontheQueenfortwohourseacheveningfor theologicaldiscussion,whichnecessitatedhisrentinglodgingsnearthecourt.
QueenCarolinediedinNovember1737,commendingButleronherdeathbed totheArchbishopofCanterbury.ButlerwasdulyelevatedtotheseeofBristolin thefollowingyear.HewasappointedtothebenchofbishopsintheLords,andso hadtomaintainahouseholdinLondonwhenParliamentwasinsession.In addition,abishopwasexpectedtoprovidehospitalitytohisclergyandtoleading citizens.AsBristolwasthepoorestseeinthecountry,andconsequentlyhadan incomeinsufficientforButler’sneeds,hefeltsomedissatisfactionwithhispreferment,whichheexpressedinalettertoRobertWalpole.
Indeed,thebishopricofBristolisnotverysuitableeithertotheconditionofmy fortune,orthecircumstancesofmypreferment;nor,asIshouldhavethought, answerabletotherecommendationwithwhichIwashonoured(Bartlett 1839:73–4).
In1740hewasappointedtothedeaneryofSt.Paul’sCathedralinLondon,which finallyprovidedhimwithanadequateincome,enablinghimtoresignfromhis otherposts.
Butlerwaswellknownforhischaritablegiving:itisreportedthathefoundit difficulttoresistgivingalmstoanyonewhobegged.Hespentthemajorityofhis
³Themagnificentrectorystillstands,thoughthebuildinghasbeendividedandtheinteriorhas beenaltered.
⁴ ThereissomereasontobelievethatButlermayhavebeenliabletodepressionwhichwasrelieved bycongenialcompany.
⁵ WifeofGeorgeII,shehadbeenapupilofLeibniz,andwaswellversedinbothphilosophyand theology,summoning amongothers Berkeley,Clarke,andBenjaminHoadlytodiscusstheology withher.
⁶ Bartlett1839:38.
⁷ ThisseemstohaveledtosomecoolingofthefriendshipbetweenSeckerandButler,theformer thinkingthelatternotgratefulfortheeffortsmadeonhisbehalf.SeckeralsocriticizedButlerfor hypocrisyinattackingthegovernmentanditsministersinprivate,yetusuallysupportingtheminthe divisionlobbies.
incomeonrefurbishingecclesiasticalbuildings,buyinglandforachurchforthe workingpoor,andaidingthedevelopmentofBristolInfirmary.
In1746ButlerwasappointedClerkoftheClosettotheKing,⁸ apositionthat promisedfurtherpromotion,whichdulycamewhenhewaselevatedtotheseeof Durhamin1750.ItischaracteristicofButler’sscrupulousnaturethatheresisted thesuggestionthatafriendbegivenaprebendalstallatDurhamonhisappointment,lestitshouldsmackofcronyism.Hewrotetoanotherfriend:
Itwouldbeamelancholythinginthecloseoflife,tohavenoreflectionsto entertainoneselfwith,butthatonehadspenttherevenuesofthebishopricof Durham,inasumptuouscourseofliving,andenrichedone’sfriendswiththe promotionsofit,insteadofhavingreallysetone’sselftodogood,andpromote worthymen(Bartlett1839:116).
TheseeofDurhamfacedmanyproblems,includingsignificantpopulation changes,andwhatButlerhimselfdescribedasthe ‘generaldecayofreligion’ (Works vol.I:271).Inhis1751 ChargetotheClergyoftheDioceseofDurham Butleraddressessomeoftheseproblems;the Charge castsfurtherlightonButler’ s viewsonthebestwaytocommunicateandinstilChristianity.⁹ AsatBristol,he wasinstrumentalinthefoundingofanIn firmary,thistimeatNewcastle-uponTyne,andwasthemostgenerousofallthesubscribers.Afterinfrequently attendingtheLordsinthesessionof1751–2,Butlerwastakenillinthespring of1752.AvisittoBathtotakethewatersprovedunavailing,andhediedon 16June.
Butler’sInfluence
Butler’sintellectuallegacywasconsiderable.Duringtheeighteenthcentury,the Analogy wentthroughatotalof fifteeneditions,andthe Sermons through five.He influenced,invariousways,manyofhiscontemporaries,includingHutcheson, Hume,Kames,Reid,AdamSmith,andRichardPrice.Hereareafewexamples. Hutcheson’saccountofthemoralsensebecameclosertoButler’saccountof conscienceinhislaterwriting.Inhisearlierwork,themoralsenseissimplya facultythatapprovesofsomeactionsanddisapprovesofothers,butbythelater
⁸ TheClerkoftheClosetisresponsibleforadvisingtheSovereign’sPrivateSecretaryonthenames ofcandidatesto fillvacanciesintheRollofChaplainstotheSovereign.HepresentsBishopsforhomage totheSovereign;examinesanytheologicalbookstobepresentedtotheSovereign;andpreaches annuallyintheChapelRoyal,St.James’sPalace.
⁹ Hestressesthevalueofexternalformsofreligioningeneratingasettledfaith.This,alongwithhis placingofawhitecrossinthechapelatBristol,ledtochargesafterhisdeaththathemayhavedieda RomanCatholic achargethatcastsmorelightontheparanoiaofthetimesthanonthereligious leaningsofButler.
workithastakenontheroleofsupervisorandguideofouractions.Inhis Short IntroductiontoMoralPhilosophy,themoralsenseisoftenreferredtobytheterm ‘conscience’;itservesto ‘regulatethehighestpowersofournature’ (Hutcheson 1747:16).Hume,inaletterof1742afterreceivingacopyofHutcheson’ s Institutio,chidesHutchesonwith,ineffect,backslidingfromhisearlierversion ofmoralsentimentalism.
YouseemheretoembraceDr.Butler’sopinioninhisSermonsonHuman Nature;thatourmoralsensehasanauthoritydistinctfromitsforceand durableness,andthatbecausewealwaysthinkit ought toprevail.Butthisis nothing,butaninstinctorprinciple,whichapprovesofitselfuponreflection (Greig1932,vol.I:47).
AlthoughHumeisopposedtomostofButler’scentralclaims,bothinethicsandin religion,hehadahighopinionofhimandsenthimadraftofthe Treatise for comment.¹⁰
ButlerundoubtedlyinfluencedHenryHome(LordKames)becauseinthe 1730stheyengagedincorrespondence,nowlost,ontheevidencesofnatural andrevealedreligion.JamesHarris(2012)examinesthecritiquesofHume’ s accountbyKames,Smith,andReid,andarguesthatallthreewereinfluencedby Butler.Finally,RichardPriceacknowledgedhisindebtednesstoButlerwhenhe cametowritehisowndefenceofthecredibilityofmiracles.
Inthefollowingcenturythe Analogy becamethestandardtheologicaltextat OxfordandCambridge,whilethe Sermons wereastapleofmoralphilosophy courseswellintothetwentiethcentury.AmonghisadmirerswereHazlitt, Coleridge,andCardinalNewman,whodescribedhimas ‘thegreatestnameinthe AnglicanChurch’ (Apologia,1959:103).W.E.Gladstone,whowasPrimeMinister ofBritainonfourseparateoccasions,devotedaconsiderablepartofhisformidable energiestoeditingandwritingaboutButler.HenrySidgwick,authorofthemonumental MethodsofEthics,attributedhisviewsaboutthenatureofpracticalreasonto Butler.Hisinfluenceasatheologianandphilosopherofreligiondeclinedinthe twentiethcentury,atleastinpartbecausehisapologeticaddressesonlythosewho alreadyacceptsomesortofDeityorIntelligentCreator.Itwouldbeanerror, however,tosupposethatthe Analogy isnowonlyofhistoricalimportance.
TheArgumentofthe Analogy
TounderstandwhatButlerisarguingforinthe Analogy weneedtoknowwhat,or whom,heisarguingagainst.HistargetisDeism,aviewthataccepts(asalmost
¹⁰ IamindebtedtoJensen1971:106–7fordrawingmyattentiontothequotationsabove.
everyonedidatthattime)theexistenceofanintelligentdesigner,butrejectsthe specificclaimsofChristianrevelation.Revelationisunnecessary,becausewecan findoutallweneedtoknowaboutGodandmoralitythroughtheuseofordinary humanreason.Moreover,Christianrevelation,asfoundintheBible,is incredible atissueofpreposterousfairystories.¹¹Onthesamegrounds,Deists rejectthespecificChristiandoctrinesofthevirginbirth,theIncarnation,the Trinity,andtheneedforasacrificialatonementbyJesusonthecross.
DeismhaditsrootsinthestrongrationalismoftheearlyEnlightenmentand theriseofmodernscience.Thus,forexample,countenancingmiracleswould conflictwiththebeliefthatGodworksthroughtheregularitiesofnature.Theneed foraperfectbeingtogiveanoccasionaltweaktotheorderlyprogressofnature woulddetractfromtheperfectionofhishandiwork.Deistsaimedtostripaway whattheytooktobetheaccretionsofmystery,superstition,andpriestcraft with which,inamorebarbarousage,Christianityhadbecomeencrusted inorderto revealthepureunderlyingreligionofreason.Onlywhenthuscleansedwould Christianitybeaviewthatreasonablepeoplecouldaccept.TheDeistsalsohad moralobjectionstotheideaofrevelation.Itwas unfair thatimportanttruths truthsnecessaryforsalvation shouldbevouchsafedtosomebutnottoothers. NorisitmorallyacceptabletosupposethatGodmighthavefavourites,suchasthe childrenofIsrael.Surely,awiseandlovingGodwouldbe,asitwere,anequal opportunityrevealeroftruth.
WhileallDeiststhoughtthathumanreasonwassufficienttotellusallwe neededtoknowaboutGod’snature,theydifferedastohowmuchthatenabledus toknowaboutGod.SamuelClarke,whoprecededButlerinarguingagainst Deism,listsfourtypesofDeistinhis ADiscourse:157–72.The first,andmost austere,restrictedthemselvestothebeliefthatGodisaneternal,infinite,independent,andintelligentbeingwhocreatedtheworld.Thesecondallowedthat Godexercisesacontinuingprovidentialgovernmentovertheworld,butthis governmentisnota moral one.ThethirdgroupacceptedthatGodisamoral governorbutdeniedimmortality.Thefourthacceptedthatthereisafuturelife andjudgementinwhichvirtueisrewardedandvicepunished.Alldeniedthatwe needrevelationtodiscoverthetruthofanyoftheseclaims.¹²
¹¹AglanceatPartIIofHume’schapter ‘OfMiracles’ (Enquiry:116–31)showshowfaritwas acceptabletoridiculetheScripturesinprint.
¹²Therewere,ofcourse,manyabledefendersofChristianityagainstDeism.AswellasJohnLocke, SamuelClarke,andGeorgeBerkeley,mentionshouldbemadeofDamarisMasham.In Occasional ThoughtsinReferencetoaVertuousorChristianLife (1705)Mashamsetsouttodefendreasonable ChristianityfromDeismontheonehandandsuperstitionontheother.Thebookisalso,inpart,an answertoMaryAstell’ s TheChristianReligionasProfessedbyaDaughteroftheChurch (1705)which waspublishedasareplytoMasham’ s ADiscourseConcerningtheLoveofGod (1696),whichwasitselfa replytoacollectionoflettersbyJohnNorrisandMaryAstellpublishedas LettersConcerningtheLove ofGod (1695).SeeentriesinStanfordEncyclopaediaonAstell,andonMasham.
ButleraimstodefendthereasonablenessofChristianbeliefemployingthe Deists’ ownassumptionsandmethodology.Hispointofdepartureistherefore thebeliefthatiscommontoDeistsandChristianTheists thatthereisaGod,in thesenseofanintelligentandpowerfuldesigner.Heacceptstheirmethodology: thatwemustexamineChristianbeliefusingordinarymethodsofreasoningthat wewouldemployineverydaylife.Heargues,however,thatthosemethodswill takeusmuchfurtherthanDeistssupposed:theycanbeusedtoshowthatmanyof thefundamentalclaimsoftheismcanbethusestablishedandthattraditional Christianorthodoxy,asrevealedinScripture,isinlinewithwhatweknowofthe world.Suchinternalcritiquesofaviewareverypowerful.Externalcritiquesofa viewcanberejectedbyitsadherentsbecausetheymakeclaims,oradopta methodology,thatproponentsofthatviewdonotaccept.ButifButlercan showthat,ontheDeists’ ownassumptions,theyshouldacceptdoctrinesthat theyreject,thentheirwholeprojectisundermined.Butthatargumentative advantagehasacorrespondingdrawback,namelythatthosewhodoubtthe mutuallyagreedpremise thatthereisaGod will findnothinginthe Analogy toassuagetheirdoubts.
IfhistargetisDeism,hismethod,asthetitleofButler ’sbookmakesclear,isto employanextendedargumentfrom(orby)analogy.Whilemanyoftheindividual argumentsemployedbyButlerareborrowedfromearliercriticsofDeism,itisthe extendeduseofargumentsfromanalogythatisuniquetoButler,andprovidesa satisfyingunitytohiswork.Theeasiestwaytolookatthestructureofarguments fromanalogyisbymeansofanexample.Supposewewishtoknowifanewdrug issafe.Usuallywetestitonanimals first;ifitissafeinrats,say,wetakethistobe evidencethatitwillbesafewhenusedinhumans.Webasethisreasoningon thefactthatthephysiologyofratsisrathersimilar(i.e. analogous)tothatof humans,sothatwehavereasontobelievethatwhatissafeintheonecasewillbe safeintheother.
Argumentsbyanalogyarecommoninscienceandineverydaylife.Theyreston asimilaritybetweentwothings,ortwophenomena,whereweknowmoreabout the firstthanthesecond.Sincethesecondthing(thehumans)resemblesthe first(therats)withrespecttothefeaturesweknowabout,weinferthatthe unknown featuresofthesecond(thehumanresponsetothedrug)will probably resembletheotherfeaturesofthe first(therats’ responsetothedrug)thatwe alreadyknowabout.
Argumentsbyanalogyarenotproofs,andtheirconclusionsarenotcertain; theyonlyleadusto probable conclusionsonthebasisofobserved similarities. Indeed,Butlersuggeststhatthesetwofeaturesareetymologicallyrelated.
Thatwhichchieflyconstitutesprobabilityisexpressedintheword likely, i.e. like sometruth,ortrueevent;likeit,initself,initsevidence,insomemoreorfewerof itscircumstances.Forwhenwedetermineathingtobeprobablytrue,suppose
thatan eventhasorwillcometopass,itisfromthemind’sremarkinginitalikeness tosomeotherevent,whichwehaveobservedhascometopass(AIntro.2).
Broadlyspeaking,thestrongerthesimilarity,thegreatertheprobabilityofthe conclusion.However,thesimilaritiesmustberelevantones.Anyonethingis similartoanotherinanindefinitelylargenumberofways,andalsodissimilarinas manyways.Whatcountastherelevantsimilaritieswilldependonwhatweare investigating.Ratsaredissimilartous,forexample,inhavingtails butthatisnot relevanttoargumentsbasedonsimilarityofphysiology.
ThefulltitleofButler’sbookis TheAnalogyofReligion,NaturalandRevealed, totheConstitutionandCourseofNature.The firstpartfocusesonnaturalreligion: thatis,whatwecangleanfromourknowledgeofourselvesandtheworldabout thenatureoftheDesignerandabouthisplansforus.Theanalogicalargument takesusfromwhatweknowaboutthepresentlifetowhatwecanexpectina futurelifewhich,giventheintelligenceandforesightoftheAuthorofNature,is probablyrelevantlysimilartolifehereandnow.Thesecondpartarguesthatthere isnothingsurprising,unfair,orunreasonableintheideaofa special revelation thatis,onegiventosomeratherthantoothers.SomepartsoftheChristian revelation,suchasthemoralteaching,reinforcewhatnaturalreligionteachesus. Whatisnewintherevelation,suchasChrist’sdivinityandhisroleasSaviour,isin tunewithwhatwehavelearnedfromstudyofthisworld.The firstpartispositive andconstructive showingwhatnaturalreligiongivesusgroundstobelieve.The secondpartisdefensive showingthattherearenogoodgroundstorejectthe Christianrevelation.
The firstpartofthe Analogy canbeseenasacontinuationofperhapsthemost famousanalogicalargumentinreligiousthought:theArgumentfromDesign. Humansdesignmanykindsoftoolsinorderbettertoachievetheirgoals. Whethersimpleorcomplicated,allofthemhavetwoobviousfeatures.Their parts worktogether toachievesome purpose.Inthecaseofmorecomplicated machines,suchascars,therearevariouspartsandsub-parts,suchasbrakesand gearbox,eachofwhichitselfhasapurposethatthencontributestothecar’ s overallpurpose.Otherthings,suchaslumpsofrock,donothavethiskindof purposiveorteleologicalstructure.Youmight findauseforapieceofrock asa hammer,perhaps butnoonesupposesitwasdesignedforthatpurpose.
Nowtotheanalogy.We findinnatureorganismswhosepartsoperatetogether inasystematicwaytoachievesomegoal.Inparticular,therearespecialized organsinanimals,eachofwhichhasaspecificfunction,andeachofwhich contributes,inharmonywiththeothers,tothewell-beingoftheanimalasa whole.Andeachanimalisbeautifullyadaptedto flourishinitsenvironment.The complexityandefficiencyofanimalsandplantsisbeyondanythingwehave achieved,orperhapscanachieve.TheanalogicalinferencetheArgumentfrom Designinvitesustodrawisthatplantsandanimals,includingourselves,were
designed.Sincetheywerenotdesignedbyus,theremustbeanotherdesigner. Whatshouldweconcludeaboutthedesigner ’snature?Whiletheymaynotbelike usinallrespects,theymusthavewhateveritisthathumanshavethatenables themtoproduceartefacts,ofwhichthemostobviousare,intelligence,aplan,and thepowertoexecutethatplan.Giventhescopeandcomplexityoftheinterrelationswe findinthenaturalworld,thatdesignermusthavethesequalitiestoa muchhigherdegreethanwehumans.Thus,theargumentconcludes,weare justifiedinsupposingtheexistenceofaveryintelligentpowerfuldesigner.
BeforeDarwin’stheoryofevolution,whichoffersanalternativetheoryto explaintheadaptationswe findinthenaturalworld,thisargumentwasextremely popular,sincenootherexplanationwasonoffer.Butleracceptsit,asdothe Deists.SinceButlerisassuming,withtheDeists,thatthereisanintelligent designer,hedoesnotappealdirectlytotheArgumentfromDesigninthisform. Rather,he extends theDesignArgumenttoseewhatelsewecaninferaboutthe Designerfromtheworldaswe findit.Inparticular,wearepartoftheDesigner’ s plan;bylookingathumannatureandathowtheworldtreatsus,wecan,Butler maintains,discovermuchmoreabouthisplanforourfuture.
TakingashisstartingpointthemostaustereoftheDeistpositionsthatClarke laidout,Butlersuccessivelyarguesthatwehavegoodreasontobelievethat:
• Thereisanafterlife.
• Thisworldisundergovernance,inthatcertainbehavioursareusuallyand naturallyrewardedwhileothersarepenalized.
• Thegovernmentofthisworldisamoralone,inthatvirtueisusuallyand naturallyrewardedandvicepenalized.
• Peoplewillberewardedorpunishedinthenextlifedependingonwhether theyhavelivedvirtuousorviciouslives.
• Thislifeisaprobationortrialthroughwhichwemustpasstoattainvirtuous habitsandto fitourselvesforthekingdomofheaven.
• Theseconclusionsareunaffectedbywhetherweacceptfreewillorthinkthat everythingcomesaboutbynecessity.
• WeinevitablyunderstandonlyasmallpartofGod’spurposes.Weknow enoughtoknowwhatGodexpectsofusbywayofvirtueandsimpleworship, butmanypartsofhisplanwillseempuzzling.
• ThequestionofwhetherChristianityistrueisofenormouspractical importance.
• Arevelation,byitsnature,ismiraculousandislikelytobeaccompaniedby confirmingmiracles.Butthereisnothinginwhatweknowoftheworldthat justifiesscepticismaboutthemiraculous.
• Wehavereasontobelievethatrepentancealoneisnotenoughtosaveus fromtheconsequencesofourtransgressions.However,sometimespeopleare savedfrombadconsequencesbytheinterventionofothers.Itisreasonable,
therefore,tosupposethatonlyamediatorandadvocatecouldsaveusfrom ourdeservedpunishment.
• Theobjectionsagainsttheneedforarevelationareunsound.Givenour ignorance,wecannotworkoutonourownwhatwearerequiredtodotobe saved,norwillwenecessarilyunderstandwhyGodchosethesemethodseven whentheyarerevealedtous.
LifeAfterDeath
ItiscrucialfortheremainderofButler’sargumentthatwehavereasontobelieve weshallsurvivedeath.Ifwedonot,theissueofhowGodwilltreatusinafuture existencebecomesmoot.Unfortunately,itisgenerallyagreedthatthisistheleast convincingofButler ’sarguments.Whatisatstakehereisthesurvivalofwhat Butlercalls ‘ourlivingpowers’:ourcapacitiestoperceiveandtoreflect.Onwhat dothesepowersdependfortheircontinuance?Wedonotknowbut,Butler argues,wehavereasontobelievethatitisnotourbodies.Ifthatisright,the deathofthebodywillnotpreventusfromcontinuing,maybewithadifferent bodyorwithnone.
Thereisa presumption,Butlerclaims,thatthingswillcontinuetobeasthey havehithertobeen.Thispresumptionunderliesourinductivereasoningfromthe observedtotheunobserved.Inparticular,anyindividualsubstancewillcontinue toexist unless acauseintervenestodestroyit.If,therefore,wecanshowthatthere isnopositivereasontothinkthatbodilydeathwillbringaboutthedissolutionof themind,thenwehavegoodreasontosupposethatthemindwillnaturally continueafterdeath.Hethenarguesthatdamagetoourbody,orlossofourbodily powers,doesnotaffectthemind.Thelossofalimboraneyedoesnotaffectour capacity toactorperceive,ascanbeseenfromthefactthat,wereweableto replacelimboreyewithanartificialone,wewouldstillbeabletomovethelimb andoursightwouldberestored.Ourbodyandsenseorgansaremereinstruments bywhichthemindinteractswiththeworld.Impendingdeathmayrobusof variousbodilyfunctions,butdyingpeoplecanretainmentalclarityuntiltheend. Thisargumentisopentoseriousobjections.WhatButlerhasshownisthat thereare many partsofourbodyanyoneofwhichcanbelostwithoutdamageto ourmentalpowers.Butfromthis,onecannotinferthat all partsofourbody mightbedestroyedwithoutmentaldamageordestruction,fortworeasons.First, itisgenerallyunsoundtoarguethatbecausesomethingcouldsurviveinthe absenceofsomeoneparticularkindofthingitcouldsurvivewithout any thingsof thatkind.ThatIcanskipanyparticularmealwithoutdetrimenttomyhealthdoes notmeanIcanskipallmealswithoutdying.Second,theredoesseemtobeone partofthebody,namelythebrain,thatwhendamageddoesaffectmental functioning.Ifmyvisualcortexisdestroyed,thenIcannotsee,evenifmyeyeis
functioningproperly.Andsimilarlyforotherpartsofthebrain.Thisparticular organdoesnotseemtobeamereinstrumentfortheuseofthemindbut somethingwhoseproperfunctioningisintegraltomentalfunctioning.Inthat case,itseemslikelythatdeathofthebrainanddeathofconsciousnessgohandin hand.Ofcourse,thisdoesnotprovethatwecouldnotsurvivedeath,butitdoes undermineButler’sargumentthatstudyoftherelationbetweenmindandbody suggeststhatlifeafterdeathisbothnaturalandprobable.
ItislikelythatsoastuteathinkerasButlerwouldnothaveplacedrelianceon theseratherweakarguments,wereitnotforthefactthatheisconvincedofthe survivalofthesoulbyathenpopularmetaphysicalargumentforthesimplicityof thesoulthatheborrowsfromClarke(e.g.in ADiscourse:264).
Allpresumptionofdeath’sbeingthedestructionoflivingbeings,mustgoupon suppositionthattheyarecompounded;andso,discerptible[=capableofbeing dispersed].Butsinceconsciousnessisasingleandindivisiblepower,itshould seemthatthesubjectinwhichitresides,mustbesotoo(AI.1.8).
Thereismuchthatispuzzlinginthisclaim,butevenifweconcededthatthemind orsoulwasindivisible,Butler’sclaiminhis firstsentenceseemsfalse.Foran indivisibleentitymightlosesomeorallofitscharacteristicpowers,notby dispersalbutbydiminution.Memorycanfadeaway;couragecanebb;intellectual graspcanwither.Weknowthatdestructionofspecificpartsofthebrainimpairs ordestroyscertainofourmentalfaculties.So,byanalogy,wemaysupposethat withthedestructionofthewholebrainwillcomethelossofallpowersandthe deathofwhatButlercallsthe ‘livingagent’
MoralGovernmentofGod
Assuming,forthesakeofargument,thatthereislifeafterdeath,whatmightwe reasonablyexpectittobelike,accordingtoButler’sanalogicalargument?Deists andChristiansagreethatthisisGod’sworld,sowecanassumethattheprinciples onwhichitrunsweresetupbyGod.Inthislifewehaveconsiderable,thoughby nomeanstotal,controloverhowourlivesturnout.Wecancertainlyruin ourselvesbyfollyandvice,andwearemorelikelyto flourishifweliveprudently andvirtuously.Further,howwebehaveinearlierstagesofourlivesdeeplyaffects whathappenstousaswegrowolder.Evenifthenaturalconsequencesofour stupidityandwickednessarelongpostponed,theyoftencatchupwithuslateron, andsometimesitistoolateto findaremedyor,ifoneisavailable,itisonlywith theassistanceofothers.Repentance,onitsown,isofteninsufficienttoforestall thesebadeffects.Byanalogy,wewouldexpectthesame,orsimilar,principlesto applyinafuturelife.Wecanreasonablyexpectvicetobepunishedandvirtue
rewardedinthelifetocome,andwemayinferthatrepentancemightnotbe sufficienttoenableustoavoidthepenalty.
Butleradmitsthat inthislife thecorrespondencebetweensinandpunishment ontheonehand,andvirtueandrewardontheother,islessthanperfect.Sowhy shouldweexpectthenextlifetobe more justinthisrespectthanthecurrentone? Surelytheanalogyrequiresustothinkthatwhathappensinthenextlifewillbe similartowhathappensinthisone.Butler’sreplydrawsonargumentshemakes inthe FifteenSermons. Humansdifferfromotheranimalsinbeingmoralagents, knowingthedifferencebetweengoodandevil,andinbeingaccountableforour actions.ThisgivesusauniqueinsightintothemindandpurposesoftheCreator. Wecareaboutjusticebecausewewere designed todoso;thesearestronggrounds forthinkingthathewhocreatedusalsocares.Ifso,wehavereasontobelievethat, inthelongrun,justicewillbeperfectlyexecuted.
Butleroffersanumberofadditionalobservationstosupportthisconclusion. Hedrawsonaconceptionoftheworldthatisthoroughlyteleological.Giventhat thereisanintelligentdesigner,thingsinnature,includingournature,willbethere foragoodreason.Butthingsdonotalwaysworkastheyaresupposedto.Itisin thenatureofwaterto flowdownhill;theimmunesystemnaturally fightsinvading organisms.Butaccidentalcircumstancescanfrustratethesenaturaltendencies. Humansmaydamriversorpumpwateruphills.Inautoimmunediseasesthe body’sdefencesattackitsowncells.Ifwearetounderstandtheprincipleson whichtheworldruns,weshouldlookatthenaturaltendencyofthingsratherthan theaccidentalexceptions.Butlerclaimsthatthe natural tendencyofvirtueisto makeourownlives,andthoseofothers,happier,andthenaturaltendencyofvice istheopposite.Aswehaveseen,however,thenaturaltendencyofactionsand processesisoftenfrustrated.Thenaturaltendencyofexerciseandagooddietisto promoteahealthy,longlife.Buttheenthusiasticjoggermayberunoverbya bus,whilethe flabbycouchpotatoissavedfromheartdiseasebyatriplebypass; suchexceptionsdonot,however,underminetheclaimthatthenaturaltendencyof exerciseistomakeyouhealthierandhappier,andthereforeallowyoutolivelonger. Equally,asocietyofthevirtuouswilltendtobehappierandmoresuccessfulthana societyofvillains,evenifthevillainsoccasionallywin.Moreover,viceisparasiticon virtue;itcanonlysucceedwheremostaretrusting,generous,etc.Aconfederacyof peoplewithoutashredofdecencyortrustworthinesswillinevitablyfail.Ifvirtue prevailsslowlyandwithdifficultyagainstobstaclesinthislife,wemayassumethat inthemuchlongertermofafuturelife,itwillultimatelytriumph.
TrialandTribulation
IfGodisperfectlyjustandbenevolent,whywaituntilthenextworldtofully realizehisaims?Whynotmakeusallperfectlyhappynow?Or,ifwethinkthe
guiltyshouldsuffer,whydoeshenowallowtheinnocenttosufferaswellasthe wicked?Thisistheinfamousproblemofevil:ifGodisgood,whenceallthis sufferingandinjustice?Butler’sreplyisthattheexistenceofsufferingisimpliedin thenotionofmoralgovernment.Inaworldwherenothingandnoonewent wrong,therewouldbenoneedfor government ofanykind.Thislife,hecontends, shouldbeseenasatestinggroundinwhichwearegiventheopportunityto developasvirtuous,fulfilledhumanbeingsortosinkintoslothandsin.Itisthus, asButlerputsit,astateofprobation:ourconductwilldeterminewhetherweare rewardedorpunishedattheendofourprobationaryperiod.Ifthislifeistobea genuinetestofcharacter,theremustbetemptationsandobstaclestoovercome. Nomeritattachestodoingrightwhenthereisnothingattractiveaboutdoing wrong.Wecandisplaypatienceandfortitudeonlywhentroublecomes.Weare imperfectbeingswhocomeintotheworldwithfewabilities.Toacquirewhatare nowcalled ‘lifeskills’,wemustfacechallenges.Wherethereisnopossibilityof failure,therecannotbesuccess.
WhatButleroffershereisatheodicy anaccountofthedivinepurposesthat seekstojustifythewaysofGodtohumanity.Headmitsthatitisonlyapartial theodicy:thereareevilsitdoesnotexplain.Manyfallbythewayside,sometimes throughnofaultoftheirown,andthiswasteoflifeisdistressing,thoughnomore surprisingthanthefailureofmanyseedstogerminateorthehighmortalityrate amongyounganimals.SincethisisGod’sworldandsince,soButlerhasargued, itisunderGod’smoralgovernance,suchfactsmustbeconsistentwithGod’ s goodness,thoughwecannotseehow.Ourignoranceinthesemattersisno evidenceagainstGod’sexistence.Itwouldbeabsurdtosupposethatwe,with ourlimitedknowledge,couldunderstandthereasonforeverything.Itwouldbe follytosupposethatweknowbetterthanGodhowthingsshouldberun.Itis sufficientthatwecanunderstandthegeneraloutlineofGod’splanforus.
Suppose,however,thatwearenotentirelyconvincedofGod’smoralgovernment.Supposewethinkitratherunlikelythatprudenceandvirtuewillbring reward,notonlyimperfectlyinthislifebutalsoperfectlyinthenext.Nevertheless, fromthepointofviewof practice,wemighthaveasgoodareasontofollowGod’ s ordinancesaswewouldifwewerefullyconvinced.For,asButlerpointsoutatthe beginningofhiswork,whatitissensibletododependsnotonlyontheprobability ofahoped-foroutcomebutonitsvaluecomparedwiththeprobabilityandvalue ofthealternatives.Thoughitisunlikelythatmyhousewillburndown,itwouldbe adisasterifitdid,andtheinsurancepremiumsarenotinordinatelyburdensome. Similarly,evenifoneisnotfullypersuadedbyButler’scaseforafuturelifeorfor God’smoralgovernment,itwouldbethegreatestfollytoriskone’spossiblefuture life,andperhapsincurGod’swrath,unlesswhatwasrequiredofyouwas excessivelydemanding.Butthedemands,asButlerexplainsinPartIIofthe Analogy,thoughperhapsdifficulttoliveupto,arereasonable.First,youneedto repentoffollyandwrongdoingandtoendeavourtoliveasober,virtuous,and
godlylife.Second,sincethenaturalconsequenceofsinispunishment,youneedto acceptthegraciousmercymadeavailabletoyouthroughChrist’smediationand sacri fice.ThisisButler’sversionofPascal’sWager:indecidinghowtolive, considerboththeoddsandwhatisatstakeeitherway.
Revelation
Revelationcanreinforcethetruthsofnaturaltheology.Ifitdoes,thisstrengthens thecredibilitybothofnaturaltheologyandofrevelationitself.ButtheBible purportsalsotorevealmuchthatcouldnototherwisebeknown,including especiallytheroleofChristinoursalvation.Itiswiththeseclaimsthatthesecond halfofthe Analogy isconcerned.Thestrategyofthispartoftheworkisnecessarily moredefensivethanthe first.Whereasinthe firstpartButlercontendsthatwhatis revealedtousaboutGod’smoralpurposeisalsoindependently supported bywhat weobserveofthewaytheworldisrun,inthesecondpartheseekstoshowonly thatwhatisrevealedaboutthemethodofoursalvationis compatible withwhatwe knowabouttheworkingsofthisworld.Thatdistinctionisbuiltintotheenterprise.Forwhatcanbeknownonlybyrevelationcannotbeindependently supportedbynaturalreligion.
ToDeistsandotherEnlightenmentthinkers,theBible,onwhichthespecific doctrinesofChristianitywerebased,seemedanimplausiblemishmashofthe fantasticandthemythical,writteninabarbarousandsuperstitiousage.Inthe secondpartofthe Analogy,Butleraddressesanumberofthesecriticisms.
A.Revelationissuperfluous.
B.Norationalpersoncould,orshould,believeinmiracles.
C.TheroleofChristasRedeemerisbothincomprehensibleandunnecessary.
D.Revelationshouldbeuniversal;ifnot,itisdiscriminatoryandmorally objectionable.
E.Appealstomysteryandtoourignoranceareashallowsubterfugetoconceal howridiculousaresomeaspectsoftheBibleingeneral,andofChristianity inparticular.
Butler’sstrategyinrespondingtoeachoftheseobjectionsisthesame.Weare necessarilyignorantofagreatpartofGod’sschemeincreation.Itwouldbe absurdtosupposewecouldjudgethesuccessofaschemeorsystemofwhichwe onlyknewasmallpart.Wemustnotassume,therefore,thatGodwillorderthings inthemannerthatseemssensibletous,withourlimitedandpartialunderstanding.Wemaynotalwaysunderstand why Godhasdonethingsthiswayratherthan that.ButwecanseethatGodgoverns this worldbytheveryprinciplestowhich objectionismadewhenitcomestorevelation.SinceDeistsacceptthatthisworld
manifestssignsofGod’sintelligentandrighteousgovernance,theycannotconsistentlyrejectarevelationthatoperatesalongsimilarlines.
A.Tosupposethatwestandinnoneedofrevelationistosupposethatweneed nothingmorethantofollowthepreceptsofnaturalreligiontostandinaright relationtoGod.Buthumanhistorydemonstratesthatwecannotworkoutour ownsalvationandneed ‘supernaturalinstructionandassistance’.¹³
B.TheperformanceofmiraclesbythefounderofChristianityandhisfollowers iscrucialtoestablishingtheauthorityofrevelation.Withoutmiracles,wewould havenoreasontoaccepttheirmessageratherthananyother.But,itmaybe objected,inorderforreportsofmiraclestobecredibletheremustbe muchmore evidenceintheirfavourthanisrequiredfortestimonyabouteverydayoccurrences,notleastbecausemiraclesviolatethelawsofnature.Butlerrespondswith twomainarguments.
First,miraclesarenotunusualinbeingunlikely.Thereisanequallystrong presumptionagainstmanyordinarynonmiraculousevents,yetwedonotrequire muchbywayofevidencetobelievethem.Itisveryunlikelythatanyparticular personshouldwinalottery.Yetwehappily,andrightly,acceptreportsofwhothe winneris,withoutdemandingextraordinaryproof.Thisargumentisunlikelyto impressthescepticaboutmiracles.Whiletheoddsagainstthisparticularperson winningthelotterymaybeenormous,theoddsagainst someone winningitarenot. Butlerdoes,however,maketwofurthersignificantpoints.The firstisthat,since amiracleisaneventnotfoundinthecourseofnature,whethersomethingwas miraculousdependsonwhatthecourseofnaturewasatthattime.Atthecreation oftheworldanditspeopling,apowerwhollydifferentfromthepresentcourseof naturewasexerted.Wastheexerciseofthatpowermiraculous,strictlyspeaking? Onlyifitwasabreachofthecourseofnatureatthecreation.Buteithertherewas nocourseofnatureatthattime,oriftherewere,wehavenoideawhatitwas.We cannot,therefore,claimthatanyrevelationgivenatthebeginningoftheworld wascontrarytothecourseofnature.Sotherecouldbenopresumptionagainst sucharevelationasbeingmiraculous.Secondly,miraclesshouldproperlybe comparednottoeverydayevents,buttoextraordinaryoccurrencessuchas cometsoreclipses,orextraordinarypowers,suchasmagnetismorelectricity.It isnotclearthat,tosomepersonacquaintedonlywithmundaneeventsand powers,thepresumptionagainsttheextraordinarymightbeasstrongasagainst themiraculous.Ifso,therewouldbeno peculiar presumptionagainstmiracles.
C.Thereisnopresumption,fromtheanalogyofnature,againsttheideathatGod wouldreconcilehimselftotheworldthroughamediator.Forhumanscomeinto existenceandarepreservedbythemediationofparentsandothers.Weneedhelpto thriveinthisworld,sowemayneeddivinehelptoachievesalvationinthenext.
Butwhy,itmightbeasked,isChrist’smediationrequired?SurelyGodcould simplyforgivetherepentant.Butler’sansweristhatnodoubthe could,butthe analogyofnaturesuggeststhathe maynot,forreasonswecannotnowcomprehend.Wehaveseenthatmisfortuneanddisasteroften,butnotinevitably,follows fromdeedsoffollyorvice.Sometimes,indeed,thereareremedies,butnotalways. Inparticular,repentanceandreformationmaybeofnoavail,andonefoolishact inouryouthmaycauseruintoourselvesandothers,howevermuchwelaterregret it.Ifthisishowthingspanoutinthisworld,whysupposeitwillbedifferentinthe next?Wemightsupposethataccordingtothegenerallawsofdivinegovernment, sinnerswillbepunished,howeverrepentanttheymaybe, unlesssomeoneinterposesandmediatesbetweenusandGod.Nothingintheanalogyofnaturerenders thisunlikely.
D.Whywasrevelationmadetosomebutnottoothersandataparticularpoint inhistory?SurelysuchfavouritismisunworthyofGod.Butler’sresponseis,as always,toappealtotheanalogyofnature.Wedonot findinthisworld,whichis underthemoralgovernmentofGod,thatallaretreatedequallyandthatno favoursarebestowed.Thecontingenciesofourplaceandtimeofbirthmeanthat someinherithugesocialoreconomicbenefitsthatotherslack.Inaddition,our naturalendowmentsofintelligence,energy,andbodilyormentalhealthdiffer greatly.Sowhyshouldwesupposethatthebenefitsofrevelationwouldbe distributedondifferentprinciples?
E.Butlerraisesthefollowingobjection:itis,surely,afeebledefencetotry ‘to solvedifficultiesinrevelation,bysaying,thattherearethesameinnatural religion;whenwhatiswantingistoclearbothofthem,ofthesetheircommon, aswellasothertheirrespective,difficulties ’.¹⁴ Herepliesasfollows:
1. ‘Itwouldbeabsurdtogiveupreasoninginareaswherecertaintyis unavailable,anddifficultiesremain.Isitnotapoorthing,foraphysician tohavesolittleknowledgeinthecureofdiseases,aseventhemosteminent have?Toactuponconjectureandguess,wherethelifeofmanisconcerned? Undoubtedlyitis:butnotincomparisonofhavingnoskillatallinthat usefulart,andbeingobligedtoactwhollyinthedark.’¹⁵
2.Itisdisingenuousforpeopletosaytheyonlyhaveobjectionstorevealed,but nottonatural,religion.Forintruththeirobjectionsareobjectionstoboth.
3.Ifwehavegoodreasontobeprudentinrespectofourtemporalaffairs,even thoughthereismuchwedonotknowabouthowthingswillturnout,there isequallygoodreasontotakecareofourspiritualwelfare,despiteour considerableignorance.
¹⁴ AII.8.2.¹⁵ AII.8.4.
4.PeopleobjectthatifChristianityweretrue,theevidencewouldnotbeso doubtful.¹ ⁶ ToButler,thisisanotherexampleofoursupposingthatGod must actinacertainwaybecause we thinkheshould.Buttheuncertainty underwhichwehavetomakedecisionsinthislifeshowsthatthisisnothow Godorganizesthings.
5.Thepurposeofthe Analogy is ‘nottovindicatethecharacterofGod,butto showtheobligationsofmen’.¹⁷
MoralPhilosophyinthe Analogy,asCompared withthe Sermons
Ihavediscussedelsewhere(FifteenSermons:xx–xxiii)thedevelopmentfromone worktotheotherofButler’sanswertothequestion,Isbenevolencethewholeof virtue?IalsobrieflyexploredButler’sinterestingsuggestioninthe Analogy that Godmightbeautilitarianwhoinstilsinus,forsoundutilitarianreasons,anonutilitarianconscience.Iturnnowtoaseconddifferencebetweenhismoral psychologyinthe Sermons andinthe Analogy,namelywhethertherearetwo superiorprinciplesinhumannature,conscienceandself-love,orjustone.Inthe Sermons Butlerclaimsthattherearetwo.Aprincipleissuperior,forButler,when ithasauthoritytoguideourlives.Actingagainstthedictatesofeitherprincipleis thusaviolationofournaturesinawaythatactingagainstsomeothermotivationalelementinournature,suchasappetites,passions,oraffections,isnot.As rationalbeings,werecognizetheauthorityofeachofthesetwosuperiorprinciples andcancontrolourbehavioursoastofollowtheiradvice.
Self-loveanddutycan,ofcourse,conflict:themorallyrightthingtodoisnot alwaysthemostadvantageous.Butler’sresponsetosuchpossibleconflictsistwofold.First,hedeniesthatthisconflictisascommonaspeoplesuppose.
Conscienceandself-love,ifweunderstandourtruehappiness,alwaysleadusthe sameway.Dutyandinterestareperfectlycoincident;forthemostpartinthisworld, butentirelyandineveryinstance,ifwetakeinthefutureandthewhole(S3.9).
Second,heinsistsonthesupremacyofconscience.
[C]onscienceorreflection,comparedwiththerestastheyallstandtogetherin thenatureofman,plainlybearsuponitthemarksofauthorityoveralltherest, andclaimstheabsolutedirectionofthemall(P24).
¹⁶ ThisiswhatJ.L.Schellenbergidentifiesasthe ‘ germ ’ ofhis ‘hiddennessargument’ :see Schellenberg1993and2015,andMacSwain2015.
¹⁷ AII.8.8.
Bothclaimscanbechallenged.Dutyandinterestin this worlddonotappearto coincideasoftenasButlersuggests.Andifthereisnoworldtocome,wecannot expectrectificationofanydisparitybetweenthetwoinafuturelife.Second,while Butler asserts that,inanyconflictbetweenthetwosuperiorprinciples,thedictates ofconscience ought totakepriority,hisgroundsforthisclaimrestlargelyonan appealto first-personalexperience:conscienceclaimsthissupremacyforitself. Thisbareassertionisunlikelytosatisfynormativeegoists,whoholdthatitis rationaltodoonlywhateverisinone’sownbestinterest.Egoistsdonotofcourse denythatsome,likeButler,thinkdifferently,butsuchpeopleareatbestmisguided,andatworstdupes.
Thereis,however,adeeperstructuralproblemwithButler’spictureinthe Sermons.Whilemoralphilosophershavedisagreedabout which considerations oughttoweighwithusinourpracticalreasoning,theprevalentviewhasoffereda monisticaccountofpracticalreason.Reasonspeaks,asitwere,withonevoice;it deliverstheauthoritativeverdictaboutwhat,inthelightofalltherelevant considerations,weoughttodo.OnButler’saccount,however,thereappearsto beabifurcationinpracticalreason:therearetwosuperiorprinciples,twoauthoritativevoices,havingtwodistinctsources:self-interestandduty.Wherethereis conflictbetweenthetwo,consciencegetsthe finalsay.Butthatisnotbecause practicalreason incorporates thetwostandpointsanddeliversaverdictthattakes bothintoaccount.Consciencesimply outranks self-love,withoutsubsumingthe latter’sdemands.
Butler’swayofputtingthingsinthe Sermons canencouragealineofthought thatseestheinputsfromeachsuperiorprincipleascompletelyindependent,and evenincommensurable.Onthisview,theverdictsofself-loveandofconscience havetheirrootsintworadicallydifferentperspectivesonourplaceintheworld: thepersonalandtheimpersonaloutlook.Eachofusisjustonepersonamong many;eachexperiencestheworldfromthepointofviewofherownconsciousness.Butthatmeansthatwhataffectsmedoessoinawaythatwhataffectsothers doesnot.Ofallthejoysandsorrows,triumphsanddisastersintheworld,Iam peculiarlyaffectedbymyown.FortheonlypainsandpleasuresIexperience directlyaremine.SoImaybethoughttohavereason,rootedinthenatureof individualconsciousness,tocareaboutmy own interests,inawaythatIdonot, andcouldnot,havetocareaboutthoseofothers.Andthatthoughtmayleadus inthedirectionofnormativeegoism.Buttheverysamestartingpointcanlead inanotherdirection.Eachofusisjustonepersonamongmany;oneindividual pointofviewontheworld.Whatisthereabout my pointofviewthatgivesit priorityoverthatofothers?Fromthepointofviewoftheuniverse,asSidgwick onceputit,myviewpoint,andhencemyowngood,isnomoreimportantthan anyother.Andthatthoughtmayleadustoadoptanimpersonalviewpoint,the standpointofimpartialbenevolence:eachperson’sinterests,includingmyown, aretobetakenintoaccountandweighedwiththerest.Fromthepersonal
