Thecontributors
PatrickCaudal (PhDUniversitédeParis-Diderot2000)isaresearchscientistatCNRS andU.Paris,LaboratoiredeLinguistiqueFormelle,France.Heisaspecialistinthe semanticsandpragmaticsoftense,aspect,andmodality(TAM),andanAustralianistfocusingnotablyontheverbsystemsofnon-Pama-Nyunganlanguages.Hehas extensivelyworkedonsemanticchange,languagecomparison/typologyandfieldworklinguisticsappliedtoAustralianlanguagesaswellasRomancelanguages,with atriplequantitative,experimentalandformalperspective.Hecurrentlycoordinates theFEMIDAL(‘Formal/ExperimentalMethodsandIn-depthDescriptionofAustralianIndigenousLanguages’)CNRSinternationalresearchnetwork(2021–2025), aswellasseveralOutreach/ScienceinSocietyresearchprojectsdedicatedtoIwaidja, anon-Pama-NyunganlanguagespokenintheCobourgPeninsulaarea.
DanielL.Everett isTrusteeProfessorofCognitiveSciences,BentleyUniversityin Waltham,Massachusetts,USA.HeisbestknownforhisworkonPirahãlanguageand cultureandforhisargumentsagainstsententialrecursionpostulatedinChomsky’s universalgrammar.Inadditiontoacademicpublications,heauthoredseveralpopularsciencebooks,including HowLanguageBegan:TheStoryofHumanity'sGreatest Invention (2017); DarkMatteroftheMind:TheCulturallyArticulatedUnconscious (2016); Language:TheCulturalTool (2012);and Don'tSleep,ThereAreSnakes:Life andLanguageintheAmazonianJungle (2008).Heiscurrentlyworkingontwobooks onthelinguisticsandphilosophyofCharlesSandersPeirce.
MattFarr isaphilosopherofscienceandlecturerintheDepartmentofHistoryand PhilosophyofScienceattheUniversityofCambridge.Hisresearchfocusesonthe metaphysicsandepistemologyoftimeandcausation,particularlywhatitmeansfor timetohaveadirection,theroleofcausalityinphysics,andthepsychologyoftimeand causation.Matt’sresearchhasbeenpublishedinphilosophyjournalssuchastheBritish JournalforthePhilosophyofScience and Synthese,andheiscurrentlywritingabook onthephilosophyandphysicsoftimedirection.MattreceivedhisPhDinPhilosophy fromtheUniversityofBristol,andhasheldpostdoctoralresearchfellowshipsatthe UniversityofSydneyandUniversityofQueensland.
GraemeA.Forbes isanHonorarySeniorLecturerinPhilosophyattheUniversity ofKent.Hedefendsadynamicviewoftime(TheGrowing-Blockview)according towhichchangeoftimehasnospatialequivalentandthepastissettledwhilethe futureisopen.Hisworkismainlyinmetaphysics,butencompassestopicsfrompragmatistphilosophicalmethodology,thoughepistemology,philosophyoflanguage,and philosophyofmind,toethics.
KasiaM.Jaszczolt (D.Phil.Oxon,PhDCantab,MAE)isaProfessorofLinguistics andPhilosophyofLanguageattheUniversityofCambridgeandProfessorialFellow ofNewnhamCollege,Cambridge.Shepublishedextensivelyontopicsinsemantics, pragmatics,andphilosophyoflanguage.Hercurrentinterestsarerepresentationof timeinlanguageanddevelopingaconceptualist-compositionaltheoryofmeaning indiscourse.Herauthoredbooksinclude Semantics,Pragmatics,Philosophy:AJourneythroughMeaning (2023,CUP), MeaninginLinguisticInteraction (2016,OUP), RepresentingTime (2009,OUP), DefaultSemantics (2005,OUP), SemanticsandPragmatics (2002,Longman)and Discourse,BeliefsandIntentions (1999,Elsevier).She co-authoredandco-editedtwelvevolumes,including TheCambridgeHandbookof Pragmatics (2012,CUP).
M.JoshuaMozersky isaProfessorofPhilosophyatQueen’sUniversityinKingston, Ontario.Hisresearchinterestsareinthephilosophyofscience,philosophyoflanguage,metaphysics,andpoliticalphilosophy.Hisessayshaveappeared,amongother places,in PhilosophicalStudies, Synthese, InternationalStudiesinthePhilosophyofScience,TheOxfordHandbookofTime,andTheBlackwellCompaniontoTime.Hisbook, Time,Language,andOntology,waspublishedbyOxfordUniversityPressin2015.
AnnaPiata isapostdoctoralresearcherattheUniversityofNeuchˆatel(Switzerland) andanadjunctlecturerattheUniversityofAthens(Greece).SheholdsaPhDinLinguistics(UniversityofAthens)andanMPhilinLinguistics(UniversityofCambridge). Herpublicationsincludearticlesinjournalssuchas Pragmatics&Cognition, Journal ofPragmatics, Metaphor&Symbol,and InternetPragmatics.Sheistheauthorofthe monograph ThePoeticsofTime:MetaphorsandBlendsinLanguageandLiterature (2018)andco-editorofthevolume TimeRepresentationsinthePerspectiveofHuman Creativity (2022).Herresearchinterestsareincognitivesemantics,pragmatics,and stylistics.
SimonProsser isReaderinPhilosophyattheUniversityofStAndrews.Heisco-editor (withFrançoisRecanati)of ImmunitytoErrorthroughMisidentification:NewEssays (CambridgeUniversityPress,2012),andauthorof ExperiencingTime (OxfordUniversityPress,2016).Hehaspublishedarticlesonavarietyoftopicsinphilosophyof mind,philosophyofperception,andmetaphysics,includingconsciousness,perspectivalthought,temporalexperience,mentalfiles,andemergentproperties.Muchofhis currentworkconcernsthefirst-personperspective.
LouisdeSaussure isProfessorofLinguisticsattheUniversityofNeuchˆatel(Switzerland).Hismainresearchareasaretense,aspectandmodality,lexicalsemanticsand pragmatics,post-Griceanpragmaticsandpersuasionindiscourse.Aftercompletinga PhDattheUniversityofGeneva,helecturedonphilosophyoflanguageattheUniversityofTexasatAustinandpursuedresearchatUniversityCollegeLondonasavisiting scholar.HefurthertaughtatvariousinstitutionsincludingtheÉcoledesHautesÉtudes enSciencesSocialesinParisandtheUniversitiesofFribourg,LuganoandAthens.He isafoundingmemberoftheCognitiveScienceCentreattheUniversityofNeuchˆatel andoftheresearchnetworkBeyondMeaningdedicatedtoexpressivityandemotion inlanguageuse.
GiulianoTorrengo isanAssociateProfessorattheDepartmentofPhilosophy‘Piero Martinetti’oftheUniversityofMilan,thefounderandcoordinatoroftheCentrefor PhilosophyofTime,andresearchfellowattheAutonomousUniversityofBarcelona. HeisthePIoftheproject CHRONOS:RethinkingandCommunicatingTime ofthe SpanishMinistryofScienceandInnovation.Torrengo’scurrentfocusofinterestisthe connectionbetweentemporalexperienceandthefundamentalfeaturesoftemporal reality.
Metaphysicaltime,humantime,andtimeinlanguage
KasiaM.Jaszczolt
1.1 Timetoutcourt andthedimensionsofinquiry
Understandingthehumanconcept(s)oftimestraddlesdifferentdisciplinary boundaries.Thisisabookforlinguistsandforphilosophers—withtheproviso thatitaimsatattractingbothcategoriesofreaders(ifindeedaboundarycanbe drawn)to both categoriesofpapers.Theaimismotivatedbythebigquestion ofthecharacteristicsofwhatwehumansunderstandastheconceptoftime andfeelasthepassageoftime.‘Ourtime’,humantime,isthetimeinthoughts, andassuch,timeinourepistemicattitudessuchasbelief(thattimepasses), knowledge(thatdeathisinevitable),orfear(thatIamgoingtobelate).It isalsothetimeofourfeelingsandsensations.Itisthetimethatwe(think we)experience,andassuchitistheBigUnknownthat,atoneend,touches uponthe realtime ofspacetimepursuedthroughthelawsofphysicsonthe micro-levelofhumanreality,and,attheother, timeinlanguageanddiscourse, pursuedbylinguistsonthemacro-levelofsocialrealityor,moretraditionally (andformally)alsoinabubbleofanabstractconstructofa languagesystem. Bothrelationsshedlightonit,buttheybothstillhidemysteriesandsecrets. Theyalsoobfuscateitbyaddingadimensiononwhichwehavetocalibrate whatexactlywetalkaboutwhenwetalkabout‘time’.
Thisvolumetouchesuponthemboth,combininginsightsintotheconcept oftimeandthefeelingofthepassageoftime(ifindeedthisiswhatitis— passageoftime—butreadon)withinsightsinto(i)howbesttoconceiveof realtime(throughquestionstodowithitsnature,asstaticordynamic),as wellasresearchinto(ii)usingtemporalexpressionsinnaturallanguage,or indeedexplicitlyspeakingabouttime.Inotherwords,windowsonhuman timeopenfromwhatweknowandthinkweknow(thatis,havewell-supported theoriesof)aboutourselvesandourcomprehensionoftheuniverse(here philosophicalaspectscomein)andwhatweknowandthinkweknowabout
ouractivitiesandbehaviourinit—forthepurposeofthisvolume,especially linguisticbehaviour.
Pertinentquestionsareampleandcanbearrangedalongseveraldifferentdimensions,suchasthefollowing.‘↔’standsforbi-directionaltravel (althoughsomedirectionswillbemorewell-troddenandmorefeasiblethan others).
[1] thefeeling,sensation,experienceoftimepassing ↔ theconcept oftime;
[2] speakingabouttime ↔ thinkingabouttime;
[3] thinkingintime ↔ theconceptoftime;
[4] theawarenessofhumantime ↔ theawarenessofrealtimeof spacetime;
[5] thepropertiesofhumantime ↔ thepropertiesofspacetime;
[6] temporalthoughts ↔ modalthoughts;
[7] temporalexpressions ↔ expressionsofmodalityandaspect;
[8] consciousness ↔ humantime;
[9] humanspace ↔ humantime;
[10] feelingoftimepassing ↔ emotions,
tonameafewseminalones.Ihavedeliberatelyarrangedthisselectionof dimensionsinanorderthatdoesnotattempttodistinguishbetweenphilosophical,linguistic,andpsychologicalquestionsinthattheveryraisond’être ofthiscollectionofpapersistodemonstratetheadvantageofthinkingoutsidesuchcategories—notmerelyoutsidetheorieswithinfieldsbutalsoreally, truly,andfreelyasanorganizedwhole,crossingdisciplinaryboundaries.Such aspectsanddimensionssumuptoaninvestigationintotherealityof timetout court,normallyseparatelypursuedwithinthemetaphysical,cognitive,andlinguisticdomain—withtheinputfrommicrophysicsatoneend,andhuman sciencesincludingpoeticsattheother.
Oneofthebasicquestionsiswheretimeistobefound.Onthelevelof thephysicallawsoftheuniverse,theanswerappearstobe:asdimensions ofspacetime.Butitisstilldebatedwhetherspacetimeexistsonthefundamentallevelofreality,or,ratherisitselfemergent,ashasbeensuggestedin theoriesofquantumgravity(seee.g. Rovelli2018).Andifitisemergent,one hastoaskwhatkindofmetaphysicalemergenceitis—thatis,howtime,as theemergentfeature,relatestothefeaturefromwhichitemerges:inadditiontotheassumedco-temporal material dependence,howontologicallyand causallyautonomousithastobe(seee.g. Wilson2021, 2022 onstrongand
weakdependenceandtypesofdependence;seealso Baron2019).Assuch, timeneednotbethoughtofasreducibletothislowerlevel:emergencedoes notmeanreduction(butseealso Jaszczolt2020 ontheexplanatoryroleof reductionism).Next,oncewemovetotheontologicallyautonomouslevelof organiclife,andespeciallybeingswithconsciousawareness,wecanlegitimatelyconceptualizethisautonomyoftimeasfundamentalityoftimeandas suchspacetime.Butthisisonlythefirsthurdle;thenextoneisthestepfrom realtimesoconceived,timeofthestaticuniverse,tothedynamic,flowing humantime.Here,again,givingourselvestheoptionofmovingbackandforth alongtherelevantdimension(dimension5)createsthemuch-neededconceptualframeinthat,ontheonehand,conceptualizationoftheuniversespecific tohumansallowsusspecificinsightsintothesymmetricaluniverse,obfuscatingothers,andbarringyetothers(dimension5above,forwarddirection;see e.g. Price1996),whileontheother,theunderstandingofthemicro-lawsof physicsallowsusamuchbetterinsightintotheemergentrealityofcomplex systemslikeourselves(dimension5,backwarddirection;seee.g.Ismael2016). Hereiswhere,assumingrealtimedoesn’tflowbuteventsareorderedasrelativelyearlierorlater(that,is McTaggart’s(1908) B-series),orassumingthe symmetricaluniverseandassuchMcTaggart’sC-seriesoftimethatnotonly doesn’tflowbutdoesnothaveadirectioneither(seeFarr,thisvolume),we beginaskingthequestionabouttheflow:howitisthatwefeelit(ifindeed wedo)andwherethisfeelingcomesfrom.Thegroundingisprovidedbythe conceptsofconsciousness,personalidentity,andself-awareness,inthatthe passageoftimecomeswiththeenduringself.Now,weeitherexperiencetime asifitwerepassing(phenomenalpassageillusionism,seee.g.Torrengo2017a, thisvolume; Prosser2012, 2013a, 2016)orweonlythinkwedo(phenomenal passageeliminativism;seee.g. Hoerl2014)inthatwemayonlybelievethatit passes(phenomenalpassagecognitivism;seeFarr,thisvolume,Sections8.4.1 and8.4.4).Onceweaddressthefeelings,wealsoaddressemotions(e.g. Piata 2018,thisvolume;Prosser,thisvolume).Thenwecanmovetothehuman conceptoftimeitself(e.g.Jaszczolt,thisvolume)andtothemostimportant sourcesofknowledgeaboutthisconcept,thatisitslinguisticrealizationsin differentlanguages,cultures(Caudal,thisvolume;Everett,thisvolume;Jaszczolt,thisvolume),functions,andlevelsoflinguisticanalysis(Saussure,this volume;Caudal,thisvolume;Piata,thisvolume).
Notethattheveryrepetitionsofthecontributionsperthemetestifytothe methodologyadoptedhere(andintheworkshopfromwhichthiscollection originated)ofamultidimensionalapproach,wherethebunchesofadopted dimensionsdifferfromchaptertochapterbutsubstantiallyoverlap.(Iwillrisk
hereaprogrammaticthoughtthatshouldsuchaprojectbedevelopedintoa principalresearchprogramme,theinsightsinto timetoutcourt wouldbefast forthcomingandexcitingindeed.)
1.2 Aroadmaptothecollection
Inviewoftheseassumptionsandmethodology,thevolumeallowsfordrawing multipleroadmapsbetweenthechapters,wherebylinkscanbeestablished accordingtotheabove(andmore)dimensions.Iwillsuggestsomesample roadmapsherebut,toreiterate,theveryraisond’êtreofthiscompilationis todrawattentiontotheavailabilityofmanynovelpathsthroughresearchon time—realtimeandhumantime,herewithspecialemphasisonevidencefrom temporalityinlanguageanddiscourse.
Webegintheinquirywiththeimportanceofthe ego andinparticularwith theperspectiveitimposesoneventualities,thatiswithegocentricmental states.InChapter 2 (‘Tenseandemotion’),SimonProssertakesonboardthe well-rehearsed‘thankgoodness’argumentbywhich,originally,ArthurPrior attemptedtorescuetheviewthattimeflows—thatis,McTaggart’sA-theory, thatthepast,present,andfutureareallreal(alsoknownas‘tensism’,thatis, tensedviewonreality—nottobeconfusedwiththeuseoftheterm‘tense’ in‘grammaticaltense’).ThegistofPrior’sdefenceoftensismisthatthinking ofa,say,painfuldentalprocedureasbeing inthepast comeswithdifferent attitudesandemotionsthanthinkingofitas,say,beingonMondayat10am. But,asProsserargues,thescenariocanalsobeusedinconjunctionwiththe B-theoreticoutlook:timeassuchdoesn’tflowbutthoughtsaboutthepast, present,andfutureareegocentric—boundtothethinkerwhoassessestherelationbetweenaneventualityandthemselvesas,say,beinginthepast.Then,the explanationfortheemotionalattitudeofreliefcomesfromtheevolutionary utilityofsuchreactions.
Inourroadmap,thisgivesusseveralpossibleroutestotake:wecan probedeeperintothesubjectivityandemotionalattitudestotime(Piata,Torrengo);continueonthetopicoftenselessreality(Torrengo,Farr,Mozersky— again,invariableorders);pursuethefirst-personperspectiveontime(Jaszczolt);orgointotheexpressionofpast-tensereferenceinnaturallanguage (Saussure,Forbes)andthroughittocross-linguisticinsightsintotemporal referenceindiscourse(Caudal,Everett).Someroutesaremorediscernible thanothersbutpursuingallofthemmakessense.Herewechoosetofollow subjectivityandemotionsinthepoeticsoftime.InChapter 3 (‘Anexplorationintoconstrualsofsubjectivetimeinpoetry’),AnnaPiatashedsnew
lightonthehumanunderstandingoftimebyinvestigatinghowtemporal experience,andinparticulartheorderanddurationofeventualitiesandthe passageoftime,arecapturedinpoetry.Havingpresentedsomelandmarks inthephenomenologyoftime,shemovestothementalrepresentationsof theseaspectsoftemporality,findingthattheutilityoftimeforthesubjects makesagreatdifferencetoconceptualization,asreflectedintheutilized(often metaphoricalandopen-ended)expressions.Suchafunctionalistanalysisis tracedbacktotheideaofembodiedcognitionincognitivesemanticsthat locatestherepresentationofstatesandevents,includingtheirtemporalityand emotionalattitudestoit,inthehumanbody—arguably,makingthe‘subjective’ lesssubjectivethroughsuchinterdisciplinaryinsights.
Atthenextcrossroads,again,wearerelativelyfreetochooseapath.Inadditiontocontinuingstraightaheadtothesubjectivityoftemporalexperience butsteppingfromthelevelofpoeticstometaphysics(e.g.Torrengo,orbackto Prosserandthenforward),oneinvitingandsuitablychallengingpathisthat ofthesemanticsoftemporalexpressions—thequestionofmeaningandtruth asitsexplanans.InChapter4(‘The2Dpast’),GraemeA.Forbeslooksintothe metaphysicalsignificanceofgrammaticaltenseandaspect,pointingoutthat focusingonthesomewhatneglectedroleofaspect(thatis,situation-internal time)shedslightonthequestion‘WhenamI?’(meaningaskingaboutone’s objectivetemporallocation),inthat,whetherthesituationis,say,ongoingor completedcanmakeadifferencewhenassessedfromtheperspectiveofthe relativefuture.Hemakesuseoftheconceptoftwo-dimensional(2D)semantics,alsousingittoconfrontstubborncaseswherethetruthvaluechangesa posteriori,say,whenallcircumstancesofapasteventualityarerevealed.
Wecannowchoosetomoveaheadwiththequestionofsemanticandmetaphysicalutilityofgrammaticalcategoriesemployedforexpressingtemporal reference,alsostayingclosetothetopicofperspective-takingfocusedonin Forbes’paper.InChapter 5 (‘CounterfactualityaspragmaticinferenceinperspectivalreadingsofPastConditionalutteranceswithmodalverbs:Evidence fromFrench’),LouisdeSaussurelooksattherelativescopeofmodalityand tensemarkersinepistemicmodalconstructions(‘Johnmighthavebeensurprised.’),pointingoutthattheirFrenchcounterparts(‘Pierreauraitdûêtre surpris.’)giverisetoacounterfactualreading,therebysuggestingthattherelativescopeisnot MODAL>PAST,likefortheEnglishconstructions,butrather PAST>MODAL.Hetheninquiriesintothepossibilityofacompositionalexplanationthatwouldrevealthesourceofthepastnessoftheepistemicattitude inFrench,ascontrastedwiththepresent-timelocationinEnglish.Heoffersa linguistic-pragmaticsolutionconsistingofaperspectivalshiftthatallowsthe
potentialityofthesituationtobeseenfromapointofviewinthepast.Inother words,thetemporalityofthemodalpertainstothatperspectivaltimerather thantothetimeofspeech.Thissolutionfromperspectivalshiftmakesus thinkofourroadmapnotonlywithreferencetothepreviousstop(Forbes)but alsowithreferencetoProsser’schapter,suggestingapossibilityofyetanother promisingconceptualroutetounderstandinghumantime.
Counterfactuality,however,neednotbeconceivedofasaclear-cutcategory. Whetherwenowpursueapathofcross-linguisticinquiryintorepresenting time,ortocounterfactualityitself,orindeedtoaspectandevenemotions, wefindonourpathChapter 6,‘Avertive/frustrativemarkersinAustralian languages:Blurringtheboundariesbetweenaspectuo-temporalandmodal meanings’,inwhichPatrickCaudalgivesaninsightintotheunderstanding oftheflowoftimebyofferingatypologicalaccountofaspecificcategory ofmodal/temporalmarkersinAustralianlanguages—groupedasnon-PamaNyungan—notageneticgroupbutratheramade-upcategory,sotospeak, negativelydefined,spreadovermostoftheterritoryofmainlandAustralia, andofparticularsemanticinterestduetotheirparticularmorphologicalcomplexityandpolyfunctionalityofcategories.Thecategoryhelooksintoisthat ofgrammaticalavertiveandfrustrativemarkers(oftencalled‘proximative’), thatisforegrounded(grammaticalized)expressionsofexpectationsanddisappointments(‘Henearlyleft’;‘Hetriedtoleave’;‘Hecameinvain’).Assuch, theserefertonegativepastevents,pastmodals(suchasdeonticorvolitional), andpastimperfectivemarkers(prospectiveandprogressive).Thecompositionalstructureofsuchmeaningsisrevealedthrougharangeofidentified patterns.Therichnessofinformationtheyconvey,includingthecaseofa mistakentakeonaneventualityandaneventnotleadingtodesiredresults, suggestsacomplexconstrualofevents,associatedwithasocialconstrualof timewhereactualandcounterfactualeventsformacontinuum.
Wecannowcontinuewithcross-linguisticvariationinexpressingtemporal reference(Everett),or,inamoreunorthodoxway,askaboutthepropertiesofthepastandthefuture,thecomprehensionofwhichsuchlinguistic expressionsreveal.Ourroadmapcontinueswiththelatter,movingtothe ontologicalunderpinningsofthesemanticsofsentenceswithfuture-timereference.InChapter 7 (‘Onmodellingthefuture’),JoshuaMozerskyaddresses epistemic,semantic,andontologicalindeterminacyofthefuture,focusingon thedependencyofthesemanticontheontological.Onanontologicalmodel ofbranchingfuture,utterancesaboutthefutureareneithertruenorfalsesimpliciterbutratheraretrueonsometimelinesandfalseonothers—becoming truewhentimemovesonalongoneofthebranches,sotospeak,causing
attritionoftheothersateachconsecutive‘present’.Needlesstosay,thisis wheretheproblemstarts.Hearguesthatbranchattritiondoesnotfollow fromamodelofthedeterminatepast.Thisleadshimtotheconclusionthat semanticsoftemporalityhastobefoundedonstatictimeofB-theory,with determinatepast,present,andfuture,inwhichthepassageassociatedwiththe waywethinkandspeakisaccountedforinaseparateway.Hereheproposes anexplanationfromatheoryoffour-dimensionalspacetime—amodelusing ‘temporallyorientedvectorfield’thatdeterminesanabsolutefutureforeach spacetimepoint.Allinall,heconcludes,wehavetolookattimebothfromthe external(asabove)andtheinternalperspective,wherethelattercomeswith retainingthoughtsinmemory,while‘sliding’,sotospeak,alongthetimelineof ourhuman,dynamictime:whatisfuturewillbepresentandthenpast.And assuch,determinateornot,itwillremainunknownforsometime(nopun intended).
Thisinterdisciplinarylandmarkontheroadmapcantakeusbackto thetruth-conditionalsemanticsoftemporalexpressions(Forbes),toother B-theoreticsolutionstoexperiencedtimeflow(Torrengo),orfurtherintothe questionofdirectionalityoftime.Wetakethelatterpath.InChapter 8 (‘Perceivingdirectionindirectionlesstime’),MattFarrdefendstheviewthattime hasnodirection(providingintheprocessausefuloverviewofwhatdirectionalityoftimecanmeanondifferentphilosophicalaccounts)andlooksatthe compatibilityofthisC-theoreticpicture(McTaggart1908)withtheexperience oftimeflow;althoughsymmetricaltimehasbeenwellsupportedbytheoriesof theuniverseinmicro-physics,itdoesnotfitwellwithourhumanexperienceof time.Hisargumentistwofold:showingthattheperceiveddirectionalitydoes notposeaproblemforsuchadirectionalrealityoftime,andshowingthatCtheorycaninfactexplainhumanexperienceofdirectional,dynamicreality. Next,helooksatanumberofwaysinwhichtheexperienceoftimepassage hasbeenexplained(orexplainedaway)andconcludesthatonecanpickand choosebetweenthem(ashetentativelydid),leavingtimelessrealityintact.
MovingonfromthesomewhatunderappreciatedC-theorytothestandard disputebetweenflow/noflow(thatis,A-theory/B-theory),explainingaway thepassageoftimenowcontinuesinChapter 9 (‘Temporaltransparencyand theflowoftime’).GiulianoTorrengodiscussestherelationbetweenthetemporalpropertiesofexperience(suchasduration)andtemporalpropertiesof theobjectsofthisexperience—say,thedurationofanevent.Therelationcan gobothways:(i)experiencecaninheritthetemporalstructureofanevent,or (ii)experiencecan project temporalstructureontoanevent.Therealquestionappearswhenweaskaboutawareness.Forexample,accordingtothe
latterdirection(projection),anunfoldingperformanceofasonatahasacertaindurationbecauseourlisteningtoithasthisduration.Butinorderfor thistoworkwewouldhavetobe aware ofthisdurationoflistening.Thefirst (inheritance)directionsuffersfromananalogousmissinglink.Pointingout thismissinglinkaddsanewargumenttohisoverallprogrammeofrepudiatingtemporaltransparency,or,putsimply,denyingthatweareawareof,say, thedurationofapieceofmusicpriortobeingawareoftheanalogouspropertyofourlisteningtoit.Allinall,wefeelthattimeispassingbutthisisnot anexperienceofthepassageoftimebutofsomethingelse,‘phenomenologicallymodified’tofeelthatway.Itallboilsdowntotheawarenessofthewayin whichaperformanceofasonataispresentedtooursenses.Andthiswayfeels likemoving—orsomehow‘flowy’.Butitisnotreally time thatwerepresent.
Now,wecaneitherincorporatethatlandmarkonaroutebackthrough ProsserandMozersky,or,inthespiritoftheinnovativemethodology andcross-disciplinarycross-feeding,moveontoargumentsfromlinguistic semanticsthattimeisreally‘somethingelse’.(Yes,literally,notjustcolloquially.)Onthelatterpath,wemoveontoChapter 10 (KasiaJaszczolt,‘Does humantimereallyflow?Metaindexicality,metarepresentation,andbasicconcepts’)thatbringstogetherthemetaphysicsoftime(timeM)andlinguistic evidenceontheconceptualizationoftime(timeL),inordertoaddressthe questionofwhyhumantime(or,epistemologicaltime,timeE)appearstoflow. Followingemergentistviews,indexicalityoftimeistakentobedependent ontheindexicalityofthefirst-personperspective—aconstrualthatIcallthe ‘metaindexicality’oftime.ThisexplainstheapparentflowoftimeE andthe apparentincompatibilitywithtimeM.AfurtherargumentforpossiblecompatibilitycomesfromthefactthattimeM asunderstoodinmodernphysicspercolatestocommonknowledgebutonlyassemi-understood,semi-propositional (Sperber),representationalbeliefs.Thissemi-propositionalcharacter,paired withtheindexicalityofthe ego-perspective,explainstheapparentflow,aswell astheapparentvariablerateoftheflow.Next,Imovetothefollow-upquestion inwhatsense timeisdynamic,arguing,withthehelpofcross-linguistic evidence,thatapparentlydynamictimeE isessentiallystatic;itisacomplex conceptthatdecomposesintoconceptualbuildingblocksthatare(epistemic) modalincharacter.Onthelevelofthesebuildingblocks,timedoesnotflow; itonlyflowsontheleveloftheirculture-andlanguage-specificcombinations.Finally,Iproposehowthisdynamicitycanbeformalizedincontextualist semantics.
Herewecanrevisitphilosophicalargumentsagainstthetimeflowfromthe previouslandmarks,orfollowalinguisticrouteandmovebacktomodality
asanexplanansfortemporalreference.Orwecanmoveforwardonthe pathoflinguisticdiversitytoChapter 11 (‘UnderspecifiedtemporalsemanticsinPirahã:Compositionaltransparencyandsemioticinference’),inwhich DanielEverettanalysesthegrammarandsemanticsoftemporalityinPirahã, anindigenouslanguagespokenintheAmazon.Pirahãhasaspectualsuffixes, suchasforexampletelic,continuativeorfrustrative(seethesummaryof Chapter6above)butnotgrammaticaltense.Neitherdoesithavemarkersthat locateaneventualityunambiguouslyinthepastorinthefuture.Inaddition,it lacksperfecttensesandthemeaningassociatedwiththem.ThismakesEverett rethinktheuniversalityoftheReichenbachian(Reichenbach1947)logicof tensesthatutilizesspeechtime,eventtime,andreferencetimeascorrelates, inthatthecorrelateofreferencetimeappearstobeabsent.Next,hesuggests thatculturepermeatessemanticsandaffectsittoanextentgreaterthanformalfeaturesofthelanguagesystemdo.Hetalksabout‘degreesoffit’between morphosyntacticstructures,meanings,andcultures,whichcallsforadopting amorepractical,common-sense,orinference-basedideaofcompositionality, wherebymeaningsarecompositional not onthelevelofsyntacticstructures butonthelevelofculture-infusedinterpretations.(Inourroadmap,apath backtoChapter10andcontextualistDefaultSemanticsemployedtherewould bepertinent.)Historically,Everettfindsconceptualrootsofsuchcontextualinference-drivencompositionalityinPeirce’ssemeiotics.Languages,heclaims, canbeclassifiedonthescaleoftheircompositionaltransparency.Butconceptualtransparencyisnotamatterofvariation:weinfermeaningbecause ourspeciesdevelopedtheabilitytoinferfromsigns—fromallkindsofsigns thatpresentthemselvesassourcesofinformation.(NotethatanotherpossibleroutebacktoProsser’sevolutionaryexplanationofemotionsbecomes evidenthere.)Allthispertainstotemporallocation,wheredifferentcultures comeforegroundingdifferenttemporalconcepts.
Culturalandlinguisticdiversityleadtothequestionastowhetherthere indeedisthehumantime—somethingwediscernasa‘humanway’ofthinking abouttime.Perhapsthediversityandthelackofdirectcorrelatesbetweenlanguagespointtowardssuchadegreeofrelativity(oratleastcorrelation)thatit overshadowswhatcouldusefullybethoughtofasuniversal?Acrossthelandmarksofthisroadmap,thehumantimestandsforinnerexperience(oftime orsomethingelse),withitssemblanceofpastness,‘nowness’,andfuturity,as wellassubjectivelyassessedduration.Philosophersstillinquireintowhatitis thatweactuallyexperienceandhowittranslatesintobeliefsabouttemporal locationandduration,offeringamultitudeoftheories(someofthemhelpfully reviewedinwhatfollows).Butitisalsolinguisticdiversitythatallowsustoget
aglimpseofwhatreallymattersabouttime,andassuchaninsightintoits properties.Since(note:‘since’ratherthan‘if’forthepurposeofthisvolume) timepassageisthehumantakeonstaticrealtimethatonlyemergesonthelevel onwhichitisofsomeuse,itisofparamountimportancetosearchforwhat this‘take’reallyisandwhatitdependson.Andsearchwedo,indifferentdisciplines,justnotoftenenoughinaboldcross-disciplinaryandinter-disciplinary way.
Toreiterate,manyotherroadmapscanbedrawn,utilizingthechoiceof dimensions[1]–[10]fromSection 1.1 andaddingothers.Itishopedthatthis ‘informedcombinatorial’,sotospeak,approachwillhelpwithdiscovering suchnovel,interdisciplinary(oratleastcross-disciplinaryifrecalibrationis moreofanissue)slantsontheBigQuestionstodowithhumantime.So, followmyroadmap,ordrawyourown,don’tskipphilosophersorlinguists, readthemboth,andenjoytheexperience—thetimespentonitwillcontract ifyoudo!
