Acknowledgements
Writingthisbookhasbeenafantasticvoyage.Ithasspannedtenyearsofmylife,in whichIhavehadtheprivilegeofcallingFrankfurt,Berlin,NewYork,andCopenhagenmyintellectualandphysicalhome.Lookingbacknow,itiscleartomethat theimpetusforwritingthisbookisultimatelyrootedinthehistoricalexperienceof the2008financialcrisis,whichnotonlysentshockwavesthroughtheglobaleconomybutalsorattledmeoutmyowndogmaticslumber,rippingoffmypersonal veilofignorancetoexposetheirrationalityandunreasonablenessofthisworldof financializedglobalcapitalism.Thebookwasfinishedamidstanewglobalcrisis, theCOVID-19pandemic.Tome,bothoftheseglobalcrisisexperienceshaveonly servedtoaccentuatetheacuterelevanceandimportanceofthebook’sundertaking. Ihopeothersmayfeelthesameway.
Manytravelcompanionshavejoinedmeonthisvoyage,morethanIcan remember,andmanyofwhomhavecontributedincrucialwaystomyintellectualjourneyandthelifeofthisbook.Thebookbeganasadoctoraldissertationat theGoetheUniversita¨tFrankfurt,writtenunderthesupervisionofRainerForst andAxelHonneth.Rainerhasbeenatrue Doktorvater intheemphaticsenseof thatGermanword.HebelievedintheprojectfromthefirsttimeImethimata conferenceinLondon,andhehasofferedinvaluableintellectualguidance,friendship,andsupportthroughoutthewholeprocess—ashehascontinuedtodoafterI leftFrankfurtin2016.Thisexpressionofgratitudeseemswoefullyinsufficient,but Iofferitnonetheless.AxelHonnethnotonlyofferedhisunsurpassedknowledge intotheFrankfurtSchooltraditionofcriticaltheoryduringsupervisioninFrankfurt,butalsokindlyextendedaninvitationtothePhilosophyFacultyatColumbia Universityinthefallsemesterof2016,whereourlongtalksprovedimmensely helpfulforthesubsequentcomprehensivereworkingofthedissertationintoa bookmanuscript.IalsowanttothankJu¨rgenHabermas,whoonseveraloccasions inHeidelbergandFrankfurttooktimetodiscussthedissertationwithme—and offeranecdotesaboutAdorno.Heremains,inmanyways,mygreatintellectual hero,andIamgratefulfortheprivilegeofpersonallyexperiencingthemagnetic auraofourgreatestEuropeanthinkerandintellectual,alivingembodimentofthe postwarhistoryofWesternphilosophy.
Imustextendaspecialdebtofloveandgratitudetothreedearfriendsandintellectualtravelcompanions,whohavemadeaninestimablemarkonmythinking sinceourOxforddays—TheresaClasen,JeffreyHoward,andTobiasBerger— aswellastoAndersDahlSørensen,whohasbeentheclosestoffriends,a
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vii non-metaphoricaltravelcompanion,andanintellectualinterlocutorsincehigh school.IamalsogratefultotheoldFrankfurtcrowd,especiallyJohannesSchulz, DorotheaGa¨deke,JulianCulp,Arvi-AnttiSa¨rkela¨,CasperMo¨lck,EstherLea Neuhann,MariusPiwonka,PhilippSchink,TamaraJugov,FedericaGregoratto, DarrelMollendorf,MartinSaar,ThomasBiebricher,andTitusStahl,forintellectualstimulusandfriendshipalike.
IthankNealCarrier,NavidPourgazi,DespinaPotari,MatteoGaravoglia, ChristianSchemmel,DavidAxelsen,DitteMariaBrassoSørensen,RuneMøller Stahl,SiriRanvaHjelmJacobsen,TiagoRito,PoyaPakzad,andEmilyHertzfor helpingme,invariousways,alongtheway.IalsothankChristianRostbølland LarsTønder,whoreadandcommentedonpartsofthebookmanuscriptand offeredhelpfuladviceonpublication.EmmaHoltenhasbecomeadearfriend andcomrade,whoreadandcommentedontheentiremanuscript—tak!Dominic ByattatOxfordUniversityPresshasbeenthekindofeditoryouhopeforbutdon’t dareexpect.Ithankhimforhisenthusiasticsupportfortheprojectandforhisgraciousandprofessionalsheepherdingofthisbooktopublication.Ialsothanktwo anonymousrefereesforOxfordUniversityPress,whoseprescientcriticismsvastly improvedthemanuscript.
Iadmittosometimeshavingfearedthatthisfantasticvoyagewouldturntoerosionandnevergetold—toparaphrasethegreatDavidBowie.Thefactthatithas cometolifeisnosmallpartduetotheunwaveringloveandsupportofmyfamily: mysisterSiriandmymumanddad,Anne-MetteandBjarne.Alongthisbook’s journey,Iexperiencedthesecularmiracleofbecomingafathermyself,firsttomy daughterFridaandsubsequentlytomysonFinn.Frida’sandFinn’spresencein thisworldandfutureontheplanethasgivenaconcretemeaningtothefearsand hopesembodiedinthiswork.Finally,mygreatestdebtofgratitude:Foryourlove andcompanionshipinlifeandletters,foryourunyieldingsupportandsacrifice inallowingmethespacetoworkendlesshoursonthisproject,forhavinggifted meour tosmåmuler,foryourforgivenessofmyfaults.Thisbookisforyou.
PARTI.HORKHEIMER
1.MaxHorkheimerandtheOriginalParadigmofCritical
2.Horkheimer’sOriginalParadigmandtheIdeaofaCritical TheoryofWorldSociety
2.1‘Existingcapitalistsociety,whichhasspreadalloverthe worldfromEuropeandforwhichthetheoryisdeclared
2.1.1Colonialism,Empire,andtheTrappingsofHistorical Materialism
2.1.2Pluralism,PoliticalEconomy,andtheRiseof Right-WingPopulism
2.1.3Emancipation,Ecology,andtheMasteryofNature
PARTII.ADORNO
3.TheodorW.AdornoandtheNegativistParadigm ofCriticalTheory
3.1ReflectionsfromaDamagedLife
3.2.2MythisalreadyEnlightenment
3.3APhysiognomyofLate-CapitalistSociety
3.3.1TheAdministeredWorld
3.3.2Ego-WeaknessandtheUniversalSystemofDelusion
4.Adorno’sNegativistParadigmandtheIdeaofaCritical TheoryofWorldSociety
4.1TheConsummateEurocentric
4.1.1ExpressiveTotalityandtheVanishingofWorld Society
4.1.2Non-IdentityattheEnd:AnEcologicalDialectic ofEnlightenment
4.1.3The‘Non-Identical’ofWesternModernity
PARTIII.HABERMAS
5.JürgenHabermasandtheCommunicativeParadigm ofCriticalTheory
5.1‘TheLeadingSystematicPhilosopherofOurTime’
5.2FoundationsofaCriticalTheoryofSociety
5.2.1TheTheoryofKnowledgeasSocialTheory
5.2.2AFormalPragmaticsofCommunicativeReason
5.2.3‘ASocialLifeinUncoercedCommunication’
5.3TheTheoryofSocialEvolution
5.3.1AReconstructionofHistoricalMaterialism
5.3.2TheRationalizationoftheLifeworld
5.4TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction
5.4.1SystemandLifeworld
5.4.2TheColonizationThesis
5.5TheNormativeContentofModernity
5.5.1DiscourseEthics
5.5.2ADiscourseTheoryofLawandDemocracy
6.Habermas’sCommunicativeParadigmandtheIdeaof CriticalTheoryofWorldSociety
6.1AKantianCosmopolitanism
6.1.1ThePostnationalConstellationandaMultilevel GlobalConstitutionalFramework
6.1.2TheLimitsofLaw
6.1.3TheLimitofProceduralism
6.1.4TheLimitsofWesternModernity
6.1.5TheLimitsofIntersubjectivity
6.2TheLastMarxist?
PARTIV.HONNETH
7.AxelHonnethandtheRecognitionParadigmofCritical Theory
7.2.1TheCritiqueofPower
7.2.2ThreeConceptionsofPower
7.3TheStruggleforRecognition
7.3.1TheOriginalProgramme
7.3.2InnovationsandRevisions
7.4TheRealityofFreedomasDemocraticEthicalLife
7.4.1TheTurntoHegel’sMaturePoliticalPhilosophy
7.4.2CommunicativeFreedom:AnExcursusonKantand Hegel
7.4.3DasRechtderFreiheit
7.4.4AHegelianAccountofMoralNormativity
8.Honneth’sRecognitionParadigmandtheIdeaofaCritical TheoryofWorldSociety
8.1BeyondSocialFreedom?
8.1.1AWestern-European‘CultureofFreedom’
8.1.2TheLimitsofHegelianism
8.1.3NaturalConditionsofAutonomy
Introduction
Theonlyrespectableformofphilosophyinviewofthedesperation wouldbetheattempttoregardallthingsastheyappearfromthe standpointofredemption.Knowledgehasnolightlikethatwhich theredemptionshinesupontheworld:everythingelsedisappearsin reconstructionandremainsapieceoftechnique.Perspectivesmust beconstructedinwhichtheworldisequallydisplaced,unfamiliar,its cracksandtearsrevealed,asitwillonedaylaybare,needinganddisfiguredintheMessianiclight.Withoutarbitrarinessandviolence,to winsuchperspectivesfullyoutofempathywiththeobjects,thatalone iswhatthinkingcomesdownto.
TheodorW.Adorno, MinimaMoralia
0.1 ABourgeoningWorldSociety
Thesewordsarecommittedtopaperatatimewhentheworldisinthegripofa deadlypandemicvirus.Scientiststellusthatsuchoutbreaksofinfectiousdiseases aregoingtooccuratgreaterfrequencyinthefuture,asaresultofanthropogenic climatechange.Coastalareaswillbeincreasinglypronetofloodingfromrising oceanlevels,whileinlandhabitatsandagriculturewillbeexposedtodraughts andextremeweathereventswithincreasingfrequencyandvolatility.Duetoglobal warming,evergreaterpartsoftheEarth’slandsurfacewillbecomeinhospitable tohumanlife,whichwillproducemillionsofclimaterefugees,fleeingfromthe onslaughtofnaturalecosystemsthathavebeenfundamentallydestabilizedby humanactivity.Inshort,asaresultofthecombustionoffossilenergysourcesthat powerindustrializedsocietiesacrosstheglobe,thenaturalexistentialconditions forlifeonEarthwillgraduallyworsenthroughthegenerations—intheworst-case long-termscenario,makingourplanetaryhomeall-but‘unliveable’.
Thehumandestabilizationofage-oldequilibriawithintheEarthsystemmirrors,inquiteunsettlingways,therecentdestabilizationofequilibriawithinthe heavilyfinancializedandunfathomablyunequalglobaleconomicsystem.Injust overadecade,theworldeconomyhasexperiencedtwoshocksofasimilarmagnitudetothetheretoforeworstfinancialandeconomiccrisisinhumanhistory, thefirstunleashedbyendogenousforceswithinapathologicallybloatedfinancial system,thesecondbyanexternalshockfromapathogenthatlikelymigratedfrom batstohumanssomewhereinaChineseprovince.Societiesacrosstheglobetoday
experiencedramaticrepercussionsofeventsthathappenindistantlands,asthe failureofasingleinvestmentbankonWallStreetcanbringdownthewholegloballyintegratedeconomyandcastmillionsacrosstheworldintounemployment anddestitution,whileaviruscantravelwithhithertounheard-ofspeedthrough aglobalnetworkofcommercialairlinetraffic,whichagainreflectsahistorically unprecedentedlevelofglobaleconomicintegrationacrossfinance,production, andtrade.
Theburgeoning worldsociety thathasemergedfromtheseformidableforces ofintegrationisshotthroughwithcontradictions.Powerappearsmoredispersed throughglobalnetworksthaneverbefore,yettomanythepowerfulseemmore remoteandremovedfromthebread-and-butterconcernsofordinarypeoplethan atanytimeinlivingmemory.Wearetoldthatglobalizedcapitalismhaslifted millionsoutofthescourgeofpovertyanddrasticallyreducedglobalinequalitythroughtheriseofanAsian‘middleclass’,yetdomesticeconomicinequality isapproachinglevelsunseensincebeforetheFirstWorldWar.Morepeopleare uprootedandexiledfromtheirhomes,andmorepeoplearefreetotravelacross bordersthaneverbeforeinhumanhistory,yetnewphysicalandmentalbarriersareerectedtostaveoff‘hoards’ofunwantedrefugeesanddenymigrantsthe ‘righttohospitality’thatKantsawastheonlytruecosmopolitanright.Theglobal integrationofeconomies,cultures,anddigitalizedpublicspheresanddensenetworksofglobaltravelhasbroughtuscloserthaneverbeforetofar-awaypeoples, yetweseemtobefatallybereftofthekindoftransnationalorglobalinstitutional structuresthatmightallowustopoliticallytamethedisruptiveforcesofglobalizedcapitalismandavertthepermanentcatastropheofadrasticallyheatedEarth system.
Globalsocietalintegrationrepresentsaformidablechallengetophilosophy andsocialscience,makingamockeryofJohnRawls’s‘idealisedassumption’of ‘closedsocieties’that‘personsenteronlybybirth,andexitonlybydeath’.¹ The notionof‘society’asageographically,culturally,andpoliticallydemarcatedentity wasalwaysanabstraction—anditwasneveraninnocentone—tradingonfragmentedlinguisticandculturallifeworldswhileignoringcross-bordereconomic relationsandexternalrelationsofovertpoliticaldomination.Butdecadesof ever-intensifyingglobalizationhaverenderedthatassumptionirrevocablyindefensible,totheextentthat‘methodologicalnationalism’hastodaybecomeclose toameaninglessfiction.
Manysocialtheoristsandphilosophershavetakenstockofthisfundamental shiftwithintheobjectofsocial-scientificstudyandnormativethinking,whileothersstillneglectorrefusetocountenanceitsimplications.Yetmorethananything, whatmightultimatelyforceaperspectivalchangefromnationallydemarcated societiestoaworldsocietyofsocietiesmightbethedisruptiveandpotentially
¹ JohnRawls, TheLawofPeoples (CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,1999).
catastrophicforcesofclimatechange,whichhavealreadyprovokedaglobalscientificresponsethatcalls,withincreasingdesperation,foragloballycoordinated politicalresponse.Thisemergingplanetaryperspectiveofhumansocietyaspartof anintegratedEarthsystemofecologicalinterchangebetweennaturalandsocial systemshasevengivenrisetoanewgeo-historicalclassificationofthepresent epochintheplanet’sexistence:theAnthropocene,wherehumancivilizationhas itselfbecomeageologicalforcetobereckonedwith.
Thisbookiswrittenontheassumptionthatcriticaltheoryhasyettocome totermswiththeimplicationsofthisnovelhistoricalconstellation.Whatisthe meaningoftheideaofa‘criticaltheoryofsociety’inaworldinwhichsomanyof theboundsbetweenstates,cultures,andcommunitieshaveallbuteroded—inan emergentworldsociety?Whatbecomesoftheleft-Hegelianphilosophicalproject of‘graspingitstimeinthought’whenmodernityisnolongerconceivedintermsof atemporaland spatialdisjuncturebetweenmodernandpre-modernsocieties—at oncehistoricallydifferentiated,aswellasculturallyandgeographicallydifferentiatedwithinasinglemomentintime—butasatrulyglobalcondition?From thepointofviewofcriticaltheory,thisphilosophicalproblemhasuntilnow escapedsystematictreatment.Itisthepurposeofthisbooktofillthis lacuna in theliterature.
0.2 TheContradictionsofCriticalTheory
TheFrankfurtSchooltraditionofcriticaltheorytodayfindsitselfinacuriousposition.Ontheonehand,theFrankfurtSchoolhasachievedundisputedglobalfame, andcriticaltheoryistaughtindepartmentsanduniversitiesacrosstheworld. Atthesametime,however,criticaltheoryistodayrarely practiced inthesense intendedbyitsfounders.Asoriginallyconceived,criticaltheorywassupposed toofferaninterdisciplinaryandcooperativetheoreticalvehicleforapprehendingtheinjusticesandpathologiesofmoderncapitalistsociety,withtheaimof allowingagentstoovercomethoseinjusticesandpathologiesinpractice.Inthe contemporaryacademy,thisdistinctivemethodologicaloutlook—withitscommitmenttoenablinglarge-scalepracticalemancipationthroughacomprehensive andinterdisciplinarytheoryofsociety—haslargelygivenwaytorivallingcurrents ofthoughttoanextentthattheconceptof‘criticaltheory’istodaywidelyunderstoodinaverydifferentsensefromitsintendedmeaningwhenMaxHorkheimer coinedthetermin1937.Accordingly,anybookoncriticaltheorymusttodaybegin byclarifyingexactlywhatismeantbythisterm.
Oneoftheimportanttensionswithinthecontemporarymeaningofcriticaltheoryisthatthe methodologicalholism characteristicoftheFrankfurtSchoolsense ofcriticaltheory—whichiswhatIwillcallamethodologicalorientationtowards the‘totality’ofsociety,ortowardssocietyassuch,inthevarioussensesofthat
termtobeexemplifiedinthechaptersofthisbook—haslargelygivenwayto a methodologicalnominalism—whichiswhatIwillcallanorientationtowards howsocialrealityisdiscursivelyconstitutedthroughdiscreteformsofpower,and whicheschewstheattempttodiscloseaunifiedbackgroundstructureordevelop ageneraltheoreticalframework.Asecondandassociatedshiftinmeaningisa moveawayfromtheFrankfurtSchool’sdefiningconcernwith humanemancipation towardsmoreambiguousnormativeconcernswith‘notbeinggovernedlike that’,the‘subversionofbinaryoppositions’,etc.InMichelFoucault’saffirmative summationofthistransformation,‘thehistoricalontologyofourselvesmustturn awayfromallprojectsthatclaimtobe global or radical’.²
Thesetensionsandgradualshiftsinmeaningoftheveryconceptofcriticaltheorymaytosomeextentreflectthegreatphilosophicaldebatebetween‘modern’ andso-called‘postmodern’currentsofthought.Arisingfromdevelopmentsin Frenchphilosophyinthe1980s,postmodernismis—insofarasitmakessenseto speakofacoherentbodyofthoughtatall—characterizedbyitsstrongsuspicion of‘grandnarratives’.Jean-FrancoisLyotard,aprominentharbingerofpostmodernity,describesasmodern‘anysciencethatlegitimatesitselfwithreferencetoa metadiscourseofthiskindmakinganexplicitappealtosomegrandnarrative,such asthedialecticsofSpirit,thehermeneuticsofmeaning,theemancipationofthe rationalorworkingsubject,orthecreationofwealth’.³ TheFrankfurtSchooltraditionofcriticaltheoryunabashedlyembracessuchgrandnarratives,whichmay beonereasonthatitsinfluencehasfadedintandemwiththeriseofpostmodern sentimentsthroughouttheacademyandthepost-Marxistintellectualclimateof theleftafterthefalloftheBerlinWall.
However,Iwanttosuggestthatsomethingaboveandbeyondgrandphilosophicalshiftsmayalsobeatworkhere.TheFrankfurtSchool’srelativetheoretical marginalizationhasnotonlytakenplaceinparallelwiththeriseof‘postmodernism’butalso,andperhapsjustasimportantly,inthecourseofthepresent waveofglobalization,andinthecourseofaconcomitantandacutelywarranted decentringandeven‘provincialization’ofWesternpoliticalconsciousness.More specifically,thedisplacementoftheFrankfurtSchooltraditionofcriticaltheory mayhavebeenmidwifedinpartbytheremarkablesilenceofitshistoricalstandardbearer’sonsomeofthecentralstrugglesofourday,suchasstrugglesagainst sexismorracism,oragainstcolonial,neocolonial,andimperialformsofdomination,andinpartbyagrowingrecognitionofthedeeply Eurocentric assumptions ofsomeofitsmaintheoreticalprotagonists—asforcefullyarguedbyAmyAllenin TheEndofProgress:DecolonizingtheNormativeFoundationsofCriticalTheory from2016.
² MichelFoucault,‘WhatIsEnlightenment?’,in ThePoliticsofTruth,ed.bySylvèreLotringer (CambridgeMA:Semiotext(e),2007),p.114[emphasesadded].
³ Jean-FrancoisLyotard, ThePostmodernCondition:AReportonKnowledge,transl.byGeoff Benningtonetal.(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,1984),p.xxiii.
ItisoneoftheworkingassumptionsofthepresentbookthatthechargeofEurocentrismnotonlyhasmeritbutalsohelpstoexplainthegradualdisplacement ofFrankfurtSchoolcriticaltheoryfromthecontemporaryacademy.Ineachof thechaptersofthisbook,Iwillthusbeconcernedwithdeterminingtheextent towhichthechargeofEurocentrismappliestothecentralphilosophicalprotagonistsoftheFrankfurtSchooltradition.AlthoughIwilldefendthetraditionfrom someofAllen’sspecificcriticismsandobjections,Iwillalsoarguethatacriticaltheoryofworldsocietymustembraceandincorporatethesortofepistemic humilityandproblematizingcritiqueoftheblindspotsanddistortionsofWesternmodernitypropoundedbypostcolonialandfeministscholars,andAllenin particular.
Moreover,althoughthefirstgenerationoftheFrankfurtSchoolshareda deepconcernwiththerelationshipbetweenhumansocietyandnature,more recentiterationsoftheFrankfurtSchoolideaofacriticaltheoryofsocietyhave hadsurprisinglylittletosayaboutthisecologicalrelationship—and,specifically, aboutthedevastatingimpactoffossil-fuelledcapitalistexpansionandeconomic developmentonthenaturalecosystemsthatmayultimatelythreatenthenaturalconditionsofexistenceformuchoflifeonEarth,includinghumanlife. ThefactthatcriticaltheoristsintheFrankfurtSchooltraditionhavehadlittletosayaboutanthropogenicclimatechangeanditspotentiallycatastrophic implicationsmaybeanotherreasonforthetradition’srelativemarginalization inrecentyears.Inthisbook,Iwillthereforealsobeconcernedwithreconstructingwhattheyhaveactuallyhadtosayaboutecologicalquestionsand withdrawingouttheimplicationsforcomprehendingtherelationshipbetween societyandnaturethatwefindintheworkofsomeofthetradition’scentral thinkers.
Yetthecentralprojectofthisbookistoexpoundanddefendthe idea ofFrankfurtSchoolcriticaltheoryinthecontextofanemergentworldsocietyandtoargue thatitsanimatingtheoreticalaspirationsarejustasrelevantandworthwhileas whenoriginallyconceived.Iusetheconceptof‘worldsociety’aswhatJu¨rgen Habermashascalleda‘placeholder’concept:asanabstractphilosophicalconcept‘standingin’fora theory ofworldsociety.⁴ Thepurposeofthisbookisnot todevelopafull-fledgedcriticaltheoryofworldsociety,butrathertothinkabout whatsuchaprojectmightmean,throughacriticalreconstructiveengagementwith theFrankfurtSchooltraditionasawholethatcombinesthetwinperspectivesof thehistoryofideaswiththesystematicintentionsofsocialandpoliticaltheory.I pursuethisaimthroughwhatAxelHonnethcallsa‘historyoftheorywithsystemic intent’:thatis,throughareconstructionofadistinctivephilosophicaltradition
⁴ Ju¨rgenHabermas,‘PhilosophyasStand-InandInterpreter’,in MoralConsciousnessandCommunicativeAction,transl.byChristianLenhardtandShierryWeberNicholson(Cambridge:PolityPress, 1990).
withtheaimofuncoveringinthistraditiona learningprocess thatculminatesin asketchofthefoundationsandelementalbuildingblocksofacriticaltheoryof worldsociety.However,asHonnethremarks,‘Thehistoryofcriticaltheorycould beconceivedasalearningprocessonlyifatleastanindicationofthestandardwas firstspecifiedbywhichinsightorprogresswithinthattheoreticaldevelopmentwas tobemeasured’.⁵
Inthefollowingthirdsection,Ithuswanttoprovideabriefintroductory accountoftheideaofacriticaltheoryofsociety,which,Ihope,willbecomeclearer asthisideaisgivensubstantivecontentinthecourseofthebook,beforeinthe fourthsectionIpresentanoutlineofthebook’scentralargumentsandconclusions.Suchanintroductoryaccountisalsowarrantedinpartbecausetheideaof criticaltheoryhas itself beenappropriatedbydiversealternativecurrentsinculturalandliterarytheory,anditisthereforedecisivethatwegetaclearsenseof whatissodistinctiveaboutthisidea,asoriginallyconceivedbyHorkheimerand theFrankfurtSchool.TheaccountthatIpresenthereconstruescriticaltheory asdefinedbyacommitmentto threecoremethodologicaldimensions,aswellasa distinctive criterionofvalidity,whereanaccountofeachofthesethreemethodologicaldimensionsrepresentsanecessaryconditionforatheorytoqualifyasa criticaltheoryofsociety,andonlyanaccountofallofthemasufficientsetofconditionsforqualifyingasacomprehensivecriticaltheoryintheFrankfurtSchool senseoftheterm.
0.3 TheIdeaofaCriticalTheory
AsweshallseeinParts 1 toParts 4,IreconstructtheFrankfurtSchooltraditionofcriticaltheoryas fourparadigmsofcriticaltheory:theoriginalparadigmof theyoungMaxHorkheimer,thenegativistparadigmofTheodorW.Adorno,the communicativeparadigmofJu¨rgenHabermas,andtherecognitionparadigmby AxelHonneth.InPart5,Iaddtwoemergingparadigmstothisreconstruction:the contextualistparadigmdevelopedbyAmyAllen,andthejustificationparadigm developedbyRainerForst.Eachoftheseparadigmsofcriticaltheoryoffersdistinctiveaccountsofthethreemethodologicaldimensionswithdifferentaccents andemphasesarisingfromtheirrespectivesubstantivecommitments.Butthey areneverthelessdistinguishedasparadigms ofcriticaltheory invirtueofsharing a methodologicalcommitment tothesethreedimensionsandadistinctivepracticalcriterionofvalidity.Idescribethemasmethodologicaldimensionsinabroad sense:theyarerootedincertainphilosophicalassumptionsaboutthenatureof socialreality,theepistemologyofsocialinquiry,andtherelationshipbetween
⁵ AxelHonneth, TheCritiqueofPower:ReflectiveStagesinaCriticalSocialTheory,transl.by KennethBaynes(CambridgeMA:TheMITPress,1991).
socialtheoryandpractice.Althoughtheseassumptionsareformulatedatafairly generalandabstractlevel,theyarenotcompletelyformalorvacuous,andsomeof themarequitecontroversialindeed.
Inwhatfollows,Iprovideabriefexpositionofeachdimensionandthemost importantassumptionsundergirdingeachofthesecoredimensions,and,finally, ofcriticaltheory’spracticalcriterionofvalidity.Itisofcoursepossibleforsomeonetobecommittedtothemethodologicalideaofacriticaltheorywhileonly providinganaccountofsomeofthesethreecommitments.Indeed,giventhe extremelyambitiousanddemandingnatureofthatidea,itwilloftenbethecase thatanyindividualpersonwillfocushisorherattentionononeormoreof thesedimensions,whilebearinginmindthatsuchworkonlypertainstoparts ofthemethodologicalframeworkthatconstitutesacomprehensivecriticaltheoryofsociety,whichrepresents—asweshallsee—aninherentlycooperativeand interdisciplinarytheoreticalendeavour.Icallanytheorythatprovides(oraspires toprovide)anaccountofallthreedimensions,andwhichsubmitstoitspracticalcriterionofvalidity,a paradigm ofcriticaltheory—ora comprehensive critical theory.
0.3.1 TheHistoricalDimension
Thefirstdimensionofacriticaltheoryofsocietycomprisesa historicalaccount of thetheory’sowncontextoforigin,situatingthetheorywithinthehistoricalevolutionofsocietyasawhole.However,thishistoricalaccountofthetheory’scontextof originisnothistoriographyintheordinarysense.Rather,thisdimensionrequires adiachronicaccountof asociallyembodiedreason,fromwhichacriticaltheory can reflexivelyreconstruct itself,includingitsownnormativestandard.Thislatterclaimrepresentstheperhapsmostambitiousandcontroversialassumptionof FrankfurtSchoolcriticaltheory:namely,theHegelianideathatreasonshould notbeunderstoodasafacultyofthehumanmind,butratherasanessentially socialandhistoricallyevolvedphenomenon.AxelHonnethdescribesthisideaas follows:
CriticalTheory…—andinawaythatmaybeuniquetoit—insistsonamediationoftheoryandhistoryinaconceptofsociallyeffectiverationality.That is,thehistoricalpastshouldbeunderstoodfromapracticalpointofview:asa processofdevelopmentwhosepathologicaldeformationbycapitalismmaybe overcomeonlybyinitiatingaprocessofenlightenmentamongthoseinvolved. Itisthisworkingmodeloftheintertwiningoftheoryandhistorythatgrounds theunityofCriticalTheory,despiteitsvarietyofvoices.WhetherinitspositiveformwiththeearlyHorkheimer,Marcuse,orHabermasorinitsnegative formwithTheodorAdornoorBenjamin,onefindsthesameideaformingthe
backgroundofeachofthedifferentprojects—namely,thatsocialrelationships distortthehistoricalprocessofdevelopmentinawaythatonecanonlypractically remedy.⁶
Thebasicthoughtheremightbeunderstoodasfollows.Anyhumansocietyis orderedbycertainnormativerulesthatregulateinteractioninvariousspheres oflife,andthemembersofasocietywillhavetomastertheserulesiftheyare tobeabletoparticipateinsociallife.Theserulesareinturntheoutcomeofa longhistoricalprocess,inwhichsuccessivegenerationshavelearnedtomasterand augmenttheserulesaccordingtovariouscontextualconsiderationsandchanges inthesocialandnaturalenvironment.Asweshallseeinwhatfollows,allfour paradigmsofFrankfurtSchoolcriticaltheoryagreethat,inthecourseofhuman history,thesenormativerulesbecomegraduallymoredifferentiatedandsophisticated,andthatwecangraspthedevelopmentoftheserulesasaprocessof social rationalization.
Thehistoricaldimensionofacriticaltheoryrequiresanaccountofthisprocess ofsocialrationalization—thatis,ofreasonasahistoricallyevolvedsetofnormativerulesembeddedinsocialpractice.Moreover,asidefromfirst-orderrules thatgovernsocialinteraction,wealsofindinseveralparadigmsanassumption thatwecanreconstructcertainsecond-orderrules,whichundergirdthefirst-order rulesindifferentsocialspheresbyprovidingtheirunderlyingconditionsofpossibility.Iwillnotgofurtherintothisissuehere,but,asweshallsee,candidates forsuchsecond-orderrulesintheFrankfurtSchooltraditionincludetherules thatregulatecommunicativeinteraction,mutualrecognition,andrelationsof justification.
Tobesure,theassumptionthatitevenmakessensetoprovidesuchanaccount ofasociallyembodied,historicallyevolvedreasonreliesonafurtherpremise: namely,thatthedynamichistoricalprocessinwhichtheserationalrulesofaction unfold itself hassomekindofrationalstructurethatwecanaccountfor.Without sucharationaldevelopmentalstructure,historicaldevelopmentwouldsimplybe ananarchicandcontingentprocessinwhichwewouldnotbeabletodetectany patternorsenseofdirection.Thehistoricaldimensionofacriticaltheoryassumes thatwecananddofindsuchpatternsinsocialhistory,whichwecanreconstruct asfollowingacertainrationalpatternor‘developmentallogic’.⁷
Theassumptionsundergirdingthehistoricaldimensionofcriticaltheorycan thusbesummarizedasfollows.First,thehistoricaldimensionofacriticaltheory
⁶ AxelHonneth,‘ASocialPathologyofReason:OntheIntellectualLegacyofCriticalTheory’,in PathologiesofReason:OntheLegacyofCriticalTheory,transl.byJamesIngram(NewYork:Columbia UniversityPress,2009),p.21.
⁷ Ju¨rgenHabermas, ZurRekonstruktiondesHistorischenMaterialismus (Frankfurt:Suhrkamp, 1976),p.155.
presupposesaconceptionofreasonthatreferstohistoricallyevolvedrulesgoverningsocialinteractionwithindifferentspheresofsociallife.Second,thehistorical processinwhichtheseruleshavedevelopedexhibitsacoherentstructure.Third, thisstructurecanbetheoreticallyreconstructed.Ofcourse,ifsuchahistorical accountofsociallyembodiedreasonistoavoidtheriskofcomplacency,licencing allexistingrulesofconductas‘rational’,afurtherassumptionisneeded.Indeed, itisafourthandequallycentralassumptionoftheFrankfurtSchooltradition thathistoricallyevolved,sociallyembodiedreasoncan itself serveasystematic functionintheestablishmentandmaintenanceofrelationsofdomination.The assumptionhereisthatthehistoricallyevolvedrationalrulesofactionmayenable somesocialgroupstodominateothers,ormight themselves dominateindividual subjectsinvirtueofthe kind ofstructuresofsocialinteractiontowhichtheygive rise.Indeed,itispreciselythisthoughtthatanimatesthefamouscredoofthefirst generationoftheFrankfurtSchool:namely,theideaofreason‘revertingintoits opposite’.
Accordingly,theFrankfurtSchoolambitiongoesfurtherthanilluminatinghow ahistoricallyevolvedandsociallyembodiedreasonmightfacilitateorbecome complicitincertainformsorstructuresofdomination.Indeed,theaimisnothinglessthantheKantianprojectofa critiqueofreasonthroughreasonitself:to reconstruct through thehistoricalaccountofsociallyembodiedreasona normative dimensionthatenablescriticaltheorytoanalyseandilluminaterelationsand structuresofdominationas‘pathologiesofreason’⁸—thatis,wherereasonhas revertedintodomination—withtheaimof overcomingthosepathologiesinpractice.Wemightcapturethisdouble-sidednessinreason—withtheideaof‘rational’ rulesofactionthatbothfacilitatedominationaswellasenableemancipation—in termsoftheKantiandistinctionbetweenthe reasonable andthe rational,which hasbeenpopularizedbyJohnRawlsbutwhichwealsofindintheworkofthe youngMaxHorkheimer.Indeed,Horkheimerexplicitlyarguesthatthe‘ideaof morality,asKanthasformulatedit,containsthetruththatthe[rational]courses ofaction…arenotnecessarilyalsothereasonableones’.⁹
ThispointstoacentralcategoryintheyoungHorkheimer’soriginalparadigm, butwhichwefindinsomeformorotherinallparadigmsofcriticaltheory:namely, thenormativeideaofa‘reasonablesociety’,whichisunderstoodpreciselyinterms ofa societalcongruencebetweenthereasonableandtherational.Thedistinction betweenthereasonableandtherationalthusallowsustoappreciatehowrulesfor actionthatcanberationalattheindividuallevelmaynonethelessbeunreasonable atthecollectivelevel,byallowingsomesocialgroupstodominateothers,orby
⁸ Honneth,‘ASocialPathologyofReason’.
⁹ MaxHorkheimer,‘MaterialismusundMoral’,in GesammelteSchriftenBand3:Schriften1931–1936,ed.byAlfredSchmidt(Frankfurt:Fischer,2009),p.118.ForRawls’saccountofthedistinction, seeJohnRawls,‘KantianConstructivisminMoralTheory’,inCollectedPapers,ed.bySamuelFreeman (CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,2001).
formingpartofabasicstructureofsocietywhichcanitselfinsomesensedominate individualsubjects.Thehistoricalaccountofsociallyembodiedreasonisthusalso meanttoallowacriticaltheorytoreflexivelyreconstructanormativestandard, whichcanthenbeappliedina sociological accountofrelationsandstructuresof dominationwithinthebasicstructureofsociety,towhichwenowturn.
0.3.2 TheSociologicalDimension
Thesecondmethodologicaldimensionofacriticaltheorycomprisesa sociologicalaccount ofthebasicstructureofsocietythatilluminatesandaccountsforthe relationsandstructuresofdominationthatitenablesorfacilities.NotethatIuse ‘sociological’inabroadsensethatencompassespoliticaleconomy,socialpsychology,andotherassociatedsocial-scientificdisciplines.Moreover,asweshallsee, wecanconstruetheFrankfurtSchoolclaimthatbothindividualagentsandsocial structurescandominateagentsinvirtueoftheoverarchingcriterionofautonomyimpairment,suchthatanyagent,institution,orsocialstructurewhichimpairsthe autonomy(orthedevelopmentofthenecessarysocialconditionsofautonomy) ofanindividualagentisdefinedasdominatingthatagent.Thisseconddimensionrestsontwocrucialassumptions:first,that societyhasabasicstructure,and, second,thatthisbasicstructureis keytoilluminatingrelationsandstructuresof domination.
Theconceptofthebasicstructureofsocietygainedwidespreadcredencein AnglophonepoliticalphilosophyundertheinfluenceofRawls’s ATheoryofJustice,buttheFrankfurtSchoolinfactemployedtheconceptofthebasicstructureof society(‘dieGrundstrukturderGesellschaft’¹⁰)longbeforeRawls.Incriticaltheory,asinRawls,theideaofthebasicstructureofsocietyshouldbeunderstood primarilyasa qualitative notion.Thatistosay,thebasicstructurerefersto the wayinwhichagivenformofsociallifeordersandarrangesitsvariouscomponent partsandreproducesitselfovertime.Inotherwords,theconceptofthebasicstructureofsocietytellsussomethingaboutwhat kind ofsocietywelivein,interms oftheoverallarrangementofitsconstituentelementsintoamoreorlesssocially coherentandtemporallycontinuouswhole.
Thecontentofthebasicstructureofsocietythereforechangesthroughthe epochs,anditisimpossibletogiveatranshistoricallyvalidconceptualcriterion fordemarcatingthebasicstructureinabstractionfromanaccountofpresentand bygonebasicstructuresofsociety.Tobesure,thebasicstructureofsocietyisnot somethingwecangooutandmeasureinthesensethatwecanmeasurevoter
¹⁰ See,forexample,TheodorW.Adorno, ErziehungzurMu¨ndigkeit (Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1971), p.88;orHebertMarcuse,‘DerKampfgegendenLiberalismusindertotalita¨renStaatsauffassung’,in Zeitschriftfu¨rSozialforschung:Jahrgang3/1934 (Mu¨nchen:Ko¨sel-Verlag,1970),161–195,p.166.
attitudes;rather,wecanonlycomprehendthebasicstructureofsocietythrough theconjunctionofempiricalanalysisanda theory ofsociety.Adornosuggeststhat thiscommitmenttosocialtheoryasthe organon forcomprehendingsocietyis thedecisivedifferencebetweenhispreferred‘dialectical’theoryofsociety—by whichhemeanscriticaltheory—andpositivistsocialsciencethatonlyadmitsof observablesocialfacts:
Whatisdecisive,inthecaseofwagesatisfactionasinallothers,isthepowerrelations,theemployers’commandoftheproductionapparatus,ifonlyinanindirect manner.Withoutanexplicitawarenessthereof,noindividualsituationcanbe sufficientlycomprehendedwithoutassigningtothepartwhatreallybelongsto thewhole,withinwhichaloneithasitsmeaningandimportance.Justaslittleas themediationofsocietywouldexistwithoutthatwhichismediated,withoutthe elements:individualhumans,individualinstitutions,andindividualsituations; justaslittledotheseelementsexistwithoutthemediation.Whenthedetailscome toseemthestrongestrealityofall,onaccountoftheirtangibleimmediacy,they blindtheeyetogenuineperception.¹¹
Importantly,thisdoesnotmeanthatacriticaltheoryofsocietycannotbefalsifiedthroughthederivationandtestingofhypotheses—butitdoesmeanthatthe explanatorypowerofthesehypothesespartlystemsfromthetheoryofsociety fromwhichtheyarederived.
Thispointstothesecondassumptionundergirdingthesociologicaldimension ofcriticaltheory:namelythatthebasicstructureofsocietyiskeytomakingsense ofrelationsandstructuresofdomination.Thecentralideahereisthatrelations andstructuresofdominationcanonlyultimatelybeunderstoodwhentheyare placedwithinacomprehensionofthestructureofsocietyasawhole.¹² Assuggestedabove,thismethodologicalholismisdistinctlyoutoffashion;why,indeed, shouldwenotbeabletounderstanddifferentformsofdominationinabstraction fromtheirlargersocialcontext?
Tobesure,thisis,again,ultimatelynotaquestionthatwecananswerinabstractionfromanactualsociologicalaccountoftheexistingbasicstructure.However, whatwecansayforsureisthatallthephilosophersbelongingtotheFrankfurt Schooltraditionsharetheconvictionthatpartofwhatdistinguishesthebasic structureofmoderncapitalistsocietyfrompreviouskindsofbasicsocietalstructuresis—inAdorno’swords—that‘humandominationisexercisedthroughthe
¹¹ TheodorW.Adorno,‘Gesellschaft’,in SoziologischeSchriftenI (Frankfurt:SuhrkampVerlag, 2003),pp.10–11.
¹² Foranargumenttothesameeffectfromthepointofviewofrepublicanism,seeDorotheaGa¨deke, ‘DoesaMuggerDominate?EpisodicPowerandtheStructuralDimensionofDomination’, Journalof PoliticalPhilosophy (28/2),2020:pp.199–221.
economicprocess’.¹³ Thismeansthatincapitalistsociety,wewillnotbeableto understandthepredominantrelationsandstructuresofdominationunlesswe placethemwithinanunderstandingofthe‘economicprocess’.Thisclaimdoesnot implythatall poweristhusmediated;ofcourse,dominationcanalsobemediated byothersocial-structuralprocesses,suchasgenderorracialnormsorcolonialor neocolonialrelations—although,asweshall,theFrankfurtSchoolhasbeenmuch lessconcernedwiththeseformsofdomination.Butitisclear,forexample,that thepowerthattransnationalcorporationsareabletoexerciseoverdemocratically electedgovernments,andtheegregiousexploitationtowhichtheyareabletosubjectunskilledlabourinmanydevelopingcountries,arebothformsofdomination thatcouldnotbeexercisedbutfortheenablingstructureofownershipwithinthe globalcapitalisteconomy.
0.3.3 TheNormativeDimension
Thethirddimensioninacriticaltheorycomprisesa normativeaccount ofhuman freedom.Itisthisnormativeaccountthatenablesacriticaltheorytoilluminate relationsandstructuresofdominationinthebasicstructureofsociety.Indeed,it followslogicallythatitisonlyinvirtueoftacitlyassumingorexplicitlypositinga positiveconceptionofhumanfreedomthatacriticaltheoryofsocietycandisclose existingformsofunfreedom.Aswesawabove,thisnormativestandardmustbe wonfromthehistoricalaccountofasociallyembodiedreason,whichidentifies— inAxelHonneth’swords—‘anormativepotentialthatreemergesineverynew socialrealitybecauseitissotightlyfusedtothestructureofhumaninterests’.¹⁴ Inotherwords,acriticaltheorymustreconstructaconceptionofhumanfreedom fromthehistoricallyevolvednormativerulesofactioninawaythatenablesusto seehowthisstandardisatonceoperativeinandfrustratedbythepresentbasic structureofsociety.
Moreover,theFrankfurtSchooltraditionconsistentlyconceptualizesfreedom intermsofKant’sconceptofautonomy.Thissharedcommitmentofcoursereflects theprofoundindebtednessofcriticaltheorytoKant’scriticalphilosophy,butthis indebtednessextendstotheconnotationsthatfreedomasautonomyreceivedin theleft-Hegeliantradition,ofwhichMarxisthemostprominentfigure.Infact, incontrasttoKant,theFrankfurtSchoolisnotinterestedinautonomysolelyas apropertyofindividualpracticalcognition,orasametaphysicalideaofactingas anuncausedcause.Rather,asweshallsee,themembersoftheFrankfurtSchool
¹³ TheodorW.Adorno,‘Spa¨tkapitalismusoderIndustriegesellschaft’, SoziologischeSchriftenI (Frankfurt:SuhrkampVerlag,2003),p.360.
¹⁴ AxelHonneth,‘ThePointofRecognition’,in RedistributionorRecognition:APoliticalPhilosophicalExchange,ed.byAxelHonnethandNancyFraser(NewYork:VersoBooks,2003), p.244.
generallyconstrueautonomyaswhatIwillcall—withinspirationfromHonneth— a communicative conceptionoffreedom.
Thiscommunicativeconceptionoffreedomconceivesofindividualautonomy asa sociallyconstitutedcapacity andthusultimatelyasahistoricalachievement restingoncertainnecessarysocialandpsychologicalconditions,andthatindividualself-determinationisthereforesomethingthatwecan,inanimportantsense, onlydo together.IntheFrankfurtSchooltradition,thepossibilityforindividual self-determinationisseenasafunctionofthestructureoftherelationsinwhichwe aresituated,andnoindividualcanbetrulyfreeifsocialrealityisnotorganized such‘thatautonomoushumanbeingsareabletoliveinit’,asAdornoputsthe point.Inotherwords,humanbeingscanonlybetrulyfreewithinabasicstructure ofsocietythatsituatesindividualsubjectsincommunicativerelationshipsthatfurnisheachandeveryonewiththenecessaryinternalandexternalmeansforliving anautonomouslife.
Ofcourse,theonlykindofbasicstructurethatallowsself-determinationisone thatis itself amenabletobeingshapedbythesubjectsthatinhabitit,andtheonly wayinwhichwecandeterminethebasicstructureisultimatelythroughsome formofcollectiveorindeed democratic self-determination.However,suchcollectiveself-determinationcannotfullyoverwriteindividualself-determination,or someofuswouldthenceasetobe self-determining.Asweshallsee,incontrast withotherprominentthinkersinthetraditionofWesternMarxism,themembersoftheFrankfurtSchoolwerequicktorealizethattheSovietcaricatureof Marx’s‘RealmofFreedom’isinfactmerelydominationwithanotherface,preciselybecauseitsacrificesindividualautonomyatthealtarofamisconceived(or deliberatelymisconstrued)formofcollectiveself-determination.
Individualscanonlybetrulyfreewithinabasicstructurethatallowsfor both individualself-determinationofone’sownlifeand collectiveself-determinationof thesocialconditionsofeachindividuallife.Wecannotliveautonomouslivesina societywherewehavenoinfluenceonthearrangementofitsbasicstructure;ifthe basicstructuremerelyassignsusasocialpositionorroleinawaythatwehaveno effectivecapacitytoinfluenceorcontest,thenwearenotself-determining:then weareunfree,andheteronomyissociallyimposeduponus,whetherthisisdone bytheanarchicdynamicsofthecapitalisteconomy,thecaptainsofindustry,orthe PolitburooftheCentralCommittee.
Thesearethebroadcontoursofthecommunicativeconceptionoffreedomas autonomythatrunsthroughthewholeFrankfurtSchooltradition.Moreover,I willalsoarguethatthecommitmenttofreedomasautonomyisnotsimplya contingentpreferenceofthethinkersoftheFrankfurtSchool,butisrathera conceptuallynecessarypartofanycriticaltheory.Thisispartlybecause,forany groupofindividuals,freedomcanonlyberealizedinthecommunicativeprocess ofworkingoutwhatfreedommeans forthoseindividuals.Butitisalsobecause theconceptionoffreedomasautonomyis builtinto theconceptualstructureofa
