HumanDignity andHumanRights
PABLOGILABERT
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Acknowledgments
ThisbookconcludesaresearchprojectonhumanrightsthatIhavebeen pursuingoverthelasttenyears.Althoughthedignitarianframeworkto humanrightsworkedoutinthebookisnew,someofthematerialusedinit hasbeenpublishedbeforeinjournalsandbookchapters.Mostofthetextin thebookhasnotappearedbefore,however.Andmuchoftheearliermaterial hasbeenextensivelyrevised.Toacknowledgethepreviouspublications,Ihave listedbelowmyarticlesonhumanrightsthatarerelevanttothisproject.The relationswiththisbookareasfollows.Someofthebook’schaptersreproduce earliermaterialwithrelativelyminorchanges.Thisisthecasewithchapters2, 3,4,andappendix1.Theycorrespondtopapers(c),(a),(i),andasectionof(f). Someofthebook’schaptersreproduceearliermaterialbutsubjectitto significantchanges.Thisisthecasewithchapters9and10,whichrelateto papers(d),(g),and(h).Finally,somechaptersofthebookdonotcorrespond closelytoanyofthepapersinthelist.Thisisthecasewithchapters1,2,5,6,7, 8,11,andappendix2.Somesectionsinthesechaptersdomakeuseofsome materialinpapers(b),(e),(f),(g),(j),(k),and(l),althoughalwayswithmajor changesandinthecontextoffreshoverallargument.
(a) “TheFeasibilityofBasicSocioeconomicHumanRights:AConceptual Exploration.” ThePhilosophicalQuarterly 59.237(2009):559–81.(Partly reproducedinchapter4ofmybook FromGlobalPovertytoGlobal Equality:APhilosophicalExploration;Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 2012).[OxfordUniversityPress]https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213. 2008.590.x
(b) “TheImportanceofLinkageArgumentsfortheTheoryandPracticeof HumanRights:AResponsetoJamesNickel.” HumanRightsQuarterly 32.2(2010):425–38.[JohnHopkinsUniversityPress]http://doi.org/10. 1353/hrq.0.0143
(c) “HumanistandPoliticalPerspectivesonHumanRights.” PoliticalTheory 39.4(2011):439–67.[SAGE]https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591711408246
(d) “IsThereAHumanRighttoDemocracy?AResponsetoJoshua Cohen.” RevistaLatinoamericanadeFilosofiaPolitica / LatinAmerican JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy 1.2(2012):1–37.http://rlfp.org.ar/en/isthere-a-human-right-for-democracy/
(e) “TheCapabilityApproachandtheDebatebetweenHumanistand PoliticalPerspectivesonHumanRights.ACriticalSurvey.” Human RightsReview 14.4(2013):299–325.[Springer]https://doi.org/10.1007/ s12142-013-0269-z
(f) “HumanRights,HumanDignity,andPower.” PhilosophicalFoundationsofHumanRights,eds.R.Cruft,M.Liao,andM.Renzo(Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2015),pp.196–213.[OxfordUniversityPress]
(g) “LaborHumanRightsandHumanDignity.” Philosophy&SocialCriticism 42.2(2016):171–99.[SAGE]https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453715603092
(h) “TheHumanRighttoDemocracyandthePursuitofGlobalJustice.” TheOxfordHandbookofGlobalJustice,ed.T.Brooks(Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress):forthcoming.[OxfordUniversityPress]
(i) “ReflectionsonHumanRightsandPower.” HumanRights:Moralor Political? ed.A.Etinson(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2018), pp.375–99.[OxfordUniversityPress]
(j) “Facts,Norms,andDignity.” CriticalReviewofInternationalSocialand PoliticalPhilosophy:forthcoming.[Taylor&Francis]https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13698230.2017.1403122
(k) “DignityatWork.” PhilosophicalFoundationsofLabourLaw,ed. H.Collins,G.Lester,andV.Mantouvalou(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press):forthcoming.[OxfordUniversityPress]
(l) “ABroadDefinitionofAgentialPower.” JournalofPoliticalPower 11.1 (2018):79–92.[Taylor&Francis]https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X. 2018.1433758
Besidesacknowledgingthepublishersofthesepapers,Ialsothankthe editorsandrefereesfortheircomments.
IamextremelygratefulforthesupportthatIhavereceivedinthecompletionofthisbook.TherefereesofOxfordUniversityPressofferedincisive criticismsandgeneroussuggestionsonthewholemanuscript.MyOUPeditor, DominicByatt,wasdiligent,cordial,andresourceful.Mycopy-editor,Chris Bessant,savedmefromlinguisticinfelicities.Iamalsoindebtedtomany peopleforcommentsonspecificchaptersandargumentspresentedinthis book,andforconversationsonrelatedmatters.TheyincludeArashAbizadeh, MarceloAlegre,ElizabethAshford,ChristianBarry,CharlesBeitz,Allen Buchanan,ThomasChristiano,RowanCruft,AdamEtinson,JeffreyFlynn, RainerForst,FranciscoGarciaGibson,RobertoGargarella,MarianoGarretaLeclercq,MichaelGoodhart,RobertGoodin,CarolGould,OsvaldoGuariglia, NicoleHassoun,EileenHuntBotting,CristinaLafont,BenLaurence,Holly Lawford-Smith,AnnabelleLever,MatthewLiao,CatherineLu,Steven Macedo,JulioMontero,JamesNickel,MassimoRenzo,MiriamRonzoni, NicholasSouthwood,andLauraValentini.IoweespecialthankstoJimNickel fornumerousconversationsandforencouragingmetoputtogethermy thoughtsonhumanrightsandhumandignityinabookformat.Icannot recalleverypersonwhohelpedme,andIapologizeforanyomission. Ipresentedargumentsincludedinthisbookinmanyconferencesandlectures,
andIamgratefultotheaudiencesfortheirfeedback.Myresearchwas supportedbyagrantfromtheSocialSciencesandHumanitiesResearch CouncilofCanada,andbythefundingandstimulatingenvironmentsprovidedthroughaVisitingFellowshipattheAustralianNationalUniversity,a LauranceRockefellerVisitingFacultyFellowshipattheCenterforHuman ValuesatPrincetonUniversity,andaVisitingFellowshipattheCentrede RechercheenEthiqueattheUniversityofMontreal.Ialsoexploredmany questionsaddressedinthebookinseminarsatConcordiaUniversity,and Iwarmlythankmystudentsforengagingwithmeintheadventureof developingnewphilosophicalideas.
IdedicatethisbooktomysonManuel. Paravos,Manu.
2.HumanistandPoliticalPerspectivesonHumanRights29
PARTII.THEDIGNITARIANAPPROACH
5.UnderstandingHumanDignityinHumanRights113
6.DefendingtheSigni
6.3.PerniciousUsesand “IrresolvableDisputes”
6.4.EliminabilityandBuck-Passing
6.5.ExclusionofNon-humanAnimalsand “Non-typical” HumanBeings
6.6.Singularity,Diversity,andChange
6.7.AbstractandSpecificRightsandtheSignificanceofthe HumanistPerspectiveBasedonHumanDignity
6.8.Moral,Legal,orPolitical?
7.DignityandSolidaristicEmpowerment161
7.1.DevelopingtheDignitarianApproach
7.2.Dignity,Power,andSolidarity
7.3.Rank,Status,andPower
8.TheDignitarianApproachasaProgram190
8.1.Dignitarianism
8.2.HumanCapacitiesandInterests:ABroadView
8.3.SolidaristicEmpowerment,theBridgePrinciple,and theSchemaofJustification
8.4.TheArticulationofRightsandDutiesandContractualism
8.5.DignitarianismandEthicalPluralism
8.6.DignitarianismandCriticalTheory
8.7.DignitarianismasaTheoreticalandPracticalProgram
9.LaborRights229
9.1.Introduction
9.2.SurveyofMajorHumanRightsDocuments
9.3.LaborHumanRightsasMoralHumanRights
9.4.IssuesregardingLaborHumanRightsandHumanDignity
9.5.Conclusion:DignityandtheStruggleforLaborHumanRights
10.PoliticalRights261
10.1.Introduction
11.MinimalistversusExpansiveViewsofHumanRights:Dignity andtheArcofHumanistJustice287 11.1.Introduction
11.2.MinimalismaboutHumanRights:ACriticalSurvey
Appendix1:SurveyofUsesof “HumanDignity” inMajor HumanRightsDocuments321 Appendix2:ScalarFeasibility,DynamicPower,andSolidarity325
Introduction
1.1.PROJECTANDCONTRIBUTIONS
TheEuropeanCommission’sPresidentJean-ClaudeJunckerrecentlycalled foradecisiveresponsetothecrisistriggeredbythewarinSyria,demanding thatrefugeesbewelcomedandallowedtowork.Hecharacterizedtheissueas “amatterofhumanityandhumandignity.”¹Humandignityisrecurrently invokedbysocialmovements.Itisalsostatedasacentralideainnational constitutionssuchasthoseofGermanyandSouthAfrica.Andithasan unmistakableprideofplaceinthemostimportantdocumentsofinternational humanrightslaw.Itscentraldocument,theUniversalDeclarationofHuman Rights,affirmsthe “inherentdignity ...ofallthe membersofthehuman family” andexpresses “faith ...inthe dignityandworthofthehumanperson,” anditscorelegalplatforms(theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPolitical RightsandtheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCultural Rights)assertthathumanrights “derivefromtheinherentdignityofthe humanperson.” Humanrightsdocumentsalsoconstruespecificrightsin dignitarianterms.Thus,theUniversalDeclarationpresents “economic,social andculturalrightsasindispensablefor[persons’]dignityandthefreedevelopmentof[their]personality.” Butwhatishumandignity,andwhyisit importantforhumanrights?Thisbookoffersananswertothesequestions. Thekeythesisisthathumandignityisthemoralheartofhumanrights.The ideaofhumandignityframeshumanrightsdiscoursebymakingitadistinctivekindofdiscoursethatarticulatesthemosturgentclaimsofthehuman personinsociallife.Thesearetheclaimsthatpeoplehaveinvirtueoftheir valuablehumancapacities,notinvirtueoftheirnationality,ethnicgroup,or otherconventionalormorallylessweightyfeatures.Byunderstandinghuman dignity,wecanexplainthecontentandforceofhumanrightsastheurgent ethicalandpoliticalprojectthatputshumanity first.
¹ “Migrantcrisis:EU’sJunckerannouncesrefugeequotaplan” (September9,2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34193568.
Thephilosophyofhumanrightsisa flourishing field.Thereisincreasing interestintheexplorationoftheuncertainties,risks,andopportunitiesgeneratedbytheongoingprocessofglobalization,andhumanrightsidentifythe mosturgentissuesofglobalconcern.Consequently,theyhavebecomethe basicrubricunderwhichassessmentsofjusticeacrossbordersaremade. Debateaboutthenature,contents,andjustificationofhumanrightsislively, andthecoreideaofhumandignity,onwhichthisbookfocuses,isitself becominganimportantsubjectofdiscussion.²Althoughnobodydeniesthe pervasiveexistenceofreferencestohumandignity,manyscholarshave expressedpuzzlementaboutit,arguingthattheideaofhumandignitydoes nothaveaclearmeaning,doesnotplayanyimportantroleinthetheoryand practiceofhumanrights,andlendsitselftoharmfulusesthatinfactunderminethem.³Thisbookprovidesaconstructiveresponsetotheseworries.
²EarlycontributionstothephilosophyofhumanrightsinEnglishwerethe firsteditionsof HenryShue, BasicRights (Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2nded.1996;1sted.1980) andJamesNickel, MakingSenseofHumanRights (Oxford:Blackwell,2nded.2007;1sted.1987). ThedebateintensifiedafterthepublicationofJohnRawls, TheLawofPeoples (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress,1999),withimportantbookssuchasThomasPogge, WorldPoverty andHumanRights (Cambridge:Polity,2nded.2008;1sted.2002);CarolGould, Globalizing DemocracyandHumanRights (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004);JamesGriffin, OnHumanRights (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008);CharlesBeitz, TheIdeaofHuman Rights (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009).AlsosignificantarethearticlesbyAllen Buchananin HumanRights,Legitimacy,andtheUseofForce (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,2010),andvariousarticlesbyJohnTasioulas(e.g., “TakingRightsOutofHumanRights,” Ethics 120(2010),647–78).ImportantrecentcollectionsareRowanCruft,MatthewLiao,and MassimoRenzo,eds., PhilosophicalFoundationsofHumanRights (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,2015),andAdamEtinson,ed., HumanRights:MoralorPolitical (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,2018).Forsurveys,seeJamesNickel, “HumanRights,” inEdwardN.Zalta, ed., TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy (Winter2014);RowanCruft,MatthewLiao,and MassimoRenzo, “PhilosophicalFoundationsofHumanRights:AnOverview” (inCruftetal., 1–41).TheevenmorerecentsurgeinphilosophicalworkondignityincludesChristopher McCrudden, “HumanDignityandJudicialInterpretationofHumanRights,” EuropeanJournal ofInternationalLaw 19(2008),655–724;ChristopherMcCrudden,ed., UnderstandingHuman Dignity (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2013);GeorgeKateb, HumanDignity (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress,2011);MichaelRosen, Dignity (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity Press,2012);JeremyWaldron, Dignity,RankandRights (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 2012);CharlesBeitz, “HumanDignityintheTheoryofHumanRights:NothingbutaPhrase?” PhilosophyandPublicAffairs 41(2013),259–80;JürgenHabermas, “TheConceptofHuman DignityandtheRealisticUtopiaofHumanRights,” Metaphilosophy 41(2010),464–80;Marcus Duwell,JensBraarvig,RogerBrownsword,andDietmarMieth,eds., TheCambridgeHandbook ofHumanDignity (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2014);ArielZylbermann, “Human Dignity,” PhilosophyCompass 11(2016),201–10.Inthisbook,Iwillexplainindetailhowmy ownviewsrelatetothevariousstrandsinthisliterature.
³See,e.g.,CharlesBeitz, “HumanDignityintheTheoryandPracticeofHumanRights: NothingbutaPhrase?”;MarcusDüwell, “HumanDignity:Concept,Discussion,Philosophical Perspectives, ” inDüwelletal.,eds., CambridgeHandbookofHumanDignity,23–49;GovertDen Hartogh, “IsHumanDignitytheGroundofHumanRights?” inDüwelletal.,eds., Cambridge Handbook,200–7;ChristopherMcCrudden, “HumanDignityandJudicialInterpretationof HumanRights,” and “InPursuitofHumanDignity:AnIntroductiontoCurrentDebates,” in McCrudden,ed., UnderstandingHumanDignity,1–58;RuthMacklin, “DignityisaUseless
Itdevelopsaphilosophicalconceptionofhumandignitythatarticulatesits substanceandvindicatesitsmoralandpoliticalimportance.Itpresentsan accountofdignityasadistinctivenormativestatusofthehumanpersonin sociallife,andshowsthatreferencetoitplayscrucialrolesinshapingthe content,justification,andapplicationoftheuniversalistichumanismcharacteristicofhumanrights.
Morespecifically,thisbookmakesfourcontributions,whichIproceedto stateprogrammatically,anddevelopindetailasthebookunfolds.The first contributionistoadvanceasystematicconceptualproposalastohowto understandtheideaofhumandignity.Idothisbyidentifyingthekeyroles oftheideainhumanrightspracticeandbyarticulatingitscontentasitarises, holistically,fromanetworkofrelatednotionsfulfillingthoseroles the conceptualnetworkofdignity.Thisnetworkcomprisesafundamentalconcept ofstatus-dignityandahostofrelatedconceptsofcondition-dignity,dignitarian norms,thecircumstancesofdignity,endowment-basedandachievement-based dignity,dignitarianvirtue,andthedistinctionbetweenbasicandmaximal dignity.Forexample,considerthepivotaldistinctionbetweenstatus-dignity andcondition-dignity.Status-dignityconcernsthenormativestandingin accordancetowhichhumanindividualsareentitledtotheobligatorytreatmentthathumanrightsstate.Condition-dignity,inturn,concernsthestates ofaffairsinwhichhumanbeingsenjoythetreatmentowedtothem.The distinctionisnecessarytoaccommodatetwoimportantusesofdignitywithoutcontradiction.Somecriticsarguethat “dignity” isusedincoherentlytosay, forexample,thatbecauseoftheirdignitypeoplemaynotbeenslaved,andthat whentheyareenslavedtheirdignityisdestroyed.Butwithmyproposed distinctionthiscontradictiondissolves:evenwhentheydonothaveconditiondignity,slavesretainstatus-dignity.Theyoughttoenjoytheformerbecausethey havethelatter.Throughthisandotherconceptualclarificationsanddistinctions, thebookchartsthediscursiveterritoryofdignitytomakeitbothcoherentand ethicallyilluminating.
Second,thebookadvancesasubstantivenormativeproposalthatarticulates thenormativerequirementsofhumandignityintermsofthegeneralidealof solidaristicempowerment.Thisidealsaysthatweshouldshapeoursociallife insuchawaythattheywesupporteverypersonintheirpursuitofa flourishinglifebyaffirmingnegativedutiesnottodestroyorblocktheir valuablecapacitiesandpositivedutiestoprotectandfacilitatetheirdevelopmentandexerciseofthem.Bymakingourpracticesandinstitutionsembody
Concept,” BritishMedicalJournal 327(2003),1419–20;BrianOrend, HumanRights (Peterborough:Broadview,2002),87–9;StevenPinker “TheStupidityofDignity,” TheNewRepublic (May28,2008);MichaelRosen, “Dignity:TheCaseAgainst,” inMcCrudden,ed., Understanding HumanDignity,143–54.
thisideal,weenactappropriaterespectandconcernforthevaluablecapacities invirtueofwhichpeoplehavestatus-dignity.Inadditiontohighlightingthe universalityanddeonticforceofthisideal(whicharenaturalresultsofit, giventhatitarticulatesresponsestohumandignity),Iwillemphasizethe importanceofthefactthatitgeneratespositiveduties.Althoughoftenneglected,thesedutiesarecrucial.Eithertemporarilyorpermanently,everyone willneedhelptomaintain,develop,orexercisetheirvaluablehumancapacities,anddependonotherstoprovideit.Humanrightscanbeseenasnormsof dignifiedinterdependence.
Third,thisbookoffersanexplorationofhowtheproposedconceptualand substantiveaccountsofhumandignityandsolidaristicempowermentare fruitfulforarticulatingthecontent,justification,andfeasibleimplementation ofspecifichumanrights.Iconcentrateontwosetsofrightswhichareboth importantandcontroversial:therightsto democraticpoliticalparticipation andto decentlaborconditions. Robustrightstopoliticalparticipationhave instrumentalsignificanceinmakingpoliticaldecision-makersaccountableto decision-takers,sothattheformertracktheclaimsofthelatter.Theyalsohave anintrinsicsignificanceasrecognitionofpeople’scapacityforpoliticaljudgmentandforchartingtheirownwayoffulfillingtheirrights.Inturn,strong laborrightstoconditionsofworkthatarenotdegrading,andtoformandjoin associationssuchastradeunions,supportworkers’ realabilitytoparticipatein theeconomyinwaysthathonortheirdignityasagentscapableofcooperative andcreativeproductionthatgeneratesgoodsthatfulfilltheneedsofother peopleaswellastheirown.
Finally,Iofferanexplanationofhowthedignitarianprogramandthe developmentofsolidaristicempowermenthelparticulatethe arcofhumanist justice,byilluminatingboththedifferenceandthecontinuitybetweenbasic requirementsof humanrights andmoreexpansiverequirementsof social justice.Thereisastrongdebateabouthowminimalorexpansivehuman rightsnormsshouldbetakentobe.Iclaimthatalthoughnotstrictlyminimal, humanrightsareasubsetoftherequirementsofjustice.Idistinguishbetween accesstoadecentlife(whichisthefocusofhumanrights),andaccesstoa flourishinglife(whichisthewiderfocusofsocialjusticeasconceivedbysome democraticsocialistsandliberalegalitarians).Iarguethathumandignitycalls forboth.Thereisthusacorrespondingdifferenceandcontinuitybetween basic and maximaldignity.Thisgeneratesatwo-tieredpoliticalhorizon:human rightsarethemosturgentrequirementsofhumandignity,buthumanistsocial justicecan,and(inaworldofgrowingavoidableinequalityitcertainly)should, demandmore.Afterwehavesecuredbasiccivilandpoliticalrights,andthe socioeconomicconditionsfortheireffectiveenjoyment,wecanandshouldgo further.Fromthedignitarianperspectiveofsolidaristicempowerment,people shouldhaveaccesstothehighestlevelsofhuman flourishingthatcanfeasibly
(andreasonably)bemadeavailable,andnooneshouldhavelessaccessthan othersthroughnochoiceorfaultoftheirown.
Byofferingoneofthemostsystematic(andoneofthe firstbook-length) philosophicalaccountsofthecontentandsignificanceofhumandignityasa centralideaforhumanrights,Ibelievethatthisbookmakesatheoretical contributiontolivelyscholarlydebates.Byarticulatingthemoralheartof humanrights,thebookmightalsohavepracticalsignificance.Myhopeisthat ithelpsmakesenseof,andconfidentlytodefend,oneofthemostimportant globalpoliticalmovementsofourtime.Inthefaceofthesimultaneous developmentofformsofglobalizationandnationalismthatthreatenindividuals’ socialandpoliticalrights,thedignitarianperspectiveofthehumanrights movementisasurgentasever.
1.2.OVERVIEWOFTHEBOOK
Thechaptersofthisbookhavebeendraftedinsuchawaythattheycanbe readindependently(withmosttechnicaltermsdefinedandthemainassumptionsmadeexplicitsothatthereadercanfollowthemainmovesinthetext). However,thebookhasadefinitestructureandanoverallargumentthatis developedcumulatively.Inthissection,Iofferanoverviewofthemaincontents ineachchapteraswellasofhowtheyareintegratedintoaunifiedwhole.
AfterthisIntroduction,whichpresentsasummaryoftheprojectanda preliminaryclarificationoftheconceptofhumanrights,thebookisorganized inthreeparts.PartIpolemicallyengagesvariouscentralobjectionstoambitiousmoralapproachestohumanrightsofthekindthisbookfavors.They haveincommonthechargethatsuchmoralapproachesaretooremotefrom thevicissitudesofthepursuitofhumanrightsintherealworld,failingto properlyaddresstheextenttowhichthehumanrightsprojectisvariously constrainedbyspecificfactualconfigurations suchaslegalandpolitical conventions,feasibilityparameters,andthepowerstructuresassociatedwith themodernstate,thecapitalisteconomy,andtheirinternationalentanglements.Ielucidatethesignificanceoftheseconfigurations,andarguethatto properlyunderstandhowpoliticalpractice,feasibility,andpoweraffectthe humanrightsprojectwemustengageratherthandismisscoremoralideasand arguments.PartIIthenpresentsapositiveaccountofthesemoralideasand argumentsbyadvancingthedignitarianprogram.Thisprogramoffersafresh moralperspectivewhichisintrinsicallyappealing,andcanalsointegratethe importantinsightsanimatingthechallengesdiscussedinPartIwhilesharpeninginsteadofsurrenderingtheambitionanduniversalismcharacteristicof thehumanrightsproject.ThekeymovesinPartIIarethesystematic
interpretationoftheroleandcontentoftheideaofhumandignityinhuman rightspracticeandthedefenseofsolidaristicempowermentasa fittingideal forarticulatingtherequirements flowingfromit.Thelastpartofthebook, PartIII,returnstothepracticalentanglementsengagedinPartI,andexplores theimplicationsofthedignitarianperspectiveforthearticulationanddefense ofspecifichumanrights.Idefendlaborrightsanddemocraticpoliticalrights ashumanrights,andconcludebyexploringhowhumandignityandsolidaristicempowermentgeneraterequirementsofsocialjusticethatgobeyond humanrights.
Itaketheideaofhumandignitytoconstitutethemoralheartofauniversalistethicsandpoliticscommittedtosupportingtheautonomyandwellbeingofeveryhumanbeingregardlessoftheirgeographicallocationor positioninexistingsocialstructures.Humandignityisanormativestatus thatallindividualshaveequally,inherently,andwhichgivesrisetostrong requirementsthatarenormallyoverridingwhencomparedtoother,competingconsiderations.Whenexploringthisuniversalistethicsandpoliticsmy focusisonhumanpersons.Thekeycontrastisbetweenthemseenashuman beingsandasmembersoffairlycircumscribedorconventionalsocialcategorieslikeclass,race,ornationality.Now,acentralpuzzleforthiskindof approachiswhetheritcanexplainhowuniversalistconceptionsofhuman interestsandrightscanjustifyspecificrequirementsinadditiontogeneral ones(thatis,notonlyrequirementsthatapplytopeopleinall,ormost,social circumstances,butalsonormsthatariseonlyincertaincontexts,suchasthose includingacapitalistsocietyoramodernstate).Iaddressthisissuein chapter2byexploringthedistinctionandrelationsbetweenabstractand specificrights.Ishowthatbothkindsofrightsareconstitutiveofhuman rightspracticewhenseeninitsbestlight,eachplayingimportantandrelated roles.Bydevelopingthisaccount,Ishowhowtoovercomeacurrentdebatein thephilosophyofhumanrights theconfrontationbetween “naturalist” or “humanist” and “practical” or “political” perspectivesonthenatureofhuman rights.
ThetworemainingchaptersofPartIaddressworriesaboutthefeasibility andrealismofambitiousmoralapproachestohumanrights.Theworryabout feasibilityissystematicallyaddressedinchapter3(andinappendix2).Taking asanexamplebasicsocioeconomicrightstohousing,water,food,education, andhealthcare,thischapteroffersadynamicaccountofthefeasibilityof humanrightsthattakesseriouslytheimportanceoffeasibilityconstraintsbut alsoilluminatesthe flexibilityanddiversityoftheimplementationofrights acrosssocialcontextsandemphasizestheprospectsforprogressiveremovalof feasibilityobstaclesovertime.Finally,inchapter4,Iaddressthecommon complaintthathumanrightstheoryisoblivioustothepowermechanismsthat bothlimitandshapehumanrightspractice.Iidentifyandrespondtothemain versionsofthisworry,andexplainthatconsiderationsaboutpowerareinfact
bestseenasimportantresourcesfor,notasdisablersordebunkersof,human rightstheoryandpractice.⁴ Together,thesechapterspresentoneofthemost systematicphilosophicaldiscussionscurrentlyavailableaboutthesignificance offeasibilityandpowerforthearticulationandjustificationofhumanrights.
Despitetheirpredominantlypolemicaltone,thechaptersinPartIintroduceconceptualandsubstantiveresourcesforunderstandingtherelation betweenuniversalandparticularrequirements,therealisticyetnormatively ambitiouspursuitofthefulfillmentofhumanrights,andthecomplexsignificanceofpowerinpoliticalprocesses.Theseresourcesarecertainlydeployedin PartII.Butthesecondpartofthebookrecaststhesediscussionsabout universalityandspecificity,andaboutnormativeambition,feasibility,and power,inthenewlightshedbythefresh,positiveperspectiveofferedbythe dignitarianapproach.
Thedignitarianapproachexplainswhythedisputebetweenpoliticaland humanistperspectivesonhumanrightscanandshouldbeovercome.Accordingtothe “political” or “practical” perspective,humanrightsareclaimsthat individualshaveagainstcertaininstitutionalstructures,inparticularmodern states,invirtueofintereststheyhaveincontextsthatincludethem.This perspectivehasbeenintroducedincontrasttothemoretraditional “humanist” or “naturalistic” one,accordingtowhichhumanrightsarefundamentally pre-institutionalmoralclaimsthatindividualshaveagainstallotherindividualsinvirtueofintereststhataretypicaloftheircommonhumanity.Iargue thatonceweidentifytheseperspectivesintheirbestlight,wecanseethattheir deepestinsightsareinfactcomplementary,thatweneedbothtomakegood normativesenseofthecontemporarypracticeofhumanrights.Thehumanist perspectivearticulatesthemoralidealofuniversalsolidarity,andthepolitical perspectivehighlightsthesignificanceofpowerinpoliticalandlegalpractice. Thebookdevelopsanintegratedaccountofthenatureandjustificationof humanrightsthatincorporates,inacoherentandsystematicway,thesekey insights.Thisaccountisbasedonanewinterpretationoftheideaofhuman dignity,whichisthemoralheartofthehumanrightsproject.Respectand concernforhumanindividualsascarriersofhumandignitygivesrisebothto abstractrightsthatholdindependentlyofparticularinstitutionalconfigurationsandtospecificrightsthatareintertwinedwiththem.Inmyview, humanrightspracticeshouldembraceaformofuniversalsolidaritythat seeks,wherepossible,toempowerhumanbeingstoaccesswhattheyneed tolivedecentlives.
⁴ Another,relatedworryisthatitisnotfeasibletosimultaneouslyfulfillalltherightsregularly invokedintheethical,legal,andpoliticaldiscourseofhumanrights.Elsewhere,Isuggesta pragmaticapproachtotheissueofthe “indivisibility” ofand “linkages” betweenvarioushuman rightsthatrendersworriesabouttheircombinedpursuitlesspressingthantheyseemtobe. PabloGilabert, “TheImportanceofLinkageArgumentsfortheTheoryandPracticeofHuman Rights:AResponsetoJamesNickel,” HumanRightsQuarterly 32(2010),425–38.
Thedignitarianapproachalsohelpsexplainhowtoaddresskeyconcerns aboutasymmetricpower.Forexample,itsfocusonsolidaristicempowerment indeedhelpsilluminateacentralsubstantivetensioninthepracticeofhuman rights.Ontheonehand,empowermentisofgreatsignificanceforhuman dignity.Emphasizingthispointhelpsrespondtothecommonchargethat thepoliticsofhumanrightsworkswithacondescendingpicturethatposits valiantpowerful “saviors” gallopingtotherescueofhelpless “victims.” Where possible,peopleshouldbeprotagonistsinthepoliticalstoryoftheful fi llmentoftheirrights.ThisispartlywhyIarguethatthereshouldbe promotionofdemocraticpracticesandinstitutionsatdomesticandinternationallevels.Ontheotherhand,theemphasisonempowermentisoften associatedwithaviewofdignityasradicalindependenceorself-reliance,a radicalidealthatisbothinfeasibleandundesirable.Somedisparitiesof powerarenoteliminable,andeverypersonneedsthehelpofothersto liveadecentlife.Thus,Ialsoarguethatweneedtochallengethepathologicalmoralpsychology,andpoliticalculture,thatarisesfromembracing theradicalidealofindependence,inwhichbeinghelpedproducesshame, andhelpingproducesguilt.Toavoidthisoutlook,Isuggest,weneedto cultivatetheabilitytogiveandreceivesolidaristicsupport,asenseof digni fiedvulnerability,andastanceofre sponsibilitytohelpwhenwehave asymmetricpower.Inthisway,wecanpositionourselvestohonorcentral objectivesofthehumanrightsmovement,suchasthepursuitofuniversal “ brotherhood ” andtheful fi llmentoftherighttoassistanceofthosewho cannotfullysupportthemselves(asmentionedintheUniversalDeclaration ofHumanRights,Articles1and25).
Thedevelopmentofthedignitarianprogram,anditsarticulationinterms ofsolidaristicempowerment,proceedsasfollows.Inchapter5,Iofferan interpretationoftheideaofhumandignitythatexplainshowitcanplaythe severalvaluablerolesthatitdoesplayinhumanrightsdiscourse.(Appendix1 provides,asabackgroundresource,asurveyofusesoftheideainsomeofthe mainhumanrightsdocuments.)Thevaluablerolesconcernthecontribution ofhumandignitytothearticulationofadistinctivesetofnormsthatare universalistandhumanistinnature,thejustificationofspecifichumanrights ofthekindthatarerecognizedinthemainhumanrightsdocuments,the groundingofthegreatnormativeforceoftheserights,thecombinedgenerationofbothnegativeandpositivedutiesthatarecorrelativetothem,the explanationofthesigni fi canceofparticipatinginthepoliticalprocessof struggleagainsttheirviolation,andtheilluminationofthearcofhumanist justice,runningfrombasicrequirementsmandatingpeople’ saccesstoa decentlifetomaximalrequirementstosupportpeople ’ saccesstoa fl ourishinglife.Theideaofhumandignityisarticulatedthroughaconceptual networkthatincludesanorganicsetofmorespeci ficideas.Theseideas
includestatus-dignity,condition-dignity,dignitariannorms,thebasisof dignity,thecircumstancesofdignity,anddignitarianvirtue.Theinterpretationofhumandignityintermsofthisconceptualnetworkis firstvindicated byshowinghowitilluminatestheful fi llmentofthesixconceptualroles mentionedabove.Furthervindicationisofferedbyshowinghowtheinterpretationhelpscounterchallengestotheuseoftheideaofhumandignityin humanrightsdiscourse.Thisisdoneinchapter6,wheredignityisdefended againstthemostimportantchargeslevelledagainstit suchasthosesaying thattheideaisempty,indeterminate,incoherent,politicallypernicious, exclusionary,sterile,andredundant.Athirdformofvindicationofthe ideaofhumandignityisprovidedintheremainingchaptersofPartIIby displayingtheexplanatoryforceofthedignitarianperspectivewhenitcomes tomakingsenseofvarioussubstantivenormativerequirements.
Afterprovidinganinterpretationofthecontent,role,andgeneralsignificanceoftheideaofhumandignity,Iproceedtodevelopasubstantiveaccount ofhowtoarticulatedignitariannormativerequirements.Idothisby first presenting,inchapter7,theidealofsolidaristicempowerment.Thisidealcalls forsupportingpeople’spursuitofa flourishinglifebyaffirmingbothnegative dutiesnottoblockordestroy,andpositivedutiestoprotectandfacilitate,the developmentandexerciseoftheirvaluablecapacities theverycapacitiesthat giverisetopeople’sstatus-dignity.Anadditionalcontributionofthischapter (togetherwithappendix2)istodevelopfurtherthediscussionsoffeasibility andpowerstartedinPartIofthebook.Thenotionsofscalarfeasibilityand dynamicpowerareintroducedandtheirtheoreticalandpracticalsignificance fortheprogressivefulfillmentofhumanrightsovertimeisexplored.
Withtheideasofhumandignityandsolidaristicempowermentinplace, chapter8proceedstoexplainthestructureofdignitarianargumentsforrights. Variouspuzzlesareaddressed.Forexample,Idiscussthedifficultyinmoving fromstatementsofhumanintereststostatementsofrights,showingthatthe dignitarianapproachprovidesabridgebetweenthesepoles.Othertopics addressedincludetherelationbetweenfactsandnorms,thepluralityof featuresofhumanbeingsthatgiverisetotheirstatus-dignity,therelations betweenthedignitarianapproachandvarioustheoriesinnormativeethics, andtheimportanceofacritiqueofideologicalconstrualsofhumandignity andhumanrights.Thechapterconcludeswithanoutlineofthemaincomponentsofdignitarianismasaresearchprograminmoralandpolitical philosophy.
ThechaptersinPartIIIproceedtoshowthatthedignitarianapproach, anditscompanionidealofsolidaristicempowerment,haveimportantimplicationsfortheunderstanding,defense,andfeasibleimplementationofspecifichumanrights.Ifocus,inparticular,oncontentiousandambitiouslabor rights(toaccesssafeworkingconditions,receiveadequatewages,andform
andjoinunions)andtherightstopoliticalparticipation(includingthefull paletteofrightsofdemocraticcitizenship).Iprovideadignitarianunderstandinganddefenseoftheserightsinchapters9and10.Asitturnsout,the dignitarianagendaofsolidaristicempowermentcanalsoshapemoreexpansiverequirementsofsocialjusticethatgobeyondhumanrights.Chapter11 thusshowshowdignitycanindeedilluminatetheamplearcofhumanist justice.Thischapteralsooffersatwo-tiered,dynamicframeworkthatarbitratesthecurrentdebatebetweenminimalistandexpansiveconceptionsof humanrights.Itexplainswhyhumanrightsconstitutearelativelylimitedset ofdignitarianrequirements,butalsowhymoreambitiousdemandsofsocial justicecanbejustifiedaspartofwhattheappropriateresponsetopeople’ s dignitycallsfor.
Insum,PartIofthisbookaddressesthesuspicionthathumanrights discourse,insofarasitaffirmsahigh-mindedstanceofuniversalisthumanism, isjusttooremotefromtherealworld itfailstoilluminateactualpolitical practice,itisunrealistic,anditisblindaboutthevagariesofunequalpower. Irespondbyarguingthatthemoraluniversalismofhumanrightsisinfact immanenttopoliticalpractice,motivatesadynamicattitudethatpushesthe feasibilityfrontiersforward,andseekstoequalizepowerandorientitsuseina solidaristicway.Thereisnothingotherworldlyabouthumanrights.They require,andexpress,acommitmentofhumanbeingstotakeeachother seriouslyasgiversandreceiversofsolidaristicsupportastheypursueadecent, orevena flourishing,life.Humandignityisthemoralideathatanimatesthis requirementandcommitmentasdevelopedinhumanrightspractice,and PartIIisdevotedtoarticulatingitandtoshowinghowitgroundsthelink betweenhigh-mindeduniversalisthumanismandrealworldpolitics.Human dignityisregularlyinvokedasthegroundofhumanrights.At firstsight,that ideamayappearasyetanotherappealtoaremoteornon-consequentialmoral concept.Butitis,infact,quiteintuitiveandpracticallysignificant.Itrequires, andmarks,ourrecognitionofeachpersonasmatteringintrinsicallyandas beingowedsupportivetreatment.Asbeingswithdignity,wematter,andwe canseethatweshouldengageeachotherwithrespectandconcernratherthan withcontempt,hostility,indifference,orinexploitativeways.Weshouldbuild practicesandinstitutionsthatwillhelpussucceedatmakingsomethinggood andmeaningfulofourlives.Thecoreidealofsolidaristicempowerment articulatesthisrecognitionasweshapeanddevelopthehumanrightsproject. Theprojectcallsforenactingthedignitarianapproachintheshapingofsocial practicesandinstitutions,especiallythosethathaveprofoundconsequences forourlife-prospects,suchasthemoderneconomyandstate.Thelastpartof thisbook,PartIII,preciselytakesupthetaskofexploringwhatdignitarianism specificallydemandsofthosepracticesandinstitutions.Itarguesthatweowe eachotherrobustsocialandpoliticalrightstoaccesstheconditionsfordecent andperhapseven flourishinglives.
Aswedevelopanaccountofhumanrights,wecandistinguishbetweenthe questionsofwhatitisforsomethingtobeahumanrightandwhatmakes somethingahumanright.Ananswertothe firstquestionprovidesaviewof the concept ofhumanrights,whereasananswertothesecondoffersthebasis ofasubstantive conception ofhumanrights.⁵ Thedivisionbetweenconcept andconceptionmaybeporous,buttoenhancetheprospectsforfruitful debateitisagoodideatokeepconceptsasecumenicalaspossible,sothat thecontendersdonottalkpasteachotherordismisseachother’sviewsmerely bydefinitionalmaneuvers.Thisbookwilladvancebothconceptualand substantiveclaimsabouthumanrights.Thissectionsummarizesthoseclaims, offeringthereaderaquickguidetothemainstatementsdevelopedin thebook.
Regardingtheconceptofhumanrights(andIamfocusinghereon moral humanrights,tobedistinguishedfromlegalhumanrights,nationalor international onwhichmoreinamoment),Ithinkthatmostpractitioners andtheoristscouldacceptthefollowingproposal:
Somethingisamoralhumanrightwhenitis(a)arightthat(b)isheldbyall humanpersonsatleastinthecontemporaryworld,(c)hasnormativeforce independentlyofwhetheritisalreadyrecognizedinexistinglegaland politicalinstitutionsandpractices,(d)mayhoweverbe(andnormallyis) suchthatatleastinpartitshouldbeimplementedthroughlegaland politicalinstitutionsandpractices,(e)hasextremelyhighpriority,and(f) givesrisetoglobalinadditiontomerelylocalconcern.
Thathumanrightsare(a)rightsisobviousbutimportant.Tosaythat somethingisahumanrightismorethantomerelysaythatitwouldbe desirabletoseeitrealized;itinvolvessayingthatsomeagentshavedutiesto takestepstomakethatrealizationafact.Ingeneral,rightsarejustifiedclaims thatpersonscanmakeonothers.⁶
⁵ Onthedistinctionbetweenconceptandconception,seeJohnRawls, ATheoryofJustice,rev. ed.(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1999),5;andH.L.A.Hart, TheConceptofLaw, 2nded.(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1994),160,246.
⁶“Mostifnotallhumanrightsareclaimrightsthatimposedutiesorresponsibilitiesontheir addresseesordutybearers,” andareinthatsense “mandatory.” Nickel, “HumanRights,” inZalta, ed., StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,sect.1.JosephRazarguesthatrights’“existence dependsontherebeinginterestswhoseexistencewarrantsholdingotherssubjecttodutiesto protectandpromotethem.” Raz, “HumanRightswithoutFoundations,” inS.Bessonand J.Tasioulas,eds., ThePhilosophyofInternationalLaw (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 2010),321–37,at335.Inthisbook,Icomplicatethispicturebyexploringwhatinterestscount forjustifyingrights,andbynotingtheimportanceofpayingattentiontotheinterestsofmultiple agentsbesidestheimmediateright-holder(suchastheduty-bearerandotheraffectedagents). Seediscussionof(C5)below.
Aswithanyconcept,thereareborderlinecasesinwhichtheapplicationof theseconditionsisdifficult.Forexample,somerights suchaspoliticalrights tovoteorholdoffice areheldbyadultpersonsbutnot(yet)bychildren. However,westillwanttouse(b)tomarkagroupofrightsthatpeoplehave independentlyofsomeparticularsocialstatusesandfeatureslikenationality, gender,andsocialclass.Humanrightsaretherightsofpeopleasindividual humanbeings,notasAmerican,male,orproperty-owners.
Onthepresentconceptualaccount,theuniversalityofhumanrightsis takentoapplyatleastincontemporarytimes.Itisnotclaimedthatevery humanrightmustapplyineveryconceivablesituationinwhichhumanbeings existandinteract.Somehumanrightsclearlycouldhavethatstrictlyuniversal standing(therightagainsttortureisanexample)whileothersseemtiedto ratherspecificinstitutionalframeworks(asseemsthecasewithworkers’ rights toformunionsandreceiveadequatesalaries).Theremaybedifferenthuman rightsofdifferentlevelsofabstraction.Themorespecificonesmaybejustified onthebasisofthemoreabstractones.Forexample,contemporaryelectoral rulesaretiedtospecificfeaturesofthemodernstate.Butprettymuchevery societyfeaturesmechanismsofpoliticaldecision-making,andarguablyagents inallofthemhaveastronginterestinbeingabletoshapethatprocess(thatis, tohavepoliticalpower),andfaceseriousthreatswhentheydonot.Iaccept thisview,butarguingaboutitisamatterforsubstantivedebate inwhich Iengageinthisbook.Ithussuggestthatwekeeptheconceptwidesoasnotto predeterminetheoutcomeofsubstantivedebateunreasonably.Wealltake humanrightstoberelevantatleastforthecontemporaryworld.
Conditions(c)and(d)arealsoquiteecumenical:humanrightsarecritical standardsweusetodefend,challenge,andreformvariouslegalandpolitical institutionalarrangementsandpractices:wewanttheformertorelatetothe latter,butnottobereducedtowhateverthelatteralreadyencode.⁷ My definitionleavesitopenforsubstantivedebatewhethersomehumanrights areheldbysomepersonsagainstothersdirectlyintheirinteractionsbesides indirectly,viainstitutions.Ialsodonotsettlebydefinitional fiatwhatinstitutions,ifany,arerelevant(forexample,whetherstatesarealwaysthecrucial institutionalagentswhenitcomestotheidentificationofduty-bearers).My ownviewisthattherearesomerightsthatinvolvedirectinterpersonalclaims. Thecaseofdomesticviolenceisagoodexample:aviolationofbodilyintegrity isinvolvedeveniftheviolatorsarenotactinginthecapacityofgovernment officials.Ialsohaveabroadviewofrelevantinstitutionalagencies,which includesbutgoesbeyondstatestoinvolveotherentitiessuchascorporations. But,again,ourdefinitionofhumanrightsshouldnotpreemptimportant substantivedebates,andthereisindeedoneaboutwhetheragenciesunder
⁷ AsIsaythreeparagraphsdown,withinsomeconstraintsthelawcanalsomakeamorally generativecontributionwhenitcomestosomespecificrights.Thispointqualifies(c).
andbeyondanation-statehavehumanrightsresponsibilities.Asthenation-state isweakenedoralteredbycapitalistglobalization,forexample,itisquitesignificanttoaskwhetherpowerfuldomesticandmultinationalcorporationshave humanrightsresponsibilities,andwhetherpublicinternationalorevenglobal institutionalagentsshouldbechargedwith(orperhapsbecreatedtoserve)the protectionofhumanrights.
Feature(e)isalsostatedquitegenerally,allowingfordifferentinterpretations.Butitiscrucialtoourunderstandingofhumanrightsthatthey constituteextremelystrong,andnormallydecisive,demands.Someseethe fulfillmentofcertainhumanrightsasconstraintsontheinternationalsovereigntyordomesticlegitimateauthorityofgovernments.Mostagreethat policiesanddecisions(ortheiromission)regardingtheviolationandlackof fulfillmentofhumanrightsaregravefaultsthatareextremelyhardtojustify byappealtoothernormsorconsiderations.Thereisalsosignificantdebate aboutwhatcanandshouldbedonebyagentswithinacertainstatetoprotect thehumanrightsofpeopleabroad.Butitisa fixedfeatureofourideaof humanrightsthattheirnormativeforceisglobal,thatitis,insomesense, everyone ’sbusinesstorespectandpromotethemeverywhere.Howthis respectandpromotionshouldproceedinpracticeisamatterofsubstantive debate,butfeature(f)initsgeneralformseemssecure.
Itisimportanttohave,andtodeploy,aconceptofmoralhumanrightsthat isdifferentfromthatoflegalhumanrights.Wehavereasontoappealtomoral humanrightsinordertojustifytheexistenceoflegalhumanrights,todefend someoftheirspecificcontents,andtoaddresssomepotentialconflictsconcerningtheirapplication.Whenpeopleintroducealegalpracticeregarding humanrights,orreformit,theywanttobeabletothink,andtounderstand whytheythink,thatwhattheyaredoingisthemorallyrightthingtodo. Invokingmoralhumanrightshelpsthemexplainwhytheyhavereasontotry toconstructlegalframeworksthatsupporttheclaimsofindividuals,whythey dosoinageneralway(thatis,bybeingdirectednotonlytothisorthat individual,inthisorthatgrouporcountry,buttoanyandallofthem everywhere),andenjoygreatnormativestrengthinthefaceofcompeting considerations.Apictureofmoralhumanrightsprovidessignificantnormativeguidancetothepracticeoflegalhumanrights,itsinception,maintenance, andchangeovertime.
However,andtoavoidmisunderstanding,Ishouldstateafewcaveatson therelationbetweenmoralandlegalhumanrights.AsAllenBuchananhas forcefullyarguedinrecentwork,weshouldnotconflatethem.Iagreewith himthatitisamistaketoassumethatidentifyingamoralhumanrighttox providesbyitselfasufficientconditionforimposingalegalhumanrightto x.Insomecontexts,coerciveimplementationoftherightmightnotbe feasible,orevendesirable,andsupportingpeople’saccesstoxinmore informalwaysmightbeappropriateinstead.Ialsoagreethatidentifyinga
