Introduction
HeideggerandtheQuestionoftheAnimal
TheaimofthisbookistoprovideacriticalanalysisofHeidegger’ sreflectionsonanimality.Thesereflectionsarepresentedmostextensivelyinhis 1929–30lecturecourse TheFundamentalConceptsofMetaphysics (FCM), sothistextwillbemyprimaryfocus.IntheselecturesHeideggerposesthree provocativemetaphysicaltheses:thehuman,Heideggerclaims,is ‘worldforming’ (weltbildend),theanimalis ‘poorinworld’ (weltarm),andthe stone themereobject is ‘worldless’ (weltlos ).¹Viaacloseexaminationof FCM,onethatalsodrawsonotherplaceswithinHeidegger’scorpuswhere thethemeofanimalityfeatures,Iintendtoclarifythetruemeaning,scope, andsignificanceofthesetheses.
WhyareHeidegger’ sreflectionsonanimalssignificant,withinand beyondHeideggerscholarship?Inthecurrentmolecular–geneticage,in whichthehumangenomehasbeendecodedandthehumanisembedded moredeeplythaneverwithinabiologicalcontinuum,questionspertaining toanykindof essential,metaphysicaldistinctionbetweenthehumanand thenon-humananimalappearobsolete.Thetwenty-firstcenturyisperhaps oneinwhichthereisnolongeraquestionpertainingexclusivelytothe human:eventoattempttoplacethehumanwithinitsowncategory,one thatfundamentallyomitsnon-humananimals,istoreinvokeadubiouspreEnlightenmentontology.
ContemporaryreadersofHeideggerhavegenerallyrespondedalongthese linestoHeidegger ’sthesesconcerninghuman ‘world-formation ’ andanimal ‘world-poverty’,andhaveoftendonesowithvehementcriticism.²The thesesforgean ‘abyssofessence’ betweenhumanandnon-humanorganisms;Heideggerappearstobeusingthemtoestablishanontotheological hierarchythatplacesthehumanatthetop,inspiteofthefactthathiswork
¹Heidegger(1995[1929–30]:ch.3,p.185).
²e.g.Derrida(1989,2011);Franck(1991);Krell(1992,2013);Haar(1993b);Jonas(1994); Glendinning(1998);MacIntyre(1999);Aho(2009).
Heidegger’sMetaphysicalAbyss:BetweentheHumanandtheAnimal.BethCykowski,OxfordUniversityPress(2021). ©BethCykowski.DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198865407.003.0001
isusuallysuspiciousofthemetaphysicaldivisionsanddualismsthatwehave inherited.Heidegger’spropositions,itisarguedinthesecondaryliterature, underminescientificdevelopmentsbybreakingapartthebiologicalcontinuuminordertosecurethehumanwithinitsownuniquecategory,allthe whileleavingtheworld-pooranimalontheothersideoftheabyss.Inso doingHeideggerreinstatesanoutmodeddualismthatheought,onhisown terms,torenounce:humanversusanimal.
IsHeidegger ’saccountofanimalityasstraightforwardasthis?Evena briefglanceathisreflectionsonanimalsgiveswaytoacascadeofcomplex questions.What,precisely,isthenatureoftheabyssthatHeideggerforges betweenthehumanandtherestoflife?Anddoeshe,infact,forgeithimself, andinsodoingendorseit,ordoesheratherobservethemannerinwhichit hasbeenforgedthroughoutthehistoryofmetaphysicsandempiricalscience?Andwhatkindofdimensionsdoestheabyssthatheinsistsupon have?IsHeideggersuggestingthat,while,atanontic–scientificlevel,human beingsshareorganicprocessesandtraitswithanimals,theircapacityto ‘take issue’ withbeingand,asheputsitin FCM, ‘form’ aworldpushesthem ontologically,ifnotontically,outofthe ‘natural’ domain?Orishemaking anevenstrongerclaim:thatthehumaniswhollyandutterly ‘other’ thanthe animal,thatitisseparateandessentially ‘disincarnated’,toborrowfrom DidierFranck ’srenderingofHeidegger’sposition,andthatnoamountof analysisorempiricaldiscoverycaneverreallyreconcileitwithnature?³
WhilebothofthesepositionshavebeenattributedtoHeidegger,most commentatorsonhisreflectionsonanimalitytendtoseeatleastthethreat ofthelattermoreuncompromisingapproach:adeepandintractableabyss that fliesinthefaceofourmorerefinedcontemporaryconceptsconcerning natureasabiologicalcontinuumthatincludesthehuman.Iaimtoshow that,whileHeidegger’sanimalanalysisdoesindeedinstituteanontological hierarchybetweenthehumanandtheanimal,itdoesnothavethenaively humanisticimplicationsthathavethusfardisturbedcommentators.His claimsregardingtheabyssbetweenthehumanandtheanimalconceiveofa hierarchyofbothanontological,essentialkind,andanontic–scientifickind; thesehierarchies,however,serveaheuristicandinvestigative,ratherthanan absoluteanddidactic,functioninhiswriting.
The ‘standard’ readingofthelecturesissomewhatsuperficial,insofarasit divorcesthesectionsonanimalsfromtheirwidercontext,bothwithin ³Franck(1991:146).
Heidegger’slecturecourseandwithinthemetaphysicalandscientificclimateofhistime.Farfrombeingahackneyedmetaphysicalorderingand valorisationoflife,forHeideggertheconceptofametaphysicalabyss betweenhumanandanimalistheexpressionofadeep-seatedinherited prejudiceconcerningadivisionbetween ‘life’ and ‘spirit’.Heideggerargues in FCM,aswellasin BeingandTime,thatthisdivisionseparatestherealm ofthe ‘natural’ fromthatofthepeculiarlyhuman.⁴ Thehuman,throughout history,hasbeenthoughtofas ‘lifeplus’ someotherproperty:reason, intellect,language,allofwhichcomeunderthetitle ‘spirit’.Viaagenealogicalanalysis,Heidegger’slecturecourselocatestheoriginofthesetwo categoriesinancientGreekthought:priortotheestablishmentofindividual philosophicaldisciplines logic(logos),ethics(ēthos),andthephilosophyof nature(physis) theGreeksencounteredhumanexistenceasthatpartof naturethat ‘speaksout’ aboutnatureasawhole.⁵ Inthissense,Heidegger argues,thehumanwasseenan essentially proto-philosophical,metaphysical being thatis,avesselviawhichnature,understoodas physis, ‘goesbeyond’ itselfinordertobringaboutitsownarticulation. ⁶
WiththeestablishmentofPlato’sAcademy,Heideggerargues,disciplinarydivisionsledtoanabandonmentofthemoreprimordialunderstanding: theconceptofthehumanasthebeingthatspeaksoutof physis fromwithin itwasrecon figuredintermsofadividebetween ‘nature’ and ‘ man ’ . ⁷ Physis became bios, ‘life’,and logos and ēthos werereinterpretedas ‘spirit’.Lifeand spiritevolvedintodistinctcategoriestobestudiedontheirownterms,and bythetwentiethcenturythesecategorieshadbeenossi fied:lifeisnowthe domainofbiology,andspiritthedomainofanthropology,disciplinesthat, Heideggerarguesthroughoutthelecturecourse,aredivorcedfromtheir ownmetaphysicalorigins.Heideggerwishestoilluminatetheseorigins, first sothatwecandiscoverthemetaphysicscontainedwithincontemporary onticscience,and,secondly,sothatwecansteerourselvesbacktothe primordialunderstandingoftheGreeks,which,asheclaimsin FCM,sees thehumannotasapinnacleofnaturebutasakindof ‘rupturing’ within nature,insofarasitisalwaysembeddedwithinandtiedtothenatureabout whichitspeaks.Theself-rupturingthatoccurswhenthehumanspeaksout about physis fromwithinitmeansthatitnecessarilyremainsunknownto itself,estrangedfromitsownessence.Heideggerarticulatesthis
⁴ Heidegger(1995[1929–30]:§18;seealso1962[1927]:§10).
⁵ Heidegger(1995[1929–30]:§10). ⁶ Ibid.,§8b),p.26. ⁷ Ibid.,§10.
estrangement,anditsphilosophicalpotency,bydrawingonNovalis’sstatementthat ‘philosophyisreallyhomesickness’ . ⁸
ThestandardreceptionofHeidegger’ sreflectionsonanimalityunderemphasisesthiswidermetaphysicalcontext.ItalsodetachesHeidegger’ s reflectionsfromtheanthropologyandbiologyofhistime,towhichheis respondinginthelectures.Thestandardreadingthereforemissesthefact thatHeidegger’sthesesonthehuman/animaldistinctionderivetheirpositivecontentfromthisbiologyandanthropology.We find,inthesedisciplines,anaccountofthehumanaspeculiarlydetachedfromtheinstinctsthat bindotheranimalstotheirenvironments.ThebiologistJakobvonUexküll writesthattheanimal’sworldmaybeconfined, ‘impoverished ’ bythe limitationsofitssensory field,butpreciselytheselimitationsgrantthe animala ‘certainty’ thatthehuman,withitscomparativelyweakinstincts andextremeopennesstotheworld,appearstobedenied.⁹ Thisview, reiteratedintheGermanphilosophicalanthropologistsoftheearlytwentiethcentury,whodescribethehumanas ‘dangerously’ vulnerabletothe contingenciesoftheworldratherthanenclosedwithinasinglehabitat, retainstheideaofanabyssbetweenhumanandanimal.¹⁰
In FCM Heideggerinteractsdeeplywiththelifesciencesofhistime because,asheaimstoshow,thesesciencescanberegardedasonticgateways todeeper,ontologicalmodesofquestioning.Asaresultofthemetaphysics implicitinthesciences,conceptsthatareconcealedwithintheirfoundations,biologyandanthropologyhaveproducedaconceptionoflifeand humanlifethatisreflectedinthepropositionsthattheanimalis ‘poorin world’ andthehumanis ‘world-forming’.Ifweturntowardsthismetaphysics,anexercisethatdemandsthatwe first ‘awaken’ the ‘fundamentalattunement’,thebasic ‘mood’ ofthecontemporaryepoch,we findtherelicofthe philosophicallymorecurious,moreprofoundviewofthehuman’sposition within physis embodiedinGreekthought.Thismoreprimordialphilosophicalcomportmenthasbeenappropriatedhistoricallyintermsofasubject/ objectdualism,butHeideggerseekstoshowthatitisinfactfarmoresubtle, ambiguous,andcomplex.Hepresentshisthreethesesasakindofphilosophicalprovocationthat,broadlyspeaking,wecanrespondtoinoneoftwo ways.Ontheonehand,wecaninterpretthemastheadvancingofa tripartitehierarchyofbeings,onethataffirmstraditionaldualisms(subject versusworld,soulversusbody,lifeversusinertmatter).Or,wecanrespond
⁸ CitedinHeidegger(1995[1929–30]:§2b),p.5). ⁹ Uexküll(2010[1934]:51).
¹⁰ e.g.Gehlen(1988[1940]);Scheler(2002[1928]);Plessner(2019[1928]).
tothemasstatementsthatchallengeustoquestionwhatisreallyatstakein theseinheriteddualismsandconceptsaboutourpositionwithinnature. Thusfar,mostscholarshaveapproachedHeidegger’sthesesasaprovocationintheformersense.Theyhavemarvelledatwhattheyregardasthe reinstitutionofdualismsthatareunacceptableonHeidegger’sownterms. However,IwillaimtoshowthatHeideggerintendedhisprovocationto pointbeyondthevestigesofthesedualismsbacktoamoreessentialwayof philosophising.Thoughthenatureandcontextofhisstatementsconcerning animalsalterthroughouthiswork,Iwishtoarguethat,eveninlater, strongeriterationsofhisanimalthesis,Heidegger’sintentionistoexamine andilluminate,ratherthansimplytorepeat,theorthodoxmetaphysical hierarchiesthatwehaveinherited.
Heidegger’s ‘AbyssalDistinction’ betweentheHuman andtheAnimal
ThenuancesofHeidegger’sargumentsinfavourofanabyssseparatingthe humanfromtheanimalalter;theabyssexpandsandcontractswithina certainmarginoverthecourseofhisworks,butitremainsintactforthe durationofhisintellectuallife.Heidegger ’suseoftheterm ‘abyssal’ (abgründig ),which firstappearsinrelationtothehuman/animaldistinction inthe1920sandisusedrepeatedlythereafter,isintendedintwosenses. First,hedescribesthedistinctionbetweenthehumanandtheanimalas ‘abyssal’ inthesenseofadeepchasm:thedifferencebetweenthesetwo modesofbeingisunfathomable,perhapsimpossibletotraverse,regardless oftheeffortsofthenaturalandhumansciences.Secondly,thedistinctionis torturousinthisunfathomability;itis,ashenotesin LetteronHumanism, ‘scarcelyconceivable’,disquieting,andliterally ‘abysmal’ tobehold.¹¹
Whenweconsiderthatwhichisanimalinus,weareencounteringour intersectionwithnature,with physis understoodastheunifieddomainof beingsofwhichweareapart.Thehumanisthebeing,asHeideggerclaims in BeingandTime,forwhom ‘being’ assuchisanissue,thebeingthat possesseslinguisticfreedom,thebeingthatanticipatesitsowndeath,the beingthatis flungintoanintimateencounterwithitsownradicaltemporality,thebeingthat,asHeideggergoesontosayin FCM, ‘exists ’ ratherthan ¹¹Heidegger(1977[1946]:230).
‘merelylives’.¹²However,thismodeofbeingneverthelessincorporatesa brutemateriality: ‘procreation,birth,childhood,maturing,aging[and] death’,Heideggersays,areprocessesthat,atacertainlevel,bindallliving beingstogether,andareonesthatincludethehuman: ‘manexperiences [these]inhimself.’¹³Thehuman,thebeingthat ‘clears ’ and ‘discloses’,that ‘speaks’ bothintoandoutof physis,isafacticalthingcomprising fleshand blood.Thefacticalvehicleofthehuman ’sdisclosivecapacitiesisaclusterof organsthatageandeventuallydecay.Thesenaturalprocesses ‘belongtothe generalprevailingofbeings ’,andthehuman,regardlessofitssingular dispositiontotakeissuewithbeing,isnotexemptfromthem.¹⁴ For Heideggerthisclaimdoesnot,Iwishtoargue,amounttoabasicassumption thatthehuman’sembodiednesscanbecategorisedinthesamewayas animalanatomy.Theclaimisinsteadananti-Cartesianattempttoinclude, incorporate,andimplicatelifeinthequestionofwhatDaseinis.The decisivefocusofHeidegger’sthinkingonanimalsisnotanethological studyofdifferentanimalspecies,butratherametaphysicalinvestigation intotheideaof ‘animality’,onethat,Iwillargue,invitesustoapproachthe questionofourownanimality.Heideggerattendstothequestionofhowwe canthinkaboutanimals,giventhattheyarebeingsthatweencounterfrom ourownhumanperspective,aperspectivethatisnecessarilysubjecttoour ownfacticallimitations,thecoordinatesofour ‘being-in-the-world’ . Heidegger’sabyssbetweenthehumanandtheanimal,whichIwilladdress inthisbook,arisesasaresultofthislineofquestioning.
ThoughHeidegger’sdiscussionofhisthesesconcerningthehumanas world-formingandtheanimalasworld-poorisadistinctivefeatureof FCM, particularlywhenitcomestohisdetailedontic–scientificanalysis,the contentofthethesescanbetracedelsewhereinhisworks.Thethesesare anticipatedduringthe1920sand,inasense,radicalisedinlaterpublications. Inhis1924lecturecourseonAristotleweseethebeginningsofaconception ofthehumanas ‘world-forming’ byvirtueofitscapacityto ‘makebeings manifest’,todiscern ‘thebeneficialandtheharmful’,viaitscapacitytospeak the logos,andtoconstruct ‘householdand polis’.¹⁵ However,Heidegger seemsfarmoreinclinedinthisearlierworktobringtheanimalintoa closeproximitytothehuman.Thereisevidenceinthistextofaconcernfor lifeandanimalitythatplacesthehumanandtheanimalmoreassuredlyon whatappearstobeanontological,notjustanonticalcontinuum.Earlyonin ¹²Heidegger(1995[1929–30]:§50,p.210).¹³Ibid.,§8a),p.26.¹⁴ Ibid. ¹⁵ Heidegger(2009[1924]:§9a),p.33).
thelecturecourseHeideggerendorsestheoriginalGreekinterpretationof thehumanas zōonlogonechon,which,unlikeitsmoresuperficial Latinisation animalrationale,seesthehuman ‘notonlyphilosophically butinconcreteliving’.¹⁶ The ‘concreteliving’ ofthehuman,itsfactical ‘animateness’,isanexplicitconcerninthisearlyphaseofHeidegger’ s thought.Storeynotesthat,priorto BeingandTime,thequestionof ‘animality’ forHeideggerwasmoreaquestionof ‘thatwhichanimates’,theselfmovementoflivingbeings,whichincludesDasein,andwhichprefigures Heidegger’sconceptionofDasein ’severydaybeing-in-the-world:
Inseizingonthepeculiarmovementofprereflectivefacticallife,Heidegger believedhewasuncoveringastratumofbeinglongneglectedbythe traditionthathad firstbeenworkedoverbyAristotle,andhiscreative appropriationofthisstratumwouldleadtohisfamedconceptionofbeingin-the-world,whichwasdevelopedincloseconcertwithconsiderationsof lifeandanimality.¹⁷
Heideggerthusascribesmoretotheanimalinthisearlyworkthanin FCM andbeyond.Heevensuggests,atcertainpoints,thatplantspossessadegree ofopennesstoworld,albeitofahighlyrestrictedkind.¹⁸ Theseontologically moregenerousstatementsseemsurprisingfromtheperspectiveof FCM’ s insistenceonanimalworld-poverty:
Alivingthingisnotsimplyathand[vorhanden],butisinaworldinthatit hasitsworld.Ananimalisnotsimplymovingdowntheroad,pushed alongbysomemechanism.Itisintheworldinthesenseofhavingit.¹⁹
And,alittlelater,weseethesuggestionofafurtherkinshipwithanimals:
Animalsandhumansarenotathandnexttooneanother,butarewithone another,and(inthecaseofhumans)theyexpressthemselvesreciprocally. Self-expressingasspeakingabout...isthe basicmodeofthebeingoflife, namely,ofbeing-in-a-world.²⁰
¹⁶ Ibid.,§5b),p.14.¹⁷ Storey(2015:38).
¹⁸ Heidegger(1995[1925–6]:§16,p.181;2009[1924]:§19, β,p.160).
¹⁹ Heidegger(2009[1924]:§5a),p.14).²⁰ Ibid.,§6,p.16.
‘Vocalannouncing’,Heideggersays,isameansbywhichbothhumansand animals ‘indicate ’ what ‘pleases’ andwhat ‘distresses’.While,asCampbell pointsout, logos doesnotsimplyreducetothemakingofvocalisationsin thiscontext,vocalisationsprovideHeideggerwiththe ‘necessarybackgroundforinvestigating λόγος becausesoundisadimensionof λόγος that revealstheoriginalandessentialtogethernessofhumans’.²¹Weseethe ascriptionof Mitsein and ‘indication’ toanimalshere,anascriptionthat, asStoreynotes,isnotrepeatedfrom BeingandTime onwards.²²
Soonafter,in FCM,Heideggerbreakswiththeexclusivelyontological preoccupationsofboththeAristotlelecturesand BeingandTime,andheads intothefarmoreempiricalterritoryofbiology,zoology,andethology,with multiplereflectionsonthebehaviouroflizards,bees,woodpeckers,and microorganisms,andreferencestorecentexperimentsbyWilhelmRoux, HansDriesch,JakobvonUexküll,andothers.Heidegger’sthreetheseson thehuman,theanimal,andthestonearepresentedalongsidea fleetof observationsandexamplesfromthesebiologists.Thisconcernforontic scienceisstriking,and,asMcNeillandWalkernoteintheirTranslators’ Introduction,notrepeatedelsewhereinHeidegger’ scorpus. FCM treats ‘world’,bywhichHeideggermeansthe ‘accessibilityofbeings’,asthe fundamentalmetaphysicalconceptimplicitwithinourcontemporaryway ofdistinguishingbetweenthehumanandlife.Worldispresentedasthe ultimateontologicalbattlegroundconcealedwithinthetraditionaldualisms, definitions,andmodesofcategorisationthatinstituteaseparationbetween thehumanandtheanimal.OneofHeidegger’schiefaimsinthelecture courseistoshowthat,ifwedeconstructthe ‘rationalanimalmodel’,and disassembleCartesiananthropology,wecanobservethatthehuman’ s distinctivefeatures language,sociality,being-towards-death arebest understoodasfeaturesofabeingthat ‘has’ world,abeingforwhomworld is ‘accessible’.Thecharacteristictraitsoftheanimal captivationbyenvironmentalstimuli,acutesenses,alimited fieldofaction arefeaturesofa beingthathasarestrictedor ‘ poor ’ world,abeingthatcannotaccessworld inthewaythatthehumanaccessesworld.
Inthewakeof FCM,thereferencestotheanimalinHeidegger’ s Gesamtausgabe becomesparserandmoreunyielding.Claimsinwhichhe explicitlydenieswhathenowseesasconstitutivelyhumantraitstothe animal includingworldhood,language,anddeath aredispersedacross
²¹Campbell(2012:251).²²Storey(2015:88).
hisworks.In BeingandTruth,alecturecoursedeliveredin1933–4during Heidegger’stenureasrectoroftheUniversityofFreiburg,heclaimsthe following:
Theanimaldoesnotspeakbecauseitcannotspeak.Anditcannotbecause itdoesnotneedtospeak.Itdoesnotneedtospeakbecauseitdoesnothave to.Itdoesnothavetobecauseitdoesnot finditselfin theurgentneed to speak.Itdoesnotstandinsuchaneedbecauseitisnot compelledbyneed. Itisnotcompelledbecauseitis closedofftotheassailingpowers. Which powers?The superiorpowerofBeing!²³
Theseclaimsarenotrichlyempiricallyadornedlikethoseof FCM. Heideggerpresentsthemwithoutanycorresponding ‘data’ fromtheworld oftheoreticalbiology.Inthispassageheseemsfarmoreintransigentregardingtheontologicalstatusofanimalthantheearlydiscussionof ‘animateness ’,indication,andvocalannouncinganalysedinhis1924Aristotle lectures,whereweseefarlessofanattempttosecureanontological hierarchy.ElsewhereinthetextHeideggerrestatesthe findingsofhis comparativeanalysisin FCM inemphaticterms,indicatingthat,though heinvokestheconceptofthehuman’sdominationmoreexplicitlyhere,the essenceofhisapproachtoanimalityhasnotchanged:
The animal isconfinedwithinitselfandatthesametimebenumbed.The essenceoftheorganismispreciselytobeconnectedtoanenvironment,but tobebenumbedinthisconnectedness.
With man,thisconnectiontotheenvironmentis cleared.Manunderstandstheenvironment as environment;heistherebyableto master itand form it.²⁴
Shortlyafter,in IntroductiontoMetaphysics (1935),Heideggercouches thingsinevenmoreextremevocabulary,baldlyassertingthat,unlikethe human,theanimal ‘hasnoworld[Welt],noranyenvironment[Umwelt]’.²⁵ Andyet,aroundthesametimeheclaimsin OntheOriginoftheWorkof Art that,though ‘plantsandanimalshavenoworld’,theydobelongto ‘the hiddenthrongofanenvironmentintowhichtheyhavebeenput’.²⁶ TheontologicalandonticalgiftsthatHeideggeriswillingtobestowonthe ²³Heidegger(2001[1933–4]:§5a),p.80).²⁴ Ibid.,§22c),p.137. ²⁵ Heidegger(2000[1935]:49–50).²⁶ Heidegger(2002[1935–6]:23).
animalremainambiguous,theyaregrantedinsomeplacesandtakenaway inothers,butitisclearthattheconceptofthesingularityofthehumanis alwayspreserved.
Almostadecadelater,inhislecturesonParmenides,weseefurther evidenceofthisefforttoretaintheideaofanontologicalspecialnessthat cannotbecapturedandarticulatedbyanthropologicalapproaches(whether ‘philosophical’ or ‘scientific–biological’):
Manhimselfacts[handelt]throughthehand[Hand];forthehandis, togetherwiththeword,theessentialdistinctionofman.Onlyabeing which,likeman, ‘has’ theword[...]canandmust ‘have’‘thehand’ . Throughthehandoccurbothprayerandmurder,greetingandthanks, oathandsignal,andalsothe ‘work’ ofthehand,the ‘hand-work’,andthe tool.Thehandshakesealsthecovenant.Thehandbringsaboutthe ‘work’ ofdestruction.Thehandexistsashandonlywherethereisdisclosureand concealment.Noanimalhasahand,andahandneveroriginatesfroma paworaclaworatalon.Eventhehandofoneindesperation(itleastofall) isneveratalon,withwhichapersonclutcheswildly.²⁷
Heideggerisexplicithereaboutthedistinctionbetweentheprehensile animalorganandthehandunderstoodaspartoftheoperationof begreifen, conceptualising,theprocessviawhichthehumangainsagripontheworld. Hisclaimsappeartobeindifferentto findingswithintheemergingdisciplineofprimateresearch forexample,Köhler’sinvestigationintothe problem-solvingabilitiesofanthropoidapes.ForHeidegger,evenanape thatstackscratesontopofoneanotherinordertoattainfoodthatisoutof reachdoesnotusehave ‘hands’ inthewaythatthehumanhashands.Its instinctualcapacitytosolveaproblemisnotoftheorderofhuman understanding.
LetteronHumanism (1946),anessayinwhichHeideggerrespondsto twentieth-centuryapproachestosubjectivityembodiedinexistentialism, containssimilarlyforcefulclaimsconcerningthehuman’sseparateness andsuperiorityoveranimality.Heideggerclaimsinthetextthatthetraditionaldeterminationofthehumanasarationalanimal,whichformsthe basisofhumanism,doesnotthinkthehuman’ s humanitas ‘highenough ’.²⁸ Andyet,priortothisstatement,heclaimsthatthehuman–animalrelationis
²⁷ Heidegger(1982[1942]:§5c),p.80).²⁸ Heidegger(1977[1946]:233–4).
‘scarcelyconceivable’ anddoesnotlenditselftorankingsandclassifications ofanykind.²⁹ Whatlooklikedefinitivestatementsconcerningthehuman/ animaldistinctionarethereforeneverentirelyunambiguous.Heidegger dramaticallysuggestsinhis1938lecturecourseonNietzsche’ssecond UntimelyMeditation thatthequestionofthehuman ’srelationtotheanimal isnotan ‘academic’ questionatall,andsocannotproduceaconcise answer.³⁰ Itisnotamatterofhavingknowledgeofacertain field,and increasingthisknowledgeuntilonehasattainedtheanswer,rendering Köhler ’sapeexperimentsentirelyirrelevant.ForHeidegger,itisimpossible foran ‘ answer ’ tocomethroughthoseempiricalchannels:
Supposingachasmseparatesanimalandhumanbeing,thequestion whetherauniversalbiologyor ‘anthropology’ determinestheessenceof thehumanbeing ‘correctly’ or ‘incorrectly’ becomesmeaningless,because theyareunabletodetermineitatall.³¹
Heideggerappearstobesuggestingherethatthe ‘abyss’ isonethatopensup withinourknowledge.Itisonethatopensupinourownthinking;itmarks thelimitationofourcapacitytocomprehendtheideaofcontinuitybetween ourselvesandotherspecies.Weencountertheabyssattheboundariesof scientificthought,anditcannotbebridgedbytheempiricalsciencesbecause theyarealwaysalreadyunabletotakeupthetaskofformulatingthe questionofthehuman ’srelationshiptotherestoflife.Anthropologyand biology,likeallcurrentsofWesternthought,alreadyhaveananswertothe questionofthehuman–animalrelationinmindpriortotheirinvestigations. Fortwomillennia,Heideggersays,
Europeanhumanbeinghas[...]determineditselfasananimal,whichis tosay:haspositedtherealmofanimalityasthefundamentalmeasureof anyessentialdelimitationofbeinghuman[...]animalityispositedasthe genericrealmwithinwhichtheessenceofthehumanbeingisspecified.³²
Wehaveinheritedandbecome ‘fixated’ (festellen )byourownconceptionof ourselvesasrationalanimals,andthisconceptionofthehumanbeingas ‘psychosomatic’ has ‘longbeentaken forgranted’.³³Thenotionthatour organicformisthebrutematerialbasisofthe ‘higher’ orientationsoflogic,
²⁹ Ibid.230³⁰ Heidegger(2016[1938–9]:§9,p.19).³¹Ibid.22. ³²Ibid.20.³³Ibid.
reason,language,andsoonissosedimentedthatonlyphilosophy,the disciplinethateludesandprecedestheboundariesandschemasofother disciplines,iscapableofputtingitinquestion.Butevenasaphilosophical question,theissueofthehuman’skinshiptotheanimalappearsintractable.³⁴ Itisthisideaofintractability,oftheoretical ‘inconceivability’ more thananythingelse,thatseemstoinformHeidegger’sconceptionofanabyss betweenthehumanandtheanimal.
ThereisnodoubtthatHeideggerispresentingastrati ficationofsome kindthroughouthiscorpus,onethat,ifanything,becomesmorerigidashis thinkingdevelops.Butwhatkindofstrati ficationisit? Primafacie itwould seemthatthehuman’sdistinctiveparticipationinBeingestablishesafundamentallyadvantageouspositionwithinnature.ButIwishtoarguethata closerexaminationoftherelativelyfewpassagesinwhichHeideggerdeals withtheanimalatgreatlengthpresentsamoreenigmaticscene.Thereisa senseinwhichtheanimal,withitsmysteriousabsenceofarichworldhood, hasadvantagesofitsown.Thehumanspeaks,questions,anddies.Butthe argumentsinwhichHeideggerproducesthisconceptionofthehumanalso describeitaspronetoa ‘turbulence’ and ‘terror’ thatthebenumbedanimal forgoes.³⁵ Thereis,therefore,somethingmoremysteriousgoingon: Heideggerdeprivestheanimalofhumanattributes,butinthesamebreath healsodeprivesthehumanofanimalattributes.Aclosereadingof FCM revealshowthiscomplextensionbetweenthehumanandtheanimalarises.
ThePhilosophicalProjectof TheFundamentalConcepts ofMetaphysics
TheFundamentalConceptsofMetaphysics,morethananyothertext,can assistusinnavigatingthisperplexity.Thecomparativeexaminationthatthe lecturespresentprovidestheclearestpossiblecompasspointsfor Heidegger’sthinkingonanimals,andthefactthatitsancestrycanbeseen inhisearlyworks,anditsprogenyinhislaterworks,alsoprovidesawindow ontotheseotherphasesofhisthought.Ratherthanattemptingtodojustice toeveryinstancewheretheideaofanimalitycropsupinHeidegger’ s thoughtinasinglepublication,Iwillthereforehave FCM asmykeyfocus,
³⁴ Heidegger(1977[1946]:230).
³⁵ Heidegger(1995[1929–30]:§7,p.21;§6b), β),p.19);seealsoHeidegger(1962[1927]: §§30,39,40).
andinsomecasesIwillusethelecturecourseasanopticforlookingahead andlookingback.ThoughHeideggerappearstoinsistonaseparation betweenthehumanandtheanimalthroughouthislife,thelatertexts, whichcontainthemost ‘hard-line’ versionofthisseparation,alsocontain farlessjustificatorywork.Hisinterestintheanimalappearstowane,andit isonlyreallyusedasacontrastcasewithhumanbeings.Itisin FCM thatthe animalismorethanjustanintriguingpointofcontrast,sobyexamining FCM closelyitwillbepossibletogainadeeperandwiderunderstandingof Heidegger’sviewsonthistopic,andtoilluminatecontextsandareasof analysisthathavethusfargoneunnoticed.
Thecorefocusof FCM’scomparativeanalysisisnotprincipallyto producestatementsabouttheontologyofanimallife,buttoshedlighton themeaningof ‘world’ asafundamentalconceptofmetaphysics.Thisisone ofthemostimportantcontextualpointswhenitcomestointerpretinghis threetheses.Heideggerexploredthephenomenonofworldin Beingand Time,intermsofthewayinwhichweareintheworldinaneverydaysense, ‘proximallyandforthemostpart’.In OntheEssenceofGround,heexaminedworldbyquestioningthehistoryoftheword ‘world’.In FCM, Heideggersayshewillembarkuponanewapproach:hewillexaminethe extenttowhichdifferentkindsofbeingmaybesaidto ‘have’ world.³⁶ This ‘having’,forHeidegger,signifiesacapacityto ‘ access ’ beingsaswhatthey are,toaccessbeings ‘assuch’ and ‘asawhole’,ratherthanapprehendonlya particularsegmentofthem.³⁷ Itseemsuncontroversialtoclaimthatthe humanbeing ‘has’ worldinthissense:itisabletoaccessentitiesandrespond tothemincountlessways.Butwhataboutanimalsornon-living,inert entities?Heideggerclaimsthat,byteasingouttheimplicationsofthetheses, andtherebyestablishingthedegreetowhichthehumanandotherkindsof beinghaveworld,thephenomenonofworldassuchcanbeclarified.³⁸
Heidegger ’scomparativeexaminationofworldin FCM isstagedwithin aninvestigationintothe ‘contemporarysituation’,theparticularjuncturein thehistoryofmetaphysicsthatwehavearrivedat.³⁹ Heideggerprefaceshis discussionofanimalitywiththeclaimthataspectsofourcontemporary epoch,ourcontemporarywayofdoingphilosophy,haveestrangedusfrom themoreprimordialknowledgeembodiedinGreekthought,whichprecededthepresent-daydualisms,schemas,categories,andpreoccupations withsubjectivitythatnowdominate,andwhichthecomparative
³⁶ Heidegger(1995[1929–30]:§42,p.176).³⁷ Ibid.,§68,p.284.
³⁸ Ibid.,§42,pp.177–8.³⁹ Ibid.,§18,p.69.
examinationofthehuman,theanimal,andthestoneaimstoencapsulate. ‘Theenrootednessofphilosophising’,hesaysnearthestartofthelectures, hasnow ‘beenlost’ . ⁴⁰ Contemporaryphilosophisingfocusesonproducing knowledgethatcanbe ‘madeintoausefulresult,somethingforeveryoneto learnandrepeat’ . ⁴¹Thefundamentalconceptsofworld, finitude,and solitudehavebeencoveredover,andhisaiminthelecturesistoshowus howtounearththemfromwithinourcontemporarysituation.
ThoughthisphaseofHeidegger ’sthoughtcomespriortohislaterthematisationoftheonto-destinaldiminishmentofphilosophicalthinking throughtechno-science,hisconcerninthelectureswiththehistorical degenerationofphilosophy,the ‘fate’ ofphilosophicalquestionsasbeing ‘rootless’ , ‘heapedtogetherinsubjectsaccordingtoviewpointsthatcanbe taughtandlearned’,anticipateshislatercritiqueofcalculativethinking,and frameshisanalysesin FCM oftheinstrumentalmetaphysicsimplicitinour understandingofthehuman–animalrelation.Heideggerindicatesthatwe werenotalwaysinthegripofthejournalistic,goal-orientedthinkingofthe contemporaryage,withitspervasiveemphasisoncorrectnessandconcision overdepthandcuriosity.Torecoveramoreprofoundmodeofthinking,he insiststhatwegobacktotheancients,andbegintorecogniseandcomprehendthevariousstagesatwhichtheoriginalunderstandingof ‘genuine’ philosophisingwasdisestablished.⁴²
Heidegger ’scontentionisthatourcontemporarymetaphysical ‘attunement’ presupposesthepositionspresentedinthecomparativeexamination. Ifwelaythesepositionsoutintheformofthree ‘guidingtheses’,wewillgeta clearerperspectiveonthemetaphysicalprinciplesthatwehavecometo appropriateunquestioningly.Thepointofsuchaprojectis,inthe final analysis,essentiallytorevealthefundamentalconceptsofmetaphysicsand thewayinwhichtheyhavebeenconcealedthroughoutthehistoryof philosophy.Heideggerclaimsthatwenowhavea ‘richstockpileofphilosophy’ ,a ‘greatmarketplace’ ofideas,butthismarketplaceisreallythe outcomeofaprocessinwhichphilosophyhasdispersedintomultiple ‘divergentelements ’ thatwemustnowtryto ‘stitchtogether’ . ⁴³Inthe text’sopeningpassagesHeideggersuggeststhat,giventhatphilosophyhas nowbecomethe ‘victimofambiguity ’,weneedtorediscoverthemore primordialGreekmodeofthinkingifwearetowithstandandcomprehend
⁴⁰ Ibid.,§10,p.35. ⁴¹Ibid. ⁴²Ibid. ⁴³Ibid.,§1a),p.2;§10,p.35.
thevertiginousthreatofanihilismlurkingattheedgesofcontemporary philosophising.⁴⁴
Ifphilosophyisthevictimofambiguity,allofourphilosophicalassertions willbeambiguousunlesswecanunderstandtheoriginofthisambiguityand addressitdirectly.Insteadoftryingtoestablisha ‘concretecharacterisation’ thatwillserve ‘foralltime’,weshouldbeginwithpropositionsthatare exploratory,aimedatopeningupaquestionoraproblemfurtherrather thantryingtosolveit.⁴⁵ Ifwearetoavoidsimplyaddingtothephilosophical ‘stockpile’,andproducingmoreconceptualcommoditiesforthemarketplace ofideas,theseexploratorypropositionsmustbemadeinfulllightofwhatever metaphysicalprejudicesandbiasesgriptheage,soweneedtodiscernwhat thesemightbe first.Wemustcometounderstandthe ‘fundamentalattunement’ ofcontemporarymetaphysics,genealogicallytotracethemetaphysical juncturewehavearrivedat,inorderto findourwaybacktoamoreessential perspective.Wecanthenapproachthethesesinthecomparative examination whichrepresentafundamental,antiquatedmethodofclassifyinghumanexistenceincontradistinctiontootherbeings withmorediscernment,andperhapsretrievesomethingphilosophicallyvaluablefromthem.
Themajorityofwhatfollowswillbededicatedtounravellingandclarifyingtheconcepts,metaphysicalschemas,andmassofbiologicalprinciples thatHeideggerpresentsin FCM inrelationtothequestionofanimality. Chapter1willprovideanoverviewofthestandardinterpretationof Heidegger’saccountofanimalityinordertogivethereaderasenseofthe deepdisquietandevendisgustthatitinspiresamongstHeideggercommentators.Chapter2willthenpresentanexegesisoftheneglectedopening passagesofthelecturecourseinwhichHeideggerclari fiestheaimsofhis project.Chapters3and4willproceedchronologicallythroughthelectures andexamineHeidegger’sanalysisinPartOneof FCM ofthe ‘fundamental attunement’ of ‘profoundboredom’,whichheregardsasthecontemporary opticthroughwhichallmetaphysicsoccurs,includingthatofthehuman/ animaldistinction.InChapter5,IwillturntoHeidegger ’sexaminationof lifebyanalysinghisappraisalofearlytwentieth-centurybiology.Chapter6 willlaunchmyowncriticaldialoguewith FCM,focusingonHeidegger’ suse oftheconceptof ‘spirit’.Asspiritisonehalfofthecruciallyimportantlife/ spiritdivide,onewouldassumethatHeideggerwouldpayasmuchattention tospiritashedoestolife,and,inthisvein,analyseanthropologyas
⁴⁴ Ibid. ⁴⁵ Ibid.,§61a),p.260.
thoroughlyashedoesbiology.However,Heideggerrestrictshiscomments concerninganthropologytothefewcursoryremarksinPartOne,inwhich hedenouncesthedisciplineasperhapsadangerousformof Darstellung. ⁴⁶ In theseremarksHeideggerignoresthebodyofwork,spearheadedbyMax Schelerduringthe1920s,knownas ‘philosophicalanthropology’.Iwill arguethat,despitethefactthatHeideggercritiqueswhatheseesasdeep delusionsimplicitinanthropology,thisGermantraditioncontainsinsights thatresonatewithhisownprojectin FCM. Havingputphilosophicalanthropologyontothemetaphysicalmapthat Heideggerdrawsupin FCM,IwillthenreturninChapter7toHeidegger’ s ownperspective,revealinghowheattemptstogetusbackonthetrackofour philosophicaljourneybyretrievingagenuinelyphilosophicalattitudefrom ourcontemporarysituation.Myconclusionwillattempttointerweavethe metaphysicalobservationsof FCM withtheanthropo-biologicalinsights thatHeideggerrejectsinordertoestablishanewapproachtothequestion ofthehuman/animaldistinctionandtheanimalityinus.
Ibid.,§18c),p.77.
