Williams Manual of Hematology, Ninth Edition Marshall A. Lichtman & Kenneth Kaushansky & Josef T. Prchal & Marcel M. Levi & Linda Burns & James Armitage
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Acknowledgements
Tis book has taken a long time to write: some bits of it are older than my children. It includes material, ofen much changed, from earlier published work. I acknowledge permission to reuse elements of the following:
• ‘Love, Poetry, and the Good Life’, Inquiry 53(2010): 565–78
• ‘Pleasure as Self-Discovery’, Ratio 25(2012): 260–76
• ‘Under the Mountain: Basic Training, Individuality, and Comradeship’, Res Publica 19(2013): 67–79
• ‘Mill’s Autobiography as Literature’ in Christopher Macleod & Dale Miller eds, A Companion to Mill (Oxford: Blackwell, 2017), pp. 45–57
• ‘Narrative, Self-Realization, and the Shape of a Life’, Ethical Teory and Moral Practice 21(2018): 371–85
• ‘Philosophical Taxonomies of Well-Being’ in Kathleen T. Galvin ed., Routledge Handbook of Well-Being (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), pp. 76–83
• ‘Rationalism about Autobiography’ in Garry L. Hagberg ed., Narrative and Self-Understanding (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 53–73
I have benefted from the generous attention, comments, and attempts to talk me out of my confusions and strange assertions, of: the organizers and audiences of events in Edinburgh, Hull, Keele, Lancaster, Liverpool, London, Manchester, Oxford, Prague, and San Francisco; the members of the Role Ethics Network run by Alex Barber and Sean Cordell; the participants in a special subject module on a draf at Lancaster University in Michaelmas 2017—Van Bui, Amy Chen, Phil Chandler, Pietro Cibinel, Hilman Leung, James Newman, and Izzy Simmons; my fellow investigators on the Military Lives and Transformative Experiences project, Liz Brewster and Brigit McWade; my current and former colleagues in the Department of Politics, Philosophy, and Religion at
Lancaster—especially Patrick Bishop, Brian Black, Reuven Brandt, Rachel Cooper, Sarah Hitchen, Gavin Hyman, Kim Knott, Kathryn MacKay, Chris Macleod, Neil Manson, Shuruq Naguib, Astrid Nordin, Lyndsey Porter, Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, Alison Stone, Cain Todd, Nick Unwin, and Garrath Williams; draf-readers including Gavin Parnaby; and my good friends Derek Edyvane, Brian Garvey, David Martin, and Ryan Shirlow, who have been wittily arguing with me over pints for years. Tank you all! I have certainly forgotten some commenters, and am sorry for it. I hope they see their efects on me here regardless of my lack of refective grasp of it.
I particularly thank two anonymous reviewers for Oxford University Press, whose generous and thoughtful comments certainly improved the book, even though I equally certainly haven’t managed to answer all of their criticisms.
I am deeply indebted for love, support, and tolerance to my family: my parents Gillian and Stephen, my mother-in-law Sara, my late father-in-law Josef, my sisters Alex and Tabby, my brother-in-law Ed, and my brother- and sister-in-law Dominic and Hannah.
I was diagnosed with a chronic auto-immune illness in 2018, and since then I’ve had a huge amount of much-needed support, for which I’m very grateful. But the person who’s done the most to shoulder the extra burdens, and to put up with my exhaustion, gloom, and periods of uselessness, is my wife Emily. Tank-you my love: I’d be lost without you. I dedicate this book to my wonderful children Hallam and Ursula, with all my love.
1 Introduction
Reasoning with autobiography is a way to self-knowledge. We can learn about ourselves, as human beings and as individuals, by reading, thinking through, and arguing about this distinctive kind of text. Reasoning with Edmund Gosse’s Father and Son is a way of learning about the nature of the good life and the roles that pleasure and s elf-expression can play in it. Reasoning with Siegfried Sassoon’s Memoirs is a way of learning about transformative experience, self-alienation, and therefore the nature of the self.
Tese and other autobiographies address ethical problems of human life. Te ethical is a larger category than the moral, if that means only what we owe to others as a matter of universal rule. Te basic ethical question is Socrates’s question—how should one live?1—and it is surrounded by such interconnected questions as: what am I? Who am I? Why did I do what I did? How did I get here? Did I do the right thing? What is good for me, and what bad? Has my life gone well? What should I become, and how? What does my life mean, if it means anything? Am I the owner of my life, or am I alienated from it? Do I live under my own command, or am I a puppet? Does my life hang together as a whole? What is the real me, and what is disposable or a mere mask? What changes can I survive?
Tese are the traditional topics of moral philosophy—the right, the good—expanded by consideration of the self, personal identity, self-knowledge, practical rationality, autonomy, meaning, and the depths and limits of the frst-personal perspective. I claim that engaging with autobiography can help us here.
1 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (with a commentary on the text by A. W. Moore, London: Routledge, 2005), chapter 1.
Tis book develops and defends that claim, by answering a series of more particular questions. What is an autobiography? How can we learn about ourselves from reading one? On what subjects does autobiography teach? What should we learn about them? In particular, given that autobiographies are narratives, should we learn something about the importance of narrative in human life? Could our storytelling about our own lives make sense of them as wholes, unify them over time, or make them good for us? Could storytelling make the self?
Te book is a continuous argument in seventy-four numbered sections, divided into two parts. Part I works from the autobiographer’s point of view, and asks what she does, what she aims at, and how she achieves her efects. Part II then works from the reader of autobiography’s point of view, and asks what we should learn from autobiography, against various arguments for the centrality of narrative to human life. My overall aim is a critique of narrative and a defence of a self-realization account of the self and its good.
Te autobiographies I read and interpret here are excellent books, and reading them could be revelatory for the right reader—maybe for you. So you could ask: why read this book instead? My reply is that I hope you won’t read this book instead, but as well, as a way into, and reasoned commentary on, a selection of great autobiographies. Tey are ambiguous as well as potentially revelatory, and my work with them disambiguates and examines their various possible lessons. I connect these autobiographical lessons with some equally revelatory work in the very diferent idiom of professional philosophy, in a way which aims to illuminate both. Tese autobiographies don’t simply hand their revelations out: we need to reason with them, and I show how, both in the abstract and in concrete cases. So it is worth reading both, and reading the autobiographies I discuss in this book alongside it.
PART I
2 Routemap 1
Autobiography
In Part I, I investigate a wide range of autobiographies, alongside work on the history and literary criticism of autobiography, on narrative, and on the philosophies of the self and of the good life. I aim to answer my frst three questions: what is an autobiography? How can we learn about ourselves from reading one? About what subjects does autobiography teach?
In pursuit of those answers, I develop an account of autobiography as paradigmatically a narrative artefact in a genre defned by its form: particular diachronic compositional self-refection. I develop an account of narrative as paradigmatically a generic telling of a connected temporal sequence of particular actions taken by, and particular events which happen to, agents. I defend rationalism about autobiography, the view that autobiography is in itself a distinctive and valuable form of ethical reasoning, and not merely involved in reasoning of other, more familiar kinds. I distinguish two important purposes of autobiography, self-investigation and self-presentation. I identify fve kinds of self-knowledge at which autobiographical self-investigation typically aims—explanation, justifcation, self-enjoyment, selfood, and good life—and argue that meaning is not a distinct sixth kind. I then focus on my main concerns, selfood and good life: I set out the wide range of existing accounts, taxonomies, and tasks for each, and give an initial characterization of the self-realization account of the self and its good which I defend in Part II. All of the italicized terms in this paragraph will be made clearer as we go on.
By the end of Part I, we will have a clearer understanding of what autobiographies are, what they can do, and how they can do it. In Part II, I put that understanding to work to critique narrative and to defend self-realization in human life.
Our frst question is: what is an autobiography? I build towards an answer by taking up various perspectives on autobiographical thinking and texts.
To begin, an autobiography is a recollection of the past, and in particular of the past life of its author. Tat author’s biological memory is one method of recollection, but not the only one. No one remembers all of her own past life or remembers with total accuracy, so autobiographers also make use of such further and corrective sources as their own contemporary diaries, ofcial paperwork like birth certifcates and hospital records, maps, photographs, and other people’s recollections.
Human memory is of three main kinds:
Procedural memory is of how to do things: I remember = know how to ride a bike, construct proofs in propositional logic, make pasta puttanesca.
Semantic memory is knowledge of propositions: I remember = know that Ambleside is at the north end of Lake Windermere, the atomic number of carbon is 12, my daughter’s birthday is in August.
Autonoetic memory (also known as episodic, experiential, or direct memory) is memory of past experiences: I remember = can, more or less vividly, present to myself lighting the oven to bake bread this morning, holding my son for the frst time, falling of a high ivy-covered wall as a child.
Tis third kind of remembering, recollection, is most distinctively relevant to autobiography. It can be further divided into feld memories, which are presented from the frst-personal point of view—I remember looking down at my minutes-old son sleeping on my chest—and observer memories, which present a third-personal perspective on
oneself—I seem to see, from a viewpoint in the garden below the wall, a small boy, myself, tripping and falling.
Memory is important for autobiographical recollection, but it is also unreliable. Particular rememberings are not straightforwardly replayings of stored representations: they are constructed on the fy to meet current demands, using the same psychological mechanisms as imagining. Autonoetic observer memories in particular make this clear, since they couldn’t be accurate replayings of any experience one had, even though they sometimes accurately report some proposition: that I fell of a high ivy-covered wall as a child, if that is actually the case. Te phenomenal sense of remembering, as opposed to imagining, some experience is a typically non-conscious judgement based on various kinds of evidence, not an intrinsic badge of authenticity. Accurate memories aren’t internally marked as such, but this doesn’t mean that there is no distinction between accurate and inaccurate memories: it means that we can’t immediately or always tell which is which.2
2 Tis and the previous paragraph draw on Richard P. Bentall, Madness Explained: Psychosis and Human Nature (London: Penguin, 2003); Charles Fernyhough, Pieces of Light: Te New Science of Memory (London: Profle, 2012); Kourken Michaelian & John Sutton, ‘Memory’ in Edward N. Zalta ed., Te Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), https:// plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/memory/.
4
Autobiography Is Refection on Experience
Recollection attempts to recover past experience. An autobiography is refection on that past experience for purposes of self-investigation and self-presentation.
‘Lived experience is the key to self-understanding’,3 says Havi Carel. I suggest that this is true but incomplete. Experience is opaque, confused, and misleading for the experiencer. Understanding one’s own experience is a difcult achievement, not automatic or transparent or incorrigible. Self-knowledge from experience is doubly difcult. Experience is necessary, but must be supplemented, corrected, and confronted with three forms of refection: frst-person refection on experience through autobiographical distance on oneself; abstract refection on experience as exemplifying more general and systematic problems and features; third-personal comparison between diferent experiences and from diferent perspectives.
Te frst of these forms of refection is the province of the experiencer. Te second is too, but is also available to others thinking about her experience. Te third is only available from a third-person perspective, although we can reach such a perspective on phases of our own lives
3 Havi Carel, Illness: Te Cry of the Flesh (revised edn, London: Acumen, 2013), p. 109. I will use ‘experience’ rather than ‘lived experience’, taking it that to experience something is to live through it, and avoiding as far as possible the technical weight of the latter term in disciplines and literatures including feminist epistemology and philosophy of science, phenomenology, and patient and disability activism. See further Elizabeth Anderson, ‘Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science’ in Edward N. Zalta ed., Te Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/feminismepistemology/; David Woodruf Smith, ‘Phenomenology’ in Edward N. Zalta ed., Te Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ win2016/entries/phenomenology/; James I. Charlton, Nothing About Us Without Us: Disability Oppression and Empowerment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
(I will have much more to say about this and other doublings and disunities of self later).
Experience, then, is not the royal road to self-understanding. It’s right to take experience seriously, especially when it teaches things which are unavailable except by experience, and especially when people report experiences of oppression, domination, and other injustice. But frst-personal and third-personal refection on experience is also needed, and is ofered by autobiography.
Tese frst two perspectives on autobiography, that it is recollection of and refection on experience, apply broadly to all autobiographical thinking, from idle musing, through impromptu reminiscence with friends, to unfnished sketches on old hard drives, all the way to fnished, published texts. But it’s the last of these that I’m most interested in here, and I now focus on those autobiographical texts.
5
Autobiography Is Artefactual
An autobiography is not raw data. It’s not a transparent window into an autobiographer’s life, but a work or a performance or a made thing: art, craf, an artefact. Tat autobiographies are artefacts has four signifcant consequences.
First, artefacts are made to do something: an autobiography is an autobiographer’s device by which she intends to bring something about. Common aims of autobiographies include apologetics, self-knowledge, self-assessment, examination of conscience, public self-presentation or self-advertisement, inspiration or warning to readers, debt-paying, score-settling, coming clean, owning up, self-defence against biographers, and making money. Tese aims can be combined, sometimes in ways which mutually complicate them: Robert Graves’s Goodbye to All Tat is at once a settling of personal accounts with an English childhood leading to terrible experience in the First World War; a performance of a character in a series of melodramatic and bitterly comic skits; and a consciously manipulative attempt to write a bestseller.4
Second, like any artefact, an autobiography both reveals and conceals its maker.5 Te autobiographer, like any artist, is in her work but does not reveal all of herself in it. Some of herself comes through regardless of intention, like a fngerprint in pottery. Some is deliberately deployed. Some is deliberately hidden, or inaccessible, or unspeakable: Rudyard
4 Robert Graves, Goodbye to All Tat (revised edn, London: Cassell, 1957). See further Paul Fussell, Te Great War and Modern Memory (25th anniversary edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chapter 6; Miranda Seymour, Robert Graves: Life on the Edge (London: Simon and Schuster, 1995).
5 Mary Evans, in Missing Persons: Te Impossibility of Auto/Biography (London: Routledge, 1999), makes much of this incompleteness of autobiography, but it’s hard to see why. Evans presents it as a revelation that life-writing can’t ofer ‘absolute and inclusive truth’ (p. 2) about its subjects, but ofers little evidence that anyone ever thought it might. Tis is, of course, a classic sceptical move: assert an impossible standard, and then triumphantly announce that nothing meets it.
Kipling’s autobiography Something of Myself might more accurately have been titled Hardly Anything of Myself.6 Some is deliberately changed for artistic purposes: in Siegfried Sassoon’s autobiographical trilogy, his alter ego George Sherston, unlike Sassoon himself, is an orphan.7 Te autobiographical artefact is an attempt to deal artfully or crafily with material that has its own demands and resistances.
Tird, to take an autobiography as an artefact is to recognize it as made in and addressed to a particular context, with inherited and public tools and techniques. Makers have particular languages and audiences which partly constitute what they do in and by making. But some makers also transform their tools and remake their audiences: late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century autobiographers like Edmund Gosse recast the inherited tools and forms of confessional and conversion narratives into their own distinctive deconversions.8
Te contexts of autobiographies are productive and institutional as well as communicative. For us, autobiography is a kind of commodity, a made thing brought to various mass and literary markets by publishing companies, and therefore sustained by a complex of international capitalist rules, processes, and hierarchies. An autobiography is a thing we can buy and sell, and selling autobiographies is big business.9
Fourth, the audience at which an artefact is aimed is not passive in response to it. Audiences remake what they are given for their own purposes, which may be far from authors’ intentions, especially when an audience is one they never imagined: what might the fourth-century
6 ‘Te frst reaction to Kipling’s autobiography was summed up by a wit among the reviewers, who said that it was not in fact Something of Myself but Hardly Anything of Myself’— Tomas Pinney, introduction to Rudyard Kipling, Something of Myself and Other Autobiographical Writings ed. Tomas Pinney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. vii–xxxv, p. vii.
7 Siegfried Sassoon, Te Complete Memoirs of George Sherston (London: Faber and Faber, 1937).
8 Edmund Gosse, Father and Son ed. Peter Abbs (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983). See further John D. Barbour, Versions of Deconversion: Autobiography and the Loss of Faith (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994), chapter 4; Linda H. Peterson, Victorian Autobiography: Te Tradition of Self-Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).
9 Although apparently not as big as it once was. According to https://www.theguardian. com/news/datablog/2013/feb/07/biographies-autobiography-nielsen-2001, sales of hard copy, new autobiographies (so not including e-books or second-hand books) have precipitously declined over this century. Some autobiographies—of Peter Kay, Sharon Osborne, Cheryl Cole, Barack Obama, Dave Pelzer—are still bestsellers, though.
Roman North African Augustine make of our responses to his Confessions? Audiences’ common uses of autobiographies include gossip, discovery of secrets, moral uplif, schadenfreude, supporting a moralistic sense of superiority or inferiority, looking for clues to the interpretation of other work by the autobiographer, looking for a hero to emulate, understanding another human being, evaluating another human being’s life and actions, looking for ways to express their own as-yet-unspoken experiences, exploring exemplary ways of being human, and aiding their own pursuit of self-knowledge.
6
Autobiography Is a Genre
An autobiography is an artefact in the autobiographical genre, a token of a generic type. A genre, as I use the term here, is a tradition consisting of a canon of exemplary works and their makers, a pattern of development—or at least a pattern of change—over time, and a shared self-consciousness.
Science fction, for example, is a literary genre. Its canon includes work by Arthur C. Clarke, Larry Niven, Ursula Le Guin, and Octavia Butler. Its development includes a prehistory in Verne and Wells, a ‘golden age’ in pulp magazines and mass-market paperbacks, the New Wave, and the cyberpunk movement.10 Tese changes are each responses to and repurposings of what went before—cyberpunk is a reaction to science fction’s past, not an ex nihilo creation, for example. Science fction’s self-consciousness is displayed in the self-identifying, identity-presenting, and identity-forming activity of its writer and fan culture; in its critical meta-literature in journals such as Foundation and blogs such as Making Light; and in its shared vocabulary for describing common technical and artistic problems.11 Tat a genre exists does not require that its boundaries be precise: Science fction has unambiguous core representatives—Ringworld—but also boundary cases and undecidables— Nineteen Eighty-Four.12
10 Brian Aldiss & David Wingrove, Trillion Year Spree: Te History of Science Fiction (New York: Atheneum, 1986); Adam Roberts, Te History of Science Fiction (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
11 Making Light, http://nielsenhayden.com/makinglight/. One widely used account of SF-specifc critical vocabulary is Bruce Sterling & Lewis Shiner, ‘Te Turkey City Lexicon—APrimerforSFWorkshops’,https://www.sfwa.org/2009/06/turkey-city-lexicon-a-primerfor-sf-workshops/.
12 Larry Niven, Ringworld (New York: Ballantine Books, 1970); George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (London: Penguin, 2009).
Rapidly forgotten Booker Prize winners, on the other hand, is not a genre, even though it is a specifable class of books and authors.
Following the same schema, the autobiographical canon includes Augustine’s Confessions, Margery Kempe’s Te Book of Margery Kempe, Benvenuto Cellini’s My Life, John Bunyan’s Grace Abounding, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Confessions, William Wordsworth’s Te Prelude, John Stuart Mill’s Autobiography, Frederick Douglass’s Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, John Henry Newman’s Apologia pro Vita Sua, Vera Brittain’s Testament of Youth, T. E. Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Gertrude Stein’s Te Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, Gerald Durrell’s My Family and Other Animals, and Maya Angelou’s I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings.13 (I intend this as a miscellaneous indicative sample, not as a complete list—which would be impossible in practice—and not as a value judgement.)
Te genre’s moments of development or change include Augustine’s paradigmatic conversion narrative; the subjective turn usually associated with Rousseau (but, according to Estelle Jelinek, actually rooted in seventeenth-century women’s autobiographies, which were far more personal and self-analytic than the records of public deeds written by men of the period14); the spiritual-political slave narratives of
13 Augustine, Confessions trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Margery Kempe, Te Book of Margery Kempe trans. Barry Windeatt (revised edn, London: Penguin, 1994); Benvenuto Cellini, My Life trans. Julia Conway Bondanella & Peter Bondanella (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); John Bunyan, Grace Abounding: And Other Spiritual Autobiographies ed. John Stachniewski with Anita Pacheco (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Confessions trans. Angela Scholar ed. Patrick Coleman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); William Wordsworth, Te Prelude: Te Four Texts (1798, 1799, 1805, 1850) ed. Jonathan Wordsworth (London: Penguin, 1995); John Stuart Mill, ‘Autobiography’ in John M. Robson & Jack Stillinger eds, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, volume I: Autobiography and Literary Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press/London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 1–290; Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave: Written by Himself ed. Houston A. Baker Jr (London: Penguin, 1986); John Henry Newman, Apologia pro Vita Sua ed. Ian Ker (London: Penguin, 1994); Vera Brittain, Testament of Youth: An Autobiographical Study of the Years 1900–1925 (London: Virago, 1978); T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London: Penguin, 2000); Gertrude Stein, Te Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas (London: Penguin, 1966); Gerald Durrell, My Family and Other Animals (London: Penguin, 1959); Maya Angelou, I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings (London: Virago, 1984).
14 Estelle C. Jelinek, Te Tradition of Women’s Autobiography: From Antiquity to the Present (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1986), chapter 4.
nineteenth-century America;15 and the deconversion narratives I have already mentioned.
Te autobiographical genre’s self-consciousness appears in several ways. First, autobiographers are typically aware, sometimes mockingly aware, of the genre that they are working in. In the opening paragraphs of Goodbye to All Tat Graves pokes fun at generic tropes: ‘As a proof of my readiness to accept autobiographical conventions, let me at once record my two earliest memories.’16
Second, there are self-identifed historians and histories of the genre in part or whole.17
Tird, there is explicit disagreement about defnitions, characterizations, inclusions, and exclusions. According to Roy Pascal, the autobiographical form is distinguished by the author taking up a self-separated double perspective as both subject and object of attention. Texts like diaries and chronicles therefore fail to be fully autobiographical because ‘the author fails to distance himself from himself.’18 In Philippe Lejeune’s widely quoted—and almost equally widely attacked—defnition, autobiography is ‘retrospective prose narrative written by a real person concerning his own existence, where the focus is his individual life, in particular the story of his personality’.19 For Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, autobiography is ‘a historically situated practice of self-representation’:20
15 Charles T. Davis & Henry Louis Gates Jr eds, Te Slave’s Narrative (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
16 Graves, Goodbye to All Tat, p. 9.
17 Apart from the historical texts already noted, examples include: Diana Bjorklund, Interpreting the Self: Two Hundred Years of American Autobiography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); A. O. J. Cockshut, Te Art of Autobiography in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Elizabeth De Mijolla, Autobiographical Quests: Augustine, Montaigne, Rousseau, and Wordsworth (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994); William C. Spengemann, Te Forms of Autobiography: Episodes in the History of a Literary Genre (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); James Treadwell, Autobiographical Writing and British Literature, 1783–1834 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Ben Yagoda, Memoir: A History (New York: Penguin, 2009).
18 Roy Pascal, Design and Truth in Autobiography (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 24. On this kind of doubling, see further Shelley Duval and Robert A. Wicklund, A Teory of Objective Self Awareness (New York: Academic Press, 1972).
19 Philippe Lejeune, On Autobiography ed. Paul John Eakin, trans. Katherine Leary (Minneapolis: University of Minesota Press, 1989), p. 4.
20 Sidonie Smith & Julia Watson, Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting Life Narratives (Minneapolis: University of Minesota Press, 2001), p. 14.