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CHARLESTRAVIS
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Preface
Attheturnofthemillenniumabookofmineappeared.Aswiththepresentone,it hadtakenabouttenyearstoprepare.Atjustaboutthetimepost-partumdepressionwasdue,Iread(tardily)acollectionofbeautifulessaysbyCoraDiamond, mostlyonFregeandWittgenstein(TheRealisticSpirit (1991)).NotthatIagreed, orsomuchasdisagreed,withanyparticularpointshemade.Whatshedidshow methough,is first,somethingaclosereadingofatextmaybe;andsecond,that IwouldhavetodoagooddealofsuchclosereadingbeforeIwasinaposition eithertoagreeordisagreewithher.Inthat2000bookIusedFregeasafoil againstwhichtopresentapictureof ‘propositionalattitudes’ owingmuchto Wittgenstein.Myviewofpropositionalattitudeshasnotchanged so muchsince then.MyviewofFregehas.Inowseehimasmuchclosertopost-1929 Wittgenstein,oratleastasbuildingafoundationforthat,muchfartherfrom pre-1929WittgensteinandfromRussell.Thisaside,Ithinkheisaphilosopherof theabsolutelyhighestorderandperhapsthemostimportantoneforphilosophy today thoughnotforthosemostoftencitedreasonsforthinkinghimimportant. InthepresentbookIattempttobringoutothers.
Tosomereaders,thephilosopherwhoappearshereasprincipalprotagonist maythusseemonlyhomonymously ‘Frege’.Whyshouldthisbe?IfIamright, theninpart,perhaps paradoxicallyenough preciselybecauseoftheclarityand cogencyofhisprose.Itisaneasystepfrom ‘IwishI’dsaidthat’ to ‘Whata felicitouswayofsayingwhatIthoughtallalong.’ Such,ofcourse,wouldproduce differentreadingsindifferentphilosopherssoimpressed.Iamwellawarethat Iamopentoappearingtosuccumbtojustthismyself.AsperhapsIhave.Bethat asitmay,IcanonlyprotestthatmostofwhatappearshereiswhatIdidnotthink (notjustwhatIdidnotthinkFregethought)beforeCoraDiamondprovokedme toreadhimmoreclosely.
Herearethreefundamentalideasguidingthepresentreading.First,Frege’ s topicwasnotlanguage.Hewasnotaphilosopheroflanguage,andadvancesno theorythereof.Such,infact,isaconsequenceofthesecondidea:thatthe distinctionFregedrawsbetween Wahrsein (being true)and Fürwahrhalten (holdingtrue)isofthe firstimportance,notonlyforallelsehedoes,butforphilosophy ingeneral.Itisaperspectivefromwhichonecanlookat thinking,atathinker’ s standingashedoesinthoughttowardsthewaythingsare,freeoftheideathat somehow what itisthethinkerthinksneedstobeconstructedoutofhowhe anywayis.Ofcourse,bythisidealanguagefallsclearlyonthesideof Fürwahrhalten,sinceitsbusinessisthought-expression,oneformofholding
true. Some wordsmaybetrue,butifso,theyarenotthetruththerethusis.And onemustbecarefulastojust what wordsmightbetrue,andinwhatsense.The thirdideaisofthecrucialimportanceofthedistinction(whendrawnright) betweenwhatrepresents(somethingassomething)andthatwhichisthusrepresented(assomething).Thismatchesupwithanotherdistinctionbetweenwhatis, orpossessesgenerality,byjustwhichitisthethingitis,andwhatisdevoidof generality.Drawingeachdistinctionrightandhookingthemuprightisnosimple matter,andwilloccupymuchofthebook.
Timesbeingwhattheyare,Ithinkitisthat firstideathatislikelytojarmost. Whywouldit if itiscorrect?Fromthestandpointofonewhosotakesit,Iwould chalkmuchofthisuptothetemperofthetimes,andthen(asabove)tohoweasy FregemakesitforaphilosophertoseehimselfinFrege,ratherthantochange himselfbecauseofwhathe findsthere.It may alsobethatFregehimselfcontributes tothisintwoways.First,atleastin1893andthereabouts,Fregehasmotivetoview Begriffsschrift asalanguage(evenifone,ashenotes,withhighlylimitedexpressive power).Inbrief,suchfacilitateshismainprojectofderivingarithmeticfromlogic: tospeakonlyabitloosely,onecanjustderivethis in logic(thatis,atheorywhich, onthisreading,Fregestatesin Begriffsschrift).IdonotdenythatFregedoesthink suchathing atleastfrom1893andforsomeconsiderabletimethereafter.Second, Fregesometimes models issuesinhischosentopic,thepurebusinessofbeingtrue, onphenomenainvolvingwords forthemostpart nearly,butperhapsnotquiteall thewhilemindfulofthegulfhewarnsofbetweentheonetopicandtheother.This tendstobeprominentattheweakestpointsinhisstory,notably,thenotions function, Bedeutung,andtheirrelationtothenotion(ornotions) concept. But,inthefreedomofaPreface,Iwillventureawordonthetemperofthe times.Itseemsthatsoonaftertheturnofthelastcentury,innumerousplacesand innumerous fields,notablydesign,aparamountconcerncametobetoridwhat wasproducedofanyidledecoration,ormoregenerallyofanythingmerelyidle, nottothepoint.AsAdolfLoosputitin1898(speakingoffurnituredesign):
The firstfundamentalconditionforanobjecttomakeaclaimtothispredicate [beauty]isthatitdoesnotoffendagainst fitnessforpurpose.Apracticalobject onitsowndoesnotyetattaintobeauty....Thoseold figuresofthecinquecento haveexpressedthepointwithprecision.Theysaid:Anobjectisbeautifulwhichis soperfectthatonecanneitherremovesomethingfromitnoraddsomethingtoit buttoitsdetriment.(1898/2008:27)
Thebeautyofapracticalobjectliessolelyinthefullnessandelegancewithwhich itservesitspurpose.
Howmightthis cinquecento ideaapplytophilosophy?Istartfromsomething nearlyallphilosopherswouldagreeto:thatmost,oratleastaverygreatdeal,of thephilosophyproducedbymostphilosophersis,touseaCantoneseexpression,
moresalivathantea.Disagreementonlyarisesherewhenitcomestonaming names.So,inaspiritakintoLoos,thenew(nowthelast)centurywastobeoneof purgingsalivafromthesubject,of findingorconstructing,antisalivants.Suchaim inforce,itismorethannaturaltoconcernoneselfwithlanguage.AsAustinputit:
Wordsareourtools,and,asaminimum,weshouldusecleantools:weshould knowwhatwemeanandwhatwedonot.(1956/1979:181)
Butsuchconcernmighttakeeitheroftwoforms.Oneis,asWittgensteinsuggests, ceaselesslytoaskaphilosopher, ‘Whatdoyoumean?’,especiallysalubriouswhen thatphilosopherisoneself.Itisthenuptothephilosopheractuallytoanswerthe question,ortorealizethathecannot.Anotherapproach,though,is,insearchfor theultimateantisalivant,totreatlanguageitselfasphilosophy’scoretopic,thusto constructatheoryoflanguage. Some philosophershaveconstrued ‘theory’ asa reductionofsomenotion,centrally ‘meaning’,tosomethingelse.Iwillnotdigress onthetopicofhowmuchsalivatinghasgoneintothatenterprise.Onanother notion theory,theaimwouldbetoidentify,inpreciseterms,exactlywhatthe semanticsofalanguage(makethatanaturallanguageifyoulike)wouldlooklike. Here,likeanyplausiblegenerativetheory,e.g.,asyntaxofalanguage,onemight expectthetheorytobeginwithsome finitevocabulary,notnecessarilyonly,but including,thatofthelanguagethetheoryisof,andthensupplementthiswitha finitenumberofrecursiverulesbywhichthesemanticsofanycomplexexpression isgeneratedfromthevocabulary.Areasonableexpectationhereisthatwithinthat whichthetheorygeneratesonecan findallthelogicalformsasentence,orproper partthereof,mighttake.So,thethoughtwouldbe,anisolablepartofthetheory wouldbeatheoryoflogicalforms.And,thefurtherthoughtwouldbe,Frege showsus,inhis Begriffsschrift (andprescindingfromacertainamountof ‘noise’ containedintheformofhisstatementofthetheory)justwhatsuchwouldbe.
ThusFrege’scontributiontotheultimateantisalivant,andthisviahis(supposed)concernwithlanguage.WithoutbringingFregeintothestory,theidea herehasatleastthismuchright:Suppose(reasonably)thata(meaningful) declarativesentence(plausiblyregardedasthecentralcase)speaksofaway thereisforthings(amass)tobe.(Ontheideaofsuchamassanditsrelationto athoughtseePartIofthetext.)Forthe sentence tobeconstructedbythetheory outofitssubsentencesisforthatway-to-betobepresentedasdecomposedina particularway(againseePartI).Ifitisa meaningful sentence,suchadecompositionwould,necessarily,beintoalogicalform(oritscorrelateforwaysforthings (themass)tobe,thatis,aformthere is forathoughttotake).NowaddingFregeto themix,itcertainlyistruethatheshowedus,anyway,nearenough,whatsuch forms,oranywayonetheoryofsuchforms,wouldbe.
Thequestionis,assumingthismuch,justhowmuchofanantisalivantwethus haveinhand.Thetheoryoflanguageincorporates,orisconstrainedby,whata
theoryoflogicalforms(i.e.,alogic)would fix.Buttoseehowmuchthatis,weneed tolookatwhatanapplicationoflogictosomesetofthoughts,e.g,thoseoccurring inacertaindiscourse(e.g,aworkofphilosophy)wouldinvolve. If,asFrege thought,arithmeticislogic,thenarithmeticshouldbeexcludedfromthedomain ofapplicationsontherelevantnotionhere.So,too,foranyotherbranchof mathematicswhichjustislogic.Ifarithmeticislogic,thentogettoanarithmetical truthonedoesnot apply logic,onejustdoessome.One derives arithmeticaltruths eitherin,oratleastfrom,logicitself.Itisadifferentmatterifthediscoursein questionis,say,atomeonmammiferousacquaticbeasts.Herewhatweneedtodo is, first,determinewhichpartsofthediscourseareexpressionsofthought,andhow thesethoughtsrelatetoeachother,e.g,bythedistributionofagivenpredicate,or theirrelationtoagivenobject.Inlightofallthis,wethenassigneachthoughta logicalform(thatis,forpurposesoftheapplication,decomposeitinoneofthe wayssuchthoughtisdecomposable).Nowweareprimedforlogictoapply.All this,though,is not workatheoryofthe language ofthetomewilldoforus.
Howlittleatheoryofalanguagewoulddotowardspurging,orstaunching, salivainoursubjectisevidentifonereflectsonDescartes’ account(1637/2001)of thenatureofarationalbeing.Oneofhisdemandsonsuchathinkeristhatitbe capableofconversingendlesslyandcoherently.Thatis,anyrationalbeingis capableofrespondingtoindefinitelymanyquestions,ifnotknowledgeably,with atleastwhatareanswers,orwherenot,withwhatarerecognizabletohimasat leastoftheformofananswer,evenifonlyevasion.(Thinkofallthewaysanyofus can findof ‘answering’ aquestionwithoutreallyansweringit,e.g., ‘Whatdoyou thinkofmy daube?’)Whatatheoryofalanguagehastotellusstopsfarshortofan accountofwhatsuchskillmightconsistin.
Frege,infact,isquiteclearonsuchlimitationsoflogicandisverycarefulto chooseitstopicaccordingly. If oneisassensitiveasheis,atleastinhisbest moments,onewillbefarlessinclinedtoregardhimasaphilosopheroflanguage. Therearethosewhohavetriedtomodel,ifnotanaturallanguage,thenaclearer, moreexactoneonthe Begriffsschrift,hismediumforalogic.Andtherearethose whoseesuchstructure,withallisstrictures,innaturallanguage.Whattheyforget (asFregedoesnot)isallthatisleftbehindwhenlogic’sbusiness,thatof being true isabstractedfromthatofthought-expression,withallthepurposesameansfor thismaybeobligedtoserve.(Itisnotirrelevantto expression oftruththatwords are,interalia,foruseinactswhichaimto affect others.)
InthistextIpayparticular(buthardlyexclusive)attentiontocertainpiecesof Nachlass,andofcorrespondence(mostnotablythelettertoMarty,orStumpf,of 1882).AsMichaelDummettobserved:
Thepublishedworkclearlyhasgreaterauthority obviouslyitdoesoversomethinghedecidednottopublish.Theonlywritingsthathaveequalauthorityare thoseheunsuccessfullysubmittedforpublication.(1993:172)
Dummettis,ofcourse,right.Heavenforfendthatsomeoneshouldholdme responsibleforthingsIsaidinoneofthemanydraftsthatprecedesomething Ipublished,whichwasnotalsopresentinthepublishedversion.Asforwhatis presentinpublishedversions,well,sometimesImustjustgrinandbearit,takemy medicine,whenIammuchlaterfairlyheldtoit.Thereissuchathingasnolonger thinkingwhatoneoncedid.
Still,thereareseveraldifferentwaysinwhich Nachlass andcorrespondence canbeilluminating.Frege’slettertoMartyorStumpf,forexample,doessetout veryclearlywhatIthinkismostfundamentaltoFrege’snotion concept andhis ideathatthoughts(in1882 ‘judgeablecontent’)precedeconceptsinlogical priority,correlatively,aremultiplydecomposable.Asfor Nachlass, thereis,for example,thelogicof1897,whichisprettyclearlyanearlierversionofwhat eventuallybecame ‘DerGedanke ’,andisthereforerevealingpreciselybecause thechangesfromearliertolast,withtheirshiftinemphasisandinpriorities,help showwhatismostcentraltohisview.
Bycontrast,the EinleitungindieLogik of1906isclearlyafailedexperiment, nottoberepeated aRussellianmovewhichdoesnotworkinthecontextof Frege.(Perhaps hesetouttoliftRussellbyhisownpetard.)Fromthishelearned, andsocanwe,atleastabouthimthroughitsnon-recurrence.
Finally,thosefamousessaysof1891–1892,especially ‘FunktionundBegriff ’ , werewrittenatapointinFrege’scareerwhentheprimarythingonhismindwas theneedsofhiscentralprojectasheconceivedit,thatofprovingthatarithmeticis logicbydeducingit from logic,ratherthanmerelyinit.Ontheonehand,thatbit of Nachlass, ‘AusführungenüberSinnundBedeutung’ is,indeed,asheintended, helpfulinunderstandinghowFregeundertooktoservethoseneeds,correlatively the point ofthoseconflations,andthatnonsequitur,whichareotherwiseagreat surpriseinathinkerofFrege’scalibre.Itplacesthesenicelyincontext.
Inanycase,IhopethereadingpresentedhereisareadingFregebears.Butof coursethereasonforwritingthisbookatallisthat(Ihope)itisareadingwhich willallowphilosophytoprofitfromFregeinwayswhich,toitscost,ithassofar missed.
Withwhichitistimeforthankstofourpeoplewhohavebeenextraordinarily helpfulandinfluentialinthewritingofthisbook.WhenInamethem,Ithinkit willbecleartoeveryonethattheyarenotresponsibleforholdinganyoftheviews expressed.Iproceedinalphabeticalorder.
The firstisJocelynBenoist.Wehavehadanumberoflongwalksandtalks togetherasthebookevolved.Weevenoncegaveaseriesofseminarstogetherat anearlystageofthings.IthinkthereissomethingofColombo(PeterFalk)in Jocelyn’sinfluenceontheideashere.Hewouldaskquestions,Iwouldrespond,he wouldbesatis fiedwiththeresponse,and justwhentheconversationseemedto bedyingout therewasthatColombo-like ‘Justonemorething’,andIknewthe jigwasup.Anotherniceideathatsimplywouldnotdo,atleastasitstood.Jocelyn
isafarbetterscholarthanIam(andhisGermanisbettertoo).Thankstohim,too, forhelpatleastonthescholarship.
ThesecondonthelistisMarkKalderon.WhileIwasstillinLondon,andlater whenIcametoPortugal,Markwasalwayswillingtolookatwork(orjusttalk aboutit),andabletostandbackandlookafewlevelsbeneaththesurface.Hehas helpedmetoseerelationsbetweenideaswithinthebook,andbetweenthoseand ideasatotherplacesinphilosophy.Andatastagewheretherewerestillquestions astowhattoputinthebookandwhattoleaveout,hewasalsoinfluential,and mosthelpful.
ThethirdonthelistisPeterSullivan.PeterandIwerecolleaguesforaboutnine years,backinthelastmillennium.Backthenwehadmanyanall-nightdiscussion onmanythingsphilosophical.Sincethenwehavehadonlyoccasionalopportunitytoexchangeideas.Butallinallheleftanindelibleimpressiononme.Iadmire greatlyhisabilitytocutthroughthicketstothecoreofanissue,toorganizeissues intolucid,andbeautiful,wholes,andtoseewhyaparticularideaisnotgoingto work.SoprettymuchwheneverIthinkIhaveanewideaofsomeconsiderable worth,I findmyselfaskinghowPetermightcutthroughtojusthowitfailstobe ontarget.Ithink(oratleasthope)thatPeter,evenwhennotpresentatall,has keptmefromcountless bêtises.Heshouldnotbeblamedforthoseotheroccasions whenmytacticsimplyfailedtowork.Ithinkitwillbemostobviousinhiscase thattheviewsexpressedherearebyandlargenothis.Still,likeitornot,itseems tomethattherearehereafewplaceswhereindependentlinesofthought intersect.
ThelastonthelistisDavidZapero.Since2017hehasaccompaniedmethrough theprocessofwritingthisbook,readingatleastseveraldraftsofeachchapter,and commentingatthesametimeencouraginglyandcritically.Criticismusually consistsinmentionofthingsheprotestsnottounderstand.Sometimesmy first reactionhasbeenthathe should have.Butgenerally,afteranight’ssleep,Icometo seethathedidnotunderstandbecauseitwasreallynotunderstandable.And,to seewhathemeanthas,moreoftenthannot,toseehowtocorrectthe flaw.Too muchofthishasgoneonoverthelastthreeyearsformetobeabletopickoutall thenumerouspointsinvolvedhere.ButIcansaythatitwouldhavebeenafar differentbook(ifeverabookatall)withouthishelp.
Iwouldalsoliketothanktwoanonymousreaderswhosecommentswereboth generousandimmenselyhelpfulinmymovefromanearlierversiontothisinits presentform.
Inthebeginning(2007–2008)partsofwhatbecamePartIweretriedoutina seminarIgavewithJocelynBenoistonFregeandHusserl,halfinLondon,halfin Paris.IgaveseminarsonthistwicethereafterinLondon,in2009–2010ifmemory serves.In2013Iagaingaveseminars,stillmostlyonPartI,inSydney,andagain ayearlaterinPorto.Thenin2017andagain2018Igaveseminarsonmostof thebook,especiallythelastchapters,inBonn.InSydneymyhostwasDavid
Macarthur,whokeptremindingmeofissuesFrege(quiterightly)didnotdeal with,andofthesignificanceofthefactthathedidnot.InBonnmyhostwas MarkusGabriel.Thoseseminarsproducedconsiderablechangesinthecontentof thebook’slastparts,forwhichhebearsnotinconsiderableresponsibility.Iam,of course,gratefultoallthose,inallthoseseminars,whocontributedtodiscussion.
Introduction
Withfewexceptions,Frege’sproseislimpid,graceful,appealingand,aboveall, readable.Tooreadable,perhaps,forhimtoberecognizedbyhiscontemporaries asaphilosopheratall.Abitshorton ‘l’ivressedesgrandsprofondeurs’.Forour contemporaries,though,hisfelicityofexpressionisliabletoprovokeafeelingof ‘I wishI’dsaidthat’,which,inresponsetotheWhistlerianretort, ‘Youwill’,easily modulatesinto ‘Butthat’sjustwhatI was saying’.Theproblemisthatsucha feelingmightbeprovokedinphilosophersofvariousanddivergentphilosophical views.
ButitisnotasthoughFrege is reallyachameleon,allthingstoallphilosophers. Textsasclearashis do expressaparticularview(moduloevolutionoveralong career,andmodulooccasionalmissteps).Inthatview,Imaintainhere,we finda greatphilosopher,onewhocanapproachKantonequalterms,andinwhose divergencesfromthatgreatphilosopherone findsthereallessonsastohowto proceedfurther;lessonsforusofthegreatestimportance.Theyconcernhowtodo philosophy,andwhatphilosophymightbe.Butthattheseremaintobeabsorbed, orevenrecognized,isevidentinthewayphilosophy is donetoday,acrossawide swathofareas,philosophyofmind,oroflanguage,aswellasphilosophyoflogic andmathematics.Theaimofthisbookistomakeclearerwhattheseare.
BeforeaddressingthattaskInoteonemajorelementworkingtoscreenofffrom viewFrege’smostimportantcontributionstophilosophy.Itistheideathat languagewas,forFrege,acentraltopic;perhapsafterlogic, the centraltopic, perhapsevenlogic’scentraltopic.SothatFrege’ssofelicitouslyexpressedideasare reallyaboutlanguage,and/ortheoriesthereof(notablysemantics).Iwillsuggest herethatsuchrunsexactlycountertoFrege’sintentions;thathisconcernwas precisely not withhowlanguageworks,andhehadnotheorythereof.Though discussionisherepremature,itisworthcitingsomeremarksofhisinthisregard:
Iamnotinthehappypositionofamineralogistwhocanshowhisaudiencea mountaincrystal.Icannotgivemyreadersathoughtintheirhandswiththe requestforthemtoregarditfromallsides.Imustbecontentwithofferingthe readerthenon-sensorythought(Gedanke)wrappedinasensorylinguisticform. Herethegraphiccharacteroflanguagemakesdifficulties.Thesensoryforcesits wayinagainandagain,andtherebymakestheexpressionpictorialandthereby improper.Thusarisesastrugglewithlanguage,andIamforcedtoconcernmyself withlanguagedespitethisnotbeingmypropertask.(1918:66(footnote))
Languagemayappeartoofferawayouthere,sinceontheonehanditssentences areperceivablebythesensesandontheothertheyexpressthoughts....Then, too,puttinglanguagetosuchuserequirescaution.Wemustnotoverlookthe greatgulfwhichseparatesthelinguisticfromthethinkable,andbywhichthe correspondencesbetweenthesearesetcertainbounds.(1923?:279)
Thesurpriseisthusthatsomanyphilosophershavesupposedjusttheopposite. GarethEvans,forexample, begins adiscussionofFregewiththisremark:
Fregewasthe firsttoformulateasystematictheoryofmeaningforafragmentof naturallanguage.(Evans,1982:7)
But,asFrege’stopicisexpresslynotlanguage,naturallyenoughheoffers no theoryoflanguage,afortiorinoneofthemeaningsofexpressionsofnatural language(onanyreadingof ‘meaning’).Hemightbesaidtoofferatheoryof thought.Then,though,onewouldneedtoattendtothenominalizationof ‘thought’ inquestion:notthatwhichspeaksofthinking,butratherthatwhich speaksofthingsforathinkertothink(ornot).Frege’sconcernisonlywith thislast.
PerhapsconstruingFregeasEvansdoesisjustlastcentury ’szeitgeist.Two ingredientsinFrege,though, might invitethis.Oneishisattemptin Grundgesetze (unsuccessful,Iwillargue)toconstrueits Begriffsschrift asalanguage,albeitone highly restrictedinexpressivepower.Suchhe thought necessaryforproving arithmetictobelogic.TheotheristhattherearemomentsinFregewherehe models issuesaboutthe pure businessofbeingtrueintermsofissuesaboutwords. Ashesaidin1923(above),language can sometimesbeusedsotomodel solong asonemindsthegulf.I finditsignificantthatthemomentsatwhichFregeisleast inclinedtomindthisgulf notablyinexplicatingthenotions function,Bedeutung, concept areanywayhisleastsure-footed(andleastsuccessful).But,ofcourse, thattheyarerequiresproof.Inanyevent,itisfundamentaltothepresentreading thatFrege’stopicisthebusinessofbeingtrueitself,hencearticulatedthought (thatis,thinkables),and(againhence) not language.
Frege’smostfundamentalcontributiontologicis,aswidelythought,aproper treatmentofquantificationanditsroleininference.Butasagreatphilosopher, hiscontributionstophilosophyare,likeKant’swhat would workfundamental changesinthewayweseethetopic unlikeKant,weretheybutattendedto.In philosophyofmindtwosuchstandout.First,inseparating objects ofthinking fromtheiroccurrenceinthinking,heallowedustoseehowthereneedbenothing elseincommontoallthosewhotakeagiventhoughttobetrue,orfalse,orfor themundecided,notpresupposingtheirsotakingit.Second,inshowingwhyitis thatathoughtmustbe(indefinitely)shareable(acaseagainst ‘privatelanguage’), heshowshowitisthattosay,orthink,oneselftobesuchandsuchneednotbeto
seem,orpurport,to see thatsuchishowthingsare.Inmetaphysicsthereisno lessthanthis:Fregeexposesidealism ’sdeepestroots(whethertranscendentalor not).Hetherebypointsto,andexempli fies,realism sansphrase. Atthebasisofall threeachievementsaretwodistinctions:thatbetweenthepsychologicalandthe logical(Fürwahrhalten and Wahrsein),andthatbetweensomethinggeneraland somethingnot.
Frege’ s firsttaskistowinnowthepurebusinessofbeingtrue logic’stopic fromathinker’sbusinessoftakingtobe,orholdingforthas,true thusfrom judgingandasserting.Theveryideaofsuchabstractionoffersaperspectivefrom whichtoask,withaminimumofpresupposition,justhowathinker’sthinking, andmoregenerally,relationtotheworld,mayrelatetothoseabstractedpartakers inthebusinessofbeingtrueassuch.Toseehowsuchmaychangeperspective, considerMichaelDummett,in TheOriginsofAnalyticalPhilosophy,wherehe presentsaproblemwhich,followingBarrySmith,hecalls ‘thelinkageproblem’ Dummettwrites:
Weperceivephysicalobjectsbymeansofoursenses...Butwithwhatorgando wegraspathought?Itcannotbepresentedtoyouandtomeindifferentways:if yougraspeditinonewayandIinanother,thewayeachofusgraspeditwouldbe partofthesense,andhenceitwouldnotbepreciselythesamethoughtthatwe bothgrasped.(Dummett1993:63)
CallthesecondsentencehereDummett’sprinciple.Butisittrue?Frege’ s first distinction,Ithink,providesaframeworkinwhichtomaketherightsenseofthis question;withwhichwecancometoappreciatethereasonswhytheprincipleis not,andcouldnotbe,true.AsFregepointsout,anytwothinkersinevitablydiffer somehowintheir ‘ grasp ’ ofanythought.Thequestioniswhatsuchdifferences matter,andwhen,towhethertheythusthinkthesamethingornot andwhat matterstothat.)Chapter6willmakeaforayintothisterritory.
Asforthedistinctionbetweentheparticularandthegeneral difficultenough todraw,evenforFrege suchcomesintoplayinwhatFregeseesasthefundamentaldifferencebetweenhimselfandacertainBennoErdmann,awould-be psychologisticlogicianwhopromptedFregetowrite:
Irecogniseadomainofwhatisobjectiveandnon-causal,whereasthepsychologicallogiciantakesthenon-causalstraightawayassubjective.Andyet...no suchconnectionbetweenconceptsisdiscoverable.(1893:xviii)
ForErdmann,Fregesuggests,thereiswhatinhabitsanenvironment(ours),and thenthereiswhatis ‘justallinthehead’ , fertig.Aprincipleonwhichamoderately cleverontologistofcurrentmodemightdineoutforawholecareer.Troubleis,as Fregeargues,wereErdmannright,therewouldbenothought:theontologist’ s
dicta,likethoseoftherestofus,wouldbemereidlechatterinthemostliteral senseofbothterms.
Frege’scaseforthepublicityofthoughtssetsanagendaforphilosophyofmind. Fregedoesnotdenythateachofusundergoes,experiences,isconsciousof,what onewouldhavetobehimsotodo(orbe).Hedoesdenythatsuchobjectsof experience whathecalls Vorstellung canbeobjectstologic’seye,thatis, objectsofpredicationinthebusinessofbeingtrue.Whatelsemighttheybe? Hereisahint.Someone ’sexperiencingwhathedoesashedoesmaybeconceived aspartofwhatthereisfor one tobeawareof,whetherornotonewouldhavetobe himtoexperiencethis.Histreatingwhatheexperiencesashedoes his finding thingstobeforhimthusandso maybesoreckoned.And,e.g.,his finding somethingexcruciatingmaybeforitto be excruciatingforhim,partofwhathis experiencing as hedoescomesto.So,too,perhaps,tosomeextent,foritsbeingto himasthoughhewereseeingablue flashinglightorarhomboid.
ThepresentworkdividesintothreeParts.PartIsetsoutabasicpicture, philosophicallysalubrious,thoughyettobeabsorbed,foundearlyandlatein Frege’swork.Itisapictureofwhatthereistothinktrueornot.Atitscore,a sequenceofarticulations:fromthewaythingsaretowaysforthemtobe;from thoughtstodecompositionsintosubthoughts,fromdecompositionstological forms.PartIIconcernsdevelopmentsinroughlytheyears1890–1895.Someof theseareperceptive.Some,Iwillargue,arethegravestofFrege’sraremissteps.It isworthrememberingthatthesearetheyearsof Grundgesetze I,Frege’sdefinitive attemptto prove arithmetictobelogic.WhatIcallmisstepsallworktothe advantageofthatproject asFregeconceivedit.PartIIItreatsFregeontruth, logic,andlogic’splacein,orrelationto,thewaythingsare,andtothesortof (species-independent)thinkingitslawswouldbind.
Aswithanysearchforthelaw-governed,Frege’swassusceptibletomisfiring. Here,though,insightreigned.Sofarasweknow,hedidmanagetoisolatethelawgovernedwithinawiderphenomenonofthought.Logic,asheconceivedit,isa success(ifonetakescareenoughastosuccessat what).ItisjustherethatFrege’ s mostpenetratinginsightshavenotyetbeenassimilatedbythesubject(philosophy),nor,perhaps,even fully byFregehimself.Weretheytobe,Fregewouldstand outasatrulygreatphilosopher,aninterlocutoron atleast equalfootingwithany otherfromKanton,aplayerinthepantheon.Perhapsmoreimportant,philosophywouldbeaquitedifferent field,conductedinaquitedifferentway,thanit currentlyis.Ambitionwillbereachedhereifthisbookgivesaninklingofwhat anotherviewofFrege,andofphilosophy,mightbelike.
Remark: AlltranslationsfromGermanorFrenchinthisworkaremine(where theoriginalwasavailable).Ifmistranslationhasledtomisinterpretation,the blameisminethroughout.Fregestrikesmeasanexemplarywriter.Ihavetried asfarasIamable,toturnunstiltedGermanintounstiltedEnglish.Thissometimesrequiresstructuralchange.Forexample,casegivesGermanafreedomof
wordordernotpresentinEnglish.SometimesmakingunstiltedEnglishoutofthe Germanmeansreordering,perhapswithlossofsomeexpressiveeffectonly Germanmakesroomfor.OragainEnglishhatesrun-onsentences,German apparentlynotsomuch.Ihavethussometimesneededtomaketwo,oreven three,sentencesoutofoneperfectlygoodoneinGerman.Ihope,though,tohave remainedtruetothesensethroughout.
IntheBeginning (IstheThought)
Frege’scentraltopicwastobethebusinessassuchofbeingtrue.His firststepin locatingthistopicwastoseparatethisbusinessasobjectofstudyfromanytruck withitbythosewhothinktrulyorfalsely.Ashewrotein1884:
Thepsychologicalmustbethoroughlywinnowedfromthelogical,thesubjective fromtheobjective.(1884:x)
Athinkermaythinktruly,butnot be true,muchlessbeatruth.Conversely,where thereissomethingdeterminateone might thinkornot,somethingbywhichto identify what athinkerthinks,bythatveryqualityitmustbethethingitis independentofitsbeingthought,orthoughtof.So,asFregealsoputsit, Wahrsein (beingtrue)mustbedistinguishedsharplyfrom Fürwahrhalten.His,andforhim, logic’stopic,is Wahrsein (though,asweshallsee,logicisnotconcernedwiththe whole ofthatphenomenon).Iwillcallthis firstmoveinsearchofatopic the fundamentalabstraction.ItisfundamentaltoFrege’swholephilosophicalview, alongwithaseconddistinction(tocome),betweenthegeneralandtheparticular. Thisabstractionishardlycommoncurrency.Perhapsoneneeds firsttomakeitto seeitsvalue.
Acontent-bearer,perhapssomewords,mightbesaidtobetrue(orfalse).Itis notthereby the truth(orfalsehood),muchless a truth.Suchisreservedfor contentborne,specificallythingswhichmightbethought.Frege’sabstraction thusleavescontent-bearersbehind.
ForFregethemainpointoftheabstractionistobringtolightthatwhichlogic governs:thelawsof beingtrue.Tothisend,questionsoftruthareseparatedfrom whoasks,orpurportstoanswerthem.Whatisthusexposedisafundamental structureinwhatthereisanyway,forthinkerssotorelateto.Insoapproaching thequestionnewlightiscastonthenatureofthoseproblemsphilosophersdiscuss astowhatitisforthinkerstorelatetothingssostructured.
Thinkingcannotmakeitso.Itneithermakesthingsthewaytheyarenorany waytheymaybethoughttobe.Nor,thus,doesitmakeanywaytheymaybe thoughttobe(ornot)thewayitis,thoughwhatwaystherearetothinkthings beingdependsunboundedlyonhowthingsare.Fregemaybethe firsttohaveseen thisclearlyandtakenit entirely seriously.
Adropofgrammar:Therearetwohomonymousnouns ‘thought’,eachreached fromtheverb ‘think’ bynominalizingdifferently.Bytheoneroute,thoughtisa certainsortofactivity,thinking.Bytheother,itistheobjectofsuchactivity:what thereistobethought,orhasbeen,oriscurrently,thought.Twomassnouns. Whereneeded,Iwillsubscripttheseasthoughtψ (for psychological)forthe first andthoughtλ (for logical)forthesecond.
1.1WholeThoughtsFirst
Our firstquestionwaswithwhatthebusinessofbeingtruebegins.ForFregethe answeriswhathecallsa ‘thought’ (‘Gedanke’),acertain countable.Hisstock explanationofthisnotionrunsasfollows(heiscarefultodisclaimthisasa definition):
Withoutmeaningtogiveadefinition,Icallathoughtthatbywhichtruthcan comeintoquestionatall.(1918:60)
Whatisdistinctiveinmyapproachtologicismaderecognisable, firstofall,by myputtingthecontentoftheword ‘true’ inleadposition,andthenbymy makingthethoughtfollowimmediatelyasthatbywhichbeingtruecancome intoquestionatall.(1919a:273)
Soathoughtisjustthatwhichis,orwhichidentifies,preciselywhatmaybetrue, orifnot,false.Itisjustthatwhichidentifiesadeterminate,answerable,yes–no question, ‘True?’ Itidentifiesjustthatwhichistomattertotheanswer.Itisthe truththereiswheretheansweris ‘Yes’.Athoughtisthusatruth-or-falsehood. Logic’sconcerncanbeseenasthebehaviourofatruth-or-falsehoodmerelyby virtueofitssobeing.
Thenotion just doesworkhere.Athoughtisidentifiedasthethoughtitisby, butonlyby,thatbywhichitbringstruthintoquestion;bywhatmatterstoan answertoitsquestion, ‘True?’ Somuch, andonlysomuch,isintrinsictothe thought.Onlybysuchfeatures,bywhatthethoughtmakesmattertotruth,cana giventhoughtbedistinguishedfromanyother.Interalia,suchdistinguishes thoughtsfromsentences.Itisanideawithmuchworktodoinwhatfollows.
Theotherpartoftheideasofaristhatitisa whole thoughtwhichcomesinto play firstinthepurebusinessofbeingtrueassuch.Itisnotasiftherearesome otherelements,notpresupposingthenotion thought ,outofwhichthethought mightbeconstructedorthatnotionunderstood.Itisnotasifthoughtsaretobe constructedoutofsomesortofindependentlyidentifiablebuildingblocks,asan EnglishsentencemaybeconstructedoutofEnglishvocabulary.Rather,thoughts are firstinlogicalandontologicalorderofpriority.Thereareotheritemsatwork
inthebusinessofbeingtrue.Butwhattheseare, inre sortor inre instanceofa sort,istobeunderstoodintermsoftheirpartinthe wholethought’ s work.
Forthemomentletthisworktoidentifythepointatwhichthebusinessof beingtrueistobereckonedtostart.Thereisnowoursecondquestion:Bywhat doesthebusinessofbeingtruearise?Whatcreatesspaceforsuchathingasbeing true?Ananswertothismayinvoketheverb ‘represent’,butthenonaparticular useofthatverb.Therelevantnotion,spelledout,wouldbe: torepresentsomething asbeingsomething (thereisforittobe (ornot)).OnemightrepresentSid,for example,asnonchalant.OronemayrepresentNapoleonasthatveryone,the victoratAusterlitz
Suchisonenotionofrepresenting.Thepatinaonthoseleatherclubchairsmay representgenerationsofprolongedpost-prandialsbymenofparts.Thedifference: supposepost-prandialswerenevertakeninthosechairs.Thenthatpatinadoes notrepresentthis.WhereaswereSidinfactaninveteratesticklerfordetails,such wouldnothinderrepresentinghim as otherwise.Onewouldsimplyberepresentingfalsely.Roomforfalsehoodhereisalsoroomfortruth(andviceversa).The phenomenaofbeingtrueandrepresenting-asthuscomeasapacket.
Atwhichpointwemightattendtoaspects.ThethoughtthatNapoleonwasa wilyfoxrepresentsNapoleonasawilyfox.MaréchalNeymayalsohaverepresentedhimassuch.Buteachinadifferentaspectofthatverb.Veryroughly,the thoughtstandstoMaréchalNeyasdoesalightswitchtoaninveterate flipperofit. Ifthatlightswitchswitchesonthereadinglightabovethebed,thensodoesSid everytimehe flips(allwell-functioning).Not,though,onthesamereadingofthe verbasdoesthelightswitch.OnlySidneed flipthe flipper.Roughlyspeaking,it wouldbeenoughforthethoughtthatNapoleonwaswilysotorepresenthim,ifto expressthatthoughtwere eoipso foronesotorepresenthim,andsotorepresent him eoipso,toexpressthatthought.
Suchisnearenoughsoofrepresenting-as,oncethisisdistinguishedfrom representing-to-be.Towonder,orask,whetherNapoleonwaswilyisalreadyto representhim as sobeing,thequestionwhetherheisleftopen.Itmayhelphereto comparetwowaysofspeakingofathought:thethought that Napoleondotedon gâteaurusse;thethought of Napoleonhavingsodoted.Fregemakessomethingof thisdistinctionin1879:
Onecanimaginealanguageinwhichthesentence, ‘Archimedesperishedatthe conquestofSyracuse’ wouldbeexpressedasfollows: ‘Theviolentdeathof ArchimedesattheconquestofSyracuseisafact’.Here,tobesure,onecan still,ifhewishes,distinguishsubjectfrompredicate.Butthesubjectcontainsthe entirecontent,andthepredicateonlyfunctionstopresentthisasajudgement. Suchalanguagewouldhaveonlyonepredicateforalljudgements,namely, ‘isa fact’.Oneseesthatheretherecanbenotalkofsubjectandpredicateintheusual sense. OurBegriffsschrift issuchalanguage....(1879:3–4)
