OnGodasanAgent
ThemovetoconceiveofGodasanagenthaslumberedaroundinphilosophyand theologyforclosetoacenturybutitisvirtuallyimpossibleto findacareful articulationofwhatthismightmean.TheideaofGodas “TheOnewhoActs” cametotheforeinbiblicalstudiesintheBiblicalTheologyMovementafterthe FirstWorldWarbutthosewhochampionedthiswayofthinkingdidnotspend timetospelloutwhatthismightmean.Theirinterestlayinrehabilitatingthe biblicalnarrativesofwhatGodhaddoneinIsraelandinJesusofNazareth.Karl Barthdeployedthenotionattimes,afeatureofthehistorythatgaveitaboost, butBarth’sinterestsandextraordinaryskillslayelsewhere.Analyticphilosophersatthetimeweregenerallydismissiveofanydiscourseaboutdivineaction. ThomistswereinterestedinexpoundingtheconceptofGodasBeingand sometimesdismissedthenotionasaquirkofmodernProtestantismseeking togetbeyondthestricturesofitsliberalProtestantphase.Whentheologiansand philosopherstookthematterseriouslybythe1960sandbeyond,theirprimary concernscenteredondebatesabouthowtohandlethosespecialactsofGodthat seemedtobeincompatiblewiththelogicofscienceandthelogicofhistorical investigation.
YettheproposalthatGodisbestconstruedasanagentlaiddormant,buriedin thebasementorhiddenawayintheattackoftheChristiantradition.Itisadelight tonotethatthegreatIrishphilosopherBishopGeorgeBerkeleyputtheissuewith starksimplicitywhenheonceasked: “AndisnotGodanagent,abeingpurely active?”¹However,givenhisradicalIdealism,Berkeleyhasalwaysbeenseenas somethingofabrilliantoutlier,moreimportantforhisproposalsinepistemology thaninmetaphysics.HissuggestionthatweshouldconstrueGodasanagent hasessentiallygoneundergivenhisrejectionofmaterialobjectsasanillusion. Heworriedthatadoptingmaterialismwasbuthalfwaytoatheism,aclaimthat canbeturnedupsidedowntobecometheclaimthatallthinkingaboutpersonal agents,bothhumananddivine,issimplytheafterglowofadiscreditedtheistic metaphysics.
ThecentralthesisofthischapteristhatChristianphilosophyandtheology shouldconceiveofGodasanagent.Ishallproceedinthefollowingmanner.First, Ishallverybrieflydelineatetheterritorywithinwhichthisthesisislodged.
¹GeorgeBerkeley, ThreeDialoguesbetweenHylasandPhilinous (Indianapolis,IN:Hackett, 1979),65.
Second,IshallindicateschematicallythecontentoftheclaimthatGodisanagent. Third,IshallindicatewhatmotivatesthemovetothinkofGodasanagentboth theologicallyandphilosophically.Fourth,Ishallenteracautionaboutthephilosophicalstatusofmybasicorientation.Finally,Ishalltakeupanimportant networkofobjectionswhichdeservesattentionandrebuttal.
TheclaimthatGodisbestconstruedasanagentis firstandforemostaclaim aboutthefundamentalcategoriesthatshouldbedeployedwhenwespeakofGod intheChristiantradition.Weareinterestedinthebestconceptualresources thatweshouldusewhenwethinkofGod.OverthecenturiesChristianshave proposedanextendedlistofthemostfundamentalcategoriesweshoulduse. Considerthefollowing:FirstCause,Being,BeingBeyondBeing,PerfectBeing, PureAct,theAbsolute,AbsoluteSpirit,theWhenceoftheWhole,theInfinite, theTrueIn finite,Process,CreativeSerendipity,andthelike.Theaiminallthese instancesisto fi ndaconceptthatwillbetheprimaryhorizoninwhichwethink aboutGod.Thecategorydeployedislikethehouseweinhabitortheoceanin whichweswim.
Preciselybecausetheyaresofundamentalsuchdevelopmentshaveevokeda hostofprotestsonvariousfronts.Considerthefollowingworries.Theseconcepts replacetheGodofAbraham,Isaac,andJacobwiththegodofthephilosophers; theyfailtodojusticetothescriptures;theysystematicallydistortthestructureand contentoftheChristianfaith;theyarespirituallydisastrousinthattheyinvolve idolatry.Thenumberandintensityoftheseobjectionsrevealthatweareentering veryprecariousterritorywherethestakesareveryhigh.
IconfessthatI findnoneofthesecategoriessatisfactory;laterIshallindicate oneofthemainphilosophicalreasonsforthisjudgment.Hereletmeindicatehow onemightnaturallybaulkatacategorylikeBeingorBeingBeyondBeingas appliedtoGod.InbeinginitiatedintotheChristianfaith,onemaynotat first knowwhatcategoriesdoordonot fitaptlyinthinkingaboutGod.Ofcourse, one ’sinitiationmayincludereferencetoGodinpreciselytheseterms;butthisis relativelyrare,andmostcertainlythiswasnotmyexperience.Iwasintroduced totheGospelinpreaching;Ireadthescriptures;Iheardgracioustestimonies; IlearnedthegreathymnsofWesleyandtheircompanionsinmyMethodist community;IbecameimmersedinWesley’scanonicalsermons.Inthisrelatively informalmanner,Ifoundmywayintothecentralelementsandpracticesofthe Christianfaith.Mydissatisfactionwithmostofthestandardphilosophicalconceptsthatweresupposedto fixthemeaningoftheterm “God” arosebecausethey didnotsquarewithmyinformalsenseofhowtothinkofGod,thatis,theGod tacitlyassumedinmyjourneyintothelifeoffaith.Therewassimplytoomuch cognitivedissonance.SoovertimeIshelvedtheissueuntilIbeganasystematic studyoftheissuesthatswirlaroundclaimsaboutdivineagencyanddivineaction. ItisinthiscontextnowthatIventureforthwiththeproposalofthischapter.How newitmaybe,Ileavetothejudgmentofhistorians.
Letmeoffera firstshotatdelineatingwhatImeaninspeakingofGodasan agent.TothinkofGodasanagentistothinkofGodirreduciblyandontologically asalogicallydistinctentityconstitutedbyvariouscapacitiesorpowersthatmayor maynotbeexercised.Godisanagentwhoactsorexertspower,asdistinguished fromapatientoraninstrument.GodistheOneWhoActsrationallyand intentionally.ThisdoesnotconfineGodtoactionsinthisdomain,fornotall personalactionsaredoneintentionallyanditwouldbeanobviousblunderto limittherangeofdivineactionstothekindswecanidentifyinthecaseofhuman agents.
Ineverydaydiscourseandlifeagentscomeinagreatvarietyofforms.Consider thisinformaltaxonomy.Thereareanimalagents,liketigersandsnakes,whichkill theirprey.Therearevegetableagents,likecauliflowerandtomatoes,which nourishthehumanbody.Therearemineralagents,likecopperandiron,which conductelectricity.Therearephysicalagents,likeelectricity,thatlightupour homes.Therearemedicinalagents,likechloroformandaspirin,whichsuppress pain.Thereareangelicagents,whooperateasmessengers;anddemonicagents thatpossessandseektodestroyhumanagents.Mostimportant,therearehuman agents.Thesecanactasindividualagents,say,ambassadorsorsenators.Theycan actascorporateagents,likenationsanduniversities.Theycanactaslegalagents, likebanksortheBritishparliament,orassocialagents,liketheRepublicanParty ortheAfrican-AmericancaucusinCongress.Oneofthemorerecentdevelopmentsistospeakofagentsintheworldofcomputerswhereanagentgenerallycan meanaprogramthatperformsatasksuchasinformationretrievalorprocessing onbehalfofaclient;ormorespeci ficallyanagentisaprogramsetuptolocate informationontheinternetonaspecifiedsubjectanddeliveritonaregularbasis.
Liketheconceptofactiontheconceptofanagentandagencyisanamazingly openconceptthatdefiesanyeasymovetoworkoutthenecessaryandsufficient conditionsofitsusage.Notsurprisinglyphilosophersreadilyseektoeasetheir cognitivedissonancebyreachingforprecision.Myowndispositionisdeflationary andrelaxedatthispoint.Wecan findourwayaroundtheterrainrelativelywell withouthavinginhandthekindofprecisionwemay find,say,inepistemologyor philosophyofmathematics.Notsurprisinglyweresorttostipulationandoperationaldistinctionsthatprovideinitialroadmaps.Themostobviousdistinctionis thatbetweenpersonalandimpersonalagents.Eventhen,somephilosophers hesitateinthatthey findthewholeideaofpersonalagentspuzzlingprecisely becauseitdoesnot fittheontologicalprimacygiventoimpersonalagents.Others havefocusedonpersonalagentsconstruedfundamentallyalongthelinesof rationalandintentionalagentsasfundamental;theytaketheideaofimpersonal agencytobeanextensionoftheideaofpersonalagency.Thesearehelpful distinctionstomakebuttheyarebynomeansexhaustiveorcomprehensive.
ItisaformofpersonalagencythatisintheneighborhoodwhenIspeakofGod asanagent.Iamthinkingofagencyintermsofonewhooperatesinaparticular
direction,whoproducesaneffectrationallybutisnotcausallydeterminedto producethateffect.Forthosewhocannotmovebeyondpersonalagencywithout thinkingofthisexclusivelyasaformofintentionalagency,Iallowthatintentional actionsaresufficienttosecuretheideaofpersonalagency.However,Iam extremelyskepticalthatintentionalactionisanecessaryconditionofpersonal agency.Thesearenotjustmattersofconceptualrigorandsensitivity;theyalso involvesensitivitytotheradicalontologicaldiversitythatisessentialtounderstandinglifeinallitscomplexityanddiversity.Withthatqualificationinplace, IwanttospeakofGodinitiallyasamysterious,transcendentpersonalagentwith superlativepowerswhichmayormaynotbeexercised.IwantalsotospeakofGod asamysterious,transcendentTriuneagentwithsuperlativepowersandattributes whoistheprimaryagentinagenuinecosmologicalandhistoricalnarrative stretchingfromcreation,throughfreedomandfall,toredemption,andthenon toperfectliberty.Hence,whatIproposecanbeadoptedeitherbythemere monotheist(ifthereareany),byJewsandMuslims,andbyrobustChristian monotheists.
OnepointofentryintospeakingofGodasanagentcanbefoundinthenotion ofagentcausation.Iconsidertheideaofagentcausationtobebothconceptually irreducibleandontologicallyfundamental.TheclassicalaccountofagentcausationinthemodernperiodwasdevelopedbyThomasReid.²Reiddevelopedhis visionofagencyinreactionagainsttheskepticismofHumewithrespectto causation.³Famously,Humenotedthatwhenwelookatwhatweordinarily taketobeacausalrelation(heatingthewatercausesthewatertoboil)we find no “impression,” nosensoryexperience,whichstandsfortherelevantcausal relation.Allwereallyhaveisconstantconjunctionbetween,say,heatingwater andboilingwater.GivenhisempiricismthisleftHumewithapuzzleabout causality,forweordinarilythinkthatcausationissomethingmorethanconstant conjunction;thereissomekindofnecessaryrelationbetweenheatingwaterand boilingwater.ClearlythereareimmediateproblemshereforHume’sreductionof causationtoconstantconjunction.Foronething,thiswouldmeanthatwecould neverperceiveacausalrelationwhenithappenedforthe firsttime.Foranother, thiswouldmeanthatnightisthecauseofday,forthereisconstantconjunction betweennightandday.Reid’sdiagnosisofHume’serrorwassimple:ourordinary
²ForarecentexpositionofReid’spositionseeMariaAlvarez, “ThomasReid,” inTimothy O’ConnorandConstantineSardis,eds., ACompaniontothePhilosophyofAction (Oxford:WileyBlackwell,2010).InwhatfollowsIamindebtedtoRyanNicholsandGideonYaffe, “ThomasReid,” The StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy (Winter2016Edition),ed.EdwardN.Zalta,<https://plato. stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/reid/>.Iamalsoindebtedtoextendedpersonalconversation withProfessorNichols.
³ItistemptingtodismissReidfromtheoutsetbyclaimingthatheisinventinga “modern” notionof agencyandactionwhichisboundtobemisleadingwhendeployedwithintheology.Thiswouldbea mistake.ReidcanrightlybereadasretrievingAristotle’snotionofefficientcausationaftercrucial elementsinandaroundtheideaofefficientcausationhadbeendeconstructedintheearlymodern period.
conceptionofcausationisnotderivedfromourimpressions;itisnotacopyofa sensation.Wehavetogobackto firstprinciples.
Howthenshouldwethinkofcausation?Initially,considerphysicalcausation. Thereareavarietyofwaysofspellingouthowcausationmightbeconstrued.⁴ Somerecentworkinmetaphysicshasthoughtofcausationintermsoftheexercise ofthedispositionsandpropertiesofvariousentities. ⁵ Hereishowthismightbe spelledoutintermsoftheinteractionoftwomaterialobjects.
[Mass]isadispositionthatmanifestsitselfinthemutualattractionofmassy objects.Thepresenceofanothermassactsasastimulusonm(andconversely) forthemanifestationofthedispositionintermsofmutualacceleration.Assoon asthereareatleasttwomassiveobjectsinaworld,thatdispositionistriggered.It isessentialforthepropertyofgravitationalmasstomanifestitselfinthemutual attractionoftheobjectsthatinstantiatethisproperty.That’swhatgravitational mass is thepropertythatmakesobjectsaccelerateinacertainmanner.⁶
Koperskinotesthreeobjectionstothiswayofthinkingasitappliestotheoriesin naturalscience.First,itdoesnotwork,say,inthecaseofthecenterofmassinthe solarsystem.Second,itmarksareturntoanAristotelianframework,therejection ofwhichwascrucialtothehistoryofmodernscience.Andthird,itismuchtoo vagueandincomplete.Bethisasitmay,Reidwasmoreofatraditionalistinhis understandofcausationinthathewantedtoretainthenotionofnaturallaw,but naturallawaslodgedwithinhisvisionofGodasalawgiver.
So,Reidheldthatoneeventcausesanothereventwhentheyareconjoinedby meansofnaturallaw.Discoveringtherelevantphysicallawsbetweeneventsisa matterofscienceandordinaryreflection.However,this,aversReid,isbuta first stepinunderstandingcausation.Evenifwehadafullandcomprehensiveaccount ofallthelawsofnature,wewouldstillnothavereachedwhatwereallyneed, namely,whatReidcalled “efficientcausation.” Thelawsofnaturearetherules accordingtowhichtheeffectsareproduced;buttheremustbeacausewhich operatesaccordingtotherules. “Therulesofnavigationnevernavigatedaship. Therulesofarchitectureneverbuiltahouse.”⁷ Henceweneedadeeperconceptionofcause,thatofefficientcausality. “Inthestrictandpropersense,Itakean efficientcausetobeabeingwhohadpowertoproducetheeffect,andexertedthat powerforapurpose.” ItwasthisnotionthatHumemissed.Reidispositingthat
⁴ ForasplendidexpositionasitappliestotheideaofthelawsofnatureseeJeffreyKoperski, Divine Action,DeterminismandtheLawsofNature (NewYork:Routledge,2020),chapter5.
⁵ Fora finearticulationofthisviewseeStephenMumfordandRaniLillAnjun, GettingCausesfrom Powers (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2011).
⁶ QuotedinKoperski, DivineAction,DeterminismandtheLawsofNature,91.
⁷ ThomasReid, EssayontheActivePowersofMind,ed.B.A.Brody(Cambridge,MA:MITPress, 1969),46.
causationinvolvestheabilitytoseetoitthataneventoccursandtomakeaneffort toensurethatitdoesoccur.
Causationultimatelyrequiresreferencetoagentswithactivepowers.Herewe hitthejackpot.
Thenameofa cause andofan agent,isproperlygiventothatbeingonlywhich, byitsactivepower,producessomechangeinitself,orinsomeotherbeing.The change,whetheritbeofthought,orofmotion,isthe effect.Activepower, therefore,isaqualityinthecause,whichenablesittoproducetheeffect.And theexertionoftheactivepowerinproducingtheeffect,iscall action, agency, efficiency. ⁸
WhatReidisinsistingonhereisthatthenotionsofagentandactionarelogically primitive;theycannotbereducedtoeventsandtoeventcausation.Indeed,the latterisparasiticontheformer.Itisonlybecausewehavethenotionofagentsand agentcausationthatwereallyunderstandtheideaofeventcausation.Event causationisamatterofnaturallaw;butnaturallaw,whileitprovidesalegitimate formofexplanation,isnotitselfultimate;beyondnaturallaw,itisappropriateto pressontoexplanationsintermsofpersonalagentsandtheiractions.Inthis instance,eitherthenotionofnaturallawpresupposestheideaofagenuine lawgiver;oreventcausationsomehowtradesontheideaofagentcausationasa kindofbackgroundmusic.Inthelattercase,naturallawisastoryofevents abstractedfromawiderstoryofagentcausation.
Reid filledouthisvisionofagentcausationinseveralcontroversialdirections. Thus,anyagentwhohasthepowertodoactionAhasotherinterrelatedpowers: thepowernottodoA,thepowertotrytodoA,andthepowernottotrytodo A.HealsoclaimsthatagentswiththepowertodoAmustbelievethattheyhave thepowertodoA.Reidappearsalsotohaveheldthatinordertomoveourbodies, we firstexercisevariousvolitions,leavinghimvulnerabletochargesofaninfinite regress.Inordertoraisemyarm,hethinksthatI firsthavetowilltomovemy arm,thusexertingthepowertodeterminemywill,thuscausingavolitionthatmy armraise.Hencethecrucialactionhereisnottheraisingofmyarmbutthe volitiontoraisemyarm.Immediatelywearefacedwiththequestionwhether Ineedtohaveavolitiontohaveavolitiontoraisemyarm,andsoonad infinitum.⁹ Furthermore,Reidarguesthatinordertoact,theagentmusthave understandingandwill.Ordinarymaterialobjectsliketablesandchairs,strictly speaking,donotact.Onlyentitieswithmindshavethepowertoact.Soifwethink
⁸ Ibid.,268.
⁹ Thisclearlyopensupthepossibilityofoccasionalism,namely,thedoctrinethatbetweenmy willingandmyarmraising,otheragentsorinstrumentsmaybeatwork.ForacogentdefenseofReid againstthechargeofbeingcommittedtoaninfiniteregress,seeTimothyO’Connor, “ThomasReidon FreeAgency,” JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy 32(1994):319–41.
thateveryeventinnatureisefficientlycaused,everythinginnatureisdirected towardsanend.Givenhiswiderontology,alleventsarecausedeitherbyGodor byhumanagents.
Inperformingthisorthataction,Reidclaimsthatagentsactaccordingto variousmotives.Butmotivesarenotcausesinthesensethattheyfollowvarious psychologicallawsandarepredictableifweknowtherelevantinitialconditions. Toactaccordingtothestrongestmotiveisnottobephysicallynecessitatedtoact. Theinfluenceofmotivesislikethatofadviceorexhortation.Humanagentshave animalmotives appetitesandpassions whichimmediatelyinfluencethewill. However,theyalsohaverationalmotives,motivesdirectedtotheirjudgment whichpresentanactionunderthedescriptionofourdutiesorofsomethingthat willcontributeeitherdirectlyorindirectlytoourgood.Whateverthemotives,itis stilluptotheagentastowhatheorshedoes.Whateverthemotivation,wearestill atlibertytoactornottoact.Wecanreadilydiscernthestrongestanimalmotive bynotingtheconsciousefforttoresistthem;wedetectthestrongestrational motivebynotingwhatmostcontributestofulfillingourdutiesorgaininghappiness.Citingmotivesclearlyprovidesacausalexplanationofwhatwedo;weare explainingthecausesofvariousactions.However,whatisatissueherearethe factorswhichinfluencetheagent;motivesarenotcausesinthesensethatthey necessitatewhattheagentdoes.
WedonotneedtobuyintoallthedetailsofReid’saccountofagencyandaction tonotethatthecrucialelementsthatshouldinterestthetheologianarethese.First, thenotionsofagentsandagentcausationarelogicallyprimitive.Agentsarenot reducibletoevents;andtheexplanationofactionscannotbereducedtothatof eventcausation.Youeitherunderstandthemoryoudonot;youeithergowith themoryoudonot.Second,agentsareessentiallydistinctontologicalentitieswho possesscertainactivepowers,whichtheyarefreetoexerciseornotexercise.There isnothingmoremetaphysicallyultimatebehindorbeyondthem.Third,agency involvesadirectcausalrelationwiththementalorphysicalchangestheybring about;theagent-causationrelationisnotbetweenanagentandhisactionsbut betweentheagentandtheresultsofhisactions.¹⁰ Fourth,agentexplanations involvethecitationofrelevantmotives,reason,andintentions;thesearenot deterministiccausalexplanationsbutfurnishtheirownintelligibleaccountof whatisgoingonandwhy.Physicalcausationisamatterofnaturallaw.Incasesof physicalcausation,oneexplainsanevent “ x ” asthecauseofevent “ y ” bypredictingthatevent “ y ” willhappenifevent “ x ” occursandrelevantnaturallawsjoining “ x ” and “ y ” areavailable.Inpersonalcausationoneexplainstheactionsofan agentbyprovidinganilluminatingaccountofwhytheagentperformedthe actionsthattheydidbecauseofvariousreason,motives,intentions,andthelike.
¹⁰ IamfollowingMariaAlvarezhereinstrippingReid’saccountofthecommitmenttovolitions.See Alvarez, “ThomasReid,” 511.
Thisinturnwillinescapablytakeoneintotheworldofnarrative,ofbiography, andofautobiography.
Giventhissketchofagentsandagentcausation,wehavetohandanattractive accountofagentsandactionsthatcanbeappropriatedbythecontemporary theologianinsearchofresourcesforunderstandingdivineagencyanddivine action.Reidhasattemptedtounpackourordinarynotionsofagencyandaction; thereisnothingessentiallytheologicalaboutthem,asisindicatedbythefactthat Reidprovidesnotheologicalwarrantsforhisargumentsandbythefactthathis visionhasbeendefendedbysecularphilosophers.Tobesure,Reidwasa Presbyterianministerwhoinhisdaysubscribedtothestandingcreedsand confessions.However,toascribehisproposalsonagencyandactiontohis theologicallocationwouldbetocommitthegeneticfallacy.Hisarguments standindependentlyofanytheologicaloriginationtheymayhavehadpsychologically.NoristheargumentherethatReidprovidessomesortoffoundational argumentforGodasanagent.RatherIamappealingtoReidbecausehiswork representsasplendidwayintoworkingourwayintothinkingasclearlyaswecan ofpersonalagency.
Wemightcapturetheissueasfollows.InthinkingofGodasanagent,Iamnot takingtheideaofahumanagentandthenconstructingavisionofGodbyadding, say,alistofpropertiestoit.Rather,standingbeforethelivingGodasdepictedin theGospel,articulatedwithcircumspectioninthescripturesandwidercanonical heritageofthechurch,deployingthelimitedbutrealintellectualfacultiesgivento us,Iamlookingforanaptwaytothinkandspeakofthisincomparable,beautiful Realitywhostandsinneedofnothingandnoone.Itisnotasifwehaveagenus, personalagent,withinwhichtheLivingGodstands;rather,we findourselves seekingforanimage,aconcept,averbalicon,bymeansofwhichwecanboth speakofGodandexpressourthanksandpraise.Reidgivesusthescaffolding; onceitisinplace,wekickitlooseanddowhatwecantousetheconceptshegives ustodepictandadoretheGodofIsraelrevealedinChristandpresentamongus intheHolySpirit.
Theideaofagentcausationdovetailsbeautifullywiththetheologicaldoctrine thathumanbeingsaremadeintheimageofGod,thatis,theyareendowedwith thekindofactivepowersthatareessentialtoexercisingsovereigncareover creation.¹¹Equally,it fitswiththeclaimsthathumanbeingsaremorallyaccountableforwhattheydobeforeGod;oftentheyhavegenuinefreedomtoact otherwisethanwhattheyactuallydo;andthattheyarenotreducibletophysics andchemistry.Humanagentsareuniqueincreation;theyareontologically distinctcreaturesequippedwithconsciousness,minds,consciences,souls,hearts, andthelike.Theyareagentswhocanbecomesaintsandsinners;theycanenter
¹¹ThisisnicelyindicatedinthenarrativeofGenesis1.
intogenuinepersonalrelationsandunionwithothersandwithGod.Theyact withgenuinefreedom,voluntarilybutnotofnecessityactingthiswayratherthan that.Whateverfeaturestheysharewithanimalsandmaterialentities,theyarenot merelytrouseredapesorcomplicatedcomputersdeckedoutwithconsciousness. Thewarrantsforthesecomplexconvictionsarenotmerelyexegeticalor doctrinal.Theyinvolveourinwardsenseofourownpersonalrealityandidentity, ofourownfreedomandofthemeaningofwhatwedo,thevaluesweentertain, andthedestinieswefulfill.Theyalsoinvolvethecrucialplaceofnarrativein understandinghumanaction,theuniquenessofhistoricalinvestigationandthe explanationsitutilizes,andthesheermysteryandcomplexityofwhatitistobe human.Thetheologiancansurelybuildonthisbasic,logicallyprimitive,andrich conceptionofagencyandaction.Shewillnot,ofcourse,beconfinedbythis picture;itcanreadilybetransfiguredbytheresourcesofspiritualexperienceand theologicalreflection;butitprovidesa fittingplacefromwhichtostartatheologicallyrobustanthropology.Itprovidesanaptmetaphysicsofagencyandaction.
Agentcausationalsoprovidesa fittingplatformfordevelopingadoctrineof Godasanagent.WecanstretchournotionofagentstorefertoadivineAgent whoisconstitutedbyvariousactivepowers,bygenuinefreedomtocreateand redeem,andbyunceasingcompassion.Thus,wecanreadilydistinguishGod ontologicallyfromcreation;theworldisnotdivine;noristheworldessentialto divinity;itisontologicallydistinctyetcausallydependentondivinecreation ex nihilo andonprovidentialactivity.WecanalsonaturallyconceiveofGodas immanentinallcreationbytheexerciseofhisuniversalprovidentialactioneven asGodalsotranscendsit.Beyondthat,wecanreadilyconceiveofGodactingina specialwaywithintheworldtoredeemit,knowingthatsuchactionisinnoway competitivewiththebestinterestsofhumanagentsandwhattheydo.
Wecaneventakecareoftheso-calledproblemof “thecausaljoint.” The problemariseswhenweasktwosimplequestions.HowcanGodinteractwith physicalreality?Inbothinstancesthequestisforsomesortofmechanismor modelofdivineactionthatwouldallowGodtobeconnectedtotheworldandto humanagents.Theproblemdoesnotneedtobesolvedbutdissolved.Thevery term “causaljoint” ismisleadinghere.ItsusageputsGodintotheworldofphysical causesonaparwithaplumberlookingforacausaljointhemightuseto fixatoilet. OncewethinkofGodasagenuineagent,withahostofactivepowers(directand indirect),whichmayormaynotbeexercisedstraightoff,thewholeideaofacausal jointevaporates.Invokingtheideaofa “causaljoint” involvesacategorymistake whichreducesdivineactiontothelevelofphysicalcausationwithintheuniverse andfailstoreckonwiththeradicallydifferentideasofagencyandactionwhich areatstake.¹²Itwouldbeonaparwithaskingahumanagenttoidentifythe
¹²ForafullerdiscussionoftheproblemofthecausaljointseeVincentBrummer, “Farrer,Wilesand theCausalJoint,” ModernTheology 8(1992):1–14.Onthediscussionofthecausaljointasitrelatesto
causaljointneededtothinkathoughtorraiseanarm.Theplumbermayneeda “causaljoint ” to fixthetoilet;whenhe fi ndsa “causaljoint” hewillnotneeda causaljointtohookitintoplace;hejusthooksitintoplace.LikewiseGod simplyactsdirectlyinthephysicaluniverse.
ConsideronefurtherargumentforthinkingofGodasanagent.Itisobvious thatsignificanttheologicalworkcentersonthinkingthroughtheexplanationsas towhyGodactsasspecifiedintheChristiantradition.Thus,thinkingthroughthe problemofevillooksto findingplausiblereasonswhyGodwouldcreateaworld withsomuchevilinit.Resolvingdisputesaboutatonementrequirecareful considerationastowhythisorthattheory,say,penalsubstitutionorransom theories,providesanaptexplanationthatwouldbeinkeepingwithsolvingthe problemofsinandalienation.Orthinkofthedebatesabouttheplaceof incarnationintheeconomyofdivineaction.Shouldwethinkofincarnation happeningwhetherornottherewasaneedtoredeemusfromsin?Ifnot,what isthedivinerationaleforthinkinginthisway?Noneoftheseenterprisesmake senseifwedonotthinkofGodasanagentdoingthisorthatactionforcertain intentionsandpurposes.Hence,agencyisnotaperipheralorsecondaryconcept inourthinkingofGod;itisutterlycentralandnon-negotiable.Withoutthe conceptofagencyandthewiderconceptualframeworkinwhichitislodged, theseenterprisescollapseforthwith.
Theseare,then,compellingargumentsfordeployingasubtleandsuitably adjustedconceptionofagentcausationinthinkingaboutdivineagencyand divineaction.Itprovidesanattractivearrayofconceptsforansweringbasic questionsaboutthemeaningofdivineagencyandforsortingouthowto find one ’swayaroundindealingwithdivineaction.Theseareintheneighborhood ofmyowninformedintuitionsaboutagencyandaction.However,itisimportant weregistercarefullythestatusoftheseclaims.Itisfoolishtothinkthatthisnetwork ofconceptsissecurephilosophically;itisevenmorefoolishtothinkthattheywill provideallthatisneededforatheologyofdivineagencyandaction.
First,inreality,thewholeideaofagentcausationisaminorityreportin contemporaryanalyticphilosophyofaction.Some findthewholeideamysterious; others finditoutrightincoherent.Yetothers finditincompatiblewiththe findings ofmodernscienceorwhatisoftenreferredtoas “thescientificworldview.” I find noneoftheseobservationscompelling.However,whiletheologiansareatliberty totakeupthisconceptionofagencyandexploreitsexplanatorypowerbothasthe coretoatheologyofdivineagencyandastheplatformforunderstandingdivine action,thereisnoconsensuswithinphilosophythatitistheonlyorthebestway tothinkaboutagencyandaction.Ifitisputforwardasaclosedconceptionof agency as the conceptionofactiongoverningoureverydayusage Iwouldreject
thecreatedorderseeChrisDoran, “TheQuestfortheCausalJoint,” TheJournalofFaithandScience Exchange 4(2000):161–70.
itoutrightbecauseIthinkthattheconceptsofagencyandactionareopenrather thanclosedconcepts.Ifproposedasanilluminatingwayoftrackingacrucial stratumofagencyandaction,thenIamonboard.ThisisasfarasIamprepared togo.Moreover,thetheologianatthispointshouldreservetherighttoenrichthe coreideasinvolvedfromhisorherownresourcesinthetradition.Hence,thereis nothingherethatunderminesthesignificantplaceoftheologyindevelopingthe relevantmetaphysicalcategoriesneededtodeveloparichconceptionofdivine agencyanddivineaction.
Second,thiskindofresourcedoesnothingtotelluswhatGodreallydidorwhy Godactedasspecified.Myproposalsimplyprovidesaformalconceptualframeworkthatsignalshowwemightfruitfullyproceedinthinkingaboutdivineagency anddivineaction.Togettothelevelofmaterialclaimsweneedtospecifywhatwe thinkGodhasdoneandsetaboutunderstandingwhatmaybeinvolvedbywayof genuineagent-orientedexplanation.Thewhatandthewhyrequireustospellout thespecificactionsweplantopredicateofGodintheology.Inandaroundthis investigationwecanthentacklethewholeraftofissuesthatcropupindebates aboutdivineaction.Inthisrespectweencounteronceagainthegainsand limitationsthatcomefromphilosophicalanalysisofagencyandactiondiscourse. Theseapplyasforcefullytothiswayofthinkingaboutagencyandactionasany otherswemaydeploy.
NoteimmediatelythatIamnotconstruingGodasamoralagentinthesense thatwecanstandinjudgmentoverwhatGoddoes,ratherthanGodstandingin judgmentoverwhatwedo.¹³SortingoutthismoveisnotoneIwilltakeuphere. However,IamclaimingthatGodisanagentandthiswillsoundnotjustoddbut idolatrousinmanyears.TheworryisthatIamconceivingGodasjustonemore itemintheuniversealongsideotheragents.This,itwillbesaid,issimplyaformof idolatry.ItinvolvesanobviousanthropomorphicvisionofGodthatputsGodin competitionwithotheragentsforspaceintheuniverseandeschewsaproperly apophaticcautionaboutallourdiscourseaboutGod.Whilewemayallowsucha conceptionofGodforthosewhoneedit,say,bog-IrishPietistswhohavenot benefitedsufficientlyfromtheirexposuretoHeideggerortoMeisterEckhartorto anaccuratereadingofThomasAquinas,weshouldkeepallsuchdiscoursewithin awidercontextwherewethinkmorepurelyandaccuratelyofGodasBeingor BeingBeyondBeing.Loweringthetemperature,itwillbesaidthatweneedsome suchdesignationifwearetopreservethetranscendenceofGod,adopt fitting dispositionsinourworship,andpreserveaproperdistinctionbetweenGodand creation.GodasBeingorasBeingBeyondBeingsucceedsherebecause,some insist,thedistinctionbetweentheCreatorandthecreatureisgreaterthanany distinctionbetweencreatureandcreature.Perhapsitissomethingalongthese
¹³SeeBrianDaviesOP, “IsGodaMoralAgent?” inD.Z.Phillips,ed., WhoseGod?WhichTradition? (Aldershot:Ashgate,2008),97–122.
linesthatnotionssuchasPureAct,theAbsolute,AbsoluteSpirit,theInfinite,the TrueInfinite,andtheirnearrelativesaremeanttokeepinplace.
TheworrythatthinkingofGodasanagenthasevokedanotherobjectionthat showsupintheneighborhood.ThusMichaelJ.Doddsworriesthatthekindof positionembracedhereinvolvesadoptingadoctrineofunivocitywithrespectto thesemanticsofdivineactionandtreatsGodonaparwithotheritemsinthe universe.TakentogethertheclaimisthatGodisbeingconstruedas “aunivocal cause. ”¹⁴ Wearesaddledwith “aunivocalunderstandingofdivinecausality.”¹⁵ DrawingonhisexpositionofThomasAquinas,hestatesthematterformallyas follows.
Univocalcause.Anefficientcausethatactswithanotherefficientcauseofthe sameordertoproducesomeeffect.Sincetheybelongtothesameorder,their effectbelongsonlypartlytoeach,andonemayinterferewiththecausalityofthe other.Whentwomencarryatable,forinstance,theyactasunivocalcauses.Each isonlypartlyresponsibleforthemotionofthetable,andthecausalityofonemay interferewiththecausalityoftheother.Themoreweightonelifts,forinstance, thelessweightthereisfortheothertolift...Inasecondsense, “univocalcause” meansacausebelongingtothesamespeciesasitseffects,asaparentandits offspringinbiologicalreproduction.¹⁶
Inresponse, first,letmeclearthedecksbymakingittransparentthattheissue hereisnotwhetherweshouldaffirmanapophaticdimensiontoallourtalkabout God.Iaffirmthatwithoutreservation.Theissueiswhetherwehavetakenwith radicalseriousnessthecataphaticdimensionofoutdiscourseaboutGod.My worryhereisthattherehasbeenasemanticoverdoseontheapophaticwhichhas lostitscarefullyguardedplaceintheeconomyofthefaith.Itisthecataphatic contentofChristianitythatisatstakehere;noserioustheologiancansacri ficeitin thenameoftheproperqualificationsthatcanandshouldbemade.Speakingof GodasBeingorBeingBeyondBeingundercutsthisandweloseourbearingson allfronts.Likewise,clearlyifwethinkofGodasa “univocalcause” wearein dangeroftheoppositeerrorbyreducingGodtoabiggerandbetterversionof humanagents.
Second,itissurelymuchtooquickamovetobringupchargesofidolatry. Chargesofidolatryarecommonlymadeagainstanalyticphilosophy.Thecharges strikemeasodiousandinappropriate.Foronethingchargesofidolatryarevery seriousindeed;thesearenotcasualasides.Moreimportantly,weshouldnotelevate radicalphilosophicaldifferencesaboutthesemanticsofourdiscourseaboutGod
¹⁴ MichaelJ.Dodds, UnlockingDivineAction:ContemporaryScienceandDivineAction (Washington, D.C.:CatholicUniversityofAmerica,2012),118.
¹⁵ Ibid.,137.¹⁶ Ibid.,266.
intothehigh-octanechargeofidolatry.Theyarewhattheyare:seriousdifferences insemanticsandmetaphysics.Letthembekeptatthisdeflationarylevel.
Third,letmehighlightpreciselywhyIrejectthemainalternativeencapsulated inthelanguage,say,ofBeingorBeingBeyondBeing.Accordingtosomeofits proponents,thedifferencebetweentheCreatorandthecreatureisgreaterthan anydifferencebetweenacreatureandcreature.Aquinasputstheissueasclearlyas anyoneatthispoint: “Althoughitmaybeadmittedthatcreaturesareinsomeway likeGod, itmustinnowisebeadmittedthatGodislikecreatures ...A creature maybespokeninsomewaylikeGod; butnotthatGodislikeacreature. ”¹⁷
Considerascaleofdifferencesatthispoint.Thinkofthedifferencebetweena tableandamotorcar.Nowthinkofthedifferencebetweenatableandhuman being,betweenatableandasymphony,betweenatableandtheplotofanovel, betweenatableandthecomplexmathematicalequationthatAndrewWiles inventedtosolveFermat’sLastTheorem,andsoon.Asweprogressthrough theseries,Icompletelyloseanygriponhowtothinkofthedifference.Now,ifthe differencebetweenCreatorandcreatureisoffthisscale,evenmoresoItotallylose anygripontheconceptofGodandhowsuchconceptsasactioncanbepredicated ofGod.Thisissilencewithavengeance.Andthereisapricetopay:weare condemnedtoutterdarknessinthelifeoffaith.Moreover,wecannotbuildthis conceptofGodoutoftheideaofcreation exnihilo because,howeverdifficultthis notionmaybe,itclearlyassumeswecanthinkofGodasourCreator,thatwecan genuinelypredicatetheaction-predicate “creation” ofGod.Furthermore,Icannot seehowthiscanforamomentbereconciledwiththeGospelwhereweannounce thegoodnewsofwhatGodhasdoneforthesalvationoftheworld.Heremy pietismofalowerorderissimplynon-negotiable.
Fourth,andcomingclosertotheissueinhand,itissimplyanobviouserrorto disallowtheoptionthatisinplayhereonthegroundsthatIamworkingwithan accountofpredicationwhichiscommittedeithertounivocityortotreatingGod asonemoreitemintheuniverse.Ileaveopenfornowtheissueofhowtodeal withthelongstandingoptiononfreedomandgracethathasrealdifficultyin allowingforanyhumanactioninthedoctrineofsalvation.Synergismwhich allowsforgenuineco-operationbetweenGodandthehumanagent,asopposedto monergismwhichdoesnot findanydeeproleforhumanagency,isprimafaciea liveoption.
Thecrucialpointstoregisteratthisstagearesimple.Tobegin,thedeployment ofthelanguageofcausationasappliedtoGodoperateswithadoctrinenotof univocitybutofanalogy;wearebuildingonourconceptofactionaspredicatedof humanagentstoapplyittodivineaction.WedothiswhenwethinkofGodaslike aFather,oraGoodShepherd,oraSavior,andthelike.AgainstAquinaswedo
¹⁷ Quotedinibid.,161n5.Emphasismine.
indeedsaythattherearehighlyappropriatewaysinwhichGodcanbespokenof aslikecreatures.Furthermore,wearenotatalltreatingGodjustlikeonemore itemintherealmofordinarycausesbecauseGodistheCreatorwhouseshis causalpowerstocreateeveryothercreatureintheuniverse.Thus,wecanallowfor aradicaldistinctionbetweentheCreatorandcreatureinwhichthereisan asymmetricalrelationofdependence.Thisismorethanenoughtosustainthe claimthatGodisnotsimplyonemoreitemintheuniverse.Inaddition,thereal differenceinplayherearisesintheendbecausewehavetworadicallydifferent researchagendasinplay.Ontheonehand,therearethosewho findthatagent causationhasmetaphysicalpossibilitiesthatneedtobeexploited.Thisisthe projectinplayhere.Ontheotherhand,thereisthemassiveefforttoretrieveand defendafreshappropriationoftheThomistictraditioninmetaphysics.Thelatter islikeavastmazeofsystematicintuitions,technicalconcepts,metaphysical distinctions,andmetaphysicalspeculationsthatcanreadilycapturetheimagination.Fromwithinthisitisalltooeasytocutcornersbyfailingtotakethemeasure ofandavoidapejorativeinterpretationofthemoremodestalternativeonoffer here.Thisisnothingnewinphilosophyandtheology.
GiventheradicaldifferencesinperspectivethatareinevitableintheologyItake solaceinthecommentsofaThomistofanearliergenerationwhoseworkIhave longadmired.Thus,W.NorrisClarke,indevelopingaThomisticallyinspired metaphysics,hasthistosay.
Itisoneoftheparadoxesofintellectualhistory...thatSt.Thomasandtheother medievalscholasticsdidindeeddeveloparemarkablenotionofthepersoninuse oftheir theological explanationsoftheTrinity.Butforsomereasontheydidnot exploitthisremarkableintellectualachievementforthe philosophical explanation oftheperson.CardinalJosephRatzinger ...takesSt.Thomas andotherscholasticthinkers totaskrathersharplyfornotdevelopingthisrelationalnotionof thepersonwithinChristianphilosophybutinsteadslippingbackintothe traditionalBoethiandefinitionofapersonas “anindividualsubstanceofa rationalnature.” AndsoSt.Thomasfailedtorecognizethatintherelational notionofthepersondevelopedwithinthetheologyoftheTrinity “liesconcealed arevolutioninman’sviewoftheworld:theundividedswayofthinkinginterms ofsubstancesisended;relationisdiscoveredasanequallyvalidprimordialmode ofreality ...anditismadeapparenthowbeingthattrulyunderstandsitself graspsatthesametimethatinitsself-beingitdoesnotbelongtoitself;thatit onlycomestoitselfbymovingawayfromitselfand findingitswaybackas relatednesstoitstrueprimordialsource.”¹⁸ ¹⁸ W.NorrisClarke, ExplorationsinMetaphysics:Being,God,Person (NotreDame,IN:Universityof NotreDamePress,1994),212.Emphasisasintheoriginal.
Idonot findtherejectionofthenotionofsubstancehereanditsreplacementby “therelational” atallconvincing.However,Clarkeisdrawingattentiontoadeep tensionwithinthethinkingofAquinasthathasnotbeenresolved,namely,the formalconceptionofGodasfoundinhismetaphysicsandtheinformalconceptionofGodneededfortheologyproper.Theprimordialmodeofthinkingthatis neededwhenwethinkofGodisthatofGodasanagent;thisisindeedarevolution inourwayofthinkingoftheworld,anditbeginswiththedifficultbutrevolutionarynotionofagentcausation.
Aswemovetoconcludeitisworthdwellingbrie flyonanobjectionthathas beenlodgedagainstthiswholewayofthinkingbythedistinguishedJewishscholar DavidPatterson,anobjectionwhichissharedbymanywho findtheveryideaof reachingformetaphysicalhelpfortheologyasnareandadistraction.Toputthe issuemildly,theproblemforPattersonisnotjustthemistakeofseekingto find conceptstoarticulateourthinkingaboutGod,butthatthisveryprocessandits accompanyingimplicationsconstitutesdeicideandleadstotheeliminationof theJews.Itishardtothinkofamoredramaticobjectiontothekindofproject attemptedhere.Myaimhereisnottoengagethebroaderelementsinhisproposal, buttorespondtoonecrucialelementinhiswork.
Patterson’sobjectionsaresetforthasfollows.
Myargumentisthatinthiscaseanti-Semitismstemsnotfromthetheologyas suchbutfromthetheologicallongingtoconceptuallypossessGod,topresumeto knowthejudgmentofGod,andthustobeasGod.Initseffortstodeterminethe judgementofGodfromthecontentofdoctrine,dogmatictheologyconceptualizes,thematizes,andthusappropriatesGod;asEmmanuelLevinasstatesit, “in thematizingGod,theologyhasbroughthimintothecourseofbeing,whilethe GodoftheBiblesignifies...thebeyondofbeing.” InawordtheGodoftheBible isnottheGodofAbraham,Isaac,andJacob.¹⁹
Oncecomprehendedandturnedovertoaconcept,theGodoftheologyisno longerapersona,nolongera Who withwhomweenterintoarelationandfrom whomweconceiveacommandingrevelation;rather,theconceptualizedGodisa What,anobjecttobeseizedandanauthoritytobeinvokedwhenattemptingto justifywhatisotherwiseunjustifiable.²⁰
Thedrivetoestablishsuchadogmatictheologyisrootedinanti-Semiticlonging tobeastheGodofhistory,notonlyknowinggoodandevilbutholdingthekeys tothekingdomthatawaitshumanitywhenChristreturnsathistory’send.²¹
¹⁹ DavidPatterson, Anti-SemitismandItsMetaphysicalOrigins (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,2015).
²⁰ Ibid.,57.Emphasisasintheoriginal.²¹Ibid.,64.
...whenChristianslosethelaw,theyloselove:thesuppressionofJudaismisa suppressionoflove.ItistruethattheChristianScriptureinvokestheimportance offaith,hope,andlove,declaringthat “thegreatestoftheseislove” (ICorinthians13:13).ButwhenChristiantheologygoesdogmatic,theformula isfaith,hope,anddogma,andthegreatestoftheseisdogma,whosedogma determinesthecreedthatunlocksthegatesofparadise.²²
Forthemomentlet’sdistinguishbetweenwhatisgoingonintellectuallyinthe formationofcreedsfromthemovetothinkofGodintermsofagencyasIhave arguedheretofore.Itisclearlythelatterthatgetsusoffonthewrongfootinitially, solet’stacklePatterson ’sobjectionheadon.First,itisinterestingthatindeploying theworkofLevinasheinvokestheverylanguagethatIrejectedattheoutsetof thischapterandappliesittoGod.Thus,theGodoftheBible,wearetold,signifies “thebeyondofbeing.” So,weareafterallattemptingtothematizethedivineeven thoughI findthewholenotionofBeingBeyondBeingunintelligible.Second, PattersonhimselfdeploysconceptstodepictthedivinewhenhetellsusthatGod is “ apersona, ” a “Who” with “whomweenterintoarelationandfromwhomwe receiveacommandingrevelation.” Third,Pattersonisalsoveryclearthatheis preparedtopredicatevariousactionsofGod.Thus,Godhasmadeacovenant withIsrael,hasrevealedhimselfatMountSinai,givescommands,andwillsenda MessiahwhowillbringanendtotheexileoftheJewsandsomehowleadallof humanitytorealizetheonenessofthehuman-to-humanandthehuman-todivinerelationships.
ItwouldbecheapandeasytopointoutthatPattersonisnowhoistbyhisown petard,forafterallheisnowseekingtopossessGodandhassethisfootontheroad toanti-Semitism.Themoreseriousobjectionstohispositionarethese.First,the realdisputeinitiallyisadisputeaboutwhatGodissaidtohavedoneinIsraeland whetherthatincludesthepossibleactivityofGodinJesusChristinfulfillmentof God’spromisestoIsrael.Thisisatheologicaldisputeandthereisnopointin runningawayfromtheologyintoadistractingcontrastbetweenbeliefanddoingif wearetodealwithitadequately.Second,itissurelyplausibletoarguethatanyone committedtoanynarrativeofdivineactionwillneedtoexplorethecrucialconcepts inplayaswedoso.Inturnthiswillnaturallylead,dependingonthenarrative invoked,toeffortstospecifymorecomprehensivelywhatGodhasdoneandwhy. Third,thewholepointofpursuingtheoptionofthinkingaboutGodasanagent ispreciselytopreservetheclaimthatGodisaWhoandnotaWhat,and thereaftertouseourGod-givenpowersofre flectiontoseewherethatleadsus.It isnonsensetoexplainthiskindofworkassomekindofefforttopossessGod,or tobeasGod,ortodeliverjudgmentsastowhoisorisnotinGod’skingdom. ²²Ibid.,65.
Moreover,itisequallynonsensetothinkthatthisperseisthesourceofantiSemitism.Pattersonisrightinhisbroadrenderingofthehorrendoushistoryof anti-Semitism;andheisrightinmanyoftheothercriticismshelodgesagainst theologians.However,heisequallyrighttocommendthosewhoarechallenging thelongreignofsupersessionismfromwithintheheartofChristiantheology itself.
Inmakingthiscommendationheisinfactcallingnotforlessbutformore theologicalreflection.Indeed,onefeatureofhisworkthatI finddeeplyattractive istheunapologeticandboldstancehetakesininsistingonametaphysicalaccount oftheoriginsofanti-Semitism.InrealityPatterson’sprojectistheologicalrather thanmetaphysical.Givenhisrejectionoftheologicalworkasheunderstandsit, thisisnotsurprising.Theonlyspaceleftoverintheacademywhenwejettison theologyisperhapsastammeringuseoftheterm “metaphysical. ” However,the argumentasawholeisatheologicalargument.Itcanbesummedupastheclaim thatanti-Semitismstemsfromanativehumanrebelliontoacknowledgethe realityandrevelatoryactionoftheGodofIsrael.Thisisarefreshingpositionto adoptandtodevelopwiththeeruditionandbrillianceondisplayinPatterson’ s workhereandacrosstheyears.Thisisinfactthebeginningsofamoveintoa theologicaltheologywhichrefusestobeconfinedtothecategoriesthathave developedvariousvetoesinordertokeepustongue-tiedandembarrassed.So mayPatterson’stribeincreaseand flourish.Intimemaytheyjoinwiththerestof uswhotakewithradicalseriousnessclaimsaboutwhattheGodofIsraelhasdone forthewelfareofusall.
Finally,onapositivenote,onewaytothinkofmyclaimistoseeitaswhat emergeswhenwestandinsidethecanonicalheritageofthechurchandseekto indicatethefundamentalcategoryinplaywhenwethinkandspeakofGod. NothinglessthanconstruingGodasanagentissufficientlyfelicitous.Iwould sayexactlythesameaboutthedoctrineoftheTrinity.Indeed,Ithinkthatone advantageofthinkingaboutGodasanagentispreciselythattheconceptofagent isasuf ficientlyopenenoughconcepttobestretchedtoincludeaTri-Personal Agentwhoistheobjectofouradorationandservice.Lookingbackalmosta century,IthinkthattheBiblicalTheologyMovementwasnotwideofthemark whenitproposedthatwethinkofGodastheOneWhoActs.Themovementasa wholewasriddledwithproblems,notleastvisibleinitslackofphilosophical sophisticationanditshostilitytosystematictheology,butitwasontherighttrack. ThatrighttrackisitsbasicintuitionthatintheJewishandChristiantraditionGod isbestunderstoodasanagent.
DivineAgency,DivineFreedom, andDivineSuffering
Theuseofagentcausationtospelloutthemetaphysicsofdivineagencyisan excitingenterprise;itcanalsobeaprecariousone.Thetheologicalrationalefor thisproposalisstraightforward.HumanagentsaremadeintheimageofGod;to useadaringphraserecentlyattributedtoAnselm,weshareinameasureinthe aseityofGod.¹Godinmakingushasbestowedonusthecapacitiesandpowers neededtocareforcreation.Moresignificantly,GodinthePersonoftheSon becameoneofus,livingafullhumanlifeeventothepointofdeathbycrucifixion. Ratherthanseethisasapuzzletoberesolved,webuiltitintoourveryconception ofdivinity.GodbecameincarnateinChrist;therefore,thereisanentirelyproper kinshipbetweenthedivineandthehuman.Iwanttolocatethatkinshipunderthe rubricofagentcausation.Fromthephilosophicalside,conceivingGodalongthe linesofhumanagencyisinkeepingwiththelong-standingpracticeofusing humandiscoursetodepictthedivinebymeansofanalogy,aswhenweuseahost ofhumananalogiestoportraywhatGodislike.Wecandothisinformallywithout aprecisionistcalculus,makingthenecessaryadjustmentsasweworkourwayinto thehighwaysandbywaysofChristianteaching.
Itisimportanttograspourmodeofthinkinghere.Wearenotstartingoutwith somevisionofthehumanagentandthenaddinganetworkofgreat-making propertiesinordertocomeupwithabiggerandbetterversionofhumanagents. Norareweprojectingasuperlativeimageofourselvesontotheuniverse.Weare seekingasbestwecantoarticulatewhatweencounterandseeonceweimmerse ourselvesintheGospeloftheKingdomofGodandgoontostandwithinthedeep, canonicalfaithofthechurch.ThishappensinitiallyinChristianinitiationand thenintheworkofsystematictheology.Beyondthatweareinsearchofanapt conceptionofthedivinethatcanhelpusnegotiateourintellectualconversionand thatwillprovideappropriatebackgroundassumptionsinoursystematictheology andinourworshipandservicetotheLivingGod.Intraditionaltermswearestill workinginthemodeoffaithseekingunderstanding.
Evenwithallthisinplace,thereisplentyofroomforacutepaininthebrain. Wenowwanttoknowwhatthisvisionofdivineagencyinvolveswithrespectto
¹KathrynRogers, AnselmonFreedom (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),91.
whatwemightcallthematerialandontologicalsubstanceoftheproposal.How farcanwedeployourconventionalthinkingaboutpersonalagencyinthinking moredeeplyabouttheagencyofGod?Ofcourse,thereisnoagreementonhowto interpretconventionalthinkingaboutpersonalagency.Thinkforamomentof thedebatesaboutfreedomanddeterminism.Orthinkofthepuzzlesthatarise whenweusesuchconceptsasmotives,emotions,passions,affections,intentions, desires,inclinations,andreasons.So,itistobeexpectedoncewedigdeeperinto agencyaspredicatedofGodthatwearegoingtorunintoahostofextrapuzzles, notleastbecausewewanttopreservearadicaldistinctionbetweentheLivingGod andhumancreaturesof fleshandblood.
Ourinquiriesarebothenrichedandhandicappedbytheworkofourpredecessors.Theyareenrichedinthatwedonothavetostartfromscratch.Thereisa wealthofsplendidbiblical,theological,andphilosophicalmaterialalreadyinplay. TheyarehandicappedinthattheWesthastakenitscuesonmanyoftheissues involvedfromAugustineandAquinas,bothofwhomaresolidlylodgedas canonicaltheologiansinbothCatholicismandProtestantism.Formanythe defaultpositionistotakethese figuresashavingeffectivelysolvedtherelevant problems;so,thetaskisessentiallyoneofexposition,defense,andenrichment. HencethereisadefaultstanceinwhicharangeofconceptssuchasPureAct, impassibility,atemporality,andsimplicityformatightlycoordinatedsystemof thoughtthatistakentobenormativeanddefinitive.Ifonethinksthatthis researchprogramisthewaytogo,thenwellandgood.Ifonedoesnot,theweight thatithasinthecurrentlandscapeissogreatthatitisveryeasytobedrawnso deepintoitthatitinhibitsthearticulationofabetterwayforward.Evencriticsin searchofanalternative findthemselvesinadvertentlydrivenbyitsagenda.
Ishallproceedinthischapterinthefollowingmanner.First,Ishallindicatethe groundsforholdingtoastrong,materialaccountofagencyasappliedtoGod. Thus,Ishallarguethatwecannotavoidpredicatingsuchconceptsaschoice, mercy,rationaldeliberation,love,suffering,wrath,andlong-sufferingpatienceto God.Let’scallthistheagentaccountofdivineagency;togiveitamoreformal name,let’scallitagentism.²InthecourseofmyexpositionIshallrespondtosome standardobjectionsthatarereadilyavailable.Second,Ishallarguethatthecentral claimsofagentismareincompatiblewithoneprevailingtheologicalparadigm, namely,Thomism,whichhaslongbeenoneofthemostsophisticatedoptionsin
²Iwasinspiredtodevelopthisdesignationfromtheuseoftheterm “actionisticprovidence” deployedbySimonMariaKopfinhis finedoctoraldissertation, DivineProvidenceandNatural Contingency:NewPerspectivesfromThomasAquinasontheDivineActionDebate,unpublishedPhD dissertation,UniversityofOxford,2019.Ipreferitto,say,personalism,atermwhichhastoomuch baggageattachedtoitforpresentpurposes.Inworkingthroughthechallengeofdelineatingwhat ImeanhereIhavefoundReinhardFeldmeierandHermanSpieckermann, GodoftheLiving:ABiblical Theology (Waco,TX:BaylorUniversityPress,2011)exceptionallystimulating.
theWest.³Third,IshallarguewhyIdonot findthealternativeThomisticagenda atallpersuasive.Finally,Ishallindicatesomeoftheissuesthatnaturallyarisebut whichIwillleavetootherstopursueinthefuture.Ishalltakenoteofthecrucial elementsinvolvedinarichresearchagendawhichseekstothinkofGodinterms ofagentcausation.
Asapointofentrytomyaccountconsiderthefollowingpivotaltextfromthe bookofExodus.
Yearspassed,andtheKingofEgyptdied,buttheIsraelitesstillgroanedin slavery.Theycriedout,andtheappealforrescuefromslaveryroseuptoGod. Heheardtheirgroaning,andrememberedhiscovenantwithAbraham,Isaacand Jacob;hesawtheplightofIsrael,andhetookheedofit.⁴
ShortlythereafterinthedialoguewithMoses,thetextgoesontosay:
TheLordsaid,IhaveindeedseenthemiseryofmypeopleinEgypt.Ihaveheard theiroutcryagainsttheslave-masters.Ihavetakenheedoftheirsuffering,and comedowntorescuethemfromthepowerofEgypt,andtobringthemupoutof thatcountryintoa fine,broadland... ⁵
IfwethinkoftheagencyofGodimplicitinthesetextsthenwecansaythatGod hascertainbeliefsthatconstituteknowledge,thathehasempathyforthepeoplein theirsuffering,andthatheisresponsivetotheirsuffering.Putmoreformally,God hascertainmentalstatesandcertainemotions.WecanaddthatGodactsintime andthathedeliberatesaboutthebestwayinthecircumstancestokeepcovenant withIsrael,whichisthreatenedbygenocideatthehandsofPharaoh.Wecanalso addthatGodhasmemoriesinthatheremembershiscovenantwithAbraham, Isaac,andJacob.Godalsohasdesiresinthathedesirestosethispeoplefree.More broadly,wemightsaythatGodhasanenduringcharacterornature,thatis,oneof faithfulnesstohischosenpeople,andbecauseoftheiracknowledgementofthat nature,thepeoplehaveuntilthispointtrustedinhispromisestogivethemaland. Moreover,itpreciselythispromiseandthecharacterthatitexpressesthathas beencalledintoquestionbytheactionsofPharaoh,forifPharaohsucceedsthen thecovenantwithAbrahamisasham.PutdifferentlywemightsaythatGodhas certainenduringdispositionsthatmayormaynotbeexercised.EquallyGodhas variouscapacities,say,tomakecovenants,tospeaktoMoses,tobeawareofthe
³Thereare,ofcourse,otheroptions,notablytheproposalsdevelopedinProcesstheologyandOpen Theism,proposalsthatIdonot findpersuasive.Inanycase,giventherevivalofThomism,Idonot thinkthereisanythingtomatchthedepthandcarethatthistraditionarticulatesrelativetomy projecthere.
⁴ Exodus2:23–5(NewEnglishBible[NEB]translation).
⁵ Exodus3:7–8(NEB).
plightofslavesbeingill-treatedbytheirmasters,torescuehispeoplefromEgypt, andpresumablythesecapacitiesmayormaynotbeexercised.
So,wehaveapackageofcharacteristicsthatwecannowquicklyidentifyin termsofmemories,beliefs,desires,emotions,dispositions,andcapacities.Godisa dynamicagentwithmanyofthequalitieswe findinordinaryhumanagents.Yet, ifwebroadenourobservationstotakeintoaccountthewiderbiblicalcanon, wediscoverthatthisisnoordinaryagent.ThisagentisalsotheCreatorofthe universeandisworthyoftrustandworship.Thisagentisnotvisibletothe physicaleye,actsinsideandoutsideEgyptandacrossallspace,andendures acrosstime.So,Godisspiritualandtranscendsspaceandtime,forhisactionsare notconstrainedbyspaceandtime.AsGodisomnipresentincreationhisactions reachacrossallspaceandtime.Thisagententersintoenduring,genuinerelationshipsbutcannotinanywaybereducedtosomekindofsentimentalagentwhois tobetakenforgrantedortreatedasapious,super-friendlylabor-savingdevice. Forthisisanagentwhojudgesusandtakesourdecisionsseriously.Thisagenthas transcendentknowledge,forGodknowsthefutureactionsofhumanagents,say ofPharaoh,includingwhatPharaohwoulddoifhewereindifferentcircumstances.Wherehumanagentshavecomprehension,canspeculate,andcan makepredictions,Godhassuper-comprehensionthatreachesasfarasevery aspectoffuturehumanactions.⁶
Inthecaseofhumanagents,itisclearthattheiractionsaresometimes determinedandnotjustinfluencedbytheactionsorpresenceofotheragents.It isalsoclearthatattimeshumanagentsaresoovercomebytheiremotionsand inclinationsthattheydothingsthatarenolongerconstrainedbyreason. Normatively,however,humanactionsareheldtobegenuinelyfreewhenthey arenotdeterminedtoactbyothers;andwhentheyarenotatthemercyoftheir passions.Inaddition,itisclearthathumanagentsnotonlyhaveempathyfor othersandtherebysufferbutalsosufferinthemoredirectsenseofenduringgreat painandmentalanguish.So,itisnaturaltoaskinwhatsenseGodhasfreedom,is governedinhisactionsbyemotionsandpassions,andmayormaynotendure
⁶ ThomasFlintdismissesthispossibilitynotedbyLouisdeMolinaas “murkyandunhelpful.” See Flint, DivineProvidence:TheMolinistAccount (Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1998),56n26. YishaiCohenagreeswiththisobservation: “[I]tisdifficulttosee,amongotherthings,whyonemust infinitelysurpasssomepersoninintellectinordertoknowcertaintruthsaboutthatperson.Atany rate, untilwearegivenacontemporarydefensethatappealstometaphysicalandepistemologicalconcepts withwhichweareatleastfamiliar,ourcredenceinthedoctrineofsupercomprehensionshouldbelow.” Seehis “CounterfactualsofDivineFreedom,” forthcominginthe InternationalJournalofPhilosophyof Religion,12,emphasismine.Cohenallowsforthecoherenceofthenotion.Moreover,Iagreeitwould behelpfultobeabletoconnectdivinesuper-comprehensionwithourordinaryideasofcomprehension.ThedeeperquestionhereiswhetherweshouldlimitGod’saccesstotruthtothemodesofaccess thatarenormativeforhumanagents,anotionthatisitselfhighlycontested.Itmaywellbeherethat,as thereferencetothedifficultyof “seeing” makesclear,wearedealingwithradicallydifferentintuitions. Cohen’spaperisanoutstandingexerciseindetached,precisionistanalyticphilosophythatcaptures manyoftheissuesatstake.
suffering.Howdoouranswerstothesequestions figureintheaccountofdivine agencyIamseekingtoarticulatehere?
Asforfreedom,thecrucialinitialobservationisthatbyfreedomImeanthatit isuptoGodwhatGoddoes.So,Godisthesourceofhisownactions.Hisactions involvethevoluntaryexerciseoftherelevantcapacities.Putinotherwords,God enjoyscompleteself-determination.ThismeansthatinsomecircumstancesGod coulddootherwise.So,forexample,therewasnonecessitythatGodcreatethe universe;itisaspontaneousactofsheercreativityakintothecreativityofan artist.Moreover,inhisactsofparticularprovidence,Godcouldachievehis purposesinmorethanoneway.So,Godcouldcreatehumanbeingsotherwise thanbytheprocessnowgenerallyagreedwithinthebiologicalsciences,thatis,by evolution.⁷ Iseenogoodreasonnottoapplythisconceptionoffreedom,the freedomtodootherwise,incertaincircumstancestoGod.
However,thisisnottheonlyconceptionoffreeactionsavailabletous. ConsiderJolene,whohasamentallyhandicappedchildcalledPenelope.She wasadvisedduringthepregnancybyherdoctorstohaveanabortion.She consultedwithfriendsandthefatherofPenelopeanditbecameclearthat, whileshecouldhavedoneotherwise,herconsciencedidnotallowhertodoso. Therewasarealsenseinwhichshecouldnotdootherwise.Wecancallthe necessityinvolvedherenotaphysicalormetaphysicalnecessitybutamoral necessity.Moralnecessitycomesindegrees.AsJolenelovinglytakescareof Penelope,itbecomesclearthatadeepermoralnecessitydevelopssuchthat whenshelooksback,she findsitabhorrentthatsheeverevenconsideredan abortionforPenelopeinthe firstplace.Moreover,ifgivenvastsumsofmoneyor threatenedbysomeradicallyevilpersontoengageinharmingPenelopeinany way,shewouldinsistthatthiswasutterlyimpossibletodo.Herenduringlovefor herchildpreventedthisfromevenbecominganintellectualoption.Godhelpher, shecoulddonoother.
Thissortofloveisexactlythekindoflovethesaintsdevelopthroughgrace.⁸ ForthemtheirloveforGodandforothershasreachedthepointwhereawhole rangeofactionsareoffthetable.Moreover,theyinsistthattheexpressionsofthat loveinvariousactionsareprofoundlyfreeeventothepointwheretheveryideaof beingabletodootherwiseissillyifnototiose.Theydo,ofcourse,inexpressing theirloveforGodandneighbor,makedecisionswhichcouldhavebeenotherwise, forthereismorethanonewaytoloveGodandneighbor.Inmakingthese decisionstheydeliberatebyconsideringvariousalternative;andinweighingthe alternativestheyconsidervariousbeliefsabouttheworldandvariousreasons,but thesebeliefsandreasonsarenotcausesinthesensethattheydeterminetheoutcome inthewaythemovementsofbilliardballscausallydeterminethemovementof
⁷ IshalltakeuptheproposalsrepresentedbytheIntelligentDesignMovementinchapter10.
⁸ Ishalltakeuptheroleofgraceinsuchactionsinchapter3.
