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DeniableContact NorthernIreland NIALLÓDOCHARTAIGH GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
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Anintricateminuet ...so delicatelyarrangedthatbothsides couldalwaysmaintainthattheywerenotincontact,sostylized thatneithersideneededtobeartheonusofaninitiative,so ellipticalthatexistingrelationshipsonbothsideswerenot jeopardized.
HenryKissingeronhisback-channelcontactswithChinain1971 (Kissinger,1979:187)
If[theBritishgovernment]thinkthereissomethingtobelost bystatingpubliclyhow flexibletheywouldbe,orhowimaginative,wearesayingtheyshouldtellusprivately ...thereisan avenuewhichtheyareawareofwherebytheycanmakewhat imaginativestepstheyarethinkingaboutknowntothe Republicanmovement.
MartinMcGuinnesspubliclyinvitingtheBritishgovernmentin February1990toreopenaback-channelusedduringprevious phasesofcontactwithrepublicans
(AnPhoblacht/RepublicanNews,22February1990)
Iftheimplication ...is thatweshouldsitdownandtalkwith Mr.AdamsandtheProvisionalIRA,Icansayonlythatthat wouldturnmystomachandthoseofmosthon.Members;we willnotdoit.
PrimeMinisterJohnMajor,speakingintheHouseof Commons,1November1993,shortlybeforesecretbackchannelcontactswiththeIRAwererevealed (Hansard,HCDeb,vol.231col.35,1November1993)
Werewemakingstatementswhichwerenotstrictlytrue,in termsofrespondingtotheHouseofCommons?Icertainly believed,inthecontextoftheconduitwhichexisted,thatwe couldcontinuetosaythatwewerenotindirectcontact.
PeterBrooke,SecretaryofStateforNorthernIreland(1989–92) whoendorsedthereopeningofasecretback-channeltotheIRA in1991,ondenyingtheywereincontact (MallieandMcKittrick1996:106)
Wewerealldancingontheheadofapinastowhatnegotiations meant.
JohnChilcot,PermanentUnder-SecretaryattheNorthern IrelandOffice(1990–97)ontheexposureoftheback-channel in1993 (interviewwiththeauthor,25May2020).
Acknowledgements Inresearching,writing,andthinkingaboutback-channelnegotiationoverthepast decadeandahalfIhaveenjoyedthesupport,encouragement,andadviceof exceptionalcolleagues,collaborators,andfriends,manyofwhomreaddraft chaptersorgavefeedbackontalks.IowespecialthankstoIanMcBride, BrendanO’Leary,JenniferTodd,LorenzoBosi,RichardEnglish,KatyHayward, SinišaMalešević,IsakSvensson,TimWilson,RogerMacGinty,DannySokatch, KieranMcEvoy,PatrickGriffin,AogánMulcahy,NiallÓMurchú,andStefan Malthaner.IamespeciallygratefultoBreandánMacSuibhne,whoreadtheentire manuscriptandmadevaluablesuggestionsforchanges.
Manythankstocolleaguesworkinginrelatedareas,andtofriends,forsharing knowledge,forofferingfeedbackonworkinprogress,andforthought-provoking conversationsovertheyears:IhavelearnedmuchfromPeterMcLoughlin,Huw Bennett,CathyGormley-Heenan,HastingsDonnan,PatriciaSleeman,Kate Kenny,AnnaBryson,AdrianGuelke,MargaretO’Callaghan,JohnCoakley, DonatelladellaPorta,FrankO’Connor,EamonnO’Kane,SanjinUležic,Paul Dixon,PaulMitchell,KevinBean,BrianHanley,BrendanBrowne,Maria Power,LiorLehrs,SandraBuchanan,EamonnMcCann,EoghanMcTigue,Paul Arthur,MarcMulholland,PaulDixon,DawnWalsh,DavidMitchell,Etain Tannam,DominicBryan,KevinClements,KarenBrounéus,StephenWinter, DanaReinhardt,DaphneWinland,SašaBožič,SimoneKuti,NeilJarman,Cera Murtagh,RobSavage,JuttaBakonyi,SarahCovington,HughLogue,José Henríquez,AndrewForde,MáirínNíGhadhra,LaurenceMcKeown,Peter Taylor,CaroleHolohan,RosieLavan,RachelKowalski,AdamBrodie,Luisdela Calle,DieterReinisch,LeahDavid,andRobertWhite.IamgratefultoTom Hennessey,JohnBew,GeoffreyWarner,SimonPrince,andTonyCraigfor generouslysharingtheirknowledgeoftherelevantarchivalsourcesandto KristineHöglundforsendingmeacopyofherbook.Aspecialwordofthanks toColinKiddforsuggestingIincludeanaccountofhowIcametowritethebook. Iwanttoexpressmyappreciationinparticularfortwocolleagueswhopassed awayinrecentyearsandaregreatlymissed:JohnDarbywho,asDirectorof INCOREandmy firstacademicboss,wasunfailinglygenerousandfullofwisdom andgoodhumour,andElizabethMeehanwhomI firstmetasaPhDstudentin Queen’sUniversityBelfastandmuchlaterhadthegreatpleasureofworkingwith asco-editorofabookonIrishpoliticswithKatyHayward.
IbenefitedgreatlyfromtimespentasavisitingfellowattheScuolaNormale SuperiorediPisa,theUniversityofAuckland,theNationalCentreforPeaceand
ConflictStudiesintheUniversityofOtago,SenatorGeorgeJ.MitchellInstitutefor GlobalPeace,SecurityandJustice,Queen’sUniversityBelfast,andasavisiting researcherattheHamburgInstituteforSocialResearch.
WhilewritingthebookIhadtheprivilegeofworkingwithagroupofexcellent anddedicatedearly-careerresearchersandPhDstudentswhowereworkingon relatedtopics.IlearntmuchwhileworkingwithMaggieScullandThomasLeahy duringtheirtimeasIrishResearchCouncilpostdoctoralscholarsinNUIGalway, andfromPhDstudentsGiadaLaganà,GaryHussey,AnnaTulin-Brett,Peter Doherty,CarmelMartyn,MichaelMartin,ShadiAbu-Ayyash,MaciejCuprys, DeirdreMcHugh,andElizabethBall.ThankyoutointernsGiadaLaganà, AgnieszkaSendur,JasmineAshby,CianHegarty,andAoifeInmanwhoeach spentanumberofweeksannotatingarchivaldocuments.
IamdeeplygratefultothelateBrendanDuddyforsharinghismemoriesand hisanalysisoveraperiodofseveralyearsandformakinghisextraordinary personalarchiveavailabletoresearchersthroughtheuniversityarchivesinthe NationalUniversityofIrelandGalway.Isaymoreabouthimintheepilogue. Thankyoutothemembersofhisfamilywhowereunfailinglyhelpfulandwho spoketome,andtowideraudiences,abouttheirperspectiveonevents,including Margo,BrendanJr,Shauna,Patricia,Larry,andBrendan’sson-in-lawEamonn Downey,whoorganizedBrendan’sprivatepaperswithexceptionalcareand commitment.
Anoldfriend,GarbhánDowney,playedavitalroleinthegenesisanddevelopmentofthisbook.Iamgratefulforallofhissupportandadvice.Thankyouto MickRuanefor filmingtheinterviewswithBrendanDuddyinDerryandediting themfordepositintheNUIGalwayarchive.Andthankstomyformercolleague inINCORE,LynMoffett,forcomingtoatalkIgaveinDerryafewyearsafter Ihadpublished ‘CivilRightstoArmalites’,mymonographontheearlyyearsof theTroubles,andsayingtomeafterwards ‘I’mwaitingforthesequel.’ Thisisa kindofsequel.ThankstofriendsinDerryandDonegal,PaulO’ConnorandLaura Pozo-Rodriguez,GeorgeHolbrookeandConorGilmore,LisaRodgersandColin Burns,andtoDióg,FergalandthelateDeirdreO’Connellforalloftheirhelp. Warmestthanksandappreciationtomymother-in-law,Terry,andlatefather-inlaw,AndyBarrwhohavebeenanunfailingsourceoflocalDerryknowledgefor decades.
Iamdeeplygratefultoalloftheintervieweeswhosharedtheiranalysisand memories.Ihavebeengreatlyimpressedbythecalibreofthoseinvolvedinthe efforttobringanendtoconflictinNorthernIreland,onallsides.Aspecialword ofthankstothelateandmuch-missedMauriceHayesforhisclear-eyedthinking andenjoyablecompany.Hispapers,whichhedepositedinNUIGalwayshortly beforehisdeath,areanas-yetuntappedresourceforscholarsofcommunity relationsandconflicttransformation.
ThankyoutomyinspiringandcommittedcolleaguesatNUIGalwayfortheir support,advice,ideas,andconversationsovertheyears,especiallyDanCarey, ShaneDarcy,Su-MingKhoo,AnneByrne,ChrisCurtin,PeteMorriss,Ricca Edmondson,RayMurphy,RachelHilliard,JohnCanavan,EoinDaly,Brendan Flynn,MaryHarris,KathleenCavanaugh,MarkHaugaard,KevinO’Sullivan, DeirdreByrnes,HenrikeRau,NicholasAllen,SeánRyder,LionelPilkington, andStaceyScriver.
ManythankstoVeraOrschel,KieranHoare,BarryHoulihan,andAisling KeaneoftheNUIGalwayarchives,andtolibrarianJohnCoxandLouisde Paor,foralloftheirworkon,andsupportfor,theaccessionoftheDuddypapers totheJamesHardimanlibraryinNUIGalway.Thankyoutothestaffand archivistsattheLinenhalllibrarypoliticalcollectioninBelfast,theMcClaylibrary inQueen’sUniversityBelfast,theLSEarchives,theKing’sCollegeLondon archives,theNationalArchivesatKew,theNationalLibrary,andtheNational ArchivesinDublin.IamgratefultotheLiddellHartCentreforMilitaryArchives forpermissiontoquotefromthe EndgameinIreland archives,totheJames HardimanlibraryatNUIGalwayandthefamilyofBrendanDuddyforpermissiontoreproducematerialsfromtheBrendanDuddycollection,andtoKat O’MaraofAPfororganizing,inthemidstofCovid-19,thescanningofthe photoofDonaldMiddleton.
Someofthematerialinthebookhasappearedindifferentformsinavarietyof publicationsoverthepastdecade.Iamgratefulforpermissiontoreproduce materialthatpreviouslyappearedinthe FieldDayReview, PoliticalStudies, JournalofPeaceResearch,InternationalJournalofConflictManagement (coauthoredwithIsakSvensson), DynamicsofAsymmetricConflict,andin Track TwotoPeace (LosAngeles:FigueroaPress).Fulldetailsofthesepublicationsarein thebibliography.¹
SomeoftheresearchforthebookwassupportedbytheIrishResearchCouncil NewFoundationsgrant ‘PoliticalViolence:BuildingaNewInternational Network’;theIrishResearchCouncilforHumanitiesandSocialSciencesgrant ‘TheMediationofArmedConflictsinNorthernIrelandandBosnia-Herzegovina’ (withSinišaMalešević);aGalwayUniversityFoundationgrantto filminterviews fortheBrendanDuddyArchiveatNUIGalway;andanNUIGalwayCollegeof Arts,SocialSciences,andCelticStudiesResearchSupportSchemegranttostudy the1980/81hungerstrikes.
MythankstoCathrynSteeleatOxfordUniversityPressforoverseeingthe journeyfrombookproposaltobookwithgreatprofessionalismandpatience,to KatieBishop,EmmaVarley,SindujaAbirami,andKalpanaSagayanathanfor ¹ÓDochartaigh2011a,2011b,2011c,2015;ÓDochartaighandSvensson2013,
ensuringasmoothproductionprocess,toPhilDinesforthethoroughandcareful copyediting,andtothethreereadersfortheirthoughtfulandhelpfulcomments. ThankyoutomyparentsNiamhandEoinandtomybrotherandsisters Conor,Eavan,andAideenfortheirsupport.ThanksabovealltoCarol-Ann, Caoimhe,andDarafortheiralwayslivelycompany,theirgreatencouragement, andforkeepingmeonmytoes.
Thispublicationwasgrant-aidedbythe PublicationsFundof NationalUniversityofIrelandGalway/ Rinneadhmaoiniúaranbhfoilseachánseo tríChisteFoilseachán OllscoilnahÉireann,Gaillimh
1.Escalation: ‘TheirWarGotOutofHandandOursGot OutofHandToo’ 19
2.Negotiation: ‘DogmaticandImpossibleDemands’ 41
3.TheIntermediary: ‘AVesselToBeUsed’ 73
4.Contact: ‘ClimbingaMountainWithoutRopes’
5.1975Ceasefire: ‘EveryoneTrying’
6.LongWarandaPolicyVacuum: ‘PassingtheTimeDecently’
7.TheHungerStrikes: ‘PlayingTheirLastCard’?165
8.BritishPolicyandIRAStrategy: ‘ADifficultHandtoPlay’ 188
9.BackTotheBack-Channel: ‘TheyShouldTellUsPrivately’ 211
10.PeaceProcess: ‘AllTheirCardsontheTableIncludingthe DeedsofTheirHouse’
ListofIllustrations 1.1.BernadetteDevlin,CivilRightsleaderandMPforMid-Ulster,inDerryon 14August1969,thedayBritishtroopsweredeployedinthecity23
1.2.RUCDistrictInspectorFrankLagantourstheLowerFallswithColonel RogerMayinOctober1969.AlongthewayhestoppedtotalktoJimSullivan, second-in-commandoftheIRA’sBelfastBrigade.Laganwouldlaterplaya roleinsettinguptheback-channelbetweentheIRAandMI630
2.1.IRAleadersSeamusTwomey(OCBelfastBrigade),SeanMacStiofáin(Chief ofStaff),MartinMcGuinness(OCDerryBrigade),andDavidO’Connell picturedoutsideanIRApressconferenceinDerryon13June1972atwhich theyinvitedWilliamWhitelawtocometoDerryforpeacetalks.Afewweeks later,theBritishgovernmentwould flythemandtwoothers GerryAdams andIvorBell toLondonforsecrettalks42
3.1.BrendanDuddy,OakleafAthleticClub,runningina five-miletime trialin195686
4.1.MichaelOatley,theSISOfficerwhofrom1973workedwithintermediary BrendanDuddytodeveloptheback-channelintoarobustchannelfor communicationandnegotiationandnegotiatedtheIRAceasefireof1975. Hewouldplayacrucialroleagainduringthe1980/81hungerstrikesand thepeaceprocessinthe1990s.Phototakenin200098
5.1. ‘Ifthereisapeacefulwayouttheywilltakeit’.BrendanDuddysets outhisunderstandingoftheIRApositioninanentryinhisdiaryon 27October1975144
6.1.BritishdiplomatDonaldMiddletontakesshelterfromarocketattackby thewingofanAirAmericaplaneevacuatingBritishembassystafffrom PhnomPenhjustbeforetheKhmerRougecapturedthecityinMarch1975. AshorttimelaterhewaspostedtoBelfasttotakechargeoftalkswiththe IRAduringthe1975ceasefire160
7.1.Entryfrom ‘TheRedBook’,intermediaryBrendanDuddy’srecordof messagesexchangedduringthe1981hungerstrike.Itgivesasenseofthe immensetimepressureexerted.Thenumbersontheright,11.58,11.59, indicatethathewasexpectingareplyfromtheBritishgovernmentby midnightbutthathedidn’tgetituntilafter2.10a.m.on8July184
9.1.BusinesscardofMI6agentRobertMcLaren,alsoknownasColinFerguson and ‘Fred’,theBritishgovernmentrepresentativeintheback-channelfrom 1991to1993227
10.1. ‘Theconflictisover’:TheFebruary1993messagethattriggeredaseriesof intensecontactsbetweentheBritishgovernmentandtherepublican leadership,culminatinginanIRAceasefireofferinMay236
Introduction NegotiatingPoliticalViolence InJune1972,BritishSecretaryofStateforNorthernIrelandWilliamWhitelaw toldhiscabinetcolleaguesthat,afterthreeyearsofconflictandalmost400deaths, ‘itwasinescapablethatsomeunderstandingwouldhavetobereachedwiththe “Provisional” IRA;nosolutionseemedpossibleunlesstheirpointofviewwere represented.’¹Bythetimeaninclusivesettlementwas finallyreachedmorethana quarterofacenturylater,morethan3,600peoplehadbeenkilled,andtensof thousandsinjuredandimprisoned,in ‘theTroubles ’.Negotiationandengagement hadrepeatedlyfailedtopreventtheescalationofconflict.Severaleffortstoendthe violencehadbeenunsuccessful,evenwhenthepartiesinvolvedwerewillingto compromise.Butultimately,effortstomakepeacethroughsecretback-channel negotiationsborefruitintheearly1990s,openingthewaytonegotiationsthat culminatedintheGoodFridayAgreementof1998,whichinauguratednew politicalandconstitutionalarrangements.
Whenviolentconflictescalatesbutnopartylookslikelytoachieveaswiftor decisivevictory,itcanbedifficulttobringhostilitiestoanendthroughnegotiated compromise.Conflictsthatmayat firstappearsolublecandragonforyearsor decades.Giventhat,since1990,violentconflicts includingmanythatappeared intractable haveincreasinglyendedinnegotiatedcompromises,analysisofhow besttoreachthepointofsettlementhasobviouspolicyimplications.
TheNorthernIrelandconflictprovidesarevelatorycaseofback-channel negotiation.Itisoneofthefewconflictsforwhichthereisextensive,reliable primarydocumentation,fromdisparatesources,ofclandestineengagement throughanintermediary.Hence,itispossibletoobtainanunusuallyaccurate and finelygrainedpicture onethatilluminatesthoseshadowyspaceswherethe partiestoconflictattemptedtotalktheirwayoutofviolence,thatidentifiesthe dynamicsofengagement,andthatelaboratesthedistinctivefeaturesofnegotiationsconductedinsecret.AsHenryKissingerlongagopointedout inthespirit ofClausewitz’sfamousdictumthat ‘waristhecontinuationofpoliticsbyother means ’²—‘force’ and ‘diplomacy’ arenot ‘discretephenomena’;rather,violence andnegotiationarepartofasinglebargainingprocess.³Hence,ifthefactorsthat
¹MeetingofGEN79,16June1972,CAB130/560,UKNationalArchives. ²Clausewitz1976[1832].³Kissinger1979,62.
DeniableContact:Back-ChannelNegotiationinNorthernIreland.NiallÓDochartaigh,OxfordUniversityPress(2021). ©NiallÓDochartaigh.DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192894762.003.0001
causeeffortsatcompromisetosucceedonsomeoccasionsandcollapseonothers aretobefullyunderstood,violenceandnegotiationmustbeanalysedtogetheras partofasingleprocessofconflicttransformation.⁴ Onthreeseparateoccasions,in June1972,January1975,andApril1991,theconflictinNorthernIrelandlooked sufficiently ‘ripe’⁵ forsettlementthattheBritishgovernmentandtheIrish RepublicanArmy(IRA)leadershipinitiatedback-channelcontactsaimedata peacefulcompromise.However,onlyonthethirdoccasiondidthoseefforts succeed.Ananalysisoftheseeffortsrevealsbargainingtohavebeenarecurring featureoftheconflict,sometimestacit,atothertimesexplicitandformal.Itwasa continuousstrand,integratedthroughoutwiththeuseofcoercionandviolence, shapingthewaysinwhichforcewasusedandintermittentlycrystallizingin formalprocesses.Back-channelnegotiationsareanalysedhereinthecontextof thelong-termbargainingrelationshipbetweentheparties.
JohnWhytewrotein1991that ‘RelativetoitssizeNorthernIrelandispossibly themostheavilyresearchedareaonearth.’⁶ Reflectingontheexponentialgrowth sincethen,PoliticalScientistBrendanO’Learycommentedin2019that ‘Thereis nosignthatthe floodofpublicationsonNorthernIrelandwillstop.’ Heestimated thathehadreadthousandsof ‘book[s]ofhistoryorpoliticalscience ’ relatedtothe conflictintheprecedingdecades,andmanythousandsofacademicarticles.⁷ Muchofthatscholarshipseekstoexplaintheoutbreakandpersistenceofviolence intermsofvariouscombinationsofideology,communaldivisions,culture,or deepsocialandeconomicforces.⁸ But,withafewnotableexceptions,ithasnot focusedonthedynamicsofnegotiationaimedatendingviolence.⁹ Comparative
⁴ Stedman’s1991studyofinternationalmediationinZimbabweremainsoneofthefewsuch studies.
⁵ Zartman1989. ⁶ Whyte1991,backcover.
⁷ O’Leary2019,26.
⁸ JohnH.Whyte’s1991 InterpretingNorthernIreland andJohnMcGarryandBrendanO’Leary’ s 1995 ExplainingNorthernIreland havecontinuingvalueassurveysofthemainlinesofargumentand interpretationintheliteratureontheTroubles.BernadetteHayes’ andIanMcAllister’s2013studyof opinionpollandsurvey findingsinNorthernIrelandovera fifty-yearperiodprovidesaninventoryof mostofthemajorthemesinthescholarship:religion,nationalidentity,constitutionalpreferences, partysupport,communityrelations,educationalintegration,andthelegacyofviolence,towhichwe mightaddsocialclassandeconomicconditions.
⁹ Therearesomenotableexceptions:Intwobookspublishedin2015, TheBritishandPeacein NorthernIreland and FromArmedStruggletoPoliticalStruggle,GrahamSpenceranalysedBritish governmentandIrishrepublicanapproachestonegotiationinthe1990s,primarilyonthebasisof interviewswiththeprotagonists(Spencer2015a,2015b).PaulDixon’s2018book Performingthe NorthernIrelandPeaceProcess examinesperformativeaspectsofnegotiationandtheuseofdeception andmanipulation.JohnCoakleyandJenniferTodd’s2020book NegotiatingaSettlementinNorthern Ireland:1969–2019 (CoakleyandTodd2020)drawsonwitnessseminarsandinterviewswithBritish andIrishcivilservantsandpoliticiansandshedsnewlightonintergovernmentalnegotiations butitis notcentrallyfocusedonnegotiationwiththeIRA.Muchhasbeenpublishedinthepastdecadeon contactandnegotiationbetweentheIRAandtheBritishgovernment,butitaddressesdebatesin intelligencestudiesandterrorismresearchratherthananalysingthedynamicsofnegotiation.See especiallyBewetal.2009;Cowper-Coles2012;Craig2012,2014;Mumford2011.Afewexcellent studiesoftheIRAdealextensivelywithback-channelcontacts,someofthemfromajournalisticrather thananacademicperspective,includingPeterTaylor’ s Provos (1997),EdMoloney’ s ASecretHistoryof theIRA (2002,2007)andRichardEnglish’ s ArmedStruggle (2003).
andtheoreticalscholarshiponnegotiationprovidesrichresourcesforunderstandingboththepersistenceofviolenceandthealignmentofforcesthatendsit. CentralthemesinthescholarshipthatareparticularlyrelevanttotheIrishcase include:thecoexistenceofuncompromisingpublicrhetoricwithawillingnessto concede;failuretoreachagreementevenwhenthepartiesinvolvedwantan agreementandarewillingtocompromise;concealmentbypartiesofinformation aboutthecompromisestheyarewillingtomake.
IraWilliamZartmanandGuyFaurenotethat,notwithstandingKissinger’ s admonishment, ‘toolittleanalysishasplacednegotiationwithinthedynamic contextofconflict.’¹⁰ Negotiationneedstobeanalysed,then,inthecontextof theconflictofwhichitformsapart.Violentconflictisoftenthoughtofasaphase duringwhichcommunicationisshutdownandcontactsevered.ButinNorthern Irelandinthelate1960scommunicationchannelsproliferated,andengagement intensifiedwhencivilunrestandconfrontationescalated.Apoliceofficerwalked throughahailofstonesinsearchofsomeonewithauthorityinariotingcrowd;¹¹a governmentministerapproachedabarricadetodiscussthegrievancesofits defenders;¹²IRAleadersmetsecretlywithBritishArmyofficersandagreedon measurestoavertconfrontationandpublicdisorder.¹³Newforcesemerged,and forcesthatpreviouslyhadlittleornocontactsoughteachotherout, findingnew waystocommunicateandconnect.Coerciveforcewasintegraltothesedensenew networksofcommunication:partiesusedforcetoconveycommitmentand capacityinthemostunequivocalandconvincingterms,withthedirectaimof shapingthepoliticalengagementsaimedatlimitingorterminatingconflict.
Secrecywasvitalinprotectingtheselinesofcommunication.Whenwarring partiesbegintotalkpeace,thesiteofthatencounterischargedwithdanger.The leadershipsofopposingsidesoftenuseback-channelstoshieldtalkofcompromisefromtheirpoliticalopponentsandthewiderpublic,butalsofromforceswithin theirownorganizationsopposedtoconcession.¹⁴ Theveryactofcontactcan arouse fierceangerandsuspicion:thereisa finelinebetweencompromiseand complicity.
Back-channelsarelittleunderstoodpreciselybecausepartiesthathaverecourse tothemconspiretoscreenthemfromview.InNorthernIreland,aconcernnotto conferlegitimacyontheIRAinhibitedtheBritishgovernment’sengagementwith theorganization.After1972,itonlymadecovertcontactwiththeorganization throughintermediariesandmediators.DuringthecourseoftheTroubles,the primaryconduitbetweentheBritishgovernmentandtheIRAwasaDerry businessman,BrendanDuddy,whoactedasintermediaryin1972–76,1980–81,
¹⁰ ZartmanandFaure2005b,5.
¹¹DistrictInspectorFrancisArmstrong,testimonytotheScarmanTribunal,ScarmanTribunal transcripts,McClayLibrary,Queen’sUniversityBelfast.
¹²Anderson2002,200–1.¹³ SundayTimes InsightTeam1971,241–4.
¹
⁴ Pruitt2006,2008,230,298–9;PutnamandCarcasson1997;Wanis-St.John2006.
and1991–93.Carefullyusingtheinformationthataccumulatedinthespace betweenthetwoparties,Duddywasabletoachieveacertainagency,shaping engagementand,onoccasion,stimulatingprogress.
TheimportanceofdeniablecontactstonegotiatedpeaceagreementsinSouth Africa,NorthernIreland,andIsrael–Palestineintheearly-1990shasfrequently beenhighlighted.¹⁵ Here,theconcernistoanalysethedistinctivefeaturesofbackchannelnegotiationthatcontributedtoasettlementinNorthernIreland;to examinethedevelopmentofsolidaritybetweeninterlocuters,theback-channel’ s effectonintra-partynegotiation,anditsimportanceindrawingthepositionsof thetwopartiescloseratcrucialmoments.
Inanalysingthefactorsthateventuallymadeforasuccessfulpeaceagreement, thisbookbuildsonrecentresearchinHistory,PoliticalScience,andSociology.It issensitivetotheimportanceofprocess,contingency,andagencyinexplaining anddrivingpoliticalchange.Hence,ithighlightsthestrategicthinkingand leadershipinvolvedinendingaviolentconflictandthecommitmentandcollectiveactionthisrequires.
Theanalysisisfoundedonarichstoreofevidence,includingtheprivatepapers ofkeyIrishrepublicanleadersandBritishpoliticians,recentlyreleasedpapers fromnationalarchivesinDublinandLondon,andthepapersofBrendanDuddy, theintermediarywhoactedastheprimarycontactbetweentheIRAandthe Britishgovernmentformanyyears,includingpapersthathavenotyetbeenmade publiclyavailable.Thisdocumentaryevidence,combinedwithoriginalinterviews withpoliticians,mediators,civilservants,andrepublicans,allowsavividpicture toemergeofthecomplexmanoeuvringatthisintersection.Itprovidesatextured accountthatextendsourunderstandingofthedistinctivedynamicsofnegotiationsconductedinsecretandtheconditionsconducivetothenegotiatedsettlementofconflict.Itdisruptsandchallengessomeconventionalnotionsaboutthe conflictinNorthernIreland,offeringafreshanalysisofthepoliticaldynamicsand theintra-partystrugglesthatsustainedviolentconflictandpreventedsettlement forsolong.
LocalEscalation,NationalSettlement Sincetheearly2000stherehasbeenrenewedscholarlyinterestinpolitical violence;civilwarresearch,inparticular,isavibrant fieldofstudy.Thisrich newbodyofworkincludesresearchonthelocaldynamicsofviolenceandon ¹⁵ Bercovitch1997;Kriesberg2001;Pruitt,Bercovitch,andZartman1997;Lieberfeld1999,2002; Pruitt2008.
negotiatedrelationshipsbetweenstatesandarmedrebelsthatisofparticularvalue inunderstandinghowconflictsend.¹⁶
‘Civilwar’ isacontestedterm.AsStathisKalyvasnotes,rulingauthoritiesoften rejectitasconcedingtoomuchlegitimacytoarmedoppositionalforces.¹⁷ Oppositionforces,ontheotherhand,prefertermslikerevolutionorwarof nationalliberation.OneneednotdefinetheNorthernIrelandconflictasacivil wartoacceptthatthecivilwarscholarshipprovidesvaluableconceptualtoolsfor analysingitsdynamics.TheBritishArmy’sin-houseassessmentof ‘Operation Banner’,theofficialnameforitscampaigninNorthernIreland,callstheIRA ‘ one ofthemosteffectiveterroristorganisationsinhistory’,butitalsocharacterizesthe initialstagesoftheconflictasaninsurgency:
[Theperiod]fromthesummerof1971untilthemid-1970s,isbestdescribedasa classicinsurgency.BoththeOfficialandProvisionalwingsoftheIrish RepublicanArmy(OIRAandPIRA)foughtthesecurityforcesinmore-or-less formedbodies.Bothhadastructureofcompanies,battalionsandbrigades,witha recognisablestructureandheadquartersstaff.Protracted firefightswerecommon.TheArmyrespondedwithoperationsatuptobrigadeandevendivisional level.¹⁸
Oneinfluentialstrandwithinthenewcivilwarresearchexamineshowlocal cleavagesandnetworksinteractwithnationalprojectsintheshapingofviolence.¹ ⁹ Thisfocusonthelocal,partofamuchbroadertrendinpeaceandconflict research,²⁰ challengestheviewthatcoherentprojectsatnationalorcentrallevel drivecivilwars.Itexplainspatternsofmilitantactionandmobilizationintermsof alliancesbetweenlocalactorsandcentralnationalleaderships.Thesedivisions withinrebelgroupsareparalleledinsomerespectsbytensionswithinstate apparatusesbetweenthevariousagenciesandelementsrepresentingthestateor alliedwithit.Itisananalysisthatresonateswiththeemphasisinthenegotiation literatureonthewayinwhichintra-partystrugglesshapenegotiationsbetween thepartiestoconflict.
Viewinganarmedorganizationasanalliancebetweenacentralleadershipand localitieshelpsinexplainingwhyitwasdifficultfortheIRAtosustainaceasefire in1972inthefaceofalocalconfrontationinwestBelfast.Itshedslight,too,on whytheBritishgovernment,whichwasunabletosufficientlycontrolitssecurity forces,failedtopindowntheIRAceasefireof1975.Thepoweroflocalforcesto constraincentralleadershipsiscrucialtounderstandingwhyitissodifficultto
¹⁶ Arjona2008,2014;CedermanandVogt2017;Kalyvas2006;Staniland2012,2017.
¹⁷ Kalyvas2006.¹⁸‘OperationBanner’ 2006,3.
¹⁹ CedermanandVogt2017;Kalyvas2006.²⁰ CedermanandGleditsch2009.
reachapeaceagreementevenwhentheleadershipsofthepartiestoconflictare activelyworkingtowardsthatend.
Thislocalturnintheanalysisofviolencehasnotbeenasevidentinresearchon thenegotiatedendingofviolence.Butiftheseinternaltensionsandcentre–local disjunctureshelptoexplaintheescalationofviolence,theycanalsoilluminate patternsofengagementandpeacemaking.InNorthernIreland,asinotherdeeply dividedsocieties,strugglesbetweencentralleadershipsandlocalforcesshaped engagementbetweenthepartiesandinfluencedtheirattemptstonegotiateand compromise.Internaldivisionsconstitutedanimportantobstacletocompromise andintra-partystrugglesshapednegotiationswiththeopponent.
NegotiatedRelationships Asecondimportantstrandinthenewcivilwarresearchistheworkonzonesof control,wartimepoliticalorders,andwartimeinstitutionspioneeredbyStathis Kalyvas,PaulStaniland,AnaArjona,andothers.²¹Someofthisresearchanalyses engagementbetweenstatesandarmedopponentsandexaminestheextentto whichtheysometimescooperatetomaintainorderandstability.Staniland ’swork illuminatesthedynamicsofengagementbyexamininghowlocalzonesofrebel controlaresustainednotjustthroughviolencebutoftenthroughnegotiated arrangementsandtacitagreements.Thisagendahasbroadenedoutmorerecently toencompassthenegotiatedcharacterofrelationshipsbetweenstatesandarmed opponentsmoregenerally,andtoconsiderthecontinuitiesbetweenphasesof violentandnon-violentinteraction.²²Stanilandhasrecentlyproposed ‘armed politics’ asaframeworkforanalysingrelationsbetweenstatesandarmedgroups, examininghowthepoliticalrelationshipsbetweenarmedactorsspanphasesof activeconfrontationaswellasperiodsofpeacefulcooperation.Engagement, ‘the levelofcooperationbetweenthestateandaninsurgentactor’,isattheheartofit:
Itisherewherepoliticalinterestsshapetheinteractionbetweenorganized specialistsinviolence...thisdimensioniswhereweshouldseedynamicsof cooperationandbargainingoperatingalongsideviolenceandconflict...By lookingatthelevelofcooperation,wecanseehowpoliticalorderswithinand acrosscivilwarsemergeandchange...²³
WhileStaniland’sworkfocusesonsituationsofongoingconflictratherthanthe endingofviolence,ithasanobviousrelevancefortheanalysisofpeacenegotiations.Itexaminesviolenceandnegotiationtogetheraspartofacontinuous
²¹Kalyvas2006;Staniland2012,2017;Arjona2008,2014.²²Staniland2017. ²³Staniland2017,247.
politicalrelationshipthatstretchesthroughperiodsofbothpeaceandviolence.In focusingattentiononthelong-termbargainingrelationshipbetweenparties,it opensupnewperspectivesonengagementaimedatreachingsustainablepeace settlements.
AgencyandStrategyintheTransitionfromViolence The ‘contentiouspolitics’ approachdevelopedbysocialmovementscholarsover thepasttwodecadesoffersaunifiedframeworkfortheanalysisofallformsof conflictualpoliticalaction,bothviolentandnon-violent.²⁴ Ithasbeenappliedin recentyearstothestudyofterrorismandpoliticalviolencewithfruitfulresultsby scholarssuchasDonatelladellaPorta,LorenzoBosi,StefanMalthaner,Chares Demetriou,andothers.²⁵ Theirworkreintegratesthestudyofarmedviolencewith otherformsofpoliticalcontention,highlightingthecontinuitiesbetweendifferent phasesofstruggleanddrawingattentiontotheimportanceofintra-organizational strugglesandthechangingrelationsbetweenparties.Muchofthisresearch focusedinitiallyontheescalationandperpetuationofviolentconflictrather thanitstermination,butagrowingbodyofworknowanalysesthetransition fromarmedconflicttonon-violentaction,emphasizingtheimportanceofstrategicchoiceandtheexerciseofagency.²⁶ Initsemphasisonthecontinuities betweenviolentandnon-violentphasesofcontention,thecontentiouspolitics approachisofparticularvalueinforegroundingthestrategicgoalsandpolitical calculationsthatrunthrough,andlinktogether,thesedifferentphasesof contention.
ContextandEmotion OnecannotabstracteventsintheNorthernIrelandcasefromthespecificcontext. Theideologicalmessagesaroundwhichpeoplemobilized,theirrepertoiresof contention,andthenormativecommitmentsthattheybroughttotheconflict wereembeddedinlong-termstrugglesoverthesocialandpoliticalrelationships betweenBritainandIreland,betweenIrishnationalismandunionism,and betweenCatholicandProtestantcommunitiesinIreland,northandsouthof theborder.Dialoguethroughsecretback-channelsandaroundthenegotiating
²⁴ SeeespeciallyMcAdam,Tarrow,andTilly2001;Tilly2003;TillyandTarrow2007.
²⁵ BosiandMalthaner2015;Bosi,Demetriou,andMalthaner2014;DellaPorta2006,2008;Della Portaetal.2018;Demetriou,Malthaner,andBosi2014,ch.1;Goodwin2012;Maney2008; Tarrow2007.
²⁶ ChenowethandStephan2011;Dudouet2010,2012,2013;Acosta2014.
