Authoritarian Regionalisminthe
WorldofInternational Organizations
GlobalPerspectivesandtheEurasianEnigma
ANASTASSIAV.OBYDENKOVA ANDALEXANDERLIBMAN
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Acknowledgments
Whileworkingonthisbook,wehavereceivedsubstantialfeedbackfroma numberofscholars.TheauthorsareverygratefultoJohnPevehouse,Rawi Abdelal,PhilippeSchmitter,HenryHale,AlexanderCooley,ChristinaDavis, RandallStone,MarkBeissinger,LeonardoMorlino,OisínTansey,Andrew Moravcsik,JohnIkenberry,GrigorePop-Eleches,RobertOrttung,Elise Giuliano,TimothyJ.Colton,MargaritaM.Balmaceda,VladimirGel’ man, StevenLevitsky,NeilMacFarlane,AndrewKonitzer,CarlosClosa,Kathryn Stoner,andLarryDiamondfortheircommentsonvariousdrafts,chapters, andideaspresentedinthisbook.Allmistakesare,ofcourse,thesoleresponsibilityoftheauthors.
AnastassiaV.ObydenkovaisespeciallygratefultoLarryDiamond, AlexanderCooley,AndrewKonitzer,AlexandraVacroux,RobertOrttung, CarlosClosa,RandallStone,andRoyAllisonfororganizationofguest-speaker eventsandtheirinvitationtodiscussthisprojectattheUniversityofStanford, ColumbiaUniversityofNewYork,theUniversityofPittsburgh,Harvard University,GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,theInstituteofPublicGoods andPoliciesofSpanishNationalResearchCouncil,UniversityofRochester, andOxfordUniversity;andshethanksEliseGiuliano,NeilMacFarlaneand JoshuaTucker,TimothyJ.ColtonandFrancisFukuyamaforbeinginsightful andveryhelpfuldiscussantsattheseevents.Theauthorsalsopresentedthis bookandbenefitedfromtheexcellentfeedbackofparticipantsatanumberof otherguest-speakereventsattheUniversityofHelsinki,FreeUniversityof Berlin,theStockholmSchoolofEconomics,UniversityofLyon(France),and PrincetonUniversity.
AnastassiaV.ObydenkovaisgratefultotheDavisCenterforRussianand EurasianStudiesatHarvardUniversityforgrantingherthepositionof KathrynW.andShelbyCullomDavisSeniorResearchScholarandtothe researchfellowsandvisitorsof2015–16forthecreativeenthusiasticenvironmentandexcellentcommentsonthisbook,specificallytoJaclynA.Kerr, LyudmilaPetrova,NadiaBoyadjieva,JillianPorter,InnaMelnykovska,Halit DundarAkarca,AlexanderDiener,andBrandonSchechter.
Thevariouschaptersofthebookwerepresentedattheconferencesofthe AmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,theEuropeanConsortiumofPolitical Research,theInternationalPoliticalScienceAssociation,theEuropeanPoliticalScienceAssociation,theInternationalStudiesAssociation,theGerman AssociationforPoliticalScience,theAssociationforSlavic,EastEuropean, andEurasianStudies,Post-CommunistWorkingGroupatFacultyofArtsand
ScienceofHarvardUniversity,andtheFungGlobalSeminarsatPrinceton University.
TheauthorsaregratefultoJamesDisleyandOxfordAcademicEditingfor theirexcellentassistancewiththelanguageeditingandproofreadingofthe manuscriptandtothreeanonymousreviewersofthisbookfortheirgreat feedbackandsuggestions.AlexanderLibmanappreciatesthe financialsupport oftheLudwigMaximiliansUniversityofMunich.AnastassiaV.Obydenkova isgratefulforsupportandfundingforthisprojectreceivedfromtheDavis CenterforRussianandEurasianStudiesofHarvardUniversityandfromthe InstituteforInternationalandRegionalStudiesofPrincetonUniversity.
5.MembershipandGovernance76
6.ImpactonWorldPoliticsandEconomy93
6.1.EmpiricalApproachandIndicators
6.2.EmpiricalResults
6.3.Non-DemocraticRegionalOrganizationsandDemocratization
6.4.NDROsandtheSurvivalofPoliticalLeaders
7.PastNon-DependencyintheTwenty-firstCentury107
7.1.EarlyYears:IdeologicalandColonialNon-democraticRegional Organizations
7.2.Large-NAnalysis:NDROsDuringandAftertheColdWar
7.3.WereDROsandNDROsAlwaysDifferent?
8.TheEnigmaofEurasianRegionalism120
8.1.ABriefHistoryofEurasianRegionalism
9.PoliticalRegionalism:TheCIS144
9.1.HeterogeneityandPowerAsymmetryintheCIS
9.4.EffectsoftheCIS:Security
9.5.EffectsoftheCIS:Politics
9.5.1.Methodologyoftheanalysis
9.5.3.Supportforautocraticconsolidationandelectoralmonitoring
10.EconomicRegionalism:TheEAEU179 10.1.DevelopmentandExpansion
10.4.HeterogeneityofMembershipandHegemony
10.5.OfficialandUnofficialGoals
10.6.1.Economicintegration
10.6.2.Democracy
10.6.3.Qualitativeevidence:threemainmechanisms
10.6.4.Qualitativeevidence:Russianforeignpolicy andpoliticalregimes
11.SecurityRegionalism:TheSCO219
11.1.DevelopmentandExpansion
11.2.GovernanceStructure
11.4.TheMotivationsandGoalsbehindtheCollaboration ofIndiaandPakistan
11.5.HegemonyandtheSCO
11.6.TheOfficialandUnofficialGoalsoftheSCO
11.7.AlliesorRivals?
11.8.CooperationwithOtherInternationalOrganizations
11.9.FailedMultilateralismorSuccessfulBilateralism?
11.10.ImpactonPoliticalRegimes
11.10.2.Honoramongthieves:SCOandtrust-building amongautocracies
12.Conclusion256
12.1.AutocraticRegionalismasaPhenomenonanditsImpact
12.1.1.Non-democraticregionalorganizationsasanew typeofregionalism 256
12.1.2.Democraticvs.non-democraticregional organizations:howdifferentarethey?
12.1.3.TheimportanceandimplicationsoftheNDRO asanewtype
12.2.TheEurasianEnigma
12.2.1.Post-SovietEurasiaasahubofauthoritarian regionalism
12.2.2.AutocracydiffusioninEurasia
12.2.3.Whatcanwelearnfrompost-SovietEurasia?
12.3.World-wideImplications
ListofFigures
5.1.DistributionoftheaveragePolityIVscoreoftheROs
5.2.MembercountriesofNDROsaccordingtotheaverage PolityIVindex
5.3.Distributionofpoliticalregimesoftheleadingcountries ofROsaccordingtoPolityIV
5.4.MembercountriesofNDROsaccordingtothePolityIVindex oftheleadingcountry
6.1.PoliticalregimeoftheleaderandofthemembersoftheRO (PolityIV)
6.2.Kaplan–Meiersurvivalfunctionforauthoritarianleaders ofcountriesbelongingandnotbelongingtoNDROs
7.1.AveragePolityIVscoreofamemberofaregionalorganization andofacountryintheworld,1975–2005
7.2.AveragePolityIVscoreoftheleadingcountryofa regonalorganization,1975–2005
7.3.ShareofNDROsaccordingtopoliticalregimeofanaverage countryandoftheleadingcountry,1975–2005
8.1.ShareofrespondentssupportingtheEAEU,2012–2017
8.2.ShareofSovietrepublicsinthetotalexportsandimportsof goodsfromRussia,1991
8.3.EnergysubsidiesfromRussiatoBelarus,bln.US$
8.4.Thelogicofthelimitingfactorinthepost-Soviettrade
8.5.SpecificfeaturesoftheEurasianregionalism
9.1.EconomicandpoliticalheterogeneityofCIScountries
9.2.NumberoftheCISdecisionsacceptedbytheCISstates, 1991–2010
9.3.Thecausallogicofthelinkbetweenauthoritarianism andCISparticipation
10.1.KerneldensityofFHscoresfortheEAEUand non-EAEUcountries
10.2.CausallinkbetweentheEAEUandtheauthoritarian consolidation
11.1.Kaplan–Meiersurvivalestimatesforthesampleoftwenty-six post-Sovietpresidents,2000–2016
11.2.CausalmechanismsoftheSCOimpactontheduration oftenureofautocrats
A.1.DistributionoftheaverageFreedomHousescoresoftheROs
A.2.Distributionofpoliticalregimesoftheleadingcountries ofROsaccordingtoFreedomHouse
A.3.Shareofdemocraticandnon-democraticROsinoursample
A.4.PoliticalregimeoftheleaderandofthemembersoftheRO (FreedomHouse)
A.5.AverageFreedomHousescoreofamemberofaregional organizationandofacountryintheworld,1975–2005
A.6.AverageFreedomHouseandPolityIVscoreoftheleading countryoftheRO,1975–2005
A.7.ShareofNDROsaccordingtodifferentcriteria,1975–2005
2.1.Summaryofthekeyconclusionsfromthethreestreamsofliterature surveyed
3.1.Politicalimpactofauthoritarianregionalism:possiblemechanisms
3.2.Democraticvs.authoritarianregionalism
3.3.Mainhypotheses
5.1.NDROsandtheheterogeneityofmembers
5.2.NDROsandthegovernanceofregionalorganizations
6.1.EconomicandpoliticaleffectsofNDROs
6.2.EffectofNDROmembershiponthedurationoftheruleofauthoritarian leaders,1950–2015
7.1.ChangesinthecharacteristicsoftheNDROovertime,NDROdefined throughtheaveragedemocracyscoreofitsmembercountries
7.2.ChangesinthecharacteristicsoftheNDROovertime,NDROdefined throughthedemocracyscoreofitsleader
8.1.HistoricalfactorsandEurasianregionalism
8.2.DependenceoftheCIScountriesonmigrationtoRussia
9.1.DeterminantsofthenumberofactsoftheCISunconditionally acceptedbyindividualmemberstates,1991–2010,dep.var.:numberof actsaccepted,OLS
9.2.ActivitiesoftheEMOupto2015anddynamicofpoliticalregimes inpost-Sovietstates
10.1.Impactofpoliticalregimes(FH)onmembershipintheEAEU, 2000–2015,two-wayFE
10.2.Impactofpoliticalregimes(FH)onmembershipintheEurAsEC, 2000–2015,two-wayFE
10.3.Russianforeignpolicy,autocracypromotion,andtheEAEU
11.1.Politicalregimesofmemberstatesin2015
11.2.Mainreligionsofactualandpotentialmemberstates
11.3.Militaryexpenditureofthetwohegemons,2014
11.4.Technologicalcomponentofthetwoleadingstates,2014
11.5.Economicpowerofthetwohegemons,2014
11.6.UnofficialgoalsofthetwohegemonsoftheSCOandtheissueoftheir compatibility
11.7.Coxhazardregressions,survivalofpost-Sovietpresidents,2000–2016
11.8.Nationalcausesoftenureversushypotheticalinternationalimpact
12.1.Impactofregionalism
12.2.PoliticalimpactofEurasianNDROs
A.1.ImpactofthetypeofROonregimeheterogeneity,OLS
A.2.ImpactofthetypeofROonreligiousheterogeneity,OLS
A.3.ImpactofthetypeofROonincomeheterogeneity,OLS
A.4.ImpactofthetypeofROonpowerasymmetry,OLS
A.5.EffectofthetypeofROongovernancestructure,logit
A.6.ImpactofthetypeofROontradeintegration,OLS
A.7.ImpactofthetypeofROonintegrationintheareaofFDI,OLS
A.8.ImpactofthetypeofROonintegrationintheareaofmigration,OLS
A.9.ImpactofthetypeofROonthelikelihoodofconflicts,logit
A.10.DeterminantsofthenumberofactsoftheCISunconditionally acceptedbyindividualmemberstates,1991–2010,dep.var.:number ofactsaccepted,negativebinomialestimations
Acronyms
AIIBAsianInfrastructureInvestmentBank
ALBABolivarianAllianceforthePeoplesofOurAmerica Peoples’ Trade Treaty
APECAsia-PacificEconomicCooperation
ASEANAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations
BRICSBrazil,Russia,India,China,andSouthAfrica
BSECOrganizationoftheBlackSeaEconomicCooperation
CAECCentralAsianEconomicCooperation
CARICOMCaribbeanCommunity
CBSSCounciloftheBalticSeaStates
CEMACEconomicandMonetaryCommunityofCentralAfrica
CESCommonEconomicSpace
CINCcompositeindexofnationalcapabilities
CISCommonwealthofIndependentStates
COMECONCouncilforMutualEconomicAssistance
CSTOCollectiveSecurityTreatyOrganization
DCFTADeepandComprehensiveFreeTradeAgreement
DR-CAFTADominicanRepublic-CentralAmericaFreeTradeAgreement
DROdemocraticregionalorganization
EAEUEurasianEconomicUnion
ECCASEconomicCommunityofCentralAfricanStates
ECOEconomicCooperationOrganization
ECOWASEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates
EDBEurasianDevelopmentBank
EECEuropeanEconomicCommunities
EFSDEurasianFundforStabilizationandDevelopment
EFTAEuropeanFreeTradeAssociation
EMOElectoralMonitoringOrganization
EUEuropeanUnion
EurAsECEurasianEconomicCommunity
FDIforeigndirectinvestments
FHFreedomHouse
FIGOformalintergovernmentalorganization
GAFTAGreaterArabFreeTradeAgreement
GCCGulfCooperationCouncil
GUAMregionalorganizationincludingUkraine,Georgia,Azerbaijan,and Moldova
IACInternationalAviationCommittee
IGADIntergovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopment
IIMDDInternationalInstituteforMonitoringDemocracyDevelopment, ParliamentarismandSuffrageProtectionofCitizens
IMFInternationalMonetaryFund
IOinternationalorganization
IPAInterparliamentaryAssembly
LAIALatinAmericanIntegrationAssociation
LASLeagueofArabStates
NAFTANorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement
NATONorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization
NDROnon-democraticregionalorganization
NGOnon-governmentalorganization
OAPECOrganizationofArabPetroleumExportingCountries
OASOrganizationofAmericanStates
ODAofficialdevelopmentaid
OLSordinaryleastsquares
OSCEOrganizationforSecurityandCooperationinEurope
ROregionalorganization
SAARCSouthAsianAssociationofRegionalCooperation
SACUSouthernAfricanCustomsUnion
SADCSouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity
SCOShanghaiCooperationOrganization
TACISTechnicalAssistancefortheCommonwealthofIndependentStates
USUnitedStates
USSRUnionofSovietSocialistRepublics
WRDWorldReligionsDatabase
WTOWorldTradeOrganization
Introduction
InDecember2007,theRussianFederationelectedtheStateDuma forthe secondtimeafterVladimirPutinbecamepresidentofthecountry.The elections,farfrombeingfreeandfair,werecharacterizedbyafurtherimportantfeaturepreviouslyunknowntoRussia substantialrestrictionsonthe accessofinternationalobservers.HavingignoredmostoftherecommendationsmadebyobserversfromtheOrganizationforSecurityandCooperation inEurope(OSCE)aftertheirmonitoringofthepreviouselectioncampaign, Russiadecidedtoeliminatethepossibilityofanewwaveofcriticismbysimply preventingtheobserversfromparticipatinginRussianelections.Whilethe OSCErulesrequireaninvitationtoobserverstobeissuedthreemonthsbefore electionday,Russiasentouttheinvitationonlyamonthbeforetheelections, andalsoimposedrestrictionsonthenumberofobservers.Asaresult,the OfficeforDemocraticInstitutionsandHumanRightsoftheOSCErefusedto senditsmonitorstoRussia.Thelackofinternationalobserverswasheavily criticizedbybothinternationalactorsandtheRussianopposition.
Therewere,however,thosewhowholeheartedlyapprovedofthedecisionof theRussiangovernment.MikhailKrotov,theSecretaryGeneraloftheInterparliamentaryAssemblyoftheCommonwealthofIndependentStates(CIS), anorganizationatthattimeconsistingoftwelveformerSovietUnionrepublics(alltheformerSovietrepublics,excepttheBalticstates),declaredinan interviewinNovember2007thattheWesternreactionwascausednotby theviolationofinternationalnormsbyRussia,butbythefactthatRussia “againclaimedtobeasovereigncountry,whichhastobetreatedasequal,also intheareaofinternational[electoral]monitoring.Anditturnedouttobean unpleasantsurprisefortheWest.” Krotovwentontodeclarethemonitoring standardsoftheOSCEobsolete,claimingthattheywerebasedondouble standardsanddirectpoliticalpressure,incontrasttothoseoftheCIS.¹ TheCISInterparliamentaryAssemblydidsenditsobserverstotheRussian
¹http://iacis.ru/pressroom/news/tavricheskiy_dvorets/zaokeanskie_k ritiki_propoveduyut_ ustarevshie_vzglyadyi_na_monit oring_vyiborov__intervyu_gen eralnogo_sekretarya_soveta_ mpa_sng_mihaila_krotova/,accessedJuly24,2018.
electionsandpublisheditsconclusionon2December2007(beforethevote countwasconcluded).TheAssemblyfoundnoproblemswiththeimplementationoftheelectionsandgaveRussianelectorallawhighpraise.Thiswas atoddswiththeconclusionsoftherepresentativesoftheParliamentary AssemblyoftheCouncilofEurope,whoissuedastatementstronglycriticizing theRussianelections.²
ThisdifferenceinhowtheRussianelectionsweretreatedisbutoneexample ofanimportanttrendthathastobetakenintoaccountwhenanalyzingthe democratizationprocessinvariouspartsoftheworld.Overthelasttwo decades,politicalsciencescholarshiphasaccumulatedsubstantialevidence ontheabilityofinternationalorganizations(IOs)andregionalorganizations (ROs)tostrengthenthedemocratizationprocessintheirmemberstatesand eventodosoamongnon-members.Regionalorganizationscanprovide incentivestocomplywithdemocraticnorms(e.g.ifthelatterarerequiredin ordertoobtainmembershiporiftheirabsencecanleadtotemporaryor permanentsuspensionofmembership)andofferdemocraticcountriesaid, support,andadvice.However,theycanalsofunctionascommitmentdevices forcountriesthatareresolutelypursuingthegoalofdemocratization,and eveninsomecasesusemilitaryforceincasesofcoupsthreateningdemocracy intheirmemberstates.TheEuropeanUnion’s(EU)externaldemocracy promotionhasbeenacknowledgedasthemajorexampleofthislogic;yet someotherregionalorganizationsalsoplayanimportantroleinthisrespect (Pevehouse2005).
Ourbook’smainargumentisthatthisevidencewasprimarilygeneratedby studyingregionalorganizationsmostlyconsistingofdemocraticmember statesandwithdemocraticleadingcountries.Atthesametime,alarge numberofregionalorganizationsworld-widewereeitherestablishedby non-democraciesorareatleastcenteredaroundanon-democraticleading state.Researchontheseorganizationshasbeenratherlimitedsofar.Thisis primarilythecasebecausetheliteraturehasfocusedonorganizationswhich evidentlyachieveahighlevelofeconomicandpoliticalintegrationandpolicy coordination.Regionalorganizationsofdemocraticstatesmeetthisrequirementmuchmoreoftenthanthoseofnon-democraticstates(Mansfieldetal. 2002).However,evenifanorganizationdoesnotachievethegoalsofficially declaredinitsmandate,itmayhaveaprofoundimpactonregimeconsolidation.Thisisthereasonwhythisbookengagesthenewphenomenonof authoritarianregionalism.AsCooley(2005,p.56)remarksomthistopic:
AcrossEurasia,theMiddleEast,Africa,andLatinAmerica,newregionalorganizationsare flourishing.Yettheirpoliticalagendasseemtobedriftingawayfrom
²http://www.vibory.ru/Regs/GD/part-11.htm,accessedJuly24,2018;http://kommersant.ru/ doc/817834,accessedJuly24,2018.
reaffirmingdemocraticprinciples,andmayevenbeveeringtowardnewpractices thatservetoshieldtheirauthoritarianmembersfromoutsidecriticismofwhat theydoathome.
Yettherearenumerousgapsinourknowledgeofhowtheseneworganizations workandwhattheirimpactsoftheirpolicyare.Weshowthatnon-democratic regionalorganizations(NDROs)differsubstantiallyfromthedemocraticregional organizations(DROs)intheirmodusofoperation.WealsoshowthatNDROs arecapableofexercisinganimpacton regimetransitionamongtheirmember states,eveniftheyfailtoachievethegoalofeconomicorpoliticalintegration,and becauseofthattheydeservescholarlyattention.
1.1.AUTHORITARIANREGIONALISMTHROUGHOUT THEWORLDANDINPOST-SOVIETEURASIA
Thephenomenonofauthoritarianregionalismisaglobalone:one finds NDROsindifferentpartsoftheworld.Atthesametime,insomeregions thepresenceofNDROsismorepronouncedthaninothers.Theaimofthis bookisthustoprovideevidenceonthefeaturescharacterizingNDROs worldwideanddifferentiatingthemfromDROs,butalsotounpackthespecific mechanismsthroughwhichNDROsexercisetheirinfluence.Thelastgoalwill beachievedbylookingataparticularregion post-SovietEurasia. Thisregion iscomprisedoftwelveformerSovietrepublics,whichbecameindependent in1991(Armenia,Azerbaijan,Belarus,Moldova,Georgia,Ukraine,Russia, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Uzbekistan,Tajikistan,andTurkmenistan).
ThefocusonEurasiaisimportantfrombothascientificandapolicy perspective.Fromascientificperspective,Eurasiaisthepartoftheworld where,aswewillshowinwhatfollows,NDROsare particularlyprolificin numberanddifferentiatedinscopeandobjectives;alargenumberofNDROs providesampleopportunityforcomparativeanalysis.Theregionfeaturesa largenumberofregionalorganizations,eachwithadifferentmembership, design,andperformancerecord.Therearetwomajorinternationalauthoritarianactorsinthisregion(Russiaisthecoreactor,withChinaanimportant outsider³),alongwithanumberofimportantdemocraticactors(mostnotably,theEU).Thismakesitpossibletoperformacomparativeanalysisofhow differentNDROsaffecttheregimetransitiontrajectoriesintheirmember states(orfailtodoso)anddiscussthereasonsforthesedifferences.
³Chinaisdefinedasan “outsider” becauseoftheparticulardefinitionofEurasiaweuse,i.e., asaregioncomposedofalltheformerSovietUnionstates(withtheexceptionsofLatvia, Lithuania,andEstonia).Chinadoesnotbelongtothisset,butitplaysanimportantroleinthe region.
Furthermore,Eurasiaprovidesanimportantexampleofhowdemocratic developmenthasbeeninvertedandturnedintoautocraticconsolidation. Whileintheearly1990stherewerehopesfordemocraticdevelopmentin thepost-Sovietworld,overtime,onlyafewcountriesmanagedtopassthe thresholdtoweakandunstabledemocracies.ThemajorityoftheEurasian countriesturnedintoconsolidatedautocracies,regressingfromthe(sometimesrathermodest)achievementstheydemonstratedinthe1990s.For instance,Russiatransitionedfromahybridregime(possiblyevenaweak non-consolidateddemocracy)inthe1990stoaconsolidatedautocracyin the2010s.Thisphenomenonwasunexpectedafterthewaveofdemocratizationinthe1990s,anditrequirescarefulanalysis.Thus,theregionallowsusto testaninteresting dynamic aspectoftheevolutionoftheNDROs.
Fromthepolicyperspective,theresurgenceofRussianforeignpolicy activismandevenimperialisminthe2010s,goinghandinhandwiththe developmentofNDROssuchastheEurasianEconomicUnion(EAEU)and theShanghaiCooperationOrganization(SCO),makesanunderstandingof thefunctioningandroleoftheseNDROscrucial.Thisimportantinsightwill, first,leadtoanunderstandingofRussianinfluenceonthedevelopmentof post-SovietEurasiancountriesand,second,enabletheUSandtheEUto deviseanappropriateresponse.ThediscussionintheEUonthepossibilityof cooperationbetweentheEUandtheEAEU,whichstartedalmostimmediately aftertheCrimeancrisisin2014andcontinuedwellinto2017–18,ordifferent viewsontheEUandUSabilitytointeractwithSCOinCentralAsiademonstratehowimportantthetopicisfordecision-makers.Eurasiaattractsconsiderableattentionduetoitsongoinginternationalcrises(suchastheconflict aroundUkraine),whichareunlikelytoberesolvedintheforeseeablefuture. Insum,Eurasiaappearstobeasuitablelaboratoryforourinvestigationand willallowustoobtainresultsthatwillberelevantoutsidethisparticulargroup ofcountries.
Atthesametime(anditisimportanttostressthis),Eurasiaisnottheonly partoftheworldwhereNDROsarepresent.Therefore,theaimofthebookis tocombinebroad(quantitative)analysisofalargesampleofNDROsfrom differentworldregionswithourin-depthstudyofthreeEurasianNDROs.The latteranalysisisaimedatunpackingthecausalmechanismsallowingNDROs toaffecttheregimetransitiontrajectoriesoftheirmembers(totheextentthat theyareindeedabletodoso).WehaveselectedthreeNDROsinEurasiafor moredetailedstudy,andweevaluatedifferencesintheirdesignandoutcomes: theCommonwealthofIndependentStates,theEurasianEconomicUnions, andtheShanghaiCooperationOrganization.
Here,however,webelieveitisimportanttobrieflymentionotherexamples ofNDROs,whichalsocallfordetailedanalysis(forwhich,possibly,the insightsintotheNDROsstudiedcloselyinthisbookcouldalsobeofvalue). TheGulfCooperationCouncil(GCC)canbeseentobeoneofthesecases.
TheorganizationcomprisessixconservativeArabmonarchies(SaudiArabia, Bahrain,Kuwait,UnitedArabEmirates,Oman,andQatar)andofficially pursuesthegoalofdeepereconomicintegrationofitsmembercountries. However,economicaffairsarebutoneaspectoftheGCC’sfunctions.Forus, themostimportantexampleofitsroleisitspositionduringtheArabSpringin 2011.Forexample,aftermassprotestsstartedinBahraininFebruary,the GCCbeganamilitaryintervention,whicheventuallyhelpedtheincumbent tostabilizehisposition.TheGCCalsoprovidedvariousformsofeconomic assistanceandsupporttosomeoftheautocraciesintheregion(andeven invitedJordantojointheorganizationduringtheArabSpring).Theextentof cooperationoftheGCCcountrieschangesconsiderablyovertimeand,infact, asof2017ismuchweakerthanpreviouslybecauseoftheconflictbetween QatarandSaudiArabia.However,thisorganizationhasshownthatinsome casesNDROsusedrasticmeasures(includingmilitarypower)tosupport otherautocracies.
YetanotherexampleofanimportantNDROistheBolivarianAlliancefor thePeople’sofOurAmerica(ALBA).Itwasfoundedin2004byCubaand VenezuelaandnowincludeselevenstatesofLatinAmerica.ALBAbelongsto (aswewillshowinwhatfollows)arelativelyraregroupofNDROsinthe modernworldwhichhaveaverystrongideologicalfoundation.Beingbased ontheideaofBolivarianSocialism,ALBAclaimstorejecteachandevery elementofwhattypicallyconstitutesaregionalintegrationinitiative.The commoneconomicspaceofthePeople’sTradeAgreement(Tratadode ComerciodelosPueblos),establishedbyALBAmembersin2006,oughtto beanalternativetoafreetradearea(e.g.theagreementenvisagesthatthe membercountriesprovidespecificsupporttotheirdomesticcompanies,limit dependenceonfoodsupplyfromothercountries,protecttheirmostimportanteconomicsectors,andreplacemultinationalsbystate-lednationalprojects,etc.).Practically,theorganizationsupportsauthoritariantendenciesin theregionthroughtwomechanisms:redistributionofresources(inparticular, oilatsubsidizedpricesfromVenezuelatoothercountriesoftheregion)and rhetoricprovidinglegitimacytoautocrats.Again,ALBA’sperformance changesovertime:thedeclineofoilpricesandthecatastrophiceconomic policyofVenezuelamakeitlessabletoprovideaidtoothercountries. Nevertheless,ALBAshouldnotbeseenasauniquephenomenon:itstands inalongtraditionofLatinAmericanregionalorganizationswithastrong
⁴ WhilefortheGCC,itwouldbeimpossiblewithoutverycarefulanalysisoftheempirical evidenceaccumulatedbytheliteraturedevotedtoMiddleEastregionalismandauthoritarianism, whichweonlytouchuponinthisbook.OntheroleoftheGCCasaregime-boostinginstitutionsee Colombo2012a;Kamrava2012;Haimerl2013;Steinberg2014;Fawcett2015,2016;Odiniusand Kuntz2015.Yom(2018)offersadetailedanalysisofthelimitsoftheGCCasacaseofauthoritarian regionalism.Colombo(2012b)confrontsGCCactivitiesaimingtosupportauthoritarianregimes insomecountriesandunderminetheincumbentsinothers.
anti-Americanstance(Sabatini2014),whichinsomecasesalsoprovideda highlevelofsupporttoauthoritariantendenciesinitsmemberstates.⁵
Thecasesofpost-SovietEurasia,aswellasoftheGCCandoftheALBA, showthatauthoritarianregionalismisindeedawelcomeinstrumentfor authoritarianpowers(suchasRussia,Venezuela,orSaudiArabia)eitherto explicitlysupportauthoritarianconsolidationoratleasttocounteractexternal democraticinfluences(seealsoKneueretal.2018).Yettheargumentofour bookgoesbeyondsayingthatauthoritarianleadingcountries use NDROsfor supportingauthoritarianregimes.Wearguethatfor smaller authoritarian states(suchasBelarusorTajikistaninpost-SovietEurasia)NDROscanbe evenmoreimportant,andthusinmanycasesitispreciselythesesmaller countriesthatarethedrivingforcebehindtheestablishmentofauthoritarian clubs.Again,thismatterrequirescloseinvestigation.
1.2.THECONTRIBUTIONOFTHEBOOK
WhiletheimportanceoftheseNDROsseemsevident,theiractualfunctioning andtheirinternalandexternalimplicationshavenotyetbeenexplicitly andsystematicallyaddressed.Furthermore,thedissonancebetweenregional organizationsestablishedbydemocraciesandthoseestablishedbyautocracies, althoughempiricallyobvious,hasnotbeenapproachedtheoretically.Traditionaltheoriesofregionalismweredesignedtoanalyzeregionalorganizations composedofdemocracies(e.g.theEU).Suchtheories,therefore,couldpotentiallyfailtoexplain “authoritarianregionalism,” thatis,thephenomenonof regionalorganizationssetupbynon-democracies.
Analysisofnon-democraticregionalorganizationsworld-wide,including theirinternalandexternalimplications,isthereforerelevantfrombothscientificandpolicyperspectives.Howdotheseneworganizationsinterrelateand interactwiththeoutsideworld?Howdotheycounteractandconfrontthe dangerofdemocratizationintheirownmemberstatesandinneighboring states?Howandwhydothepoliticalregimes,theeconomicdevelopment,and theculturesoftheirmemberstatesmatterinthefoundationanddevelopment oftheseorganizations?
Thisbookaimstoaddressthesequestionsbydevelopinganewtheoryof NDROsandbyusingamixedmethodsstrategy,combiningbothquantitative andqualitativeanalysis,totestit.Thequantitativeanalysisusesalargedataset ofallregionalorganizationsworld-wide,forthepost-WorldWarIIperiod, withtheaimofdefininghistoricaltrendsinthedevelopmentandmodification
⁵ SimilarlytotheGCC,formoredetailedanalysisofALBAwerefertoD’Anieri(2014)and DelaTorre(2017).
ofregionalismoverthelastsevendecades(1940s–2010s).Qualitativeanalysis refinesanddevelopstheargumentbylookingatthecaseofpost-Soviet Eurasia.Regionalorganizationsaredefinedasinternationalorganizations thatincludeonlycountrieslocatedingeographicproximitytooneanother (typically,thosesharingcommonborders);suchorganizationsdonotaspire toexpandtheirmembershipbeyondaself-defined “region” (e.g.Europe,postSovietEurasia,theArabMiddleEast).⁶ Intheempiricalresearch,weexclude militaryalliances,whicharetypicallystudiedinadifferentstrandofthe literature,andfocusonmulti-purposeandeconomicorganizations.Thisis because, first,mostactiverecentNDROspresentthemselvesaseconomicor multi-purposeorganizations,thoughtheymayactuallyserveadifferentsetof goals(suchastheGCC,theALBA,ortheCIS),andsecond,becauseweare particularlyinterestedinthenon-coercivetoolswithwhichNDROsaffect theirmembers’ politicsandsocieties.Thesetoolsare,again,especiallyimportanttoday,whentheuseofcoercionhasbecomelesspopular(althoughnot impossible,astheactionsoftheGCCinBahrainshow).
Afterperformingthelarge-Nanalysisofaworld-widesampleofregional organizations,thebookproceedswithdetailedinvestigationsofselectedcase studiesfromEurasia.Thecasestudiesalsofollowamixedmethodsdesign: theyincludebothin-depthinvestigationofparticularcausalmechanismsand econometricanalysis,andweredesignedtocapturethespecificsoftheinstitutionaldesignofeachoftheregionalorganizations.Intheworld-wide analysis,ourmainfocusisoncross-sectionalvariation:welookatalarge sampleofregionalorganizationsandinvestigatehowthemembership,governance,andpolicyoutcomesofdemocraticinternationalorganizationsdiffer fromnon-democraticones.Werepeatthisexerciseforseveraltimeperiods, lookingathowthedifferencesbetweendemocraticandnon-democratic organizationshavechangedovertime.Inthecasestudyanalysis,weuse paneldataanalysisandsurvivalanalysis,focusingonhowthepoliticalregimes ofindividualcountriesorthelengthoftheruleofleadersarecorrelatedwith thesecountries’ membershipintheorganizationsweinvestigateandtheextent oftheirinvolvementintheregionalorganizations’ activity.
Theworld-widelarge-Nanalysisisbasedonahand-pickeddatasetdevelopedbyaresearchteamincludingoneoftheco-authorsofthestudy(Vinokurov etal.2014);thisdatasetincludesdetailedinformationonnumerousregional organizations.Thedatasetisparticularlyrelevanthereasitincludesnumerous quantitativeindicatorsoneachoftheinternationalorganizationsderived fromofficialstatisticalrecords(suchasthoseoftheWorldBankandthe InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF))andanalysisofthedocumentsofthe
⁶ Thestandardwayofdefiningregionalorganizationsisbasedon(a)geographicproximity and(b)referencetoparticularregionsinthefoundingdocumentsoftheinternationalorganizations.Geographicproximityreferstocommonbordersandtheabsenceoflargedistances.
internationalorganizations.Assuch,thedatasetisuniqueinitscoverageand levelofdetail.Thelarge-Ncomponentofthecasestudyanalysisisbasedon variousdatabasesthattheauthorshavecollected:theycombinestandard sources(IMF,theWorldBank,PolityIV,FreedomHouse,etc.)withtheunique databasesofparticularregionalorganizations(e.g.theCISLegalActsDatabase).
TheanalysisofNDROswillbeconductedfromtwoperspectives:the regionalorganizations’ originsandtheirpolicyconsequences.The firstperspectiveaimstoexplain(throughanalysesofthegoals/objectivesofthe foundationofinternationalorganizations)whythistypeoforganizationwas founded.Thesecondperspectiveisrelatedtoliteratureonthediffusionofthe regimes;itlooksatregionalorganizationsasanindependentvariableand explainstheirimpactontheregimesofitsmemberstatesandofthestates beyondtheirborders.Thesecondperspectivealsolooksatthegovernance structureandadmissioncriteriaoftheNDROs,asopposedtothedecisionmakingofDROs.Therefore,afurthercontributionofthebookistodemonstratethepotentialdualnatureofNDROs,relatedtotheireconomicand politicaldimensions.Intheeconomicarena,theycreatenewrent-seeking opportunitiesfortheirmemberstatesandneighboringstates.Inthepolitical arena,theystrengthenauthoritarianregimes.
Insummary,thebookinvestigatestheroleofNDROsandbuildsonthe internationalrelations,internationalsecurity,andcomparativepoliticsliteratures.Thebookengagesinthisinterdisciplinarydialogandaimstocontributeto studiesofregionalism,politicalregimes,andregionalorganizationsworld-wide. Therearetwomain findingsofthebook.First,NDROsindeeddifferfrom DROsinseveralimportantrespectsconcerningboththeirgovernanceand membership.We findthatNDROsmoreoftenusegovernancemechanisms thatallowinformalinteractionamongtheleadersratherthanrelyonbureaucraticinstitutions.Wealso findthatNDROsaremoreheterogeneousinterms oftheirmembershipthanDROs:theyincludebothrichandpoorcountries, countriesofdifferentcultures,andevenaremorelikelytoincludecountries withdifferent(inthiscase,democratic)regimes.Thesecondmajordifference isthatNDROsdohaveanimpactonthepoliticaldevelopmentoftheir members.Inthebook’snovelanalysisoftheeffectofNDROmembership onthesurvivalofautocraticrulers,we findthatautocratsrunningcountries whichbelongtoatleastoneNDRO,inthelastseventyyears,havesystematicallymanagedtostayinpowerforlongerperiodsoftimethanauthoritarian leadersofcountrieswhichdidnotbelongtoanNDRO.Thesmall-Nanalysis illustratestheparticulartoolsandmechanismsNDROsusetosupport authoritarianregimesamongtheirmembers.⁷
⁷ WehavetopointoutthatnotallNDROspromoteordiffuseautocracy.InEurasia,we find muchstrongerevidenceoftheautocracypromotionexercisedbytheCISortheSCOthanbythe EAEU,whereitappearstobeindirectatbest.
Therefore,NDROsarecharacterizedbyaninterestingcombinationof features.Ontheonehand,toextracteconomicandsecuritybenefits,they needtoenlargetheirmembership.Thismakesthembehavepragmaticallyand acceptmorepolitically,economically,andculturallyheterogeneouscountries thanDROswoulddo(DROshavetotakeintoaccountthepreferencesofthe populationdissatisfiedwithstrongheterogeneityandthehighercostsof consensus-finding,whichwillbeevenhigherincasesofhighheterogeneity). Ontheotherhand,non-democraticregimesuseNDROstostrengthenthe regimesofthememberstatesoratleastpreventdemocratization(fearingthe diffusionofthedemocratizationprocessesintotheirowndomesticpolitics). Thus,NDROstrytobecomemoreheterogeneous(toincreaserents)andless heterogeneous(tostabilizeregimes)atthesametime.Wealsoshowthat NDROsarenotnecessarilycreatedbyasinglestrongstate:infact,whilesome NDROsaremorelikelytobeestablishedbyapowerfulhegemon,othersare groupsofstatesofroughlysimilarpower.
1.3.SEQUENCEOFCHAPTERS
Thebookhastwelvechapters,organizedinaccordancewithourresearchgoals andobjectives.This firstchapteristheintroduction.Thesecondchapter reviewstheexistingliteraturethatisrelevantforouranalysis.Itshowshow thebook fitsintoseveralstrandsofextantresearch,whichpotentiallyenrich eachother,butstillleaveimportantlacunaeforfurtheranalysis.Chapter3 developsthekeyelementsofthetheory,whichwillthenbetestedthroughout thebook.Chapter4presentsourmethodologicalapproach.Thenextthree chaptersfocusonlarge-Nworld-wideanalysis.Chapters5and6lookatthe contemporarydevelopmentofNDROs;thesetwochaptersinvestigate whetherNDROsdifferfromDROsintermsofmembership,governance, andpolicyoutcomes,botheconomicandpolitical.Chapter7providesa historicaloverviewoftheevolutionofNDROssinceWorldWarII.
ThenextfourchaptersfocusonparticularcasesofNDROsinEurasiaand serveadoublepurpose.First,asiscustomaryinmixedmethodsresearch,they specifythecausalmechanismsexplainingthelarge-Nobservationsof Chapters5and6.Second,andevenmoreimportantly,theylookataparticularlycrucialtopicthatisdifficulttostudyusinglarge-Ndata thelink betweenNDROsandautocraticconsolidationintheirmembercountries.In theworld-widelarge-Nanalysis,oneofourkeygoalswastoidentifythe universeofNDROsempirically,throughthecharacteristicsoftheirmembers (ratherthanbyworkingwithapreselectedandpossiblybiasedsetoforganizations exante referredtoasnon-democraticorilliberal).However,precisely becauseofthisempiricaldefinition,thequestionofwhetherNDROsaffectthe
