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Introduction:TheProjectof Intention Intention isbasedonacourseoflecturesthatElizabethAnscombedelivered attheUniversityofOxfordduringHilaryTermof1957.Herphilosophical interestinthetopicofintentionhadcrystallizedin1956duringher controversialoppositiontotheuniversity’sdecisiontoawardanhonorary degreetoformerUSPresidentHarryTruman—amansheregardedas a murderer inlightofhisdecisiontobombthecitiesofHiroshimaand Nagasaki,andthusdidnotthinkworthyoftheuniversity’shonors.“Formen tochoosetokilltheinnocentasameanstotheirendsisalwaysmurder,”she wroteinapamphletexplainingherposition,“andmurderisoneoftheworst ofhumanactions”(“TD,”p.70).Onthisgroundsheobjected“vehemently ... to our actioninofferingMrTrumanhonours,becauseonecanshare intheguiltofabadactionbypraiseandflattery,asalsobydefendingit” (p.70).
Anscombesawagreatdealofself-servingflatteryamongthosewho stoodindefenseofhonoringTruman.Butshethoughtaswellthatsome distinctlyphilosophicalerrorslaybehindtheirwillingnesstopraiseorexcuse him,andherprojectin Intention isultimatelyintheserviceofcombating thesefalsedoctrines.However,inAnscombe’sviewthefundamentalerrors inneedofcorrectionwerenotinmoraltheorizing,butratherinthe philosophical psychology thatcontemporarymoralphilosophytendsto assume.Her1958paper“ModernMoralPhilosophy”singlesoutforspecial criticismthedefinitionofintentioninHenrySidgwick’s MethodsofEthics: [Sidgwick]definesintentioninsuchawaythatonemustbesaidtointend anyforeseenconsequencesofone’svoluntaryaction. ... Heuses[this definition]toputforwardanethicalthesiswhichwouldnowbeaccepted bymanypeople:thethesisthatitdoesnotmakeanydifferencetoaman’s responsibilityforsomethingthatheforesaw,thathefeltnodesireforit, eitherasanendorasameanstoanend.(“MMP,”pp.34–35)
TherearetwoquitestraightpathsfromSidgwick’sdefinitionofintentionto thepraiseofTrumanasonewhoactedcourageouslyinthefaceoffrightful
Anscombe’sIntention:AGuide. John Schwenkler, Oxford University Press (2019). © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190052027.001.0001
necessity.Thefirstisthat,byerasingthedifferenceinresponsibilitybetween theforeseenandintendedeffectsofanaction,Sidgwick’spositionrenders incoherenttheveryideaofexceptionlessprohibitionsagainstcertain types ofthingsthatapersonmayneverdo,nomatterthecircumstancessheisin. Thisisbecauseanysuchprohibitionwillnecessarilyconcernwhataperson intentionally does,incontrasttowhatisbroughtaboutasaside-effectofher action:thus,e.g.,theprohibitionagainstkillinginnocentpersonsistakennot tobeviolatedbyapersonwhopushessomeoneoffacliffwhenheismenacing herlife,orbyadoctorwhoadministersapalliativedrugthathastensthedeath ofapatient.2 Accordingtoaviewofhumanactioninwhichthisdistinction iserased,theonlythingthatcanrecommendagainstanactionistheoverall badnessofwhatwillhappenifonedoesit—whichmeansthatthegeneral badnessinvolvedindoingacertainsortofthingcanalwaysbeoverwhelmed, intherightcircumstances,bythebadnessoftheconsequencesthatwould resultfromdoinganythingelse.Anscombe’spamphletunfoldsthelogichere:
Theactionwasnecessary,oratanyrateitwasthoughtbycompetent, expertmilitaryopiniontobenecessary;itprobablysavedmorelivesthan itsacrificed;ithadagoodresult,itendedthewar.Comenow:ifyouhadto choosebetweenboilingonebabyandlettingsomefrightfuldisasterbefall athousandpeople—oramillionpeople,ifathousandisnotenough—what wouldyoudo?Areyougoingtostrikeanattitudeandsay“Youmaynotdo evilthatgoodmaycome?”(“TD,”pp.64–65)
Itisnot,however,theprojectof Intention todefendtheancientprohibition againstdoingevilinpursuitofagoodend.Rather,thepointatissueisthat ifweassumeaviewofintentionlikeSidgwick’sthenthequestioncannot even arise whetheragivenactmightfailtobejustifiedbythebalanceofevil itavoidsandgooditbringsabout—cannotarise,thatis,becauseitcannot evenbe formulated withintheconceptionofactandintentionthatSidgwick provides.Hereheisin TheMethodsofEthics:
Moralistsofallschools,Iconceive,wouldagreethatthemoraljudgments whichwepassonactionsrelateprimarilytointentionalactionsregardedas intentional.Inotherwords,whatwejudgetobe“wrong”—inthestrictest ethicalsense—isnotanypartoftheactualeffects,assuch,ofthemuscular movementsimmediatelycausedbytheagent’svolition,buttheeffects whichheforesawinwillingtheact;or,morestrictly,hisvolitionorchoice
2 Fortheseexamples,see“WM,”pp.54–55.
ofrealisingtheeffectsasforeseen.WhenIspeakthereforeofacts,Imust beunderstoodtomean—unlessthecontraryisstated—actspresumedto beintentionalandjudgedassuch.3
AnscombeagreeswithSidgwickonthismuch:thatamongthethingsa persondoesorbringsabout,theonlythingsforwhichthepersoncanbe creditedorblamedarethosewhichshekneworbelieved4 thatheraction wouldinvolveorbringabout.HercriticismisthatSidgwickdoesnotmake afurtherdistinction,withinthiscategoryofthingsthatapersonknowsor believesthatshewilldoorbringabout,betweenthosethatareandarenot intended.Ifwedonotmakethisdistinction,thenthe only thingthatwe candoinevaluatingtheactionsofaTrumanistocomparethenumbers oflivesandothergoodsforeseeably“saved”tothoseforeseeably“sacrificed” amongthecoursesofactionavailabletohim.IfSidgwickisright,then all theconsequencesthatareforeseeninachoiceareequallypartoftheagent’s intention.HadTrumanchosentocontinuethewarby“conventional”means, understandingthatinthischoicesomeciviliandeathswouldresult,hewould haveintendedthosedeathsnolessthanheintendedthedeathsofthecivilians inHiroshimaandNagasaki.Atleastasfaraslifeanddeathareconcerned,the onlythingforhimtodowaschoosetheoptionthatappearedtohavethemost favorablebodycount.
AmongAnscombe’scontemporaries,herOxfordcolleagueR.M.Hare wasespeciallystraightforwardinendorsingtheupshotofthisSidgwickean conceptionofchoice.HereisHareinhis1952book TheLanguageofMorals:
supposeIamanemployer,andamwonderingwhetherornottosacka clerkwhohabituallyturnsupattheofficeafterthehouratwhichhehas undertakentoturnup.IfIsackhimIshallbedeprivinghisfamilyofthe moneyonwhichtheylive,perhapsgivingmyfirmareputationwhichwill leadclerkstoavoiditwhenotherjobsareavailable,andsoon;ifIkeep him,Ishallbecausingtheotherclerkstodoworkwhichotherwisewould bedonebythisclerk;andtheaffairsoftheofficewillnotbetransactedso quicklyastheywouldifalltheclerkswerepunctual.Thesewouldbethe sortsofconsiderationIshouldtakeintoaccountinmakingmydecision. Theywouldbetheeffectsonthetotalsituationofthealternativeactions,
3 HenrySidgwick, TheMethodsofEthics,Bk.III,ch.1,pp.201–202.
4 Or,perhaps, ought tohaveknownorbelieved.Anscombearguesthatthisadditionmatters quitealot:hereseeherpaper“OnBeinginGoodFaith.”Butitwouldnotbeenoughtosave Sidgwick’sviewfromthepresentcriticism.
sackinghimornotsackinghim.ItistheeffectswhichdeterminewhatI shouldbedoing;itisbetweenthetwosetsofeffectsthatIamdeciding.The wholepointaboutadecisionisthatitmakesadifferencetowhathappens; andthisdifferenceisthedifferencebetweentheeffectsofdecidingoneway, andtheeffectsofdecidingtheother.(LM,pp.56–57)
ForHareasforSidgwick,adecisionissimplyachoicebetweeneffects;and itisthebalanceoftheeffectsthatdeterminewhatshouldbechosen.Given thisview,he must treatasequivalentthechoicetokillonepersonasameans ofpreservingthelivesofsomeothers,andthechoicetoknowinglyallow orbringaboutthedeathofonepersonastheconsequenceofalife-saving act.Exceptinsofaraswewishtofollowtheadviceofourreceivedmoral traditions,theonlythingthereistodecidebetweenthesechoicesisthe foreseeableeffectsofeachone.
TheotherwaythatSidgwick’sdefinitionofintentionleadsstraightto thejustificationofwartimeatrocityisinthewaythatitrequiresustoframe thedistinctionbetween“legitimateandillegitimateobjectsofattack”ina militarycontext(see“TD,”p.63).OntheclassicalviewthatAnscombeis outtodefend,nopersonmaybetargetedinanattackwhois innocent from theperspectiveofthosewagingwar—whichiswhyanarmymaysometimes bombamilitarybasebutneverdothesametoavillage,andwhysoldierscan justifiablybetakenprisonerwhilecivilianscannot.However,theconceptof “innocence”atworkinthesedistinctionsdoesnothavetodowithaperson’s moralcharacter:thepointoftherestrictionsisnotthatarmiesshouldattack badpeopleratherthangoodones,butratherthattheymayattackonlythose peoplewhoareactivelyinvolvedinthemilitaryconflict.ThusAnscombe:
Whatisrequired,forthepeopleattackedtobenon-innocentinthe relevantsense,isthattheyshouldthemselvesbeengagedinanobjectively unjustproceedingwhichtheattackerhastherighttomakehisconcern; or—thecommonestcase—shouldbeunjustlyattackinghim.Thenhecan attackthemwithaviewtostoppingthem;andalsotheirsupplylines andarmamentfactories.Butpeoplewhosemereexistenceandactivity supportingexistencebygrowingcrops,makingclothes,etc.,constitute animpedimenttohim—suchpeopleareinnocentanditismurderousto attackthem,ormakethematargetforanattackwhichhejudgeswillhelp himtowardsvictory.Formurderisthedeliberatekillingoftheinnocent, whetherforitsownsakeorasameanstosomefurtherend.(“WM,”p.53; andcf.“TD,”p.67forasimilaraccount)
Theproblemonceagainisthatitissimplyimpossibletodrawthislinein therightplacewithoutanappropriateunderstandingofactandintention. Forsupposeitweretobeaccepted,withinaconsequentialistframeworklike Hare’s,thatthedeathsofinnocentsaremoretobeavoidedthanotherdeaths, sincetheyareinsomewayaworsethingtohavehappen.But who arethe innocents?Iftheanswercomes:Theyarethosewhoarenotfightingand notengagedinsupplyingthosewhoarewiththemeansoffighting,then weneedawaytodelineatethesecategories.Andbytreatingalltheforeseen consequencesofaperson’sactionaspartofthecontentofherintention,a philosopherwhoacceptstheSidgwickeanviewofintentionwilldrawthis lineinentirelythewrongplace.Ifafarmergrowscrops, foreseeing thatthese willbesoldtoaconglomerateandtheneatenbythetroopswhofight,then onaviewlikeSidgwick’stheeffectsthatherfarmingcontributestowardthe wareffortcountas intentional actionsorconsequencesnolessthanthose ofthesoldiersandthegenerals.Andthesamewillholdinturnforany civilianwhounderstandsthat something sheisdoingislikelytocontribute in some waytohernation’smilitaryefforts.Itisonlythosewhoarevery young,orotherwiseblissfullyunawareofthewartimesituation,whowill failtosatisfythiscondition—butthenmanysuchinnocentliveswilllikely be“lost”nomatterhowawarproceeds,andsothechoicetokillsomeof themwilloftenbejustifiedbyappealtothetotalsituationthatthisbrings about.
Theprojectof Intention is,onceagain,nottoestablishanyexceptionless moralprinciplesordefendarobustconceptoflegalinnocence,butratherto makeitpossibleatleastto ask coherentlywhether,forexample,itisaworse thingtotargetciviliansdirectlythantoactinawaythatoneforeseeswill resultinciviliandeaths—aquestionthatwenaturallytaketobeanimportant partofmoralevaluation,butwhichcannotevenberaisedintelligently withinaframeworklikeSidgwick’s.Indeed,questionslikethisoneremain importantforphilosopherswhoholdthatallmoralprinciplesadmitof possibleexception,aslongastheyacceptthattheintrinsicnatureofanact has some specialbearingonthepermissibilityofperformingit.Forexample, inhispaper“WhatMakesRightActsRight?,”theOxfordphilosopherW.D. Rossrejectsthe“idealutilitarianism”ofG.E.Moore,accordingtowhichthe only moraldutyisthatofproducinggoodeffects,andarguesinsteadthat thereareanumberofother“primafacie duties”thataresignificantinmoral deliberation.Rossgivesasexamplesthedutiestokeepone’spromises,make reparationforwrongfulacts,expressgratitudeforservicesdone,andnot
injureordoharmtoothers.5 OnRoss’sview,noneofthesedutiesarebinding ineverypossiblecircumstance:thatis,theyareallsuchthatit can berightto violatetheminordertopreventagreatenoughevilorbringaboutagreat enoughgood.Evenso,Rossneedsarobustdistinctionbetweenintention andforesightinordertogethisnon-absolutistpositionoftheground,as wecannotunderstandwhatthesesupposeddutieseven concern without distinguishingaperson’sintentionalactionfromitsforeseenconsequences. Therequirementsthat,forexample,wenot“killonepersoninordertokeep anotheralive,or ... stealfromoneinordertogivealmstoanother”(p.22), eveniftheybindonlyprimafacie,cannotbemadesomuchas intelligible ifwedonotdistinguishanintentionalkillingfromadeaththatforeseeably resultsfromachoicenottokill,orintentionaltheftfromaperson’sforeseen poverty.6
Atthesametimeassheopposesthecollapseofthecategoriesofintention andforesight,Anscombealsoopposesanyaccountthatidentifiesaperson’s intentionwiththe mentalstate thatissheisinbeforeorduringthetimewhen sheacts.Inacoupleofplacesin Intention,aswellasapairofotheressays thatshewrotearoundthesametime,7 shesinglesoutforspecialcriticism theideathatintentionconsistsinan“interiormovement”(I,§25,42:1)of sayingtooneself“I mean tobedoingsuch-and-such.”Thisconceptionof intentionis“falseandabsurd”(“GW,”p.247),shesays,sinceaccordingto itsimply thinking intherightmanneraboutone’sactionsturnsouttobe“a marvellousway ... ofmakinganyactionlawful”(“WM,”p.59).Butthisisnot theonlywaythataconceptionofintentionassomethinginteriortoanagent canleadaphilosopherintoabsurdity.8 ConsiderthefollowingfromJudith JarvisThomson:
Supposeapilotcomestouswitharequestforadvice:“See,we’reatwar withavillainouscountrycalledBad,andmysuperiorshaveorderedmeto dropsomebombsatPlacetowninBad.Nowthere’samunitionsfactoryat Placetown,butthere’sachildren’shospitaltheretoo.Isitpermissiblefor
5 SeeW.D.Ross,“WhatMakesRightActsRight?,”pp.19–22.AnscombereferencesRoss’s account,thoughnotRossbyname,indiscussingrecent“productionsofOxfordmoral philosophy”inthepenultimateparagraphof“MrTruman’sDegree.”
6 Foramorecontemporaryexampleofapositionwiththisform,seeWarrenQuinn’sdefense ofanon-absolutistDoctrineofDoubleEffectin“Actions,Intentions,andConsequences.”
7 See I,§§25and27,togetherwith“WarandMurder”(1961)andherunpublishedreviewof GlanvilleWilliams’s1958book TheSanctityofLifeandtheCriminalLaw.
8 ThankstoJuanPiñerosforpromptingwhatfollows,andtonumerousphilosopherson Facebookforhelpingmeworkthroughthedetails.
metodropthebombs?”Andsupposewemakethefollowingreply:“Well, italldependsonwhatyourintentionswouldbeindroppingthebombs. Ifyouwouldbeintendingtodestroythemunitionsfactoryandthereby winthewar,merelyforeseeing,thoughnotintending,thedeathsofthe children,thenyes,youmaydropthebombs.Ontheotherhand,ifyou wouldbeintendingtodestroythechildrenandtherebyterrorizetheBads andtherebywinthewar, thenno,youmaynotdropthebombs.”What aqueerperformancethiswouldbe!Cananyonereallythinkthatthepilot shoulddecidewhetherhemaydropthebombsbylookinginwardforthe intentionwithwhichhewouldbedroppingthemifhedroppedthem?9
AnscombewillofcoursedisagreewithThomsonoverwhetherthiscase showsthemoralirrelevanceofthedistinctionbetweenintentionand foresight.Shedoesagree,however,thatitis entirely wrongtolook“inward” ratherthan“outward”inevaluatingthepermissibilityofanact—whether one’sownorthatofanotherperson.OnereasonforthisistheoneIjust gaveearlier:adviceofthesortthatThomsonimaginesgivingtothepilot practicallyinviteshimtofocusongettinghis attitudes alignedinawaythat willallowhimthentoactashewishes.10 Whatmakesthisintrospective concernsoperverseisthatthebadnessofmurderhastodowithwhatis done—thatis,withthekindof event or happening thatitconsistsin—andnot withtheinnerstateofthepersonwhocarriesitout.AndThomson’sadvice representsthesituationasifthereweretwodistinctthingstoconsiderhere:as ifwhatthepilot does willbethesamewhetherheintendstheciviliandeathsor merelyforeseesthem,andthedifferencebetweenthecasesliesintheattitude thathehastowardthiseffect.Yetsurelyitisnot himself thatthepilotshould beconcernedwithindecidingwhetherornottodestroyahospitalfullof children!
Aswewillsee,Anscombeallowsthattherearecircumstancesinwhich theintentionwithwhichapersonacts,conceivedassomethingsomehow
9 JudithJarvisThomson,“Self-Defense,”p.293.Thomsondoesconfuseoneveryimportant pointhere:itisnopartofthetraditionalpositionsheischallengingthatciviliancasualtiesare permissible whenever theyarenotintended.Indeed,asIdiscussinwhatfollows,Anscombe followstraditioninholdingthatonemaybea murderer eveninbringingaboutadeaththatone didnotintend,aslongasoneactswithindifferencetohumanlife.(Forthispointsee I,§25,45:3, asdiscussedinsection3.4oftheCommentary.)Thisisjustwhatweshouldsayofsomeonewho woulddestroyanentirecityinordertogetridofthemilitarytargetsthatwerepresentinit.
10 ThusitisthatmanyCatholics,myselfincluded,whowereraisedontheteachingthat mortalsinrequires“fullknowledgeandconsent”havediscoveredthestrategyofkeepingoneself selectivelyignorantinorderthatone’ssinsbe“merely”venial.Anscombecriticizesthisteaching inheressay“OnBeinginGoodFaith.”
distinctfromwhattheyactuallydo,canberelevantinmoralevaluation. Section25of Intention quotesapassagefromWittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations thatpointsustothisphenomenon:
WhydoIwanttotellhimaboutanintentiontoo,aswellastellinghimwhat Idid?—Notbecausetheintentionwasalsosomethingwhichwasgoingon atthetime.ButbecauseIwanttotellhimsomethingabout myself,which goesbeyondwhathappenedatthetime.(PI §659;quotedin I,§25,45:4)
Itis,however,acentralthesisofAnscombe’sbookthatthe primary roleof ourconceptofintentionisquitedifferentfromtheonethatWittgenstein describeshere.Onherview,themainuseoftheconceptofintentionisnot tocharacterizethestateofmindofanagent,butrathertodescribe what happens inawaythatrevealsthemeans–endorderthatanagent’s(realor proposed)actionembodies.Aswewillsee,Anscombeholdsthattheethically relevantdifferenceinacaselikeThomson’sissimplybetween(1)destroyinga buildingbecauseitisfullofciviliansand(2)destroyingabuildingbecauseitis neartoamunitionsfactory.Andneitherofthesedescriptionshasreference totheagent’sstateofmind:thedifferencebetweenthemisadifferencein whatisdone.ForAnscombe,itisinsofarashe acted inwaysthatfallunder descriptionslikethefirstonethatTrumanviolatedtheprohibitionagainst theintentionalkillingofinnocents.Tobringsomeone’sactionundersucha descriptionis thereby todescribethatpersonasactingwiththeintenttokill. Andtheimportanceofthisdescriptionisnotwhatitsaysabouttheinner stateoftheagent.Incontextslikethese,theusetowhichweputtheconcept ofintentionissimplyindescribingwhatpeopleactuallydo.11
Thereissomedangerinframingtheprojectof Intention againstthe backgroundoftheseethicaldebates.Foraswehaveseen,themistakesthat Anscombemeanstocorrectinherbookhavetodowiththewaythatconcepts like“action”and“intention”areconceivedinphilosophical psychology, 12 anditisnopartofherprojecttodevelopan ethical theorythatjustifies exceptionlessprohibitionsorgivesweighttothedifferencebetweenintended andforeseenconsequences.HereishowAnscombedescribeshersituationin amemorablepassagefrom“ModernMoralPhilosophy”:
11 ForfurtherdiscussionofthedifferencebetweenAnscombeandThomsonoverthe interpretationoftheintention/foresightdistinction,seeT.A.Cavanaugh,“Anscombe,Thomson, andDoubleEffect.”ForadifferentwayofreplyingtoThomson’sargument,seeMatthewHanser, “PermissibilityandPracticalInference.”
12 Thatis,whattodaywewouldcall“philosophyofaction”and“philosophyofmind.”
Inpresent-dayphilosophyanexplanationisrequiredhowanunjustmanis abadman;togivesuchanexplanationbelongstoethics;butitcannoteven bebegununtilweareequippedwithasoundphilosophyofpsychology. Fortheproofthatanunjustmanisabadmanwouldrequireapositive accountofjusticeasa“virtue.”Thispartofthesubject-matterofethicsis, however,completelyclosedtousuntilwehaveanaccountofwhat type ofcharacteristic avirtueis—aproblem,notofethics,butofconceptual analysis—andhowitrelatestotheactionsinwhichitisinstanced:amatter whichIthinkAristotledidnotsucceedinreallymakingclear.Forthiswe certainlyneedanaccountofwhatahumanactionisatall,andhowits descriptionas“doingsuch-and-such”isaffectedbyitsmotiveandbythe intentionorintentionsinit;andforthisanaccountofsuchconceptsis required.(“MMP,”p.29)
Heridea,then,isthatinorder(a)tounderstandwhatmakesapersonbad weshouldfirst(b)givepositiveaccountsofcertainvirtues.This,however, requiresaccountsofboth(c)whatvirtueisand(d)howvirtuesrelateto virtuousactions,whichinturnrequireunderstanding(e)whathumanaction isand(f)howthecorrectdescriptionofanactionisaffectedbytheagent’s motivesandintentions.This,finally,requires(g)accountsofwhatmotives andintentionsthemselvesare.AndAnscombeinsiststhatweapproachthis taskbyconsideringthesequestions“simplyaspartofthephilosophyof psychology,”andso“banishingethicstotally fromourminds”(“MMP,”p.38), inorderthatouraccountoftheseconceptsnotbecoloredbyourpriorethical commitmentswheninfacttheproperdependenceistheotherwayaround. IfIamcorrectintheaccountIhaveoutlinedthusfarofAnscombe’s positiononthesematters,thentheprojectof Intention isradicalindeed, andmuchmoresothanisusuallyrecognized.For,thanksinlargepart toherinfluence,philosopherstodayarequitedifferentfromAnscombe’s contemporariesintakingtheconceptofintentionveryseriouslywithin moraltheoryandthephilosophyofmind.Butitiscommongroundin thesediscussionsthatwhateverintentionis,itisamentalstate,andthat thedistinguishingcharacteristicsofintentionalactionmustlieinsome connectionbetweenthementalstateoftheagentandthethingsthatshedoes becauseofthis.13 Likethegroundbeneathourfeet,weproceedfromthese assumptionssosteadilyandconsistentlythatwetendtobeforgetfulofthe
13 Foranexceptionthatprovestherule,seePartIIofMichaelThompson’s LifeandAction
useweputthemto.Wehavenot really engagedwithAnscombeonherown termsuntilwehavegivenherthechancetoshakethisground.
Suggestionsforfurtherreading
• ForasystematicoverviewofAnscombe’sphilosophicalthought,see RogerTeichmann, ThePhilosophyofElizabethAnscombe.
• Forfurtherdiscussionoftheprojectof Intention inrelationtothe controversyoverTruman’sdegree,seeAnthonyKenny,“Elizabeth AnscombeatOxford”;RachaelWiseman, GuidebooktoAnscombe’s Intention,chapters1–2;andWiseman,“TheIntendedandUnintended Consequencesof Intention.”
InterpretivePrécis Intention isaphilosophicalinquiryintotheconceptnamedinitstitle.This isaconceptthatweputtoworkinanumberofdifferentways,including treatingcertainstatementsasexpressionsoftheintentiontodosomething, categorizingcertainactionsasintentionalandothersasnot,anddescribing theintentionswithwhichpeopleactastheydo.Whatconstitutestheunity amongtheseformsofthought?
Anaturalansweristhattheword“intention”referstoa mentalstate thatisoperativeinallthesethings:itisthestate expressed inexpressing anintention,thestatethat causes orotherwisequalifiestheexecutionof anintentionalaction,thestatethatapersonis in whensheactswiththe intentiontodosuch-and-such.ButAnscombeturnsthiscommonpicture onitshead.Onherview,theprimaryuseoftheconceptofintentionconsists inadistinctivemannerofdescribing whathappens intheworld.
Thedistinctive formofdescription whichweengageinwhenweemploy theconceptofintentioncanbeelucidatedbyreflectingonthespecialsense of “Why?” expressedinquerieslikethefollowing:
(Q1)Whyareyougoingtomarryher?
(Q2)WhyareyousawingthatplankofSmith’s?
(Q3)Whydidyousteponmytoejustthen?
Apositiveanswertooneofthesequestionswillgiveone’s reasonforacting in themannerdescribed,e.g.:
(A1)Togetatherparents’money.
(A2)BecauseIambuildinghimabirdhouse.
(A3)Inordertogetyourattention.
Asstatementsgiveninanswertothepreviousquestions,eachof(A1),(A2), and(A3)representstwoeventsasstandinginsomeconnection:
(B1)Iam goingtomarryher to getatherparents’money.
xxviiiinterpretiveprécis
(B2)Iam sawingSmith’splank becauseIam buildinghimabirdhouse. (B3)I steppedonyourtoe inorderto getyourattention.
Theconnectionsrepresentedin(B1),(B2),and(B3)areallrelationsof dependence:eachonesaysthatI wouldnot do,bedoing,orhavedone,one thingifI werenot therebydoinganother,andlikewisethatmydoingthelatter thingisorwastobea consequence ofmydoingtheformer.Andallthese relationsareinsomesensecausal—thusitisnoaccidentthatthesameword “because”appearsbothin(B2)andin
(B4)Thetreeisfallingbecauseitwasdamagedinthestorm.
Butthe sort ofcausalrelationrepresentedinastatementlike(B4)isdifferent fromthesortrepresentedin(B2):while(B4)presupposesageneral(though notexceptionless)lawtotheeffectthatstorm-damagedtreeshaveatendency tofall,(B2)couldbetrueevenifwhenIsawplanksitisalmostalwaysbecause Iammakingbookshelves,andbirdhousesIgenerallymakeoutofplastic instead.Whatisthesortofcausaldependencethatisrepresentedinthese statements,andinvirtueofwhatdoesitobtain?
Anscombe’sanswertothefirstquestionisthatthedependence representedinstatementslike(B1),(B2),and(B3)is teleological:itisthe dependenceofameansonanendthatitserves.Andheranswertothesecond isthatthisdependenceobtainsinvirtueof theagent’sownunderstanding of whatsheisdoingandwhy—thatis,thatitisonlybecausethespeakerof(B1), (B2),and(B3)endorsesthesestatementsintheirfirst-personalguisethatthe correspondingthird-personstatementsaretrue:
(B1*)Heisgoingtomarryhertogetatherparents’money.
(B2*)SheissawingSmith’splankbecausesheisbuildinghima birdhouse.
(B3*)Tommysteppedonyourtoeinordertogetyourattention.
Thereseemstoberoomforexceptionhere:couldn’t(B1*),forexample, betrueofsomeonewhodoesn’tunderstandwhatheisreallyafter?Butin caseslikethiswedonottakeapersontobe wholly ignorantofhisorher motivations:e.g.,ifthetruereasonIammarryingsomeoneisthatIwantto getatherparents’money,thenImustknow“atsomelevel”thatIammoved bythisdesire,evenifIwon’t admit ittomyselfortoothers.Itisthusquite unlikeacasewhere,e.g.,Isignawaymyinheritancebecausesomeonehas trickedmeintodoingthis—inwhichcaseIam simply unawarethatthisis thetrueaccountofwhatIdo.
Similarquestionsariseinconnectionwithoneofthebest-knowntheses of Intention,whichwemayabbreviatehereasthe KnowledgeThesis:
(KT) Apersondoessomethingintentionallyonlyifsheknows,without observation, that sheisdoingitand why.
Thetruthof(KT)wouldaccountforthepossibilityofdelineatingtheclassof intentionalactionsaccordingtotheapplicabilityof“Why?”-questionswith thespecialsenseexpressedin(Q1),(Q2),and(Q3).Forifquestionsofthat sortareansweredpositivelywithdescriptionsthathavethedistinctiveform of(B1),(B2),and(B3),andthetruthofthesedependsontheagent’sown knowledgeofthecausalitythattheyrepresent,thenthedomainofanagent’s self-knowledgewilloverlapwiththatofthe“Why?”-question’sapplication.
Anscombetreats(KT)asanexceptionlessprinciple,andrejectsany attempttopropitupbyrestrictingthescopeofanagent’sself-knowledge toaninnermentalstate,orthedomainofagencytoaproximatetriggerof outwardevents.Herthesisattributestoanagentfirst-personalknowledge of whathappens,broughtundertheformofdescriptionweemployin representinganaction’smeans–endstructure.Assuch,itcanbehardto square(KT)withcaseswhereanagent’sself-knowledgeofheractseems tofallshortoftheworldlyhappeningsthatconstitutetheexecutionof herintention.Isitreallytrue,forexample,that(B2*)couldbetrueof someoneonlyifshe knowswithoutobservation thatsheissawingSmith’s plank?Howcouldthisbe,giventhefallibilityofouractivepowersandthe ineliminableroleofperceptionintheknowledgeableperformanceofsuch anact?
Theanswertothischallengeissupposedtolieinthecharacterization ofanagent’sself-knowledgeas practical knowledge,knowledgethatis(in thephrasethatAnscombeborrowsfromAquinas)thecauseofwhatit understands.Thisknowledgeisthe measure ofitsobject,settingthestandard bywhichactionisjudgedasasuccessorfailure:thusapersonwhojudges (B2)whentheplanksheissawingisnotreallySmith’swillbemakinga mistakeinwhatshe does.Itistheprincipleofitsobject’s form,constituting whatwouldotherwisebeamere“chaos”ofeventsintothemeans–endunity representedintheagent’spracticalreasoning:thusanagent’sself-knowledge ofheractiswhatmakesitpossibletobringitunderthespecialformof descriptionwehaveexplored.Anditisalsothe efficient causeoftheagent’s movementsandtheireffects—asfireisthecauseofheat,andGod’sknowledge thecauseofthethingshecreates.
Itisnoteasytosaywhetherthisdefenseof(KT)issufficient.One ofthemaincontentionsofmyCommentaryisthat(KT)cannot,afterall, holdupasAnscombemeantit,andthatweshouldtreatitinsteadasa principledescribingwhatholds“forthemostpart,”andadmittingofpossible exceptions.Onlyso,Iargue,canweholdontotheideathattheproper domainofanagent’sself-understandingisthematerialrealityofheract.
OutlineoftheText TermsthatappearinboldfacearediscussedintheGlossaryofTerms.
§1:Threewaystoemployaconceptof“intention”:(i)treatinga statementasthe expressionofintention,(ii)categorizing action asintentional,(iii)describingthe furtherintention withwhich apersonacts.Whatconstitutestheunityamongthese?
§2:Considerationofheading(i).Astatementoftheform“Iamgoing todoX”mayexpresseithertheintentiontodoXorthemere estimate thatoneisgoingtodothis.Inbothusesthestatement offersa prediction—itdescribes whatonewilldo,andnotthe stateofmindoneispresentlyin.Onlyinthefirstuse,however, doesthepossibilityariseofa mistakeinperformance—thatis,a caseinwhich whatonedoes canbecriticizedor“impugned”for notbeinginaccordancewithwhatonesays.
§§3–4:Thedifficultyofcharacterizingwhatis expressed inexpressingan intentionbyappealtothementalstateofthespeaker.Intention issomethingmorethanmeredesire—butinwhatdoesthe differenceconsist?Wedonotrecognizeourownintentionsby introspectingourpsychology.Andoneofthebestwaystotell anotherperson’sintentionsissimplybylookingatheractions anddescribingwhatshedoes—intheusualcases,youwill thereby reportsomeofwhatsheintends.
§5:Intentionalactionscanbedefinedasthoseaboutwhichitis possibletoask “Why?,” inasensethatwouldbeanswered positivelybygivinga reasonforacting.Thedifficultyin explicatingthelatterphrasewithoutappealtoaction-and intention-concepts.
§§6–8:Beginningtoelucidatetherelevantsenseof“Why?”by identifyingwaysof refusingitsapplication.(1)Claimingthat onedidnotknowthatshewasdoingthethinginquestion—as whenIsawSmith’splank,notknowingthatitbelongsto
him.(2)Claimingthatoneknewshewasdoingthisonlyby observation—aswhenIoperatethetrafficlightsincrossing theroad.(3)Claimingthatitwasonlybyobservationthatone knewthecauseofherdoingit—aswhenatapfromthedoctor’s hammercausesmylegtokick.Actionasintentionalonly under descriptions:namely,thoseunderwhichitisnonobservationally known.
§§9–16:Afurtherwaytorefuseapplicationofthequestion“Why?”: (4)Statingthatone’sactionwasmerelytheresultofa mental cause.Considerationofthislastconcept,andofthedifference betweenactingfromamentalcauseandactingfroma motive. Thepossibilityofarguingagainstmotivesinawaythatmental causescannotbearguedagainst.Atentativeproposal:action frommotiveisdistinguishedbythewaythatthoughtsofwhat isgoodandbadareinvolvedinit.
§§17–18:Considerationof “fornoreason” and“Idon’tknowwhyIdidit,” aspossibleresponsestothequestion“Why?”.Answerslikethese arenotwaysofrefusingthequestion’sapplication.
§19:Anargumentthatactionisnotintentionalinvirtueofan extra feature thatexistswhenitisperformed.
§§20–21:Anargumentthatouroriginalheadings(i),(ii),and(iii)are connected.Therecouldnotbeaconceptofintentionalaction, assomethingtowhichaspecialsenseof“Why?”isgiven application,ifitwerenotpossibletoanswerthisquestionby expressingintentionforthefutureanddescribingthefurther intentionwithwhichoneacts.
§§22–24,26:Furtherdiscussionofthesetwowaysofansweringthequestion “Why?”:withawiderdescriptionofwhatone isdoing,andwitha descriptionofsomethingelsethatoneis goingtodo.The “break” separatingdescriptionsofthesetwosorts.Theunityofanaction asrevealedinthe A–Dorder inaseriesofdescriptionsofthe actionthatstandtooneanotherasmeanstoend.Thespecial senseof“How?”thatseekstodiscoverthemeansbywhich somethingisdone.
§§25,27:Considerationof“Ididn’tcareaboutthat”asawayofrefusing applicationofthequestion“Why?”Thedistinctionbetweenone’s intentionandtheforeseenconsequencesofone’sactdoesnot dependonaconceptionofintentionasaninteriormovement.
§28:Raisingdifficultiesfortheclaimthatintentionalactionis nonobservationallyknown.Isthistrueevenfordescriptionsof anactionintermsofwhathappensatadistancefromone’sbody?
§§29–30:Thesedifficultiescannotberesolvedbyrestrictingthecontentof anagent’snonobservationalknowledgetoherwillorherbodily movements,norbyidentifyingactionwithaproximaleventthat merelyinitiatestheconsequenthappenings.
§§31–32:Thestatementofone’sownintentionalactionis contradicted onlybytheexpressionofanopposingintention,andnotbya merelycontrarydescriptionofwhathappens.Howanorderor expressionofintentionthatisnotcontradictedmaynevertheless falltotheground orbe directlyfalsified bythefacts.Consideration ofthedifferentrelationsthattwolistsmayhavetowhatthey describewhenonelisthastheroleofanorderandtheother theroleofanaccuratereport.Introductionoftheconceptof practicalknowledge asthepossiblesolutiontoourdifficulties.
§§33–36:Tounderstandpracticalknowledge,wemustfirstunderstand practicalreasoning,i.e.,thereasoninginlightofwhichone acts.Argumentthatthisreasoningdoesnothavetheformof ademonstrationor proof thatsuch-and-suchistobedone.Its formisratherthatofa calculation ofameansofobtaining somethingthatonewants.Theconsiderationthatonereasons fromisnotone’swantingitself,butthe object thatiswantedin somerespect.
§§37–41:Furtherdiscussionof desire,inconnectionwiththethesisthat theendsoughtinactionmustappearundertheaspectofsome good.Thisdoesnotmeanthattheobjectofdesiremustbe regardedas ethically good—forthegoodoneseesinsomething maylieinitsbeingbad.Butdesirecanmakeactionintelligible onlyinsofarasitisarepresentationofthedesiredobjectasgood insomerespect.Practicalreasoningasreasoningbywhichthe purposeor point ofanactionisshowninrelationtothegood thatitissupposedtobeameansofobtaining.
§§42–43:Inexhibitinganagent’spracticalreasoningwedonotrepresent aprocessofthoughtthatprecedesheractionandgivesriseto it.Theorderofpracticalreasoningisanorderthatispresentin actionitself,asameans–endunitythatissubjecttoaseriesof questions“Why?”or“How?”
§§44–45:Thepracticalknowledgeofactionas “causeofwhatit understands.” Twosensesinwhichthisformulamayapply: knowledgeofanactasproductiveor efficient causeofanagent’s movementsandtheireffects,andknowledgeofanactasthe formal principleofitsunity,invirtueofwhichitfallsunder descriptionsthataresubjecttothequestion“Why?”
§§46–48:Theterm“intentional”relatestoa formofdescription ofevents. Weemploythisformofdescriptioninrepresentingthingsas intentionallydone,includingwithspecialconceptsofhuman actionandwiththeuseofwordslike“by,”“because,”and“in orderto,”wherethesegive reasonsforacting inthesensesought afterbyourquestion“Why?”
§49:Therelationbetweentheintentionalandthevoluntary.Merely voluntaryactionasmovementthatfallsoutsidethescopeofan agent’spracticalknowledge.
§§50–52:Furtherconsiderationoftheexpressionofintentionforthe future,nowunderstoodasastatementofwhatonewilldoto whichourquestion“Why?”hasapplication,andthatisjustified byreasonsforacting.Howtothinkaboutthepossibilityoffailing todowhatoneintends.Whatcouldbemeantinsaying,e.g.,“I amgoingtodothis…unlessIdonot.”St.Peter’sconflictedview ofhisfuture,whentheconclusionofhisownpracticalreasoning isopposedbytheprophecyofChrist.
Preliminaries Anscombebeginsherbookbyintroducingthreedifferentwayswe“employa conceptof‘intention”’(I,§1,1:1):wetreatcertainstatementsdescribingwhat apersonwilldoasthe expression ofthespeaker’sintentiontodothatthing;we describe actions asintentionalanddistinguishthemfromthingsthatpeople dowithoutintendingtodothem;andwecharacterizepeople’sintentions in acting,orthe further intentions withwhich theyactastheydo.Having introducedhertopicinthisway,inSections2–3shebrieflyconsidersthe natureofexpressionsofintention,emphasizinghowintentionisexpressed throughadescriptionof whatonewilldo andnotofone’spresentstateof mind.Followingthis,sheproposesinSection4thattheconceptofintentional action—thatis,of“whatphysicallytakesplace,i.e.whatamanactuallydoes” inactingintentionally(§4,9:2)—isthemostpromisingstarting-pointfora philosophicalinquiryintotheconceptofintention.
Thismethodologicalpriorityisnotthatofaphilosophicalbehaviorist.1 ForAnscombeexplicitlyallowsthatthereissuchathingas“purelyinterior” intentionthatapersonneverevenattemptstoexecute(see§4,9:2),andlater onshewillarguethattherecouldnotbearobustconceptofintentionalaction withoutawayofdescribingaperson’sfurtheraimsandfutureends.2 But sherecommendsher action-first approachasawaytoavoidwhatshecalls “deadends”(§3,5:4,6:2)thatwecanbeledintobyconstruingintentionas “somethingwhoseexistenceispurelyinthesphereofthemind”(§4,9:2).On thislatterapproach,thetaskofthephilosopherisfirsttocharacterizethis interiorstateandonlythentoconsider“whatphysicallytakesplace,i.e.what amanactuallydoes”(§4,9:2)indoingsomethingintentionally.Anscombe’s recommendedstarting-pointispreciselytheoppositeofthis.
1 Thisaccusationcomesupinconversationmoreoftenthanitappearsinprint—butforan exampleofthelatter,seeMichaelBratman, Intention,Plans,andPracticalReason,pp.5–7.Also, in“Davidson’sTheoryofIntention,”BratmandescribesAnscombe’sdiscussionofreasonsand causesas“rootedinstrongbehaviouristicassumptions”(p.210).
2 ThisisthethesisofSections20–21,asdiscussedinsection3.2.
Anscombe’sIntention:AGuide. John Schwenkler, Oxford University Press (2019). © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190052027.003.0001
1.1Thethreeheadings(§1)
Considerthreedifferentwaysthatweuseaconceptof“intention”ineveryday life(see I, §1,1:1):
1.Wetreatintentionassomethingthatcanbe expressed, paradigmaticallybysayingwhatoneisgoingtodo;
2.Wecharacterize actions asintentional,distinguishingintentional activityfromthingsthatpeopledonon-intentionally;and
3.Wedescribepeopleasacting with intentions,e.g.,boilingwaterfor teaorstudyingforthebarexambecauseoneplanstobecomea lawyer.
Thefirstthingtonoticeisthesheervarietyofthelist:heading(1)describes aninstanceof linguistic behaviorasanexpressionofthespeaker’sintention; (2)describesaninstanceof overt behaviorasitselfintentionalornot;and (3)describes—well,howshouldweputit?—the aim ofanactionorofan agent,i.e.,somethingthatapersonactsinpursuitof,suchthatheraction canbeunderstoodinrelationtothisfurtherthing.Ontheotherhand,there seemstobea unity withinthisvariety,insofarastalkof“intention”isn’tjust equivocalbetween(1),(2),and(3)—asitiswithtalkof“bank”instatements like“Mymoneyisinthebank,”“Shehitabankshot,”and“Theflowofwater iserodingthebank.”Anadequatephilosophicalaccountofintentionneeds torevealtheconnectionsamongthesethreeformsofunderstanding.
Anessentialthingtoobservehere,whichAnscombe’sinitial presentationtendstoobscure,isthatveryoftenwe“employaconceptof ‘intention”’(§1,1:1)insomeofthewaysshedescribeswithoutusingthe language of“intention”indoingso.Thisiseasiesttoseeinconnectionwith heading(1),asoutsideofphilosophicalcontextsapersonwillnotusually(or ever!)usethe phrase “expressionofintention”tocharacterizethemeaningof astatement.ConsiderAnscombe’sexamplefromthestartofSection2:
ifIsay“Iamgoingtofailinthisexam.”andsomeonesays“Surelyyouaren’t asbadatthesubjectasthat”,Imaymakemymeaningclearbyexplaining thatIwasexpressinganintention,notgivinganestimateofmychances. (§2,1:3–2:1)
Facedwithaconfusionlikethis,whatapersonwouldmostlikely say to explainhermeaningisnot“Oh,Iwasexpressinganintention,”butrather
preliminaries5 somethinglike“Ohno,it’snotthat—Iamjustsotiredofallthepressure thatmyparentshavebeenputtingonme,andIneedtoshowthem .” Thisclarification is awayofsayingthatonewasexpressinganintention, andanyonewhocanofferorappreciatesuchaclarificationwillhavetodraw onhergraspofthatconcept,butallthiscanbedoneevenifthephrase “expressionofintention”neveroccursintheexchange.Inasimilarway, aswewillseelater,Anscombe’sroutetodiscoveringourordinaryconcept ofintentionalactionisnottoexplorethecircumstancesinwhichwe call actions“intentional,”butrathertoinvestigatetheconditionsunderwhich weregardanactionassuitedtoarequestforreason-givingexplanation.In eachcaseourpre-theoreticalgraspoftheseintention-conceptsisputtousein ordinarypracticeswherewordslike“intention,”“intentional,”etc.,willoccur onlyrarely.
Sonowwearetoask: Whatdowemean whenwespeak,implicitlyor explicitly,oftheexpressionofintention,ofdoingthingsintentionally,ofthe intentionswithwhichpeopleact?Howarethesewaysofspeaking,andthe otherhumanpracticesthatareboundupwiththem,interrelated?Andwhich ofthethreeshouldbethestarting-pointofourphilosophicalinvestigation?
1.2Predictionsandexpressionsofintention(§§2–3)
Sections2and3takeupthefirstofAnscombe’sthreeheadings—expressions ofintention—andconsiderhowtheserelateto predictions ofwhatwill happeninthefuture.Itisworthreadingthisdiscussionalongside §§629–632ofWittgenstein’s PhilosophicalInvestigations,wherethereare severaldistinctions,examples,andargumentativeturnsthataremirrored byAnscombe’sargumentsinSection2especially.Inparticular,weshould noticethataccordingtobothAnscombeandWittgensteintheexpressionof anintentiontodosomething is akindofprediction(Voraussage)ofwhatwill happen,albeitofakindthatissomehowdifferentfromthekindofprediction giveninwhatAnscombecalls“estimates”ofthefuture.Whyarewesupposed tothinkthis?
Tobegin,consideragaintheexamplefromthestartofSection2.IsayI amgoingtofailanexam,andthenwhentoldthatI’mnotsobadatthesubject, I“makemymeaningclearbyexplainingthatIwasexpressinganintention, notgivinganestimateofmychances”(I,§2,2:1).Suchanexplanationusually will clarifymymeaning,whichshowsthatwehavean“intuitivelyclear” (§2,1:3)understandingofthedifferencebetweenexpressinganintention
anscombe’sintention:aguide
andestimatingwhatisgoingtohappen.Ineverydaylifewerarelyhave troubleemployingthisdistinctiontounderstandwhatpeoplesay.But what doweunderstand,whenweunderstandthis?Whatsortofdistinctionarewe drawing?
Anaturalanswer,whichAnscombewantsustoresist,isthatexpressions ofintentionaredistinguishedfromestimatesofthefuturebythedifferent waysthattheyrelatetothe mentalstate ofthespeaker.Shesuggeststwoways todevelopthisidea:
Supposeitissaid“Apredictionisastatementaboutthefuture”. Thissuggeststhatanexpressionofintentionisnot.Itisperhapsthe description—orexpression—ofapresentstateofmind,astatewhichhas thepropertiesthatcharacteriseitasanintention.(§2,2:2)
Thefirstsuggestionhereisthatexpressionsofintentiondifferfrom predictionsinwhatthey describe:whereasapredictiondescribeswhatwill happeninthefuture,theexpressionofintentiondescribesthe“presentstate ofmind”oftheonewhospeaks.Andthesecondisthatthesethingsdiffer inwhatthey express—thatis,inthestateofmind fromwhich onespeaks, andwhichismanifestedorgivenvoiceinone’sverbalbehavior.3 Implicitin bothsuggestionsistheassumptionthatwealreadyhaveaworkingconcept ofintentionasamentalstate,andcanappealtothisconceptinexplaining thedistinctioninquestion.TheaimofSections2and3istoundermineour confidenceintakingsuchaconceptforgranted.
Soletusask:underwhatconditionsisastatementlike
(1)Iamgoingtofailthistest
the expressionofanintention tofail,ratherthananestimateofone’schances? Accordingtothefirst mentalistic analysissuggestedatthestartofSection2, thiswillbethecasewheneversuchastatement describesthespeaker’sstateof mind:
3 Afurtherpossibility,whichAnscombedoesnotmentionhere,butwhichwouldalsobe calledintoquestionbyherargumentsinthesesections,wouldbetosaythatanexpressionof intentionisa prescriptive claimabouthowtheworld should be.Thediscussionofcommands inSection2(see2:4–3:1)revealstheinadequacyofthisanalysis,byarguingthatdescriptions ofthefuturecanalsofunctionasorders(e.g.,“Nursewilltakeyoutotheoperatingtheatre,” saidbyadoctorinthepresenceofthenurse:§2,3:1),andthusthat“theindicative(descriptive, informatory)characterisnotthedistinctivemarkof‘predictions’ asopposedto ‘expressionsof intention,’aswemightatfirstsighthavebeentemptedtothink”(§2,3:1).
(M) Anestimateisadescriptionofwhatwillhappeninthefuture,while anexpressionofintentionisratheradescriptionofthespeaker’sstate ofmind.
Thefirstandmostobviousreasontoresistthisproposalissimplythatitseems wrongonitsface.Forastatementlike(1),wherethisexpressestheintention tofail,atleast appears tohavethesamesortofdescriptivecontentasanyother indicativestatementaboutthefuturestateoftheworld,suchas
(2)Itisgoingtoraintomorrow.
Astatementlike(2)mightbejustifiedby,ortrueinvirtueof,anaspectof howtheworldpresentlyis:forexample,itmightbebecauseofafrontthat ispresentlyovertheGulfofMexicothat,tomorrow,Floridaisgoingtoget somerain.Neverthelessthisstatementdoesnot describe thepresentatall—it is,rather,simplyadescriptionofwhatisgoingtohappeninthefuture.And thesameseemstobetrueof(1):evenifthisstatementisjustifiedby,ortruein virtueof,thespeaker’spresentmentalstate,itdoesnot describe suchastate, butonlydescribeswhatthespeakerwilldo.Atleastonthefaceofthings, what onedescribesinexpressinganintentionwithastatementlike(1)isthevery samethingonedescribesinpredictingor“estimating”afuturehappening thatonedoesnotintend:ineachcase,one’sstatementissimplyadescription ofwhatisgoingtohappen.
Anscombenotes,however,thatthereisafurtherand“deeperrooted” (§2,4:2)objectiontosayingthatintentionisexpressedinaprediction.Here ishowsheputsit:
IfIdonotdowhatIsaidIwould,Iamnotsupposedtohavelied;soit seemsthatthetruthofastatementofintentionisnotamatterofdoing whatIsaid.(§2,4:3)
Ifthisconclusionofthislittleargumentwerecorrect,thentheexpressionof intentionwouldhavetobesomethingotherthanadescriptionofafuture happening—foranystatement describing whatwillhappencanbe true only ifthingshappenasitsaystheywill.ButAnscombegoesontoarguethatthe lineofreasoninghereisfallacious(forthisrebuttalsee§2,4:4–5:1).Itistrue thatsomeonewhosaysshewilldosomethingthatshethendoesnotdohas notnecessarily lied inwhatshesaid—forherstatementmayhavebeen sincere aslongasshereallyhadtheintentiontoactinthisway.Butthisdoesnot showthatherstatementwasreallya description ofherintention,anymore
anscombe’sintention:aguide
thanthepossibilityofofferingasincerebutmistakenforecastoftheweather showsthatanestimateofthefutureisreallyadescriptionofone’sbelief.(If Iutter(2)andtomorrowitisdry,thisdoesnotmeanthatIhavelied—forI mayreallyhavebelievedthatitwouldrain.Neverthelessmystatementwas a description oftomorrow’sweather,andnotofmybeliefaboutit.)Inboth cases,whilethespeaker’sstateofminddeterminesthe sincerity ofwhatshe says,the truth ofherstatementturnsonwhathappensintheworld—andthis wouldnotbetrueifthesestatementsmerelydescribedthespeaker’sintention orbelief.
Throughthesearguments,Section2thusopposesthementalistic analysis(M)andsupportsinsteadwhatIwillcalla factualist analysisofthe expressionofintention:
(F) Likeapredictionorestimateofthefuture,anexpressionofintention isadescriptionofwhatisgoingtohappen.
Thefactualistanalysisholdsthatinexpressingtheintentiontodosomething, what apersonsaysissimplythatsomething willhappen—namely,thatshe willdowhatshesaysshewill.This,Isuggest,iswhatAnscombehasinmind whenshefollowsWittgensteininsayingthattheexpressionofintentionis aspeciesofprediction.Andithelpshertomarkanimportantdifference betweenintentionandmereappetiteordesire:whenapersonexpresses theintentiontodosomethingbysayingthatsheisgoingtodoit,shesays somethingquitedifferentthanifshejustsaidthatshewantedordesiredtodo it—forshehasdescribedwhatsheisgoingto do andnotmerelytheinternal statethatsheisin.Itisthusthattheanalysisofthecontentofexpressionsof intentionissupposedtokeepusoutofthe“deadends”thatwecangetinto bythinkingofintentionfirstasapsychologicalstate(see§3,5:4–6:2):wefind acluethatintentionsaredifferentfromemotionsor“drives”inthefactthat theexpressionofintentionparallelstheexpressionof belief.Theexpressionof intentionisnotmerelyamanifestationofhowthingsarewithinoneself,but asignthatpointsbeyondone’sownpsychologyandrepresentshowthings areorwillbeintheworld.4
4 ThisisalsowhatAnscombehasinmindwhen,attheendofSection2,shecorrects Wittgenstein’sremarkinthe Investigations aboutthe“naturalexpressionofintention,”saying insteadthattheexpressionofintention“ispurelyconventional,”andthatasaconsequence non-linguisticanimals,thoughtheydohaveintentionsandengageinintentionalaction,cannot have“anydistinctexpressionofintention”(see§2,5:3;andcf.§47,86:2–87:1formoreonthe intentionsofnon-linguisticanimals).Thatis,Anscombe’spositionisthatwhileintentioncan be manifested innon-verbalbehavior(aswhenacatis“crouchingandslinkingalongwithits
Onemightwonder,however,whetherthefactualistanalysis(F)also appliestocaseswhereapersonexpressesherintentionbysayingthatshe intends (ormeans,plans,etc.)todosomething,andnotsimplythatshewill doit.Anexample(compare§2,5:2)mightbesaying (3)Iintendtogoforawalk.
Doesn’tapersonwhosayssomethinglike(3)expressanintentionby describingherstateofmind?Recallingtheparallelwiththeexpressionof beliefcanhelpdislodgethisintuition.If,forexample,apersonsays
(4)Ibelievethatitisgoingtoraintomorrow, herstatementfunctionsquitedifferentlyfromasuperficiallysimilar statementthatattributesabelieftosomeoneelse.Toseethis,noticethatthe conjunctionin
(5)Shebelievesthatitwillraintomorrow,butitwillnot isinnowaystrange,butthefirst-personalcounterpart
(6)Ibelievethatitwillraintomorrow,butitwillnot hastheringofparadox.5 Aplausibleexplanationofthisisthatastatement like(4)isusuallynota mere descriptionofone’sbeliefinthesamewayasone like
(7)Shebelievesthatitwillraintomorrow is merely adescriptionofthebeliefofsomeoneelse.AndasAnscombepoints outtowardtheendofSection2,somethingsimilarholdsfortalkofwhatone intends todo:thusastatementlike
(8)Iintendtogoforawalkbutshallnotgoforawalk “doessoundinsomewaycontradictory”(§2,5:2),whereasthereisnosuch appearanceofcontradictioninacorrespondingstatementaboutsomeone eyefixedon[a]birdanditswhiskerstwitching”(§47,86:2)),theexpressiveresourcesavailable toanon-linguisticcreaturedonotallowforawayto express intentionthatisdistinctfromthe expressionofmeredesire.Anon-linguisticcreaturewhoseexpressiveresourcesarelimitedto behaviorslikelaughingandwhimperingcanexpressemotionslikejoyandsadness,andthesecan ofcoursebecluestoitsintentions.Butsomethingfurtherisavailabletous:wecanuselanguage tosaywhatwearegoingtodo.
5 HerewemightcompareWittgenstein’sremarksonMoore’sparadoxin Philosophical Investigations II.x.Idiscussthisparallelatlengthinchapter7.
anscombe’sintention:aguide
else.Exactlyhowastatementlike(8)iscontradictory(ifitreallyisatall)is aquestionAnscombewillreturntolateron.6 Fornowitisenoughtonote thedifficultyofaccountingforthisappearanceofcontradictorinessonthe suppositionthatastatementoftheform“Iintendto F ”doesnotofferany descriptionofwhatonewillinfactdo.
Afinalobjectiononemightraisetothefactualistanalysis(F)isthatthere seemstobeadifferencebetweenthe kind ofthingwhich,inexpressingan intention,onesaysisgoingtohappen,andthekindofthingwhichonesays isgoingtohappenwhenonedescribesfuturehappeningsotherthanone’s intentionalactions.Morespecifically,onemightsuggestthatthefuturestate oftheworldonedescribesinexpressinganintentionwillbeone“inwhich thespeakeris somesortofagent ”(§3,6:3;emphasisadded),whereasthisis notthecaseinanestimateofthefuture.Whilethissuggestionseemsright asfarasitgoes,therearesomedifficultieswithit.Foronething,ifaperson sayssomethinglike(1)andmeansitasanestimateofthefuture,clearlyshe is some sortofagentinthefutureshedescribes.Moreimportantly,making goodonthissuggestionwouldrequireanexplanationofwhatitisto be an agentintherelevantsense,whichwouldtakeustothesecondheadingin Anscombe’sinitialdivision,i.e.,theconceptofintentionalaction.Thiswill bethefocusofourinquirybeginninginthenextsection.
First,however,weneedtolookmorecloselyattwodensebutimportant paragraphswhereAnscombegesturesatapairofideasthatwillturnoutto becruciallateron,namelythatexpressionsofintentionmightdifferfrom estimatesofthefutureinrespectof (1) howtheyare groundedorjustified (see §2,3:5–4:1)and (2) thewaytheyestablisha standardofcorrectness forthe eventstheydescribe(see§2,4:5–5:1).Inwhatfollows,Iwillconsidereach pointinturn.
(1) Anscombeintroducesthefirstdistinctionasfollows: thereisadifferencebetweenthetypesofgroundonwhichwecallan order,andanestimateofthefuture,sound.Thereasonsjustifyinganorder arenotonessuggestingwhatisprobable,orlikelytohappen,bute.g. onessuggestingwhatitwouldbegoodtomakehappenwithaviewtoan objective,orwithaviewtoasoundobjective.(I,§2,3:5–4:1)
AsAnscombe’swordingmakesclear, soundness hereisadifferentconcept from truth.Astatementis sound inthesenseatissueheretotheextent
6 SeeSections31–32and50–52,discussedinsections4.3and7.2.
