WhoseGod?WhichTradition?
MuchphilosophyofreligionfocusesonthetopicofGod.For centuriesphilosophershaveaskedwhetherthereisreason tobelievethatGodexists.Theyhavealsoconsideredwhat, ifanything,canbeknownofGod'snature.Butwhatshouldwetakethe word'God'tomean?Youmightfindthisquestionpuzzling.Youmight say:"Weallknowwhat'God'means.Whatweneedtoaskis'DoesGod exist?'and'WhatcanweknowaboutGod?�'Yetaremattersassimple asthat?
Unfortunately,theyarenot.Andanyonestartingworkonphilosophyofreligionshouldbeawareofthisfactattheoutset.Forthosewho saythattheybelievethatGodexists(peoplewhoarecommonlyreferred toas'theists')oftendisagreeintheiraccountsofGod.Theword'God' hasbeenunderstoodindifferentwaysevenbythosewhosubscribeto beliefinwhattheOxfordEnglishDictionarycallsits"specificChristian andmonotheisticsense:'
'Monotheistic'istheadjectivalformofthenoun'monotheism;which means"beliefthatthereisonlyoneGod:'AndtheOxfordEnglishDictionaryisclearlythinkingofbeliefinGodasprofessedbyJews,Muslims, andChristians,allofwhomdeclarethatthereisbutonetrueGod.Yet thereissubstantialdisagreementaboutwhatGodisevenamongJewish, Islamic,andChristianmonotheists.SowhenyouhearJews,Muslims, andChristiansusingtheword'God;youshouldnotassumethattheyall
understanditinthesamesense.Youshouldnotevenassumethiswhen confiningyourattentiontooneofthesegroups.Amongotherthings, orthodoxChristiansbelievethatGodis"threepersonsinonesubstance" (thedoctrineoftheTrinity).TheyalsobelievethatGodbecameincarnateinJesusofNazareth(thedoctrineoftheIncarnation).ButJewsand MuslimsdonotbelievethatGodissomehowthreeinoneorthatJesusis Godincarnate.Thenagain,peoplewhohaveself-identifiedasChristian oftendisagreewitheachotherwhenitcomestowhatGodis.Soweneed tobequiteclearthattherearedistinguishabletraditionswhenitcomes totheism.Noteveryonewhosays,"IbelievethatGodexists"or"Iam atheist"believesthesamewhenitcomestowhatGodis.Correspondingly,weshouldnotjustassumethatpeoplewhodeclarethemselvesto beatheistsarealwayscontradictingwhatalltheistsmeanwhentheysay thatGodexists.Whatsomeatheistshavetakentheismtobeisnotwhat sometheiststakeittobe.Andinthischaptermyaimistoindicatehow allofthatisso.Amongphilosophersofreligion,Godistypicallytaken tobetheGodofmonotheism(ortheism,forshort).AndIshallnowfall inwiththislineofthinking.Fromthispointon,therefore,Itake'God' tomean"theGodofJudaism,Islam,andChristianity:'AsIhavesaid, however,thisstillleavesuswithaproblemofunderstanding.Sonow Ishalltrytoexplainwhy.Itisnoteasytodoso,buttosimplifymatters, Ishallsaythatmonotheismortheismcanbedividedintoatleasttwo approachestoGod.Forreasonswhichshouldsoonbeobvious,Ishall callthem'classicaltheism'and'theisticpersonalism:
ClassicalTheism
Classicaltheismiswhatyoucanfindendorsedinthewritingsof peopleliketheJewishauthorMosesMaimonides(1135-1204),theIslamicauthorAvicenna(980-1037),andtheChristianauthorThomas Aquinas(1224/6-1274). 1 ClassicaltheismiswhatallJews,Christians,
I.MosesMaimonideswasbornatCordova,SpainandfinallysettledinCairo, Egypt.TheauthorofnumerousworksonJewishtheology,heisbestknowntodayfor hisGuideforthePerplexed(1190),whichisdevotedtotherelationbetweenreasonand religiousfaith.Avicenna,sometimescalledIbnSina,wasanIslamicphilosopherwho alsohadastronginfluenceonmedievalChristianthinkers.ThomasAquinaslivedand workedinGermany,France,andItalyandbecameoneofthemostrespectedRoman Catholicphilosophersandtheologians.Hewrotevoluminously,butisbestknownforhis SummaTheologiaeandSummaContraGentiles.
andMuslimsbelievedinformanycenturies(officially,atleast).AndnumerousphilosophershavetakenitforgrantedthatGodiswhatdefendersofclassicaltheismtakeGodtobe.FromthetimeofSt.Augustineof Hippo(354-430)2 tothatofG.W.Leibniz(1646-1716),3 philosophers almostalwaysworkedontheassumptionthatbeliefinGodisbelief inclassicaltheism.Andtheirunderstandinghasbeensharedbymany theologians.ThemajortenetsofclassicaltheismarepartoftheofficialteachingoftheRomanCatholicChurch.Theywerealsotaughtby mostofthemajorsixteenth-centuryProtestantreformersandbyheirs oftheirs,suchasJonathanEdwards,theeighteenth-centuryAmerican Puritantheologian.
Butwhatdoesclassicaltheismamountto?CentraltoitisaparticularunderstandingoftheclaimthatGodisCreatorofallthings.Onthis understanding,theexistenceofeverythingotherthanGoddirectlyand entirelydependscausallyonGod.
ClassicalTheismandtheNotionofCreation
Accordingtoclassicaltheism,GodisprimarilytheCreator.ClassicaltheistsdonotthinkthatGodhadtocreateanything.Theydonot thinkthatGodis,bynature,acreatorasmycatisbynatureacarnivore. ButtheydothinkthatGodiswhataccountsfortherebeinganyuniverseatall.Forclassicaltheists,God,consideredastheCreator,isthe "makerofallthingsvisibleandinvisible;'astheNiceneCreedputsit. Godiscausallyresponsiblefortheexistenceofeverythingotherthan God.Morespecifically,God,forclassicaltheism,istheone(andthe onlyone)whocreates"fromnothing"(exnihilointhetraditionalLatin phrase).TheideahereisnotthatGodworksonsomethingcalled'Nothing'inordertocreate.ClassicaltheismclaimsthatGodmakesthingsto bewithouttherebeinganythingpriortoGod'screativeact.Godmakes thingstobe,butnot out ofanything.
Accordingtoclassicaltheism,forGodtocreateisforGodtomake ittobethattheuniverse,andeverythinginit,simplyexists.Artists
2.AugustineofHippolivedmostofhislifeinNorthAfrica.HisimpactonWestern Christianthinkingissecondtonone.HismanywritingsincludetheConfessions(akind oftheologicalautobiography)andavarietyofworksonbothphilosophicalandtheologicaltopics.
3.LeibnizwasborninLeipzig,wherehelaterstudied.Generallyregardedasone ofthegreatestseventeenth-century'rationalist'philosophers,hewroteonphysics,mathematics,metaphysics,andtheology.
makeittobethatthereisaworkofart.Surgeonsmakeittobethat someone'sinsidesgetmodified.Nuclearexplosionsmakeittobethat landscapesarerearranged.Accordingtoclassicaltheism,however,God makesittobethatthingsarejustthereregardlessofwhattheyarelike (whilealsobeingresponsibleforthat).Rather,forclassicaltheism,God accountsfortherebeingsomethingratherthannothing.Manypeople thinkthattosaythatGodhascreatedisonlytosaythatGodbroughtit aboutthattheuniversebegantoexist.However,thoughclassicaltheists typicallyagreethattheuniversebegantoexist,andalthoughtheyhold thatitwasGodthatbroughtthisabout,theyalsotypicallysaythatbelief inGodasCreatorisnotjustbeliefinGod'spastactivityorinwhatwas goingonwiththeworldbeforenow.Forclassicaltheists,God'screative workisjustasmuchpresentinthecontinuedexistenceofyouandmeas itwasintheoriginoftheuniverse.
InthethirteenthcenturytherewasabigdebateattheUniversity ofParisconcerning"theeternityoftheworld:'Somephilosophersand theologianssaidthatitcanbeprovedthattheworldhadabeginning. Othersdeniedthis.ThomasAquinas,whoengagedinthisdebate,believedthattheworldhadabeginningsincehetookthattobetaught bythefirsttwochaptersofthebiblicalbookofGenesis.Buthedidnot thinkthatthisbeliefofhiscouldbeshowntobetruebyphilosophical reasoning.Yethealsoarguedthatwhetherornottheworldhadabeginningisirrelevanttothedoctrineofcreation.Hesaidthattobelievethat theworldiscreatedischieflytobelievethattheworld'sbeingthereatall andatanytimeisGod'sdoing.Andthisconclusionisverycharacteristic ofclassicaltheism.Accordingtothis,allcreaturesdependonGodfor theirsheerexistence.AndGodisasmuchthecreatorofthingswhich continuetoexistasheisofthosewhichbegintoexist,regardlessof whentheyhappentodoso.Intermsofclassicaltheism,GodasCreator makesthingstobewhenevertheyhappentobe.
IfthisaccountistruetheneverythingotherthanGodistotallydependentonGodforitsexistingandforitsbeingasitis.Notsurprisingly, therefore,classicaltheistscommonlystressGod'sintimatecausalpresencetocreatures.Forthem,GodiseverywhereinthesensethatGod causeseverythingthatexiststobewhatitisforaslongasitexists.4For classicaltheists,Godisnoteverywherebybeingphysicallylocatedinall places.Godiseverywhereascausingtheexistenceofallplacesandthe
4.Cf.ThomasAquinas,SummaIheologiae,la,8.
WhoseGod?WhichTradition?5
thingsthatconstituteplacessimplybyexisting.Oneconsequenceofthis viewisthatGodcannot,strictlyspeaking,interveneinthecreatedorder. Fortointerveneistostepintoaplaceorsituationwhereonewasnot presenttostartwith.AccordingtotheOxfordEnglishDictionary,'tointervene'isto"comeinassomethingextraneous:'Yetclassicaltheistshold thatGodisalwayspresentastheircreatortoallcreaturesandcannot comeinassomethingextraneous.SomepeoplewouldsaythatGodcan intervenetobringitaboutthatcertainchangesoccurintheworld.On theclassicaltheist'saccount,however,suchchangescannotbeliterally thoughtofasdivineinterventionssincetheyandwhatprecededthemare equallythecreativeworkofGod.5Asonemodernclassicaltheistputsit:
ItisclearthatGodcannotinterfereintheuniverse,notbecausehehas notthepowerbutbecause,sotospeak,hehastoomuch.Tointerfere youhavetobeanalternativeto,oralongside,whatyouareinterferingwith.IfGodisthecauseofeverything,thereisnothingthathe isalongside.Obviously,Godmakesnodifferencetotheuniverse.I meanbythisthatwedonotappealspecificallytoGodtoexplainwhy theuniverseisthiswayratherthanthat.Forthisweneedonlyappeal toexplanationswithintheuniverse...WhatGodaccountsforisthat theuniverseisthereinsteadofnothing."
Youcannotinterveneinwhatyouaredoingyourself.And,sayclassicaltheists,Godcannotliterallyinterveneinhisowncreatedorder. SometimestheymakethispointbyclaimingthatforGodtocreateis notforhimtobringaboutachangeinsomething.Somethingcanbe changedonlyifitpre-existstheactivityofachanger.But,askstheclassicaltheist,whatcanpre-existtheactivityofGodtheCreator?
ClassicalTheismandtheNatureofGod
Theclassicaltheist'sanswertothatlastquestionis,asyoumightnow suspect,"Nothing:•Or,asAquinaswrites:
Wemustconsidernotonlytheemanationofaparticularbeingfrom aparticularagent,butalsotheemanationofallbeingfromtheuniversalcause,whichisGod;andthisemanationwedesignatebythe nameofcreation.Nowwhatproceedsbyparticularemanationisnot
5.Cf.Chapter11.
6.HerbertMcCabe,"Creation;•NewBlackfriars61(1980).Iquotefromthisarticle asreprintedinBrianDavies(ed.),PhilosophyofReligion:AGuideandAnthology(Oxford, 2000),p.199.
presupposedtothatemanation;aswhenamanisgenerated,hewas notbefore,butmanismadefromnot-man,andwhitefromnotwhite.Hence,iftheemanationofthewholeuniversalbeingfromthe firstprinciplebeconsidered,itisimpossiblethatanybeingshould bepresupposedbeforethisemanation.Fornothingisthesameasno being.Therefore,asthegenerationofamanisfromthenot-being whichisnot-man,socreation,whichistheemanationofallbeing,is fromthenotbeingwhichisnothing.7
Andthisanswerhasfurtherimplicationsforthosewhosubscribeto classicaltheism.OneisthatnothingcreatedcancauseGodtochangeor bemodifiedinanyway.Intermsofclassicaltheism,thereisnocausality fromcreaturestoGodsincecreaturesarewhollyGod'seffects.Parents canactcausallyontheirchildren.Andchildrencanactcausallyontheir parents.Butthatissobecausetheybelongtothesameworldaseach otherandbecauseneitherparentsnorchildrenoweallthattheyareto eachother.Accordingtoclassicaltheism,however,creaturesconstantly oweallthattheyaretoGod,andanycausalactivityoftheirsis,firstand foremost,God'scausalactivityinthem.Manyclassicaltheistsmakethis pointbyinsistingthatGodisimpassible.
Inthiscontext'impassible'means"notabletobecausallymodifiedby anotheragent:'Itdoesnotmean"callous;'"heartless;'or"indifferent:'And formostclassicaltheiststheclaimthatGodisimpassiblegoeshandin handwiththeteachingthatGodisimmutable.Theideahereistwofold: (1)Godcannotbealteredbyanythingacreaturedoes,and(2)Godis intrinsicallyunchangeable.Whyintrinsicallyunchangeable?Forclassical theists,theanswerliesintheirunderstandingofwhatisinvolvedinGod creating.Ontheiraccount,allchangeisthecomingtobeofsomething new.Andyet,sotheyreason,allcomingtobeofsomethingnewisGod's doing,whichmeansthatGodcannotchangewithoutbeingacreature, somethingwhosewayofbeingatagiventimeisderivedfromGod.
Formanyclassicaltheists,thisideaalsosuggeststhatGodisoutside time.Basically,theyaresayingthatifGodiswhataccountsfortheexistenceofthespatio-temporaluniverse,thenGodcannotbesomething spatio-temporal.Philosophershaveoftenthoughtthatthingswhich existintimegothroughprocessesofchangewhichcanbelistedin termsofbeforeandafter.Theideahereisthatwecanthinkofsomething
7.ThomasAquinas,SummaIheologiae,la,45,I.Iquotefromthetranslationofthe EnglishDominicanFathers(London,1911).
asbeingintimeinsofaraswecanrecognizeitasbeing.firstlikethisand thenlikethat.Theideaisthatclocksmeasurechangeasrulersmeasure length.Workingwiththisidea,classicaltheistsregularlymaintainthatif Godisunchangeable,thenGodisnotintimeasyouandIare.According,forinstance,toSt.AnselmofCanterbury(1033-1109):
Allthatisenclosedinanywaybyplaceortimeislessthanthatwhich nolawofplaceortimeconstrains.Since,then,nothingisgreaterthan You[sc.God],noplaceortimeconfinesYoubutYouexisteverywhere andalways...Youwerenot,therefore,yesterday,norwillYoube tomorrow,butyesterdayandtodayandtomorrowYouare.Indeed, Youexistneitheryesterdaynortodaynortomorrowbutareabsolutely outsidealltime;however,You,thoughnothingcanbewithoutYou, areneverthelessnotinplaceortimebutallthingsareinYou.For nothingcontainsYou,butYoucontainallthings.8
TheBibletellsusthatGoddelivered(pasttense)theIsraelitesfromEgypt. AnditsaysthatGodwillcome(futuretense)tojudgethelivingandthe dead.OnemightinstinctivelyreadsuchassertionsasmappingGod'sprogressthroughtime.Forclassicaltheists,however,Godexistsatnoparticulartime(andthereforeneitherexistedatsomeinstantinthepastnorwill existatsomeinstantoftimeinthefuture).Intheirview,tensesappliedto God'sactivityshouldbeunderstoodashelpingustodatecreatedevents (liketheescapeoftheIsraelitesfromEgyptorthestateofthosejudgedby Godinthefuture).TheyshouldnotbeconstruedaslocatingGodintime. TheideahereisthatGodcanactsoastobringaboutdateableeventswithouthimselfbeingpartofanytemporalprocess.Theyaremappingoutthe effectsofGod'screationintime.Or,asAquinasobserves:
WhenwespeakofGod'srelationtocreatures,wecanapplywords implyingtemporalsequenceandchange,notbecauseofanychange inhimbutbecauseofachangeinthecreatures;justaswecansaythat apillarhaschangedfrombeingonmylefttobeingonmyright,not throughanyalterationinthepillarbutsimplybecauseIhaveturned round.9
8.Anselm,Proslogion,chs.13and19.IquotefromBrianDaviesandG.R.Evans (eds.),AnselmofCanterbury:TheMajorWorks(Oxford,1998).Anselmwasatonetime abbotofBee,inNormandy.HediedasArchbishopofCanterburyHisbest-knownwritingsincludehisMonologion,Proslogion,andCurDeusHomo.
9.ThomasAquinas,Summa1heologiae,la,13,7.Iquotefromvolume3ofthe BlackfriarseditionoftheSumma1heologiae(LondonandNewYork,1964).
Ifallthatisso,however,Godmustbevastlydifferentfromanythingwithwhichweareacquainted.Yetclassicaltheistsembracethat implication.Forthem,wemustsharplydistinguishbetweenGodand everythingelse.Thingsintheworldaresubjecttothecausalactivity ofotherthingsintheworld.But,saystheclassicaltheist,Godisnot subjectinthisway.Thingsintheworldareeitherchangingorableto undergochange.Accordingtoclassicaltheism,however,Godisunchangeable.Everythingintheworldexistsatsometime.Accordingto classicaltheism,however,Godtranscendstime.
Forclassicaltheism,wegetthingsbadlywrongifwetakeGodto besomethingwecanpictureorgetourmindsaround."Iwouldbesurprised;'saysAnselm,"ifwecouldfindanythingfromamongthenouns andverbswhichweapplytothingscreatedfromnothingthatcould worthilybesaidofthesubstancethatcreatedall:' 1°Classicaltheists agreethatGodcanbetrulydescribedusingwordswhichweemploy whenspeakingofwhatisnotdivine.Theyhold,forexample,thatGod trulyacts,causes,moves,knows,wills,andloves.Yetclassicaltheists alsotypicallyinsistthatnoneofthismeansthatwethereforehavea graspofGodoraconceptwhichallowsustosaythatweunderstand whatGodis.
Thisfactpartlyemergesfromthewayinwhichclassicaltheists oftencharacterizeGodinnegativeterms(asnotcreated,notpassive, notchangeable,ornottemporal).Butitalsocomesoutinthefactthat classicaltheiststendtodenythatwordsusedtocharacterizeGodmean whattheydowhenappliedtowhatisnotdivine.Hence,forexample, althoughtheyagreethatGodacts,causes,andmoves,classicaltheistsdo notthinkthatGoddoesallthisaspartofaworldinwhichotherthings act,cause,andmove.Forthem,God'saction,causation,andmovement ofthingsareinaclassoftheirown.And,theyhold,thesameistrueof God'sknowing,willing,andloving.
Whenwethinkofknowledge,will,andlove,wearenormallythinkingofpeople.Itispeoplewelooktointhefirstplacewhentryingto explainwhat'knowledge;'will;and'love'mean.Accordingtoclassical theism,however,knowledge,will,andlovearedifferentinGodfrom whattheyareinpeople.People,forinstance,knowbecausetheyhave learned.But,saystheclassicaltheist,tolearnistochangeandGod
10. Anselm, Monologion, ch. 15. I quote from Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (eds.), AnselmofCanterbury:TheMajorWorks (Oxford, 1998), p. 26.
cannotlearnsinceGodischangeless.Peoplecometoknowbecauseof beingtaughtorbecauseofwhattheyhaveobservedbymeansoftheir sensesordiscoveredbymeansofempiricalinvestigation.But,saysthe classicaltheist,Godhasnobodyand,therefore,nosenses.Godisimpassible,socannotbetaught.
ClassicaltheistswouldalsonormallyaddthatGod'swillingand lovingmustfurtherdifferfromours,since,unlikeours,itcannotinvolve Godreactingtoanything.Isometimeschoose(will)tocatchatrainfor somereasonorother.But,accordingtotheclassicaltheist,Goddoesnot choose(will)inthelightofascenariowhichheconfrontsandwhich disposeshimtoactthusandsoforreasonshehasaspartofthatscenario.Awifemayloveherhusband.Yet,notestheclassicaltheist,love,in people,isanemotion.Soitisrootedinbodilycontactandbodilyreactions.AndtheclassicaltheistholdsthatGodhasnobody,since,making thedifferencebetweentherebeingsomethingandnothing,hecreates allbodies.Inpeople,lovecanshowitselfintheirattemptstodogoodto theobjectsoftheirlove.YetGod,saystheclassicaltheist,cannottryto dogoodtothings.Intermsofclassicaltheism,theunchangeableGodis effortlesslyresponsibleforanythingthatwefindtobegoodintheworld. Or,asSt.Augustinewrites:
ThetruestbeginningofpietyistothinkashighlyofGodaspossible; anddoingsomeansthatonemustbelievethatheisomnipotent, andnotchangeableinthesmallestrespect;thatheisthecreatorof allgoodthings,butishimselfmoreexcellentthanallofthem;that heisthesupremelyjustrulerofeverythingthathecreated;andthat hewasnotaidedincreatingbyanyotherbeing,asifhewerenot sufficientlypowerfulbyhimself.Itfollowsthathecreatedallthings fromnothing.1 1
Godas an Individual
Wecanputallthisbysayingthat,accordingtoclassicaltheism,God isnotaperson.Whenwespeakofpersons,wearenormallyreferring tohumanbeings.Forclassicaltheists,however,Godshouldbesharply distinguishedfromthese.Humanbeingshavebodiesandarepartsof achangingandchangeableuniverse.Accordingtoclassicaltheism, however,Godisincorporeal,unchanging,andnotpartoftheuniverse.
11.St.AugustineofHippo,DeLiberoArbitrio,I,2.IquotefromThomasWilliams (ed.),Augustine:OnFreeChoiceoftheWill(Indianapolis,IN,1993},pp.3f.
Asweshallseelaterinthischapter,andalsoinChapter13,somephilosophershavethoughtthathumanpersonsarereallynon-material.But eventhesephilosopherstakepersonstobedistinctindividualsbelongingtoakindsothatonepersonaddedtoanothermakestwothingsof thesamesort.Forclassicaltheism,however,Godisnotanindividual belongingtoanykind.YouandIarebothhumanbeings.Neptuneand Marsarebothplanets.Accordingtoclassicaltheism,however,thereis nothingofthesamekindthatGodis.
Classicaltheistshavesometimesexpressedthispointbysayingthat Godisentirelysimple.Theydonot,ofcourse,meanthatGodisstupid orunintelligent(onesenseof'simple').What,then,dotheymean?We shallbeturninginsomedetailtothenotionofdivinesimplicityin Chapter8.Forthepresent,though,themainpointtograspisthatclassicaltheistswhosaythatGodissimplemeaninpartthatGodisnotwhat wewouldordinarilycallanindividual.
Tocallsomethinganindividualisusuallytoimplythattherecould beanothersuchthingjustlikeitintermsofkind.Differentpeopleare individuals.Butinthissenseof'individual'.saystheclassicaltheist, Godisnotanindividual.Godbelongstonokindorsort.According totheteachingthatGodissimple,Godalsolacksattributesorpropertiesdistinguishablefromhimselfandfromeachother.Youcandifferentiatebetweenmeand,say,myweight,height,orcoloringatsome particulartime.TodayImightweighonehundredandfortypounds. AndImightbesixfeettallandpale.Butintenyears'timemyweight andheightcouldbedifferent.So,myweight,height,andcoloringare notsimplyidenticalwithme.Tohaveweight,height,andcoloringis nottobeweight,height,andcoloring.Accordingtotheteachingthat Godissimple,however,attributesorpropertiesofGodare,infact,the sameasGod.Onthisaccount,Goddoesnot,strictlyspeaking,have distinctattributesorproperties.Godisidenticalwiththem.Hence,for example,what'thepowerofGod'and'theknowledgeofGod'amount toinGodarenottwodistinctattributes,astheyareinus.Theyarejust God.AsSt.Anselmputsit:"Thesupremenatureissimple:thus,allthe thingswhichcanbesaidofitsessencearesimplyoneandthesame thinginit:'12
12AnselmofCanterbury,Monologion,ch.17IquotefromBrianDaviesandG.R. Evans(eds.),AnselmofCanterbury:TheMajorWorks(Oxford,1998),p.30.
WhoseGod?WhichTradition?11
TheisticPersonalism
Turning,however,towhatIamcallingtheisticpersonalism,wegetavery differentpicture.Take,forinstance,thecontemporaryChristianauthor AlvinPlantinga.13Accordingtohim,theteachingthatGodissimple isfalse,sinceGodpossessesdifferentpropertiesandisaperson,not "amereabstractobject."14 Thenagain,accordingtoRichardSwinburne (alsoaChristian),15atheistis"amanwhobelievesthatthereisaGod;' andby'God'thetheist"understandssomethinglikea'personwithout abody':' 16 "ThatGodisaperson,yetonewithoutabody,seems;'says Swinburne,"themostelementaryclaimoftheism:'17BothPlantingaand Swinburnecountastheisticpersonalistsonmyunderstandingofthe expression.Andonereasonforsayingsoisthat,unlikeclassicaltheists, theythinkitimportanttostressthatGodisaperson.
PersonsandBodies
WhatdoPlantingaandSwinburnemeanby'person'?Theirwritings, andthewritingsofthosewhosharetheirviewofGod,proceedfromthe assumptionthat,ifwewanttounderstandwhatpersonsare,wemust beginwithhumanbeings.YetPlantingaandSwinburne,andthosewho broadlyagreewiththemaboutGod,donotwanttosuggestthatGodis justlikeahumanbeing.Sotheyalsothinkthattherecansomehowbea personwho,whilebeinglikehumanbeings,isalsodecidedlydifferent fromwhatpeopleare.Inparticular,andasSwinburne'sphrase'person withoutabody'indicates,theythinkthattherecanbeadisembodied person.Yetwhatarewetounderstandbyexpressionslike'personwithoutabody'and'disembodiedperson'?
Manyphilosophersholdthatsuchexpressionsmakelittlesense.18 Theyarguethatpersonsareessentiallyembodiedbecausehuman
13.Plantinga'spublicationsincludeGodandOtherMinds(1967),TheNatureofNecessity(1974),andWarrantedChristianBelief(l999).
14.AlvinPlantinga,DoesGodHaveaNature(Milwaukee,WI,1980),p.47.
15.RichardSwinburneretiredasNollothProfessorofthePhilosophyoftheChristianReligionatOxfordUniversityin2002.Hehaswrittenwidelyintheareasofprobabilitytheory,philosophyofmind,andphilosophyofreligion.HisbooksincludeThe ExistenceofGod(2nded.,1991),TheEvolutionoftheSoul(I986),IsThereaGod?(I996), ProvidenceandtheProblemofEvil(1998),andAreWeBodiesorSouls?(Oxford,2019).
16.RichardSwinburne,TheCoherenceofTheism(rev.ed.,Oxford,1993),p.I.
17.Ibid.,p.101.
18.Formoreonallthis,seeChapter13.
beingsaresuch.Ontheiraccount,theword'person'has'embodied' builtintoitsmeaningsothatphraseslike'personwithoutabody'and 'disembodiedperson'haveanairofself-contradictionaboutthem. Hence,forexample,Aristotle(384-322BC}19holdsthatthepersons wecallpeopleareessentiallycorporeal.Forhim,personsareasnecessarilybodilyascatsarenecessarilymammalian.Thislineofthinking canalsobefoundinwriterssuchasBertrandRussell(1872-1970)20 and LudwigWittgenstein(1889-1951}.21 Butotherphilosopherstakeadifferentview.Consider,forinstance,JohnLocke(1632-1704).22 Accordingtohim,personscouldhypotheticallyswapbodieswitheachother. Aperson,saysLocke,is"athinkingintelligentBeing,thathasreason andreflection,andcanconsideritselfasitself,thesamethinkingthing indifferenttimesandplaces:' 23 And,soLockegoesontosay,theperson ofaprincecouldcometooccupythebodyofacobbler.Theprince's person,nowinthecobbler'sbody,wouldnot,Lockesuggests,bethe samemanastheprince.Butitwould,heargues,bethesameperson.24 Lockeisassertingthatpersonscanbedistinguishedfromparticular bodiesandarenot,therefore,identicalwiththem.Andifheisrightto doso,thenpersonsarenotessentiallycorporealandmaybetherecould beonenon-materialpersonrightlyreferredtoasGod.
19.Aristotle,generallythoughttobeoneofthegreatestofancientGreekthinkers, wrotetreatisesonscience,metaphysics,andethics.Hemoreorlessinventedthediscipline oflogic.HeactedastutortoAlexandertheGreat.HealsostudiedunderPlato.
20.BertrandRusselltaughtatCambridgeUniversity.Heisbestknownforhiswork onlogicandmathematics.Buthealsowroteonothermatters,includingreligion.His majorwritingsincludeThePrinciplesofMathematics(1903/1937),TheProblemsofPhilosophy(1912),ThePhilosophyofLogicalAtomism(1918),AHistoryofWesternPhilosophy(1945),andHumanKnowledge:ItsScopeandLimits(1948).
21.WittgensteinstudiedunderRussellbutcametodisagreewithhimphilosophicallyonanumberofissues.HetaughtatCambridgeUniversity,butalsoworked innon-academiccontexts.Widelyregardedasoneofthegreatesttwentieth-century philosophers,hisworks(almostallpublishedposthumously)includeTractatusLogicoPhilosophicus(1922),PhilosophicalInvestigations(I953),TheBlueandBrownBooks (1958),andOnCertainty(1969).
22.JohnLockeisbestknownforhisworkinepistemology(theoryofknowledge)and politicalphilosophy.HisEssayConcerningHumanUnderstandingwaspublishedin1690.
23.JohnLocke,AnEssayConcerningHumanUnderstanding,editedwithanintroductionbyPeterH.Nidditch(Oxford,1975),BookII,ch.XXVII,p.335.
24.Cf.ibid.,p.340.
WhoseGod?WhichTradition?13
TheviewthatpersonsarenotessentiallycorporealismostoftenassociatedwithReneDescartes(1596-1650).25InhisMeditationsonFirst Philosophy,Descarteslooksforatruthwhichcannotbedoubted.Hehits on'Iexist'aswhatheissearchingfor.Onecannotdoubtthatoneexists, heargues,sinceonewouldnotbecapableofdoubtingifonedidnot exist.Itis,saysDescartes,absurdtodoubtone'sexistenceaslongasone isthinking.Andhegoesontosuggestthatbeingaperson(beingableto refertooneselfas'I')isinseparablefromthinking.Descartesasks,"What amI?"Hisansweris,"Iamathingthatthinks:thatis,athingthatdoubts, affirms,denies,understandsafewthings,isignorantofmanythings,is willing,isunwilling,andwhichalsoimaginesandhassensoryperceptions:'26Andthisthinkingthing,Descartesadds,isnotanythingbodily.27
Sothehistoryofphilosophycontainsexamplesofauthorswhotake personstobedistinguishablefromwhatisessentiallycorporeal.And itistheirapproach,orsomethingverylikeit,whichseemstosurface intheisticpersonalism.Generally,theisticpersonaliststakeGodtobe strikinglysimilartowhatDescartesdescribeshimselfasbeingwhen explainingwhathethinksheis.
TheisticPersonalismandtheRejectionofClassicalTheism
Notsurprisingly,therefore,theisticpersonalistsfrequentlyrejectalmost allthetenetsofclassicaltheismasintroducedabove.Take,forexample, theirapproachtothetopicofcreation.Alltheisticpersonalistsagree thatGodistheCreator.TheybelievethatGodcausesthingstoexist. ButtheyalsotendtoregardGodasstandingtothecreatedorderasan onlookerwhoisabletostepinandmodifyhowthingsare.WhileclassicaltheiststypicallyholdthatallhistoryisGod'sdoing,theisticpersonalistsmorecommonlyseeitonlyaspartlythis.Someevents,they oftensay,arenotsomuchcausedbyGodaspermittedbyhim.Hence, forexample,whenexplainingwhathemeansbytheassertionthatGod istheCreator,Swinburnewrites:"ThemainclaimisthatGodeither
25.Oftencalled"thefatherofmodernphilosophy;'Descartesisespeciallyfamous forhisphilosophyofmind.HismajorworksincludetheDiscourseonMethod(1637)and theMeditationsonFirstPhilosophy(1641)
26.IquotefromThePhilosophicalWritingsofDescartes,vol.II,trans.JohnCottingham,RobertStoothoff,andDugaldMurdoch(Cambridge,1984),p.24.
27.SeeChapter13.
himselfbringsaboutormakesorpermitssomeotherbeingtobring about(orpermitstoexistuncaused)theexistenceofallthingsthatexist ...thatthosethingsexistonlybecauseofGod'sactionorpermission:'28 Itwould,Swinburneadds,"hardlyseemtomatterfortheismifGodon occasionpermittedsomeotherbeingtocreatematter:'Speakingina similarvein,JohnLucasdeclares:
Noteverythingthathappenscanbeattributeddirectlytothedetailed decisionofGod.AlthoughHeknowshowmanyhairsIhaveonmy head,Hehasnotdecidedhowmanythereshallbe.HedistancesHimselffromthedetailedcontrolofthecourseofeventsinorder,among otherthings,togiveusthefreedomofmaneuverweneedbothtobe moralagentsandtogobeyondmoralityintotherealmofpersonal relations.29
AccordingtoLucas:"EvenifGoddidnotknowthesecretsofmen's hearts,butonlywhattheyexplicitlytoldHimorimpliedintheirimportunatepetitions,Hewouldstillbebetterinformedthanmostofus:'30 SwinburneandLucasareherecausallydistancingGodfromthe worldinwaysthatmostclassicaltheistswouldnot.Andthedifference betweentheisticpersonalismandclassicaltheismoftenshowsitselfina tendencyamongtheisticpersonaliststoechoSwinburneandLucasinthis respect.Hence,forexample,whileclassicaltheiststypicallysaythatGod knowsallhistorybybeingitsmaker,theisticpersonalistsaremorelikely toassertthatGod'sknowledgeofhistorymaypartlybeacquiredbyhim ashistoryunfolds.Ontheirpicture,God'sknowledgeoftheworld,especiallytheworldofhumanaffairs,iscapableofincrease.Itisalsomuch derivedfromaprocesscomparablewithtakingalookatanobjector eventwhichconfrontsonefromoutside.IntheMiddleAgessomeclassicaltheistssummarizedtheirteachingonGod'sknowledgebysayingthat theknowledgeofGodisthecauseofthings(scientiadeicausarerum). Theisticpersonalists,bycontrast,oftenconceiveofGod'sknowledge ascausedbythingsotherthanGod.Hence,forexample,RichardCreel writes:"Godmustbeaffirmedasaprivilegedobserver:'Why?Because, saysCreel,ifGodcannotobservethingsaswedo,Godmustbeinerror.31
28.Swinburne,TheCoherenceofTheism,p.131.
29.JohnLucas,TheFuture(Oxford,1989),p.229.
30.Ibid.,p.22I.
31.RichardCreel,DivineImpassibility(Cambridge,1986),p.96.
ThinkingalongCreel'slines,theisticpersonalistsoftendenythat Godisimpassibleandunchangeable.Indeed,manyofthemmakea pointofdoingso.Why?Largelybecausetheythinkthat,ifGodisimpassibleandunchangeable,thenGodcannotbetakenseriouslyasaperson. Thepersonswecallpeoplearechangedbywhattheyencounteranddiscover.Theyaremodifiedbyotherthings.And,saysthetheisticpersonalist,thisishowitmustbewithGod.AnimpassibleandunchangingGod would,theyargue,belifeless.SuchaGod,theyoftenadd,wouldalso notbeadmirable.Weadmirepeoplewhocanbemovedbytragicevents. Weadmirepeoplewhocanbecomeelatedwhengoodthingshappen. And,sotheisticpersonalistssometimessay,wecanadmireGodonlyif God,likeadmirablepeople,issuitablyaffectedbythegoodandthebad whichoccursintheworld.AnotabledefenderofthisviewisCharles Hartshorne(1897-2000),accordingtowhomGodundergoesjoyaswe flourishandgrievesaswesuffer.ForHartshorne,thismeansthatGod undergoesdevelopment.Godimprovesastimegoeson.32 Hartshorne's understandingofGodis,ofcourse,utterlyatoddswiththesuggestion thatGodisoutsidetime.AndGod'stimelessnessisrejected,whether explicitlyorimplicitly,byalltheisticpersonalists.Thesamegoesforthe teachingthatGodissimple.Asweshalllatersee,sometheisticpersonalistsrejectthisteachingonpurelyphilosophicalgrounds.Some,forexample,arguethatitislogicallyindefensibleorinsomewayincoherent. But,asweshallalsolatersee,othersrejectitontheologicalgrounds. Why?Thereasonstheygiveareusuallybasedonthewaytheyreadthe Bible.Intheirview,thebiblicalpictureofGodisjustflatlyatoddswith whatthosewhobelieveindivinesimplicitytakeGodtobe.TheOldand NewTestamentsspeakofGodasthoughGodwereadistinctindividual withdistinctattributesorproperties.Andthis,saymanytheisticpersonalists,isreasonenoughfordismissingthenotionofdivinesimplicity. Manyofthemwouldaddthatitisalsoreasonforrejectingclassicaltheism'semphasisonthedifficultyofunderstandingwhatGodis. St.AugustineofHippo,likeclassicaltheistsingeneral,expresseshimselfbaffledwhenitcomestothedivinenature."Whothenareyou,my God?;'heasks.HeanswershisownquestionbystressingthatGodis supremelymysterious.God,saysAugustine,is"mosthigh,utterlygood, utterlypowerful,mostomnipotent,mostmercifulandmostjust,deeply
32.Cf.CharlesHartshorne,OmnipotenceandOtherTheologicalMistakes(New York,1983).
hiddenyetmostintimatelypresent,perfectionofbothbeautyand strength,stableandincomprehensible,immutableandyetchangingall things,nevernew,neverold...alwaysactive,alwaysinrepose:'33Accordingtotheisticpersonalists,however,GodisnotnearlyasextraordinaryasAugustine'saccountsuggests.
Augustine'saccountisinseparablefromhiscommitmenttothe teachingthatGodissimple.Butwhatifwerejectthatteaching?And whatifwethinkofGodasbeingratherhowDescartesthoughtDescartes was?ThenwemightthinkthatGodisnotsohardtofathomafterall. Descartessays:"Icanachieveaneasierandmoreevidentperceptionof myownmindthanofanythingelse:'34IfDescartesisrighthere,andif heisalsocorrectinhisviewofwhatitistobeahumanperson,might wenotclaimafaircomprehensionofGodbyreflectingonwhatweare asthinkingthings?
Theisticpersonalistsoftensuggestthatwecandojustthis.They alwaysconcedethatGodissomethingofamystery.Buttheyfrequently implythatwecanhavesomesenseofwhatitistobeGodsinceweknow fromourowncasewhatitistobeaperson.Theyalsosometimessuggestthatwords(especiallyadjectives)usedbybelieverswhenspeaking ofGodaremostnaturallytobeconstruedinthesamewayaswhen theyareappliedtopeople.TheistssaythatGodis,forexample,knowing,loving,andgood.Andweknowwhatitmeanstosaythatpeople areknowing,loving,andgood.So,reasonsmanyatheisticpersonalist, weknowwhatitmeanstosaythatGodisknowing,loving,andgood. Sometheisticpersonalists(Swinburneisanotableexample)addthat ourknowledgeofpeopleandGodallowsus(withnoreferencetodivine revelation)toformconjecturesandexpectationsconcerninghowGod islikelytoact.OtherssuggestthatGod,likeus,couldbesubjectto lapsesofmemory.Hence,forexample,StevenT.Davisasks:"Suppose Godknowstheanswertoanyquestionthatcanbeaskedexceptthis: WhatcolorshoesdidMarthaWashingtonwearonthedayofherweddingtoGeorge?SupposeGodhassomehowforgottenthisfactandhas forgottenhowtodeduceitfromotherfactsheknows.Isitsoclearhe wouldthennolongerbeGod?"Davisanswers:"IbelievethatGodisin
33.IquotefromSaintAugustine,Confessions,trans.HenryChadwick(Oxford, I991),pp.4f.
34.ThePhilosophicalWritingsofDescartes,vol.II,trans.JohnCottingham,Robert Stoothoff,andDugaldMurdoch,p.23.
