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Abortion remains one of the most contentious ethical issues, eliciting diverse perspectives rooted in fundamental normative theories. To navigate this complex terrain, it is essential to analyze prominent philosophical arguments regarding the moral permissibility of abortion, assessing their strengths and limitations. This essay aims to demonstrate an understanding of these arguments by supporting one theorist's view—namely, Marquis—and showing why the opposing approach by Warren fails. In doing so, it will consider premises, assumptions, normative frameworks, and illustrative examples to provide a comprehensive ethical analysis.
Supporting Argument: Marquis’s Future-Like-Our-Existing Account
Don Marquis's influential argument posits that abortion is prima facie morally impermissible because it deprives the fetus of a valuable future—a future like ours, filled with experiences, plans, and pleasures. Marquis's central premise is that being a potential person entails moral significance deserving protection, similar to current persons. His core argument hinges on the notion that killing any being with a future of value is morally comparable to killing an adult human, which is generally considered wrong.
The premises of Marquis’s argument are as follows: (1) Fetuses have a future like ours, containing valuable experiences. (2) Killing deprives the victim of this future, an act which is generally wrong when performed against persons with such futures. (3) Therefore, abortion is morally impermissible when the
fetus has a future like ours. Marquis assumes a consequentialist framework, emphasizing the value of future experiences, and presupposes that moral permissibility is tied to the deprivation of valuable futures.
An example illustrating the permissibility of abortion under Marquis's view might involve a late-term abortion performed to prevent severe fetal abnormalities, where the fetus's future quality is compromised or non-existent, thus weakening the argument's restriction. Conversely, in early pregnancy cases without known abnormalities, the fetus's potential future gives strong moral weight against abortion, rendering such acts impermissible.
Objection to Marquis's Argument
One significant objection is that Marquis's account conflates potentiality with actual personhood, raising questions about whether potential futures confer the same moral rights as actual individuals. Critics argue that not all beings with future-like experiences—such as embryos or even non-human animals—should garner such strong moral protections, especially in early pregnancy stages. Furthermore, Marquis’s focus on future value does not address the rights or autonomy of the pregnant individual, potentially justifying prohibitions that infringe upon bodily autonomy and personal liberty. An objection from a deontological perspective emphasizes that a woman's rights to control her body may outweigh the fetus's future interests, especially when pregnancy results from rape or endangers the woman's health. Marquis's view also faces practical challenges, such as determining when the fetus's future begins to have sufficient moral weight to prohibit all abortions, raising a potential slippery slope.
Opposing Argument: Warren’s Moral Status of Fetuses
In contrast, Elizabeth Warren (sometimes conflated with philosophers like Warren or Warren’s pro-choice views) argues that moral status depends on specific capacities, such as consciousness, reasoning, or self-awareness. Warren emphasizes that persons possess traits like rationality or self-awareness, which fetuses lack, especially early on. Her position suggests that abortion may be permissible before certain cognitive capacities develop, as the fetus does not yet qualify as a person with full moral rights. For instance, Warren might argue that early-stage fetuses are not self-aware and do not possess the qualities that grant moral protection, allowing for early pregnancy abortions without unjust killing.
This perspective aligns with a form of utilitarian or virtue ethics that considers the actual capacities of beings, rather than potential futures. The moral permissibility of abortion, then, hinges on developmental stages and capacities, making early abortions more permissible and late-term abortions more morally
ambiguous or impermissible. For example, Warren would argue that terminating a fetus before it develops consciousness is morally permissible, whereas late-term abortions might warrant more scrutiny.
Objection to Warren’s View and Response
A key objection is that Warren's capacity-based criterion risks excluding early embryos or less developed fetuses from moral consideration, which could lead to permissive policies allowing for the killing of potential persons with future value—something many find morally troubling. For instance, critics argue that potentiality should have moral significance, and Warren's focus on actual capacities might undervalue the moral importance of potential future persons. A counter-response emphasizes that capacity-based criteria do not negate the moral significance of potential futures but recognize that moral rights are rooted in present capacities that warrant respect and protection. Moreover, balancing these capacities with women's rights requires nuanced policies that consider developmental stages and contextual factors.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Marquis’s future-like-our-futures argument offers a compelling case against abortion by emphasizing the intrinsic value of future experiences, aligning with consequentialist views on the importance of potential life. However, it faces objections regarding the misapplication of potentiality, autonomy issues, and practical boundaries. Warren's capacity-based approach provides a different perspective, allowing for early abortions when capacities are lacking, but risks neglecting potential future persons. An ethical framework that integrates the strengths of both views, respecting women's rights while acknowledging potential future value, offers a more nuanced understanding of when abortion may be morally permissible. The debate underscores the importance of balancing respect for potential life with respect for bodily autonomy, shaped by carefully considered normative principles and contextual factors.
References
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Warren, M. (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion." The Monist, 57(2), 43-61.
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Thomson, J. J. (1971). "A Defense of Abortion." Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(1), 47-66.
Hursthouse, R. (1999). "Virtue Theory and Abortion." In T. damer (Ed.), Virtue Ethics and Moral
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Norcross, A. (2005). "The Moral Status of Abortion." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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