4.15 Security
Related SPD sections
Key City Plan policies
• 4 5 Street Furniture
• 4 7 Street Trading / Commercial Activity
43. Public Realm
44. Security Measures in the Public Realm
Context
Westminster is a busy international tourist destination, the centre of the UK government, and home of several major institutions and businesses. This means security risks (including terrorist attacks) in the public realm are higher in Westminster than elsewhere. Ensuring and maintaining a safe and secure environment is paramount and proposals in the public realm should seek to proactively consider crime, disorder and protective security in the development and design of all schemes
By security we mean all efforts aimed at protecting the public from deliberate harm (crime). They normally include:
o Saferdesign - designing out opportunities for crime and anti-social behaviour
o Physicalbarriers - creating barriers to prevent hostile vehicle attacks
o Surveillance - creating opportunities for natural surveillance over publicly accessible spaces, and where absolutely necessary use of CCTV monitoring
Ensuring the public realm is secure involves identifying potential risks and addressing them appropriately.
Safety relates to freedom from risks of harm or danger. The feelings of safety and fear are often linked with individual perception of the level of risk in a certain environment. It is important to understand public perception of safety, including from security risks, in public spaces.
Fear of crime, as well as crime itself, can deter people from using even good-quality public spaces. Children and young people, for example, are often prevented from using our parks, squares, and streets because of their parents’ fears about crime, whilst women often also face particular concerns. Fear of violence and crime in outdoor areas can also deter adult people from engaging in physical activity in public spaces. Physical changes to, and the better management of, public space can help to allay these fears 87
Prominent security measures could however have the detrimental impact of creating a sense of uneasiness (e.g. too many bollards/visible security measures can create a perception of danger). Schemes should therefore seek to achieve public security without increasing fear of crime.
Landscaping can be a useful crime prevention tool. Careful placing of suitable plant and tree species can reduce opportunities for concealment or vandalism and help define public and private spaces. Good deterrent plants such as Berberis, Robinia and Rose varieties can be employed where suitable. Conversely, poorly designed, ill maintained landscaping schemes may obscure views and create shadows and places for people to hide and hide antisocial materials; thereby encouraging opportunist criminals and increasing fear of crime.
87 The Value of Public Space, CABE
When arranging street furniture, its placement should be carefully considered to help reduce opportunities for crime. For example, the positioning of benches or litter bins in relation to fences and railings, The presence of active frontages and activities spilling over onto the public realm can also act as a deterrent for crime and anti-social behaviour.
Protective security encompasses a range of measures and risk reduction can be achieved in a variety of ways but should be proportionate to the risk and threat posed. One of these ways is through Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM). HVM are a series of measures to protect users from vehicle-borne threats. Bollards are only one form of vehicle security barrier a form of HVM. More detailed guidance on bollards can be found in the Street Furniture section (see chapter 4.5).
It is not always possible to entirely predict how a space will be used in the future, and this poses a challenge to designing appropriate security solutions. Applicants should consider implementing a variety of mitigation measures in anticipation of possible future risks.
The government’s draft Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill, known as ‘Martyn’s Law’ (previously known as the ‘Protect Duty ’ Bill) in recognition of the campaign led by the mother of one of the victims of the Manchester Arena Bombings was published on 2nd May 2023. The primary aim of the Bill is to improve protective security and preparedness measures in publicly accessible locations. The emerging Bill, if enacted by Parliament, will place a requirement on publicly accessible venues and locations to consider the threat of terrorism and put into place appropriate mitigation measures.
In delivering security measures within the public realm, it is important that security systems are designed and properly maintained for longevity and reliability. They should be designed in such a way that is both functional but adaptable to future change and balance the potential risk and threat posed with amenity, functionality, aesthetic, pedestrian comfort, accessibility etc. By working in partnership with key stakeholders we can ensure the right security measures are in place for all public realm schemes, future-proof our city and keep the public safe.
Security Guidance
A. Security should be considered in the design and operation of public realm, to improve the wellbeing of users of those spaces.
B. Potential security issues and constraints should be identified at the early stages of developing a scheme impacting on the public realm. Assessments should include consideration of how a place functions at different times of the year (e.g. to account for seasonality/events) and throughout the day, including particularly during night hours.
C. Proposals are expected to incorporate the principles of ‘Secure By Design’ at the outset of the design process and to have undergone an appropriate risk assessment considering schemes in the context they would be operating 88. The assessment should identify potential solutions to reduce the likelihood or mitigate risk. Solutions must be reasonable, viable, specific, and proportionate 89 to the identified risk. When devising solutions to address the identified risk(s), applicants are advised to explore a range of approaches that are not limited to just physical measures, as several elements can affect the level, type, and extent of security risk. These include layout, land use, lighting, thresholds, etc.
D. Applicants should demonstrate that they have given due consideration to risks and have acted on that due consideration when putting forward a proposal with impacts on the public realm. The City Council needs to be satisfied that the risk is sufficient to require special measures and that there is no alternative way to address confirmed safety risks.
E. Measures should be integrated into the design of schemes, while retrofitting is to be avoided where possible.
F. Emergency service needs, management and servicing access should be considered when designing security measures and – particularly for ’active’ measures 90 – how they will be operated.
G. Public realm schemes should ensure resilience against emergencies including terrorism and related hazards. Applicants should work alongside Metropolitan Police ‘Designing Out Crime’ to incorporate Counter Terrorism Security Advisors’ advice.
88 Please refer to the Police’s Protect Guidance for specialist advice: https://www.protectuk.police.uk/
89 Solutions to respond to JASPAR (Justifiable, Achievable, Sustainable, Practical, Affordable and Reasonable) principles.
90 E.g., removable, socketed, coffin and manual/hydraulic/electric bollards
H. Proposals should also consider how they can mitigate the risk of suicides in public spaces 91. In particular, where taller buildings provide new public realm (e.g. through publicly accessible roof gardens), a holistic design concept should be established from the outset to create safe places and ensure the safety of members of the public. Where practicable schemes should incorporate a range of measures in order to mitigate possible future risks.
I. The public realm should be designed for maximum natural surveillance to encourage its use and discourage misuse.
J. Designs should ensure a balance between security and accessibility.
K. Pedestrian routes may need to be more serpentine to thwart vehicle-borne devices but should ensure pedestrian access is maintained
L. Bollards may need to be staggered to allow wheelchair users to pass between them, whilst still maintaining a physical barrier to hostile vehicles, with specific bollards made removable to facilitate access when required.
M. Schemes should deliver places that feel safe to use (‘perceived security’).
N. A balance should be achieved between the need to make users aware that security measures are in place and making measures too visible
N. Demonstrate a holistic and multifunctional approach to public realm design, including with regards to security measures.
O. Public realm elements should seek to be multifunctional (‘multi-functional objects’) wherever this is possible and would not create increased security risks.
P. Unnecessary bollards, where there is no other public benefit, are unwelcome, unless they protect fragile vaults or that there is no alternative way to address the identified risk and that the level and type of risk demands special measures.
Q. Street furniture should be positioned to help reduce opportunities for crime
R. Temporary approaches may be acceptable in instances where this is considered appropriate and will be determined on a case-by-case basis. For example, temporary security barriers can be used for special uses of the public highway (e.g. events).
S. Proposals for Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) measures should respond to the key guiding principles set out above and align with specialist guidance in the National Protective Security Authority’s (NPSA) Public Realm Design Guide for Hostile Vehicle Mitigation 92
T. Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Security Advisor, NPSA, TfL, and Westminster City Council’s Town Planning and Highways teams are key stakeholders that should be consulted when considering security measures for a scheme.
U. Public realm schemes including security measures should be subject to coordinated planning and highways consent by Westminster City Council.
V. Security measures should ideally be agreed through legal agreements and then deemed consent, where appropriate and in light of a significant vulnerability to terrorism.
91 Public Health England – Preventing suicides in public spaces https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/suicideprevention-suicides-in-public-places
92 Public Realm Design for Hostile Vehicle Mitigation | NPSA https://www.npsa.gov.uk/public-realm-design-guide-hostilevehicle-mitigation-0