THE
D I A RY O F 1636 Second Manchu Invasion of Korea
The
Na Man’gap T R A N S L AT E D A N D W I T H AN INTRODUCTION BY
George Kallander
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n the early spring of the pyŏngja year [1636], Military Officer of the Sub-Prefect (musin tongji) Yi Kwak and Na Tŏkhŏn, a fifth minister (ch’ŏmji), traveled to Mukden as envoys (ch’unsinsa).1 The eleventh day of the third lunar month was the day Hung Taiji of the Manchu Jin dynasty assumed the title of emperor. 2 The Manchu ordered the envoys, against their will, to take part in the congratulatory procession (panyŏl), but, risking death, they did not obey. The barbarian official seized Kwak and the others with force, damaging their clothes and caps, but the envoys never surrendered.3 Among the Chinese people (Hanin), there were those who shed tears.4 When it was time for Kwak and the others to return to our country, Hung Taiji gave them a state letter. In this letter, Hung Taiji designated himself emperor.5 Kwak and others took it, wrapped it in a black cloth, secretly put it in a sack, and reached Tongyuanpu.6 Kwak made an excuse that his horse was ill and that the load was too heavy and left the sack [with the state letter] with the barbarian (hoin) guarding Tongyuanpu.7 Hong Myŏnggu, the provincial governor of P’yŏngan Province, blamed Kwak and the others for receiving the letter from
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Hung Taiji in which he styled himself the emperor and not reprimanding him harshly on the spot. The fact that the envoys secretly left the letter on their way back was actually a conspired excuse to set themselves free of criminal charges. Hong thus requested the sword of Shangfang to sever the heads of Yi Kwak and the others and display them at the frontier. 8 His Highness [King Injo] sent a royal report (changgye) to the Border Defense Command (piguk).9 Kim Sanghŏn, the minister of personnel (ijo p’ansŏ), believed that Kwak and the others were guilty, but they did not deserve the death penalty. The Border Defense Command reported back to His Highness and referred only to capturing Yi Kwak and the others and bringing them back. His Highness agreed. The Border Defense Command was well aware of their innocence. However, all kinds of opinions were then raised, and so they reported it that way. The Three Offices (Samsa) argued that they had to be punished according to the law, without exception.10 The Confucian scholar (kwanhak yusaeng) Cho Pogyang and others petitioned the throne.11 As for Chief State Councilor (Yŏngŭijŏng) Kim Yu, those of the Young faction (Yŏnso)—who stringently criticized him and advocated war (chŏkhwa)—followed him and wanted peace.12 Among the high officials (chinsin), some thought that “although the Jin dynasty claimed the title emperor within their own country, our country only needs to maintain the brotherhood with them taken under oath during the chŏngmyo year [1627].13 They dare to overreach by assuming the title of emperor. How can this event even matter to us? If we do not properly estimate the strength of our military and abandon the oath of alliance with the Manchu, it could incite death and deep misfortune.” Even though some truly thought this way, no one dared to open his mouth. This year, at the end of spring, Ingguldai and Mafuta, two Manchu generals, arrived for the funerary ceremony of Queen Inyŏl. The tenth prince of the Jin dynasty (sibwangja) dispatched
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a diplomatic letter to His Highness.14 It explained the claim to the title of emperor and stated the hope that peace should not end. It also mentioned the crimes of Yi Kwak and others for not being respectful when attending the congratulatory celebration. This was indeed how the Manchu probed our intentions and attempted to use military force. This plot was very intriguing. But the court (chojŏng) appointed such inappropriate people as Yi Myŏng, Pak No, and others to host the Manchu envoys. Yi Myŏng and the others grew aware of the potential misfortune of this appointment, but they feared offending the common consensus. Whenever they dealt with the barbarian envoys, they always treated them poorly and deliberately slighted them. A Mongol, whom the two generals brought, was a person who recently swore allegiance to the Jin dynasty. He intended to make our country treat him hospitably as he thought this was a land of exaggerated power. But the court did not approve. They treated him in a manner similar to his host barbarians [the Manchu] in order to disappoint him. In addition, the court said that the subordinate [the tenth prince of Jin] could not dispatch this diplomatic letter to His Highness. In the end, the letter from the tenth prince remained unopened. Once, during the funeral services of Queen Dowager Inmok (Inmok taebi), a barbarian general paid a condolence visit.15 At that time, he was allowed to enter the royal palace and offer sacrifices. But this time, the court offered the excuse that the palace was too crowded, so they separately set up an empty tent across Kŭmch’ŏn Bridge where the Manchu could conduct sacrifices and express their condolences.16 Then the wind blew, and the tent lifted up. Ingguldai and the others started to realize the deception and grew angry. Moreover, governmental, arquebus soldiers (togam p’osu) were secretly practicing in the rear garden on this day, and they all assembled below the palace gate.17 At the same time, the royal security guards were rotating shifts. Because the barbarian envoy was at the
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palace gate, each one grasped his weapon, and all stood behind the flap. When the wind lifted up the tent flap, Ingguldai and the others looked out. They were suspicious of an ambush and departed in haste. At this time, Third Inspector of the Office of the Inspector General (changnyŏng) Hong Ikhan reported to His Highness, petitioning for the beheading of the envoys and others. The Confucian students (kwanhak) reported to His Highness the second time, petitioning for the beheading of the envoys. The barbarian generals and others became aware of these schemes. They also grew suspicious and fearful, so they tore down the city gate and walked out. They scattered, broke into the homes of the villagers, stole their horses, and ran off. Those in the paths and roads who witnessed this were shocked and frightened, and the children at the village gates and alleyways ( yŏhang) fell over each other in their eagerness to throw stones at them. The capital grew clamorous. Only then did the court begin to fear. Timidly, the court officials dispatched high-ranking courtiers (chaesin); these courtiers proceeded one by one along the road, begging the barbarian generals to stay, but, in the end, they did not return.18 His Highness issued a royal proclamation to the eight provinces to reject peace. The royal order that proceeded along the western road was seized by the barbarian generals and they came to grasp the extent of its message. The court thought the event—when Yi Kwak and the others secretly left the letter from Hung Taiji on their way back behind in Zhongdao—had not been publicized, so they made the royal messenger (sŏnjŏn’gwan) take to Mansang the letter in which they denounced Mukden.19 That the court criticized Mukden meant letting the Manchu learn about this event [that Kwak and the others did not purposely bring back the letter]. Afterwards, His Highness repeatedly issued royal edicts of regret, and through selfless loyalty (ch’ungŭi), he strove to convey his hatred of the enemy.
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From near and far, appeals poured in daily. Every one of them called for war and attacking the barbarians. Censor General (taesagan) Yun Hwang reported to His Highness, requesting the reduction of royal exactions (ŏgong), the removal of music from the temple (myoak), the burning of the palace (haenggung) on Kanghwa Island (Kangdo), and a sole commitment to war. 20 Vice– Minister of Personnel (ijo ch’amp’an) Chŏng On reported to His Highness, calling for the military garrisoning of Songdo. 21 Third Minister (ch’amŭi) Kim Tŏkham requested the garrisoning of P’yŏngyang. These requests were to excite the military leaders. At this time, natural disasters and unusual events took place. The rocks of Pup’yŏng and Ansan shifted. The mallards of Yŏngnam and Kwansŏ fought each other. The cranes of Taegu grouped for battle. The frogs of Ch’ŏngp’a went to war. The toads of Chungnyŏng marched in procession. The streams of Yean ran dry. Lightning struck Two Hills (Yangnŭng), and the soil of the capital turned red. 22 About twenty- seven locations shook violently throughout one day in the capital. A great flood suddenly appeared. The road to the east gate was washed out. The three royal palaces (samgwŏl) shook simultaneously. A white rainbow threaded the sun, and celestial portents appeared. 23 These events all happened in a single year. But Chief State Councilor ( yŏngŭijŏng) Kim Yu, Left State Councilor (chwaŭijŏng) Hong Sŏbong, and Right State Councilor (uŭijŏng) Yi Hongju were eminent officers at the court. It was not clear if peace negotiations would be successful, so attacking and defense had yet to be discussed. Supreme Commander of War (ch’ech’alsa) Kim Yu submitted a petition that said, “If the barbarian enemy launches a deep invasion into the country, the supreme field commander (towŏnsu), the assistant supreme commander (puwŏnsu), and the provincial high commissioner (pangbaek) of Yangsŏ must face collective family punishment (noryuk) according to the law.”24 His Highness’s instructions were that it would
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be difficult for the supreme commander of war to avoid serious punishment. Kim Yu originally advocated war, but now, after receiving His Highness’s warnings, he advocated peace. The time for autumn defense preparation (ch’ubang) drew near. 25 Ch’oe Myŏnggil requested the dispatch of a peace envoy. Fifth Counselor (kyori) O Talche and Section Chief of Personnel (ijo chŏngnang) Yun Chip petitioned the throne, demanding the beheading of Ch’oe Myŏnggil. The petition by Third Censor (hŏnnap) Yi Ilsang spoke of such things as betraying the Heavenly Court (Ch’ŏnjo) and deceiving the people. 26 Popular opinion (siron) called for war and agreed that the establishment of tributary relations with the Jin was erroneous. There were no dissenters. The court showed an ambiguous attitude toward these two views and did not offer a proposal. Then Kim Yu came to agree with Ch’oe Myŏnggil’s view. Later, he sent a low-level interpreter (soyŏk) to Mukden in order to explore the intention of the enemy. 27 The Three Offices jointly demanded that the interpreter not leave, but they failed to halt the debate, and the interpreter was dispatched by royal decree. The Manchu Jin [Hung Taiji] spoke to the interpreter, saying, “If your country does not send us a high official and the king’s son and agree to peace before the eleventh lunar month, the twenty-fifth day, then I will immediately raise a great army and invade the east by force.” His response letter stated,
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Your distinguished country has constructed many mountain fortresses, but as I pass along the main road toward the capital, can these mountain fortresses block me? Your honorable country puts its trust in Kanghwa Island, but as I ravage along the roads throughout the land, can you turn this small island into a country?28 Those who argue for war in your honorable country
are Confucian officials, but can they wield their brushes and fend me off?
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The interpreter returned and conveyed this message and the written letter. The court intended to dispatch the prime minster (chaesang), but the argument for war still dominated, and no one dared to say clearly that the envoy should go. After a long time, the court ordered Pak No to depart, while officials of the censorate (taegan) argued strongly against sending him and persisted with their disapproval for a time. They were finally forced to dispatch Pak No, but he had already missed the deadline the Manchu Jin [Hung Taiji] had set. At this time, Yi Sibaek was the defense commander (suŏsa) of Namhan Mountain Fortress (Namhan sansŏng). Sibaek’s father Kwi and Kim Yu did not get along with each other. None of the defense issues regarding Namhan was approved by Yu. The soldiers among the troops defending the fortress were all deployed from Yŏngnam. In case of urgency, how could people from such a distance come in time? Since the time of the ancestral kings of the royal court, they had put in place important towns at strategic locations to ward off the enemy and defend the country. In recent times, Kim Yu and Supreme Field Commander Kim Chajŏm took the lead in pleading for the redeployment [of troops from towns to nearby mountain fortresses]. As a consequence, Ŭiju redeployed to Paengma, P’yŏngyang redeployed to Chamo, Hwangju redeployed to Chŏngbang, and P’yŏngsan redeployed to Changsu. 29 Among them, the relatively close one was roughly thirty or forty li away from the main road, whereas it took one or two days to journey to the distant ones. The large towns of the two western regions ( yangsŏ iltae) had become uninhabited.30 At that time, Area Commander (todok) Sim Segoe of Kado Island notified the Ming court about the intention of our country
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to go to war [with the Manchu Jin].31 In the autumn of that year, the Ming sent Army Inspecting Censor Huang Sunmao to offer praise and honor to our country.32 When he returned to Kwansŏ, he issued a report to the Chosŏn court.33 It read, “Despite observing the will of your people and the military preparations of your distinguished country, you will never be able to deal with those Manchu bandits. Do not end up conciliating with the Manchu only because of this praise and honor from the Ming court.” Unexpectedly, Kim Chajŏm was given the important responsibility of supreme field commander (ch’ugok).34 However, he did not comfort the soldiers. He enslaved the commoners, levying them to build defenses. Moreover, he used punishment to impose his prestige. Gradually, he lost much of the will of the people. He constantly said, “The enemy is certainly not coming this winter.” If someone said that the enemy was coming, he would grow infuriated. If someone said that the enemy was not coming, he would be pleased. Therefore, those under him were reluctant to say that the enemy was coming. The time for winter defense preparation had already passed, but the troops that defended the fortresses had not been reinforced even by a single man. Along the ridge of Yonggol Mountain at Ŭiju are fire beacons [to signal the start of an invasion].35 Lighting one torch means there is no activity. Two torches mean the enemy has appeared. Three torches mean they have crossed the frontier. Four torches mean they approach for battle. Starting from Yonggol and ending at Chŏngbang, where the commander-in-chief is stationed, the fire beacons seem to reach the capital. Fear would turn into chaos, so any disturbance must be stopped here.
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n the sixth day of the twelfth lunar month, two torches were lit, but Kim Chajŏm said, “This just means that the dispatched Pak No must have been greeted by the barbarians. How
can this mean that the enemy is approaching?” Hence, he did not notify the king promptly. On the ninth day of the twelfth lunar month, Kim Chajŏm dispatched the military official (kun’gwan) Sin Yong to Ŭiju to examine the situation. The next day, Sin Yong arrived in Sunan, and the enemy’s horses (ma) were swarming all over the district capital (ŭmnae).36 Immediately, Sin Yong turned around and rode back, reporting this situation to Provincial Governor (kamsa) of P’yŏngan Province Hong Myŏnggu. Myŏnggu did not know about the situation of the enemy either, and when he learned about it, he grew alarmed and rode alone to Chamo Fortress. Sin Yong returned and reported what he had witnessed to Kim Chajŏm, but the commander-in-chief scolded him by saying that his nonsense would upset the military situation (kunjŏng) and proclaimed he would behead Yong. Yong said, “The enemy troops will arrive here tomorrow. Do not behead me. Please wait.” Before long, the military official (kun’gwan) who was sent in pursuit returned again and made an urgent announcement, corroborating Yong’s story. Only then did the supreme commander submit a royal report. Virtually all the enemy troops crossed the river and ignored the fortresses and towns. Arriving like the wind (p’yop’ung), they moved directly to call for peace terms (kanghwa). All the reports (changgye) of the officials at the frontier had been completely captured by the enemy, so the court was unaware of the circumstances along the frontier. E A R LY C O M P L I C AT I O N S
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After a Chosŏn faction realigned Korea with the Ming dynasty, the Manchu attacked in 1627 and again a decade later, forcing Korea to support the newly founded Qing dynasty. The Korean scholar-official Na Man’gap (1592–1642) recorded the second Manchu invasion in this diary, the only first-person account chronicling the dramatic Korean resistance. “The Diary of 1636 is a fascinating firsthand description of the turmoil during the second Manchu invasion. George Kallander’s engaging and highly readable translation provides an understanding of the Chosŏn response to the invasions, internal power struggles, and the consequences of this momentous event that reshaped East Asia.” —Michael J. Pettid, coeditor of Premodern Korean Literary Prose “Na Man’gap’s vivid and detailed description of the Manchu invasion of Korea constitutes an essential work for anyone interested in Manchu-Korean relations. Kallander’s expert translation and exhaustive introduction make The Diary of 1636 one of the most important primary sources available in English on early seventeenth-century Korean and East Asian history.” —Nicola Di Cosmo, translator of The Diary of a Manchu Soldier in Seventeenth-Century China “The Diary of 1636 offers a fascinating narrative of military attacks, traumatic experiences, humiliating defeat, surrender, and the post-invasion political circumstances. This excellent translation is a must-read for students and scholars working on Sino-Korean relations in the early modern period.” —Jisoo M. Kim, author of The Emotions of Justice: Gender, Status, and Legal Performance in Chosŏn Korea “Kallander’s translation of Na Man’gap’s eyewitness account of the Manchu invasion of Korea opens a window into an important event in Korean history. Truly required reading for the history of Korea’s Chosŏn dynasty.” —Don Baker, author of Catholics and Anti-Catholicism in Chosŏn Dynasty Korea George Kallander is associate professor of history at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, where he is director of the East Asia Program at the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs. He is the author of Salvation Through Dissent: Tonghak Heterodoxy and Early Modern Korea (2013).
TRANSLATIONS FROM THE ASIAN CLASSICS PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.
COVER IMAGE: Anonymous artist, Chulgipajŏkdo, from the series Pukkwan Yujŏk Toch’ŏp. Ink and color on paper, c. eighteenth century, Korea University Museum COVER DESIGN: Chang Jae Lee COLU MBIA U NIVERSIT Y PRESS
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