Social Change and Public Policy (1967) by La Colección Puertorriqueña

SOCIAL CHANGE AND

PUBLIC POLICY A SEMINAR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO 20-24 FEBRUARY 1967

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SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH CENTER RÍO PIEDRAS, PUERTO RICO 1968

SOCIAL CHANGE AND

PUBLIC POLICY A SEMINAR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO 20-24 FEBRUARY 1967

MILLARD HANSEN EDITOR

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH CENTER RÍO PIEDRAS, PUERTO RICO 1968

TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction

Agenda

List of Seminar Papers

Curriculum Vitae of Seminar Members

Anderson, "Reflections on 'Focus and Approach' for a Study of Social Change and Public Policy in Puerto Rico" .

Clinard, "Urbanization, Urbanism, and Deviant Behavior in Puerto Rico"

Cochran, "Suggestions for Further Study of Puerto Rico"

Cunningham, "An Inventory of Research in Puerto Rico Relevant to Social Change and Public Policy"

De Jesús Toro and Ferracuti, "Research Goals and Strategy"

Diaz Alejandro, 1°Notes on the Growth of Argentina and Thoughts It Suggests on Social Change and Public Policy Hansen, 'Major Themes of Social Charge and Public Policy"

-. J-

López-Rey, "Social Change, Crime and Criminal Justice" . .

105

Mueller, "Changing Law in a Changing Society" and "Social Change and Legal Change in Puerto Rico"

118

First day, 20 February, seminar discussion

132

Second day, 21 February, seminar discussion

165

Third day, 22 February, seminar discussion

213

Fourth day, 23 February, seminar discussion

247

Fifth day, 24 February, seminar discussion

291

Index of persons

327

Index of topics

329

INTRODUCTION The planning for the February 1967 seminar on social change and public policy began in November 1966 at the initiative of Pedro Muñoz Amato, Dean of Studies, and of Franco Ferracuti, Director in the Social Science Research Center of the Criminology Program, and Rafael de Jesús Toro, Director, Social Science Research Center. I was invited to organize and conduct the seminar. The central issue in our minds, I believe, was disquiet about deviant conduct in the society, inefficient conduct, and feelings of distress which - so we believed - were probably consequences of the extensive changes which had occurred so swiftly in the society of Puerto Rico. If social change was producing these undesirable effects, perhaps an understanding of the process would encourage and facilitate a public policy to eliminate or diminish these undesirable effects. An issue of almost equal importance was the expectation that, if social change were better understood, some aspects of the process would be more amenable to control by a public policy based on such understanding. We probably believed - and it is certain that I believed - that more knowledge about our social change would permit us to improve both schools and universities. These issues emerged in the seminar discussions again and again, which suggests that the seminar did in fact address itself to these initial interests and issues. There were 26 participants in the seminar with an average daily attendance for the five sessions of about 20. Of these, 6 were invited from North American universities. Many fields of research were represented: economics, sociology, psychology, law, planning, education; and within these categories various particular research interests such as economic development, deviant and delinquent behavior, and so on. Nine papers were prepared to inform and stimulate the discussions. On four of the five days, there was a particular issue on the agenda, but on all five days the discussion remained open and spontaneous enough for the generation of its own issues of choice during the discussions. The interest in Puerto Rico in social change and its consequences was certainly not a new concern. More than ten years ago, several persons in Puerto Rico, as I have noted in my seminar paper, tried to launch research on the question. Political and university leaders initiated a discussion about social change and about the possibilities of studying and influencing it. The interest expressed elsewhere is ubiquitous. Whatever diction and rhetoric may be chosen, commentators, statesmen, and scholars are devoting major portions of their energy to questions about the new nations, modernization, industrialization, urbanization, and to what was once called culture diffusion. Professor Inkeles, on the fourth day of our meetings, provided us with a summary of the themes he noted in the discussions. The six categories of the statements and arguments we had been presenting, as Inkeles found them, were these: the process of change in

-2the major social institutions; recommendations that the Puerto Rican reality be studied in its concrete detail, including its major value commitments; concern for the problems confronting one because society has changed extensively and quickly; the implementation of public policy and the consequences of agency programs; demands for clarification and definition of meanings, especially the large terms like "modernization"; and the sixth theme noted is methodology. Others might choose other terms, but this useful summary maw suggest what the seminar participants in fact regarded as interesting and relevant to the objectives of the meeting. I observed our meetings, and I have in addition the advantage of having read the entire transcript to edit it for publication, and I have noted several important issues to which many of us addressed ourselves. One of these may be called the effects of social change. With few exceptions, speakers tended to include in this category facts which displeased them - criminal behavior, for example or the malaise of persons who had moved their positions (from country to city, or from slum to public housing apartments, or from Puerto Rico to New York and the reverse). As Anderson says in his paper, many people regard social change as the source of unpleasant consequences and ask questions about what remedies can be applied. The sources of change were given much less attention, and scarcely any attention was given to the question of whether social change could be modified. Americanization was often discussed. It was noted that economic development in Puerto Rico is very closely associated with capital sources, entrepreneurs, and markets of the United States, and since the intrusion of these factors into the Puerto Rican society has been extensive in the last two decades, they have affected the social structure which received these new factors. Some discussions turned on the question of whether these changes were as extensive as the Western Civilization (and even the world) or were more particularly American. The issue arose also in speaking of the organization, funding, and staffing of research enterprises. The most urgent objectives of planning, and inevitably therefore the most fruitful planning organizations, constituted a major issue in the seminar. Some argued that economic planning had the higher priority and that this required much more study of capital flows, entrQpreneurship, technology, markets, and relationships between external and internal sources to satisfy these requirements. The premise of those taking this view was that the present structure of the Puerto Rican economy needs much improvement, that the permanent continuance of growth is by no means assured, and that a grave proportion of capital, management, and market of the new enterprise are not Puerto Rican. Others believed the economists have already been too prominent in planning, and these speakers preferred a new emphasis on national planning, on social planning, to face the consequences of the economic development which

-3has resulted from the very extensive economic growth of recent years. Performance, both efficient and not efficient, was discussed, The meaning of performance was talked of, several requesting better definitions of the objectives and the means included in the question. The issue of which institution or kind of persons could more effectively influence performance was part of this discussion. The degree to which schools could form character and teach skills productive of more efficient performance was debated, and attention was given to the role of the manager and supervisor of economic enterprises in getting high labor productivity. The question of how policy and science are associated with one another was amply discussed. Anxiety was expressed that the powerful makers of public policy would exert harmful influences on scientists. Doubt was expressed that policy-makers would be much influenced by research results and recommendations. Another way the issue arose was to question the loss of scientific spontaneity and impartiality on the part of scholars having too intimate relations with the makers of public policy. Others recommended a closer association between policy maker and scholar and a more explicit understanding by each of his role and of his interaction with the other. Two methodological issues got attention in the meeting. One issue was whether it would be more profitable to fashion one grand research design about social change and to orient all particular researches to this design, or whether it would be more prudent to initiate a series of researches concerned with particular problems within the society. The structure of the research organization was also discussed, often in terms of its degree of centralization within the university. More agreement, perhaps, appeared about this issue than about any other; namely, that much centralization in the office of a dean or in one institute was difficult and unlikely to yield good results. An important question was about the proper subject of research, whether communities or individuals, and if individuals, whether comparisons of individuals of different career stages could permit inferences about change. For example, would a study of cohorts of persons of similar ages permit the research to speak in a valid way about changes of social structure from one time to another? Research needs benchmarks, I think. Research is continuous, and the later studies should be related to the objectives, procedures, and conclusions of the studies of an earlier time. Not only this. Research, furthermore, changes while moving through the natural history of a study: motivation for giving attention to it, early plans, research design. The collection and publication of the papers and discussions of the social change seminar may provide something of such a bench mark. A year from now, five years from now, a decade later, one can compare research on social change which has appeared with these earlier statements about it. The

-4comparison might be helpful. For one thing, it might reveal that research actually achieved differs a good deal from the research initially talked about. One might put it this way: we require a history and an analysis of the research enterprise itself. For example, during the seminar it was said that an earlier generation of scholars thought they had discovered that slums produce criminals, and since then policy makers have been excessively busy pushing slum dwellers into public housing apartments. We may find here a considerable warning. Will our researches be seen later as irrelevant or harmful or too simple? The principal use of the seminar doubtless will occur in the future, and to this future use the publication of the papers and the discussions is devoted. The obvious interest of such a group of scholars identifies a significant area of present concern, and this suggests the need for research and planning. To note this on the part of scholars from such diverse trainings and current interests may and should encourage further development of the movement to integrate many disciplines in the enterprise of gaining more insight about structure and problems of concern to all of us. The initiation of research projects may find stimulus and some guidance in these materials. If the participants and others, upon readi.ng some of the transcriptions, engage in further discussion, there will be considerable gain. Finally, one might hazard the statement that knowledge is what persons concerned say to one another, and if this be so, then (despite the informality of seminar discussion) one might find in these pages an image of social science at this time and place. The editing of the papers, which I have undertaken, has been limited to the objective of making the statements clearer and shorter. I have made no attempt to improve any paper or discussion statement, for that would exceed my authority and my capacity. I have sought to revise the material so that it will appear in complete, correct sentences whose meaning is reasonably clear. Most of the words found in spontaneous oral expressions - the the "oh", the "I - have been edited out. Oral expression tends to be longer than written expression, and I found many opportunities to eliminate words, phrases, sentences which did not advance the idea or contribute more information. Several of the seminar participants were kind enough to edit their own papers and discussion statements, and I take this opportunity to thank each of these for easing my burden. There is a person index. The subject index was aimed at simplicity and importance in the establishment of its categories. Mrs. Ineke Cunningham has assisted me competently in the organization of the seminar and the editing and publication of these materials. Millard Hansen 15 September 1967

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AG E N DA

February 20

"Major Themes of Social Change and Public Policy"

Millard Hansen

February 21

Suggestions for New Research Questions

Seminar Members

February 22

"Focus and Approach of the Study"

Robert W. Anderson

February 23

"Research Goals and Strategy"

Rael de Jesús Toro and Franco Ferracuti

February 24

"The Role of Social Policy"

Pedro Muñoz-Amato

SEMINAR PAPERS

Clinard, Marshal B.

Notes on Urbanization, Urbanism, and Deviant Behavior in Puerto Rico

Cochran, Thomas C.

Suggestions for Further Study of Puerto Rico

Cunningham, Ineke

An Inventory of Research in Puerto Rico of Social Change and Public Policy

Diaz Alejandro, Carlos F.

Notes on the Growth of Argentine and Thoughts It Suggests on Social Change and Public Policy

Hansen, Millard

Themes of Social Change and Public Policy

López-Rey, Manuel

Social Change, Crime and Criminal Justice

Mueller, Gerhard O.W.

A Supplementary Memorandum to Professor López-Rey's paper

-7CURRICULUM VITAE ANDERSON, ROBERT W. San Mateo, California, 1926 A.A. San Mateo Junior CoLlege M.A. University of Chicago PH.D. University of California, Berkeley

1945 1948 1960

Associate Professor of Political Science and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO "Social Science Ideology and Political Integration," a paper presented at the Third Caribbean Scholars' Conference, Georgetown, British Guiana, 1966. "Consenso y Conflicto: La Dimensión Politica de la Sociología", a paper presented at the XVI Congreso Nacional de Sociología, Veracruz, Mexico, 1965. ~

"Partidos Politicos en Puerto Rico: el Contexto Legal," Memoria del Sexto Congreso Latinoamericano de Sociología, Caracas, 1961.

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BOBONIS-DIAZ, AUGUSTO Humacao, Puerto Rico, 1907 B.A. University of Puerto Rico M.A. University of Puerto Rico Ph.D. University of Chicago

1927

1934 1939

Professor of Education and Dean, College of Education, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO.

CLINARD, MARSHALL B. 1911 B.A. Stanford University M.A. Stanford University Ph.D. University of Chicago Professor of Sociology, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. Slums and Community Development: Experiments in Self-Help, 1966 Sociology of Deviant Behavior (1957, revised 1963) Criminal Behavior Systems: A Typology (1967 with Richard Quinney)

COCHRAN, THOMAS C. New York, 1902 B.S. New York University M.A. New York University Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania

1923 1925 1930

Professor of History of the People of the United States, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA The Inner Revolution, 1965 The Puerto Rican Businessman, 1959 Entrepreneurship in Argentine (with Ruben Reina), 1962 The Age of Enterprise (with William Miller, paperback edition), 1962

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CORRADA GUERRERO, RAFAEL Morovis, Puerto Rico, 1931 University of Puerto Rico B.S. M.C.P. Harvard University

1952 1956

Professor of the School of Planning, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO "Redistribución Poblacional y Desarrollo Económico", serie de artículos publicados en el periódico El Mundo, 1959. "Vivienda por Ayuda Mutua y Esfuerzo Propio" (panfleto publicado por el Congreso de Planificación), 1960.

CUNNINGHAM, INEYE Vorden, the Netherlands, 1937 A.B. M.A.

La Verne College Northwestern University

1963 1966

Research Associate, Social Science Research Center, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO.

DE JESUS TORO, RAFAEL Ponce, Puerto Rico, 1924 B.S. University of Pennsylvania M.A. Syracuse University Ph.D. Syracuse University

1947 1954 1957

Associate Professor of Economics and Director of the Social Science Research Center, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO El Aumento del Capital y el Crecimiento y su Impacto sobre el Futuro Ritmo de la Economía de Puerto Rico en Revista de Economía y Estadísticas de Puerto Rico, 1962 E1 Desarrollo de Empresarios en Areas de Escaso Crecimiento Económico, 1957

DIA7. ALEJANDRO, CARLOS F. Havana, Cuba, 1937 Ph.D.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1961

Associate Professor of Economics, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA Exchange Rate Devaluation in a Semi-Industrialized Country: The Experience of Argentine 1955-1961, 1966 "An Interpretation of Argentine Economic Growth since 1930", The Journal of Development Studies, 1966 "Industrialization and Labor Productivity Differentials," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1965

FELDMAN, ARNOLD S. Hartford, Connecticut, 1926 B.A. Wayne University M.A. Wayne University Ph.D. Northwestern University

1949 1952 1956

Professor of Sociology, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY "The Experience of Modernization" in Sociometry (1966) Social Class and Social Change in Puerto Rico (with Melvin M. Tumin) 1961 Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas (with Wilbert E. Moore) 1960

FERRACUTI, FRANCO Montottone, Italy, 1927 M.D. University of Rome Residency in Forensic Medicine, University of Rome Hospital

1951 1955

-11Professor of criminal anthropology, University of Rome, and Director, Program of Criminology, Social Science Research Center, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO The Subculture of Violence (with Marvin E. Wolfgang) 1967. "Juvenile Delinquency and Social Change in Puerto Rico", a paper read at the Symposium on "Psychological Research related to Social and Economic Innovations Abroad," held at the 1966 APA Meeting, New York. (Mimeographed). "Etiological Research and Prevention of Delinquency in Countries Undergoing Rapid Social Change", a paper read at the Symposium "Youth in Revolt around the World," held at the 1965 APA meeting, Chicago. (Mimeographed).

FRANKENHOFF, CHARLES Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1922

~ ~

B.S. Yale University S.T.B. Gregorian University (Rome) Ph.D. Georgetown University

1943 1951 1962

Associate Professor of Economics and Director of the Housing Policy Project, Social Science Research Center, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO "The Economic Role of Housing in a Developing Economy", written for the Economic Policy Seminar and published by the Ministerio de la Vivienda de Chile, 1966 "Algunos Obstáculos en la Planificación de Vivienda en el Desarrollo Económico", E1 Mensaje (Chili), 1965 "Low-Cost Housing in a Latin Economy" in Inter-American Economic Affairs 1962

-12GARCIA RODRIGUEZ, PABLO San Sebastián, Puerto Rico, 1924 B.S. Harvard University L1.D. Harvard University Law School

1943 1946

Assistant Professor Social Sciences, College of General Studies, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO

HANSEN, MILLARD Grand Island, Nebraska, 1912 B.A. Grinnell College M.A. State University of Iowa Ph.D. State University of Iowa

1933 1936 1939

Professor of Social Sciences, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO Social Change projects while Director of the Social Science Research Center during 1952-59

INKELES, ALEX Brooklyn, New York, 1920 B.A. Cornell University M.A. Cornell University Ph.D. Columbia University

1941 1946 1949

Professor of Sociology, Director of Studies on Social Aspects of Development of the Center of International Affairs, and Director of Studies on Social Relations of the Russian Research Center of HARVARD UNIVERSITY What is Sociology, 1963 Soviet Society (edited with H. K. Geiger), 1961

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LOPEZ-REY ARROJO, MANUEL Madrid, Spain, 1903 Ll.D.

University of Madrid

1933

Research Professor and Adviser in Social Science Research Center, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO and Visiting Fellow, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY, ENGLAND La Reforma Penal en Puerto Rico, 1967 "Preliminary Considerations on the Formulation of Policy for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency in Developing Countries", a Lecture delivered at the XIIIth International Course on Criminology, Cairo, 1963 "Les Exigences Pénales d'aujourd'hui et la Politique Criminelle Contemporaine", Revue Internationale de Criminologie et Police Technique) 1962 United Nations Activities in the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, American Journal of Correction, 1960 "Juvenile Delinquency, Maladjustment and Maturity", Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1960 "Present Approaches to the Problem of Juvenile Delinquency", Federal Probation, Washington, 1959

MUELLER, GERHARD O.W. Germany, 1926 J.D. M.A.

University of Chicago Columbia University

1953 1955

Professor of Law, Chairman, Graduate Department of Criminal Law; and Director of the Comparative Criminal Law Project at NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW President-elect, American Society of Criminology E1 Derecho Penal Legal Regulation of Sexual Conduct Essay in Criminal Science Criminal Law and Procedure (with J. Hall) International Criminal Law (with E. Wise)

1963 1961 1960 1965 1965

-14MUÑOZ AMATO, PEDRO Santurce, Puerto Rico, 1921 B.A. University of Puerto Rico L1.B. University of Puerto Rico L1.M. Harvard University M.A. Harvard University Ph.D. Harvard University

1940 1942 1943 1947 1950

Professor of Law at the UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO LAW SCHOOL and Dean of Studies, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO Introducción a la Administración Pública (2 volumes)

NIEVES-FALCON, LUIS Bayamón, Puerto Rico, 1929 B.A. University of Puerto Rico M.A. New York University Ph.D. London University

1950 1956 1963

Associate Professor of Social Sciences and Director of the Study of the Puerto Rican Teacher Study, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO Recruitment to Higher Education in Puerto Rico. 1940-1960, 1965 "E1 Futuro Ideológico del Partido Popular Democrático," Revista de Ciencias Sociales, 1965

PABON, MILTON Lajas, Puerto Rico, 1926 B.A. M.A.

University of Puerto Rico University of Chicago

1947 1959

Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Political Science Department, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO

-15PADILLA ESCABI, SALVADOR Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico, 1924 B.A. University of Puerto Rico M.A. Cornell University Ph.D. Cornell University

1948 1951 1958

Professor of Planning and Director of the Graduate Program of Planning, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO.

REIMER, EVERETT Mountain Lake, Minnesota, 1910 B.S.

University of California, Los Angeles

1940

Consultant, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

RODRIGUEZ BOU, ISMAE L Orocovis, Puerto Rico, 1911

B.A. University of Puerto Rico M.A. University of Columbia Ph.D. University of Texas, Austin

1936 1938 1944

Professor, Department of Psychology, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO Estudio de las Condiciones Socio-Económicas y Sociales de los Estudiantes de Nivel Universitario, 1966 La Diserción de los Estudiantes de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1966

ROSELLO, JUAN A. San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1913 M.D. University of Maryland Residency on Psychiatry, Bronx Veterans Administration Hospital

1938 1946-1949

Professor of Psychiatry, Head of the Department of Psychiatry, and Director, Psychiatric Center for Training and Research at the SCHOOL OF MEDICINE OF PUERTO RICO. Superintendent at the STATE PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL, PUERTO RICO

Tratado General de Psiquiatría, 1962 Psicología de las Organizaciones (with others) in print. Planning for Mental Health in Puerto Rico, 1965

-16STANTON, HOWARD New London, Connecticut, 1923. B.A. The University of Chicago Ph.D. The University of Chicago

1947 1960

Professor, Graduate Program of Planning, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO. THORNE, ALFRED P. B.S. London University M.S. Columbia University Ph.D. Columbia University

1941 1950 1958

Professor Graduate School of Planning and Director of Interindustry project. UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO. "A Critical Analysis of The Growth Rates of Puerto Rico and Jamaica", Income and Wealth, Series XI, 1965, The International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, Bowes & Bowes, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY. Sector and National Income Systems for Latin America and Caribbean Economic Analyses: More Relevant Identities and Equations, The International Journal of Economic Abstracts, January 1963, The American Economic Association. "A Critical Analysis of the Rates of Growth of Puerto Rico and Jamaica During 1950-1960" (mimeographed) 1963.

TORRUELLAS, LUZ M. Santurce, Puerto Rico, 1927 B.A. University of Puerto Rico M.A. Harvard - Radcliffe Universities Ph.D. Harvard - Radcliffe Universities

1941 1947 1950

Professor of Economics, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO. "Perspectivas Económicas Futuras de Puerto Rico - los Prob 1emas que se Plantean" (mimeographed) 1967 "Consideraciones Teóricas en Torno a Desarrollo" 1966 (mimeographed)

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Reflections on "Focus and Approach" for a Study of Social Change and Public Policy in Puerto Rico By Robert W. Anderson The problem of "development'' and "modernization" is a principal intellectual and political preoccupation of our day. These, or other analogous terms, form the conceptual guidelines for much of the intellectual activity of social scientists and others concerned with problems of social change. Puerto Rican social scientists are as much a part of this "mainstream" as anyone else. In addition, the society in which they act has been in the throes of a highly-publicized process of rapid social change. Change is the order of the day. It is touted in the newspaper advertisements, in the proliferating housing developments, in the migrations to and from the mainland, in the policies attendant upon the industrialization program, etc. As a result, we confront the problem of distinguishing between the image and the substance, between hortatory publicity and the real patterns of conduct and attitudes, between the vaunted directions of change and the objective process of change itself. The social scientist is both a product and interpreter of change: he has a vested interest in seeing that social change be directed in ways that will not prejudice the relevance of his own profession, which in large part owes its very existence to a process of social change over which the social scientist, whether we like to admit it or not, has had very little influence.

Since the subject of this seminar hints very broadly at the research project in social change with desirability of wedding the directions of public policy, I wish to direct myself here to the relationship between these two purposes--science and policy-which we must make every effort not to convert into the horns of a frustrating and insoluble dilemma. My own "focus and approach" in this very preliminary paper will be on the context in which terms like "social change" are defined, and who--whether by default, arrogation, or delegation--defines them. "Social change" is not a self-defined object but rather a subjective preoccupation of intellectuals and power-holders; it is a rhetorical gambit which lends a universal-sounding aura of relevance to the very concrete concerns of certain élites. Our task is to identify those areas of concern which are most accessible to the techniques of social science and clarify the value assumptions upon which they lie, realizing full well that even in the most successful of eventualities, the public effectiveness of a piece of social science research will depend on factors extraneous to the research itself. Our current preoccupation in Puerto Rico with social change rests on certain suppositions which may or may not be correct, but

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are sufficiently widespread to merit a serious commitment to a systematic research endeavor. They are a source of élite preoccupation, and, as such, the normative starting point for hypotheses leading to a variety of research possibilities. Social change in Puerto Rico, it is assumed, has been particularly rapid and intense in recent years as a consequence of industrialization, the decline of agriculture, the migration movements to and from the United States, overseas military service by Puerto Rican Youth, the upsurge of factory employment of women, the influx of tourists, etc. Furthermore (and without this additional supposition there would be no consciousness of problems, and hence no research projects) such rapid change is actually or potentially disruptive of something deemed desirable, which may be referred to in a variety of vague ways--traditional values, breakdown of religion, disruption of family, the idealized ,jibaro, etc. The problem may be seen either as a desire to preserve certain of these alleged values in the face of rapid change or so to direct change and keep disruption at a minimum, in the name of "identity", "serenity", "stability", etc. In either event, one supposes that public policy can be used to control and direct change in the name of a higher good. But we must remember that the ways of affecting and effectuating public policy grow out of the very context which the social scientist would like to control. "Public Policy" is not an independent variable waiting on the sidelines for the wisdom of the social scientist, fortressed by outside expertise and technical assistance, in order to lead us along the rational road to serenity or the "Great Society". Policy makers and social scientists alike are part and parcel of the changing society in which they function. Thus, the sources of public policy (i.e., politics) must be brought into our focus as we discuss the scope and method of this project. It is also necessary, as I have already hinted, that we pause at the outset to reflect upon the rather severe limitations of social science research in coming to grips with the problems of social change as these are envisioned by our concerned élites. In order to justify any research in the social sciences, the project must be relevant to its "constituency". By "constituency" I mean those groups or sectors who are capable of understanding the terms and approaches of the project and can be expected, at least in theory, to be able to "do something" with the results. Now, one supposes that in an advanced stage of development the social scientists are able to define the relevant problems on their own terms as scientists and to abstract from reality those areas which are amenable to the quantitative and probabilistic explications of scientific rigor. But this is possible, only when there is a generalized confidence that the problems so defined by the professional social scientist are indeed germane, even after one strips away the jargon, and that there is reasonable chance that the activities of the social scientist might be useful not only

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in gauging, but in influencing what people actually do. Much of modern social science has largely originated in attempts to respond to or to solve problems of social deviation, pathology, or malfunctioning. The terms and significance of these problems must be set by someone and in terms of some kind of value. Once the value is accepted, it can be shunted into the background, or even into the subconscious, and the scientist can go about his business in communication with his methodology and his like-minded colleagues. If there are enough of these latter, the scientific community can, in a sense, be a relevant surrogate constituency for the society at large. The concern with "social change" as a problem area in social science--and most certainly the concern in Puerto Rico which has given rise to this seminar and the projected study--is based on a generalized uneasiness about the directions in which society is moving or may move unless compensating actions are taken. In other words, there is an awareness of either an imminent or an existing conflict of values; social change is seen as the abstract context in which the conflict is expressed; and public policy is seen as the possible mitigator. I suspect there are two dominant perspectives from which this conflict of values may be seen in our context here in Puerto Rico. First, is that which sees in industrialization, urbanization, high rates of physical mobility, "Americanization", etc., a potential menace to the cohesion of society and to certain traditional values which are deemed worthy of retention. Industrialization, urbanization, etc., breed special problems of delinquency, crime, and a potential for social disorganization, which public policy should be groomed to prevent or to forestall. The preservation or restoration of traditional values or the search for substitute palliatives in order to ameliorate the disruptive pressures of social change become the policy orientation of such an approach, which is basically a negative one, in the sense that social change is perceived as creating substantive social problems, which have to be solved. The second approach or perspective is that which sees social change in a basically positive light. It is an approach--typified in much of the current literature on what is now fashionably called "development"--which focuses on factors which affect "modernization", i.e., movement toward a differentiated, universalistic, future-oriented, achieving society. Industrialization and modernity--conceived in this approach as enviable ends--can only be achieved if such conduct and the necessary supportive values are inculcated. In this approach, change is a positive value, and given societies can be seen as falling more or less short in their abilities to handle change adequately or to direct it toward desired goals.

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Now, the theoretical relation between policy and study in each of these two approaches is quite clear and simple. In both cases a value is assumed or asserted and the purpose of research is to shed light on possible practical measures of either a palliative or restorative nature, in the first case, or of an adjustive and manipulative nature, in the second. So-called "cultural nationalists", disenchanted intellectuals, and many, many politicians (these are not mutually exclusive terms) share the first approach; planners, young entrepreneurs, imported American experts, and many, many other politicians (again, these overlap mightily) share the second. An emphasis on the public policy aspect of this impending study would inevitably oblige us to decide which of these two value premises are to hold pre-eminence. Such a decision, in the last analysis, would be a political one. If we are to be unabashedly policy-oriented, let us be clear as to the ultimate directions we want to take, admitting from the outset that this has nothing to do with science itself and that the social scientist who does not share these base-values must be excluded. But if we are to behave as social scientists, and not as technical advisers to a program of action already decided upon, we must set our own terms as scientists and be obliged as little as possible to choose at the outset between "good" change and "bad" change. The initial goal should be to discover what change is and how it is experienced, perceived, and evaluated by concrete people, not the least important of whom are those who themselves feel most concerned about change. After all, the selection of policy alternatives and their appLication a.rA always independent, in the final analysis, of the "objective" information which is fed into the policy hopper. In other words, we should avoid an excessive optimism--quite common in some of the so-called developing areas--in the ability of science as such to solve social problems or to control and direct social change. If the conclusions of the social scientist, or she value content of his definitions of the proper direction of social change are not shared by the public policy makers, all his sophisticated methodological paraphernalia will be of little relevance. Thus, we should de-emphasize the public policy aspect of our endeavor and concentrate on the ways of discovering what social change means in differing contexts, to different groups in different circumstances, and in varying perspectives. "Policy-orientation" implies that the public organs are there, passively to be influenced; it assumes that a dosis of scientific rationality is all that is basically needed to improve our institutions and our decisions; it may even mean that the institutions themselves are beyond the pale of the prodding eye of the analyst. What we must take care to emphasize is that any manifestation of social change must be seen in the broadest possible context; that all groups and

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institutions may be affected by it; and that in the absence of a reasonably clear agreement in this society, among public figures or among social scientists, as to what the general directions of change should be, any supposition on our part in that regard should be clearly seen at the outset as a politically relevant supposition. The policy de-emphasis I recommend for the intellectual design of this study, which means that we take into account conflicting elite values regarding change without deciding among them, points up in itself the political dimension of the research. Only if we could agree on a common attitude toward change and its effects on Puerto Rican society, could we seriously contemplate here a single grand research design for our study. As social scientists, we neither can nor should attempt to reach such a consensus. Some will believe with Friedrich, for example, that the eclecticism and ambivalence in the Puerto Rican polity which has resulted from the processes of change are positive virtues to be encouraged, and institutionalized. Others will see in the phenomena of change on the island of recent years an agonizing or frustrating context which is difficult either to understand or to accept. Still others will see it as a process of successive degeneration under the sinister aegis of materialistic Americanization. As we all know, social scientists are no more immune from assuming such value positions than any one else. Indeed, as members of the concerned elites, they are perhaps less immune than others. Operationally, we should behave as though social change is nothing but a series of potential questions as to how groups of people perceive and respond to differing experiences and conditions over time. Our choice of the groupings to be studied will be based, probably, on certain holistic assumptions regarding their importance. My plea here is only that they be as amply conceived as possible, certainly including the elites themselves--governmental, economic, intellectual, Puerto Rican and North American--who in the last analysis are what we really mean by "public policy". It follows from these considerations that we should eschew from the outset a single grand research design, based on a common set of values or methodological premises. A project on social change in Puerto Rico must combine several differing but hopefully complementary levels and approaches. The first, and to my mind most basic, may be called the behavioral-attitudinal--the measurement and analysis of the kinds and degrees of change experienced by the population as a whole, of which the Tumin-Feldman study of 1961 -and the current Feldman follow-up study are the only examples so far in Puerto Rico. This type of study should be intensified and broadened. It represents the kind of analysis in which values are seen clothed with the sometimes contradictory raiment of experience and attitude.

-22Second, there should be a series of studies of functional intermediate groups in the population, directed towards discovering the sources of their creation, their growth, and their possible roles as instigators, interpreters, or buffers to change as it is experienced by their clienteles. I refer here to such groups as the local party organization, informal political, social, or civic groups, labor unions, formal organizations or "interest groups". The conceptual and methodological problerrs involved here are formidable, but such matters as recruitment into these groups, attitudes of their members and leaders, their actions as agencies of or resistance to change, are of crucial importance to an understanding both of the social mechanism through which change is channeled and of the institutional setting in which change is experienced. Third, there should be studies of the elite structures which contribute to the public tone regarding change and its reception. Intellectuals, political and business leaders, the bureaucracy, both insular and federal, may be studied first as more or less distinct groups, analogous to the intermediate groups which I have mentioned in the preceding paragraph. But an attempt at discovering the process of social recruitment into the elite structure and its consequences over time regarding attitudes and response to change should be an important item on the research agenda. Obviously, these three levels of concern--the three ideal research constituencies or units, as it were--overlap greatly. The mass-to intermediate group-to elite sequence sounds overneat when set down so nakedly, but it seems to me some kind of initial conceptualization of this kind is called for in order to make it clear at the outset that we are dealing with a complex living society which is experiencing its own values and is not simply moving either backward or forward along the road to some vague non-entity such as "modernity" or some such euphemism. The complementary approaches I mention here should be carried out as much as possible in a comparative context, in relation to counterpart activities and institutions as these have been similarly analyzed elsewhere. There is no substitute for the comparative approach in social science analysis as long as it is used as a tool of abstraction for the understanding of particular problems in specific societies and not as an excuse for using a particularly hospitable society as a laboratory for the verification of some social scientists' favorite theories. Finally, there is a fourth possible level of research concern. This refers to the policy institutions which one assumes are to bear the brunt of directing change or assuaging some of its more problematic effects: the educational system; the administration of justice on all levels; the theory and practice of planning, of industrial development, of tourism, etc.--all of which correspond to special public agencies. These institutionalized elites are, in a sense, both targets for our research and its potential consumers.

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They may not be exempt from our scrutiny, since they are among the foremost instigators and interpreters o£ change; neither may they be made the center of our concern, since they do not control or stimulate change in a social or cultural vacuum, and since on their receptivity to our findings hinges much of whatever practical relevance our researches are to enjoy. I suggest that they be studied not as autonomous institutions but functionally, in terms of their personnels relations with the broader elites and intermediate groups we have mentioned before. In this way, our policy organs may be seen in terms of their dynamic relation with the society from which they emerge, and thus subject to the same tensions and influences of the society which they, somehow or other, are supposed to represent. Again, let us insist on the social relativity of "public policy" and concentrate our attention on what social change is and how we, citizens, policy makers, and social scientists alike, respond to it and, to a large degree, are governed by it.

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URBANIZATION, URBANISM, AND DEVIANT BEHAVIOR IN PUERTO RICO By Marshall B. Clinard

Puerto Rico is encountering the impact of extensive processes of urbanization, industrialization, "educationalization," Americanization, and, to a degree, secularization. These processes have achieved or are achieving many of the developmental goals now being sought by various less developed countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. To most of them, Puerto Rico might appear to represent a model of economic development and modernization. The modernization of Puerto Rico has been accomplished by other social changes. The political system is much more "democratized" than formerly. There have been increased contacts, particularly by air, with the Mainland, Europe, and Latin America. Mass media of communication have brought the modern world to isolated areas of the Island. The wider participation of women in the larger society has increased greatly over former days. Modernization has not proceeded uniformly, and there is unevenness in its effects. Looking at the Island as a whole, one study, done in the 1950's, concluded that while there had been extensive increase in the beliefs about the importance of education there was a "lack of change in basic norms of conduct regarding family life--what people think is right and should be done--and in basic religious actions and attitudes--how frequently people warship and how religious they feel in comparison to their parents." Other associations and groups appear largely not yet to have furnished satisfactory substitutes for strong kinship ties. Despite extensive development, there is evidence, and considerable concern, that the present social situation in Puerto Rico is not what was perhaps originally anticipated. Extensive economic and other development has not solved problems in many areas of social life and, in fact, has created new problems or intensified old ones. While the traditional norms of family and kinship are still largely affirmed, the actual conduct of family life is much different than in the past. Adherence to contradictory norms has caused some decline in family unity and control and portends even greater future changes. As a whole, juvenile delinquency appears to have increased by five to six times between 1956 and 1964 (in 1964, 12,768 interventions, in 1956, 2,542). Certain more serious types have increased even more. While drug addiction was virtually un-

1Melvin M. Tumin, Social Class and Social Change in Puerto Rico (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 11.

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known on the Island a few years ago, it has become a major problem since the late 1950's, with between 10,000 and 12,000 addicts, most of them adolescent or youths.2 There appear to be evidences of unsought concommitants of chngge in other forms of deviant behavior such as mental disorders and family maladjustment. There are difficulties in estimating the incidence and prevalence of deviant behavior so that some might claim that these changes are fictitious. Granted that such difficulties exist the differences are so great, however, between the past and present that they appear to indicate that real changes have occurred. Urbanization and Urbanism Probably the most extensive social change in Puerto Rico has been in the area of urbanization and urbanism. This seems to be the most appropriate model for viewing the changes that have occurred in Puerto Rico. The model enables us to see Puerto Rican changes as part of a world wide pattern of urbanization and compare what has happened then with other societies. In fact, what Inkeles has termed "the modern man" and "modernity" seems to be essentially "the urban man" and "urbanism".+ There are differences in these terms and certainly not all urbanpeople are "modern". Yet the "themes" in the definition of "modernity" that Inkeles has stressed, besides urbanization itself, have an urban ring to them: (1) readiness for new experience and openness to innovation and change, (2) opinions beyond the immediate environment, (3) orientation to the future, (4) respect for planning, (5) view that man can dominate his environment, (6) calculability of the world in fulfilling obligations, (7) respect for others not based solely on status attitudes, and (9) belief in distributive justice. Rural and village persons may acquire these "themes", but they are an integral part of the world of urban persons. From a primarily rural country the urban population of Puerto Rico has increased to 44.2 percent in 1960. The San Juan 1etropolitan Area has now 700,000 inhabitants, as compared with approxi-

2Franco Ferracuti, "Juvenile Delinquency and Social Change in Puerto Rico," Paper read at the Symposium on Psychological Research Related to Social and Economic Innovations Abroad, held at the 1966 A PA meeting, New York. Also see John C. Ball and Delia O. Pabón, "Locating and Interviewing Narcotic Addicts in Puerto Rico," Sociology and Social Research, 49 (July, 1965). 3 Lloyd H. Rogler and August B. F-IoLlingshead, Trapped: Families and Schizophrenia (rew York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965). 4 Alex IInkeles "The Modernization of Man", in i yron Weiher, ed., Modernization (New Yor'c: Basic Books, 1966).

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mately 200,000 only yesterday. Ponce and Mayaguez are fair-sized cities, and the Island itself seems to reflect increasingly an urbanized world of tastes and interests. It has been estimated that by 1975 the number of urban families will have increased by 100,000.5 Some of the concommitants of urban developments taking place in Puerto Rico appear to be similar to what is happening in other countries. With few exceptions, countries undergoing rapid economic development and urbanization have reported extensive social dislocations resulting in the decline of traditional systems of control and an increase in deviant behavior. Such reports have come from such wide~y scattered places as Caracas, Bogota, Bombay, Bangkok, and Lagos. These reports cannot be dismissed as figments of statistical reporting. This might well have been anticipated since urban living, as contrasted with rural and village life, is generally associated with a greater incidence of all types of crimes, prostitution, the use of narcotics, alcoholism, suicide, and various other forms of juvenile delinquency.? Urbanization gives rise to different social values, some of which are conducive to delinquency and crime, to greater freedom of action, more temptations to violate norms, and a general decline in social control through the family, neighbors, and similar groups. This effect of urbanization appears to be particularly strong among youth, and it is largely for this reason that most delinquents, criminals, and even drug addicts and prostitutes are younger urban persons. As the migration from the rural areas to the cities continues in Puerto Rico, one must expect even more association with various

SGordon K. Lewis, Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean (New York: P4 R Press, 1963), p. 254. 6 See, for example, United Nations, "Prevention of Types of Criminality Resulting From Social Changes and Accompanying Economic Development in Less Developed Countries," A/CONF.17/4, p. 4., "Some Considerations on the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency in African Countries Experiencing Rapid Social Change," International Review of Criminal Policy, No. 16 (United Nations Publication, No.61.1V.$), p. 43, and A Report on Juvenile Delinquency in India (Bombay: The Children's Aid Society, 1956), p. 8. Also see Phillip M. Hauser, ed., Urbanization in Latin America (New York: UNESCO Publication, 1961), 7Marshall B. Clinard, Sociology of Deviant Behavior (rev. ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1962), pp. 78-87.

-27types of deviant behavior in urban life. The change to city life alters personal relationships and the very nature of community living. The migrant must (1) adapt to new and unfamiliar ways of making a living, (2) become familiar with a new money economy, (3) work regular hours, (4) become accustomed to the absence of warm family living, (5) cope with large numbers of impersonal contacts with other human beings, (6) learn new forms of recreation, and (7) adjust to quite a new and different physical setting, often one involving new kinds of housing, sanitation, traffic congestion, and noise.8 One of his greatest adjustment problems involves the transition from a subsistence to a monetary economy, and reliance on a steady job for subsistence. Any migration of people to an urban setting results in considerable heterogeneity of norms and values. While there are exceptions here and there, intimate personal groups such as kinship, caste, and tribal, come tohave less meaning as the person participates in the larger urban world. Formal controls, such as laws administered by governmental agencies and agents like the police, become ways of trying to enforce a certain degree of uniformity of important normative standards. With less widespread community controls, rural migrants who have learned to accept the supremacy of other norms may become skeptical of their validity when they discover that their norms are different under urban conditions and that the breaking of rules does not always bring about social ostracim and censure. There is a decline in effective communication among the members of ueban society as a whole and its effects upon the social control of behavior. Several recent studies, particularly of suburbia in the United States and of some urban slum neighborhoods in the United States, exico, India, and Africa have tried to minimize the impersonality of the city. According to Janowitz, sociologists have failed to take into consideration that "impressive degrees and patterns of local community life exist within . . . . metropolitan limits."9 Certainly a degree of intimate life does exist in any city, in both the neighborhood and the place of work, but it is generally not nearly the same as that in villages or rural areas. Furthermore, in the city, a person shares almost daily many impersonal relations in which his identity is not recognized, and in which he is confronted with a variety of conflicting norms and values. To admit

Phillip M. Hauser, "The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization," in David E. tvovack and Robert Lekachman, Development and Society: The Dynamics of Economic Change (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), P. 249. Morris Janowitz, The Community Press in an Urban Setting (New York: The Free Press, 1952), p. 19.

-28the need for exercising caution to avoid overstating the universal presence of urban characteristics does not minimize, however, their importance as a framework for understanding much of contemporary life and urban problems. Moreover, a particular characteristic of rapidly expanding urban a'es has been the ever-increasing institutionalization of society and the individualization of man. Institutionalization can be seen in the scope of governmental and non-governmental servicesin the city, all of which have been the inevitable results of the presence of large numbers of people concentrated in particular areas. Government has grown larger, there are more specialists to take care of varied services, and the active participation of individual people in the improvement of urban society has correspondingly diminished. Often the lines of communication among the people, the city officials, and the politicians break down, and the agencies are frequently cut off from those whose needs they presumably serve. In both developed and, particularly developing countries the rural migrant to the city, as well as the older urban resident, becomes bewildered by the impersonality of the city, the municipal government, and often the factory for which he works.l0 Slums and Public Housing Projects While various forms of deviant behavior appear to be largely an urban phenomenon in Puerto Rico, a disproportionate amount is concentrated in the slums and housing projects or Caserios of the San Juan area. Particularly significant is the evidence that deviant beh vior appears often to be most frequent in newly urbanized families.il More pronounced urban problems, such as delinquency and crime, have been found to be generally concentrated in certain areas which have been known by various terms such as "blighted", "deteriorated", "low income", "inner core", and "lower class neighborhood", but which are more appropriately and realistically called slums. While slums vary from one typel o another, certain general patterns of The slum is generally, but not always, slum life are universal.

op,

10 Marshall B. Clinard, Slums and Community Development: Experiments in Self-Help (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 116. 11 cit. Ferracuti, 12 Clinard, op, cit., and also Marshall B. Clinard, "Delinquency, Crime and Community Development, and the Slum", in Stephen

Schaefer, Poverty and Crime (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company, 1967).

-29characterized by inadequate housing, deficient facilities, overcrowding and congestion, but it is much more than this. Sociologically it is a way of life, a sub-culture with its own set of norms and values, which is reflected in poor sanitation and health practices, deviant behavior, and characteristic attributes of apathy and social isolation. Evidence of the fact that physical conditions really do not alone constitute a slum is the continued existence of widespread deviant behavior and poor health and sanitation practices in many slum clearance projects on the Mainland. It is important to realize that a great deal of deviant behavior not only involves persons from the slums but is committed against other slum residents. Much theft and other property offenses, such as robbery, are perpetrated against stores in the area. The victims of nearly all violence such as criminal homicide and assault are the w}es, husbands, friends, and other nearby residents of the slums. i A London study showed that nearly all crimes of violence occurred in the slum areas and were perpetrated against other slum people. "This was predominantly so in cases of domestic strife and neighborhood quarrels, but even in the attacks and fights in public houses, cafes and streets the victims were attacked by other working class people in the same neighborhood."]-4 The victim of forcible rape are almost entirely girls from the slum area. The adolescents and others of the slum who take up the use of drugs complicate not only their own lives but those of others in the local area. Problems of sanitation and health directly affect the slum dweller's families. One of the most fully documented facts about crime is that the common serious crimes that worry people most-murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary--happen most often in the slums of large cities. Study after study in city after city in all regions of the country have traced the variations in the rates for these crimes. The results, with monotonous regularity, show that the offenses, the victims, and the offenders are found most frequently in the poorest, and most deteriorated and socially disorganized areas of cities.l6 13 14 15

Marvin Wolfgang, Patterns in Criminal Homicide (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), p. 191. F. H. McClintock, Crimes of Violence (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd,, 193). Menachem Amir, "Patterns of Forcible Rape", in Marshall B. Clinard and Richard Quinney, Criminal Behavior Systems: A Typology (New York: Holt, Rinehard & Winston, Inc., 1967). The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, A Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administr i n of stice Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19&7), p. i . Underlining the authors.

-30Slum dwellers are isolated from the general power structure and are regarded as being inferior; they, in turn, reflect their own suspicions toward the outside world. Slum neighborhoods often have different conduct norms than those to which children are exposed in school and various agency programs. School and similar programs created to deal with juvenile delinquency often cannot succeed without the support of the people in the neighborhood of the school. The efforts of law enforcement officers and social workers may be either supported, ignored, or ridiculed by the people of a local community. To succeed in controlling delinquency and criminality, police officers, for example, need the cooperation and the support of the families in the area in which they work. It is extremely difficult for police or outsiders dealing with slum areas to eradicate stealing, fighting, gambling, prostitution, and illicit use and distribution of drugs if this behavior has the tacit approval of the locality. About prostitution one study of a Puerto Rican slum has stated: Prostitution has a different meaning in a slum community like La Esmeralda, where about a third of the households have had a history of prostitution, than it does in a slum or other local community where it is rare. For unskilled, often illiterate women, whose lives are a struggle for survival, prostitution is a tempting economic alternative which does not necessarily ostracize them from their neighbors or social group, and which does not represent as sharp a break from ordinary life as it does for middle-class women. In the culture of poverty, with its free unions, unstable marriages and high rate of 11!ife and the legitimacy, the line between the routine ] "gay life" is sometimes a very thin one.l Public housing projects, or caseríos, in Puerto Rico, as on the Mainland, are not physically slums. Facilities are often quite adequate, in fact, but they appear to exhibit many of the characteristics of a slum way of life. Delinquency and other problems of deviant behavior appear to be high. Studies have indicated a loss of community feeling; in fact, there appears to be less than in the more settled slums, and residents dislike the social conditions and rules often run counter to lower class ways of life such as rules restricting the inclusion of other relatives in the dwelling unit. "To turn away a relative is reprehensible; to disregard a government regulation is not."1$ Rules to promote sanitation as

170scar Lewis, La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty--San Juan and New York (New York: Random House, 1966), p. xxx. l$A. B. Hollingshead and L. H. Rogler "Attitudes Toward Slums and Public Housing in Puerto Rico", in Leonard J. Duhi, ed., The Urban Condition: People and Policy in the Metropolis (New York: Basic books, Inc., 1963), p. 240.

i r

-31well as various financial rules are also sources of irritation. "Most slum dwellers like their neighborhoods; most dwellers in public housing dislike theirs. This finding poses a dilemma for social planners. The slums have grown up naturally. They are overcrowded, malodorous, noisy., unsanitary, and under condemnation by 'enlightened' segments of the society. Yet, their inhabitants are fonder of them than caserío dwellers are of their neighborhoods.il9 In one study only 7 per cent of the fathers said tat they believed a caserío is a .good place to rear a child. In a study of schizophrenia Rogler and Hollingshead have comented unfavorably on the lack of privacy and the conflict with neighbors that characterize both the slum and the caseríos. "Beyond the extended family, the neighborhood is not integrated on a cooperative basis; rather relations with neighbors are conflict ridden. Almost all husbands and wives are quick to recite a history of accumulated grievances against the neighbors who are derogated as dirty, noisy, immoral and inconsiderate." 1 The negative effects of public housing on community controls of delinquency in large cities on the Mainland have also been indicated by Cloward and Ohlin.22 Some areas in San Juan which are slums both physically and socially, like La Perla, have a longer history than the slum areas called Buenos Aires and Little Tokyo. All of them are quite large and continually resocialize new migrants from rural areas. "The slums of San Juan have been built through the efforts of individuals and their families in search of a niche where they may meet the necessities of life and death and store their meager possessions. Slums have grown on land too swampy to support commercial buildings and on hillsides so steep they have not been attractive for other uses . . . These low-lying slums stretch for several miles along the sides of the lagoons and backwaters of the meandering Channel."23 In Puerto Rico the residences of those who commit delinquent acts and many other forms of deviant behavior are concentrated in certain parts of urban areas,--largely in slums or new housing areas and public projects, or caseríos. A fairly recent study of San Juan found that delinquency rates were highest in the Slum Belt (1.7 per 1,000 population), and Old City (1.6) and the Central

Ibid., p. 243.

Ibid., p. 239. 21 Rogler and Hollingshead, Trapped, op. cit., p. 408. 22 Richard Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, Delinquéncy and OpportuA. nity (New York: The Free Press, 1960).

Hollingshead and Roder, "Attitudes Toward Slums and Public Housing in Puerto Rico", op. cit., p. 233.

-32District (1.2), while the Beach Front had only 0.4.24 The delinquent acts took place in reverse order, with the Beach Front having the highest rate indicating that delinquent acts are more often committed by groups or gangs in forays in the more prosperous areas. 'The conception of delinquents as invaders from districts where 'people live differently than we do' adds a good deal to the threatening character of ~linquency and reinforces existing motives for suburbanization. Urban Community Development Many believe that the problems of the slum have primarily an economic explanation. Poverty and the lack of adequate economic and educational opportunities are thought to have brought about the serious problems related to slums and slum dwellers. If the slum dweller can be given a chance to better himself, through government assistance, the young slum dweller, at least will take advantage of such opportunities. Considering the nature of slum Life and the enormity of its extent and complex nature, in most major cities such as San Juan, this approach appears to offer only limited possibilities in dealing with the slum way of life. Many slum persons have limited aspirations and feel little desire for material wealth, education, or a better way of life strongly enough to strive for it. They may disdain to engage in activities yielding what should appear to be, for them, the highest rewards. This arises primarily not from poverty but from a feeling of powerlessness derived from the fact decisions save been made for them, for a long period of time, by outsiders.2e Thus they have not developed sufficient experiences and skills in dealing with ways of life that are incompatible with effective urban life for the city as a whole. In order to deal more effectively with large-scale problems created by living in actual slums and caseríos a more realistic approach is the use of citizen participation, self-help, and selfdetermination through group action, in meeting problems created by city living. In this way residents of the slum and caseríos become themselves involved in responsible action directed toward solving mutual problems. This approach to the problems of the city slum areas and public housing projects in Puerto Rico could involve the following elements: 1. creation of a sense of social cohesion on a neighborhood basis and strengthening of group interrelationships;

25 26

Theodore Caplow, Sheldon Stryker, and Samuel E. Wallace, The Urban Ambience: A Study of San Juan, Puerto Rico (Totowa, N.J.: The Bedminster press, 1964), p. 62. Ibid., p. 51

Warren Haggstrom "The Power of the Poor", in Frank Riessman, erome Cohen and Arthur Pea eds. Ment Health of the Poor New York: The Free Press, l9e ), pp. 209-zOá.

(

-332. encouragement and stimulation of self-help, through the initiative of the individuals in the community;

3. stimulation by outside agencies when initiative for self help is lacking; 4. reliance upon persuasion rather than upon compulsion to produce change through the efforts of the people; 5. identification and development of local leadership; 6. development of civic consciousness and acceptance of civic responsibility; 7. use of professional and technical assistance to support the efforts of the people involved; 8. coordination of city services to meet neighborhood needs and problems; 9. provision of training in democratic procedures that may 27 result in decentralization of some government functions. Change in identity or self-image is essential in any effort to alter the normative behavior of slum residents or those of public housing areas. Slum dwellers are often suspicious of, or reject, changes introduced from without and may not avail themselves of possibilities of changing their situations because they accept the view that their present identities cannot be changed. Without a change in identity, expectations and actions that differ from tradition may be rejected; a desire for change begins by creating dissatisfaction with present identities. Change in identity follows a process of providing new experiences to alter the present self-image, a commitment to change in self- entity, and a recognition by others of new identities and roles.' With a change in identity it may be hoped that behavior such as various forms of deviant behavior, may no longer fit this new identity.

Clinard, Slums and Community Development, op. cit., p. 126. Also see his 'The Organization of Urban Community Development Services in the Prevention of Crime and Juvenile Delinquency, with Particular Reference to Less Developed Countries,'t International Review of Criminal Policy, No. 19, pp. 3-16 (1962).

Clinard, Slums and Community Development, op. cit., pp. 3O1-3O7. Also see Ward H. Goodenough, Cooperation in Change: An Anthropological Approach to Community Development (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1963), Chapter 9.

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On Future Research Puerto Rico seems to present a favorable situation for measuring the impact of large-scale forces of urban change. Culturally, it has largely homogeneous background, in language, religion, and many other areas; there is little racial or regional separation, and it is small enough in area and population to visualize almost the entire cultural situation. Studies of change brought by urbanization in other countries are often complicated by many other factors. Another important element is the presence of a substantial body of social science research extending over the past twenty years. Few countries in a similar situation have such a body of material which could be used as some sort of base lines in a new, more comprehensive study. These studies cover sociological, economic, and political aspects. (1) There is need to determine more accurately the extent of actual trends in deviant behavior. Puerto Rican official statistics and other evidence seem to indicate a marked increase in delinquency and many other forms of deviant behavior. The increases are so great that they seem to serve as a sort of index for social changes that are occurring. Official statistics purporting to indicate increases in delinquency, crime, and other forms of deviant behavior in Puerto Rico as elsewhere always must be utilized, however, with great caution. Changes in administrative practices, in tolerance of certain acts by the public, in social conditions, and in the reporting of offenses may produce fictitious increases. In Puerto Rico, for example, a study showed considerable errors and variations in the classification of offenses by policemen.29 Likewise, an increase in delinquency and youth crimes may reflect population growth in the younger age categories. In Puerto Rico, for example, it was estimated in 1965 that 48.1 per cent of the total population was 19 years of age or under. It may also reflect the availability of more police and judicial facilities for this age group. An increase may also reflect the transfer of social control from the family and other institutions to the legal measures of the political state, even though approximately the same number of offenses previously occurred. New laws, or the greater use of existing laws due to changes in the society, may also tend to increase delinquency and crime may reflect more general public concern, and consequently a tendency for the police to apprehend more persons in certain age groups for certain offenses. (2) Communities of various size could be selected throughout the Island and continuing studies could be made of trends in in-

Franco Ferracuti, Rosita Pérez Hernández, and Marvin E. Wolfgang, "A Study of Police Errors in Crime Classification", The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 53:113-12O (March, 1962).

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creasing urbanization and urbanism which may account for changes. The normative standards of persons residing in San Juan and returning migrants from the Mainland might also be found to be affecting the local situation. Base line studies made as soon as possible might enable the measurement of such changes in the future.

behavior.

(3) The impact of social change could be studied not only in the lives of individuals such as cohort groups, but also through local communities in, for example, metropolitan San Juan. Comparative studies of the extent of community integration need to be made in slum areas and public housing projects. There is need to study the extent of normative and communicative integration in local communities and their consequences for delinquency, crime, prostitution, mental disorder, suicide, acid family integration.30 Slum areas, both old and new, and particularly new housing projects, should be studied in terms of their effects on migrants to the city and on the lives of persons who have lived there for longer periods of time. It would appear that slum norms and values are spread to new housing projects and the latter, because there may be little community feeling, may also facilitate the development of deviant

(4) The constant interplay between Puerto Ricans going to the Mainland and then returning, either temporarily or permanently, presents an interesting and important focus of study. Such persons, living as they do in large cities on the Mainland and primarily under slum conditions, indiv'dually, presumably, bring back with them deviant norms and values»1 Hypothetically, for example, the increase in drug addiction in San Juan, as well as some patterns of more aggressive delinquency, may stem from this source. Detailed studies using representative samples could be made of the dissemination of deviant norms by returning migrants and their children. (5) The effect of urbanization in Puerto Rican youth deserves particular study. In a city such as San Juan there is added to urbanization the effects of Americanization and the presence of a "tourist subculture", which to Puerto Rican youth presents something of a "rising level of expectation" in standards of living. Research needs to be carried out on the nature of Puerto Rican "youth culture", and the extent to which it is separated from adult controls with its own norms and standards. Separate peer group norms can well lead to forms of delinquency and crime as accepted forms of recreation, excitement, and illegal methods of obtaining "necessary" material items. In developing countries the impact on rural migrants of the slum way of life, with its often deviant norms and standards, may be particularly great on youth.

30 See Werner S. Landecker, "Types of Integration and Their Measurement", American Journal of Sociology, XVI:332-340 (January, 1961). 31 Lewis, La Vida, op, cit.

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(6) Another area needing study is the effect of increasing emphasis on individual freedom of action. In the Puerto Rican family context democratic values, particularly as they are taught in the schools, the emphasis on the individual and his need for freedom of action, may have great consequences upon the behavior of youths in an urban setting.

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SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY OF PUERTO RICO By Thomas C. Cochran

I In economic development every country presents a somewhat unique case, requiring for its understanding thorough empirical research as well as the application of theory. The Puerto Rican situation, in particular, has so many unusual features that general development models have only limited applicability. To begin with, models for underdeveloped areas no longer fit neatly since Puerto Rico is as industrialized as many of the leading nations of western Europe. There is no longer any problem of changing the attitudes of the civil service, of modifying upeer-class resistance, or of properly motivating entrepreneurs and workers. What is needed now are hypotheses regarding the possibilities of growth in particular situations such as would be applied to other advanced societies. Offhand, Puerto Rico seems closest to the economic situations of England and Japan. The Island receives raw materials, which it lacks itself, and exports manufactures. It is basically a processor, and success obviously depends on doing the job satisfactorily and cheaper than competing countries. A closer look, however, shows so many differences that the England-Japan analogy is scarcely worth exploring. In exports England and Japan process for the world--Puerto Rico almost entirely for the United States. England and Japan have large home markets capable of supporting mass production industries, while in Puerto Rico many new enterprises aimed at the home market have failed because of its limitations. All three countries have to rely on a wage/productivity ratio for certain processes, lower than those o£ their competitors, but in the case of Puerto Rico there are both business and labor pressures from the mainland, operating strongly through government and trade unions, to raise wages and end the favorable differential. Other elements that make Puerto Rico different are: an unhindered flow of capital to and from the principal money market of the world; unrestricted and cheap export of surplus population to the world's area of highest wages; relatively easy attraction of North American management; a large tourist expenditure in relation to the total insular income; and an agricultural resource, sugar, which provides a nucleus of overseas purchasing power. In spite of all these differences John E. Stahl has thought it worthwhile to apply a £(lein growth model to Puerto Rico. This yields the routine conclusions that the labor cost differential is "crucial", but in addition that continued advances in real per capita income depend heavily on capital movements from the Mainland, out-migration, and stable government.l Since, in discus1Eoonomic Development and Cultural Change, XIII (July, 1965), 471.

-38sions regarding Puerto Rico, the last two factors are generally assumed as either constant or unpredictable, and capital flow in this case is a function of the wage/productivity differential, the model really suggests a rather exclusive focus on this single factor. While the author recognizes that tax exemption may also influence capital flow from the Mainland, he concludes that "tax incentives . . . may or may not be an adequate magnet for further investment."2 While one will not go far wrong in starting a study of growth prospects in Puerto Rico with the wage/productivity ratio relative to the Mainland, the factors that influence this ratio open up an entire world of social, business, and technological analysis. This central mechanism of economic competition is, in fact, influenced, by a host of "noneconomic" forces such as social institutions, the level and type of social learning, types of personality, and traditional patterns of behavior, as well as by chance or exogenous events. It would appear that over the last decade almost every thing possible has been said and hypothecated regarding factors of economic change and that the gist of the discussion is that only careful study of the particular situation pays off. Looking at economic development in general Albert O. Hirschman says: "Just as there is no set of prerequisites' for economic development, so it is impossible to define fixed numbers of backwardness features. What is a hindrance to progress in one setting and one stage may be helpful under other circumstances."3 Ruben Reina and I found, for example, that many of the apparent obstacles to better wage/ productivity complained of by Puerto Rican managers, were converted into assets by a gifted entrepreneur in Argentina.4 Lloyd G. Reynolds and Peter Gregory in their carefully prepared study on Wages, Productivity, and Industrialization in Puerto Rico find management a "crucial` element in economic development and conclude that "Managers create the kind of work force they get."5 To me this is a penetrating observation that sums up much of the development or growth pattern. It accords closely, as do

2 3

Ibid. The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958, p. 9. Entrepreneurship in Argentine Culture: Torcuato Di Te11a and S.I.A.M. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962),

pp. 262-265 5

New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1965, p. 117

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the rest of the Reynolds-Gregory findings with the conclusions reached more impressionistically in The Puerto Rican Businessman.6 It means that a large percentage of the causes of low productivity can be traced to management.

II What does this introductory discussion suggest regarding further study and future policy in Puerto Rico? Let me first take up further study. Research on management-worker relations similar to that of the Reynolds-Gregory project should be continued with more detailed analysis of management problems, and the inclusion of service industries, at least, as well as manufacturing. The latter because of the very important role service industries have come to play in producing income in themselves and stimulating further construction both public and private. More study of entrepreneurship, or decision-making, in all areas, including government, should be most rewarding. Regardless of tax laws, resources, or available credit, the allocation of in-puts is controlled by the entrepreneurs, and their decisions are far from automatic or uniform. The ability of the entrepreneur to improve productivity or to innovate in respect to processes, depends upon the type and scope of his imagination, or, as some anthropologists say, his "subjective constructions". These, in turn, depend on child socialization, education and other conditioning forces of the culture. The entrepreneur, in other words, approaches his essential task of combining the factors of production equipped with a certain level of "social learning" and certain ranges of possible subjective construction, which are fairly uniform for those of his class and education in the given culture. Progress, therefore, is more a function of altering the social learning and subjective construction of the entrepreneur than of any type of resource, per se. As Goethe observed, well before the age of modern psychology, "We see only what we know". Some innovation or progress is, of course, possible by recombining existing elements into new configurations, but a much surer formula for advance is that of widening the scope of entrepreneurial knowledge and interest. The failure of the foreign creation of social overhead capital to stimulate a take-off to industrial advance in many areas has been associated with local entrepreneurs unprepared to imagine the next phase of action. This lack of preparation is often hard to detect, because the entrepreneurs talk glibly of the overall developments needed, but when pinned down to specifically

6Thomas C. Cochran, The Puerto Rican Businessman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959).

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what they plan to do, they lack a proper conception, or "construction", of the immediate steps to be taken. In a more detailed analysis of entrepreneurship and management, tole theory may be a useful analytical tool, providing the research team involved select proper concepts and definitions from the confusion of terminology that has overwhelmed the subject in the last ten years.7 The entrepreneurial role is a channel through which the diverse and, often in themselves intangible social forces translate their effects into measurable economic action; the characteristics of role behavior mirror the social forces of the culture and their relative ir_tensity.O But again, theoretical models should not take the emphasis away from empirical research. Reynolds and Gregory found the same types of managerial weaknesses as I did, and these can be understood clearly without any need for an over-all cultural model or theory. Furthermore, these are much the same weaknesses found in Argentina and, in part, by surveys on the Mainland. Very briefly they are: 1) a tendency, perhaps Latin, to prefer abstract theories or philosophical ideas to detailed technological understanding, and to be equipped, therefore, with the wrong possibilities of subjective construction; 2) an underestimation of the complexity of actual operations or tasks; 3) a reluctance to admit failure or to discuss the difficulties that arise in a frank way with managerial snper~.ors; and 4) a general failure in free and easy communication between lower and upper levels of management that would not only help to solve immediate problems, but also to increase general understanding. When local companies become really large, or Puerto Rican branches are started by big Continental concerns an additional managerial friction develops. Small business employees and managers think in terms of the authority and personality of an individual, el jefe. The large firm presents middle managers with life in a bureaucracy, with a series of teams or departments run by impersonal systems. One might say that the rather uniform management systems of big business are inevitably at war with cultural differences. The transition everywhere is a difficult one, unless eased by some unusually understanding executives. The following account of such a transition in Argentina may be suggestive:

7 See Neal Gross,

Ward S. Mason and Alexander W. McEadwin Explorations in Role Analysis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958) for role theory in useful form. See Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas, eds., Role Theory (New York: 1966) for present confusions.

See: Thomas C. Cochran, The Inner Revolution (New York: & Row, 1964), pp. 128 ff.

Harper

-41"The main company was administered by a committee, the Consejo, in whose meetings prior to 1960, only one member of the owning family regularly participated. In the late fifties, delegationof considerable authority to 'small consejos' for the chief branches and subsidiaries was instituted. Each of these consejos in turn was required to send representatives to meetings of the Gran Consejo at Avellaneda. This permitted continuing face-to-face discussion, highly valued by the members of the Gran Consejo. "As levels within S. I. A. M. were linked by personal contact, so the entire organization was integrated around the symbol of Di Tella (the founder) in a way that would probably not have been effective in United States culture. The Consejo ruled S. I. A. M. not only through the formal positions of its members but more importantly by virtue of their inheritance of confianza from Di Tella. After his death the patron underwent a process analogous to canonization. To preserve the legend of infallibility, his policies were never criticized by the members of the Consejo. Wherever the employee went he was confronted with tangible symbols of the man. Pictures of Di TelLa hung in every room and a lifesized statue watched over the entrance to Avellaneda. The incoming employee was oriented into S. I. A. M. tradition by old company men as part of the training process; continuity of the Di Tell symbol was used as a well-spring for company morale." The key men in the success or failure of most Puerto Rican enterprises are the supervisors or foremen, the administrators directly concerned with the wage/productivity ratio. But even if they correctly construct the situation their efforts may be frustrated by middle or top management. Their communication upward is often hindered by the language barrier, and frequently by the location of ultimate authority on the continent. Their control of the worker is weakened, in turn, by this lack of ability to make on-the-spot decisions. Without rehearsing all the well-tested observations regarding the characteristics of Latin workers, of dignidad, personalismo and desire for attention from el jefe,10it can be seen that the Puerto Rican supervisor is in an unusually hard apot with pressures on him from both above and below, and that this role merits continuing detailed study. In general, as an area such as Puerto Rico nears a mature level of industrialism, and as the problems become not the initial spread of the factory process, but rather the more efficient and wisely selected production of both goods and services, social 9 10

Cochran and Reina, Entrepreneurship, pp. 26?-268. See: Reynolds and Gregory, Wages, pp. 133-138.

-42and cultural problems gain in importance. Evon Z. Voght writes: "The widest proposition that I think can be defended with our present evidence is that the importance of value orientation in shaping the direction of change is proportional to the amount of economic and technological control a society has achieved."11 III As usual, therapy is more difficult than diagnosis. Improvement in managerial relations is not only a matter of more special education for local supervisors and managers at various levels by instructors thoroughly conversant with the problems involved, but also one of educating managers sent to Puerto Rico from the continent. A large part of the poor upward communication that undermines shop authority and creates confusion in the operation of branch plants is due to failure on the part of continental managers to understand their new relationships. This is perhaps a more difficult matter to remedy than is poor foremanship, because there is no easy way of reaching these managers in advance of their arrival in Puerto Rico. Publicity for the problems of Puerto Rican management in continental publication is one way, but it unfortunately runs counter to the maximum attraction of northern firms. Puerto Rican education on both the worker and management level can certainly profit from more study. Reynolds and Gregory show that the need is not simply for more grades of schooling. A better quality of general education with more emphasis on English as a second language would doubtless help, and a stronger system of vocational education at about the junior high school level might also produce better trained workers and supervisors. It is encouraging to see that educational expenditure as a per cent of Puerto Rican income is steadily rising. But it appears that more study of the relationship of particular types of education to economic growth is needed. Education may be able to develop the needed types of subjective construction far more rapidly than can business experience. So far I have devoted myself to the areas with which I am somewhat familiar. It still seems, however, as it did in the 1950's, that land use and agricultural productivity might repay additional research. Is it possible, for example, that some types of agriculture such as marginal sugar production should be subsidized in order to increase the total income from exports? Can more intensive use be made of good land than is being achieved at present? On the basis of over-all statistics, the artificially high wage/productivity ratio seems to be working toward under-utilization of land.

"On the Concepts of Structure and Process in Cultural Anthropology", American Anthropologist LXII (February, 1960), 266.

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In all, I suggest three major types of research. First, continued, up-to-date, economic and business history of the Island with results published every three to five years. Second, a more intensive study of entrepreneurship and management than has appeared so far, with due attention to types of education, training, and communication. Third, more emphasis on agriculture as an industry for both domestic consumption and export. Puerto Rico has already been a pioneer in several types of public assistance to economic growth and further research can expand such policies and apply them to new areas.

-44AN INVENTORY OF RESEARCH IN PUERTO RICO RELEVANT TO SOCIAL CHANGE AND PUBLIC POLICY By Ineke Cunningham

I. Introduction To define and discuss in detail what is meant by "social change" and "public policy" is beyond the scope of this paper. Its purpose is to survey recent studies of Puerto Rico which have a bearing on these subjects, and to offer generalizations regarding future change and suggestions for future policy. Yet it is necessary, for the sake of clarity, to describe briefly the concepts under consideration. Social change refers to the processes whereby societies become significantly different over time. Such change may originate in forces external to the society as in contacts with other societies, through such processes as invasion, and so forth, or from within society itself. Moore (1960) has noted that inequalities within every society cause tensions; the attempts to manage these tensions cause strains, and from these strains arise changes. There are in every society some members who either appoint themselves or are chosen to direct the management of tensions, one aspect of which is planning; thus the process becomes institutionalized. Eisenstadt (1964), however, points out that institutionalization in itself can give rise to change, for, as institutions are maintained, they fail to fulfill completely the goals for which they were established, and conflict arises from attempts to change established institutions and from attempts to maintain them. Policy means to act consistently and consciously over time and space to reach certain pre-established goals. Thus public policy is directed toward the goals of society as perceived by its effectors, and is concerned with solving problems accompanying social change. But policy presumes a limitation of resources for action, and the necessity of planning to direct this action. Both of these factors in themselves may give rise to further tensions, and therefore further problems. Public policy is effected by only a small percentage of the population, such as government officials and administrative personnel, and not by the population in general. It is expressed through the formation and changing of the laws of the society. In order for these laws to be successful, they must correlate closely with the norms of the society. The greater the gap between the laws and the norms, the less chance of success there is that the laws will be upheld or adhered to, and the more chance there is for mass resistance on the part of the people. To be effective, public policy must therefore be closely in harmony with the norms of society.

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The "problems" referred to in this paper are evidences of societal strains. As they reflect social change and necessitate public policy, they are central to the purpose of this paper. Therefore studies of problems and problem areas will be included in this survey, as well as studies focusing directly on social change. The reader must remember that many of the studies noted in this inventory have been carried out at different periods of time. Consequently, some of the findings and recommendations may be out-dated. II. Studies of Social Change Very little research has focused explicitly on social change in Puerto Rico, despite extensive changes which have occurred on the island, particularly during the past thirty years. Roberts and Stefani (1946) attempted to establish a basis from which to study social change. They surveyed a sample of families from all levels of Puerto Rican society, with the aim of describing present conditions and formulating basic needs toward the fulfillment of which policy could be oriented. Although they did not study social change as such, they gave a basis for comparison to later studies, thus allowing for some measurements of changes at a later time. Bourne and Bourne (1966) attempted to study social change by comparing ten separate Puerto Rican communities as they had been in the 1930's and as they were in the early 1960's. The hypothesis which they undertook to prove was that "planned change is good, bringing about a desirable development". Unfortunately, the hypothesis is non-specific enough to be difficult to doubt, and vague to the point that it is very difficult to define. There is also little control in the study, as different observers used different standards of measurement. The authors reached the general conclusion that positive changes were noted in all regions, although to a greater extent in those communities which were more urban in nature or which were located more closely to urban centers. The prevailing sense of optimism in the Puerto Rican situation which the Bournes noted is also found in the results of a study performed in 1954 by Tumin and Feldman (1961). They used a representative sample of 999 heads of households and interviewed them extensively concerning many aspects relevant to social change. One problem which the study faced is that the researchers were dependent on the recall of their respondents for data of periods prior to the time of the study. At present, however, Feldman under the auspices of the Social Science Research Center and Northwestern University is in the process of reinterviewing all available subjects of the 1954 study. I feel that the study is a very important one, as it attemptsnot only to identify points of change in Puerto Rican society and the directions change is taking, but also to discover what attitudes the people are holding to these changes. In

-46order to relate social change to public policy it is absolutely necessary to consider the attitudes of the people, for any public policy directed towards the initiation of favorable social changes must be approved by the general population if it is to succeed. Tumin and Feldman provide some background for their study by noting some general changes which have been affecting Puerto Rican society increasingly over the past forty years. The economy is shifting from an agricultural to an industrial base. The island is becoming much less isolated than formerly due to the increasing ease of communication. The standard of living, although remaining very low, is when compared to the rest of the world much higher than it was formerly. There is a tendency toward a way of life now which is much more materialistic. According to the authors, Puerto Rico has been receiving increasing amounts of autonomy from the United States politically. It is against this background of change that Tumin and Feldman measure the accomplishments, attitudes, expectations, and aspirations of the Puerto Rican people. The overwhelming conclusion to which the authors come is that the population of Puerto Rico is surprisingly optimistic, particularly in contrast to its environment. Class structure is viewed as open. Parents are sure that their children will have far more opportunity than they themselves had, and also the ability to use this opportunity. People tend to see themselves as having more community and local influence than is generally the case. Tumin and Feldman see this as a reflection of one of the major tensions of Puerto Rican society, between an older and more traditional system of relations and an industrial system in which personal competition and initiative are stressed and conspicuous consumption is a basis for status. This phenomenon has both positive and negative aspects. Among the positive aspects is that the favorable self-images of the people result in fairly stable social relations even though, as noted above, Puerto Rico is at present undergoing rather extensive social change. Another positive aspect concerning the favorable self images held by the people is particularly relevant to a discussion of public policy, as, due to their optimism, it is much easier to evoke participation of all the people in implementing desirable future plans. There is, however, a negative aspect closely parallel to this which Tumin notes. With suci} g<eneretized optimism there is, to some extent, a loss of political energy. Still another advantage to this attitude, which Tumin (1960) claims in another article, concerns social change itself. The optimism of the people enables them to believe that favorable social change is occurring within the present institutions, and there is thus no marked desire to bring about an abrupt change in the Tumin credits inStitutionS by revolt or other direet measures_ the present government with determining that all levels of the society share in the general increase in wealth, thus supporting these general positive attitudes.

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Tumin and Feldman (1961) mention several more specific changes in the Puerto Rican social structure that were noted from the answers that were given by their respondents. There is an increasing tendency for society to view itself as containing three strata, rather than the two present in the traditional Spanish structure. Thus a middle class is emerging. There is also a tendency for the Puerto Rican to identify the strata of his neighbors and himself by wealth and life style. This differs both from the old Spanish custom of using family affiliation to identify social status and the American means of using occupation for this identification. The Puerto Rican society is becoming more mobile as are all industrializing societies, but Tumin and Feldman found that these mobility rates are tending to become patterned after class divisions. In other words, the upper classes are becoming more mobile quickly and the lower classes slowly. This mobility, therefore, is tending to solidify the class structure rather than to blur it, and the ultimate result is that a strong class consciousness is beginning to develop. There are several points of tension dominating the societal environment of Puerto Rico. Not the least of these is that between high aspirations and low achievements as mentioned previously. There is also a conflict between the value of dignidad (honor, pride, and dignity) and the increasing emphasis on material wealth and consumption. A similar conflict is that between the value system which reveres the jíbaro, and that which reveres the successful entrepreneur, the latter of which is becoming more prevalent particularly among the middle class. Tumin and Feldman also detect a political strain: the one between the present commitment to democracy which the present political party adheres to, and the traditional methods of power displayed in the colonial system and still present in fact, if not in name, in many of the smaller local political units. Due to the large amount of optimism which the authors of this study have identified in the common people, they view change in Puerto Rico as a relatively uncomplicated course in further industrialization. Tumin and Feldman warn of the necessity of attempting to diminish present inequalities, however, if certain of the more undesirable features of an industrialized society as observed in the United States and other countries are to be avoided. Another important conclusion reached by Tumin and Feldman is that there seems to be a sharp break in the style of living, aspirations, achievements, and opportunities between the Puerto Rican who ha6 less than four years of education and the one who has completed four or more years of school. This gap is much wider than that between any other two educational groupings the authors used in their analysis. Four years is probably the point of functional literacy. This fact underscores the importance of education in determining the differences between various Puerto Rican social strata and supports the authors' contention that, whereas education is a major determining factor, it is also "the most effective point of leverage in the social system" (p. 464).

-48Mintz (1966) notes that not all studies of Puerto Rico have been so optimistic concerning social change and its effects. As an example he summarizes an article by Seda Bonilla(Mintz, 1966, Appendix B) based on field work done by the author and his wife in a north-coast community and covering a ten-year period. Seda does not see social change developing as the result of several tensions within society, but rather he sees it in the rural community he studied as a deterioration of a stable traditional social structure and value system, without a satisfactory replacement. As Mintz quotes, "people fear both being left helpless, and being free, since being free means each can do as he pleases, resulting in a sort of chaos." (p. 160). Oscar Lewis (1966) also finds a very pessimistic evaluation of the future among his slum subjects. But it must be remembered that the "poverty culture" which he studied is different from the "Puerto Rican culture" which Tumin studied. Nevertheless, there can be found cause both for pessimism and optimism in the direction of social change in Puerto Rico. III. Studies of Problems. the Resolutions of Which will Have an Impact on Social Change and Public Policy A. Political Status: The persistent status problem presents a question of the relationship of Puerto Rico to Spain prior to 1898, and since then to the United States. For more than a century the same three alternatives have been considered. Complete independence and complete assimilation are the extreme alternatives, with the third possibility of autonomy in association. This third alternative has been in effect, with the autonomy present to d greater or lesser degree. Hunter (1966) has presented a survey of the Puerto Rican Status question since 1898. He notes how long it has taken for Puerto Rico to achieve each step in autonomy, and concludes that, as the present government appears to be satisfied with the present status and, as the present government appears to be so popular with the people, it is likely that no further status developments will occur for some time to come. Muíoz Amato (1953), on the other hand., views the present ambiguities, most notably the question of whether the Federal Relations Statute, the law creating the present association, will be amended exclusively by Congress, or bilaterally with the approval of the Puerto Rican people. This issue can be clarified in several ways. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court of the United States will take initiative to action, as it most likely will follow the leadership of the political organs of the federal government. It seems more likely that the issue will be clarified in the political processes. Present practices eventually may be translated into constitutional norms if the relations with Congress and the federal government are

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based on mutual agreement and respect for local government. Thus further development and clarification of the status problem are necessary. The Puerto Rican status question is of importance to any consideration of social change and public policy on the island, for it directly determines the political climate in which such change occurs and such policy is initiated, and also educational and economic environments. B. Definition of .National Cujture: Linked closely to the question of status is a question concerning culture. Does Puerto Rico have a culture which is distinctly Puerto Rican? Perhaps difficulty in reaching a decision about political identity could be a reflection of difficulty in defining a national identity. Certainly those at opposite ends of the status question would also differ in their conception of the uniqueness of Puerto Rican culture. There have been several attempts to define and study the culture of Puerto Rico. Perhaps the most definitive of these has been one by Sidney Mintz (1966). The author attempts, however, to support the contention that Puerto Rico has no distinctive "national cultúre" as such. I think that, although it may be granted that specific items of a Puerto Rican culture might be difficult to define, there are nonetheless many Puerto Ricans who consider themselves to be "Puerto Rican". If members of a society define their culture as unique, they will act as if it were, so whether it is or not becomes a moot question. Mintz does make an important distinction between a national culture and a culture of a smaller sector of the population. Any sector which is reported as being a part of Puerto Rican culture should be identified either as representing all Puerto Ricans as a whole or representing only a specific segment of the population of Puerto Rico. Mintz notes that this is a particularly difficult distinction to make, especially with regard to Puerto Rico, as most of the studies which have attempted to describe a Puerto Rican culture have been based on a "representative" area, but it is difficult to determine to what extent and in what way any area may be representative (for example Landy's Valle Caña). Mintz has also been very helpful in suggesting particular areas in which elements of a national culture might be identified more easily. These are: 1) the history of a given society; Z) value-categories recognized throughout a society; 3) socialization patterns; and 4) what Mintz has called "social idioms". There have been no successful attempts to link cultural characteristics with particular elements of Puerto Rican history. Mintz mentions a work by Figueroa Mercado (in Mintz 1966) which attempted to link various personality characteristics with particular heritages, but little real evidence seems to be offered to support these ideas.

-50Ayala (1953) traces the residues of Spanish culture to contemporary Puerto Rico, but concludes nothing more specific than that the island has kept a nucleus of Spanish heritage, which is trip of many Latin American countries, and certainly not peculiar to Puerto Rico. There are several studies which have tried to identify values held in common by all Puerto Ricans. Certainly the identification of such values are relevant to a study of social change and even more so to an evaluation of public policy, as particular values can either accelerate or hamper social change. Brameld (1959) tries specifically to discover one value system which is valid for all Puerto Ricans. He attributes to the Puerto Ricans many positive values including friendliness, hospitality, gregariousness, family devotion, racial egalitarianism, an accent on being rather than becoming (his italics), and so forth (p. 267). One cultural value which he identifies and which may be of particular relevance to social change is that of tolerance. Puerto Ricans, he notes, are so tolerant or accommodating that "they would much rather acculturate and even assimilate foreign values and accompanying values than militantly resist them." (p. 271) Saavedra de Roca (1963) attempted to determine basic Puerto Rican values by reviewing pertinent literature. Among the personality values which she presented, perhaps the most discussed is that of dignidad. This is an inner value which is concerned with maintaining one's public status without relation to external circumstances. But it is not only an external attitude; it also is an inner feeling of personal worth, honor, and pride. It is considered to have definitely positive value by Tumin and Feldman (1961), who see the concept of dignidad as one of the bases of the prevalent and almost ungrounded optimism in all, butparticularly among the lower class Puerto Rican people. Cochran 1959) also sees it as a positive trait, the basis of a sense of integrity. Tugwell, (1956) however, sees it used often as a cover for incompetence, and therefore as an eventual hindrance for Puerto Rican progress. Another personal characteristic which tends to have high value for Puerto Ricans is personalismo or personalism. This value is seen by Cochran to have negative value, particularly for economic development, because it requires contact to be kept on a face-to-face basis, hampering the consolidation of small businesses into large ones, interfering with efficiency in salesmen and so forth.

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Where Saavedra de Roca has attempted to pick characteristics which were mentioned frequently in the literature and to assessthe value of each one, Collier (Mintz, 1966, Appendix A) has taken a different approach, although also using available literature. She used the Kluckhohn Binary Value Categories to identify Puerto Rican values. These are a series of polar categories against which

-51formation about a particular society may be rated. Some categories, for example, are Determinate-Indeterminate, with reference to the supernatural; Good-Evil, with reference to the social; IndividualGroup; Autonomy-Independence; Dominance-Equality, with reference to power evaluation; and so forth. Some of Collier's findings are that Puerto Ricans tend to believe in determinate (that is, orderly and consistent) supernatural and social worlds, and a good supernatural world, although their actions suggest that they doubt that man is naturally good. They are very gregarious and dependent. Although by her own admission same of Collier's analyses are weak due to insufficient and conflicting evidence in the literature, I feel that she has provided a good basis upon which further studies can be built. She has also located many areas in which evidence is ambiguous thus pointing to a need for further investigation. It is not only in personal characteristics that values are found which tend to be held, to a large extent, through the entire island. As many investigators have mentioned (Steward et al 1956); Tumin and Feldman, 1961; Hill et al 1959) a high iralue is placed on education. Many family values have also been delineated. These will be discussed in other portions of this paper. The next area in which to look for indicators of cult e, according to Mintz, is in the socialization process. Landy (1959), in particular, attempted to confirm several hypotheses which suggested that socialization_ causes more dependency and stability in girls and more rebellion and aggression in boys. One of the striking aspects about Puerto Rican childhood is the very early separation between the sexes. Boys are taught to be "macho" (male-like), and aggression is approved, where girls are always dressed very properly and are early taught their role of submissiveness. For boys, however, there are definite conflicts. Independence and aggression are highly valued for them, yet they must never talk back to their parents, particularly their father, as they must always show respeto (respect). Several studies quote parents who claim that respect for one's parents is much more important than love for them (Brameld, 1959; Stycos, 1955). Fighting among children is always punished (Landy, 1959; Wolf, 1952). The mother stays at home with the children, so a marked dependence upon her is instilled in the male, usually lasting well into adulthood. The result is a tendency for insecurity in the man. Ego structure is definitely limited. Landy notes that a man must depend on other men for support, but as they are all dependent they are not able to give the support demanded of them. One must be careful about generalizing too widely concerning Puerto Rican socialization patterns, however. Wolf (1952), in studying families in three different communities,discovered three rather different patterns. Among small farmers an identification with the family unit is formed with an authoritative father. A major problem for children is the repression of aggression. In a

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community of sugar workers, the child's main problem is multiple parent figures and thus a dispersion of affect. Among the middle class members the increase of female autonomy and decline of male dominance lead to conflicts between ideal norms and actual behavior. Yet despite these variations in local patterns, the basic roles taught to children are similar throughout the island. As the socialization process tends to give stability and responsibility to the girl, the woman becomes the stable member of the family, and it is upon her rather than the father that the children are dependent. Landy proposes that, as the increasing employment of women leads to further debilitation of the man's ego and strengthening of the woman's, there will probably be a trend toward increasing equalization of social roles or perhaps even dominance on the part of the woman. However, I can see where a conflict might develop between the submissiveness of the wife and the stability of the woman, causing further role confusions as the woman begins to takemore responsibility. This is one point where further study would be of benefit as also present evidence seems to be unclear. Launia (1964) has studied ways in which the uses of "respeto" (respect) and "rela_jo" (to joke around) reflect Puerto Rican culture. This illustrates what Mintz refers to as "social idioms". Laura shows how these concepts are used by all Puerto Ricans in defining particular social relationships. Respetois demanded of all and offered by all in social contact. The person failing to observe it loses his right to receive it, no matter what the circumstances. By this idiom one can keep a social distance between himself and others. Although this basic concept of respeto is shared by all adult Puerto Ricans, various segments of the society use special forms of ceremonial behavior to communicate certain kinds of deference and respect. Thus, while all Puerto Ricans can communicate the general idiom, not all are capable of manipulating all the special forms, and thus members of various segments cannot feel completely comfortable with all the members of other sectors. Relajo is an even more complicated idiom, providing a means for defamation in such a way as to prevent loss of respect and the resort to anger. The uses of the relajo idiom are much more restrictive than those of respeto, but the framework, again, is understood by all adult Puerto Ricans. These idioms, therefore, serve to integrate the Puerto Rican culture as a while. I think this is one aspect of Puerto Rican society which needs further study. There must be other similar idioms which serve the purpose of integrating a "Puerto Rican culture" by offering a point of focus which is relevant to and understood, at least to a great extent, by all elements of the society. They also offer clues to general personality characteristics of the Puerto Rican society.

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There are two studies of Puerto Rico which attempt to study culture but focus on subculture, placing little emphasis on national characteristics. The first of these is the study of Julian Steward and his associates (1956). This is a study of four different Puerto Rican communities and some upper class families in San Juan. It is probably as complete as any study concerning facts related to Puerto Rican life, but there is little attempt to delineate patterns of a national culture. The authors contend that Puerto Rican cultural attitudes derive from two sources: a traditional Spanish heritage, and contact with modern American industrialization. Neither of these is unique to Puerto Rico, they claim. Puerto Rican culture differs from the culture of other societies only to the degree in which these two sources mix and are manifested. These cultural manifestations, however, differ among varying regions and among varying strata in the Puerto Rican culture. For this reason the Puerto Rican culture can only be identified as a trend toward industrialization, and therefore can not be considered unique in itself.

Scheele, in Steward's book, describes several upper class families in San Juan and notes that they have reached a state of 10Americanization'i by two ways; partly this is due to the process of rapid industrialization and partly to a conscious copying on the part of upper class families. However, as Steward (1953) notes, there has been very little passing down of this 11Americanization1° process from the upper classes to lower classes, except perhaps to some members of the middle class. The obstacles to this passing on of culture are apparently economic, for the characteristics of this upper class "Americanization" presupposes a relatively high income. In this study it is also noted that there are many similarities between the tobacco farmers and sugar workers of Puerto Rico and corresponding categories in the United States. The authors attribute these similarities, however, much more to similar change processes present in both cultures than to any sharing between them. There seem to be so many other factors involved that the usefulness of this fact to the study of social change is limited.

Oscar Lewis in La Vida (1966), tries to define a set of characteristics and values not peculiar to and representative of Puerto Ricans, but characteristics of a slum culture, or, as he calls it, a "culture of poverty':. This is a subculture which arises within a society which provides low wages and has a high level of unemployment, and which also has a dominant class which values highly the accumulation of wealth, explaining poverty as evidence of the social inadequacy of the person who suffers from it. Those who lack the material means for wealth accumulation are therefore unable to participate in the economic system and in the major institutions of the society. The result is an individual who has a weak ego structure, and a feeling of marginality and inferiority, is rather fatalistic, and is unable to orient himself to the future, but

-54lives for the present. This study might help to explain the cultural differences between the "jibaro"of the mountains and the slum dweller of the city, and thus it may illustrate why planning must differ in consideration of the sector toward which it is directed. C. Economic Development: Economics furnishes some of the resources for change and social change provides part of the stimulus for economics. Economics is even more closely related to public policy, for public policy is directly dependent upon the economics of that public, as no policy may be implemented without the economic means to do so. Possibly one of the most ambitious attempts to describe and assess the Puerto Rican economy and various trends in its growth was that of Perloff, (1950) using data from the years 1948-49. His facts and figures are now out of date, but the conclusions he reached probably are not. He suggested seven particular problems which affected Puerto Rico, and which would have to be evaluated and attacked if the economy were to continue to develop and grow. The population of Puerto Rico in 1950 had one of the highest rates of increase in the world. This problem is accentuated by the fact that there is very little productive land per person. Another major problem for the Island is that it has such a scarcity of natural resources, and this had forced the maintenance of an agriculturally based economy. Limited wage levels make possible only a very limited consumption level. The excessive population leads to a very large labor force in comparison to the available employment, and thus a high level of unemployment. This, in turn, is accentuated by the fact that there is a low educational level, which contributes to a shortage of skilled laborers and a general lack of efficiency among Puerto Rican workers. Puerto Rico is within the United States tariff system, and thus needs to be able to compete within the American market. Limitations on its products, such as the sugar quota, are detrimental to its economic development. Finally, there is an insufficiency of financial resources on the Island, which can be used for savings and industrial investments. Studies focusing on each of these problems and propositions for their solutions will be noted here. As Puerto Rico is within the United States tariff and monetary systems, its economics are closely linked to those of the mainland. Baer (1962) has studied this tie by comparing changes in the Puerto Rican economy with fluctuations in the United States economy. He discovered that, during the recession of 1953-54, unemployment levels rose because of a rapid decrease in migration. During the recession of 1957-58 there was a decrease in the need for production, and thus an increase in unemployment. This decreased need for production was manifested more commonly in the older industries. The author concluded that there were three different directions which Puerto Rico could take to prevent the Island economy from

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being simply a reflection of the Mainland economy: 1) there could be a greater effort expended in attracting ownership firms in a stable industry, for example apparel; 2) public expenditures could be varied with the economy, increasing with depression and decreasing with expansion; and 3) the governmental monetary policy could be varied with the political climate. Because of the scarcity of mineral resources, Puerto Rico must use, instead, land and labor as its two chief resources. The former is made use of by agricultural production. The latter is made use of by increasing industrialization in an attempt to create more jobs. Agriculture was the main contributor of national income in Puerto Rico up to 1955. Three crops were dominant: mostly sugar, coffee, and tobacco. Perloff (1950) notes that any crop, to be of major contribution to the Puerto Rican economy, needs to satisfy three conditions: 1) it must have a high yield per acre; 2) it must need large amounts of labor; and 3) it must have enough local marketing potential to cushion losses in a year of export failures. All of the local crops have deficiencies in some of these areas. Perloff suggests pineapples as one crop which would fit all of these conditions. He also suggests that attempts be made to make sugar, tobacco and coffee more productive.

The development of industry in Puerto Rico is well reviewed by Moscoso (1953) and Barton (1959). In a word of caution, Moscoso noted that it is always necessary to maintain a balance between funds used in industrial development and funds used in welfare expenditures. Perloff (1950) writes of the need to find industries with high wage-profit ratios, good local markets, and the ability to make use of local resources. To assist in attracting industries to the Island, the government has arranged that new industries pay no tax for a period of ten to seventeen years after opening. Accordingly, as these firms pay no taxes for these years, the economy is benefited by the creation of new jobs, payrolls, and the investment of profits. Reynolds and Gregory (1965) note that to increase employment and wages at the same time is difficult, as they tend to act on each other, for the increase of one tends to result in a decrease in the other. Isard. Schooler. and Vietorisz (1959) study the feasibility of

setting up an industrial complex consisting of oil refinery, petrochemical, fertilizer, and synthetic fiber operations. The authors found that, whereas in some cases the entire complex, and particularly a synthetic fiber operation, might yield greater profit if placed on the island rather than in the United States, in most cases a partial complex, or a fiber operation in which one or more of the components is imported, would be of much greater benefit as far as higher profits are concerned. An important proposal offered by the authors is that, although a partial operation would yield a larger percentage of profits, full operations would probably be of more benefit for Puerto Rico, because they would stimulate the

-56economy to a greater extent, encouraging more local investment, and have a more desirable effect on the rate of industrialization. Therefore, the benefits of new industries should not be assessed solely from their immediate profit expectations. Carlos Lastra (1964) has made a study of industries with regard to the highest minimum wages they are able to take. He found that it would be generally harmful to make a blanket rise of minimum wages on an industry-wide scale, but that some industries, especially the more stable ones, such as those manufacturing ladies garments, would be capable of making a satisfactory profit if minimum wages were equal to those in the United States. He thus proposes a differential scale for the raising of minimum wages, which is in effect, as a government board sets the minimum wages for each industry,. Reynolds (1965) notes that minimum wages can be raised for each industry as the productivity of the workers increases, thus explaining why many industries have raised their levels rather quickly over time. The problem of a large labor force with resulting high levels of unemployment is directly related to the problem of overpopulation. Jaffe and Fort (1956) surveyed the labor force in 1952, finding an average unemployment rate of approximately 15%, with an increase to nearly 25% during the off-season for sugar cane. Reynolds and Gregory (1965) have noted that, rather than resulting in a decrease of unemployment, increased industrialization is resulting in more productive jobs and higher wages for those who are working. Increasing numbers of women will be active in the labor force. Reynolds and Gregory (1965) note that about 60% of the jobs in the new industries were specifically for women. Although this provides families with a working wife or mother with an extra salary, it also tends to disrupt patterns of living and authority in the family, as was noted above. Closely related to the labor force is the labor union. Unions do not play as strong a part in the Puerto Rican labor picture as they do in the United States. Knowles (1966) suggests that, at the present time, as the government sets wage levels rather than management, there is some confusion as to the benefits of the union's function. Also, as the unions compete with each other for members, because most unions are multi-industrial, the workers have no craft union or industrial union with which to identify. However, Knowles thinks that, as agricultural employment decreases and workers begin to become disenchanted with industrial jobs y the union will find a stronger place by gaining benefits for the workers for which, to this time, they have seen no need., but are likely to in the future. The most useful union service at the present time is in airing grievances for the worker. Another factor particularly applicable to industrial expansion in Puerto Rico is that the characteristics of the Puerto Rican

-57businessman tend to differ from those of the United States businessman. Cochran (1959) made a study to discover if these differences had any effect on industrialization. He found several traits in the Puerto Rican which tend to impair entrepreneurial efficiency. Puerto Ricans are not wholly capitalistic. They place a high value on personal worth as well as, if not rather than, financial assets. Their Spanish heritage leads them to mistrust innovation. Also as a result of this heritage, Puerto Ricans tend to look to the family as their chief source of authority and security, and this is carried over into industrial enterprise. Those entrepreneurs who adapt to modern business practices most readily are those who necessarily must have more contact with United States businessmen, such as bankers and industrialists, rather than retail men and merchants. The author concludes that interplay between cultural attitudes and business is so strong that entrepreneurial progressiveness may be correlated with a weakening of traits based on Spanish heritage.

The findings of Reynolds and Gregory (1965) tend to support those of Cochran. They point out that there is really very little difficulty in Puerto Rican industry at the level of the uneducated, unskilled worker. The difficulty instead lies at the managerial level. The authors discovered that, given similar training opportunities and working environments, Puerto Rican workers developed working habits and productivity levels similar to those of mainland workers. Productivity was low in plants where managers tended to have a very poor opinion of the capacities of the Puerto Rican laborer, and thus paid little attention to efficient recruitment techniques, job training, personnel matters, and so forth. Workers tend to respond to managerial expectations. A commonly assumed notion that was found by the authors to be without basis is that workers just beginning to enter industrialized labor markets will work only as many hours as are necessary to earn a salary compatible with the standard of living. More than 50% of those unskilled workers earning the highest per hour wage were willing to work an average of eight hours more per week. This finding correlates with conclusions reached by Gregory (1960). Commitment is easier to obtain on the part of workers entering industrial jobs by preference, rather than by necessity, and tends to be facilitated if workers have been involved in labor markets prior to entry into the industrial labor markets. Most Puerto Rican Laborers have been involved formerly with agricultural labor. All of these findings, as Gregory points out, support the hypothesis offered by Feldman and Moore that "commitment as a means to development is reinforced when the process of change includes the gradual achievement of the ends of development" (G ory, 1960, p. 71). As Puerto Ricans are able to realize benefits in the industrial market rather quickly, particularly when they have farsighted management, problems in gaining commitment become minimal. With regard to the problem of a lack of local financial resources for investment, Maccoby and Fielder (1953) studied saving

-58habits among upper class Puerto Ricans. It was considered that considerable amounts of money are saved, but in ways which prevent use for industrial development. Much is invésted in real estate, which inflates the real estate market, but does not contribute to industry. Those Puerto Ricans in upper income bracke*s are limited in their investment ability through a level of aspirations which is frequently even higher than their incomes, and thus a high level of consumer debt is caused by credit buying. The authors have suggested that local capital can be encouraged through three measures: the issuance of Puerto Rican saving bonds, the development of an investment trust fund, and the selling of securities in new Puerto Rican industrial enterprises. There are some studies that have examined particular sectors of the economy, and are related to social change and public policy through their effect on the economy in general. Eastman and Marx (1950) studied shipping. They discovered that, due to the necessity for goods bound for the Mainland to be carried in American ships, the companies which controlled the shipping were virtually able to monopolize certain routes. It was noted that shipping costs of some of the basic food items were as much as 7% of the total cost of the item, and therefore figured importantly in the Puerto Rican cost of living. The investigators wondered whether low prices for sugar shipments and passenger service were being supported by excessive shipping prices for basic goods. Their conclusions were that the government should probably take a more direct interest in shipping affairs. D. Population : The population problem in Puerto Rico is enormous. The very high death rate began to fall substantially before 1930, but the birth rate has been decreasing only very slowly. The result, as pointed out by Davis,(1953) has been a rate of population increase on the island which itself has been increasing. At the time of his assessment of the situation, Davis saw two factors which tended to balance the excessive increase: a lively economic development and migration. Although the lively economic development will not slow down the rate of increase, it enables the society to support its new members better thus easing the problem. Migration directly tackles the problem of population explosion, although how satisfactory this solution is must be assessed. Migration from Puerto Rico, almost all to the United States, and particularly to New York, has been of importance, Senior (1953). It increased steadily to a net total of 69.124 in 1953, and then decreased to the point that in 1961 over a thousand more Puerto Ricans returned to the island than left it. (Senior. 1966). This trend suggests that any capacity which emigration had to reduce the population problem will perhaps no longer be effective. Senior (1966) in his report tends to view the migration habits of the

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Puerto Ricans positively, claiming that the migrant is benefited as he finds work; the area from which he comes benefits particularly if it has a high unemployment level, which Puerto Rico has; and the area to which he goes also benefits as it gains his labor. Reynolds and Gregory (1965) note that, although the emigration to the United States had fallen by the 1960's, during the period of the 1950's the role played by emigration was crucial, as it drained off laborers from an overcrowded labor force (which would have burdened the government). They would not only have added to unemployment, but would have forced the government to spend on welfare much of what it spent on attracting new labor. Others have not viewed migration so positively. Augelli (1956), in studying migration patterns concerning a tobacco-growing area in the mountains, notes that, although decreasing local economic opportunities cause a migration from Puerto Rico, a large percentage of those leaving the area eventually returned. This is not necessarily negative for, as Reynolds and Gregory (1965) point out, they usually return with more skills and a greater understanding of English. Many have suggested that migrants might tend to be a select group as far as education and skills are concerned. Lewis (1966) found that migrants from the San Juan slum he studied, in comparison to their relatives in San Juan, had on the average two more years of education. Thieme (1959), in studying biological measurements, discovered that migrants are larger and healthier, and thus probably have healthier and better environments than did their non-migrating countryment. Hernández Alvarez (1964), in studying return migration to Puerto Rico, notes that most returning migrants have no intention of settling in Puerto Rico. Instead, a return visit often solidifies desires to settle permanently on the Mainland. Many of those who do return to stay, although slightly more skilled or better educated than when they left, tend to return because they are the most economically vulnerable of the Mainland Puerto Rican population. The author sees this as a repetition of the pattern of Mexicans in the depression of the 1930's, and proposes that it may indicate that Puerto Rican migration has reached an '1economic saturation point" on the Mainland. Second generation Puerto Ricans seldom return. They tend instead to migrate to other areas of the Mainland in their search for better opportunities. The most direct attack on the population problem is to combat high fertility. In determining factors causing high levels of fertility, one must study the basic unit of population production, the family. Hill. Stycos, and Back (1959) suggest that, although population growth presents a general problem for the society, it is a specific family problem as well, for there are many families that have more children than they can adequately care for. Feldman and Hatt (1953)note four factors correlating with low fertility: 1) urban residence; 2) a younger age; 3) high education

-60levels; and 4) the raising of the economic level. The first two of these do not lend themselves to solution by public policy, and the effect of the last is more long-range and indirect. Therefore the authors conclude that the most direct and effective approach to low fertility appears to be through raising education levels. Studies by Stycos (1955) and Hill. Stycos, and Back, (1959) have attempted to look specifically at family structure and interaction in examining high fertility. Both studies presumed that four major factors would be: 1) large family values; 2) ignorance of birth control methods; 3) domination of males by the "machismo" complex; and 4) the influence of the Roman Catholic Church. All these factors were largely disproved by the studies. The early and strict separation of the sexes in Puerto Rican childhood apparently has two results which tend to hinder a decrease of the fertility level. Rebellion by the girls often leads to early marriage and to hasty consensual marriages. These marriages tend to be fruitful as there is a lack of responsibility for the children on the part of the male, and an effort on the part of the female to cement her tenuous consensual relationship with children. Perhaps the biggest barrier to fertility control which results from family structure is the lack of communication between husband and wife. The sexual separation of childhood carried into adulthood. Although the couple make a family, the husband rules the household, while the wife is subservient and submissive. The engagement period does not exist as a time for personality exploration. Hill (1955) reports that even on the college campus students, though having some freedom to date if they so choose, do not make use of an engagement period to get acquainted, but virtually commit themselves to marriage by dating. Landy (1959) concludes that another barrier is thrown between husband and wife by the fact that women see their husbands as symbols of the subservience and burdens of their married life, while men see their wives as symbols of the loss of freedom which marriage brings them. Lack of communication between spouses prevents decreased fertility in two ways: ideal family size is not discussed, and the knowledge concerning the use of contraceptivesis not spread. (Hill et al 1959). Hill, Stycos. and Back discovered two typologies which were of great assistance in predicting fertility. They grouped the families they studied into eight types along a rural-urban continuum, also considering type of marriage and level of education. The conclusion was that those families at the extreme urban end of the continuum were more receptive to change, they quickly perceived family size as a problem and ranked high on general communication. On the other hand, those at the rural extreme were the most conservative in all these areas.

-61The.familistic typologies were identified by the freedom of the wife to be employed, freedom from the husband's dominance in decision making, and freedom from prohibitions on her participation in social activities. More restrictive families tended to be less urban, with fewer legal marriages, and a lower level of education among the wives. They also tended to be more traditional and fatalistic. There was a very low level of communication between spouses, particularly on birth control measures. Despite this low level of communication, these couples tended to be as happily married as the less restrictive families. However, their level of fertility was very high. Although the familistic typology was more accurate in predicting fertility behavior, the authors found a rather high correlation between the two typologies. This has significance in areas other than fertility, as will be mentioned. Birth control education has been attempted on the Island chiefly by pre-maternal clinics, yet they have been unsuccesful. The authors suggest that, by working only with the women, these clinics violate three norms of society: 1) the male centeredness of the Puerto Rican family; 2) the modesty of the women; and 3) the respect and status barriers between husband and wife which prevent the wife from involving her husband with the clinics. The main deficit in the birth control program in Puerto Rico is the lack of family planning. The people have knowledge of birth control methods and the materials are available, but communication patterns within the family are so poor that implementation is markedly hampered. E. Education: As has been noted, Tumin and Feldman (1961) see education as the chief point of leverage of the Puerto Rican social system. Hill et al (1959) have pointed out that education is the best starting point for decreasing the level fertility. Perloff (1950) states that one of the major economic problems in Puerto Rico is a lack of skilled workers, due mainly to poor levels of education. A major study which has attempted to deal with the education problem directly is that of Nieves Falcón (1965). Nieves Falcón found that the school system of the Island grew too fast in the 1940's for quality to be maintained. Increasing numbers of students caused a decrease in the hours at school per student, increased a need for teachers, and resulted in a lowering of the educational requirements for teaching. The schools in the most rural areas suffered the most. This increased educational differences between the upper and the lower classes and made opportunities even more limited for those at the lower end of the socio-economic scale. This gap is accentuated further by the widening of the difference between rural and urban wages (Reynolds and Gregory, 1965). It becomes increasingly difficult financially for their families to

-62allow older boys the opportunity to remain in school beyond an age at which they could be working. In contrast, the quality of university graduates has not decreased with the increase in university enrollment. There are two reasons for this: 1) nearly 50% of the university students drop out prior to graduation, the majority of these for academic reasons; and 2) nearly one-third of the rest take Longer than four years to finish their degree. However, according to Nieves Falcón, there are two problems in university education which may tend to have long-term adverse effects on the Puerto Rican society. One is that the students in the college of Education tend to be of poorer quality academically than the rest of the students, promoting a cycle that tends to be self-perpetuating. The other is that the university tends to be training students for the particular positioasin society that are available for them, rather than giving them a broad-based education. F. Social Problems: Public policy is often directed specifically toward the elimination of certain social problems, but as was noted above, further problems are sometimes the by-products of the policy. Ferracuti (1965) has pointed out that the increase of juvenile delinquency and appearance of drug addiction in Puerto Rico coinciding with the rapid increase and success of economic planning is due in large measure to a failure of social planning to balance economic planning. Rogler and Hollingshead (1965) have made a fairly detailed study of mental illness, specifically of schizophrenia, among Puerto Rican slum dwellers. They discovered that schizophrenia tends to be related more to immediate environment than to family background. There tended to be no differences between the childhoods of schizoprenics and non-schizophrenics. For approximately one year prior to the onset of evidence of their disease, schizophrenics had gone through several major family crises, and had eventually suffered major impairment in their ability to perceive their environments realistically. The authors point out that schizophrenia, and mental diseases in general, tend to be more prevalent among the poor than among the members of the upper and middle classes. Lewis (1966) also included high prevalence and tolerance of mental illness among his characteristics of a "culture of poverty". Rogler (1966) has suggested that members of the lower classes perhaps have fewer opportunities and outlets for release of frustrations, and thus they tend to have deeper psychiatric problems. Perhaps the prevalence of mental disease in Puerto Rico is related to the large percentage of the population which occupies the lower classes. A more general problem is that of the slum itself. One of the means of combating this problem is the relocation of slum dwellers in housing projects. Back (1962) studied people moving

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into housing projects and distinguished two types. The passive type moves because often they are unable to make their way satisfactorily in the slums because they are the most economically vulnerable. There are also those who choose to move as they want to use the new home as a broader economic base from which to improve their lives. These persons often move on quickly, as economic opportunities open, leaving the most passive type behind. Roder and Hollingshead (1966) in noting that the slum dweller generally is more content than the resident of the housing project, suggest that this is probably due to the fact that slum rules tend to be developed from the group, whereas policies in housing projects tend to be dictated by the middle class elements of the society. It may be concluded that resettlement may perhaps best be accomplished by attempting to work with the people to improve their environment, rather than forcing them to change it. Caplow, Stryker. and Wallace (1964) studied twenty five neighborhoods in the greater San Juan area in an attempt to discover various characteristics of neighborhoods where interactions between neighbors tended to be most satisfying to the inhabitants. They discovered that the superficial appearance of the neighborhood could not be correlated to the level of satisfaction of the interaction within it. They concluded that there are two ways in which community planning can assist in developing networks of satisfying neighboring. An attempt can be made to raise the socio-economic level, and the quality of housing can be improved. IV. Conclusion As this inventory of research with regard to social change and public policy is concluded, it is difficult to refrain from noting that several items seem important, and are alluded to frequently, but are not dealt with directly. These appear to be in need of restudy or primary investigation. 1. The changing role of the Puerto Rican woman is very uncertain. There is much contrary evidence as to what her present roles are and how they are changing. She has now more opportunity for equality in education and for employment. Yet her stable position in the family conflicts with her submissive role. (See pages 75-76). What effect will these changes have on the family as a unit and on other institutions? 2. It would be useful to determine which attitudes and forms of interaction are unique to the Puerto Rican society and to establish how these affect patterns of change which accompany industrialization, increasing education, and so forth. For example, to what extent do such concepts as "respeto'1 and "relajo" influence the capacity of the Puerto Rican person to work efficiently in a group setting? Does the attitude of dignidad impair his ability to receive constructive criticism and to share ideas with others?

-64As mentioned before, I feel it to be of importance to look for other idioms which may be of particular relevance to the Puerto Rican society, as they would be useful points of focus at which to notice the impact of cultural characteristics upon the process of change. 3. Many authors have mentioned the importance of education, and some have studied the formal education system. But what about informal education? Are there not many channels of informationsharing other than those in the school system? What are these, and how can these be used in conjunction with formal systems? 4. The political status question is important, as much hinges on the eventual results, such as economic welfare, educational policy and possibly individual welfare. These are only a small sample of the concerns which I feel have significance for a better understanding of social change and which have also implications for public policy. The fact that many researchers have reached similar conclusions in several fields of endeavor suggests that there is reason for optimism for the usefulness of research for policy programs.

i i

-65V. Selected Indices of Social and Economic Progress 1940

1950

1960

1965

Population (in thousands)

1,869

2,211

2,350

2,626

Density (per square mile)

543

682

Estimated Birth rate (per 1,000 population)

39.0

39.6

31.6

29.7

Estimated Death rate (per 1,000 population

18.2

10.5

6.6

6.5

Percentage of Population living in rural areas

69.7

55.8

Gross product - in current prices (millions of dollars)

287

755

1,688

2,757

Net income per capita (in current dollars)

121

279

585

900

Imports (millions of dollars)

107

345

915

1,515

Exports (millions of dollars)

235

622

974

Percentage of Employed in: Agriculture, forestry, and fishing

Manufacturing (except home needle work)

Trade

Government

Other

Percentage Unemployed

75.3

83.0

Life Expectancy (in years)

Literacy of population ten years old and over (percent) 68.5

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Bibliography Books Back, Kurt W., Slums, Projects and People: Social Psychological Problems of Relocation in Puerto Rico, (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1962) Baer, Werner, The Puerto Rican Economy and United States Economic Fluctuations, Rio Piedras: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, 1962). Bourne, Dorothy D. and Bourne, James R., Thirty Years of Social Change in Puerto Rico: A Case Study of Ten Selected Rural Areas, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966). Brameld, Theodore, The Remaking of a Culture: Life and Education in Puerto Rico, (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1959). Caplow, Theodore; Stryker, Sheldon, and Wallace, Samuel C., The Urban Ambience: A Study of San Juan. Puerto Rico, (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1964). Cochran, Thomas C., The Puerto Rican Businessman: A Study in Cultural Change, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959). Eastman, Samuel Ewer and Marx, Daniel, Jr., Ships and Sugar: An Evaluation of Puerto Rican Offshore Shipping, (Rio Piedras: Editorial Universitaria, 1953). Hansen, Earl P., Puerto Rico: All for Progress, (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962. Hatt, Paul K., Backgrounds of Human Fertility in Puerto Rico: A Sociological Survey (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 19525. Hill, Reuben; Stycos, J. Mayone, and Back, Kurt W., The Family and Population Control: A Puerto Rican Experiment in Social Change, (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959). Isard, Walter; Schooler, Eugene W. and Vietorisz, Thomas, Industrial Complex Analysis and Regional Development: A Case Study of Refinery-Petrochemical-Synthetic-Fiber and Puerto Rico, (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York: 1959). Landy, David, Tropical Childhood: Cultural Transmission and Learning in a Rural Puerto Rican Village, Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959).

-67Lastra, Carlos J., The Impact of Minimum Wages on a Labor-Oriented Industry, (Santurce: Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico, Govbank Technical Papers, No. 1, 1964). Lewis, Gordon, Freedom and Power in the Caribbean, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963). Lewis, Oscar, La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty, New York: Random House, 1966). Maccoby, Eleanor E. and Fielder, Frances, Saving Among Upper-Income Families in Puerto Rico, (Rio Piedras: Editorial Universitaria,

1953). Nieves Falcón, Luis, Recruitment to Higher Education in Puerto Rico. 1940-1960, (Rio Piedras: Editorial Universitaria, 1965). Perloff, Harvey S., Puerto Rico's Economic Future: A Study in Planned Development, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950). Reynolds, Lloyd G. and Gregory, Peter with assistance of Torruellas, Luz M., Wages. Productivity. and Industrialization in ?uerto Rico, (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., l 5). Roberts, Lydia and Stefani, Rosa Luisa, Patterns of Living in Puerto Rican Families, (Rio Piedras: Editorial Universita-

ria, 1949). Rogler, Lloyd H. and Hollingshead, August B., Trapped: Families and Schizophrenia, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965).

Steward, Julian H., et al, The Pople of Puerto Rico: A Study in Social Anthropology, (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1956). Stycos, J. Mayone, Families and Fertility in Puerto Rico: A Study of the Lower Income Group, New York: Columbia University Press, 1955). Tumin, Melvin M. and Feldman, Arnold S., Social Class and Social Change in Puerto Rico, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961).

Other Material ~-

Augelli, John P., "San Lorenzo, a Case Study of Recent Migrations in Interior Puerto Rico", The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Volume II, No. 2, (January, 1952).

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Ayala, Francisco, "The Transformation of the Spanish Heritage", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (January, 1953, pp. 104-110.) Back, Kurt W., "The Change-prone Person in Puerto Rico", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 3, (1958), pp. 330 .0 Back, Kurt W., Hill, Reuben and Stycos, J. Mayone, "The Dynamics of Family Planning", Marriage and Family Living, XVIII, No. 3, (August, 1956), pp. 195-200. , "The Puerto Rican Field Experiment in Population Control", Human Relations, X, No. 4, (1957), pp. 315-334. Barton, H. C., Jr., "Puerto Rico's Industrial Development Program", A Pre-publication copy of a paper presented at a seminar of the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University, held at Cambridge, Mass., October, 1959. Baer, Wernar, "Puerto Rico: An Evaluation of a Successful Development Program", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXIII, (November, 1959), pp. 645-671. Davis, Kingsley, "Puerto Rico: A Crowded Island", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 285, January, 1953), pp. 116-123. Eisenstadt, Shmuel N., "Institutionalization and Change", American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, (April, 1964), pp. 235-248. Emerson, Rupert, "Puerto Rico and American Policy Toward Dependent Areas", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 285, (January, 1953), pp. 9-16. Feldman, Arnold S. and Hatt, Paul K., "Social Structure as Affecting Fertility in Puerto Rico", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 285, (January, 1953), pp. 123-130. Fernós-Isern, Antonio, "From Colony to Commonwealth", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 285, (January, 1953), pp. 16-23. Ferracuti, Franco, "Juvenile Delinquency and Social Change in Puerto Rico",a paper read at the Symposium on "Psychological Research related to Social and Economic Innovations Abroad", held at the 1966 APA Meeting, New York. (Mimeographed). , "Etiological Research and Prevention of Delinquency in Countries Undergoing Rapid Social Change", a paper read at the Symposium "Youth in Revolt around the World", held at the 1965 APA meeting, Chicago. (Mimeographed).

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Friedrich, Carl J., "The World Significance of the New Constitution", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 285, (January, 195 , pp. 42-48. Galbraith, J. K. and Solo, Carolyn Shaw, "The Puerto Rican Lessons in Economic Development", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (January, 1953), pp. 55-60.

(New

Gregory, Peter, "The Labor Market in Puerto Rico", in Wilbert E. Moore and Arnold S. Feldman, Labor Commitment and _Social York: Social Science ReChange in Developing Areas, search Council, 1960), pp. 136-172. Gutiérrez-Franqui, Victor and Wells, Henry, "The Commonwealth Constitution'', The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 285, (January, 1953), pp. 33-42. Hamilton, Walton, "The Puerto Rican Economy Linked with the Mainland", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 285, (January, 1953), pp. 76-85. Hansen, Millard, "Commonwealth of Puerto Rico", Collier's Encyclopedia., 17th ed. XVI, ( 1963). "Training ad Research in Puerto Rico", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 285, (January, 1953), pp. 1.10-116. , "The Family in Puerto Rico Research Project", Approaches to Problems of High Fertility in Agrarian Societies, a paper presented at the 1951 Annual Conference of the Milbank Memorial Fund, New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1952, pp. 50-61. Hernández Alvarez, José, "Return Migration in Puerto Rico", September, 1964. (Mimeographed) Hill, Reuben, "Courtship in Puerto Rico: An Institution in Transition", Marriage and Family Living,, XVII, (February, 1955), pp. 26-35. , "Impediments to Freedom of Mate Selection in Puerto Rico", Journal of Home Economics, XLVII, (March, 1955), pp. 189-197. "Fertility Control in Underdeveloped Areas: The Case in Puerto Rico", The Torch, XXX, No. 2 (April, 1957), pp. 34-38. Hill, Reuben; Back, :Curt W. and Stycos, J. Mayone, "Intra-Family Communication and Fertility Planning in Puerto Rico", Rural Sociology, XX, September-December, 1955), pp. 258-271.

-70"Family Structure and Fertility in Puerto Rico", Social Problems, (October, 1955), pp. 73-93. Hoiiingshead, August B. and Rogler, Lloyd H., "Lower Socio-Economic Status and Mental Illness", Sociology and Social Research, XLVI, (July, 1962). , "Attitudes Toward Slums and Public Housing in Puerto Rico", reprinted from Leonard J. Duhl, The Urban Condition, pp. 229-245. Hunter, Robert J., "Historical Survey of the Puerto Rico Status Question, 1898-1965" in Status of Puerto Rico: Selected Background Studies prepared for the United States-Puerto Rican Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico, 1966, pp. 50-147. Jaffe, A. J. and Fort de Ortiz, Elydia, "The Human Resource Puerto Rico's Working Force", in Eugenio Fernandez }vténdez, editor, Portrait of a Society: A Book of Readings on Puerto Rican Sociology, (Rio Piedras: University of Puerto Rico Press, 1956), pp. 88-112. :<nowles, William, and Politics in Puerto Rico", in Status of Puerto Rico: Selected Background Studies prepared for United States-Puerto Rican Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico, pp. 315-339. Laura, Anthony, "Respeto, Relajo and Interpersonal Relations in Puerto Rico", Anthmaolo~ical Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2, (April, 1964), pp. 53-67. Lewis, Oscar, "Even the Saints Cry", Transaction, (November, 1966), pp. 31-41. Manners, Robert A., "Tabara: Subcultures of a Tobacco and Mixed Crops Community" in Julian H. Steward et al, The People of Puerto Rico: A Study in Social Anthropology, (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1955), pp. 93-171. The Subculture of Workers on a GoMintz, Sidney W., vernment Owned Sugar Plantation" in Julian H. Steward et al, The People of Puerto Rico: A Study in Social Anthropology. (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1955), pp. 314-418. , "Puerto Rico: An Essay in the Definition of a National Culture" in Status of Puerto Rico: Selected Background Studies prepared for United States-Puerto Rican Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico, 1966, pp. 339-435. Moore, Wilbert E., "A Reconsideration of Theories of Social Change" American Sociological Review, XXV, (December, 1960), pp. 810-818.

-71Moscoso, Teodoro, "Industrial Development in Puerto Rico", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 285, (January, 1953), pp. 60-70. Muñoz Amato, Pedro, "Congressional Conservatism and the Commonwealth Relationship", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 285, (January, 1953), pp. 23-33. Muñoz Marín, Luis, "Development Through Democracy", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 285, (January, 1953, pp. 1-9. Padilla Seda, Elena, "Nocorá: The Subculture of Workers on a Government Owned Sugar Plantation" in Julian H. Steward et al, The People of Puerto Rico: A Study in Social Anthropology, (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1955), pp. 265-314. Perloff, Harvey S., "Transforming the Economy", The Annals of the American Ac demy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 285, (January, 195)), pp. 48-55. Picó, Rafael, "The Role of Planning in Puerto Rico", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.

285, (January, 1953), pp. 48-55. Rogler, Charles G., "The Morality of Race Mixing in Puerto Rico", Social Forces, Volume 25, pp. 77-81. , "The Role of Semantics in the Study of Race Distance in Puerto Rico", Social Forces, Vol. 22, (1944), pp. 448-453. Rogler, Lloyd, "Trapped: A Study of Schizophrenia among Puerto Rico's Poor" in San Juan Review, Vol. 2, No. 12, (January, 1966), pp. 1~-22. Rottenberg, Simon, "Labor's Role in Industrialization", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 285, (January, 1953), pp. 85-91. Ruml, Beardsley, "Financial Institutions in Puerto Rican Development", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 285, (January, 1953, pp. 91-95. Saavedra de Roca, Angelina, "Algunos Valores Prevalecientes en la Sociedad Puertorriqueña", Revista de Ciencias Sociales, VII, (March-June, 1963), pp. 121-140.

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Scheele, Raymond L., "The Prominent Families of Puerto Rico", in Julian H. Steward et a1, The People of Puerto Rico: A Study in Social Anthropology, (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1955, pp. 418-463. Senior, Clarence, "Migration and Puerto Rico's Population Problem", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 285, January, 1953), pp. 130-137. Senior Clarence and Watkins, Donald O., "Toward a Balance Sheet of Puerto Rican Migration" in Status of Puerto Rico: Selected Background Studies, prepared for the United States-Puerto Rican Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico, 1966, pp. 689-796. Stanton, Howard, "Puerto Rico's Changing Families", Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, IV, pp. 101-107. Steward, Julian H., "Culture Patterns of Puerto Rico", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, ZJanuary, 195 95-104. Stycos, J. Mayone and Hill, Reuben, "The Prospects of Birth Control in Puerto Rico", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (January, 1953), pp. 137-145. Tugwell, Rexford G., "What Next for Puerto Rico", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 285, (January, 1953), pp. 145-153. "Dignidad and its Implications" in Eugenio Fernández Méndez, Ed., Portrait of a Society: A Book of Readings on Puerto Rican Sociology, (Rio Piedras: University of Puerto Rico, 1956), pp. 259-263. Tumin, Melvin ., "Competing Status Systems in Wilbert W. Poore and Feldman, Arnold S., Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas, (New York: Social Science Research Council, 196d), pp. 277-290. Tumin, Melvin M. and Feldman, Arnold S., "The Miracle of Sabana Grande", Public Opinion Quarterly, XIX, (February, 1955), pp. 125-139. "Status, Perspectives and Achievement: Education and Class Structure in Puerto Rico", American Sociological Review, XXI, (August, 1956), pp. 464472. Wallace, Samuel, et al, "An Other-Directed Fantasy in a Puerto Rican", Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 58, (1962), pp. 43-60.

-73Wolf, Eric, "San José: Subcultures of a Traditional Coffee Municipality" in Julian H. Steward, et al, The People of Puerto Rico: A Study in Social Anthropology, (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press,3955), pp. 171-265. Wolf, Katheleen, L., "Growing Up and Its Price in Three Puerto Rican Subcultures", Psychiatry, Vol. 15, (1952), pp. 401433.

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RESEARCH GOALS AND STRATEGIES By Rafael de Jesús Toro and Franco Ferracuti

For many centuries, from the ancient Greeks to Francis Bacon, scores of scribes, philosophers and generals spoke of and wrote about society and social patterns. History was conceived as an endless series of cycles, each society unceasingly changing but endlessly returning to a prior form; to Aristotle, the number and kinds of social organization were finite, and each had to obey certain "laws", as fixed as the laws of geometry. This view persisted throughout the Middle Ages and even in early modern times. Isaac Newton made a last grandiose attempt in the 17th century to explain nothing less than the physical universe in terms of the "laws of nature's. In the middle of the 18th century philosophers such as Montesquieu and Hume, and the biologist Lamarck were beginning to cast their observations in a newer mold, that of evolution. The concept that things not only change, but that they change into new and totally different things, was intruding itself into history, philosophy and natural science. For Darwin in the 19th century, the conc<~pt was expressed as the "origin of species", in Marx as the development of "quantitative" into "qualitative changes". Gradually, the belief spread that the most important social, economic and even physical processes (as represented, for example, in government, economic production and the movement of heavenly bodies), commented upon by the philosophers for ages, were all evolving into new forms. Now, with the aid of this concept, much of what had been a mystery was suddenly and dramatically made apparently explicable; so great was the enthusiasm of such scientists as Huxley and Spencer that they proclaimed no riddle to be insoluble. And to the greatest mystery of all: What was happening to the old social order?, the answer was given: It was changing! And it was changing into something entirely new, where old "natural laws" (from Divine Right of icings to the irresistibility of the force of gravity) no longer applied, and where change became the rule rather than an irregularity. Henceforth, it would no longer be adequate to describe a phenomenon at a single time in its existence; scientists would demand to know how it originated, what forces brought it to its present state, and into what new things we could expect it to change. Today, many parts of the world, and all important social process in them--from the production of commodities to the socialization of infants--are undergoing continuous and drastic change. They are not the familiar and repetitive changes vital to the continued existence of any organism--physical or so& al--rather, they are changes in the patterns of relationships between the corn-

-75ponent parts of the social organism, that is, changes in the basic organization itself. Puerto Rico's rate of social and economic change during the last generation has been one of the highest in the world. The usual economic indicators all reflect this--and the background material prepared for this gives ample evidence of the fact. The economic change has been accomplished by a predictable and dramatic increase of social problems, as reflected in indexes of social pathology. The preventive and treatment aspects of these problems are under serious scrutiny and the administrative and normative structures are being subjected to questioning as to their validity and usefulness. From a traditional pattern of colonial rigi.d social system, the Commonwealth has been propelled into an advanced XX century condition of progress. The "revolution of rising expectations" has become a constant companion of the existential problem of any Puerto Rican. The dramatic developments in Puerto Rico during the last generation--the positive ones as well as the negative--merit comprehensive and overall examination. While a large number of studies have been conducted on specific and important economic, social and social-pathological questions and problems during the last two decades, no attempt has been made to evaluate the overall experience, to compare actual developments with stated goals and objectives or to reassess priorities in view of recent achievements and shortcomings. A first reason, then, for studying social change in Puerto Rico is an academic and intellectual interest. The country has undergone extremely rapid socioeconomic change in recent times. Furthermore, its small geographical area and the relatively large number of studies and information already available greatly facilitate the planning and the implementation of adequate research efforts. What does the Puerto Rican experience suggest regarding the interrelationships between economic growth and social change? Do certain types of economic change always result in given kinds of social behavior? Does a high level of "social development"--in terms of education and health--tend to generate a more rapid development of the economy? Or, is it that increased production facilitates the attainment of a higher social level? Or, are both propositions correct? how much social pathology, in its various phenomenologies, must be accounted for and accepted as part of the price to pay for progress and modernization? There are, of course, other important questions. Can a "valid" theory, or set of hypotheses, be developed, based on the experience

-76of Puerto Rico and other countries? Is this too ambitious at this stage? Are we, then, to pursue studies on socioeconomic questions without integrating hypotheses that facilitate our understanding of what is happening in our midst? Can we only study the process, or can we try to direct it or, at least to prevent or minimize its negative effects? Does, or does not, the principle of indeterminacy apply also to social change? On a different level, a study of social change can bring clearer perspectives and deeper insights that are useful, indeed ne!~essary, for a more rational planning. Econornic plans and measures should not be taken without due concern for the social results once a better knowledge is available of the interrelationships between economic and social factors. Indeed, the whole concept of social planning has no operational meaning if more precise knowledge about the process of socioeconomic change is not forthcoming. Adherence to a political philosophy of liberalism does not prevent the maximum use of preventive policies. To undertake a comprehensive study in Puerto Rico today could

simply follow a well-established historical pattern. The first such report was issued by Alejandro O'Reilly to the King of Spain in 1765. It was followed by similarly comprehensive Memoriales in the first and second halves of the 19th century. The end of the Spanish-American War of 1898 ushered in a new series of reports and studies which were followed by others in later years; culminating with the Brookings Institution study,of 1930. The 1930's witnessed not only a proliferation of studies on many aspects of Puerto Rican life but it was a period of anguished soulsearching by Puerto Rican intellectuals and political leaders. The 1940 victory of the Popular Democratic Party brought into the governmental power structure many of the ideas and plans developed during the depression years.

While the number of studies of social and economic subjects conducted in the last twenty-five years has been unprecedented, Puerto Rico i..s certainly "in" as far as social science field operations are concerned, more than a quarter of a century has elapsed since the last major re-evaluation of the Island's goals and needs, and the means to achieve them, was undertaken. Public policy would greatly benefit from the ideas and information yielded by a comprehensive study of social change in Puerto Rico during the last gene-

ration. A seminar like the one we are attending brings together persons with different backgrounds and interests and evokes a generalized set of responses in terms of research goals. Several of these goals are outlined in the preparatory documents and, inevitably, this exposes to the risks of repetition, arbitrary selection and vagueness. However, this risk must be faced in order to move from the broad encompassing goals outlined before towards more immediate short-term goals, to be selected and possibly

-77ranked on a priority basis by the concentrated efforts and skills of interested participants. At this stage, the discussion should perhaps concentrate on a list of short-term goals, as they emerge in view of the present status of social change research in Puerto Rico, in view of what seems to be the more urgent and inescapable needs of the Puerto Rican society and in view of the not unlimited financial and manpower resources which will be available to any concentrated research and planning effort in the Island. A goal has to be defined as a purpose for a research effort, which finds theoretical and/or practical justification and warrants a time-money-personnel expenditure in the social-economic context of the Island. No ranking should, and will, be attempted at this stage. A number of studies, particularly those from the UNRISD in Geneve have outlined the intercorrelation of social indicators of development and the possibility of building predictive models from a restricted number of objective indicators. For example, health and education seem to move together and, although no etiological explanation of this fact is as yet available, the parallel movement in itself is suggestive for theoretical purposes. Similar correlations should be analyzed for the Commonwealth, with a view to establish adequate predictive models. These should incorporate the social and socio-psychological elements of change as well as the traditional economic indicators. Any predictive model really consists of two parts, as Roy Francis has pointed out. On the one hand, it is predicted that certain fundamental conditions will either remain constant or change in certain expected ways. On the other, it is predicted that given these basic conditions certain events will or will not take place. However, when there is a negative value connotation with regard to a predicted event, efforts are made to change the very basic conditions on which the prediction is based. Thus, the establishment of etiological relationships between the predicted events and the conditions on which they are based is all-important. For this reason, etiology and pathogenesis of social problems should form part of a problem of study of social change. It has been held by many scientists in recent years that economic growth seems to possess a "welfare effect" and, conversely, that social factors possess a "productivity effect". This indicates a need for a coordinated analysis or the social-economic profile of a country and underscores the urgency for balanced planning. However, experience has amply proved that blueprints for balanced developments are not transferrable from country to country and that, if they fail to take into account the cultural reality of the country in which they are implemented, they meet resistance and objections from the expected participants in the development process. It has been claimed that development is a process of westernization, and the label of 'Americanization" has sometimes been attached to the process. Unless such labels are removed, the

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process may meet with political resistance which may frustrate its acceptance and obscure its goals. The dichotomy of change-prone versus change-resistant has been attached to individuals and nations. At the individual level, it seems that existing studies in Puerto Rico and in other developing countries warrant the hypothesis that this dichotomy may be complicated by another typological differentiation: change fit versus change unfit individuals. Without wishing to embark at this state of our knowledge, upon any refined typological effort, it could be suggested that, possibly, the following groups should be considered in an analysis of the process of change at the individual level: 1. Change prone and change fit. 2. Change prone and change unfit. 3. Change resistant and change fit. 4. Change resistant and change unfit. Type one, change prone and change fit, would almost, inescapably be the leader of the changing process and ultimately its finest product, the other three types may define subcultures of resistance, pathological groups and lag-producing blocks of the population. This is true in spite of general societal aims irreversibly committed to progress. Any progressive social policy should obviously make allowance for and take remedial action against the social and the individual ills and problems which derive from the presence of pockets of resistance and unfitness for accelerated change. One obvious goal of a social change study should be the isolation of these critical areas and the suggestion of adequate remedial action. Moving from the molar to the molecular of the Puerto Rican society, the standard diagnostic and assessment tools which we use to estimate elements such as skill, I. Q., "adjustment", mental health, level of socialization, etc., must be revised and adapted to the changing conditions of the individuals. This process must take place at several professional and technical levels in order to avoid psycho-pathological mislabeling and confusion concerning normal adjustive processes of the individual under study, which may appear deviant to the diagnostician committed to a value system different from that of his subjects or patients. The Puerto Rican value system has been the object of many studies, which are summarized in one of the introductory papers. A process of change inevitably involves revising and challenging the traditional values in view of new opportunities and of increased possibilities. No rigid adherence to "the good old times" appears realistic. The spread of mass media, the increase of opportunities which is implicit in an open social structure, the concern with maximum utilization of the manpower and intellectual

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resources of the country, make the value change process inevitable. Some degree of anomie, instances of frustration, intragenerational conflicts are some of the consequences of the process of acquisition of future-oriented expectations. The "Puerto Rican with international range of vision" which the mass media present as an Ego-ideal must first break the shell of protective and passive isolation. Whenever this process takes place, particularly in a former colonialistic culture, the indigenous culture may become a subculture to the emerging society. To retain the original identity of self-respect and the historical continuity, the culture retainers become a more committed group, thereby finding themselves in opposition to the dominant developing culture. A careful analysis of the value system of such groups in non-political terms seems in order. Many other research goals have been discussed in the introductory papers, and we can only second most of them. The problem of the "legal lag" seems to be of great practical relevance and similar lags may exist in other normative structures, different from formalized codes. At a general social policy level, these lags cause a premature arteriosclerosis of existing structure and hamper development. The individualization of such lags seems to constitute another high priority goal of a progress of studies on social change. The methodology of a program of studies of social change can obviously be discussed only after goals are selected and transformed into specific projects and after their ranking in terms of priority has been made. Social change is a typical interdisciplinary concept and calls for close collaboration of many disciplines ranging from the sociological to the biological spectrum of human knowledge. No single discipline should be allowed to claim and establish prevalence in the analysis of the process of development of a society. However, the usual claim for interdisciplinary cooperation is not enough. An adequate effort should be made for an integrated research program. Several types of integration are possible. One of us has discussed this problem, in collaboration with M. E. Wolfgang, in a different context. Some of the concepts outlined in that discussion can perhaps be cited. The following types of integration are possible: 1. integration of disciplines in initiating and conducting research; 2. integration of scientific theory and data within and between disciplines; 3. integration of scientific theory and practice in social policy and in remedial and preventive action. Efforts towards integration are part of the middle-range approach, and particularly in the early stage of a research, emphasis

-80should be placed on the first two types mentioned above. The strategy and practical elements of interdisciplinary collaboration are, of course, of paramount importance. In 1951-1952 several behavioral science conferences on interdisciplinary team research methods and problems met under the auspices of the National Training Laboratories of the National Education Association. The patterns of collaboration which were discussed and described by the delegates included the following: 1. Fusion. In this approach, 'disciplinary loyalties are discarded and all researchers subscribe to an over-all theoretical system within which an attempt is made to handle all problems that are undertaken'. 2. Multivariate Approach - with a common focus. Members of a research team 'work together on the same central problem but use their own methods and stay essentially within their own theoretical framework". 3. Formal Integration - within which the separateness of disciplines is maintained. 4. Division of problem into subinquiries with interdisciplinary collaboration. 5. Collation. This is the loosest kind of collaboration; a type of interdisciplinary research in which members of different disciplines, each with different theories, work in the same general problem area without any specific provisions for integration. They exchange information and data, but essentially each uses his own techniques to work on his own part of the research'. It should be obvious from the previous discussion that fusion should be favored in reference to interdisciplinary research. The initial stages of research may also accept the multivariate approach as a necessary intermediate step towards fusion. Also, it does not appear necessary to discard disciplinary loyalty in the sense that one abandons intellectual attachment to concepts, theories, and findings if these have been fruitful in producing operational hypotheses and useful data. What should be discarded in fusion and in the multivariate approach is an unidimensional perspective on the problems under investigation, for each team member must expand and accept the injection of concepts, theories, and findings into his own set of ideas so that meaningful integration can be achieved. •n guideline for problem selection, design planning and research direction, could be sketched as follows:

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A. From the standpoint of the research problem 1. Focus on a single set of clearly defined problems. 2. Problem definition determined by demands of problem rather than by disciplinary or individual interests. 3. Formulation of the research problem in such a way that all participants can contribute to its solution. 4. Existence of collaborative potential as a result of previous work on the problem by more than one discipline. 3. From the standpoint of theory 1. Acceptance of a unified overall theory, when available. 2. Acceptance of a common set of hypotheses and assumptions. 3. Agreement on definition of common concepts. 4. Agreement on operational definitions. C. From the standpoint of methodology 1. Utilization of resources of all relevant disciplines in exploring possible methodologies. 2. Team agreement on most appropriate methodology, including research procedures, relevant variables to be measured or controlled, and methods to he used. D. From the standpoint of group functioning 1. Selection of team members on basis of their ability to contribute to research objectives. 2. Approximate parity of influence exerted by the representatives of one discipline on another. 3. Acceptance of leadership regardless of disciplines from which leader and researchers come. 4. FlexibiLity of roles. 5. Development and use of a common language. 6. Free communication among all team members. 7. Free interchange of information about the research, with mechanics for facilitating such interchange when necessary.

-828. Sharing of suggestions, ideas, and data: among members from different disciplines. 9. Participation of all team members in joins planning of each step of the research. 10. Reciprocal teaching and learning among team members--a continuous learning process. 11. Problem-centered rather than discipline- or individual-centered team activity. 12. Minimum influence on research plans and operations exerted from outside the research team. 13. Willingness of participants to subordinate their own methods and interest to achieve project aims. 14. Publication of research reports by the group as a whole rather than by individual members. In the area of social change, the goals outlined in the preceding pages and the research strategy to be adhered to can, possibly, best be achieved by the establishment of a Program of Research on Social Change which should select and carry out a coordinated group of studies, rather than by one large scale single research effort.

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Selected References (Mrs. Ineke Cunningham, in her preparatory paper An Inventory of Research in Puerto Rico Relevant to Social Change and Public Policy has collected a comprehensive list of basic materials. A large amount of important information is also included in the Status Commission Reports. Following are other items which we have used in the preparation of our paper). Albizu-Miranda, C., Matlin, N. and Stanton, H. R., The Successful Retardate, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, March 1966 (mimeographed report). An., Social Change and Criminality, A/Conf. 26/1, Working paper prepared by the Secretariat for the Third United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Stockholm, 9-18 August 1965. Banon Luzzki, N1., Interdisciplinary Team Research Methods and Problems, N. 3, Research Training Series, New York, National Training Laboratories, 1958. Department of Psychiatry, Report on Comprehensive Mental Health Planning in Puerto Rico. 19615, School of Medicine, University of Puerto Rico, 1966. Ferracuti, F., Juvenile Delinquency and Social Change in Puerto Rico, (in press), 1966. Francis, R. G., The Predictive Process, Rio Piedras, Social Science Research Center, 1960. Soddy, X. and Ahrenfeldt, R. H. (Ed.), Mental Health in a Changing World. London, Tavistock Publications, 1965. UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development), Aspects of Social and Economic Growth. A Pilot Statistical Study, Report No. 1, Geneva, October 1965. UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development), Social and Economic Factors in Development. Introductory Considerations on their Meaning. Measurement and Interdependence, Report No. 3, Geneva, February 1966. Wilkins, L. T., Social Deviance, London, Tavistock Publications, 1964. Wolfgang, M. E. and Ferracuti, F., The Subculture of Violence. Towards an Integrated Theory in Criminology, London, Tavistock Publications, 1967.

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NOTES ON THE GROWTH OF ARGENTINA AND THOUGHTS IT SUGGESTS ON SOCIAL CHANGE AND PUBLIC POLICY By Carlos F. Díaz Alejandro

Between 1860 and 1930 the real gross domestic products of Argentina expanded at an estimated average annual rate of at least 5 per cent. It is doubtful that very many countries in the world have managed to grow so fast for such a long period of time. Argentina public policy during these years took full advantage of the relatively free trade and international factor mobility (of both labor and capital) which existed in the world. The mobile factors or production were brought over to cooperate with the unusually fertile Pampean land, while the output resulting from such combination was to a large extent exported to expanding world markets. The whole arrangement was very sensible and came close to fulfilling ideals of economic efficienty. Thanks to these policies, by 1929 Argentina had reached a level of gross national product per capita of around 660 U. S. dollars (at 1964 prices). While this per capita figure was below that for the United States ($1,790 at 1964 prices) and even below those for Australia and Canada (around $825-$900 at 1964 prices, the overall growth rate of the gross national product in Argentina during the previous seventy years was probably very similar to those of these countries. Population expansion, which in these resource-rich, labor-poor countries could be taken as an index of "progress", was larger in Argentina than in Canada and Australia between 1869 and 1929: In Argentina, population in 1929 was 5.2 times what it had been in 1869, while for Canada and Australia the corresponding figures were 2.8 and 4.0, respectively. Between 1895 and 1929, while the population of Argentina grew at an annual rate of 3.2 per cent, that of Canada grew at 2.1 per cent, while that for Australia expanded at only 1.8 per cent per annum. The overall real gross domestic product of Australia grew at an annual rate of 2.5 per cent between 1900 and 1929, while the corresponding Argentine figure was 4.8 per cent. Furthermore, it should be remembered that while in both Australia and Canada the non-European native population was insignificant, in Argentina this was not the case; especially in the western and north-western zones, there were relatively large groups of citizens of Indian background, often with attitudes less favorable to growth than those of European immigrants. It is likely that the per capita income of the residents of the Pampean zone in 1929 was very close to that of Australia and Canada, while its growth rate in the previous sixty or seventy years had been higher than those in Canada and Australia.

#Data and other information in this paper have been obtained from a forthcoming monograph on Argentine growth I am preparing for the Economic Growth Center of Yale University.

-85In 1928/1929 Argentina ranked in eleventh place among the major trading nations in the world. Its merchandise exports per capita were not far behind those of Australia and Canada; in 1928/1929 U.S. dollars, per capita exports were 90 dollars a year, while those of Australia and Canada were 105 and 125, respectively. With 26 inhabitants per automotive vehicle, it ranked ahead of the United :angdom in the per capita number of these vehicles in 1930. Illiteracy rates (calculated as a percentage of the population of 14 years of age and older), which had dropped from 77 per cent in the 1869 Census to 36 per cent in the 1914 Census, was probably around 25 per cent in 1929 (and reached 14 per cent in the 1947 Census). The death rate in 1929 in Argentina, 1.3.1 per thousand inhabitants, was not far from that in Canada for the same year (11.4 per thousand inhabitants). The population living in cities of 2,000 or more inhabitants had been only 28 per cent of the total in 1869; by 1929 the urban share had probably risen to around 57 per cent (it was 53 per cent in 1914, according to the Census of that year). While political tensions were rising during 1929, a person wishing to take an optimistic lone-run position had some powerful arguments. Looking back over the previous twenty years, it looked as if Argentina had witnessed a peaceful and irreversible surrender of political power from the traditional (land-holding) ruling groups which dominated the government during 1860-1916, to the rising urban middle classes, represented by the Radical Civil Union. Under a conservative president, Roque Saenz Persa, a new electoral system providing for universal, secret and obligatory vote for citizens registered on the rational military rolls was approved (in 1912). In the 1916 election, Hipólito Irigoyen was elected president, opening an era of control of the government by the Radical Civic Union which was to last until the onset of the great depression (1930). By 1929, the struggle between the province of Buenos Aires and the rest of the country, which had been a source of unrest in the country during the nineteenth century, was nearly forgotten. The concentration of wealth and population in the Pampean zone, and especially around the metropolitan center of greater Buenos Aires, was still resented by the rest of the country, but the dominance of the national economy and politics by the Pampean zone could not be challenged. Indeed, such hegemony was rooted in superior natural resources and geographical position. As is well known, the performance of the Argentine economy (and of its political institutions) after 1930 presents a melancholy picture very much in contrast with pre-1930 developments. Three main features have characterized its economic growth since 1930; a. A low and irregular annual rate of growth in the Gross Domestic Product, which for the whole period may be estimated at

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2.7 per cent. During the same years, population has expanded at an annual rate of 1.9 per cent. Economic cycles and swings in income distribution have been so violent that they have oaccasiona11y dwarfed the meagre overall per capita growth rate, and left some groups in the economy worse off than they were in 1929. Furthermore, in some service sectors (e.g., the post office), declines in the quality of the "product" have not been taken into account by the national accounts, although such a decline is widely recognized, b. Wide disparity is found among the sectoral growth rates: in particular, rural activities have grown more slowly than total population, while the service sectors (and especially government) have grown at rates substantially above the overall .growth rate. Contrary to widespread belief, the growth rate of manufacturing has not been spectacular since 1930 (about four pre cent per annum); in fact it appears that the rate of growth of manufacturing during 1900-29 was higher than during 1929-65. c. Indices of export and import quantums have fallen relative to 1925-29 level; by 1960-64, in spite of a strong recovery, it was still 10 per cent below the level of 1925-29. These economic features of Argentine development are of course interrelated. Most Argentine exports are goods of rural origin, which are also consumed domestically. Thus, a plausible hypothesis is that the slow growth of rural output, accompanied by increasesin domestic demand for "exportables" arising from population growth, led to a fall in the export quantum; together with a decrease in foreign capital inflow after 1930, this led to a foreign exchange bottleneck of the Chenery-McKinnon type, which has been the main cause of the low and irregular post 1930 growth. This hypothesis seems more relevant to the post second world war period, as for 1930-45 it could be argued that lack of foreign demand was the key cause behind the stagnation of foreign exchange earnings. But after 1945, lack of foreign demand can no longer be blamed for the poor performance of Argentine exports; in fact, it can be shown that Argentina's shares in world exports of her major staples have fallen sharply since 1935-39. One should emphasize that this diagnosis is not identical with the usual "too much industry at the expense of agriculture" judgment applied to Argentina. More accurately the diagnosis could be summarized as "too many home goods (mainly services) at the expense of both exportable and importable goods. Exportable goods could have included goods other than those of rural origin. The discrimination has been against actual and potential exportable goods, rather than just against rural commodities. And not alL manufactured goods have been equally favored by the system of protection built up after 1930. Other factors, such as inflation, have also influenced the rate and direction of post-1930 growth. But there seems little

-87doubt that a shortage of foreign exchange has been the key bottleneck holding down the growth rate, and that the main responsibility for such a shortage rests with domestic policies toward the production of importable and exportable goods. The next question then becomes obvious: why did Argentina turn her back on foreign tráde after 1930, and especially during 1945-55? Had not the pre-1930 experience clearly shown the advantages of relatively free trade and free factor movements? To answer these questions let us go back to 1929 and discuss the frictions which had been generated by the great expansion which started around L860. A first source of latent friction was based on the factor endowment of Argentina, combined with the way in which the relatively most abundant factor (i.e., land) came to be distributed. In any country, free trade produces an income distribution more favorable to the relatively abundant factor of production than does autarchy. The owners of land in Argentina clearly benefit from free trade (what would have Ricardo thought?), and from the free factor movements which allowed them to employ relatively cheap labor and capital. Most historians agree that ownership of the fertile Pampean land was concentrated among a relatively small number of landlords. Under these conditions, policies of relatively free trade and factor movements could not be expected to be very popular among the urban sectors, even if it can be shown that they are economically efficient. The same issue can be looked at from the side of output prices: to the urban masses, a policy of artificially restricting exports of rural staples such as meat and wheat always offered the appeal of lower domestic prices of foodstuffs. However viewed, a latent conflict existed between "efficient" policies and what broad sectors of the population considered a "fair" income distribution.

A second source of friction had to do with the very high participation of foreign capital in the total capital stock, and the fact that a good proportion of the foreign capital went into activities which may be regarded as natural monopolies, such as public utilities and railroads. Even meat packing and refrigerated shipping was an industry in which competitive forces worked sluggishly due to difficulties of entry. Under these conditions, discussions as to whether foreign companies were making "normal" or abnormal profits became unusually bitter and muddy. These discussions no doubt gained heat from the fact that while Argentina was predominantly Latin, foreign investors were mainly Anglo-Saxon. We are taught in welfare economics that if policies which lead to economic efficiency, like relatively free trade and free factor movements, generate an income distribution society does not like, such a distribution can be modified by "appropriate" fiscal policies which need not interfere with economic efficiency. To carry out such a delicate operation, however, a government must

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rely on a flexible tax system, which Argentina did not have in 1929 (and does not have now). Indeed, the groups in society most likely to carry out these types of reform policies, the urban middle classes, were weakened in Argentina by their recent immigrant status, so that even when they reached power during 1916-30, they lacked self-assurance and cohesion to put through important reforms. It is somewhat ironic that the income tax was introduced in Argentina by a conservative regime during the nineteen thirties. Before 1929 these frictions, however, remained largely beneath the surface. The system '~worlced", and prosperity smoothed the frictions. The great depression changed all of this. The demand for Argentine exports fell not only because of depressed incomes in North America and Europe, but also because of a sudden change in the "rules of the game" in world trade, as the industrialized nations turned to protection and political preferences. In particular, the United (ingdom used Commonwealth preferences to bully Argentina into the Roca-Runciman trade pacts, whose psychological impact on nationalistic Argentines can be seen even to this day. The capital inflow also dropped sharply, leaving Argentina with a large foreign debt, whose real burden rose as a result of the drop in the world price level. It should be said that one of the very interesting aspects of Argentine economic and social history is the highly intelligent way in which the conservative governments of the nineteen thirties reacted to these exogenous shocks. Politically, these governments were based on a system of electoral fraud and thinly veiled repression. Traditional groups displaced the middle class government after the coup of 1930, and showed admiration for fascist models. And yet, they entrusted economic policy to technocrats (such as Raúl Prebisch) who managed to make the best out of the great depression, and even stimulated a modest industrial boom after 1933. The stagnation of the rural sector plus the industrial boom gave an impetus to internal migration, especially toward greater Buenos Aires. A mixture of circumstances set a favorable stage for the arrival of the Perón regime, whose policies against foreign trade and foreign capital (at least until 1953) took full advantage of the frictions which had been generated by pre-1930 Argentine growth, as well as the frustrations and humiliations of the nineteen thirties. It should also be added that a person taking decisions in 1945 could not be at all sure about the future of international trade. The previous fifteen years had been disastrous for foreign trade, and at the time many experts were forecasting a major post war depression and/or another world was between the USA and the USSR. To the nationalistic Perdn regime, it was an ideal time to ignore foreign trade. Since 1955, public policy has tended to reverse the Perón delayed responses to the great depression. But the reversal has not

-89been easy, as the reconciliation between "efficient" policies and "fair" policies has not been accomplished. Some governments, such as that of Arturo Frondizi, hoped that growth would once again act as the great reconciler. But political ferment did not give him the required time. It is still perhaps the central problem of public policy in Argentina to achieve such a reconciliation (unless a fully dictatorial path is followed). The proper balance among efficiency, equity and nationalism is, of course, something which each society must determine by itself. But policy makers should be aware of the trade-offs among these goals to avoid social and economic difficulties which could arise from overstressing one goal while neglecting the others. Finally, I would like to list a few other points suggested by Argentine experience: 1. It seems very hard to differentiate between "self-sustained" growth and other types of growth. In 1929 only one economist in a thousand would have argued that Argentina's growth was not "self sustained". This suggests that it may be unwise for Puerto Rico to rest on her economic laurels. 2. "Unbalanced growth" of the Hirschman species has had an unfortunate record in Argentina. Obvious bottlenecks have appeared in a glaring fashion in the rural sector, oil, electricity, etc. , and have been corrected only in a slow and halting manner. 3. The influence of "traditional" groups on public policy is not as simple as it is often made out to be. The landlord class in Argentina clearly followed policies favorable to economic development until at least 1914 (including the setting up of an extensive system of public education). During the nineteen thirties the conservative regime (in which landlord interests were heavily represented), followed enlightened economic policies and even stimulated (unwittingly, according to some) an industrial boom. Their political finesse, however, was considerably less than that of their parents, or perhaps it was that they lived in more troubled times. 4. However, one judges the performance of the landlord class in Argentina, one thing appears certain: their longevity. Although landholding has not been the exclusive privilege of a few, many of the most influential Argentine families of today trace back their fortune and power to land acquired in the nineteenth century, if not earlier. In spite of the rise of industry (manufacturing now contributes around 23 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product, while the rural sector's share is only around 17 per cent), these traditional groups maintain considerable influence. To some extent, a stalemate between the industrial and traditional ,groups has developed, which accounts for part of the contradictory economic policies of recent years.

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5. Comparing United States economic history with that of Argentina (and other Latin American countries) one may ask: why is it that the landlord class in one country seems to have "withered away" while in the others it has remained relatively powerful? The most fertile Argentine lands are those relatively close to the seaboard and the urban center of Buenos Aires; as one moves west and south humidity and fertility decrease. This simple fact, plus the additional advantage enjoyed by these lands arising from their proximity to harbors and the main urban centers, had an important implication for Argentine economic, and perhaps political, history. While during the nineteenth century it appeared that Argentina had an "unlimited" supply of raw land, the additional land which came under cultivation as a result of the railways and the elimination of the Indian menace on the frontiers was on the whole of a lower economic quality than that closer to the metropolitan zones on the banks of the rivers flowing into the River Plata estuary. Thus, from the start of the economic expansion of 1860-1930, the more favored lands, and their landlords enjoyed considerable and increasing rents. Growing population, leading to the expansion of the frontier and the opening-up of new lands, brought to the established landlords not financial disaster, but increasing rents. This situation may be contrasted with that for the United States in the same century. In this case the opening up of new lands in the North American Middle West often brought ruin to the established eastern landlords, whose lands were far inferior to those of the great plains. Thus while expanding frontier meant the near elimination of the eastern landlords in the United States as a significant economic and political agent, it had no such effect in Argentina. The different economic, social and political repercussions of an expansion which proceeds from poorer to better lands, compared with another which goes from better to poorer lands may be summarized in the following conjecture: expanding societies of the former type will be more "progressive" and "dynamic" than the latter type. It would be very interesting to test this conjecture with more precise and quantifiable measures and data.

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MAJOR THEMES OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND PUBLIC POLICY By Millard Hansen Modernization is the basic theme of social change in our generation. It is like its ancestor the coming of equality of condition, of which Alexis De Tocqueville wrote in 1835; it seems to be "a providential fact . . . universal, it is lasting, it constantly eludes all human interference, and all events, as well as all men, contribute to its progress . . ." Modernization is complex and perplexing, and so public policy should provide better understanding of it. Modernization creates social dislocations, and so public policy should search out programs capable of making new institutions. Modernization means a better life for most men and women, but on the road from the traditional society to the modern, most men and women suffer acute stress and anxiety, and a considerable number suffer disaster. Public policy must provide programs to alleviate some of the stress of change, to ease some of the anxiety, and to rescue or at least to guard compassionately the disaster victims. But more than all these, on the premise that both observers and participants in an overwhelming majority believe that modern society is better than traditional society, public policy must encourage, hasten, and facilitate the change from traditional to modern society. The dichotomy between traditional and modern societies has been studied and clarified at least throughout our century, and most of us have adopted for ourselves the words and propositions about it which give us the most satisfaction. We are all familiar with the pairs of terms: traditional-modern, folk-urban, peasantindustrial, rural-urban, hereditary status-competitive status, and so on. I find traditional-modern the most useful, but I do not wish to excite opposition among any who prefer a different pair of terms and some more complex statement exceeding a mere pair of terms. What modern means to me, generally and briefly, is a society with many diverse positions in it for which nearly all persons may prepare themselves and compete with at least legal equality. The sum of the work done in these positions is immense in contrast with the product of traditional society, and this brings to the modern men riches, ease, and power. To make and to fill these modern positions, modern men are required. They must acquire education, which must include as a minimum: dexterity with symbols and science and all the skills, knowledge, and value commitments associated with science and its agents--technology and planning. What traditional means to me, generally and briefly, is a society with little diversity of positions and positions into

-92which persons are born. The total product per capita is meagre, so that most men and women can have only short, arduous, poor lives. For even the tiny elite there is, in contrast with modern society, less ease and power. The persons required to fill these positions must he born and held in them, otherwise the peasant mass of the society would not accept so harsh a life. It is not education such peasants require; on the contrary, they must be trained and controlled by custom and law to do simple tasks and to accept a meagre life. There are always a few who praise the traditional and dislike the modern society, but their comment will not prevail. There may be some personal satisfaction--nostalgia for the past, either a real past in which one or one's family enjoyed elite status now lost; or a past of phantasy in which one perceives goodness, simplicity, or whatever is the object of one's phantasies. The genre is familiar since Rousseau and phantasies about noble savages not yet corrupted by civilization. The nostalgia for the traditional society will not prevail simply because almost all men ene women with access to infoLm ation know that their only hope fora more satisfactory life requires the making of a modern society. The social change process was noticed centuries ago when the early modern men hesitantly came to believe that they were superior in knowledge, skill, and achievement to their classic masters in ancient Athens and Rome. Spaniards of the XVI Century who had sailed the Atlantic and found a new world realized that they had surpassed the ancients (Maravall, 1963). Men of many European nations in the XVII Century began to affirm a similar superiority, and during the XVIII Century The Idea of Progress had become dominant, commitment to it colored all men's ideas about the nature of man, historical destiny, and the ways to organize a society (Bury, 1932). As Condorcet perceived progress in 1794, the requirements were science, education and liberty--individual and political. The social change process stands today virtually, at the center of the major study and attention of the social and historical sciences. Economic development is the basic study of economics, and "development" or "growth' appears in the titles of a host of books, study institutes, and university courses. A survey o£ this work would be inappro?riate here and unnecessary, but reference to the work of Moore (1963) and Inkeles (1) will clarify the question now being asked about social change and will provide a point of departure in the search for major themes. _Moore first inquires whether change is continuous or intermittent and then whether the origins of change are external to the process or within it. He concludes that change is continuous and not merely a process moving between two fixed points, the unchanging past and an imagined unchanging future. He also concludes that external factors cannot explain it--factors such as geography,

-93climate, biological characteristics, and others--because they are fairly constant and therefore incapable of explaining a wide variety of changes. He defines social change, therefore, as a continuous, self-generating system in the following terms: the society has positions which must be filled by recruiting persons with characters and preparations sufficient for a reasonable performance of the requirements of the position. The performance of the recruits, however, is never identical with their predecessors nor identical with all others in similar positions. The consequence inevitably is continuous social change. Pursuing the idea further, Moore argues that many persons will feel strain in the performance of the requirements of their social positions, and will search for ways to diminish strain and thus produce social change. If many persons feel acute strain in their positions, it is probable that socialization has been gravely insufficient, and the conduct rules which must be largely internalized will be harder and harder to impose by excternal force, with the prospect of violent, abrupt social change. Moore then rejects the usual image of a three-stage process used in the study of modernization and economic development. This process would be change from the static, traditional-pre-industrial society through modernization and economic development to the third, and also static, stage of modernized and developed. Moore, who here refers also to writings in collaboration with Arnold Feldman, says that "This kind of change model . . . is clearly wrong in exaggerating the static qualities of pre-modern societies, and grossly wrong in implying that rapid change ends with the completion of the transition to industrialism." (p. 41) Many historians, economic developers, and students of modernization might find this argument logically correct in some distant way but less useful than the traditional-modern change model for explaining our moment in history. The peasant and tribal societies of Asia, Africa, and much of Latin America may undergo continuous change, as Moore argues, but the change is so scanty as compared with the disruption of modernization as to seem virtually static. There are many men and women living in Puerto Rico who have experienced two swift, drastic social changes in the direction of modernization--the traumatic change of 1898 when more modern institutions were established; the applauded change since 1942 when the extension of cities and factories brought a host of new positions, each offering greater ease and reward than those of the nearly peasant society of the earlier generation. The image of a swift social change, one capable of explanation in terms of factors grouped under the terms traditional and modern, seems to me to accord well with the facts of our time. It is certainly not that I imagine static societies from rare time to rare time being changed swiftly, drastically. It is rather that I find it convenient to construct typologies (or the periods of the historian) in order to bring order into my perception of changes. And I believe these periods and typologies have validity, they are not

-94merely artifacts of my desire for coherent perceptions. They will explain events. They will accord with the explanation of many other scholars. As to the future. No doubt change is in the nature of man and society, it must continue, we cannot hope (or dread) the establishment of a static society without further change. But again in the future as in present and past, I suspect that modest changes within a coherent society will take place without changing that society enough to require us to change its name. It is still reasonably valid to say we live in a modern society in the United States. We all notice grave strains in the society. Numbers of persons by words and deeds reject the positions and value commitments of this modern society. It is possible that they--or others less noticed by us--will initiate a change, a revolutionary episode which our descendants will recognize as a great change from one historical period to another, from a modern society to the contemporary society. I Robert Sinai (1964), for example, sees social change in abrupt terms as traditional-modern. The challenge Sinai perceives in Asia and Africa and many parts of Latin America is the attempt to modernize without knowing just how to achieve this drastic social transformation. It is clear to inhabitants of modern societies that a modern society is a structure of inter-dependent positions in cities, factories, bureaucracies, universities, schools, and in a vast diversity of service shops and stores. It is also apparent that persons must be prepared for these positions, recruited to fill them, guided in their performance so these may be improved. Sinai argues that the great majority of mankind and nations and societies seek this modern: society but have not yet been able to create it for their people. Until yesterday most of them were wards or victims of modern societies and states and thus participated, however modestly, in the fringes of the modern society. National independence now confronts them with the task of moving swiftly (more swiftly than their enormous population increases) into the modern society. Sinai says that the Afro-Asian world is in a dangerous crisis. 'The old social forms which they have inherited are in a process of disinteáration: the new forms which they have taken over from their former imperial masters have either been twisted out of all recognition or are in ruins. All these old societies are machines worn out by the wear and tear of use and abuse. Most of their peoples are socially and politically at sea." (p. 207) The Industrial Man Project directed by Alex Inkeles is a study of modernization in six partly developed societies--Argentina, Chile, Israel, India, Pakistan, and Nigeria. The working payers already provide definitions, concepts, and rheoric of great usefulness. Finally, the project has developed questionnaires capable of replication in other societies. Comparisons among the societies measurements of modernization against several bench-marks are now possible. Inkeles argues that cities and factories are both places of residence and work and at the same time powerful educational in-

-95stitutions. As peasants enter these places, they learn, they change in the modern direction. Inkeles and his associates compare peasants, urban workmen who are not factory employed, and urban factory workers to learn how persons of six developing societies are changing from peasants into modern men. Almost 6,000 men in their productive years have been studied in the six societies and the various environments and communities. The questionnaire was astutely constructed, tested, and used by well trained students. The information is probably correct. The most notable finding already published is a remarkable homogeneity among modernizing men in six otherwise very different societies. This remarkable homogeneity may be explicable either in terms of a universal human nature or of the universality of the modernization of men, or of both. The Industrial Man Project concerned itself with more than 20 items about the subjects' definition and use of time, technical competence, mastery of their environment, the granting of dignity to others, faith in and the use of planning, aspirations for advancement of the self, one's children, the community and the nation; readiness for change and mobility; political orientation, use of the mass media of information, attitudes about family size and the planning of family size, the rights of women, the obligations of one's kin, faith and conduct with regard to religion, attitudes about social classes, and patterns of consumption. (Inkeles, 1.) These issues were studied by the use of a questionnaire with 119 measures of attitude, value, and opinion; with 17 items of self-reported behavior; and with 23 items to measure information and verbal fluency. These items were found, by a study of the literature of modernization, to include the issues other scholars had given their attention to. Various short forms of this questionnaire were constructed and measured against the original, long form, and these were found to have only a little less validity than the original long form. Of these short forms, one has 14 items and covers modernization well. Ten items measure attitudes on public issues, schooling, innovation and work patterns, qualifications for high public office, image of the future of one's country, the role of scholars and scientists, one's control of his environment, interest in and use of the mass media of information, response to strangers, and religion. To these were added four items about behavior and information: organization membership, response to national problems, information about where Washington and Moscow are located, and use of the mass media. An index of "overall modernity" (OM) was developed from the data, with reliability coefficients of at least .73 for the six countries. As seen in this data, what is a modern man? A modern man is ready for new experiences. He is disposed to form opinions about any questions, not merely issues of his immediate environ-

-96ment. In time, he orients himself more towards the future than towards the past, he accepts fixed schedules, he is punctual. He knows how to plan and sees thenecessity of planning. He seeks to dominate his environment to satisfy his objectives, and he does not feel subjected to a fate beyond knowledge or control. He is confident his world is orderly and its process can be calculated. He has an increased awareness of the dignity of other persons and is more disposed to respect them, and this position is most clearly revealed in his attitudes towards women and children. He has confidence in science and technology. Finally, and ninth, he believes that there is at least a rough distributive justice, that is, that achievement is rewarded in accord with its worth. What forces produce a modern man? Beyond all others is education. It seems clear that the school not only instructs its students but also is a social organization with models of rationality, of the importance of technical competence, of the operation of a rule of objective standards to measure performance (the student's grades), and a model also of a system of distributive justice where rewards (the grades) accord with the achievement made. The city also powerfully forms modern man, and with it the impact of mass communication media, the influence of the factory, and finally the force of the national state fashion modern man. While these forces sometimes upset qualities widespread in traditional culture, yet Inkeles and his associates believe that the qualities produced by these forces can often be adopted "without in most cases coming in conflict with what is best in their cultural tradition and spiritual heritage". (Inkeles, 1) Performance and failure to perform well in the positions provided by modern society are crucial factors for the well-being of individuals and the strength of the society. Three recent studies give insights into this issue: Gardner (1961), Ginzber,g (1966), and Albizu-Matlin-Stanton (1966). Much can be done about performance by university, school, and the management of the organizations in which men work. This will be one of the most rewarding themes of a study on social change and public policy. Gardner studied a developed, modern society--the United States. Its dilemma of equality versus the necessity of high adhievement will be found, also, in developing, modernizing societies. It is already acute in Puerto Rico. Gardner perceives three systems of recruitment of persons to their positions in society and argues that some reasonable balance among the three must be found, for no society can endure the strain or frustration of relying solely on one of them. The three are hereditary, equalitarian, and reward in return for achievement. The first two systems, of course, ease the insecurities of human life in a society and contribute to a The son who inherits sense of tranquillity and of self-confidence. his father's factory can have this ease. The union member who can neither be discharcmed for incomDeter►ce nor rewarded for extra effort, also has a similar defense against incessant competition with

-97all other men. The danger of both systems of curbing complete competition are obvious. In the first place, incompetent persons will often fill positions, and a spreading malaise will attack the institution, community or nation which relies too much upon these systems of recruitment and control. Excluded groups will in the end take advantage of the weakness thus engendered, and the barbarians from without or within (frustrated by lack of opportunity) are likely to over-run the society of these comfortable persons. Exclusive reliance on competition for all positions is likely to induce an intolerable insecurity, and it will promptly be thwarted by either or both of the limiting systems--hereditary and equalitarian. The sharp issue for societies committed to equality, as is Puerto Rico, is to guard the competitive principle against the attacks of the hereditarian and the equalitarian. The necessary word for this enterprise is standards. Standards of achievement are contagious, and when they are slovenly, performance will be slovenly; when they are exigent, performance will be better. Standards of excellent performance must be active and must be learned in the university and the schools, and from thence permeate the other re?,ions of the society. The problem is to persuade the many, who are unlikely to achieve in accord with high standards, to permit the continuance and application of these standards, and the difference of prestige, authority, and rewards in general for achieving according, to these standards. One possible way to persuade those of modest achievement to accept high standards and their rewards is to make it absolutely clear that in some ways all mén are equal: as men, not as performers measured against standards. All men have equal worth in some ultimate sense--as man, some will say, as the children of God, other will say. Every man has his dimity, which must be respected regardless of achievement and status. All men are equal under the law and in their vote for the men who will legislate and administer the law. Finally, and perhaps the most potent factor to persuade modest achievers to reward high achievers, is as much equality of opportunity as a society and its families can allow. Performance in Puerto Rico needs improvement. In none of its basic institutions and organizations are high standards deeply honored; on the contrary, the hereditary and equalitarian principles are powerful, they undermine the principle of recruitment, authority, and reward based on high achievement. One important objective of social change research in Puerto Rico must be to study the interaction of these principles and to seek strategies for strengthening the principle of high standards and high achievement. No member of our university can be unaware of the depressing pressure upon standards as we double each ten years. The United States Employment Service has distressing evidence that innumerable positions cannot be filled by competent persons. Until most people are persuaded to accept high standards and the rewards achievement in accord with them bring, Puerto Rico cannot be a fully modern society. In the wry words of Gardner, we need both good philoso-

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phers and good plumbers, and I fear we confront a considerable scarcity of both: "An excellent plumber is infinitely more admirable than an incompetent philosopher. The society which scorns excellence in plumbing because it is a humble activity and tolerates shoddiness in philosophy because it is an exalted activity will have neither good plumbing nor good philosophy. Neither its pipes nor its theories will hold water." (Gardner, 1961) Ginzberg (1966) studying the quality of men measured as they came in the millions for induction into or rejection by the Army during the Second World War shows that incompetence and the cultural and educational preparation of a man are wholly related. Over 700,000 men of ages 18-37 were rejected by the draft system for mental deficiency. Of these, over 75% came from a few Southern states whose schools and cultural advantages were far below those of the other regions of the nation. Men from New England, from the Northwest, and from the Far West, all combined, accounted for only 7% of the rejected draftees. The lesson is applicable to Puerto Rico. If performance is inadequate, let us look to our schools. The point does not rely only on reference to United States experiences. Albizu-Matlin-Stanton (1966) show that 32% of the population of Puerto Rico is mentally retarded, that its members cannot answer questions a seven-year-old child is expected to understand, that their IQ ranges around 80 and below. The incidence is more extensive in the rural places with fewer schools, as Ginzberg found in the United States, and both studies affirm that the insufficient schools condemned these tens and hundreds of thousands of persons to the helplessness of mental retardation. These cannot meet high standards of performance for the positions of modern society. The evidence is clear. The development of a modern society requires the preparation of modern men to fill its positions. The preparation of these modern men requires sufficient schools, and sufficient universities, and these cannot be sufficient until they adopt and apply contagious standards of excellent performance. Only yesterday every child advanced from grade to grade each year wholly without regard to any achievement. The statement was that no child should suffer the ignominy of failing, of not remaining with his peer group. Here the contagion of non-standards is epidemic and fatal. Needless to say in this place, the contagion has long since reached the university. Most students of Puerto Rican society during the last generation have agreed that the society is about midway on the continuum traditional-modern: developed far beyond Haiti or Nigeria or many

-99Latin American countries, but falling short of the developed societies of North America, Europe, Japan. Most students in the past two decades, furthermore, agree that change in Puerto Rico is swift and drastic. Most students agree that those entering the modern sectors of the society are satisfied with their improvement, glad tq leave behind them the deprivations of their traditional lives. Finally, most students agree that the change occasions stress for nearly all involved in it and for some it means great harm. There is no serious opposition to the trajectory of social change towards modern society. There are nationalist, literary, anti-American criticisms about the Puerto Rican predicament, it is true, including nostalgia in many writers for the noble simplicity of the jíbaro and the charm of a plantation past ( they seem not often to read Zeno Gancía LA CHARCA ) , but even these: do not propose halting the process. During the years 1952-1954, there were two attempts to initiate research useful to public policy for social change. In 1952 four distinguished scholars agreed to make an integrated study of industrialization in Puerto Rico in order to provide insight and judgment for the Point Four foreign assistance programs and Operation 3ootstrap. The four scholars were Pedro Muñoz Amato., law and public administration; John Gillin, anthropology; _Gardner.' Means, economics; and Marshal Dimock, political science. Some of the questions the study would have given attention to are the following: major issues still_ remain unanswered and urgently require solution. Among such questions are the balance between industry and agriculture, between management and labor, between outside and local capital, between public and private enterprise, between older and newer motivations and culture traits, between production and distribution, between a single party system and an effective two-party system, between individually and cooperatively owned businesses. And underlying all these policy and instrumental decisions is the basic one of adaptin! techniques to cultural traits, patterns, and motivations." (Proposal to Social Science Research Council, 5 September 1952.) We are all im?overished because, when the Carnegie Corporation did not provide the funds we had expected, the study was not done. The second attempt to make a social chan^e and public policy study had its origins in a series of conversations concerning education beginning 12 October 1953 at the home of Governor Muñoz 4arín. Jaime 3enítez said at that time that: "Our job, as I see it, is to take stock of our Puerto Rican society, including its present realities

-10oand future potentialities; identify our basic characteristics and tendencies, formulate a program of desirable and feasible goals to be brought about through education; identify and evaluate educational forces operating in our society; distinguish between educational forces within and without the functional jurisdiction of the state; gauge the proper degree of orientation, cooperation and freedom - and by freedom we mean freedom for evil and for good, for destructiveness as well as creativeness - befitting non-governmental educational agencies in a democratic society; re-examine present, and if need be formulate new objectives, procedures and techniques for state educational agencies in the light of the general objectives of their limited but nonetheless significant impact of the general cultural picture For most of us, our programs - educational, political, industrial - spring from or are related to undisclosed assumptions, generally imprecise and oftentimes contradictory, concerning the nature of the world, of change and of man. Now we are called upon to show our hands and put our philosophical cards on the table . . Our concern with the orientation of the future must of necessity concentrate on the forces shapirig the Puerto Rican man and on the inner potentials of his present culture. This is Operation Diogenes, bent this time upon finding the man we want and the society we ought to try to foster." (Manuscript, "Unfinished Notes on Educational Objectives", by Jaime 8enítez.) At a meeting one wee' later, Benitez said the first field in need of study was "El problema cultural puertorriqueño en to que se refiere al impacto de los recursos, los productos, las técnicas, los valores norteamericanos en la vida puertorriqueña, a la vez que las ventajas, adaptaciones e incongruencias resultantes de é1." (:"Ianuscript record of the meeting referred to.) The statement continued as follows: "No existe ningún trabajo que abarque la totalidad de los problemas culturales planteados en las dos primeras páginas de las 'Unfinished Notes on Education. Parecería aconsejable encomendar al Centro de Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad, 1a elaboración de un proyecto que intente contestar las preguntas formuladas por el Comité Educativo." ("The Puerto Rican cultural problem in relation to the impact of the resources, products, techniques, and North American values on the Puerto Rican life, at the same time the advantages, adaptations, and inThe statement congruities resulting from it . . . " continues as follows: "There exists no work that comprises the totality of the cultural problems mentioned on the first two pages of the 1 Unfinished Notes

on Edueation~.

It would seem advisable to request

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from the Social Science Research Center of the University of Puerto Rico the elaboration of a project that would attempt to answer the questions put forth by the Education Committee.") Governor Muñoz Marín in December 1953 spoke to the Teachers Association. He chided "Agapito" for using English for the sign in front of his small bar in a mountain town. And in this context the Governor said further: "I believe we are near the precise historical moment in which, if we do not take deliberate command of the cultural process upon the basis of examining what it is and what it should be, it is possible we may involve the Puerto Rican personality in inextricable stews (burundanga) without head or foot." During the early months of 1954, public discussion about the Agapito question was heard and read ubiquitously. Part of this discussion turned on the question of whether the University of Puerto Rico should seek to help its students form themselves and find their identity as Puerto Ricans or as Occidentals. Political and cultural nationalism became the issue of the day. At this point Governor Muñoz Marín said that he would dissociate himself from the Agapito debate if it aroused nationalism. His subsequent statements depreciated nationalism. The most notable such statement came in 1959 in the Godkin Lectures at Harvard University in April, the first of which lectures Governor Muñoz Marín entitled "Breakthrough from Nationalism." He said that " . . . the people of Puerto Rico had to break through that great unsound barrier of our times, the barrier of nationalistic feeling, to find their way to a world of hopeful achievement and spiritual creativity." (Manuscript) In the Harvard University Commencement Addrdss of June 1955, Governor Muñoz Marín showed his search for a better life in Puerto Rico along routes other than the cultural nationalism of the Agapito speech. In 1955 his emphasis was upon Operation Serenity, which meant a society of happier citizens. Happiness he argued was more attainable by moderating one's taste for goods than by increasing his consumption. "Are the attitudes and habits that are associated with modern high productivity inexorably interwoven with the attitudes and manners of relentless material consumption? Can a culture be efficient in production and at the same time wise and modest in consumption? (Manuscript) The Social Science Research Center, 25 March 1955, proposed a research project on cultural change to the Ford Foundation. This proposed integrated study hoped "to identify the mador characteristics of the society and culture of Puerto Rico and of the personality of its people, to analyze the United States influence upon these, and to estimate probable future influences.

It is recognized that public leaders cannot or should not attempt to control changes in some areas of a society and culture, but it is assumed that control of other areas is possible and desirable. Changes in the latter areas will be influenced by the policy adopted in politics, industrialization, education, and elsewhere. This research should provide information, insights, and knowledge to stimulate and improve the public discussion of the policies indicated." The initial divisions of the study were on "Cultural Change and Political Behavior", which was not done; "The Family in Cultural Change," which Reuben Hill and his associates published four years later (1959); "Business and Cultural Change", which Thomas Cochran published in 1959, and "Cultural Change and Education", which also was not done. The proposed project had attached to it a memorandum of a conversation on 29 January 1955 between Robert Redfield and me in which Redfield said that scientists should be cautious about the big words "culture" and "personality". "The contribution of social science to planning and action in the field of culture and personality is very modest. Research can contribute much more to planning and policy in definite areas such as the standards of living or the pressure of population on resources. As to culture and personality either in the area of planning and action or the area of research, the crux of what is done and thought is perhaps the values of the people of Puerto Rico. The people of Puerto Rico must themselves determine such values, and changes in such values, and therefore in the ultimate sense it is they who should plan and think about culture, personality, and their development . Planning, action, and research should also avoid the raising of false hopes and the exciting of foolish fears in this general area." The application to the Ford Foundation in 1955 did not prosper. Nor had I as Director of the Research Center the temerity to insist that the project be undertaken. I listened to the cautious warning of Redfield. He reminded me of James Thurber, who advised one to leave his mind alone, and said perhaps a people and its social scientists ought to leave their culture alone. Today I have a little more temerity, having read more and perhaps become, with the addition of a dozen years, more reckless. Some are coming to believe that certain early modern men (Machiavelli, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke) created a power society of free individuals to supplant the just society sought by Plato and others. (Wheeler, 1965). The United States made this position its own, and "For several generations in America it was virtually unconstitutional to apply reason, foresight, prudence, planning, and control to the basic problems of the social, economic, and political orders." (Wheeler, 1965). As I noted earlier, Jaime Benftez said it was time to put our philosophical cards on the table. I would not

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help research which might deliver our souls to a government or its university and schools, but I would commit myself to research seeking to form a more just society with a republic which helps men form themselves as competent, modern men.

To summarize: I think the major themes of social change and public policy research are facets of the world movement from traditional to modern society. Perhaps the most central of these facets is the issue of forming a competent, modern man. To achieve this, as Inkeles shows, one must send the peasant to the city and to the factory. And to achieve this, as Gardner shows, one must strengthen standards of achievement and let high performance be rewarded by status authority, and money, without alarming or punishing the hereditary and equalitarian persons seeking security from an intolerable, incessant competition with everybody about everything. From these facets will emerge particular questions for research about capital, entrepreneurs, the recruitment and control of workers, curriculums in the university and the schools, recruitment and achievement standards for students, and the planning required of the major state agencies.

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Bibliography Albizu-Miranda, Carlos; Matlin, Norman; Stanton, Howard R., The Successful Retardate, March 1966. Mimeograph Bury, John Bagnell, The Idea of Progress, an Inquiry into Its Origin and Growth, 1932. Cochran, Thomas C., The puerto Rico Businessman, A Study in Cultural Change, 1959 Condorcet, Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progres de 1'esprit hurnain, 1794 Gardner, John W., Excellence: Can We Be Equal and Excellent Too? 1961 Ginzberg, Eli, The Development of Human Resources, 1966 Hill, Reuben; Stycos, J. Mayone and Back, jurt W., The Family and Population Control: A Puerto Rican Experiment in Social Change, 1959 Horton, David and Inkeles, Alex, The OR Scale: A Comparative Socio-Psychological Measure of Individual Modernity. Mimeograph. Inkeles, Alex, The `odernization of Man. General Description of THE HARVARD PROJECT ON THE SOCIOCULTURAL ASPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT. (referred to as 1) Project Director, Harvard Project on the Socio-Cultural Asoects of Development (Industrial Man Project), Standard English \Tersion of the Questionnaire, March 1966. 4imeograph. (referred to as 2) Maravall Casenoves, Jose Antonio, Los 'actores de la Idea de Progreso en e1 Renacimiento Es~atiol, l63 • Moore, Wilbert E., Social Change, 1963 Sinai, I. Robert, The West's Impact on the Non-Western World, 1964, Wheeler, Harvey, The Resotration of politics, 1965,

-105SOCIAL CHANGE, CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE By Manuel López-Rey

I. PURPOSE

ciml

1. The purpose of this paper is the critical analysis of sochange s a general explanatory factor of crime, including delinquency,1.l) with particular reference to the United States and more specifically to Puerto Rico where the author is, at present, working as Research Professor and Adviser. Requirements of space and time have forced him to condense his criticism as much as possible, a circumstance which undoubtedly makes his point of view more vulnerable than it should be 2. For American criminology to take its place as a truly applied science it must first liberate itself from its position as an appendage to behavioral sociology; at the same time it must not become a medicopsychological appendage. The sociologists have a virtual monopoly of criminological teaching, training and research and, despite some outstanding contributions, the scientific criminological cycle they represent under the aegis of a predominantly behavioral sociology, is already completed. Therefore, a new approach to the study of crime is required and in this the sociologists have a less important role to play. 3. Although different in some respects the case of Puerto Rico is not unique. Substantially, crime offers very little that is new and the same applies to offenders, whftever is said to the contrary. In fact, as far as crime is concerned, Puerto Rico's predicament typifies that of many other countries either developed or developing. What makes the case sadder, particularly among the latter, is that sometimes they become the testing grounds of a variety of sociological and/or criminological theories. Concerning crime this should be avoided since the main casualty of that "laboratory approach" is not the offender, but society itself. II. SOCIAL CHANGE 4. Among the current explanations of crime social change still maintains a privileged position particularly regarding developing countries, occasionally challenged by the less favoured explanation of culture conflict or the somewhat discredited theories of social disorganization or maladjustment. More recently the equally put forward ambitious but still more vague social forces has be as a promising candidate at an international forum.) 5. Close scrutiny of the content assigned to social change by sociologists and criminologists shows that the term is little

-106more than a label behind which its advocates try to reduce to some chosen aspects the growing complexity of the everlasting process of the evolution of society. Here two brief remarks should be made, one that evolution does not necessarily mean progress if by this is meant a better human condition, and the other that, although essential, the individual is not the only element to be considered. What is meant by social change? The answer may be as varied as is the broad and confusing content assigned to it by the copious literature on the subject. Quite often cultural and social change are dealt with together and the composite concept social-culture change is used instead. Certainly culture and social are terms of difficult delimitation, the latter probably for more than the former. The situation is further complicated by the difficulty of defining change in general and cultural or social change in particular. Contrary to what is apparently believed by those who use the mixture cultural-social change, the difficulties are increased by the use of such a formula. Although interdependent in many respects, culture and society are two different things. Among other differences culture may survive after the society which created it has disappeared. The distinction between these terms has again been stressed with reference to Puerto Rico and as far as possible should be maintained in sociological and criminological research;(3) otherwise, by using together such broad co cepts, it is difficult to understand what is meant by social change.~4) 6. To others social change is expressed by references to, or more or less identified with, social process, social mobility, greater national and per capita income, general raising of material living conditions, achievement of individual or group aims, industrialization, urbanization and other aspects of general improving, growing and expanding. Certainly it would be difficult to deny the connection of all these aspects of social functioning, growth and expansion with social change and yet it is questionable whether all of them may be regarded as expressions of it, and not less important whether other non-social aspects do not also play a definite role in the always transitional state of social change. Even if non-sociological aspects are excluded, the vastness of the subject matter assigned to social change always prevents a complete and coordinated consideration of it. As an example of such vastness Martindale's idea of social change is illustrative enough, as an example of imposed limitations in the operational field by such vastness Tumin's survey on Puerto Rico is no less significant. change virtual7. To Martindale the subject matter of soci ly embraces all branches of sociological theory.) Such content is the Logical sequel of his wide conception of sociology "as a science of motion". By the same token many other sciences would be undistinguishable from sociology and vice versa. No less open to criticism is his assertion that sociology 'attempts to discover the laws of interhuman behavior.' If anything is discredited it is the attempt to establish sociological laws. His other assertion that if sociology can account for structure it can also ac-

-107count for change, carries little weight, since both cannot be accounted for by sociology alone. In sum, Martindale's Introduction as well as the erudite essays which follow it, show the dialectical condition of the theory of social change and its inability to explain what actually social change is. 8. The same happens to Tumin's study and for that matter to any other study devoted to the mechanics of social change.(6) To begin with, Tumin excludes from his operational field the political and economic aspects, although in the latter part of the volume references to them may be found; and secondly, from the vastness of social change he deals only with education, self-identification, self-image, occupational location and occupational mobility, all within the narrow framework of social stratification and as expressions of individual mobility. Briefly, social change is conceived mostly, if not exclusively, in function of the latter, i.e. as a behavioral undertaking. Corroboration of this may be found in his interpretation of the role played by self-identification and self-image. According to him the achievement of much that is desired for the future depends on the good will and high hopes of many, on how energetic and hopeful any individual will be in assuming the tasks which donfront him. Putting aside the fact that all this was well known before social change and social mobility were transformed into scientific sociological theories, motivation alone cannot explain individual climbing and going down from one social status to another. I say going down because, carried away by his optimism, the inference in Tumin's study is that if energetic and hopeful enough, self-identification and self-image are decisive to provoke social mobility and reach higher social status. In rebuttal, it may be said that expanding mass policies on welfare, housing, education, nutrition, production, consumption, propaganda, etc., curb more and more the role of self-identification and self-image. Certainly the fight against the obliteration of the individual is still going on here and there but the prospects are not very encouraging. That both self-identification and selfimage may work contrary to Tumin's assumption is demonstrated by the resistance to move from slums to public housing projects, by the dissatisfaction with living conditions in these projects, and by the less frequent but no less significant cases in which people prefer to return to the slums. 9. To Tumin the great dissolver of social barriers and therefore promoter of social mobility is education. Very few will quarrel with this general assertion but since generalizations are of little value the following quectionsseem to be justified: at what educational level does that dissolving power act; at the elementary, secondary, university or what combination of them; in the long run will not the expanding educational facilities offered nowadays to attend university programmes inevitable lead (a) to a disproportionate number of drop-outs and of 10 professional~* students, and (b) to the lowering of university standards by the necessity of improvising a teaching staff which later will be ex-

-108tremely difficult to dispense with; if no rigorous selection of capability is made, will not the abundance of university graduates hinder social mobility; would it not be advisable that liberalization of university facilities be coordinated with national needs; and finally, should the present academic conception of teachers, particularly at the preliminary and secondary level, be maintained or should the teaching functions be enlarged so as to encompass other aspects at present partly performed by other agencies.(7) From a social change point of view these questions are as significant as the generalization mentioned above. None of them however is dealt with by Tumin. The most significant reference the writer has found in connection with the above questions is the convenience of achieving general functional literacy, which is obvious. The question, however, is whether this type of literacy can explain by itself the kind of social change and mobility that Tumin had in mind. 10. What are Tumin's findings about social change in Puerto Rico? Briefly the following are submitted by him in the last part of his survey: (a) Puerto Rico has moved fast from an agricultural to an industrial status; (b) While in the past it was relatively isolated, it now receives direct impulse from world society and does much of its own screening; (c) In a short period of time, the standard of living has moved from among the lowest to well among the highest. This statement is somewhat softened afterwards; and (d) In many areas of Life there is a discernible change from the meanings and values ordinarily associated with a traditional way of life based on sacred sanctions for behavior, to new values and meanings based upon other criteria of adequacy and relevance, ordinarily regarded as secular. It is also added that Puerto Rico has emerged from a condition of virtually no political autonomy to one of great autonomy in determining matters of its own interest and welfare. 11. Nobody will quarrel with such findings, or for that matter, with the remarks and predictions that follow, all of them showing the same way of thinking. The question however is whether or not the same or very similar findings about social change could not have been reached without using as premises social change and social mobility, but simply by close consideration of the history of Puerto Rico, of some documents such as its Constitution, of its administrative organization and corresponding policies and programmes and the comparative analysis of certain statistics. The impression left is that the project, although obviously useful in

-109some respects, like many othersusing the same or similar premises, cannot offer a comprehensive explanation of what social change is and what are the causal relationships it originates so as to counteract harmful effects and reinforce those which are beneficial. III. SOCIAL CHANGE AND CRIME 12. The connection of social change and crime has been and still is frequently put forward as a general explanation of crime, particularly of the increase of juvenile delinquency. To that effect industrialization, urbanization, rapid growth of population, migration, social mobility and the like are often mentioned. Actually the harmful effects of social change are extended to mental disorder, alcoholism, drug addiction and any other form of human behavior regarded as deviant, maladjusted, subcultural, etc. Practically every textbook or essay on the matter relies on such general assertions to prove the causal relation which nevertheless remains non-proven. More often than not the methodology used reflects a behavioral sociological or psychological approach which, although useful in some respects, is unable to deal with crime as a social problem. 1.3. The relationship between social change and crime has been discussed at two United Nations Congress. First at the London Congress in 1960 where some matters were clarified and then at Stoc-Cg ) holm in 1965 where the subject was left in a state of confusion.`( Briefly, at the London Congress the following points were made: (a) the conclusion that social change be identified as a cause of criminality is unwarranted. At most it is associated with, or related to crime, but in this case it should be noted that social change has even contributed to the decrease in criminality or certain forms of it; (b) the disrupting action of social change is increased when it takes place in a disorderly way; (c) social change is subject to a certain degree of control and should be a matter of social planning; (d) by itself, migration is not conducive to criminality. The same applies to urbanization and industrialization; (e) the unfavourable results of rural migration to urban areas may be ameliorated by providing the latter with appropriate social and economic advantages; (f) with respect to rural-urban migration one of the essential elements is to prepare the migrant for the experience as well as the urban community to receive him; (g) programmes for the prevention of criminality should be closely co-ordinated, if possible by an agency organized for this

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purpose and constituted by persons highly qualified. It is recommended that this agency operate as an integral part of a co-ordinated scheme for national social and economic planning; (h) in considering the question of criminality and social change, emphasis is generally laid upon the urban centre. This may be warranted but it is advisable to assess the impact of social change on rural areas as well since this may uncover the roots of crime which later manifests itself in the urban setting; (i) the penal code must be in harmony with and reflect social change; (j) research is required. Statistical techniques and procedures should be improved. Case studies, field observations and pilot projects are justified. 14. From the foregoing as well as from other sources than those indulging in the traditional use and abuse of the generalizations already mentioned, I submit that: (a) the phenomenon of social change has always existed; (b) the recipient of social change is not only the individual or the family or a particular group or groups but also the institutions,agencies or services, and society as a whole; (c) social change does not affect everyone or reach every corner, institution or activity in the same way or to the same extent. Actually in more than one respect the impact of social change may be successfully neutralized, resisted or only partly accepted because of the resistance offered by the previous systems of value, tradition, beliefs, etc., i.e. by the remnants of previous social changes which oppose new ones. In sum, social change is not always intense or extensive and its effects may be either beneficial or disruptive; (d) social change may eradicate or reduce certain forms of crime as well as originating new forms or increasing the number of old ones, or it may not affect crime. Incidentally, it should be noted that social change seldom, if ever, creates a new crime, more often than not what is regarded as such is no more than a new modality or form. 15. Since the individual is not the only element that participates in social change, particularly in the present era of mass policies and programmes, it is obvious that the organization and functioning of agencies and services, the aims and implementation of planning and the role of the penal system in assuring the orderly development of society are at least as important as selfidentification, self-identity, self-image, individual social mobility and the like. In other words, in some respects the policy

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approach is at least as decisive as the behavioral approach. Here two remarks seem to be in order: one, that social change is nowadays mostly originated by mass policies and programmes of many sorts, and the other, that more often than not what is regarded as social change is the result of lack of coordination among policies and programmes and their respective implementation. In sum, in the study of social change the policy approach may be proved more important than the behavioral one. This means that the equation policy-social change replaces to a great extent that of individual behavior-social change. By policy is meant not only that formulated by new planning and programmes but also that pursued by already existing agencies, services and machinery of many sorts, among which the penal system is of particular importance as far as crime is concerned. The question then is to determine whether, in the constant process of social evolution, the penal system is not as conducive to social disruption as any other factor. Moreover, when dealing with urbanization, industrialization, etc., the behavioral approach is of limited value. This may shock its devotees but the truth is that these processes embrace far more than individual behaviour. Certainly the individual is one of the elements involved, but this does not mean that what he does at a certain moment is the outcome of having moved to an urban area, worked in a factory, been a migrant or even because the family and society are "changing". 16. As far as change and causality are concerned it may be added that the individual, the family and society have always been changing; and that sometimes the changes have been rapid and drastic. A case in point is the industrial revolution period when the gap between social change and the penal system was obvious. 17. The lack of parallelism between social evolution and penal policy is nowadays more evident in developed and developing countries because both are trying to be as affluent as possible without paying due attention to their ezal systems still rooted in XVIIIth and XIXth century conceptions.º Certainly patching remedies have been introduced but fundamentally the system.remains the same. As for causality it should be remembered that economists, sociologists and politicians frequently maintain that the improvement of material living conditions, of which industrialization and urbanization are powerful ingredients, will eventually reduce the amount of crime. Curiously enough after a certain period these and other processes are blamed for the increase of crime, especially of juvenile delinquency. Besides being a contradiction it is unfair, because a causal relation between these processes and individual behaviour cannot be established. The contradiction is explained by the supporters of social change in many ways. Some say it is caused by the rapid way in which social change takes place; others that the social forces unleashed by social change are to be blamed, and others bring in the concept of subculture as an explanation of crime. Since the discussion of these and similar assertions would take more time than is available, suffice it to say that it would

-112be difficult, if not impossible, to determine what is the 'right'' speed for social change, also that rapid social change is not necessarily more conducive to crime than slow social change. What is relevant is the problem of coordination among the policies and programmes dealing not with social change, but with social problems. As for social forces, the Stockholm discussion shows that the term barely disguises the existing confusion about social change, industrialization, urbanization, migration, etc., as disrupting elements and causal explanations of crime. As for subculture, it may be said that unlike society, culture cannot be segmented or subdivided; secondly, that the varied origin of the offenders prevents the formation of a subculture of their own; thirdly, that even if crimes are committed more frequently by members of certain social classes--which is rather doubtful--this does not mean that such classes are subcultural, and finally, as a concept subculture is potentially dangerous from a political point of view. 18. In sum, social change is a poor explanation of crime even if in certain cases it has social or individual disrupting effects, because disruption does not necessarily imply crime. Individual groups and society are far more resilient than is realized. Even if, for the sake of argument, crime were the causal outcome of social change, the latter cannot be stopped and short of authoritarian policies the same applies to industrialization, urbanization, migration, changing families, social mobility, etc. The problem here is that as a social phenomenon--so different from crime as an individual event--causal relationships cannot be established. The urgent matter nowadays is prevention and control of crime. This does not mean that the treatment of offenders should be abandoned. It means that contemporary criminology, still essentially behavioral, is not the applied science needed to achieve within reasonable limits the prevention and control of crime. At present the main criminological task is to determine what is the amount of crime that a particular society may endure without being seriously disturbed. The first step is to see whether 1 he~criminal justice machinery satisfies contemporary penal needs. O IV. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19. As a social need criminal justice should be part of a planned social policy. This presupposes that criminal justice is a social and not a purely juridical function, also that the main purpose of criminal justice is not the rehabilitation of the offender, although this should be attempted, but the protection of society, a concept that essentially differs from the defence of society. One of the greatest obstacles to encompassing criminal justice within a social framework is the rapid expanding of selfsatisfying beliefs that any scientific explanation of human behavior, particularly medico-psychological, amounts to justification vis-a-vis the acceptdd system of fundamental values. Another

-113is the generalization of findings in the study of individual behavior and the acceptance of such generalizations as the ratio essendi of general policies and programmes. One of the most significant cases in this respect is the meaning of "child" with respect to juvenile delinquency. According to a standard theory and irrespective of the country concerned, child is understood to mean any person under 18 or even 21 years of age. This behavioral approach to the problem of juvenile delinquency has displaced the minor from his social setting and transformed him into a "welfare" entity which does not correspond to the role of juvenile people in modern society. Needless to say, this fictitious concept has also been transplanted to Puerto Rico. 20. Social criminal justice is also handicapped by the obsolete content of most of the penal codes even of recent date. Furthermore their preparation is still regarded as the monopoly of the legal profession. As examples those of Wisconsin and Illinois should be mentioned, also the projects of Germany 1962, Argentina 1960, Brazil 1963 and Venezuela 1961. The situation in Puerto Rico is not encouraging in view of the procedure followed to replace the code, still substantially the California penal code of pe(l~ l873. 11 ) In this unsatisfactory situation a definite role. is played by the way in which penal law is taught, i.e., as e. logicabstract operation in which the cult of the precedent still prevails. This cult is contrary to the individualization of the offence, the offender, the victim, the penal sanction and the consideration of the setting created by social evolution. All this explains why dispensing justice is still aptly called administration of justice, and why penal textbooks are mere collections of cases. 21. Although rejuvenated, correction services are no less anachronic. I say rejuvenated because they are part of a system which remains substantially unchanged, the administration of justice. This explains why in most cases the reform of those services is little more than the allocation of more financial resources to keep the growing penal population in new institutions. Compared with other countries, the prison population of Puerto Rico is disproportionally high. The following data are illustrative: In the fiscal year 1964-65 out of 15,745 persons sent to prison less than 62 per cent were persons awaiting trial and no less than 85 per cent of prisoners were sentenced to less than one year; it is also significant that of 10,710 persons awaiting trial 54.3 per cent were released on bail and 40.3 per cent of these after having been kept in prison for one day or less. In 1965-66 of 6,413 sentenced prisoners no less than 76 per cent were released after having completed less than six months, and 80 per cent of these had completed less than three months. As for parole the figures are so low that both the law and its implementation are open to serious criticism.0-2 22. If crime as a social phenomenon is more pressing than crime as an individual event, it is obvious that social policies and programmes aiming at its prevention and control are more important than those devoted to treatment. Treatment is necessary but the

-114belief that treatment findings and techniques may be transformed by generalization into preventive policies is erroneous. In the same way that tuberculosis of the individual is different from tuberculosis as a social problem, crime as an individual act is different from crime as a social phenomenon. Up to now prevention has been made dependent upon the discovery of the causes of crime which is a hopeless task. The example of using social change as a general explanation confirms this. 23. In order to be effective social policies should be directed to the mass so as to.modify attitudes and habits. The eradication of poverty will not be achieved by welfare assistance, which often is little more than a treatment policy, but by policies aiming at better socio-economic organization. In any case, crime will never be totally eradicated but it may be reduced if social policies are undertaken not only with the purpose of dispensing benefits or improving conditions regarding education, housing, industrialization, general care, etc., but also in order to inculcate some sense of social responsibility either individual or collective. Hence the wider role assigned in this paper to schools. 24. Up to now criminal justice, which includes police, has remained apart from social policies. It is true that here and there certain reforms may give the impression that criminal justice is nearer to social policies than it actually is. Since the main purpose of that machinery is the control and prevention of crime as a social problem it is obvious (a) that the multiplicity of agencies and services dealing with crime should be coordinated and the control and prevention of crime duly planned. The case of Puerto Rico in this respect is significant; (b) that this planning should be part of the more general socio-economic planning of the country, i.e. the crime control and prevention should, at least in certain respects, be related to national development. This idea has recently been incorporated into the United Nations programme of social defence; (c) that since both control and prevention frequently show a tendency to go to extremes, the protection of human rights should always receive priority in any planning; (d) that an essential part of this planning is the adoption of new penal and criminal procedure codes as well as a radical transformation of corrections. These purposes call for a new judicial function which cannot be performed by "generalists", i.e. by judges who may dispense justice in every field without specialization; and (e) th~t3) a new criminology not centerdd around the offender is required. 11 25. In sum, social policy and planning should embrace criminal justice but the inclusion of the latter is not easy inasmuch as criminal justice, which is a social need, has been overlooked in the attention given to the treatment of the offender. This aspect is important but nowadays the priority belongs to crime as a social problem. Since no social problem can be tackled on an individual basis, crime requires a policy which regards it as a whole and not as a sum constituted by individual offenders. This is why explana-

-115tions like social change still based on causal assumptions such as individual mobility, self-identification and the like, are of limited value. It is then useless to blame migration, industrialization, urbanization, the "changing family", etc., in sum, social change, for the increase of crime. The intricacy of these phenomena can never be transferred to the individual.

NOTES ~ (l)The Second United Nations Congress, London, 1960, recommended that the term delinquency be restricted to the commission of an act which, committed by an adult, would constitute a criminal offence. See, United Nations Publication, Sales No. 61.IV.3; also Manuel López-Rey, Juvenile Delinquency. Maladjustment and Maturity, in the Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol. 51, No. 1, May-June 1960; T. Sellin and M. E. Wolfgang, The Measurement of Delinquency, New York, 1964, Chapter 6; and A Manual for Constructing a Crime and Delinquency Index in Canada, Department of Criminology, Montreal 1966, p. 16. y ~ 2~At the Third United Nations Congress, Stockholm, 1955, the item Social Forces and Criminality was discussed in such a general way that the experience should not be repeated. As the writer pointed out during the discussion, the matter was being discussed without trying first to determine, at least tentatively, what social force means. No less discouraging was the discussion of the item Social Change and Criminality where all the generalities about urbanization, industrialization, rapid change, changing family, etc., were again uttered. ~ 3~See, Sidney W. Mintz, An Essay in the Definition of a National Culture, and Lidio Cruz Monclova, The Puerto Rican Political Movement in the 19th Century, in Selected Background Studies, United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico, Washington, 1966. ~4~See, Explorations in Social Change, edited by G. K. Zollschan and W. Hirsch, New York, 1964. Particularly illuminating about the dialectical condition of social change is Schneider and Sorokin's papers and their controversy; Beshers' attempt to study social change by mathematical methods and Hirsch's essay, Knowledge, Power and Change: The Role of American Scientists. To the writer the most significant aspect of that role is the growing gap between professionalization and the objective appraisal of social events. ~5~See his Introduction to the volume mentioned in previous note. ~ 6~Melvin M. Tumin with A. Feldman, Social Class and Social Change in Puerto Rico, Princeton, 1961.

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(7)The analysis of national statistics, see UNESCO Yearbooks, leads to less optimistic conclusions than those advocated by Tumin and supporters of the same school of thought. With respect to Latin America the recent essay by Solari, Soaris and Labbens on the subject Universidad y Sociedad, in Aportes, Instituto latinoamericano de relaciones internacionales, No. 6, octubre 1966, Paris, deserves particular attention. The question whether the elementary school should perform a function beyond the academic field was touched upon but not discussed by D. Dulles Bourne and James R. Bourne, in Thirty Years of Change in Puerto Rico, New York, 1966, p. 251. To the writer contemporary needs require a function beyond the academic field. (8~gee report mentioned in note number 1 as well as special reports submitted to the 1960 Congress by the Secretariat and Messrs. Panakal and Khalifa. The report of the 1965 Congress is still pending. For the summaries of the discussions see Rapporteurs' Summaries published by courtesy of the U. S. Bureau of Prisons, Washington, 1966. (9)See Manuel López-Rey, Les exigences pénales d'aujourd'hui et la politique criminelle contemporaine, in Revue Internationale de Criminologie et Police Technique, XVI, No. 4, Geneva, 1962 and Revue de Droit pénal et de Criminologie, No. 10, juillet, 1963, Brussels, with the discussions on the matter at the forum organized in Brussels in February, 1963; also Aspects and problemes de la codification pénale a 1'heure actuelle, in Revue de Science criminelle et Droit penal comparé, No. 1, Paris, 1965. (10)See Manuel López-Rey, Economic conditions and crime with special reference to less developed countries in Bulletin de 1a Societé de Criminology, first semester, Paris, 163; Some Analytical considerations on criminology and criminal justice, in Kriminologische Aktualitat, Hamburg, 1966, and with respect to Puerto Rico his Informe penal y criminológico sobre el proyecto de código penal de Puerto Rico, mimeograph, 125 pp., November, 1966. The report was used by the Department of Justice in the preparation of a final draft. (ll)See references in note No. 10. (12) See, Informe mentioned in note No. 10. The Parole Board is part of the Department of Justice. About parole systems and the disadvantages of giving to the Executive any jurisdiction on the matter see Manuel López-Rey, Release and Provisional Release of Sentenced Prisoners, in The British Journal of Criminology, July, 1966, London. Criticism has also been voiced by Pedro Muñoz Amato and Raúl E. González Díaz, in Informe preliminar sobre los derechos a la vida, la seguridad y la libertad personal frente a los problemas de la delincuencia, Comisión de Derechos Civiles, Puerto Rico, 1966-67 mimeograph, p. 89.

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The multiplicity of agencies and activities as well as the lack of coordination has also been pointed out with the support of data by Muñoz Amato and González Diaz in their Inforrne.

-118CHANGING LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY By Gerhard O. W. Mueller

The social and economic development of Puerto Rico has reached a point at which a serious study is absolutely mandatory if the potential growth rate is intended to match the rate of progress of the past few decades. From the point of view of law, a proposed research program on social change offers a number of unprecedented opportunities to study the reciprocal impact of legal change and social change. When the Island of Puerto Rico changed its allegiance from the crown of Spain to the United States of America, a law was thrust upon the population of the Island in whose selection and creation the citizenry had no participation. Obviously, in the selection of the theretofore existing Spanish penal law system governing the Island, the Puerto Rican citizenry had little choice as well, but it may be assumed that the Spanish system was more congenial to the cultural heritage of the Island's citizenry. Nothing is known about the impact which the Ang'o-American criminal law system had upon the Island population when, in effect, the Penal Code of California was introduced here. It is to be assumed that this relatively alien code was somehow adapted for use by the population in an effort to make the best of it and to live with it. While the change from Spain to the United States was purely political, the change from an agrarian economy to a highly industrialized society caused major convulsions. Yet the same alien law, however badly adapted, had and has to serve a newly industrialized society. Again, nothing is known about the interaction between the California Penal Code in Puerto Rico and the social change. The project proposal to study social change in Puerto Rico is intended to primarily serve as the basis for a potential social planning, with emphasis on political, economic and social factors. It should be remembered that the criminal law system of any society is thought to be, or perhaps even can be, one of the most powerful factors in stimulating or retarding the political, economic and social growth. There is no evidence that in Puerto Rico the criminal law has been efficiently used to maximize the economic, political, social, and cultural values of the Puerto Rican society. The proposed study of social change, therefore, must focus on the creation and best possible utilization of an indigenous criminal law system which, in the best utilitarian tradition, will use the criminal sanction only when all other means of social control fail.

lOr (November 1966)

-119While it cannot be predicted as yet what specific sub-topics of legal change (i.e. particularly criminal law change), should be investigated, one thing is clear already: pending such a major inquiry into social change as is planned for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, it is advisable to postpone the final enactment of a new penal code. While the current draft penal codes might well serve as guidelines for the future, a reassessment of the use of the criminal sanction after completion of a study of social change in Puerto Rico will permit draft of a much more realistic penal code.

own

The methodology to be used in the study of social change is as yet undeveloped and the proposed research program must, therefore, establish its methodology. In fact, only a major research program, as the one envisaged, is capable of establishing its methodology. Among the questions to be investigated are: 1. Whether any of research subjects yet to be chosen ever felt either addressed or affected byte existing penal law of Puerto Rico. This question would help solve the oft-discussed problem as to who the addressee of a penal code should be, whether the citizen or whether the judiciary entrusted with the application of the penal code. It is well known that the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute is not addressed to the citizenry, but solely to the judiciary. In my opinion, this is a mistake, since the judiciary can very well operate with a multitude of existing case collections; whereas the succinct conduct norms of a penal code should be addressed to a citizen who is unfamiliar with the case law. There is some literature on this topic, including the works of Sir James Fitzjames Stephens, Joel Prentice Bishop, Jerome Hall and others. 2. A second question needing inquiry pertains to the use of the criminal sanction in stimulating or retarding economic growth. Enterprises and individual businessmen doing business in Puerto Rico should be closely examined as to their views on whether the existing system of penal laws has in the slightest degree affected their business practices positively or negatively, and whether in their opinion the criminal sanction could be used to promote economic growth or stability. 3. A particularly significant objective of inquiry should be the interrelationship between criminal law and family law on the one hand, and family stability on the other. Such an inquiry could be based on the prior research work of Professor Max Rheinstein of the University of Chicago. 4. Another subject of inquiry could be the changing awareness of Puerto Ricans to the use of legal tools and resources in their family life. In sum the significance of the legal change-social change aspect of the projected research program cannot be underestimated.

-120If this study were to be completed successfully, and if its research findings would go into the creation of the new penal code for Puerto Rico, a model, not just for the United States but for the entire world would have been created. Savigny and Bishop warned about codification in a society of rapidly changing complexion like the Puerto Rican society of the present moment. They uttered this warning because the 19th century was not capable of assessing the legal needs of a society and of planning for the future. It appears to me that the 20th century has the scientific knowhow of making such an assessment and of projecting the interaction between legal change and social change. Quite apart from providing a model for the world, the projected study would quite naturally provide Puerto Rico itself with the best possible system of criminal law, suited to its needs and its own aspirations. There is only one country in the world in which a detailed study of social economic and cultural conditions has preceded the creation of a new penal code. The example to which I refer is Greenland, for which, following a detailed study of the culture of its 25,000 inhabitants, the Danish Parliament has enacted a fitting penal code in 1954. This precedent, however, is so infinitesimally small and insignificant that it cannot serve as a model. It is at best a curiosity item which points the way toward the future. The proposed study could mark the first significant accomplishment in the scientific development of assessing and projecting the interaction of social change and legal change.

-121SOCIAL CHANGE AND LEGAL CHANGE IN PUERTO RICO k By Gerhard O. W. Mueller I. A Unique Opportunity for a Social Change Inquiry.

planner

increasing,

intensity

Among the myriad of theories with which the changing structure, and form of crime in society has been attempted to be explained, a "social change" theory has recently gained favor. More misunderstood than comprehended, the social change theory is occasionally thought to rest on the idea that, inasmuch as crime, in the aggregate, is social change-the only universally observable phenomenon in society--is to blame for the increase: tanta rei.l The reality is probably far from this assumption, though neither reality nor assumption have so far been empirically investigated. This is not to say that the two separate phenomena of "social change" and "criminality" have not been subject to separate investigation. Quite to the contrary, Even for the society in question, Puerto Rico, studies of social change and of criminality are not wanting.2 But the correlation of social change and criminality, in the past a favorite preoccupation of legal historians, has not yet been developed into a science. Beyond that, social planners have a long way to go before causative forces may be identified in the maze of correlations, and before general conclusions may be drawn from social change-criminality correlations or causations, in any one society of the past, for purposes of potential application to another sois ciety in the future. Thus, at this point the social without guidelines of any scientific value. The opportunity to study any social theory of which a substantial number of social scientists has become enamored does not present itself very often. An opportunity for such an inquiry under virtual laboratory conditions is without precedent. Yet, it seems that such an opportunity is before us: An island, with an indigenous island population and island culture, has gone through a movement of social change in three generations which it has taken many large nations to pass in perhaps eight or nine generations, reaching a culmination which several large nations have not yet reached and which, indeed, four/fifths of the population of the world will not reach for another three to four generations. Might it be possible to draw general conclusions from such an in-depth, in-breadth study of the multitude of social forces in Puerto Rican society for the last seventy years? Will it be possible to isolate the factor, or force, of law, more particularly of coercive-corrective-regulatory law in this witches'

* February 1967

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brew of social factors? Is it likely that such a study will show law--so far by all mankind believed to be the principal regulator to social change--to be indeed as significant as lawyers thought it to be? Could a Puerto Rican study serve as the blueprint for social planners the world over? II. Historical Studies of Puerto Rican Politico-Socio-Economic Developments. For purposes of setting up an empirical investigation of the interconnection of social change and criminality in Puerto Rico, it should not be too difficult to structure a descriptive politicosocio-economic history of Puerto Rico. The behavior patterns--in terms of conflict with the demands of the law-determining forces of the island--can be reconstructed for the several distinct periods of Puerto Rican history, particularly: 1. the era of relative Puerto Rican insignificance from the mid-16th century to the early 19th century, when the population was dominated by local patriarchs. 2. the era of political unrest in Latin America, when the Spanish crown increased the pressure on the population, encouraged Latin immigration, improved the economy, but severely suppressed budding drives for individual liberty ( first ha 1 , 19th century). 3. the era of a changing Puerto Rican economy (decline of sugar plantation, switch to coffee and cattle), revolutionary uprising (1868, "E1 Grito de Lares"), and the granting of freedom for slaves and forced laborers (second half, 19th century). 4. the termination of Spanish sovereignty, followed by U.S. occupation, economic exploitation by U.S., absentee owners, as well as attempted cultural improvement: "Americanization." (first half, 20th century). 5. the war-time boom and bonanza economy (1941 to 1947). 6. the post WW II era of operation boot-straps with its fantastic spiral of social development, migration and re-migration, industrialization and acculturation. The developments in these six distinct eras are quantitatively measurable through statistics on such factors as employment and unemployment,per/man productivity, literacy, hospital births, welfare contacts, prison-time service, economic wealth, etc. But they are also qualitatively explainable in terms of contemporary values, i.e., attitudes toward such factors as power, respect, enlighten-

-123ment, wealth, well-being, rectitude, skill, affection (Lasswell and MacDougal). III. Legal Change and Social Change. By itself, such an historical descriptive and evaluative study does not reveal anything about the interaction of legal change and social change. A change of law is in itself a significant event in the history of a society. Western civilization, since time immemorial, has endeavored to remove danger and trouble sources by changing its behavior norms. Thus, social responses were attempted to be elicited by changing (or, in the first place, interposing) social stimuli. What is really meant, of course, is that politically organized society has interposed X times individual stimuli, in expectation of X times individual responses. Oddly enough, society has yet to develop a mechanism for measuring the effect of such experimentation. It is rare--and often only due to an unofficial, personal observation--that we learn of any effects of such political experimentation with regulatory (penal) law. 4 Puerto Rico, in the last three generations of her history, has experienced several astounding changesof its system of regulatory laws. Perhaps only Japan and Turkey have witnessed similarly radical experiences which, incidentally, have been evaluated and are avai,abLe for exploitation in evaluating the Puerto Rican These legislative and enforcement changes must be experiments. precisely pinpointed and it must be ascertained with all methods in the arsenal of the social scientist, what effect these changes had on the behavior patterns of those intended to be affected.by the legal change, as well as those incidentally affected. The measurement of legislative and enforcement changes should rely on questionnaire methods, statistical measurement and record evaluation, but should aim at identifying the nature and frequency of contacts of the population with law enforcement. As regards such questions as crimes against property, insurance rates ought to be compared. Impressions of all types of observers (literature!) ought to be recorded. The legal changes of which I speak are, principally, the following: 1. the radical repeal of the indigenous (?) Spanish law and introduction of commom law (Penal Code, 1901, Juvenile Court Law 1915), followed by 2. the era of 'colonial" enforcement; 3. the era of economic and social-welfare regulatory statute law and enforcement, and

-1244. the era of attempted social engineering with socialwelfare type legislation. A few words about each of the four periods and their attempted correlation with the other extant social forces of the total social change pattern are in order. IV. The Puerto Rican Switch From the Indigenous Civil Law of Crimes to the Common Law. When Puerto Rico became an American dependency, as a result of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the Island had a complete system of criminal law based upon the principles of continental jurisprudence. The Spanish Peal Code of July 17, 1870, as revised by the Laws of July 7, 1876, was extended to Puerto Rico by decree of May 23, 1879. Upon the change in sovereignty, this code was continued in effect by the general provisions of General Orders, No. 1, of Oct. 18, 1898. By virtue of authority vested in him by Section 40 of the Foraker Act (April 12, 1900), the President of the United States appointed Joseph F. Daly, Esq., of New York; L. S. Rose, Esq. of Pennsylvania; and Juan Hernández López, of Puerto Rico commissioners to revise and compile the laws of Puerto Rico.' Directed to make a full report within one year after the passage of the Foraker Act, the appointment of its members was not made until two months thereafter. This meant that the Commission had only nine months to familiarize itself with the Civil Law and the Common Law in relation to each other in Puerto Rico, to study the situation which prevailed on the Island, to decide on the changes to be recommended, and to make its report to Congress. The revision of the criminal, civil, and commercial codes and codes of procedure contemplated by the Foraker Act presented greater difficulties than the revision of the political and administrative system. These are the institutions intimately connected with, and in one sense the outgrowth of the traditions, habits, and life of the people. Every change, particularly in the substantive law, must therefore be tested, not merely with reference to its practicability and intrinsic value, but also with a view to its influence on the stability and orderly development of the institutions of the country. Of course, to begin with, the Spanish codes introduced into Puerto Rico had been intended for a social organization more complex than that of Puerto Rico.

quaere,

It was early decided to replace the Penal Code of Spain-what impact did it have on the island population in its one generation of applicability?--with a statutory structure of the eammon law type. In 1901, Professor E. R. Keedy, with whom this author had been in correspondence until his death in 1959-was entrusted with the mission of drafting a code of crimes and

-125punishment as well as a code of criminal procedure.9 Both these codes were approved by the commission over the objection of Commissioner Juan Hernández López, who delivered a strong dissent on the ground that the criminal code drafted unnecessarily repealed the Spanish penal code, which he held to be in many respects superior and certainly more congenial to the tr ditions and concepts of justice of the people of Puerto Rico.1U The historical background of the legislation was described by L. R. Rowe: "In Porto Rico we have come into the midst of a people foreign to us in manner of thought and distinctly European in their institutional life. For nearly four centuries the Roman Law, with its essentially different theory of the family, has governed domestic relations; a highly centralized administrative system has given the tone to civil life, and the Roman Catholic Church supported by the state and identified with it, has strengthened the principle of authority which pervades both domestic and public relations. Whatever our opinion as to the desirability of this social structure, it is evident that it cannot be changed at a stroke without seriously endangering the entire social fabric of the island. But for the conservative policy of the civil government established under the Foraker Act we might have aroused a distrust of American institutions that would have delayed, for a generation at least, the Americanization of the island. To the mass of Americann resident in the island and this is particularly true of the lawyers, the entire system of law and government, of domestic and public institutions, was bad simply because it was different from our own. Everything that did not conform to our system was not only un-American but anti-American. The lawyer from Massachusetts wanted the Massachusetts system, the lawyer from South Carolina the South Carolina system, and so on. The fact that one of the prosperous states of the Union is living under civil law in many respects similar to the Spanish system was given no weight. The system was condemned because it was different from our own. The only way to make Americans of Puerto Ricans, it was argued, was to give them, without delay, the system of law of one of our states. 'This is the way we do it in the states' was regarded as an argument sufficient to bring conviction to the mind of every native." 11 Despite the fact that the commission had declared itself as '?strongly attached to the historical school of jurisprudence as represented by Savigny",12 the adopted Penal Code of Puerto Rico, as well as the Code of Criminal Procedure, were essentially the same code which the state of Californ4 possessed in 1902, based, in turn, on the Penal Law of New York.£3

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Persons are still alive who remember the significant change in the governance of the island's population. Lawyers are still alive who had to participate in the switch. Keedy's papers can still be located. Records are still accessible. What happened when this Spanish-speaking society switched to the codified mores of Anglo-Saxons? Would an investigation of the happenings support Sellin's culture-conflict theory of crime?14 Sellin posits that conflicts between the norms of divergent cultural codes may arise (1) when these codes clash on the border of contiguous culture areas; (2) when, as may be the case with the legal norms, the law of one cultural group is extended to cover the territory of another; or (3) when members of one cultural group migrate to another. Speck noted: "Where the bands popularly known as Montagnais have come more and more into contact with Whites, their reputation has fallen lower among the traders who have known them through commercial relationships within that period. The accusation is made that they have become less honest in connection with their debts, less trustworthy with property, less truthful, and more inclined to alcoholism and sexual freedom as contacts with the frontier towns have become easier for them. Richard White reports in 1933 unusual instances of Naskapi breaking into traders' storehouses.'' 15 Similar illustrations abound in the works of the cultural anthropologists. We need only to recall the effect on the American Indian of the culture conflicts induced by our policy of acculturation by guile and force. In this instance, it was not merely contact with the white man's culture, his religion, his business methods, and his liquor, which weakened the tribal mores. In addition, the Indian became subject to the white man's law and this brought conflicts as well. Maunier in discussing the diffusion of French law in Algeria, stated in 1937: "In introducing the Code Penal in our colonies, as we do, we transform into offenses the ancient usages of the inhabitants which their customs permitted or imposed. Thus, among the Khabyles of Algeria, the killing of adulterous wives is ritual murder committed by the father, brother of the wife and not by her husband, as elsewhere. The woman, having been sold by her family to her husband's family, the honor of her relatives is soiled by her infidelity. Her father or brother has the right and duty to kill her in order to cleanse by her blood the honor of her relatives. Murder in revenge is also a duty from

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family to family, in case of murder or even in case of insults to relatives: the vendetta, called the Rekba in Khabylian, is imposed by the law of honor. But these are crimes in French law! Murder for revenge, being premeditated and planned, is assassination, punishable by death! . . . . What happens, then, often when our authorities pursue the criminal, guilty of an offense against the public enemy of the French order, but who has acted in accord with a respected custom? The witnesses of the assassination, who are his relatives, or neighbors, fail to lay charges against the assassin; when they are questioned, they pretend to know nothing; and the pursuit is therefore useless. A French magistrate has been able to speak of the conspiracy of silence among the Algerians; a conspiracy aiming to preserve traditions, always followed and obeyed, against their violation by our power. This is the tragic aspect of the conflict of laws. A recent decree forbids the husband among the Khabyles to profit arbitrarily by the power given him according to this law to repudiate his wife, demanding that her new husband pay an exhorbitant price for her--this is the custom of lefdi. Earlier, one who married a repudiated wife paid nothing to the former husband. It appears that the first who tried to avail himself of the new law was killed for violating the old custom. The abolition of the ancient law does not always occur without protest or opposition. That which is a crime was a duty; and the order which we cause to reign is sometimes established to the detriment of 'superstition'; it is the gods and the spirits, it is believed, that would punish any one who fails to revenge his honor."16 When Soviet law was extended to Siberia, similar effects were observed. Anossow and Wirschubski both relate that women among the Siberian tribes, who in obedience to the law, laid aside their veils were killed by their relatives, for violating one of the most sacred norms of their tribes.l7 Of course, the "cultural collision" between the United States and the Spanish-American heritage of Puerto Rico cannot be spoken of in the same terms as the conflicts discussed above, as has been well argued by the Puerto Rican sociologist Francisco Ayala:18 "In relative and indefinite terms it is acceptable, no doubt, to refer to a Spanish culture, as well as to a Puerto Rican, Colombian, New England, or California culture. This points out local variations, and there is no harm in it; we all understand each other. But in more precise terms, and taking the word 'culture' in a strict sense, the United States and the Spanish-American countries, together with England, France, Spain and others,

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belong to the same Western culture, internally diversified, of course, until it reaches the social atoms which are human individuals, We may properly speak about impact, collision, overlapping, or assimilation, only when cultures of completely different and independent roots come into contact. This concept of acculturation of transculturation would be valid, for example, to study the relationships of the European conquerors, colonizers, or immigrants with the Indians of the Americas. 'The cultural relations between Puerto Rico and the United States are of a very different nature, because when political contact started with the American invasion of the island, Puerto Rico was already a territory perfectly and completely incorporated into the Western culture, within the Spanish branch, just as the United States was, under the Anglo-Saxon branch. The cultural imbalances which the political dominion could have caused--which we shall examine in detail--would be, rather, maladjustments between two sections of the same culture, and only in these relative terms should they be considered."

any

Ayala may well have underestimated the significance of the actual culture-conflict between the Spanish approach to human conduct regulation by prospectively operating, broadly-gauged, culture-rooted conduct norms on the one hand, and Anglo-American, casuistic and pragmatic precepts of experience (which here came from another tradition) on the other. But the matter cannot be argued without detailed examination. Certain it is only that the conduct norms of the penal codes of California and New ?ork, can not possibly have had the same meaning in Puerto Rico which they had had at their points of origin. Quaere: Whether they had significant impact upon Puerto Rican behavior patterns at all? The attempted acculturation to an Anglo-American penal code went hand in hand with the attempted process of Americanization in general, during an otherwise relatively (?) undisturbed (?) pattern of economic development. V. Legal Changes During Periods of Rapid Social Change. A detailed study will have to be undertaken of the multitude of social changes--and particularly changes in attitude and political self-conception--on the island since the beginning of World War IL. Those changes were accompanied (influenced? conditioned?) by the unprecedented activist efforts at attempted behavior sti•mulation through social legislation and financial subvention. The history of this legislation remains to be written and examined. As yet it is totally uncertain whether the legislative gamesmanship of social engineering through regulatory laws had any impact on the structure of law abidance, or whether such impact was signi-

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ficantly greater, or smaller, than impacts of another nature, in no way related to regulatory law. Quaere: for instance, what was the impact on thousands of poverty-stricken islanders, employed as hotel employees, of the considerable wealth displayed by the new flood of mainland tourists? Quaere: what was the impact of literacy on the part of Puerto Rican youngsters on the traditional position of respect which the illiterate pater familias of the rural Puerto Rican clan structure enjoyed? Quaere: what change in form occurs during crime-prone-phases of the life cycle (e.g., at puberty, or upon family dissolution, etc.) when literacy has replaced illiteracy, when sustenance satisfaction has replaced starvation diets? uaere: what happens upon the typical dissolution of the closely-knit kinship group, traditionally held together by a patriarch or matriarch, who no longer enjoys respect? VI. A Surmise on the Relationship between Legal Change and Social Change. A study of the many facets of social change in its intercourse with legal change may well lead to two primary conclusions: 1, the impact of traditional penal law upon individual and social behavior has been vastly overestimated. There is little response tÜ the conduct demands of penal law--regardless of what origin--and actual behavior patterns, and, socially acceptable behavior is rarely the result of legal conduct demands. 2. the conduct norms as found in penal codes bear little resemblance to actual or potential human behavior patterns, particularly among youth. These two surmises, likely to emerge from the type of study here envisaged, should be further investigated by codifying the conduct expectations presently existing among the Puerto Rican population, as the culmination of the socio-economico-politicocultural developments of the last three generations. These codified expectations should then be phrased in the language of the persons sought to be affected, and--lastly--they should be supported by the type of social stimuli which current knowledge of the behavioral sciences regards as most effective for the largest possible number of subjects. In short, what is here envisaged is an emerging regulatory conduct code which will put an end to the priestly penal codes (and draft codes) with which Puerto Rico had been bombarded over the past century, and which will, for the first time in the history of human civilization, introduce a rational and model instrument of social engineering in conduct patterns, the result of a fully understood developmental process, under minimization of whatever social turmoil may be expectedly produced by predictable social change. In fine: Puerto Rico has the opportunity of becoming the first political society in the history of mankind, to (1) recognize itself in a completely controlled self-study;

-130(2) become the model of successful social determination of conduct patterns, particularly with respect to social deviancy, and especially (3) through complete re-definition of conduct expectations in realistic terms of definition and regulation.

FOOTNOTES The research assistance of Miss Chi-Chung Wang is gratefully acknowledged. 1For a critique of such a naive understanding of the social change theory see López-Rey, Social Change, Crime and Criminal Justice (1967). 2See Cunningham, An Inventory of Research in Puerto Rico Relevant to Social Change and Public Policy (1967), esp. parts II and IIIF. See especially Ferracuti, Juvenile Delinquency and Social Change in Puerto Rico (1966). 3Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law, 3 vols. (1948-1957); Hall, Theft, Law and Society (2d ed., 1952). 4E.g., the "Daily Express notes crime-in-subway down 100% as a result of tripling police force" type of newspaper reporting. SFor simply two of many perceptive references see Hall, Studies in Jurisprudence and Criminal Theory, ch. VI (1958), Hall, Comparative Law and Social Theory (1963). 6 Report of the Attorney General of P. R., 1902, pp. 4-6. 7 Report of the Commission to Revise and Compile the Laws of Puerto Rico, Vol. I, p. 10 (1901) 8 Ibid., p. 28. 9 10 11 12

Puerto Rico Code Commission Report, San Juan, 1901, p. 1. Ibid, p. 33. L. R. Rowe, The United States and Porto Rico (1904). Supra, note 2.

-13113

Parma, History of California Codes, Journal of Law Library, Vol. 22 (1927). 14

Thorsten Se11in, Culture Conflict and Crime (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1938) pp. 63-70. 15

Speck, Frank G., Ethical Attributes of the Labrador Indians, American Anthropologist, N. S. 35:559, Oct.-Dec. 1933, p. 559. 16

Maunier, Rene, Independence Convergence, and Borrowing in Institutions, Thought, and Art, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937. pp. 84-85. 17 Anossow,

J. J., Die Volkstumlichen Verbrechen in der Strafrechtsreform. 24:534:37, Sept. 1933; Wirschubski, Gregor, Der Schutz der Sittlichkeit im Sowjetstrafrecht, Zeitschrift fur die gesame Strafrechtswissenschaft. 51:317-28. 1931. 18

Francisco Ayala, The Transformation of the Spanish Heritage, 284 The Annals 104.

-132February 20, 1967

Hansen:- First, I should like to say that you are all very welco me indeed, and I speak also for my colleagues whom you see around the table, with whom I have been working to organize the conference: the Director of the Social Science Research Center, Rafael de Jesus Toro; the Director of the Criminology Program, Franco Ferracuti; Pedro Muñoz Amato, Dean of Studies; and Robert W. Anderson, Dean of the Social Sciences Faculty. You may now have noticed in the program a very brief curriculum vitae for each of us. If there are errors in the curriculum or if there are errors in our transcription of papers, I suggest that you get in touch with Mrs. Cunningham, who will be able to correct these for the permanent record. You will notice that we are recording our discussion, as we will each day. For this reason we must take some care. We are about twenty-four persons and there are about ten microphones. We are intending at the end of the seminar to transcribe these discussions and the papers. We will then send them to all the members of this seminar for whatever revision or elimination they wish to make. If it seems advisable, we could publish this for the use of ourselves and for others. I would like our discussions to be reasonably free and flexible. We have something of an issue or an agenda for each day, but one will notice the considerable generality, the intentional generality of these words; so that I think one can feel reasonably free in his transactions here. My aim, and perhaps that of many of you, is, by participating in the discussion and listening to it, to search out some clues, some guidance, and some direction for the designing and the doing of research in the social change and public policy field. This is what I am concerned with. The Chancellor, Abrahán Díaz Gonzalez, cannot be with us this morning. He will be with us the morning of Friday, however. On his behalf, I extend to you an invitation to have lunch with him on Friday at the end of our session. You have all received a copy of my paper; some of you, I think, some days in advance, and some now. Perhaps it can serve as a point of departure for our discussions today. I have tried to argue that modernization is pervasive in all the world and not only in Puerto Rico, and that its attractiveness and the commitment to it of large numbers of people is very, very considerable. I have suggested that in the making of a modern society one creates more positions, a great diversity of positions, and that these require new techniques and the formation of new modern men. The

-133attractiveness, of course, turns on upward mobility for individuals and a very considerable increase in wealth, in power, and in much besides, for the society which achieves this modernization. This modern society, I am arguing, requires the formation of modern and competent men. For me, the key words are: high standards and the illiciting of competent performance. There are resistances to which I allude, such as the hereditary, the equalitarian principles, and other mixtures of value and culture which tend to form men and to reward their achievement for other reasons. Muñoz Amato:- Millard, it may be of help if you could relate the substance of your paper to the general purpose of the seminar. Hansen:- The paper I have written is supposed to suggest avenues down which the seminar can proceed, exploring their practicality, their utility, and by so doing provide some clues for persons here at the University who wish to initiate a program of social change and public policy. Muñoz Amato:- Well, it is our hypothesis, I think, that if our program is to be launched, it will be mainly one of research and perhaps technical assistance. We are not thinking right away of a program, for example, of teaching. It is also our immediate objective to get as much help as possible from this group in the planning of whatever has to be done. Therefore, we have a very open mind. It may be that this advice from this group or any further advice convinces us that we should not do anything. But, in any case, we are in the very preliminary planning stage. Hansen:- Completely preliminary. I was invited to give attention to this only in November, and this is February. Frankenhoff:- Would you mind giving us some background, Millard, on the generation of the problem itself, how it came to your attention, why you think it is important, what some of the historical background is? Why do you think this is the moment to discuss social change, for example? Hansen:- As I have indicated in my paper, there are certain questions of performance, and there are questions for the schools and the University about the preparation and the formation of persons to perform in the positions of Puerto Rico, which is no longer traditional and is not entirely modern. There is a certain accumulation of disquiet. The lack of performance, the inability, for example, of the employment service to fill a great many positions in the face of a low per capita standard of living and of tremendous unemployment. I think also that it is a time to re-examine what one wants to do with a University and a school system. These are my interests in the matter. Clinard:- I saw the paper just a few moments ago, I didn't get it before. I would appreciate your elaborating the ideas on it.

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Hansen:- My premise, obviously, was that the paper has already reached you. I would now ask others in the meeting whether my premise is somewhat shaky. Clinard:- In my case, I haven't seen it. I didn't mean for you to read it, just to get some of the highlights out of it. Hansen:- Well, let me go over it. I can skip, I will.

If I feel there is something

(The summary given here has been eliminated because the paper itself is included in this volume.) Frankenhoff:- In this traditional-modern dichotomy, would you see gradations, for example, in terms of Puerto Rico, the traditional Puerto Rico before 1898 and immediately after or not too immediately, and the traditional Puerto Rico of 1930, and the present? Could you have that kind of flexibility in this division? Hansen:- Yes, of course. This is a process, it is a continuum, the two ends of which I have tried to name, traditional and modern. But I don't want to lose track of my issue with Wilbert Moore, it: is not a completely straight line, there are very sharp ups and downs, These, I think, are noticed by historians and called periods. Muñoz Amato:- How would you describe in more specific terms this process of modernization in Puerto Rico? How much Americanization, how much commercialization, or any other trend that you may find? Hansen:- An adequate answer would be very difficult. In a sense that is one of the things that has to be done in this research. I would immediately select the school; I think that the modernization of Puerto Rico is wholly connected with the school from beginning to end. If I want a single thread, it would be the history of the school and of the University. If I were to look for one other clue, it would be, I think, the factory, the capital, and the entrepreneur and the worker which are necessary for it. López-Rey:- Mr. Chairman, if I understand you correctly, your paper and the exposé you have right now made, in my opinion the g neatest contribution is that you bring a quite different element into consideration of the problem examined here, social change and public policy. It seems to me that public policy, as you understand it, and I agree to a great extent wihyour point of view, is far more important than social changé at the present juncture particularly here in Puerto Rico. Among other reasons, because it seems to me that the meaning of social change needs clarification. The element you have introduced is the question of performance, which is the backbone of your paper. It is true, as you say, that diversity is one of the characteristics of a developed society, or even developing society. This diversity implies different aspects and functions which have to be performed by somebody and also

-135greater intervention of governmental agencies among which, I agree fully with you, the University is supposed to play ah important role, among other things because the University is expected to train or to prepare people for public policy. The problem of performance, as you describe it reflects a past cultural pattern which doesn't correspond to the requirements and the needs of contemporary public policy. In other words, it means that the problem of performance which is inherent in public policies cannot be identified with social change, that it may be a disrupting element, it may even go against social change, because the performance patterns reflect past cultural patterns which are obsolete. If I understood that correctly, it seems to me that problems of performance, as you raise it, present two different aspects, one individual: why a particular person doesn't perform his duties or responsibilities as he should which, in my opinion is relatively unimportant and another far more important good performance, as part of a good public policy. This means that those in charge, governmental agencies, universities, and so on, have to pay far more attention to the question of performance and hence responsibility as a part of public policy. If I understood your point, it seems to me that as far as Puerto Rico is concerned the problem of performance as a fundamental characteristic of public policy is more important than the somewhat theoretical question of social change. Hansen:- I think you caught the emphasis of the paper exactly; this is my view. I once thought of, instead of themes, putting down a few crucial hypotheses around which one could group his research and his thought. Had I done that, the first would be performance. So that is the heart of the matter. As to the importance of policy I have no doubt at all, I take the simple well-known example, when it is a matter of policy for every child automatically to move from one grade to the next, so that his psyche will not be hurt, I think you get bad performance. When the legislature passes by and asks a sixth grade child: "can you read?" and he says "no", in parenthesis, sarcastically, one might say, "how is your Psyche, has it been hurt?' This, I think, is the application of bad policy to bad performance and consequently we are moving in the wrong direction. I think other examples are easy to find, I could find them, and I think that in this program they should be found. And they should be very well explained and one should ask that public policy be in the direction of good performance and not bad performance. Nieves-Falcón:- I understand that some people do not speak Spanish? Hansen:- I think we should conduct the sessions in English because there are several who do not understand Spanish. Nieves-Falcón:- I have three queries about your exposition. The first one has to do with the whole model of traditional-modern. I wanted to ask you whether within this model you can see that in

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a particular society, although one could classify it as modern or as traditional, there would be coexisting basic facets, which one could qualify as either traditional or modern. Hansen:- The answers will be simpler if I take your questionsone at a time. Of course, the answer is yes. Again, I spoke of a continuum. We probably have existing in Puerto Rico today personalities, performances, which would go the whole range almost from the stone age to the most modern. What one does, I think, is to take some kind of statistical emphasis and say this is more and the other is less. Nieves-Falcón:- The second one has to do with your paper and also with what Dr, Mu?oz Amato said. In bringing into focus the problem of social change in Puerto Rico, in general it's equated with Americanization. Would it be possible to differentiate one from the other? What one really calls Americanizations are patterns common to all urbanizing societies, rather than being autochthonous, typically American. But we learn them from America because it is the closest urban country near us. Hansen:- I think there is no doubt of that, and I think, as Alex Inkeles has pointed out in his researches, this is widely known and recognized almost everywhere and will be recognized even in France and Puerto Rico, I think, within a short time. The reason for it, I think, is simply that this is a modern, industrial, urban world and it so happens that the United States is one of the earliest and the biggest communities of this kind. Inkeles:- If I might just offer an amplification, at this point, I think that the question you raise, Dr. Nieves-Falcón, is one of the most troubling in all discussions of modernization because inevitably, in the process of modernization, as large scale forced of change are introduced into the lives of everyone, people suffer what is now very popularly called an"identity crisis", and obviously, as one acquires a new identity, people want it to be one which is positive rather than negative, obviously. In addition, many things that one had one doesn't wish to give up because one thinks that they were fine. Even if one doesn't, they are one's own, and one rather would often have one's own than something foreign. As a result of this the question of what is the definition to be placed on the influences which are entering the culture and society is always always enormously important, at least from a political and social-philosophical-evaluational point of view, though it may in fact, from other points of view, not really be terribly critical in the long historical view. And there is a good deal of confusion about this issue. The case that you cite in Puerto Rico, I think, is probably the most typical. For example in Africa you have it more identified with what is distinctively French culture, whereas in fact many of the things that have been imported are shared by a much larger cultural realm. Now, that doesn't mean, however, that one can in fact say that everything which is characteristic of, let's say, Western Europe and the United States is automatically

-137co-terminous with a theoretical conception which you might have of modernization. Nor does it follow in the other direction that everything which is modern is automatically to be found in countries like France and the United States; there are very important areas in which there is not perfect fit between these two. I can give you one simple and very obvious example. It seems to me that, insofar as we define the main features of the modern society and the physical-psychological characteristics and skills that must go with it, the organizational forms that are essential to its operation, the type of legal and political structure, which we wish to include within that framework, and so on, it by no means follows that the kind of suit which most of us are wearing around this table is necessarily very adaptive in that kind of environment. Yet in point of fact, if you go, let's say, to Japan, which has a quite distinctive culture, you will find everyone, almost without exception, who falls into the modern realm, wearing a suit of this type. Now, what I mean to point out by this example is that inevitably those societies, or if you like, cultures, which have first succeeded in mastering some elements of what we call modernity (especially control over science, utilization of rational administration, emphasis upon organized and planned systematic change, use of technology, mobilization of the population, mass media of communicatiol3, which I would say are inherent in the concept of modernity) influence the rest of the world not only in this core which is unchangeable, but also in many features of its own traditional culture which have nothing to do with modernity. Every developing society, in which I would include Puerto Rico, must re-examine this list of factors and assess those elements of this package which are indispensable if one wishes to run amodern society, and those which are relatively dispensable. Now, it may turn out that those which are dispensable are so marginal that it isn't really worth the effort; for example, perhaps it doesn't much matter what kind of cLothing we wear, if we really have to have all the rest of the package. But it is a scientific issue, and I think a conference of this kind might find room at some point for a discussion of the ranges of choice that are available. You might think of this as constraints. In becoming modern there are some constraints which are invariant, there is no choice about them; for example, you must have a relatively rapid system of communication, and you cannot say, "we would feel better sending our messages by drums from hilltop to hilltop". You will not have a modern society if you insist on that, but you may be able to say that we are much more comfortable living in many individual houses rather than apartment houses, or in having our kitchens in the front rather than in the back, or having six generations of a family live together rather than two. Those are realms in which there may be a great deal of choice. The most obvious choice, I think, is with regard to language, but there are many others of this kind. So I think this is a complex issue and it is easy to confuse modernization and a particular culture from which it comes, but it is not an absolute necessity.

-138Hansen:- Thank you.

Let us finish Luis Nieves Falcón's question.

Nieves-Falcón:- Well, Dr. Inkeles' answer bears partly on my third question. Although it has been presented in your paper, the modern man is a rather homogeneous context. I had a question and it is whether you would agree that despite this rather homogeneous context of modern man the collective perception, the evaluative collective perception of what is modern man varies from society to society, and secondly whether each different society doesn't put different ingredients on what each particular one considers as modern. Inkeles:- This is a very complex issue. My research is really mainly addressed to trying to resolve this issue. And in order to give you an answer, and I shall try to do it very briefly, because I don't think that is the main subject for this morning, we have to go much further in the elaboration of the description of my research than Professor Hansen was able to go in the time that he had available. The answerbD your question is "yes", that is to say, each society can and does define what is modern in slightly different terms, but I have found it extraordinary the extent to which, within the range of content which each society puts into its description of what is modern, there is a core which all of the different societies I have studied seem to hold in common as part of their conception of what is the modern. And in the material which Dr. Hansen reported he is referring mainly to the statement that I have made so far in my research, as to what is the common core. You might, if you like, think of this as a series of lines which one draws on the board, with the total space of the board available within which to draw the lines, and each culture defines modern as one part of the total area which it could draw the line in. What I have attempted to do is to ask to what extent is there some area of the blackboard or the scale in which the lines drawn by each culture overlap with the lines drawn by every other. Now I can't say every other because I have studied so far only six, but what I have found is that, in the six very different societies which I have studied, there is a very substantial agreement, which emerges statistically as well as theoretically, in the content of the definition of what is the modern man, and those were amongst the elements which Dr. Hansen presented. Now, it is also true that in each of the cultures some things are added as part of the modern package which are distinctive to it, and here you have a problem which is one of translation of concepts and values from one culture to another, and because of the great difficulty that is involved in that, I have been striving to find a universal language for describing the modern man, and In doing that I may push him into a mold which is unreasonable. But I can give you one important illustration of the effort that we have made in this direction that I think is revealing. I don't have the final results yet; indeed, I have just received a little note from my colleague, who is working in India, about this, so this is as we say "hot off the press". I invited the collaborator in each of the

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countries in which I worked to develop a model of the modern man which will be entirely independent of my theoretical model, would be according to how, locally, you'd think of a modern man. None of my field directors found himself free enough in terms of time and other obligations to do this except my colleague in India, and he devised a unique Indian measure of what is a modern man entirely rooted in the local culture. For example, he asked such questions: "Do you believe that food tastes better when it is cooked on cow dung cakes? (you know, the Indians dry cow dung on the walls and then use it for fuel) or whether it's cooked on charcoal?" "Do you believe that water tasted better if it comes from a well which is a tube well, or a non-tube well?" (The Ancient Indian well is a quite different type than the sort that is sunk now.) And, "do you believe that clothing feels better on the back, when it is woven by hand, as against when it is woven on a machine in a factory", and many other questions of this kind. And he measured modernity entirely independently of my scale using these very deeply rooted local forms of defining what is a modern man, and there is an extremely high correlation, as it turns out, between my universal measure of modernity and the one that is distinctively rooted in the Indian culture. Now, since the content of his items is so profoundly different it suggests to me that within the framework of different cultural content, there are probably some common dispositions in men, I think of them as psychological properties, you might speak of them as character traits or qualities, which are more or less the same under all conditions of modernization. Now this does not deny that there are also many possibilities for variation around this central core and it does not specify, and this is easy to misunderstand, it does not specify what must be the political and social form in which this modernization is embedded. For example, I personally do not believe that it is clear that a socialist or a communist, as against a so-called capitalist form of political economy, is a necessary ingredient in the definition of modernization, at least psychological modernization. You can find equally modern men on my psychological measure in both of these types of society. But whether you could find this type of man in a traditional monarch such as, for example, you have in Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, is a quite different question. Cochran:- It seems to me, Millard, that your emphasis on public policy and performance would allow us to center our discussion on these elements, and give us a sharper focus. I would suggest, first as a footnote to this, that public policy has been so continuously favorable in Puerto Rico that I think it's often easy to overlook how important it is. That is, if we take Argentina in the last forty years, as I am sure Alex Inkeles and Díaz Alejandro would agree, that forty years ago they were ready for what Rostow would call the take-off stage, and this just never happened, and the reason it never happened, I am sure from my own studies there, is bad public policy, particularly uncertain public policy, not always bad, but always uncertain; so that I think that public policy is extremely important for economic growth. In the United

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States Government stability has been extremely important. Public policy for economic development may be divided into encouragement of economic growth, and taking care of the hardships that occur because of growth. Taking care of the hardships involves problems of the rural underprivileged, the urban poverty areas, and these are of such importance in themselves that they divert attention from the dynamics of modernization. If modernization through public policy is the focus of this meeting, I think that we should not get involved in the problem of dealing with backward areas in the culture of Puerto Rico; there is a backward culture in Pennsylvania just as there is in Puerto Rico, you only have to drive thirty miles outside of Philadelphia to find traditional men such as the Amish. Such contrasts are present everywhere; and are matters of degree. But if you think of public policy in relation to the dynamics of change, you inevitably concentrate on the entrepreneurial middle class. There is, of course, a labor problem, but this is probably going to be solved more by better foremen and managers than by labor itself. Therefore I would suggest that the focus of discussion should be: how public policy can usefully bear upon this entrepreneurial managerial clerical middle class. I just suggest five areas for study. First, proper education, and along with this, of course, proper child socialization (how you cut in by public policy to produce proper child socialization is a subsidiary proble . Proper education in secondary schools, I think much more important than is the University, because most of the middle class are probably for some time to come going to end with secondary school. Second, proper values are needed, but this is a derivative matter, and it's one that I won't try to expand on this brief discussion. Third, efficient work habits, and this involves my own particular interest in entrepreneurial efficiency. As a fourth element there are efficient living habits as well, and I'm struck by the fact that the middle class in Puerto Rico seems to have a certain inefficiency in living habits, involving such things as housing, quiet surroundings, efficient transportation for getting to and from work within reasonable periods of time; and also the stresses and strains that industrialism is putting on the traditional Puerto Rican middle class family. And lastly, efficient government with favorable public policy, and this goes back to the question of efficient work. By focusing on the middle class in some such fashion as this, we may get at the kind of problems that Millard brought up in his original statement. Hansen:- I would agree, I think, with just about all that Mr. Cochran has said, but as of this morning, at any rate, it seems to me that the efficiency of the local government and its correct direction are somewhat less than he seems to think. Padilla:- I was going to refer to some of the remarks made by Mr. Cochran relative to the efficiency issue or the performance stand-

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ards versus the welfare function of government. This, I think, is a crucial matter that cannot be dispensed of so easily. I think that from the political point of view government must take into consideration the welfare function that it is to provide might be somewhat contrary to the concept of performance. I agree that in Puerto Rico this is one of the problems we have now, the lack of performance standards. But I am not so sure that we are giving proper attention to the fundamental issue involved here of performance versus welfare in the case of developing countries. Another fact which I think is also very important is the problem of values. I think that you are assuming here, again, the problem of efficiency. When you mention, for example, living efficiency here in Puerto Rico in terms of zoning and all, I think you are referring perhaps to the fact of our urban sprawl. But I am not so sure that there is any information that would prove that it is more efficient psychologically or even economically to live in an apartment, in a twenty-storey building, than in single detached housing that we have here. There are ideas about the way that people live, for example, in the States in regards to density, but this does not necessarily imply that modernization must be along those same lines. Cochran:- I am only presenting a problem. mediate answer to it.

I do not have an im-

Padilla:- I would use this to refer to my second point, which relates to values. I think the crucial point is, in values, that this is very clear in the type of urban living here. People here consistently want their own housing. Why? I do not know whether this has been carefully researched or not. But anyway, the problem of values is very crucial in any one of these things. I just wonder how much attention has been given in the overall planning of this study, of this activity, to the more precise discovery of values and to the guidance in value changes, that is, I think, necessary in relating to policy issues. Hansen:- I am going to ask Franco Ferracuti to speak.

-well

non

Ferracuti:- First, in relation to your paper, Millard, and then to some of Padilla's comments. I suppose that we are all anticipating some of our own papers, but this is inevitable. You postulate a modern man versus a non-modern man and you also emphasize performance, but this immediately complicates your model into four types. Just substitute change-prone for modern, and change-resistant for non-modern, and change fit for well-performing, and change-unfit -performing; and you are going to have four types: the for change-prone-change-fit, and all the others; change-prone and change-unfit, change-resistant-change-fit, and so on. Now of these four, your leaders of change, are only type one, change-prone-changefits; the others are subcultures of resistance or misfits. Now how much of a misfit, that is a good question. I wouldn't be very much ready to buy that 32 per cent figure of Dr. Stanton. Perhaps

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planning

this is a bi-modal population in terms of IQ, in terms of performance. This is a question that has to be researched before we plan for change. Now it seems that in Puerto Rico, at least to an outsider, the public policy question is basic; the public policy is towards modernization, in fact it is more revolutionary than the society around. How much of the population does it apply to? How many fractions of populations are left behind? How much allowance for caring for these groups which are left behind must be included in the in order not to have pockets that are inevitably deviant pockets? The type of instruments, like Dr. Inkeles' type of measurements, always are very difficult to apply in a society of this kind. We often may confuse symbols with values. And this brings me to agree with Dr. Padilla; the value problem is basic, here. Who wants to change, and what does change mean for that person? How much is he prepared to give up? This basically is a psychological problem which must be reduced at an individual level before we can do anything about it. We can plan a policy, but then we always have to bring that policy down to an individual level. Either we do it when we plan, or we are going to have to do it when we are faced with those who are damaged by the change process. The productivity versus welfare question, well, there are a set of studies from something called UNRISD, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, in Geneva. There seems to be a high correlation. There is a welfare effect on productivity and a productivity effect on welfare. How much of that is going on here? That's another question to be answered. That's all, thanks. Hansen:- I think we might adjourn fifteen minutes for coffee and resume in fifteen minutes. I think we can resume our discussion. López-Rey:- Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a request. Since what I am going to say refers to something which has been previously stated by Mr. Inkeles, and he is not here, I would like to speak second instead of first so that he knows what I'm going to say. Hansen:- Instead, then, let me call on Mr. Thorne.

reason

one

reasons:

many

Thorne:- I would like very much to ask a question with regard to the central point of your paper: performance. Are we discussing performance on the basis of performance that is consistent with economizing, economic development, and so on? It seems to me very much that way. Now frankly, I am very sympathetic to this being considered seriously, since I happen, unfortunately or fortunately, to be someone engaged in the field of economics and economic development. On the other hand, I would like to know whether we should always judge performance, and meritorious performance, excellent performance on the basis, mainly or only, of efficiency economically. I am asking this for that, if I have understood history (I am not a historian) not too

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badly, haven't we had in the golden age of Greece high levels of performance, but not aimed mainly at economic efficiency? Highly developed work in sculpture and art were produced in times which, at the time they were being produced, in the Golden Age of Greece, of Athens especially, would have been considered modern at that time, but at that time modern did not mean economically, developmentally modern. Criteria differ. In Italy, a long time afterward, you have hours and hours, man-hours, devoted to painting, high level of performance in painting, the composition of music; but these artists, if I have understood correctly, did not try to produce many pieces of painting in as short a time as possible, which is what the economically motivated effort would lead to. They were quite content to gain satisfaction from contemplating the work of art they had achieved personally. And I would like therefore, to know whether you would comment, either contrariwise or in agreement, that your definition of performance could be the definition that we would use in economic development theories. Thank you. Hansen:- I would share the comment you make. Performance is by no sense measured exclusively, in this paper or in my mind, by economic efficiency, and I am talking about performance in all the ranges of the positions of the society. I have quoted with great approval and pleasure the remark by John Gardner about plumbers and philosophers, and he is concerned with both of them; and so am I. We want both the theories and the pipes to hold water. You mention Athens and Rennaissance Italy; I think that concurrent with, and somewhat before, the greatness of Athens they had become extremely efficient and modern merchants of olives and the rest, and consequently had the funds to do some of these things. I think that a good many of the paintings that we admire were paid for by a banker in Florence named Medici. So I don't think in any sense that one wants to dissociate economic efficiency, artistic and philosophical efficiency, and above all political efficiency, in public policy. I have no intention of doing so. López-Rey:- Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that we have to make a clear distinction between the concept of modernization and the need for performance. It is true that in your very interesting paper you relate the one to the other and Dr. Inkeles has conducted research about the characteristics or homogeneity of the 'modern man" image. It seems to me that one thing is performance and another the image of modernity. In fact, if we look at the characteristics which are assigned to the 'index of overall modernity" on page ten of your paper, apparently following Dr. Inkeles' survey, it would be rather controversial to maintain that all these characteristics belong to the modern man. If we look at them carefully, and I am not going to read them because I think interventions should be as short as possible, we find that in past civilization the same preoccupations for orderly society, calculations, fixed schedules, and so on. That is to say that the usefulness of this modern man image is relative existed in the sense

-144that we have to ask one single question. If we relate this kind of research undertaking to social policy, we can ask, should social policy be addressed to this symbolic image of modern man, or to the man of many sorts to whom actually social policies are addressed? I do not know whether I have made myself clear; although from a scientific research point of view the act of building a modern-man-image may be interesting the image created does not correspond to reality, to needs, and even less will it justify that in future social policies should be formulated and implemented, having in mind this image of the modern man. As far as Puerto Rico is concerned, I do not think that the research and creation of modern man-image, which does not correspond to reality will serve a factual purpose. Hansen:- Mr. Inkeles, do you want to answer, or shall I? Inkeles:- Well, I do not know whether in general it is crucial for us, this morning, in terms of the agenda to get very far into these questions although they are the ones that seem always to stir interest. I find as a rule that one gets much more disagreement about psychological models of modernity than one does about economic and public policy questions. And even though this conference is supposed to be on public policy we are already drifting toward the discussion of these issues. And that is something for the group as a whole to decide, how it wishes to spend its time. I would just like to say with regard to the material here that I am dealing not just with an image, but with an empirical reality. We have measured in six thousand different individuals their personal properties in a four-hour interview, and what we have described here as the modern man is the common core which characterizes those people whom we define as most modern. The fact we define them that way does not make them modern. So the first point to consider is that we have found, in six very different societies, and as a matter of fact in more than a dozen cultures, because many of these societies have more than one culture, that there is a series of psychological properties which seem in nature, (this is not an image, it is an empirical fact, this was derived statistically by a computer) to cohere. Now we have called this set of psychological properties "the modern man". We called it that because we feel it is legitimate to do so since it turns out that empirically the properties that characterize these men fit a theoretical model with which we began. But there is no reason why you have to call it modern. As a matter of fact, very often we have thought that the discussion would go better if we called it a new factor, factor "X", which we have found in men, or "M", and the curious thing about this factor is that it seems to have the same set of psychological properties in each of the cultures in which we have examined it, because our usual idea of culture is that these properties don't go together. Now we find that they do in cultures that are enormously diverse. That does not mean there are no other ways in which these cultures are different, but in every one of these cultures you find a group of men who statistically have the same

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properties. Now the question you might then ask is, "well, what about these men; is it interesting to know more about them, and if so, what made them?" And this does get you very close to the policy issue because in the first place it turns out that the men who have these properties of modernity, which we have defined psychologically, also are men who behave differently in action. We have, for every one of our subjects, studied their actual behavior. We know their productivity in the factory; we know whether they have voted or not; we know whether they take an interest in politics; we know whether they have ever talked to a local official and asked for some change in a program of action; and it tends to be generally true that the men who are more modern on the psychological measures also act differently in their behavior. Now, this doesn't necessarily mean that you have to accept as positive the qualities that they manifest. And that takes us to the third issue. Are the things that these men do in practice things that we would like to have more widely diffused in our contemporary, growing, developing societies. By and large, in my judgment at least, the behaviors these men manifest are the very ones which as a rule we want more cf. We want men who produce higher productivity; we want men to take an interest in politics; we want men to read their newspapers; we want men to treat their children with more respect, (incidentally that is one of the things that is true of the modern man; he is less likely to shut his son up if his son presents a new idea, he is the man who is more likely to ask his son to explain his ideas); he shows more sensitivity for the dignity of his wife; and he is quicker to adopt methods of child restriction, which in most developing countries, at least, is a very, very big issue. So there are very positive consequences in behavior. Now that makes it important to find out what makes such a man, and here Dr. Hansen has gone into detail, indicating that such men are made more by a series of influences which are no mystery: education, urban experience, and we have found very important, experience in the modern productive enterprise. Now, none of this is to say that you necessarily have to want these things. That's a question which is at the policy and value level. I am only trying to present the information which has come out of our study so far. Finally, the point which is close to Dr. Nieves-Falcón's point, and that is about the relationship of this to other systems of culture value. This type which I described, of course, exists in other times. As a matter of fact, I believe that empirically in Greece what I call the modern man was the most common type of man amongst the leaders of Greek society. I think the Elizabethan man was a man of that type too. These are general psychological properties which could emerge in any historical era. The point that I am making is that in the modern world we want these properties not just in a small elite, but we want them to be very widely diffused throughout the population, partly because we think that's a good thing from a policy point of view and partly because we feel that, from a practical point of view, the

-146society will not run well unless people have these properties. Now I may be wrong at many points on this position, but this is essentially what I have been describing as the factual and the practical policy side of it. I don't think that this really deals with what I take is the chief concern of your paper, which is what kind of a policy should we adopt, or can we achieve these or other purposes through policy or behavior or change measures of a different kind. My own research, I think, as of the moment, is neutral with regard to these issues. I don't think it's coercive with regard to the position one takes on change or public policy as against other means for dealing with the problem of the contemporary world. Hansen:- Some things that I would have spoken of have been said by Inkeles, and I will skip them with only the commentary, that while I think empirically in Athens or in Elizabethan England you will find men who have many of these characteristics, I think not quite all of them or as many as you say. I refer to something you wrote; you showed this profile to somebody who was a student of Greece, and who said: "well, these people are Greeks of the ancient classic time". And my response to that was, well not quite, and I could name some things in which they don't fit at all. But I think you have covered this issue. I would merely say, obviously whatever the modernization process is, a new animal was not created: it is still man; and I am persuaded of the magnificent preface of Mann to the Joseph series. He says he worked back, and back, and back. He wanted to find a man; a modern man like himself. And that was Joseph. I don't think Joseph would be very perplexed if he were here with us. On the other question, performance which can be improved by standards, and standards which can be established and enforced by public policy, is very much what I am concerned with here. But I believe that certain images about modernity or some other word, if you prefer it, are going to be very important in getting this policy established and accepted. So that I see no dichotomy of policy and modernity or vice-versa. And I think my paper rests upon a pair of forces, namely, modernization and public policy. Clinard:- I suppose that Dr. de Jesús-Toro will talk about this tomorrow, but what I am interested in is not the question of modernity, modernization; I think that this is not essentially the problem. I think that the problem is, to what extent fundamental values are interfered with by modernization and which produces problems. Hansen:- Mr. Clinard, if I may interrupt, we will not have tomorrow the paper of Mr. De Jesús-Toro. Clinard:- I see. It seems to me that the problem here is what these changes have brought about. It is not the superficial things about a modern man, but it's the changes that have taken

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place, for example, in the processes affecting religion. I have spent a great deal of time in India, and perhaps my colleague Mr. Inkeles has found other things than I have found in my own research. There is an amazing lack of shift in the Hindu religion; it stands up under the impact of almost anything called modernity. And it is this Hindu religion with its dharma and karma that, in my own judgment, is the greatest single stumbling block to the movement of India into the modern world. Western dress, habits, the patterns are very fundamental shifts, I agree, but they may not affect certain fundamental patterns of belief. My own feeling is that in Indian cities there is much less crime and that the control of law is not as necessary in the great cities of India because of the control exercised by kinship patterns, caste and religion. As I understand it in Puerto Rico the family has also retained its importance under urban conditions. Now it seems to me that the problem is the extent to which the changes of 11modernity11, or whatever you want to call it, disturbs the kinds of fundamental relationships that I have mentioned here. I myself am very much convinced that of urbanization and industrialization, the first is the most important. I think that a factory located in a large city and a factory located in a small city or rural area are two different things. If I were to summarize what I have to say, it seems to me that we ought to come to grips sooner or later here with what is the most significant factor in Puerto Rican society that is producing social change, whether it is education, whether it is the industrial-factory system, or whether it is urbanization. A place like San Juan with 700,000 persons out of a total of some two million persons on the Island represents more than simply an industrial complex in terms of a way of life and a set of social problems to the Island. Hansen:- I won't make a detailed reply but merely refer to my paper. I think that my paper is specific and is addressed to the specific problems in this community, with the possible exception of where you speak about identity problems and these deep value and behavioral patterns which you associate with religion and with the family. All of these things I think are of grave interest, and I think that they have to be taken care of. I have not emphasized them perhaps because they are so well known. Ferracuti:- Some of this already has been expressed by Mr. Clinard. I only know of Dr. Inkeles' study through a brief glance at the material you lent me. And, of course, what one sees is an extremely interesting diagnostic instrument for modernity. This is a little bit like the MMPI; it will allow us to identify a schizophrenic, but it will tell us nothing about schizophrenia as a process. As a diagnostic tool it is extremely interesting, and particularly interesting is the search for fundamental characteristics that he is conducting in different societies. And it would be interesting to see those fundamentals here, but that still leaves open the question of what is it in the value system of that individual that

-148makes him modern. And unless we go back to that, it will not be very easy to assess the damage or absence of damage and to take any remedial action in the sense that Dr. Clinard was discussing. Clinard:- May I just add one remark? I think that I agree in general with Mr. Inkeles, Wilbert Moore, and others. I think I am more interested, however, in the relation of certain specific cultural and social factors to change. For example, the migration of Puerto Ricans to the Mainland has run up to about a million. These persons go to New York and Chicago into some of the most difficult urban slum places in the world, and then later many return for short visits or return permanently. They bring with them norms and values which I would presume have much influence on changes in the Island. It is likely that much serious gang delinquency and drug addiction can be traced to the influence of youth returning from the slums of New York. Hansen:- Migration, Mr. Clinard, is of course so everwhelming in Puerto Rico that we are conscious of it, everybody talks about it, and we have done considerable research on it, and we will continue to do so. Clinard:- I was trying to point out the peculiar qualities of the Puerto Rican migration situation. I know nothing quite like it.

Pabón:- I would like to refer to four aspects, which are mainly aspects in the theoretical presentation of your paper. In the first place, I would like to stress Dr. Thorne's comments. It seems to me that in your theoretical model you stress too much economic developments as a criterion for modernity. The whole idea cf mobility, achievement, transition from peasant communities to industrial settings, and things like that, come really from the Western sociological analysis and refer mostly to what has happened to the Western society. In this sense, I think that we should try to develop a wider form of reference. In the second place, the idea of performance seems to me to deal mostly with skills, with means, not with goals, because performance is not a goal in itself. When we deal with performance we are dealing with different skills, and we have to refer to the different contexts in which these skills are operational. For example, the educational skill is different from the economic skill; the political skill is different from the educational skill, and so forth. We cannot relate, for example, the idea of modernity and economic development with the educational system just like that, because we have to ask first whether the skills in the economic system and the skills in the educational system should correspond to each other. In the third place, the models that you have presented, contrasting the traditional and the modern society, stress too much the existence of stratification in the traditional society and stress too much the less stratified society, in the inidea of an open society, of dustrial-modern typology. I would like to ask, for example, how far the Puerto Rican society has become an open society, or how

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far the Puerto Rican society has become a more stratified society, because it seems to me that when we accept the model, we are accepting that the Puerto Rican society has become a more open society, and that by accepting this we are begging the question of political power. How far, for example, have we created here new political elites? How far has the political system become more authoritarian? How far has social stratification become more stratified? These are questions relevant to the Puerto Rican situation. And finally, the fourth point, is in relation to public policy. It seems to me that the question of public policy is a question of access to power, access to the decision-making process where the policy is made. Although the symbols of modernity can exist in any society, as professor Inkeles has pointed out, regardless of the political system of those societies, yet the problem of policy formation and policy decision is related to the political system, and we have to find out more about how policy is made in Puerto Rico. We do not know enough about policy formation in Puerto Rico, and I think this is one of the areas we have to look into. Hansen:- I will reply as briefly as I can to the excess emphasis on economic development which you and Alfred Thorne have both mentioned. I would say it was certainly not intended. You say performance is a matter of skills, it deals with means and not with ends. I think it is a far broader term than that, and I have never been able to make strong divisions between ends and means. I follow John Dewey and see these as an endless chain. You set an end, and you find the means for it, it's the means for the next end, and so on. As to stratification and open society, I see all societies as stratified, including the society in Puerto Rico. Open has to do with how much movement within the strata you will find possible. I think that in Puerto Rico i..n 1967 movement is much freer than it was in 1937, and we are moving, therefore, in that direction. And in my paper, when I talked about the principle of giving positions, prestige, rewards, in terms of achievement, I am saying that this is a necessity of a more open society, but I am thoroughly conscious of two things, and I am indebted to a large extent to Mr. Gardner for this. One, there are other ways to give positions and I think they must not be overthrown prematurely or drastically. Secondly, I know perfectly well the openness of the society in Puerto Rico is a matter of considerable degree. There are many things that prevent movement in the society. Policy, you say, is a question of access to power. Well, of course, I agree, but I take that for given. My concern is what, having gained power, you are going to do with it, what is the policy, not the gaining of power particularly. Nieves-Falcón:- You have answered my question. I was coming back to the matter of performance because you did tell Alfred that you were not thinking merely in terms of economic efficiency, but then, I would like to know what did you have in mind about performance, because on page 13, for example, you say "performance in Puerto

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needs improvement. In none of its basic institutionsand organizations are high standards deeply honored, on the contrary the hereditary and equalitarian principles are powerful, they undermine the principle of recruitment, authority and reward based on high achievement." Hansen:- I refer to the University, I refer to the schools, I refer to the failures all through the economic enterprises of the society which become visible and measurable, and the inability of the U.S. Employment Service to find people for jobs, for the positions we have created. Now, these are not all economic or all connected with economic development, but they are throughout the range of the whole society. To put it otherwise, I want better formed men who will perform at a higher level than they are now performing; this is what I am saying. Now if your question would be one of fact; if you would say to me, "you have observed incorrectly, we do have high performance in all of these things"; this becomes an empirical discussion. We set up our criteria and find the best evidence. But that, of course, would not be convenient in a place like this, although it becomes necessary, as well as convenient, during the course of any program of research in this general area. Reimer:- I will accept your disclaimer to Nieves and assume that you mean performance standards in general for all kinds of behavior, and take issue directly with the importance that you are attaching to performance standards. My concern arises from the assumption that if this position holds, performance standards, excellence as such, becomes the first consideration for public policy, which I think it should not be. If anything, more equal opportunity, even at the expense of present performance standards, ought to have first claim on public policy. It seems to me that Puerto Rico is not a very good example of the importance of performance standards. Puerto Rico is an outstanding success in a sea of failure despite some weakness in performance standards. The success of Puerto Rico is, as Mr. Cochran pointed out, due to its public policy, which, as I see it, has given higher priority to equality of opportunity than to standards of excellence. I have one other disagreement. The Coleman Report, an "Equal Opportunity for Education" in the United States is the first big study which casts doubt on the efficacy of the school system. If you take the Coleman Report at face value--it seems to me a technically very good report--the quality of the school has very little if anything to do with performance as objectively measured. Hansen:- I'll reply again as briefly as I can. You find an excessive emphasis on performance in the whole paper and then go on to specify it. You prefer, you say, equal opportunity rather than excellent performance. I'm completely perplexed by this. Equal opportunity is precisely what Gardner is talking about and it opens the door so that there can be competition, good performance for

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the positions there are. Excellent performance by no means excludes equality of opportunity. The whole point of this issue in the paper is that it requires it and it is the hereditary, equalitarian, and other principles which try to assign positions and prestiges on criteria other than performance that deny equal opportunity. You argue that success has come to Puerto Rico in a sea of failure because of excellent public policy and despite indifferent performance. I can't accept this at all. I think we've had high performance in public places and for that reason adequate and well enforced public policy which permitted the success you talk about. But in addition, that public policy in the absence of high performance, in those Fomento factories for example, which is the heart of the thing, where the money came from for the success that you talk about, was essential, and it was there. I think we must see what that was. You go on to say that my emphasis on the school is too much, that the schools aren't very good. I'm emphasizing education because I'm quite aware of the fact the schools aren't very good, but what I'm making is a plea that the schools be rapidly and very gravely improved. Reimer:- Well, I'll go backwards. First, my point was not how good the schools are, but that the schools aren't very important in forming the person; not nearly as important as I think we've been led to believe. My point in contrasting emphasis on excellence with emphasis on equal opportunity, I take both from your paper and Gardners. In both papers there is an implication that if you push equality of opportunity too far, you do it at the expense of performance. I would argue that the emphasis in Puerto Rican public policy ought to be for even greater equality of opportunity, for even greater extension of opportunity, even at the expense of present performance standards. We have succeeded, in Puerto Rico because the emphasis of public policy has been on equality of opportunity and because we have been willing to accept indifferent performance. On your other point, that we have had good performance, in policy making, this is granted, but I assume that we are not talking about good policy making, we are talking about good implementation. In the factories we've had good enough performance to meet the standards of the market, which aren't very high. Certainly I agree we've got to meet minimum performance standards, but this is a different matter, it seems to me, than emphasis on high performance or emphasis on excellence. Hansen:- As briefly as possible, but perhaps just to show the emphasis, equal opportunity and good performance go together. The opposite of equal opportunity is not-equal opportunity; and it's not equal if all men equally may have the same position or if from a hereditary point of view only a few would get them. So here we have a disagreement, but that I think will not push further. López-R :- The concept of performance is difficult to define, but since the questions of opportunity and equality have been raised, we should look at the elements that in principle should be taken

-152into consideration when talking about performance. My suggestion is that when we think of performance we have in mind first, targets for plans to be fulfilled, to be implemented. As a second point the question of abilities and capabilities required to carry out the plan should be considered. The third point is the selection and preparation of people, equipment, who are supposed to carry out the plan. Selection is particularly important. A push point which is no less important is the question of supervision. And the final one often forgotten is the question of responsibility. All five points constitute the main elements of performance not as an individual phenomenon, but as the main materialization of public policy. Obviously we have to take here into consideration the question of opportunity and equality with respect to those who may be regarded as apt to perform something, but it seems to me that opportunity and equality are subordinated to the main aim of the performance of public policy which is effectiveness. It is not that I intend to introduce here an antidemocratic element. On the contrary. Everyone is equal but equality does not mean capacity and responsibility. As for opportunity like equality it is subordinated to capacity, results and responsibility. In sum, in a democratic society individual equality and opportunity are subordinated to the aim of better performance. This is particularly the case with public policy. Reference has been made here to India and to the characteristics of India, a country that I know rather well, but if you look at the different parts of India, how can you put together the characteristics of Indians of Orissa, Benares, and Uttar Pradesh, and even if you compute them, maintain that what results is the image of the modern Indian? The problem of Japan has been mentioned here, but Japan is the country in which the most ambivalent characteristics face each other. As far as I personally know, Japan presents the most contradictory characteristics, it is old and it is modern. The question is, are not these two poles present in every country and person? What is then the value of the modern image-man in the formulation and implementation of social policy if whatever scientifically obtained that image is purely abstracted empiricism? Hansen:- I would like to make a very brief comment and then I will call on Mufioz Amato. I would like to recede a little and be more of a chairman and less the presenter of a paper. As I think back I've been answering each as he comes along. I would much rather have a much more general discussion. I hope that a number of comments and criticisms have been brought to the paper to which I have replied, but I would like now to be relieved of replying in each particular case. Muñoz Amato:- I'd like to react to Dr. Clinard's questions and the proposal he made that we should include some of his questions in the agenda. I think that from the point of view of Puerto Rico we must try to clarify a little bit more what the history of this seminar is and what are our hypotheses in terms of future action. The interest in this analysis of social change with respect to

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uncertainty

social policy began very early when the economic development trend was taking great momentum, great intensity. It was from the beginning our idea that we have here the possibility of improving the methodology of social sciences by looking at a situation of intensive economic development and relationship with the United States. We wanted to try, if it was possible, to use the research and the methodology of the social sciences to focus on this situation in Puerto Rico which has promise of intensive economic development, drastic social change, and uncertainty in terms of social policy. We did a lot of things to find out this usefulness of the social sciences, and you know that very good studies were made, especially in the Social Science Research Center, which could tell very little in terms of what to do in the public policy realm. It was only natural because the complexity of the problems is tremendous. The methodology of the social science is unfortunately not so advanced as it is necessary to cope with the problems of public policy. And as time went by, we had to suffer the insufficiency of the social sciences, the inadequacy of the public policies, and the results of these two factors put together. Now what is it that now moves us again to try to do something about it? The same hope, the same hope that there may be improvements in the investments that are made for social research in the methodology of social sciences and in the possible orientation of public policy coming from the findings and the interpretations of the social scientists. Now, we have had, I think, great success so far in economic development. It may not be as good as we would want it, it may not be a permanent trend, but we have done a lot in terns of economic development. At the same time we begin to experience the consequences of economic development in terms of intensive among the people as to their norms and social change, their patterns of behavior, and a very great deal of confusion in the government as to what to do with things like preventing delinquency or correcting delinquency, treatment of delinquents, what to do with the primary schools, the secondary schools, the university programs, what to do with the growth of the big city of San Juan, in specific terms of housing, public facilities, and so on. We have a feeling that the educational forces of society are not good enough to clarify for the people and for the leaders of the people what are the factors to take into account, the alternatives for their decisions, and the possible trends for the future. I think we cannot forget the future because what is taking place now may become better or worse, and there are certain trends that are very interesting from this point of view. I don't know what is the actual situation in terms of the family. We've done a lot of research, but I know very little of what actually is taking place in terms of the Puerto Rican family. I think I know that the educational system is not being very important in the orientation of our people in terms of what to do in concrete situations. What should be done, I don't know. This is something we have to study, certainly not in terms of general solutions, but in terms of specific remedies, of specific attention to certain particular problems. We are facing the very old problem of what are the things

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that make human beings better or more satisfied, or more selforiented, or more capable of expressing their best potentialities. Now that has always been and still is an almost impossible problem, but we have to do something about it anyway, and since we have governmental and social forces of such great importance, of such great impact on the people, it is always pertinent, especially in terms of intensive change, to try to find out how these social forces influence human individual values. I think that the last of questions faced by Dr. Clinard is very pertinent. I think we have the problems of the influence from outside, whether it is more or less Americanization, that has to be found out. It may be the channeling through the American influence of worldwide changes and situations, but it may also be that Americanization in itself is important because it is for one thing a factor of outside decisions of uncertainty for Puerto Ricans, and we know our political status problem, our relations with the United States, is a question of great importance and also of great uncertainty for our people. We have to find out what to do with urban development and inefficiencies of our planning organisms in government. We must orient our educational system. It may not be very influential, but I think it is very influential. It may not be very constructive, but I think it is not very constructive. And we have always the persistent problems of people in the positions of leadership of our educational system not knowing what to do. Now tourism is also a factor of great significance. It is a constant bombardment of people coming here for very superficial reasons affecting our life, and we don't know what to do with it. Take economic development in itself: there have never been, in my opinion, more American influences than what we have now with the latest stages of economic development. It may be worldwide influence; I think it is also peculiarly American. Now, what do we do with drug addiction; we know very little as to what to do with drug addiction. What do the social sciences contribute to the problem of drug addiction? We have a problem of deterioration in our public administration system. We are not now, as we were ten years ago, in a very optimistic atmosphere, a very constructive Leadership for economic development. We are now facing very difficult problems of not finding the people in all the different important positions of the government to cope with the very complex situations that they have to face. We have a certain pessimism in our people as to these problems of delinquency because the government is alarmed, everybody puts fences and "rejas" in their houses, the mass communication media exaggerate; but almost nothing constructive, really constructive, is being done in terms of preventive work, or even the efficiency of reports, or even the treatment of delinquents. I don't know very much as to the situation in terms of mental health, but I think there are symptoms of preoccupation and concern with this aspect. I think that if we focus on these problems that we face in Puerto Rico it may be more manageable to plan a series of studies or a series of future actions in the University. Otherwise, we may be taxing the more difficult and more complex questions without enough concentration on the particular practical problems.

-155Hansen:- There are a number of people who would like to speak, including myself, so I think that in fairness, since I have spoken much today, I will ask others to speak.

morning

Ferracuti:- There are some variables that we cannot forget. One variable is the tempo of change. There is no society which is static unless the Amish or other similar marginal groups are studied, but the characteristic here again, at least to an outsider, seems to be the tempo of change. It may be that we have not found the optimal tempo of change for our resources. There is a matter for policy decision, and it is a matter that should be reassessed. The tempo leads inevitably to another point, the base line of change. Puerto Rico changed from an extremely low base line, and it's a common knowledge that the tempo has to change the farther we move from the base line. You cannot increase at the same rate forever. There is a limit, and there is a limit set among other things by available performance. There just aren't enough skills around in any society, not just the Puerto Rican, for unlimited progress at the same speed, at maximum speed as we ever had. Concerning equal opportunity, I would like to remind you of a piece of work which is fairly common knowledge in criminology that came out about five years ago, Cloward and Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity. We all adhere to the principle of equal opportunity of course, it is part of our way of thinking, of our democratic way of life; but doing this, occasionally we run the risk of creating the Cadillac around the corner myth. Yes, opportunities are equal, should be presented as equal, but if we insist in the mass media on this point, we run the risk of raising expectations which cannot be fulfilled by the individual, and we run the risk that if he cannot get the Cadillac through legitimate opportunity just because he does not possess the skills to get it, he may find it easier to steal it, and we have built into him the expectation of that Cadillac. So, equal opportunity must be tempered to available opportunities. I would like to disagree, Mr. Reimer, with another point. Education is important; beginning with these U. N. studies, health and education are the two welfare factors that correlate between themselves and with development in the eighteen countries studied. What we need is probably a list of ills as listed by Muñoz Amato, and possibly of remedial action, keeping in mind some of the variables which we have been discussing. We are now running over the surface of the problem, and this we've had a long list of possible topics. Now perhaps our Chairman will condense this. I don't know whose task this should be. Hansen:- I will not at this time, but I will call on Rafael Corrada. Corrada:- I wanted to say something along the lines that Pedro Muñoz Amato suggested. I would like to begin by this question of performance that seems to bother us a lot here. To me this concept brings about a notion of the ability to carry out a given task effectively, and therefore it is neutral as to the sort of task; that, I

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think, was worrying some of us in the sense that an ill-conceived public policy can be implemented with high performance, and therefore produce more damage in a society than if the public body is a not performing at high levels. This is why I see the case of Puerto Rico as one of performing highly but with an ill-conceived public policy; an ill-conceived public policy in the sense that, although it created economic development, it failed to forecast and to take proper precautions as to the consequences of that economic development, and therefore was ill-conceived, if you wish, in that sense, although at that level that Puerto Rico started, it was very difficult to tackle the whole problem of development with all the adequate planning tools, and therefore perhaps we were asking too much from that generation that pushed the country from a very low base line to the line that we are reaching now, which is producing some problems that are worrying us and that is why we had to reconsider, reevaluate the public policy that the country ought to follow. In this particular, the image that comes to my mind is that economic development has been brought mainly through a sort of exogenous procedure. That is, the Puerto Rican society was not capable of creating industrialization, for example, by its social structure. So it had to be with a demonstrational effect, if you wish, based on the social Darwinism that if the Puerto Ricans are exposed to the factories as run by the Americans, who know how to run them, somehow they will acquire their skills and somehow they will acquire the image of the modern man as has been defined tip to now. Of course, we see that there is something wrong with this social Darwinism approach in the sense that people don't seem to get to the opportunities, they don't seem to exploit the opportunities that are available with the proper performance. And that perhaps in this area our public policy had to be reviewed more profoundly in the sense of checking what are the endogenous factors that could he inculcated in the population, perhaps with an educational system which seems to be the most powerful instrument in this connection, as to bring about social change of a nature that provides us with a more harmonious pattern of development in connection with the Americanization that is affecting us. That is, I'm suggesting, that perhaps the cultural pattern of modernization that professor Inkeles suggested that we are using may not be the most proper for the Puerto Rican society because it is one that comes through the American interpretation of it, and perhaps other international patterns are more akin and closer to our social base line or social structure, and therefore one of the tasks I would Like to suggest in terms of the future topics for study is to analyze what other possible modernization patterns, cultural patterns, are applicable or should be considered by the Puerto Rican that are different from the American ones. Rodriguez Bou:- I just want to express my main interest in participating in this seminar, which I think is very timely. It has been very frequently and repeatedly stated that few societies have been more intensively and extensively studied in the past twenty years than Puerto Rico. It has been studied in fragments, especial-

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ly a good number of them, and I think it has been a good thing but in some respect not so constructive, with the main purpose of writing doctoral dissertations. The thing that worries me is that I think that so many studies about the Puerto Rican society, at least fragments of the Puerto Rican society, are available that I have had the hope that in this seminar we might be able to put together some of the main findings of these repeated, fragmentary studies of our society with the aim or with the help of the people participating in the seminar, we might come out with some valuable and interesting new leads on how to tackle some of our present problems on social change. I will just point out that if we are going to keep this seminar in the high level of rehashing issues that have taken decades to discuss or remain in the theoretical level and conceptualization without focusing on the problems that really are pressing us and about which we need to know more by putting some of these studies together and by divising new studies that may give us some more important information, then we are going to be far short of our aims in this seminar. Take for example a problem we have been dealing with very recently, the problem of security in our society from crime, delinquency, and so forth versus the civil rights of the people affected. We have been feeling a tendency of people putting much more emphasis on security than in the civil rights involved in these procedures. Take for example the confusion between the exercising of power in policy making and the utilization of the correct knowledge in policy decision, the confusion between knowledge and power in policy decision. Take another important, and I think very important, consideration in our society, most of the sociological and anthropological studies that have been made in Puerto Rico take as a point of reference the middle class of other more highly developed societies. Our middle class is a very new one and most of the people in our middle class, in our professional class, still carry with them the psychology of poverty although they are dealing economically in a middle class milieu. And this brings to focus a different type of psychology in dealing with out problems. People in our middle class are too close psychologically to the places from the subcultures where they came from although they are economically functioning at a different level, and I am very much interested in these psychological problems created by the middle class or that they are suffering than with just the economic aspect of the position that they occupy in society. Take for example the other problem, tied up with the type of press, the newspapers that we have. We are suffering here from the advertisement psychology and the creation of images that are brought to our milieu from the North American advertisement and psychological creation of images by Madison Avenue. Those techniques used in highly concentrated, urbanized, and commerciallized societies apply to a very small society, two million and a half inhabitants in this Island; and I think the psychological problem involved in these advertisement techniques and the creation of images politically speaking and socially speaking, is the contrary to what it would be in the society from which we are borrowing these techniques, because here one of

-158the problems is that we know too much of everybody else. We know too much of them and we can continue creating false images. So, I hope, what I mean to say with these few examples, and I could go on with hundreds of them, but, really I hope we do in this seminar aside from discussing this highly theoretical and conceptual things that have been rehashed in so many seminars, that we try to put together some of the key findings, some of the studies that have been made in Puerto Rico. How do we put them together and what light, with your help, we can bring out new leads on what to do from here on. With our present needs without mentioning at this occasion the complications that we have with the cultural and value systems. So I hope that we give more emphasis to this type of problems in this seminar, and I am expressing just my personal point of view, then just devote excessive time to the conceptual and theoretical discussions about which we can read extensively in books and publications that have been made. But we want, I think, to deal with some of those problems that Muñoz Amato has mentioned, Ferracuti has mentioned some, and some of the other participants have already mentioned some. And I think that will give us more basis from which to proceed and where to go from there on in these studies of social change and how they are affecting this small segment of the world population, only a little more than two and a half million people, in such a small territory where everybody knows so much of everybody else. Díaz Alejandro:- As an economist I get the feeling I am in the minority, so I must be careful with my comments. Some of them may not seem appropriate to some of you. I am used to thinking about social change in any country by looking at the past and future with the help of a developed plan, which gives special attention to economic strategy. Therefore, I find it somewhat peculiar that we have been talking about future social change in Puerto Rico without discussing the future economic strategy of the island. I realize that this is likely to be a complicated subject matter, because it is tied up with a lot of other non-economic issues. The Planning Commission which exists here perhaps engages in such long-term planning, and I would be interested in hearing more about the work of this group. But it is important for us to give some thought to such a strategy for several reasons, some of which have already been raised. For example, we have been talking about the issue of performance, which to me means economic efficiency. Now performance or economic efficiency have to be defined with respect to some social and economic framework. An activity may be said to be efficient given social goals, income distribution and other institutional rules of the game. Future performance will depend on the framework within which the Puerto Rican economy is called to operate. Because Puerto Rico is a small island, and small islands have a lot of economic troubles Which large Continental -type countries do not have, it is very important to define and research objective-

-159ly the economic alternatives open to it. One obvious alternative is continued integration with the United States Common Market. That would call for a certain economic strategy from which a lot of other social policies would follow. Other alternatives could be explored. A possibility for twenty years from now could be the integration of Puerto Rico with the Latin American Common Market, which by then, hopefully, should be a going concern. But besides considering economic efficiency with regard to these and other possible frameworks, there is also the need of reconciling economic efficiency with social goals, and here, I may mention briefly the Argentine experience. Argentina for a very long time followed a public policy which I think could be regarded as extremely good from the point of view of economic efficiency. I am talking of the period roughly between 1870 to 1930. Sustained growth was achieved for a long time and the country seemed to be doing very well. Yet, we know of the economic stagnation and social unrest which have taken place in that country since 1930. Nobody knows for sure the basic explanation for post-1930 Argentine social change, but there is a strong suspicion that failure to reconcile the goals of economic efficiency with social and political aspirations lies at the root of the poor post-1930 performance. Large foreign investments in Argentina no doubt accelerated her pre-1930 growth, but they also created frictions and resentments among the local population. These feelings of the population were on the whole neglected or dismissed scornfully until they exploded and provoked policies highly detrimental to economic efficiency. The lesson seems to be that besides economic efficiency, wise public policy must take into account other factors, some of which may well be based on "irrational" feelings. But by saying they are not rational they will not go away. They exist and they will persist. Cochran:- I guess I am extending the remarks of Diaz Alejandro and making them a little more specific for Puerto Rico. Looking back over the economic history of Puerto Rico, it is clear that the minor industrial revolution that got under way with the Puerto Rican Reconstruction Administration at the end of the New Deal, and was greatly stimulated by World War II, set the objective of a high degree of industrialization. Industry seemed to be going forward so fast, that the feeling was why not put all government pressure behind this kind of policy? Meanwhile agriculture would take care of itself. While I know that if there was somebody here, from the Puerto Rican Department of Agriculture they wouldn't agree that it had been left to take care of itself, nevertheless in looking at the statistics of the present day, I would say it is still being relatively neglected. This has had a number of repercussions on the economy as a whole. For one thing, it produces unemployment because in the agricultural sector, education, whether in school or through some other kind of training, has been inadequate. It has failed to train people for the industrial labor force, either in Puerto Rico or on the continent. Consequently, the agricultural sector is the source of a large part of industrial

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unemployment because young people are not properly equipped to be absorbed into the industrial sector. The other alarming thing to me is that there are actual declines in the productivity of Puerto Rican agriculture. Sugar is not meeting its quota, which used to restrict sugar very sharply. In general, it does not seem that the agricultural sector has been developed with the greatest possible efficiency and thoroughness. It could probably take care of some of its own employables to a greater degree than it does, and it certainly could operate with higher standards of educational efficiency. Hansen:- May I change my modest rule for a moment? For years, Mr. Cochran, there have been very good studies to show that it is feasible, necessary, and desirable to develop agriculture if only for the local market, but for other reasons as well. It has been a widespread and acceptable policy in the government that this should be done. Now comes an area in which I am wholly without light and information and I think there is a tremendous need here for information. But when you look at certain things such as the encouragement of bringing in outside firms precisely in order to increase the industries of milk, and meat, and chickens, and eggs, and a number of other encouragements of this order, and they have not prospered well. And, consequently, I think at this point one is confronted with a very particular, Rodriguez Bou, a very particular question, "why is it that this wide agreement that this should be done, this wide agreement this will be done, in fact has not been done?" Now, of course, those of note in the field have hypotheses and questions, but I intervene here to emphasize what I think is a very important line of study. Clinard:- This is just a matter of inquiry. I. have been looking over the abstracts that Mrs. Cunningham prepared. It seems to me that most of our studies provide a rather extensive body of knowledge on Puerto Rico of a social science nature. But it seems to me that most of it is rural or is a sort of sample drawn from the whole island. There are few urban studies even though Puerto Rico is now 55% urban. We do have a few urban studies such as Caplow's and Rogler's studies on urban housing and urban ecology. Oscar Lewis' new book, about which I have ambivalent feelings about its usefulness, is urban. Cunningham:- Most studies are on the rural area of the Island, and there are a few representative studies. One of the very few of the latter is the Tumin-Feldman study. One thing to be noted is that most studies are at least ten years old. It seems to me that Puerto Rico has changed a lot in the last ten years, so perhaps we should take that into account as well. Hansen:- There are some smaller studies to be mentioned, but I choose to mention only one large one, the very recent study of Rogler and Hollingshead on mental illness; and that is urban, and while their concern is mental illness, the variables, the approaches they use are urban sociological. So I would add that to the list.

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Rodíguez-Bou:- The Housing Authority has just finished a very interesting and important study. It summarizes seven other studies they have conducted about slum clearance and this matter of urbanization in the metropolitan area, and as that study is finished, I think an effort should be made to get copies of it; it isn't published, it is in a sort of Xerox way of reproducing it, but they may be able to provide this seminar with copies of this study that really covers the entire metropolitan area. Glinard:- Offhand one can be very proud of all social research that has been done here in Puerto Rico. On the other hand, when one comes to look at it carefully, one wonders whether we really do have much knowledge of contemporary Puerto Rico. If some of the studies could be repeated or done in an urban setting we could have a better understanding of the present situation. Bobonis:- There are two problems that are worrying me which are theoretical in nature. The first one is that through these discussions a considerable number of statements have been made concerning public policy, social change, education, performance and so on, but the relations among these variables have not been clearly defined. No attempt bias been made to identify explicitly, if at all possible, which of the mentioned variables are dependent and which are independent. There is, for example, a subtle implication that public policy determines social change and therefore that it is one independent variable. I wonder if this is so, or on the contrary, is it social change that affects public policy. These relationships should be looked into more thoroughly. The other problem that preoccupies me is the rate of change of social change and not the tempo of social change. There have been, I think, more social changes in developed societies during the 20th century than there ever were all preceding years of history. It is difficult for me to understand how the Puerto Rican society in particular can taste, gulp and assimilate the social changes taking place at the present rate of change, without having adverse effects in the psychology of the masses. Inkeles:- I have one very slight suggestion--I wonder if it could be possible when we start tomorrow to arrange it so that the pattern of economic development which is anticipated for Puerto Rico in the next two decades is somehow presented to the seminar as a basis for our discussions. I was much impressed by the point that Díaz Alejandro made. I don't think it exhausts the possibilities for the seminar from now on, because we could certainly spend a lot of time discussing what happened on the basis of events of the past. We also can obviously spend a lot of time asking what truly exists in this moment because I think in regard to many of the questions that Mufioz Amato raised, we don't really know the answers

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and the big part of the problem is to see the facts while attempting to set policy for the future. It seems to me very important to have some idea of what are the constraints within which we should operate. For example, is it reasonable to assume that the rate of population growth in Puerto Rico will be at the same rate of the last ten years or the average of the last forty years or will it be a declining rate? Is it reasonable to assume that the rate of industrialization will be at the rate that it was in the last ten years or profoundly different, and will the content of industrialization be very different? For example, will there be a shift towards a different type of industry, let's say heavier or lighter, increasing use of electronics? Will women be more employable in the kind of industry that will exist or not? Are there plans for changes in transportation patterns that might be relevant, because otherwise it's very hard to know what kind of public policy one ought to be enunciating. Hansen:- Let me raise this question among all of those here at the seminar in terms of the feasibility of responding favorably to Mr. Inkeles' suggestion, which followed a suggestion of Díaz Alejandro. Cochran:- Millard, I would li1,e to make a suggestion. I'm not going to come up with any answers, but I wonder whether we shouldn't at some point in our five days proceedings, break down into three or four groups of people interested in handling this problem from different angles. I mean, it occurs to me that possibly the psychologists and criminologists are not very deeply interested professionally in this matter of economic development. Whereas economic development people can probably talk to each other more rapidly and fruitfully if they were alone with whoever else was interested. Hansen:- Mr. Mueller might wish to applaud that. about it in the first place.

This was his idea

Mueller:- Mr, Chairman, I can see that there will be some very specialized knowledge required for fruitful discussions at some points. I was afraid from the very beginning that, as a lawyer, I might get bored at some places in the discussions. But I know now, after listening here for two hours, that this will not be the case. Nevertheless, I also know that, as a Lawyer, my contribution will be quite minimal at some places of the discussion. On the other hand, perhaps my contribution might be more fruitful in a session where legal change and social change could be discussed. Now, these are my personal views. I would think that perhaps economists might feel the same way in their area. Naturally, such a division might make sense only if we reconvene before the seminar is all over and then exchange our views and put the pieces together. Hansen:- This second question, I think, we can take into our consideration early in the session on Tuesday, the procedural one. To go back to the original question placed by Mr. Inkeles. Have we any suggestions?

-163Rodríguez-Bou:- I don't know the extent of the knowledge of our guests here, but I'll suggest that there have come out lately a number of documents, they are not too long, and they summarize quite adequately some of the big problems that we are facing. For example, there is an excellent paper by Dr. Vazquez Calzada on population growth and on unemployment that I think is an excellent one to give a view of these problems. There is another along these lines in English produced by Hugh Barton for the Status Commission that deals also with these problems of economics and population growth. I think it is important that they see these. I think this other study that summarizes seven other studies by the Housing Authority is important to get the core of this urban problem of the metropolitan area, where one-third of the island population is concentrated right now; dealing also with the educational problem and the housing problem, and all the other factors that go with it. There are two or three short papers that deal with the educational problem and the projections of the educational problems that we are going to face up to 1980 that I think is very important that you have, and I think this document should be in the hands of the people here so that they get a feeling of what is going on recently. Hansen:- May I intervene just a moment to say this is all useful, perhaps we could do it, Rodríguez-Bou, but this is not the question I think that Inkeles was putting. López-Rey:- Mr. Chairman, I am in full sympathy with Dr. Inkeles' suggestion, but I am very much afraid that the time that we have at our disposal will prevent us from going deeply into the matter. I think the points he raised are important, but on the other hand I am not quite clear about the final aim or purpose of this meeting. Are we going to simply have an interdisciplinary discussion about problems on the basis of the papers submitted, and the discussions or what is said here will be used for something having a more practical purpose? I am afraid that if we break into small groups or if we discuss the matter as suggested, we are not going to achieve what I think was the main pu.~pose. On the other hand, may I say that Mr. Muf%oz Amato and Mr. Rodríguez Bou have already made some suggestions about questions which could be discussed by the group. It seems to me that since the path has already been opened perhaps we should follow it. Hansen:- I merely wanted to say, Mr. López-Rey, that the discussion of whether or not we change our procedure in the direction suggested I would prefer to hold until next time. Corrada:- I would like to suggest that Mr. López-Rey may have a very, very important point. It comes to my mind a very distinguished Israeli economist who was explaining the development of Israel was talking about the economic development that was taking place in Israel and how Kibuts in the middle of the desert were developing economically, and producing tomatoes which are very,

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very costly. And I asked him what was the economic rationale behind it. What was the economic rationale behind this development or economic strategy, and he said that that was not the purpose of it. They were not engaged in economic development, they were engaged in national development. It seems to me that although the point is very important of talking about economic strategy, it may be the purpose of the seminar is to try to define the social strategy, and after that ask the economist to provide us what is the best economic strategy to fit our social strategy for Puerto Rico, because I think we are putting the cart in front of the horses and that perhaps the purpose of this is to try to define social strategy and to try to indicate the areas of research that Puerto Rico ought to initiate in order to have a more clearly defined public policy in terms of social development. Hansen:- Well, fortunately we have four more days for discussion.

-165February 21, 1967

Hansen:- If you find it convenient, I think we can begin.

morning,

our

now

May I introduce Arnold Feldman, from Northwestern, who had a flight cancelled yesterday and found it, therefore, impossible to come yesterday. Perhaps by tomorrow, we'll have his paper reproduced and put your hands. The paper by Gerhard Mueller you have. During the course of the morning I hope we will be able to distribute to you two further papers: the paper on "Research Goals and Strategy" by De Jesus and Ferracuti, which will, be agenda for Thursday and the paper "Reflections on Focus and Approach for the Research" by Anderson which will be on our agenda tomorrow morning. During our session this morning I would like to collect as many views, as many ideas, objectives, methodologies as this group wants to talc about with regard to social change and public policy research. But in another way, I do not wish yet to close any options. I would like to have it open as much as possible. Someone made the suggestion yesterday that I would list the things that are already emerging. I should be very happy to do so, but not today. I want to leave all options open. If you like, I would rather make a list after the list is longer than it already is. As a consequence, I think that all here around the table should feel entirely free to use this morning's meetings for what they think is useful to us, or if you like, for your own interests, and let us see how the discussion will in fact develop. By no means do I wish to suggest that this means we cannot criticize what has been said and written. This kind of confrontation, I think, is valuable. Mueller:- Thank you, Mr. Hansen. I think I should present my remarks with an apology, as I appeared late in yesterday's session. This was not out of disrespect for this group. Quite the contrary. My lateness was occasioned because I was made to feel the impact of social change. The social change appeared in the form of a 1954 Buick automobile which was operated by an intoxicated driver who was unlicensed, uninsured, untrained, who was speeding because he was rushing to the hospital; one of his passengers was almost dead, because he had been hit on the head with a lead pipe. The driver lost control of the car in a curve. I had the misfortune of coming from the other direction in that curve. The point I am trying to make, I think, is a very obvious one. Fifteen years ago it could have been, it should have been, predicted in Puerto Rico that this country would experience a fantastic motorization. I think the Island did not tool up for this motorization. There should have been social planning, but there was not at least in this respect. Of course, we are operating primarily with a criminal sanction in trying to control this

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fantastic problem which the automobile has created. Think of your own experiences as children or as parents. When you failed to keep your child happy then you spanked it. Whenever society fails to solve a social problem adequately by urbane or by civil means, then it resorts to the criminal sanction. The result of failure to control by urbane means is, of course, that the Island today has an enormous criminality problem attributable to the automobile. I am referring not only to the fatalities, the deaths which the automobile created, I am also referring to the lives which it may create because love-making is usually and often done in automobiles. I refer to the traffic offenses; I refer to the use of the automobile crime-wise; I refer to unauthorized use, larceny and so on. But this in only one problem area. Puerto Rico society and every other society is experiencing changes constantly, some more rapidly than others. But so far law has represented the force of conservatism. It has followed, it has not led. Maybe the time has come when this use of law can be changed so that law becomes the stimulator of conduct, rather than the responder to conduct. I, myself, have tried to express that in the second edition of our book on criminal law and procedure. Punishment and other sanctions had been in the last chapter. We have now made it the first chapter, because we want to regard sanctions no longer as a retributive force, which comes after conduct, but rather as a stimulator of human conduct in expectation of a given response. As I tried to demonstrate in my paper, which I will not repeat here, I think it is quite evident that the criminal law or the regulatory penal law of Puerto Rico was not planned; it happened. While happenings are most amusing events in the arts, they may be catastrophic in social behavior. The only planned event in Puerto Rican criminal law was the adoption of the Penal Code of California, in the year 1902. This was effectuated by a colleague of mine, Professor needy, of the University of Pennsylvania, with whom I had been in correspondence until he died in 1958. I do not know why 1Ceedy picked up the Penal Code of California for this Island. He thought perhaps that this was the closest American penal code contiguous to a Spanish culture--that of Mexico. He could equally have well picked the Penal Code of Maine. It would have been just as alien to this culture. Keedy's papers, incidentally, are still available. It might be well to find out why he picked that code and perhaps whether he kept an interest in control of subsequent developments. In fact, I think that the story of eedy demonstrates the advantage of this Island: that all the events that pertain to social change and criminal law, or law in general, occurred within the memory of people still alive. You

have encapsuled in the last three generations on this Island the experience which mankind, on the whole, or rather mankind on the Northern hemisphere, has gone through in about twelve generations.

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conveniently

Materials are much more accessible on the Island than they are in the rest of the world, and the Island is practically a social laboratory because it has its rather limiting shores, and an easily determinable umbilical cord, simply controlable to the Mainland. My point is that you have a unique opportunity to study social change in Puerto Rico. The purpose of such a social change-legal change study--should have one principal focus, namely to find out how the regulatory sanction can best be used to maximize the values which Puerto Ricans cherish and hold in common. In order to find these values, of course, we have to find out what they generally think and what they generally believe and then do. Fortunately, none of the penal reformer's codes has so far been enacted on the Island. I say Ifortunately" because no penal reformer in Puerto Rico has ever thought of studying Puerto Rican values and needs before drafting about doing that. The codes proposed for this Island ever since 1938 could equally be applicable to Turkey, or to Italy or France or Norway. Why not write a penal code which addresses itself to the population of the Island? And I mean to the population, not to the judiciary of the Island. The judiciary doesn't have to be controlled through a penal code. The population needs direction penal code in the terminology of the people affected thereby. So far, penal codes have been written in "Supreme Court" or legislative language which nobody, not even police officers, can understand. Why should not such a penal code use the conceptualizations that people themselves use on the Island? Those conceptualizations are determinable by studying what happened during these last seventy years. Let me give you an example: The law of this Island prohibits assaulting others. An assault conjures up a picture of a knight in shining armor who levels his lance and attacks. Is that what some people do in Puerto Rico on a Saturday night when they have one rum too many? But these are only the more obvious parts, it seems to me, of a social change study. The more important, but less obvious parts, are concerned with the protection of values less than life and physical integrity. I am talking, among others, about the protection of the family, the protection of all other kinds of social institutions, and the protection_ of the honest and efficient distribution of goods and services. It seems to me that a social change study on the Island ought to detect the significant values, it ought to fathom the extent to which they are jeopardized, it ought to subject them to legislative control, it ought to enforce these controls, and it ought to record the effects. We still have the opportunity to study the effects

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of the events in social control. Many regulatory statutes have been enacted in the Island in recent years and we can find out through historical study what happened as a result of those controls. These experiences can then be used to build better mousetraps, to build better controls, and these can then be projected into the future. Unlike in the economy, where you had an amazing progress-if that is the right term--you had no such progress in law. In economic development perhaps all you want to assure is a similarly fantastic growth rate for the future. In law you have to stimulate this growth, to begin with. All I want to say at this point is to introduce the subject of legal change. Clinard:- Let us ask if professor Mueller could spell out a little more clearly how the law would relate particularly to Puerto Rican culture and society---My question to Professor Mueller is something Like this: he has mentioned the need for revising the law in order to bring the law in action more in line with the culture and, I wondered if perhaps you could spell this out more specifically. I gather that you have in mind the fact that in Latin America the use of violence to settle disputes seems to be more common than it is in other parts of the world, and perhaps this has resulted in some rather serious injuries, and should be so recognized as a pattern. I suppose also the common law marriage is evidently rather common. My other question is: if Puerto Rico is undergoing change, would not such a recognition of the past patterns of behavior, would these not be out of line with a new kind of legal system? In other words, it is possible that Puerto Rico actually is adapting itself more clearly today to the kind of legal system they have than perhaps to what the California system was when it was put in, say, fifty years ago. Mueller:- I will be glad to answer that. Let me give you one example. T\either the Penal Code of Puerto Rico nor the body of law formed by Supreme Court decisions--by Puerto Rican Supreme Court decisions--recognizes the concept of partial insanity which many foreign nations now recognize, but all the district courts, trial courts in Puerto Rico, do recognize the idea of partial insanity, which is perfectly proper plea and it corresponds to reality because you cannot divide mankind into the mentally ill and the not mentally ill; there are many shades in between. In other words, through usage and through practice the population of Puerto Rico concerned in the matter has worked out its own solution and the right solution is that of partial insanity. My point would be that a new penal code would take that into consideration. You referred to common law marriage which here is a quasi, semi-legal concept, which leads a shadow existence. Under the welfare laws the concept is, of course, recognized because

-169child benefits depend on it, even some duty of support exists de facto, although it is not recognized in the codes. This too is something which could perhaps be incorporated into a new set of laws which is more indigenous to the population. Reimer:- I must take exception to the history which Mr. Mueller cited, not simply to clear the record but because I think it is the kind of misreading of history that has important implications for planning. It is suggested that certain things could have been prevented by planning or could be prevented by planning. The implication is that the automobile situation, the number of cars and the amount of traffic, should have been foreseen and that it was not. In fact, it was foreseen by a number of technical people. The fact is recorded in several studies. What really happened was that choices were made about the means that could be taken to limit the number of automobiles, and that certain actions were taken. The relatively stiff taxes that are imposed on automobiles by the Puerto Rican government was as much an attempt to limit the growth in the number of automobiles as it was to raise revenue, perhaps more so. Other things that might have limited the number of cars, such as mechanical inspection, were discarded because this would have been discrimination against the lower classes. The funds that might have been expended in building the road system and providing for the larger number of cars more adequately, were very deliberately shifted to education and to health programs, which were competitors with the road programs. This merely suggests the difficulty of some of these problems and the impossibility of solving them all with better planning. Hansen:- I suppose Mr. Mueller would like to reply? Mueller:- Thank you for your correction. I think this is a terribly important point. There is a difference between no planning at all and perhaps planning with the wrong choices or with limited choices. Proper planning, of course, is right planning or planning which will predict the desired responses. Unfortunately, we, democratic people (Western style) are not as good at social planning as are the authoritarian societies. We can observe that time and again. They get their responses perhaps sometimes by brute force or by governmental fiat. I just recently returned from some of the Iron Curtain countries, and I was tremendously impressed by the type of social planning they are doing for the advent of the mass use of automobiles. For example, Hungary has an enormous program of building and extending its road system and attaching highway signs at every street corner and no cars yet, to speak of, to make use of these signs, but they know the growth rate of the automobile production and of the imports and they know that they will really be hit by automobiles in another two or three years. The number of automobiles has, of course, increased significantly already. They have an enormous driver education program, and they have already passed inspection laws, safety inspection laws for automobiles. The point is that we cannot perhaps be as vigorous

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in our own social planning. on government fiat.

We have to rely more on consent than

Hansen:- One sentence only in support of that is the goal I was concerned with in making Ponce de León and Muííoz Rivera Streets one way. This became a long diplomatic negotiation with everybody that owned a hundred square meters on either street and was exceedingly difficult. Mr. Clinard. Clinard:- I wonder if Mr. Mueller would comment about the last part of the question I raised. I had hoped he'd have some more examples of how the law ought to be changed. Is it not possible that the law of California was out of line with Puerto Rico fifty years ago, but that the Penal Code as it is now may not be nearly as much out of line? In other words, in this case social change has made the law much more in line with reality than in the past, and that to recognize such artifacts as the common law marriage may not be in line with the Puerto Rico of the future. Mueller:- Thank you. I think you are right. To begin with, the Spanish Penal Code which was introduced here in 1874, I believe it was, may not have been proper for the Island. Whether it ever became a useful instrument of social control, I have no way of knowing, but of course, this is something that could be studied by the historical method. Certainly, the Penal Code of California meant nothing to the population to begin with. If we were to try to find out what impact it had on the population, my surmise is we would come to the conclusion that it had virtually no impact at all, that people behaved according to behavior patterns that had nothing to do with what was in the Penal Code. Certainly, by today, as Wallace and his two co-authors have shown in their study on violence, by today, the norms that are in the Code mean something totally different, so that you have this enormous gap between what the Code says and what the courts will adjudicate. Under those circumstances, we have to ask ourselves what good is such a code? Should it not be re-written? You ask me for more examples. Well, let me give you one: the concept of larceny--it is phrased in terms of the taking and carrying away of the personal property of another with animus furandi, the intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof. I`ow this terminology is terribly artificial. It is two thousand years old, and has been derived from the furtum concept of Roman law, which found its way through Bracton into English law. It does not correspond at all to what people do when they take somebody else's property away nowadays. There is no such thing as animus furandi in the mind of the perpetrator. He takes the property. Period. He takes it because he wants it. Maybe a Penal Code ought to say that and say that anyone who takes a property of somebody else when he wants it and the other does not consent, then etcétera, etcétera.

-171Hansen:- Tom Cochran. Cochran:- I want to suggest that this imposition of the California Penal Code was rather similar to U.S. actions in general in the period up to 1933. American patterns were imposed without much regard to whether they fit the culture here or not and in most cases they didn't. As for example, the compulsory use of English in schools and government. I would suggest that if you re-do the Penal Code, you go right back to the Spanish Code, modernize that, discard the Code of California, which never fitted, and make a new code based upon the traditional law here, just as we take the common law as a guide in the Anglo-Saxon countries. I think that we need to study decision-making in government as much as we need to study it in business. I had the impression in the 1950's that government always felt virtuous and good about its decisions and Government officials held that businessmen were making the unwise decisions. I think that government decisions need to be studied with the same kind of models that we would use in analyzing managerial practices. But this is only indirectly related to this Penal Code matter. Ldpez-Rey:- Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the discussion embraces far more than the problem of Puerto Rico. Nevertheless, I would like to say something about the situation in this country. As a preface I should say that what we are facing now is the growing gap between social, economic, and even political progress and development, and the obsolete condition of criminal justice or machinery, including the Penal Code, in the majority of countries. As a rule, I should say, that still, and I am going to offer examples, criminal law is regarded as a purely dogmatic oppression mostly viewed from a professional point of view, and is still rooted in ideas, concepts and purposes of the last part of the nineteenth century. It is to say, we are still operating in most countries, whether developed or developing, according to a rationalization of law in general and of criminal law in particular, mostly because criminal law is still basically a reflection of purely ethical considerations. Puerto Rico is a typical case, but may I say that in the United States the latest penal reforms, the Penal Codes of Illinois, Wisconsin, and even the reform introduced in the Penal Code of New York State still conform with this obsolete pattern. I should go further in saying that even this pattern has been followed by drafting of the American Model Penal Code. It seems to me--and I would like to hear my colleagues here from the Mainland--that codes reflect a philosophy, a rationale that doesn't correspond to contemporary United States. The result has been this enormous growing gap between what we call social change--and my opinion is it would be better to say social-economic-political evolution--and criminal justice. Criminology has not been able to fill the gap, among other things, because it is still operating

-172on obsolete conceptions very much obsessed with the discovering of the causes of crime and doing very little about prevention and control. As far as Puerto Rico is concerned may I say that the situation is far from being satisfactory. Some months ago I was requested by the Department of Justice to make a survey about the present Penal Code and the project under consideration by the Department of a new Penal Code. I submitted a study in Spanish in mimeograph form. Those able to read it in Spanish will get a copy if they are interested in it. But the situation is that if you look at the social, economic, industrial, and political development of Puerto Rico you can see that the criminal justice machinery of Puerto Rico is at least 60 or 70 years old. It is true, as it has been said here, that the old California Code of 1873, which was put into force in Puerto Rico in 1902, has undergone quite a number of alterations and modifications. If my memory is correct now, the number of sections was about 400. Now the Penal Code contains well over 2,000 sections, but if you look at them you can see that in many respects the present Penal Code represents an inflation of crime and criminality. In sum, Puerto Rico is still operating with a concept of crime which does not correspond to its present condition and needs. In my paper, I mentioned that of those sent to prison almost 88% are sent for less than six months, that recidivism amounts to 53%; that in 1964-65, of almost 60,000 persons sent to prison, no less than 10,000 were awaiting trial. When the government tried to reform the Penal Code it followed the usual pattern, and by following it they didn't take duly into account what has happened in Puerto Rico in the last six decades. In my survey I pointed out the necessity of taking into account the transformation of Puerto Rico, the different aspects involved, and how the drafting of a Penal Code is not a task which should be carried out only by lawyers, and even less only by public prosecutors. In sum, to make a long story short, I declined further cooperation as long as the procedure wasn't changed. It has been said here that perhaps--if I understood my colleagues in front of me correctly--that the American government when it took over Puerto Rico should have followed a general pattern. It is true that this pattern has been applied by many countries. It is useless if not romantic to think that the new Penal Code that Puerto Rico requires should return at least to some extent to the old Spanish Penal Code. No. The Spanish Penal Code as it was in 1879 is completely useless to Puerto Rico nowadays. Among other things, because Puerto Rico is neither Spanish nor American; it is something of its own and that is what in my opinion should be taken into account.

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Therefore, the rationale or the philosophy of the criminal justice, the reform of criminal justice, the reason why criminal justice, including the Penal Code, should be put at the same level as social-economic-cultural and any other public policy is that criminal justice plays also a social role and therefore it cannot go behind of everything as it was in the past, as it has been until now. Criminal law has to play within limits a leading role in the general national development of a country. National development means far more than socio-economic development. Secondly, criminal law cannot be based only on ethical considerations. It has to take into account also even if maintained by minorities, non-ethical considerations. Please don't identify non-ethical considerations with unethical considerations--they are two different things. Therefore, the problem as far as Puerto Rico goes, is how to integrate criminal justice, the machinery, particularly the Penal Code, with national development and that is not an easy task. In the months I have been here, I have observed also the same kind of obsession I had seen in quite a number of countries in my twenty years as adviser to the United Nations on crime and prevention, and it is that people, what they want is security, to reinforce police measures so as to be protected. Security and protection are justified but I should say that prevention, security and protection mean little if human rights are not fully respected. I say this because in Puerto Rico, the authorities seem to be somewhat obsessed with greater security and prevention. But prevention doesn't mean necessarily security and security doesn't necessarily mean prevention. They are closely related, but they are different things. Therefore, and I apologize for the length of my exposé, I think that at least we have, in connection with what generally spealing is called social change, two matters, crime and criminal justice which should be considered. With respect to Puerto Rico the reasons are: (a) criminal law should contribute to national development; (b) the meaning of crime should be reduced inasmuch as Puerto Rico does not need the hundreds of modalities of criminal behavior enclosed in 2,000 sections; and (c) we need to know what are the attitudes of those in charge of criminal justice. Do their attitudes correspond to contemporary Puerto Rico, or do they reflect something lUce a professional deformation, the so-called judicial reality as reflected or built up by the Penal Code? In other words, are not the judges, public prosecutors, identifying their own professional reality with Puerto Rican reality? Because they are two different things. In sum, the drafting of a Penal Code cannot be done as it has been done in the past and is done at present. The reason is what is the purpose of criminal law? Is it purely a criminal purpose? In my opinion, no. Criminal law performs a social function and as such is part of national development. Therefore if what is called social change and social policy are discussed, criminal justice should be part of the discussion.

-174Feldman:- I was struck by several things in Professor Mueller's remarks. I should think that the incidence of reckless driving, by the way, is not a good index of social change. Almost the same incident happened to me in driving about fifteen years ago, so that there probably are as many reckless drivers today as there were then. One of the things I thought was particularly salient about those remarks was the idea that one ought to try to design sanctions, punishments, in terms of what some of the basic values-I forget the exact phraseology that Professor Mueller used for some of the basic values of Puerto Rico--are. And I would like to say that I think both sides of this implicit equation are very, very problematic. That is to say, I think first there is considerable doubt in my mind, based on some of the research that I have read, as to the effectiveness of sanctions in securing compliance in a wide variety of essentially legal or punishment-related situations, so that both research in the United States as well as some of the researches carried out in some of the Scandinavian countries, I think cast doubt on the effectiveness of sanctions, negative sanctions for securing such compliance. Secondly, I think there is considerable doubt in my mind as to whether the notion of a consensual "value system" for Puerto Rico is an efficient notion, an idea that is useful for the designing of new research on public policy and social change. For example, quite recently some associates and myself have been conducting research on social change in Puerto Rico. We have been re-interviewing a sample of cases that we originally interviewed about ten or eleven years ago, using pretty much the same interview schedule, and one of the things we have been concentrating on is the extent to which you do get value change and particularly the extent to which you get value differentiation, and we find that indeed there is considerable differentiation in values. For example, and perhaps most relevant, if you ask a Puerto Rican population what their notions are of why life is either unfair or fair to them . . . in other words, if you ask them as to the basic value of equity, you get two very different responses. One segment of the population, approximately one quarter of our respondents, by the way, answers that life has been fair-unfair insofar as they have achieved ambitions for themselves or for their children, like they have been able to get a job or they have been able to get education for their children. Another segment of the population answers with regard to the extent to which they have been able to fulfill their role obligations, that is to say, the extent to which they have had decent lives, that they have satisfied a marital relationship, etcétera, etcétera. Our findings are really quite clear to us in the regard that they refer, I think, to both time periods. We find that individuals of low occupational status and low income are very unlikely to judge the fairness of life in terms of the achievement or non-achievement of their aspirations for

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even limited mobility. Overwhelmingly, this lower group stated life has been fair because basic subsistence needs have been satisfied and familial or interpersonal satisfactions have been obtained. This we call a kind of role fulfillment notion of equity. When life has been unfair to these people they tend to blame it on things like bad health, or things that prevent them from playing their very basic roles in the society; white-collar workers, on the other hand, people of somewhat higher status, tend to judge the fairness, the equity in life, in terms of mobilityaspirations they have achieved and to say that life has been unfair when such ambitions have not been achieved. So that, in any case, I think both the notion that sanctions are an effective way of compliance, and a notion that there is ''some place" where people are thinking and behaving in any society, as well as in Puerto Rico, a consensual value system, I think these are subject to doubt. And I think what this suggests is a strategy of the research vis-a-vis the legal institution. I think the importance for the kind of research we might be concerned with this week is that the legal institution, like a few others, is one of the principal ways in which the administrative agencies of a society can intervene in the lives of its population. In that sense it is a critical point of intervention to try either to bring about change or to try to foster other kinds of programs, other kinds of goals. And this notion that the legal institution, like others, particularly the educational institutions, may be very salient and very efficient vis-a-vis a strategy of social change. A strategy of policy also suggests that it may have much the same efficiency, much the same utility vis-a-vis a strategy of research. I would suggest that one of the things, therefore, that we might consider is the idea of the use of these agencies of intervention as sites for what might be called field experimentation. That is to say, if there can be a much closer connection between the agency of intervention and the agency of research, it is very possible that the correlation between these twd strategies might have a considerable pay-off for both those who are primarily interested in the production of information and knowledge and those who are primarily interested in the production of more efficient modes of legally oriented social control. So that there are a number of areas in which, for example, one might, in conjunction with some of the legal agencies of society, arrange experimental situations where laws are either enforced differentially to try to assess the effects of one or another mode of enforcement, or either perhaps, a most unique and exciting possibility, that laws are so written as to allow differential sanction, differential relationship to the offender so as to see what the effects of different kinds of sanctions--different kinds of treatments, I would prefer to call them--are. For example, if there is indeed a problem with rising violence--and I take it to be a worming assumption of the conference

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that there is indeed such a problem--then it seems to me one might have a kind of a work-out with the legislature, with the judiciary, a kind of program where, with different kinds of perpetrators of violence, different kinds of treatments are attempted as a field experiment. They could have something like a placebo, something like a sanction, something line an attempt at invoking one or another value that might be there; to see what difference,if any, the various modes of treatments--I am using treatment not in the therapeutic sense now but in the experimental sense--make. In this way one could, I think, perhaps zero-in on those agencies and those ;mechanics of change that might be particularly effective, and you would have a truly informative connection between those who are interested in research on social change and those who are concerned with the drafting and effecting of public policy. Miufioz Amato:- I agree that it would be very fruitful to study the problem of criminal law and criminal justice. Perhaps it would be even more so to try to study not only criminal law and justice but the general system of law improvement and administration of justice. It could be even a comparison between what has happened there and what has happened in economic development. We have here two programs: one very successful-economic development; the other, perhaps the extreme of failure in Puerto Rico. And the aspect of administration of justice involves all fields of law and the whole impact of inefficiency, bad leadership in the legal profession, in the administration of the courts, and how it affects the attitudes of people. Because here you have, I think, a good example of Law and legal administration being a very negative factor with respect to the attitudes of the people in terms of their norms, of what they live for. If they lose respect for the administration of justice, or for the legal norms, it is, I think, a very important factor in other connections in social life. I submit that the degree of respect among the people for judges and courts and legal norms has been going down in Puerto Rico, although I have no statistics to prove it. I also submit that the government has been very careless in the whole field of legal improvement and administration of justice. It was a matter of priority, of planning, deliberate planning, to concentrate resources in other fields and not to concentrate resources and effort in the administration of justice. Afterwards, it was changed and now there are some improvements. But it would be very interesting to find out how these decisions were made, what factors were taken into account, what factors were not token into account, and the degree of sheer indifference and neglect of governmental planning and action because a lot of our problems in the field of relating social science to social policy, factors are not found in the attitudes of the people, to begin with, but they have to be searched for in the attitudes of the leadership and the governmental programming. On the other hand, you have the great success of economic

-177development. We didn't know all the facts as to the attitudes of the people or their patterns of behavior when we started our economic development program. I also think that the planning made by the economists was very imperfect, was a very trial-and error thing. There were no perfect plans for our economic development. Yet, there was a creation of certain institutions in the government like the Bureau of Budget, the Planning Board, the development corporations, and putting together good leadership, which when promoted, administered efficiently, attracted the resources of capital from the United States, tried very hard through a lot of difficulties to educate and train our workers and there has been, as you know, great success coming out of all these administrative actions. I'ow, in the field of criminal law and criminal justice, which is the extreme side of the administration of justice in general, you have completely the opposite. You had some norms, which were not adequate, but the main trouble has not come, I submit, from the inadequacy of the norms. I think it has been the neglect, the lack of resources, the lack of know-how among the people dealing with prevention and correction, and also with the adjudication of delinquency. Ferracuti:- I should react to some of the cottuuents of Professor Feldman, and I should second what just has been said by Dr. Muñoz Amato. I have to react in terms of a certain number of studies that we have been doing here for the last three years in the area of delinquency and crime. And I will do it the way I have noted it, although it will look a bit disorganized. You see, Professor Feldman, we all agree that the efficacy of criminal Law, criminal sanctions, is low. We define what we choose to call crime. You propose differential enforcement, differential sanctions. Well, differential sanctions are extremely difficult to accept. A code is always an expression of a consensus of values, generally of the middle class, which is imposed on the lower class, which constitutes 90 to 95% of our delinquent population. This is true in any country including Puerto Rico. So we have always this problem of putting up a law which does not correspond to the values of the people who are the subject of that law in the largest majority of the cases. The same problem arises for specific sub-cultures. The Sardinian Italy, or the Colombian in the violencia area, or the jíbaro here, simply does not accept the code. He has his own code, and that is the only one which really counts. When that coincides with the law of the land, it is all right. But if he has to choose, he will go by his own sub-cultural norms and occasionally accept punishment. This tends to disappear when the country progresses. The type of personal crime that one would see here in Puerto Rico, in the country, in the agricultural area, is no longer with

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us. The jíbaro would kill and then surrender himself and accept punishment without any conflict. He kills on the most futile motives; futile for the middle class, which prepared that code, but not for him. It could be postulated that in the case of Puerto Rico the entire country has been treated as a sub-culture when the California Code had been imposed. That is an interesting historical question. Nowadays we are faced with the need to create something in the way of criminal norms for the country as such, something which cannot be American, -cannot be Spanish; has to be Puerto Rican. How much to derive it from existing values? Well, existing values of which section of the population? The middle class? The lower class? A combination of them? These are questions that remain open. Experimental jurisprudence has tried to solve some of them. We have had a few studies here of this type--for example, on bad checks--without coming out with very realistic answers. The thing that seems to be most effective is not so much the type of sanction as the certainty of the sanction. And that's a different story. Here sanctions are haphazard because the police system is inadequate. Here punishment is a chance process because the correctional system is outdated. If you are asking for whys, I have a very simple and blunt one: convicts don't vote, therefore they are lowest in the ranking of interests; but this is true in any country, not only in Puerto Rico. This type of administration is the "Cinderella" of public administration anywhere. Another few comments . , . I am sorry to take up this time. Look at some specific instances: the bolita laws. This is another case like the one against alcohol in the United States. Time will come when the law will be abolished and then somebody will pay the bolita fine by practicing bolita. As with the prohibition laws. The law simply does not correspond to anything in the Puerto Rican value system--still it's there. You can be sentenced to a very high number of years in prison for something which you do not accept as a crime and nobody does, not even the judge who tries to pass it. Another element: we have here a sixteen-year age-limit for juvenile delinquency . . . I'm sorry, we have here an eighteen year age-limit for delinquency. That is, anybody under eighteen is treated as a juvenile delinquent. This is a tropical country where if anything, that limit should be fourteen. It's nonsense to keep it at eighteen. It is contrary to biological development laws of the population; it is contrary to practice. We have a fantastic amount of juveniles who aren't juveniles; they are adults, and we keep treating them as juveniles just because an outside code--the Standard Juvenile Code Act--has been translated into Spanish and imposed on a country which couldn't take it. There have been attempts to change this. They have met with

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opposition from professional circles, totally unbased on any fact. Another element yet, juvenile delinquency is treated here almost entirely as a social problem. This country has had a fantastic decrease in infantile mortality. It's now at its lowest, only something like ten units lower per thousand than the Continental United States. One of the lowest, it should rank thirteen or fourteen all over the world. This is apparent dramatically in the last thirty years. Now, look at some of the practical consequences of this. A child is born and saved--it does not die as it used to 35 years ago--but because of the fast increase in childhood clinics, in maternal assistance, that child, although alive, is not entirely normal. He has been brain-damages at birth. We have made a study of samples from the courts. In half of the cases--in half!--we have found ample evidence of mental illness, very frequently of an organic type. While the juvenile courts use assessment of a psychiatric or medical nature in one per cent of the cases the consequences are self-evident. So the matter must be restudied, restudied in the complex of the reality of the Island. It does not help at all to translate the Standard Juvenile Code Act into Spanish and apply it in Puerto Rico. In principle, it is the best available, but it simply does not correspond with the reality around us. I suppose that's all. Thanks. Reimer:- I wanted to endorse the line of thought which the last four or five speakers have followed, in which I find, perhaps mistakenly but I think not, a consistent thread. I simply wanted to stress the importance of looking rather deeply at legal codes as rules of the game, as having their fundamental significance in what people believe is right and in what in effect is right in particular circumstances. We have inherited the legal code, both criminal and civil, from a society which has nothing to do technologically and distributionally with the society that we live in; and Puerto Rico, I think, would be in a wonderful situation to take a really basic look at its legal system in terms of what ought to be the rules of the game of an industrial society. To my knowledge, no country in the world has ever done this. Hansen:- When I arrived here, economic development was fashionable and anything else was absurd--one should not talk about it. Now, I think, perhaps we are getting to the point where we talk about social and national planning, and--in my own personal interest--in physical planning, in making the cities more beautiful--these are now so fashionable that if anyone comes along and wants to talk about an economic plan, entrepreneur's capital, he is looked at as though someone had left him over from the Saturday party before. My suggestion is that this is to be avoided. I think that a community in its basic structure doesn't change that much. We needed physical planning desperately in

-1801950 and we need economic planning desperately in 1967. Now, in addition to that, when disclaimers have been made that we were busy with economic planning and therefore we could not worry about trees and we could not worry about many other matters, I am not persuaded. We've got manpower around. It is just that everybody goes around thinking the same things, and they could have done some physical planning and should have done some traffic planning a long time ago. After the coffee break I would like to turn to Mr. Corrada and Mr. Díaz-Alejandro in particular, and perhaps also to Mr. Cochran, to bring before us some questions about a national plan, an economic plan, above all the existence of alternatives. ( COFFEE BREAK) Hansen:- We are about to begin. As I suggested before this little intermission, two of our members would like to make an intervention: Nieves and Clinard. I will turn to them and then with the permission of the seminar I want to turn to Mr. Corrada and Díaz Alejandro and Cochran to raise the questions which I found of great interest at the meeting yesterday. Nieves-Falcón:- I just wanted to mention some of the areas, some of the problems or some of the queries which the problem of social change poses to me. I will just throw them out as possible avenuesof interest for some of the other participants of the conference. First of all, I would like some problems to be posed on the diffusion of social change, in particular regard to what does it mean to the different social segments. Naturally, it seems that social change does not mean the same thing to the different social strata. I would like also, in regard to this area, to find out something about the persistence of the traditionally held attitudes and values. With regard to this first area, I would like to have something done on the persistence of the traditionally held attitudes and values. Many times we have taken social change as if it were a monolithic thing. But, for example, some indications, especially from Tumin and Feldman, show that although there has been a tremendous social change in some physical aspects and perhaps on the skill and performance aspects, some of the attitudinal value changes have been much less or greater. Another area which I would like to see investigated is that having to do with self-perception. If you read the literature on Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans, you find a whole gamut of attributes which are ascribed by others to Puerto Ricans and which

-181are ascribed to Puerto Ricans by themselves. I would like to know what is the self-perception that they have because many of the things that supposedly are characteristic of Puerto Ricans are so contradictory. I would like also to see something done on the role of mass media. Supposedly we have departed from the premise that mass media have a tremendous influence. For example, it has been said that mass media reinforce patterns which tend to upgrade alien symbols in the culture. On the other hand, political parties have found that the best way for political propaganda is not mass media, but is is a small tertulia, a small group. So what is really the role of mass media in this society? I would like to see something on the study of the American community in Puerto Rico. This is a segment that has particularly passed unstudied by most of the studies that have been done in the Island, not only in terms of the relative numbers, but also in terms of their relative power and behavior. I would like to see in the area of economic development something done on the controls of the economy and to what extent are the controls local or alien. I would like to see a study on the policy decisions in the economic segment which affect, or will affect, present decisions. For example, one of the reasons why some of the major industries were established in the periphery of the Metropolitan Area was because investors did not like the hinterland. To what extent do such extraneous factors as these affect a policy decision in economic development, and afterwards, we have a whole repercussion on the Island. I would like to see, besides that, some study on economic development on what has been the stage of development of the managerial or of a business local class. To what extent are they distributed to the upper echelons of the managerial positions. In regard to education, I would like to see some things investigated. I would like to see what is the image that education tries to portray of the society as a whole. I would like to see what is the role that education plays as an agency of change, not only to facilitate change but also to resist change. I would like to see the role of education as an egalitarian institution, and here I would like to see some of the instruments that supposedly are used in this scheme of education as a social institution. For example, I would like more to be done on the instruments used to qualify either talented groups or mentally retarded groups. I have a hunch that many of the so-called mentally retarded groups are students that come from a very underprivileged social environment rather than being mentally retarded. I would also like to see, in regard to education, something done about planning, what is the ambience under which planning

-182occurs. How does planning transfer from the upper echelons down through the middle buraaucratic administration and to the district level of the educational system? I have a hunch that when the upper decisions permeate to the lower echelons of education, it transfigures the policies that have been taken up at the upper level. In relation to language, I would like to see whether it is true that it is eroding or not under American influence. I would also like to see which are the attitudes of the people towards change in language one way or another. In relation to the political parties, I would like to see something done on decision-making. Many decisions have been taken by the various political parties in one way or the other, which had tremendous repercussions afterwards in the history of this country, but very little is known about which were the factors that stimulated one decision or the other. I would like to see a study of the political leaders of the Island. In the administration of the law, although I am not a lawyer, I am preoccupied with another concern. I am preoccupied rather with what is the influence of penalty on social class in those instances where the judge has the prerrogative to set a determinate sentence, let's say from three to five. If he has a lower class client, or he has an upper class client, who is going to get the minimum penalty and who is going to get the maximum penalty? Are there class factors influencing and determining who will get a maximum or a minimum penalty? In regard to health, I would like to see something done on the social distribution of diseases, not only by social classes, but also by historical classes, and I would like to explore some hypotheses that were expounded in the International Congress of Psychiatry by an American psychiatrist in Puerto Rico, Doctor Simon, in which he states that the effect of the diagnostic methods learned in an alien culture invalidates the diagnosis of the psychiatrists in Puerto Rico. And finally . . . that is all in regard to content. In regard to methodology, I only have one basic preoccupation. I would like to see in this kind of thing native participation throughout, not only in the data collection but in the planning, in the analyses, and in the writing of the manuscripts. I think that the natives are vital and essential to give an adequate perspective, and adequate interpretation to any data that is collected on this society. Ciinard:- I know that the Chairman wants to switch the subject. I think we have spent quite a good deal of time on crime and criminal justices but I would like to make a few comments and possibly hope that if anyone wants to reply that they reply to me personally, because I think we have already discussed it enough,

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rather than take it up generally. Hansen:- I will interrupt a moment, Mr. Clinard. The transference of our attention for the moment does not mean that we will not return to these issues. Clinard:- I see, that's good. Let's take my own view now. I feel that we have practically no evidence that efficient criminal justice systems necessarily mean that we have less crime and delinquency or even more rational ones. Sweden, for example, has an extremely rational new law dealing with criminality, but they are faced with what appears to be difficult and comparatively extensive problems in spite of a revision even of the criminal law. In the United States you have great variations in the efficiency of the police and in the courts, but I have never seen any evidence to indicate whether child guidance clinics, better police, etc., result in any substantial reduction. By that I do not mean that if you were not to have this improvement one might have a slight increase. I do not suggest it. I am not throwing the baby out with the bath. My own approach is quite different. I myself feel that we have to accept a number of premises: one, that most of what we call delinquency or crime is an urban phenomenon and that, with some exceptions here and there in the world, it is largely localized. It is localized, I gather, in San Juan, primarily in slum areas that are physically slums and public housing projects which while not physically slums are socially slums.

My own feeling is that we do not necessarily have to impose middle-class values on such people. Incidentally, I do not like that term; I prefer "ways of life that are incompatible with effective urban living". I would not suggest, for example, that the use of violence, which might be carried out in the rural areas, is compatible with effective urban living, and would even make adjustments in the law to accept that kind of thing. I think that common law relationships present, as in New York, grave problems to social welfare and to the school and to the child. Common law relationships in rural areas may present few problems. The main solution lies in efforts to develop some kind of citizen participation, I should say community consciousness, community discussion. To be more specific, I have in mind in the public housing projects, in the slum areas, the promotion of what I call urban community development. There are, I think, in all areas persons who do not share these norms, that often are thought to be predominantly subcultural, and counter-values could be set in operation to prevent or eliminate many of these problems. The actual fact is that violence and many of these problems directly affect the people of the lower class more than they do the middle class and upper class. If these people can work with this and discuss it, they will see it that way. In other words, I have grave doubts about the effectiveness

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of the use of law, the use of force, or the use of better administration in controlling these things. The people themselves, this segment of the population, will have to change their pat. terns of deliquency, illegitimacy, drug addiction and so on this segment of the population. They must find ways in which they themselves will bring to bear upon the problem informal sanctions and if necessary, in cooperation with the agencies of formal government, to eliminate ways of life which are incompatible with urban living and which directly affect them. I am convinced that in the cities of London, of Chicago, of Los Angeles, of New York, in all of these places, it is not the problem of criminal justice, it is the problem of changing and modifying the attitudes of the people, from groups, from whom deviants arise and this requires, I think an entirely different approach. Hansen:- Thank you, Mr. Clinard, and I have no doubt that before the seminar concludes, that we can come back to this issue, which obviously lies before us. For the moment, however, I should like to turn to the questions that came up yesterday. Mr. Corrada suggested that we could think of an economic development plan or, alternatively, we could think of a national plan, and I remember his visit to a kibbutz in Israel and this distinction was clearly made. I remember Díaz-Alejandro saying there are different patterns of economic planning. There are different models you can follow. Which one are you going to follow? And if I remember correctly, he said, for example, you could integrate or plan to integrate your economic growth with the market in the United States, or you could take some alternative integration and you could integrate, let us say, with the growing market in Latin America. There are still further possibilities. Would you be able, for example, to bring capital and entrepreneurs from Japan? The government of Puerto Rico has tried to do so. Could you bring capital and entrepreneurs from Frankfurt in Germany or from Paris, where they have set up and closed down offices? These are alternatives, and I thought that the seminar would wish to give some attention to these questions. In addition to this, Mr. Rodriguez-Bou raised a number of questions about further information. The one in particular which is relevant to what I am now saying is: But what are your plans? I think Diaz-Alejandro said what's the economic plan? You have before you now the economic report to the Governor. Now this is substantially the economic plan. Corrada:- Well, the point that I was trying to make yesterday is based on the impression--that somehow differs from a previous statement made by the Chairman--my impression is that although

-185society confronts several problems at any point in time, those problems have different priorities or are given different priorities by the government in any case, and that initially the government thought that the problem that needed most priority was that of economic development, and to that effect proceeded to organize itself to promote it in the most effective ways it thought convenient. Therefore, we in Puerto Rico saw for several years that emphasis on economic development, which gave a preeminence to the economists to dictate the future of the country. It is a fact that if you look to the sort of organizations that were organized by government, some of them were peculiarly oriented to achieve that economic development. It is also a fact that when attempts were made to initiate social planning at the Planning Board, that attempts failed because it was not given sufficient attention or sufficient emphasis. So, I was suggesting that instead of giving again pre-eminence to the economists, we ought to consider the problem in a different light, namely, what sort of strategy and national development is required. I am particularly interested in the concept of social strategy as opposed to economic strategy, if you wish; and by social strategy I was thinking in the following: I said that perhaps the purpose of this meeting could be oriented in the sense of starting, for example, with the so-called social goals that our legislature is confronting now. That is, our Governor stated that Puerto Rico had some social goals--the so-called propósitos de Puerto Rico-and a body of technicians and representatives of the government were set up to define the social goals of Puerto Rico. That, to my understanding, gives a very good framework for the analysis of the social strategy; namely, are those social goals the ones that the Puerto Ricans envisage for themselves? Taking that as one point of reference, I found that perhaps the strategy of social development could be further specified looking at the social problems that apparently are causing and provoking seminars like this one, and a number of us have been suggesting different problems. I was very impressed by the List of Nieves-Falcón, for example, and particularly I would suggest that the American society be studied this time by Puerto Ricans strictly to see how each reflects the different notions. But this list of social problems may give us a baseline, if you wish, in the sense that the social strategy adopted should try to solve those social problems that are confronting us now, and conceding that we have set the framework of analysis by stating the social goals of Puerto Rico. Then we have two points of reference, they may define for us the nature of social change that we envisage in Puerto Rico, and after we look at that problem of social change, analyzing the best line as defined by the problems; and analyzing the other

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transition

point of reference by the goals of Puerto Rico within intensifying our work in the nature of social change as such. That is, what is the sort of that we have to cover in order to solve our problems now and come nearer to the social goals that the Puerto Rican society had stated. And in that analysis of social change, of course, I would suggest that perhaps we have to look at different culture patterns and not simply the American culture pattern, in the belief that our society has some peculiar culture patterns that do not fit so easily into the American culture pattern. That is not to say that we are trying to develop a unique Puerto Rican interpretation of modernity because, as Professor Inkeles very well suggested, different culture patterns have interpreted the modern man in various overlapping ways, but if we face our problems in terms of the broader perspectives of the world and different countries developing that modern man, perhaps that could provide a very good suggestion for the analysis of social change that has to take place in Puerto Rico. Cochran:- I am taking on the role of the bad guy and letting Díaz Alejandro be the good guy. In other words, I want to talk a Little bit about the difficulties in the Puerto Rican economic situation at the present time and then let him talk about the better future that may come. I very much agree with what Millard Hansen was saying about styles in intellectual interests. We all see this in the academic world, and I think the recent prosperity has led to a de-emphasis on the economic development problem here, which is probably not very realistic. If I may lapse into economic terminology, and let me assure you I am not an economist--I am an amateur sociologist, I guess, who is interested in business--but in economic language, exogenous forces are to a very considerable extent responsible for the present prosperity and the endogenous forces, that is, those built into the situation, are not nearly as favorable. I want to raise some of these problems both to bring the balance back in this direction, and to emphasize the framework in which we operate.

national

I will start by saying that Puerto Rico, not being a national state, lacks some of the economic controls available to governments. For example, a national state can inflate in order to hire labor, to create public works, to do away with unemployment, spread into new lines of activity and so on. Puerto Rico, while it is able to borrow, is limited as to amounts and has to borrow from the New York banks, which means that the Commonwealth state to force public securities hasn't the ability of a into the money market. In other words, Puerto Rico is relatively limited as compared with Argentina or Brazil or Chile in what they can do to correct economic situations. Perhaps this is good in the long run, but it also as I say, limits the means for meeting any particular type of crisis.

-187In addition, Puerto Rico is tied to a single market. I do not want to say more because Mr. Diaz will take this up, but it again means that there is not much opportunity to develop new markets and that Puerto Rico is subject to forces on the Mainland over which it has no control. In 1959, most of the people with whom I talked down here, both economists and business leaders, anticipated a mild recession. Things were not to be good in the early sixties unless some developments could be pushed. Then, Mr. Castro helped everybody out by losing his American sugar quota and closing Havana to American tourism. I would hazard a guess that a good part of the very favorable performance from 1959 to 1967 has depended not only on long sustained prosperity on the Mainland, which must never be overlooked since Puerto Rican welfare depends very much on both the export of population and the sale of products in the States, but the upswing has also come from the boost continuously supplied by tourism. In addition to the money tourists spend, they stimulate the construction industry and subsidiary industries depending upon the local market. Yet, I would say that this is basically an exogenous factor. Puerto Rico probably will never lose tourism, and undoubtedly it will continue to increase all over the Western world. But it is quite possible that Bahama competition, for instance, is going to get more and more severe. They are nearer, they haven't quite as good a climate, but there is a great deal of development money going into the Bahamas at the present time and, consequently, I think that the tourism situation is more competitive than is generally recognized in the Island. Puerto Ricans are in danger of pricing themselves out of the market if competition steps up. Turning to a larger sector of the economy, Puerto Rican manufacturing basically depends upon a wage-productivity ratio, which is more favorable than in the United States, if this were not the case there would be little advantage in establishing Mainland business here. If new industry should drop off, it would undoubtedly have a very depressing effect on the Puerto Rican economy and would produce some hard thinking as to non-Mainland market possibilities for local industry. This danger is modified by tax exemption. But my reading of studies of economic development leads me to minimize tax exemption as an incentive for small business. An average of profits for small business might show that they are earning ten per cent, but this gives a misleading impression of the way a small business works. Such enterprises tend either to make about twenty-five or more per cent profit or no profit at all. If you are making twenty-five per cent profit, it is a minor matter whether you have tax exemption or whether you do not. You have a good, profitable business. If you are going broke, the tax exemption is not doing you any good.

-188Consequently, as I say, the general opinion of writers on economic development seems to be that while tax exemption is an incentive, it is a moderate one. It is not a factor that will operate strongly if the wage productivity ratio ceases to offer any advantage. And, of course, there are very severe pressures from the Mainland on this wage productivity ratio. Mainland Unions seek to raise wages in Puerto Rico. It is a tenuous situation in which Puerto Rico tends gradually to lose its advantage. I will put it this way: Puerto Rico is engaged in a race to increase productivity fast enough to keep up with inevitably rising wages and if productivity cannot be kept up, cannot continue to grow fast enough, there is going to be trouble. The forces that can improve this ratio, unfortunately, are not technological because, Puerto Rico is unlikely to have any technology not known on the Mainland. Consequently, Puerto Rican entrepreneurs cannot hope to mechanize to a greater degree than their competitors as, for instance, Japan has in relation to many of its markets and as England has for generations in relation to some of its customers. The only way that the productivity ratio can go up is from better work, that is, more efficient management and more productive labor; and, therefore, this gets us right back to a set up of socio-cultural problems. Improvement in the efficiency of management and the efficiency of workers, depends basically on Puerto Rican values and attitudes, which, in turn, depend on levels and types of education. Improvement in managerial practice depends largely on types of imagination, that is, what they think in terms of, how they see the situation, how they see their own actions. In this sense, I think we come in the economic sphere back to the problem of social change and how to produce greater social efficiency. I have written more of this in my paper, so I wont go on any further and will turn the subject over to Mr. Diaz. Díaz Alejandro:- Mr. Chairman, I would like to start by making some comments on planning. Although I believe in economic planning in general, I would like to point out something which has disturbed me in some of the comments made up until now. It seems to be the implicit assumption that in planning, the more the better, and perhaps the earlier the better. I think this is quite wrong. In fact, we were given an example of the type of waste of resources too early "planning'I may create. We were told that in the socialist countries they are already putting up stop signs without having very many automobiles. This is a trivial example; but it clearly points out a wasteful use of resources, wasteful because a country which is not terribly rich cannot afford to leave resources idle for that long a time. Although I must confess I really do not know much about Puerto Rican economic history, I would submit that the early emphasis

-189on purely economic planning, neglecting for a while other types of planning, seems like a good use of scarce planning resources. In the United States of 1933 it would have been far-fetched and irrational, in the midst of the great depression, to worry about planning for better cities in 1967. I think that in the Puerto Rico of 1940 it may have been a wasteful use of resources to worry about what was going to happen to the traffic in San Juan twenty five years ahead of time. Twenty-five years is a long time and resources invested wisely during that time can produce great wealth, so one should be clear about investment priorities. Today's comments, however, have persuaded me that it is time for Puerto Rico to move forward at a greater speed on other types of planning, although it would be certainly a shame to assume that because there have been twenty-five years of fast economic growth, future growth will be self-sustained and automatic. Argentina for a long time--1870 to 1930--had a very fast rate of economic growth. Those 60 years of growth certainly did not assure Argentina of continuous economic expansion. Steady growth is a goal which requires constant attention. Even in the United States, the Council of Economic Advisers has to keep, year after year, making sure that the economy is moving ahead at a rate sufficient to maintain full employment while avoiding inflation. As my colleague Luz Torruellas pointed out, a lot of the social difficulties which one observes, undoubtedly, are the result of industrialization; but more industrialization may in fact help to ameliorate some of these difficulties. All countries that have industrialized have gone through periods of social crisis beginning with Great Britain during the industrial revolution, but more economic growth improved this situation. I agree that economic growth may have been over-sold as a cure-all. Very often one hears that growth is the great reconciliator and it smoothes all social difficulties. That may not be completely right, but there is still a lot of truth in it. In the United States even difficulties like civil rights and farm problems, are much better handled when full employment and fast economic growth are maintained. And I think that type of consideration would apply a fortiori to a place like Puerto Rico. I think it was Lord Keynes who said that economists do not create civilization, certainly, but they help to maintain it; they help to create the framework in which civilization can flourish. Turning to future economic strategies, I think some may be ruled out quickly. No island of the Caribbean can consider autarchy as a serious options It is just too costly. As I mentioned yesterday, one obvious option is continuous integration with the United States. I would imagine, without having examined the question very deeply but just on general principles, that this would imply more growth of light manufacturing but not very much expansion of heavy industry.

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It would seem that all islands of the Caribbean are destined to be integrated with larger continental markets. The island of Cuba used to be very closely integrated with the United States market, and has now swung to complete integration with the socialist countries. The Smaller Antilles are tightly integrated with their metropolitan countries in Western Europe. However, new interesting opportunities could be looked at and researched. The Latin American Common Market is one of them. It occurs to me that in the future it should not be impossible for Puerto Rico to maintain special relationships with both the United States and the Latin American Common Market. The benefits for the economy of Puerto Rico could be substantial--more choice is better than less. The possibility of opening up new markets in Latin America may be worth exploring to the point that--I do not know whether this is being done--Puerto Rico could follow the discussions on the Latin American Common Market very closely by sending special representatives. If not at the Latin American level, there is the possibility of integration with the Central American Common Market and with countries on the north coast of South America. Of course, greater trade and financial links with Western Europe are also worthwhile. I agree very much with the comments made about Puerto Rican agriculture. Even socialist Cuba is apparently making a big effort to develop agricultural exports to Western Europe, and it strikes me that Puerto Rico could do the same thing. Diversification of the economy and of trade and the sources of finance would be a very healthy thing, and would avoid a feeling of national claustrophobia. Economic planning is in my opinion very closely tied with national planning because any of these options implies a whole set of other decisions which fall between the boundaries of economics, politics and sociology, and which should be discussed calmly as soon as possible. They include such things as who are going to be the entrepreneurs promoting the future growth, whether Puerto Rico associates more closely with Latin America, with the United States or Western Europe. Are they going to be primarily Puerto Ricans or is one going to have Puerto Rican capitalism without Puerto Rican capitalists? The example of even a country like Canada, which has been traditionally free of extreme nationalism, points out that if the participation of local entrepreneurs in growth is small, one begins to get into problems which may, if they get out of hand, really hinder economic growth by creating political instability and all sorts of uncertainties. So that I would certainly agree that the role of local and foreign capital in the development of the Island would be worthwhile exploring. Finally, I would like to make a few general comments on research. Puerto Rico seems like an ideal test case for many research

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projects. Data appear to be relatively abundant. In any research center one issue is whether research should be only in things which are of interest to the local population or whether it should be more general. Naturally, the reaction of most people would be to first concentrate on local problems, and here I agree that there is a lot to be done, for example in analyzing the implications for Puerto Rico of the Latin American Common Market. But it may be also very rewarding intellectually to go into matters of more general interest. In particular, I would very much like to see more research done comparing Puerto Rican industrialization with that which has taken place in Latin American countries, perhaps involving the cooperation of Puerto Rican and Latin American scholars. I think this would open up a little more the research center and give it a perspective which would come from studying problems other than those of Puerto Rico. Hansen:- My very brief intervention is to remind Mr. Cochran of at least four studies that I know--by Rosemary Griffith and Hugh Barton and Teodoro Moscoso and David Ross--which are well argued and have good evidence to suggest that your idea about tax exemption is just not correct for Puerto Rico. Maybe it is good somewhere else, but tax exemption is a much bigger factor, according to these four authors, than you have given it credit for, and I thought you would like to know these items. The other one was the idea of participation of Díaz-Alejandro-would you have a Puerto Rican capitalism without any Puerto Rican capitalists. This is an idea that engages me very much. An old friend of mine was unable to be here, Walter Isard, and he would have had a very interesting intervention on this question. He calls it participation-potential, and he's showing how the lack of it in many economic situations cannot only be harmful but almost fatal. It bears tremendously on this question, and I think that in this social change and public policy field we have heard many overtones on this in Mr. Nieves-Falcdn's intervention. This question has got to be faced directly, and its thorny aspects have got to be dealt with. Thorne:- Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What I would like to say I think, would undoubtedly apply in many respects to some other Caribbean communities. What I say is going to be undoubtedly influenced, biased very much, by the fact that I have lived in Puerto Rico now for nearly twelve years. I am from the British part of the Caribbeari,Guyana. I have spent time working in Jamaica, at the college, and was educated mainly by Englishmen and later by American professors. So, here you may get quite a hodge-podge of inferences which may be quite without clear delineation. But one thing that strikes me is that we are asking people in Puerto Rico, large numbers of people, to participate in a game of which they do not know the rules. Of course, I am aware of the fact that only very recently in the

-192United States has attention been given (sponsored and supported by the American Economic Association) to the development of economic education in the advanced American economy. One of the main rules--if I understand what people tried to teach me many years ago--is that reward and effort should be linked, and that economic development results mainly material but also in the form of prestige. Now, again, much of the theorizing underlying the system that we are living in and many of the assumptions are far from being close to reality. This, I think, is important for us to study in the University, in a research project, because I think that even where the rules are known, if people have common sense, they realize--and most do even when they are very poor--they realize the vast gaps between the assumptions underlying the theory of the system and reality and, therefore, they are often inclined to reject the system. I think that another observation is relevant. Although reward is--as a rule I accept this--closely related to effort and economizing and contribution to the nation in the advanced countries, and I suppose to a large extent even in the underdeveloped ones, in many of them, the fact is, and this may be exaggerated, I think that the common observation of many of the people who are likely to become delinquents is that reward and contribution are not always very closely related; and so there is a tendency, it seems to me--judging by a number of young students and also people who are not at the university level--to reject the entire system. It is, I think, not unreasonable to assume that a great deal of the robbery and theft that take place really represent protest against the system. Many people have the knowledge, or at least the suspicion, sometimes knowledge, that vast sums are accumulated by persons who have not really made any positive contribution to the society in which they live. This obscures the fact--I think it's a fact--that in most cases, the accumulations result from positive effort, innovations, economizing, and so forth. The absence of economic knowledge, the absence of any theorizing or any teaching of history, economic history, in secondary school and elementary school, throughout the area, I think has much more serious consequences for us than it has for the United States or England because in the case of England especially, and America, many of the principles upon which the system is now built were taught in homes and churches: For example thrift and economizing. They were taught, in non-economic language perhaps, to avoid waste, waste of time included to seek ways of reducing costs; this led to innovating, and so forth. So, here we are in a cabin, apart from a few of us who happened to be taught in these kinds of schools, or by these kinds of schoolmasters, operating and floundering around, not knowing really where we are going in terms of economic direction,

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personally and socially wise. And this, as I say, I think leads to a lot of the rejection that results in crime. Another observation I would like to make is that the relationships between economic variables and social variables, I think, deserve much more attention than they have been given in former studies. In books on economic development, books recently written in the last fifteen or seventeen years, we do get an opening chapter or two on the social prerequisites of economic development. For example, in books like Arthur Lewis', Myer and Baldwin's. Higgins. They point out that, however, these social conditions can be brought to be consistent with economic development and are often the result of economic development itself. The result of the gap in research is that in none of the economic development books I have read so far have I seen any clear proposals for planning to alter the social and psychological factors so as to accommodate the economic results that are desired, and vice versa. It may well be that a University like this, placed where it is socially and economically and geographically, could make a great contribution in fostering studies of this nature, which I think would reduce a lot of the conflicts that arise after the development process has gone ahead without any previous preparation. One example of the relationship between the social and the economic may be relevant here, where we are talking of crime. We are told that the family bonds and family life are basic in preventing crime. If we have a high emphasis on economic development for ourselves as families, so that we have father and mother working fulltime outside of the home, and if at the same time the youngsters do not quite realize why this big effort is being made, what it is all about anyway, . . . I think that we have a double reinforcement of the tendencies making for confusion in youthful minds and for antisocial behavior. If we are going to increase our personal incomes at a maximum rate then it seems to me that we are also inevitably going to reduce the time at home with our families substantially. There is an opportunity cost, in other words, a family rate of economic development, just as there is an opportunity cost, in terms of social cost and social problems, for rapid rate of economic development for a country. I think here I would like to join with Professor Corrada. I think that certainly we could reduce this social cost if in envisaging a plan for a country we do not assume that we have to attain very high rates of economic growth and then try to accommodate the non-economic factors and goals of life to this high rate, but rather plan both sets of goals, the non-economic and the economic, so as to try roughly to optimize attaining them. Finally, and I am sketching, I realize, very superficially, but I am trying to save us time, in regard to strategy for economic development, I fully agree that Puerto Rico ought well to con-

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sider the alternatives in terms of external relationships: foreign markets and common markets, including European market relationships. But I think also that the examination of alternative strategies should go a little further, if possible, and consider alternative internal structures for achieving growth. For example, and this is understandable, given many conditions, in many underdeveloped countries including Japan, which we in America and elsewhere hold up as quite a successful nation in terms of its economic development and the avoidance of serious social costs, the government for a long time actively participated in promoting enterprises. Now, we are terribly scared in Puerto Rico and in the United States of government participation. The cry of "communism" rises hysterically at once. I can assure you that I am not a Communist. I would be in Guyana, perhaps, hoping for the day when Jagan would take over, if I were a communist: I would not be here. But I really am shocked by the reluctance to consider economic organizational alternatives in a logical, objective manner. Taking into full account dangers that may arise, and planning to avoid those dangers courageously, instead of dodging issues cowardly. This may be very presumptuous for me to say, but it is how I feel and think, and I make really no great apology for saying this. In the case of Puerto Rico, for example, unlike Jamaica, the pressures are much greater to avoid anything seeming to be socialistic or anything of this kind. In Jamaica the government buys stock in private enterprises, thus helping the private entrepreneurs, including United States enterprises, to get started. The government, therefore, has some influence in hiring policies and also,--I don't think it does this enough--there is a possibility of the government in this kind of situation, with the cooperation of the other owners of the enterprise, getting these enterprises to serve as partly educational organizations as well, through which local businessmen are trained not only in the routine functions of management, accounting and so forth, but in the art of taking important business decisions. This could help to create a larger number of local private entrepreneurs. I am not recommending a firm policy. topic for research.

I am recommending a

Again one of us says that cooperatives have not been very much used as agencies for promoting development in Puerto Rico. Here, undoubtedly, I think we ought to look to other communities, especially Northern European communities, like Denmark and the Scandinavian countries, to a much greater extent than we look to the United States. I do not think the United States cooperatives have attracted the prestige that cooperatives have attracted in Denmark, for obvious reasons. In the United States we have communities so large that the purely competitive enterprise obviously has a much better chance of survival than in a small economy Like Denmark or a small economy like Sweden. Here we are trying, in Jamaica and Puerto Rico

-195and such other countries, to implement development policies without having any recourse at all to various tools of implementing growth that have been used successfully in communities that are more closer in terms of size than the United States. And finally, I believe that we can't escape the fact that the non-economic rewards tend to be rather underplayed. Now, here I am undoubtedly very much biased, but I have always been very full of admiration for some of the British society's methods of rewarding effort, economic and other, considered socially contributive and meritorious. I am not suggesting a firm policy, but the award of a few letters after a name--they may mean nothing to people outside the society, M.B.E.s and O.B.E.s and so forth--tend in Britain to divert some of the attention from purely material rewards which, I think, can be useful, and also can be dangerous. Undoubtedly, if we are urged to acquire more in terms of material goods, we may make more efforts to save and avoid waste, and innovate and so on; and I am sure these things have been historically proven to have been extremely important in producing wealth in the West. On the other hand, is it not also a fact, historically, that in these societies we have tended to have not only much delinquency at the bottom, which is what comes mere obviously to our attention, but also much delinquency at the top, where people have embezzled millions of dollars? The latter conduct has not but should become the subject of a high level university investigation also. Hansen:- One very brief comment--I have many I wish I had the time to make and I do not feel authorized to make them--but the question of the social consequences of economic development and the reverse, the economic consequences of social development, would have been explored in an engaging way, and full of great insight, I think, if Alfonso Villa Rojas had been here, and he was to have been here but, unfortunately, he could not be here. So, I should like the record at least to show that there would have been very rich comments on this question had he arrived. I have other comments which I will forego. Cochran:- I think Mr. Thorne has said some very important things. Before I make a little addition to what Mr. Diaz was saying, I want to say more in regard to tax exemption. It is, of course, a very complicated affair and it has a long world history. I said exemption was a minor incentive, that the wage productivity ratio was the major incentive. Just how near this ratio could get that on the Mainland and have tax exemption enough incentive in itself to bring plants, I have no idea and I do not think, from having read most of the studies Mr. Hansen mentioned, these authors could predict that. There is really no way of accurately forecasting the effect of taxes because there are two quite different types of business operations.

-196First, there is the small producer who brings himself as well as his business. He is probably going to get a little benefit on personal income tax as well as in corporate tax. Also the climate is an incentive, so that it is very hard to weigh cost factors in this situation. Second, there is the case of the large corporation where a profit-tax calculation carefully worked out and ptobably some of these big companies today could evaluate tax incentives in relation to wage-productivity advantages. Unfortunately, my experience was all with native Puerto Rican business. I have very little knowledge, except from hearsay, of the calculations that large United States corporations may have made in home offices. Simon Rottenberg may have information on this, since he has studied the situation in a number of Latin American nations. At any rate, I think that alt of us who know the Puerto Rican business situation in general, should be skeptical as to whether tax exemption alone would be enough if the wage productivity ratio was no better than on the Mainland. Now, addenda to what Mr. Diaz was saying: I think Puerto Ricans ought to investigate the possibility of foreign markets, but here, again, you run into the difficulty that most Puerto Rican owned business, as distinct from United States firms with branches down here, is fairly small-scale. When such small enterprises try to break into a foreign market, they probably have to have some assistance from public policy. Theoretically, an association in the industry could do something for the potential exporter on a voluntary basis, but my experience in other countries has been that this is not very effective.

If I may tell a short story: I had a couple of weeks to idle away in Athens, so I had the U.S.I.S. set up a business interview project for me, to keep me busy during the day, and I interviewed a number' of Greek businessmen, including the man who was the Chairman of the Export Industry Association in Greece. They had very much the same problems as Puerto Rico, and this man had all of the arguments down pat. He told me what he was doing, what everybody should do, and so on, and I said to him, finally: "What do you manufacture?" He said: "I am a candy manufacturer." I said: "What markets have you penetrated?" He said: "Oh, I am too small to really do this yet. I haven't gotten into any market." I am afraid that this is the usual case. You can get a voluntary association, that will talk a lot about getting into Latin American Markets or the European Market, but without some real assistance from the state, I am a little skeptical as to whether it wilt really happen. Feldman:- One of the things I think I have noticed in the discussion since the coffee break is that there is in the rhetoric a tension, a kind of competition between two notions that I do not think really are all that competit.ve. One notion is there has been

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rapid growth, and in that sense a great many new social problems have been generated. The other notion is there may have been rapid growth but perhaps it has been insufficient, and these problems are continuations of older problems and even more growth is the solution. I think that this tension, as I say, may not be all that useful a tension and that perhaps, if we look at economic growth and development as a double entry bookkeeping process, we can comprehend a little more just what is going on because I think economic growth is always both, it always both solves and generates new problems, and indeed I think it does them simultaneously; that is to say, it generates as it solves. I do not think I would propose the idea, and I am not sure of how the empirical evidence falls out, I am not sure that the net balance of social problems in a society, no matter how ca?..culated, is so much a function of the level of economic growth or the level of economic performance as is the content of the problems that you are looking at, and thus whether or not the last two decades in Puerto Rico have solved many problems. I think it has generated many problems, and it may be that these are the problems we are now concerned with. So that if we look at both the survey data and the social bookkeeping data, I think we get some idea of the situation between the consequences of economic growth and the generation of new problems as they are currently in being here. First of all, I think the data indicates that although income, almost anyway you want to calculate it, has risen quite rapidly and the society is much more invidiously differentiated today than it was twenty years ago. That is to say, as income has gone up so has the magnitude of inequality, and in that sense Puerto Rico is a society with a much greater degree of inequality today than it was two decades ago. Even though you start higher, you end much more higher. Secondly, I think that one of the things I must notice in my own data--and I think we can document it in the social bookkeeping data--is that the urban-rural distinction has become more sharper in Puerto Rico in the last two decades. I think not only of my own survey data, but I think this is really the message of Professor Nieves-Falcon's book: that the real differentiation here is in part class, but really class in so far as it is correlated with the rural-urban axis. As a footnote, I might say that in looking over the data we have recently collected, I was reminded of the point that the Inkeles and Bauer book made on the Soviet citizen, of the sharpness of the urban-rural distinctions, vis-a-vis the socialeconomic status distinctions. Thirdly, there has been, I think, considerable value differentiation. That is to say, it is not so much that the values have become very different, but they have changed at very unequal rates so that those who have participated in the growth process, those who have become urbanized, have seemed to change their values much more rapidly than those who have not,

-198even though there is not all that much difference in kind. There turns out to be a tremendous difference in degree, and I will specify that in the paper that I hope will be distributed tomorrow. Fourthly, and perhaps most important of the data that I have available, is that we cannot assume the consequences of the experience of growth from cross-sectional data. That is to say, those who participate in growth, those who experience mobility, do not become in other aspects like those who are at the status to which they have achieved, rather they become quite different. The most startling finding in this regard is those who have been most mobile, those who have gone from agricultural to factory work, have become most negative towards education. They argue, as compared to the same people we interviewed ten years ago on the same items, they argue today that education is much less accessible to their children than they did twelve years ago, and they argue today, even more important for any concern with social problems, that education is much less important for the mobility of their children than they did ten or twelve years ago. So that you cannot, I think, deduce the nature of a person's reaction to the experience of change by contrasting people before they had this change with people after they had it. The cross-sectional data just won't do it for you. Now, I think what this comes down to, is this: not all questions have answers, and not all problems have solutions. I think we are concerned here with the conjunction of questions that perhaps social sciences can answer and problems that perhaps policy makers in Puerto Rico can solve. And I think, if we can keep ourselves ruthlessly oriented towards that conjunction, which is a difficult one, that conjunction that allows us to immediately specify . . . here is a kind of question one might answer that relates specifically to a kind of problem one might solve, and perhaps the title of the conference--Social Change and Public Policy--might be given some thrust for the future of both research and administrative procedure. Padilla:- First, I would like to address myself to some remarks made about planning and the planning experience of Puerto Rico, and then perhaps attempt to discuss the relationship of planning to the research activities that are being considered in this conference. I think the impression I have been given here is that there has been a lot of emphasis on economic planning in Puerto Rico in the past and I think perhaps this could be challenged. I think that if one examines very carefully the historic activities in planning in Puerto Rico, one will find that the major emphasis at the beginning was on physical planning and public works, coordination of public works, and that in terms of economic planning there was not such planning after all. Most of the activities might have been considered to be the promotion of industrialization, but that there was not a clear-cut economic plan.

-199I remember that in a series of conferences we held here, we have been holding here at the School of Planning, one of the participants said that another agency was doing it, and when the other one came, we asked if he had been doing economic planning and he said: No, the other agency was doing it. In other words, I think the local participants can sense which the two agencies were. It was the Planning Board and Fomento. The reality is that there has not been in Puerto Rico a true, comprehensive, or even a true economic planning effort. We have had policies pertaining to economic growth in general but mainly, I would say, to industrialization. If not, witness what has happened in agricultural development on the Island. Witness what happened to tourism, to commercial development in the Island. There has not been a clear-cut policy in these areas at all. So, I do not think we can say that we have had a very effective, or even a very active economic planning process in Puerto Rico. We have had a lot of economic development efforts in the industrialization field, but I do not think we have really done a lot of economic planning. Certainly; although we have had some studies, the long range implications of many of the economic goals have been missing completely. Even in economic terms the relationship to the political status and to other things, these have always been . . . I would say, not given the proper attention that they merited, that they would merit if they were going to guide economic development in the Island. Well, this brings me to the second point, which I think is the fact relative to national development. I would agree with Corrada that the crucial thing now is to move into what might be called a national development emphasis, which would take into consideration physical, economic and social development, but this has to be, in my estimation, this has to be done on the basis not of the type of planning we are doing in Puerto Rico now, where there are no values even implicitly or explicitly stated in the planning. The goals are not operational. The so-called propósitos de Puerto Rico, the purpose of Puerto Rico, if you just make a very elementary attempt to reconcile them or to study them, you find that in many cases they are completely contradictory. They have not been put in operational terms. I understand that the commission that has been appointed to do this is having a tremendous problem because they were put as a political platform rather than as a true societal purpose and goals. Therefore, this political expediency or political purpose that was behind this purpose of Puerto Rico is, I think, influencing negatively the definition of the goals and the values. So what I think has to be given, or I hope will come out of this conference, is an attempt to provide the values and goals in operational terms. Let me put it this way: that this conference should not use the approach that doctor Feldman is suggesting, if I understand him correctly, of just continuing an analysis of social problems in Puerto Rico on an individual basis, handle one question at a time. But to

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try to go deeper into what are the fundamental values and the fundamental goals of the Puerto Rican society in a truly comprehensive way, including economic, social, physical, political, and try to put them into operational terms. If we do not try to put them into operational terms, no rational policy can be developed. Perhaps I am using a typical planner's approach to the problem, but in my review of the Puerto Rican experience in planning what I find lacking is not so much the social data that is needed but even the social studies that have been done do not really pose the fundamental issues, or are not directed to solving the fundamental questions that the policy-maker or the planner has to address himself to. So, therefore, what I would suggest is that this conference attempt to address itself, or the research that will come out of this conference, to what are the fundamental issues in terms of values and goals, operationally that would really give the framework to direct the research in Puerto Rico, social research, and other type of research. I might be wrong on this but this is my Opinion. Pabón:- I have noticed in the development of this conference so far that there is a special dialectic that Doctor Feldman was mentioning: that some people have been de-emphasizing the economic strategy and emphasizing the social strategy, but in this dialogue between the persons who favor the economic strategy and the social strategy there has evolved a new strategy, which I will call the political strategy. Let me say first that social change, or the research in social change in Puerto Rico, is not a new phenomenon. The relationship between the study of social change and public policy is not a new phenomenon. The relationship between social change research and governmental policy is not a new phenomenon. What has been characteristic of this research in social change in Puerto Rico and in the relationship between this research and public policy, and governmental policy, is that it has taken for granted the constraints of a subordinate political system. This is my first point. rly second point: generally we have to recognize that although the Puerto Rican society is a highly politicized society, yet we had to wait for the Status Commission to bring out in special studies, or through special studies, the relationships between the economic, cultural and political problems that the Puerto Rican society faces. Of course, the report of the Status Commission is a political report. The third point is that research, especially research oriented toward social change and public policy, has so far either avoided the basic questions of what are the political constraints of the subordinate political system of Puerto Rico, or has reinforced those constraints and has reinforced the current governmental policy at a given time, a policy which has assumed the continuous operation of the constraints of the subordinate political system

-201without questioning it. I am very happy to hear comments on the criminal law and adjudication and so forth, mentioning, for example, that a factor in that situation is the adoption of the California Code. I am very happy to hear Doctor remarks about difficulties of economic development and to hear Díaz-Alejandro's comments on the possible strategies of politics---for economic development. But this should lead the conference to face, not to evade again, to face the basic questions that have been evaded for so many years. They have been evaded by the academic circles and by social research, which is this question of the political strategy, meaning by that the comprehensive study of how the many factors, external factors, political factors and so forth, that impinge on the Puerto Rican society are really conditions which should be investigated in terms of suggesting a political strategy and that we should not take it for granted that those conditions should be there. Another thing is that in dealing with research proposals we have to be very careful about another danger, which is the danger of subordinating research to governmental policy. Research, especially academic research, is in a great danger in all the universities precisely because it has been subordinated to external political forces, especially governmental forces. The relationship in Puerto Rico has been too close. Relationship between research and governmental policy has been too close. I am suggesting that it should not be too close. That the problems and approaches and so on, that would develop in this conference should be judged according to academic merits and the research merits and not according to a position which assumes that research has been auxiliary to governmental policy, and the best way to begin this, I suggest, is by trying to handle this problem of the political strategy. Nieves-Falcón:- I wanted to comment on some of the things that Mr. Padilla mentioned because I really think that he put his finger on one of the big problems that planning has had here in Puerto Rico, and this is that planning has largely been associated with political power in terms of its preoccupation for the need to determine societal goals and how to put them into operation. Such a thing was done in a memorandum that had a long time ago some influence in the Planning Board--the Gans memorandum--in which each and every specific facet of Puerto Rican life was planned. Really, to me this was a very dangerous one because rather than showing the values and the basic things in terms of societal aspects, what it did really show us was the values and things in terms of the political control. Inkeles:- I find myself regretting it is twelve-thirty because I think a number of interventions have raised a very large number of fascinating points. I think we might say that the confererAce is just beginning to warm up; it is on the verge of being hot. It is a great pity it had to happen at twelve-thirty. So many of the very,

-202very fundamental questions such as the political restraint factor that was introduced by Milton Pabón, which I think are fundamental in understanding Puerto Rican development, we cannot, I think, discuss this afternoon, I am going simply to assume that they will come up when we discuss in our subsequent days research goals and strategies and the related papers, those by De Jesüs and Doctor Anderson, and so I will postpone until then a little model that I have been developing. I have been trying to analyze the flow of the conference and I have tried to develop a model of the different research themes that have been introduced. It may be helpful in thinking and planning. But I would like to use the time I have now rather to be responsive to what I take is the immediate subject on the table, namely, the political-social development nexus, which I think is of great importance and which I am sure we'll be coming back to extensively. My comment is directed to one point that was raised by Doctor Thorne because I have the feeling sometimes at conferences that they are a little bit litre a deep sea and, as you know, in deep seas there are movements which occasionally bring things up from below, which rise to the surface, are there for a while, but then the currents move them down again and unless one is exactly there just at the right time and seizes on this element, it sinks down again into the sea, it is now lost to us, it's inaccessible. This particular point has to do with the effort to do something practical. I share Doctor Pabón's reservations about having research too political, but I think we have all accepted to a degree that one of the purposes of this conference is to devise measures that might be directly implemented, that might make a significant difference in the life pattern of Puerto Rico and its economic and social developmer}t. And a point that was mentioned had to do with something which I am not sure is a fact . . . it is typical of many things at this conference . . , many things that are alleged to be facts may not be, namely, that there is a lack of sufficient Puerto Rican-born, raised and bred--the term indigenous, I think, was used by Doctor Nieves-Falcón at one point--administrative and entrepreneurial talent. Now, if that is a fact--and I think it would be enormously important to establish how far that is really true--if that is a fact, then I think it is clearly the kind of thing about which everybody would probably agree we ought to do something, because it not only has the promise of advancing Puerto Rican development, but it also has the promise of advancing a goal, which I suspect all of us very much share, which is that Puerto Rico should, in so far as it is possible to accomplish the purpose, and it has meaning, be the place of Puerto Ricans and not people who are from outside. This is not just in the ideological, but in many other levels I think, a very important issue. Now, so there are two issues: one, could we find some way of assessing the extent to which there is such a lack of talent? Is it not a reasonable subject for research? Secondly, that we could

-203generally agree and ought to be part of a general program in models, its implications for economic development, for governmental administration, for all aspects of the activities of the society. Secondly, if we could ascertain something of this kind, could we discover something about the forces that seem to h-ave created this? Would we have any opportunity for indicating the extent to which it might be, as many people assert, the family pattern? Could it be the way people are taught in school? Could it be the way industry is organized and the predominance of capital from the United States? Could it be imbedded in the legal structure? Could it be in the pattern of interpersonal relations? Can we identify some sources which generate this condition in so far as it exists? Such a study, therefore, assumes that we would try particuLar]_y to identify those who have violated this general rule, if it is a rule, to try to find out what was distinctive or unique in their life pattern that made them exceptions to the rule, because goodness knows, there are very many important exceptions to thi..s rule, a large proportion of the people around this table representing such. And third, I would propose that we would have to give attention to the problem of what we can do about making changes in this pattern. Now, in so far as we have identified structural factors, I think we would want to address ourselves in so far as we could to these structural factors in so far as they were amenable to influence. If we discover that the factors were not structural but of a more intimate and personal nature, we might want to address ourselves to those. So we might want some combination. Now, this could get you into some operations that you might consider quite well. David MacClellan, as you probably know, believes that behavior of this kind is determined by the presence of something he calls need-achievement. I have never had great faith in his data with regard to that issue, but he is confident that this is in fact the case and he has now gotten to the point where he runs small schools in which he trains people in this new quality and he claims to have very good evidence from India that he has brought about remarkable transformations in economic behavior in several small communities in India by re-training local people who are already engaged in small scale trade and industry, so they were better able to adapt to the conditions of effective trade. Now, we may not adopt such Cloud 7 propositions necessarily. We might want to develop things that were particularly meaningful for the conditions which exist in Puerto Rico. It could well be, for example, that it might be possible to run schools in which people who have already been identified as relatively promising, having qualities of energy, initiative, and vigor and so on, could be trained either in government schools or by cooperation with industry in order to increase the flow of individuals of this type. And to come back to Dr. Thorne's point about reward, to make the investment that people would then make in these efforts, really

-204meaningful by making it an example for other people, behavior that actually got rewarded; it could be that the solution is more along the line of developing facilities that would encourage already existing talent, because I believe there is much more in Puerto Rico than most people allow. For example, I am not clear how far it has been true in Puerto Rico that there has been a really persistent effort on the part of the government to give the kind of support to small-scale personal initiative, which very often leads to small scale industrial and quasi-industrial. activity. How far, for example, there has been a small loan corporation which gave direct support to energetic Puerto Ricans of the sort who seem to have industrial initiative, but in fact did not find the means in an environment which they could be easily pushed outside of the market by large capitals. Series of issues of this kind Now, I can see . . . I do not want to press this point further, but if we could identify a series of issues of this sort, then I would be more inclined to take up Doctor Mueller's earlier suggestion that we might then break up into small teams, each with a kind of mandate, to come out with a research plan and an action program on some concrete and reasonably identified problem. But I think we have to have some dozens of such problems to make these smaller conferences meaningful. Corrada:- I was confronted with a very interesting fact from the statement made by Doctor Padilla. He suggested that by engaging in physical planning we have achieved, without intention probably, economic development, because it is a fact that we have achieved economic development, and if it is a fact that we have not planned for economic development, then by engaging in physical planning somehow, by some mysterious procedure, we arrived to a very high rate of economic development. Naturally, what I was suggesting is not that we have done the best planning possible in Puerto Rico. What I was suggesting was closer to a question of emphasis: that to my understanding of the planning procedures in Puerto Rico, the economic question had been emphasized to the detriment of all the questions such as the social effects or the social causes of industrialization. Aside from that point, I would like to indicate that I am very much impressed by the point brought up by Milton Pabón: this question of political strategy. One of the conclusions of the socalled Commission of Status is that we perhaps do not have to worry too much about economic strategy because the three formulas are possible, economically apeaking: that we can be Independent, that we can be a State or that we can be a Commonwealth, and still economically make it.. And, therefore, that poses again the problem on our hands, namely, that we have to clarify the issue in terms that are probably non-economic, in terms of a social context, and

-205in this sense perhaps one of the points that I was trying to reach without expressing it properly was that the task of the conference may be, since everybody is suggesting different tasks for the conference, it may be to explore the nature of the social change that the country will have to undergo in order to harmonize itself with either of those three political strategies open to the country, and to indicate whether the nature of the social change that has to take place to fit the country to either one of those, is amenable to analysis, and is amenable to a suggestion to the public bodies as to the possible negative and positive effects that such a social change would have in the population of Puerto Rico. Torruellas:- I would like to start by referring to Corrada's assertions that the Status Commission has concluded that the three formulas are feasible economically speaking. The Status Commission, upon coming to conclusions as to Economic feasibility of the three formulas, took a long run point of view. In fact, the Status Commission emphasized that each formula would work out effectively without any loss of the economic gains that Puerto Rico has achieved only if a certain length of time is allowed for the economy to gradually accommodate itself to the demands of the new status relations. It seems to me that continued economic growth during this period is a must if the transition problems involved are to be met effectively by the Puerto Rican people. I do not think that we want to enter into a discussion of the length of transition of time required or of the merits of these arguments because that does not come to the point of this seminar, but the impression should not be given that as of tomorrow any change in status would be feasible without any economic implications for the Puerto Rican society. Coming back to Doctor Padilla's and Professor Inkeles' remarks. I think that we are coming back again to the central point in Doctor Hansen's presentation yesterday--the point of performance. I think that it has been established that we are not satisfied with the performance that we have thus far achieved and that there is need for research so as to determine in what sense we are not satisfied, what are the problems that have arisen that do not allow us to be satisfied with what we have achieved and what factors have contributed to the creation of those problems. The answers to the questions will provide a lot of information that might be useful in determining the kind of public policies that Puerto Rico might want to undertake. This sort of establishes the premise that in the same way that in the last two decades the changes that Puerto Rico has undergone have been to a great extent injected or motorized by public policy, in the future public policy will continue to play a dynamic role in the determination of the changes that Puerto Rico will undergo. This brings us to the question of who makes public policy and on what basis is public policy made. It seems to be implied from

-206the discussion that the public policy that Puerto Rico has followed, although it has produced very interesting and positive results, has been ill devised in a number of ways and that this fact has to a great extent been responsible for many of the problems that have arisen or, at least, for the intensifying of some of the existing problems. If we are thinking of the possibility of influencing public policy in the future, we have to keep in mind that one cannot think of public policy without reference to the goals that are to be achieved. And this brings forth a very interesting question: who sets the goals? Well, the goals are set by the policy makers, the politicians to put it in more general terms. On what basis? I would say that on the basis of their interpretations of what the needs and the wishes of the people are. The question here, I think, is whether the interpretations they make of the needs and wishes of the people, that are then translated into the goals that public policy is to achieve, are the correct ones. It seems to be implied from the discussion that many times those interpretations are not the right ones for the purposes that we want to achieve. We have then to ask ourselves to what extent can research contribute to help the policy makers to make more correct interpretations of the needs and wishes of the people, so that the goals set for public policy and the specific policies adopted produce more effective results. I mean, a better performance-to put it in Millardis words--than the one so far obtained in Puerto Rico. To summarize my point I think we have to start by asking ourselves the questions: What problems have arisen? In what sense are we not satisfied with what we have achieved? What are the factors that have contributed to that situation? From there we can start bringing public policy in but not before, because public policy has to be geared to a certain set of goals and those goals have to be established in terms of what the society most effectively needs and wants in order to achieve the image we have set for our society. Rodriguez-Bou:- I want to comment on something that was said early this morning. Mr. Hansen made the remark that research here and studies are made following certain patterns, certain fashions. Ever since that remark was made, I was tempted to say something, but other comments lead me now to state that it looks to me that most of us in Puerto Rico have been trying to do some research and some planning, not on the basis of what is known on certain problems, but more to follow whatever policy is dictated at a particular time in history, in our short history, in this matter of social and economic research. I think that there is the crux of the matter and it is, I think, where we, University people, have failed. We have been too attached to policy dictated to us e and we have not tlad the nerve to do the type of research that will tlelp guide public

-207policy and defend and stand by that. We have been more prone to be followers instead of being the light to force by sound research and by the facts gathered objectively and soundly to guie public policy. Instead, all of the time . . . and you can look at most of the research and most of the studies done here and the emphasis on certain types of research, just because the hard-fisted hand of government policy has said: this is what we are interested in now. We have evidence of very sound studies made, for example, and this may illustrate what I mean. We had had cases of a group of persons spending a year's time studying salary scales and bringing sound reports on salary scales to policy makers, and then the policy makers when the reports are presented, say: well, this is too complicated. Call in the secretary and say: the increases in salaries are going to be so much for such and such a group, so much for such and such a group, and so much for such and such a group. But then, the scholars doing that type of research do not have the courage to stand up to that type of challenge of academic objectivity and academic hard work. I think we may spend years trying to devise more research on social change, but if we are going to be followers of the power structure and not be willing to suffer the consequences of defending our points of view, I think :hat we may be wasting time. Hansen:- Permit me one or two sentences, since I have done a lot of the projects that were just referred to. If I am not mistaken, in thirty projects or so at the Social Science Research Center we were not following the government, we were following, when we followed fashions, the fashions of the intellectual world. As to presenting information on wages and having it brushed aside and then not defending it, I do not know what you refer to. We have made study after study, which has been disregarded by the government. We have castigated the government publicly about it. We stood our ground. Our researchers have again and again castigated everybody from top to bottom in the government. I think, in short, our independence is not the trouble. It is our utility, our insight that I think is missing. I think we have plenty of independence. Muñoz-Amato:- I was precisely thinking of the same issue. I think that Dr. Rodriguez-Bou's comments are very valid in terms of what we would do and also in terms of what has been done in certain instances. But then, I think it is also true that the University has been independent in its social science research, has many times become a conflicting force with respect to the government and other centers of power. For instance, I never forget that the first accounts of national income were made in the Social Science Research Center. There were no such guides before and the small percentage of profits going outside to the Mainland made the government change its policy of beginning from then on, not to fight so much the investments and

-208the know-how coming from the States. I think that this little piece of research was very influential in changing a very tough governmental policy, advertised all over in the political campaigns previous to that, of being against what was called absenteeism. After the net income and gross products accounts were made, this slogan of being against absenteeism disappeared from the public policy picture. Other studies made in the Social Science Research Center pointed out new avenues of industrialization. I think the petrochemical analysis had a lot to do with that. Hansen:- For example, the results of those studies, of course, were available to Phillips and to Moscoso long, long before the publications came out. They were, of course, instrumental in policy decisions of this order and this was completely independent. Walter Isard and I thought this up: nobody suggested that we study petrochemicals. Muñoz-Amato:- It was our policy allthe time that we would not serve as a research agency for any government program, and it was a source of irritation for many powerful leaders in the government. We said we were going to do basic long-term independent research, and they had to build their own research offices for their immediate program and publicity needs. We had also a Labor Relations Institute led by Simon Rottenberg and by other very well known persons afterwards, which was constantly arguing against bad labor policies in the government. We had a group of people from the School of Public Administration and other parts of the University who came to the Constitutional Convention; very young, very naive, very immature, and we argued, and the statements appeared in the first page of the newspapers, that there were many ambiguities and defects in the Federal Relations Statute and in the new Constitution, and this was completely opposite to a very powerful program of the Popular Democratic Party, that this was going to be the good, perfect solution for the future, that there were no such defects, that it would be tested in the courts and the courts would say that it was a bilateral agreement not to be changed unilaterally, and so on and so forth. Groups of people from the University have worked with the Civil Rights Committee of 1958 to 59. There was a large sector of professors from the Law School, the College of Social Sciences, and the College of General Studies, including Bob Anderson and Milton Pabón, and we argued very critically, very strongly, against many governmental policies on issues of great significance, of hot debate among the political parties. We criticized the Penal Code. We said it was anachronic, obsolete and completely out of context in the cultural situation of Puerto Rico. We criticized very strongly the action of the government in the Nationalist uprisings of 1950 and 1954. We said there had been arrests without due process and trials without due process and mass

-209hysterical reactions and governmental mistakes, and this was a serious business in terms of political power in Puerto Rico because, if you remember, in 1950 and 1954 we had actual shooting; it was no word shooting. So, I think it is good University policy to be independent in these matters. We should never forget it for the future, and if we are going to do anything now along the lines of this conference, I agree with Doctor Rodríguez-Bou and Milton Pabón that we should be very independent in our actions. Clinard:- I suppose that all of us look at the problems such as Puerto Rico faces with different models, with different frames of reference. My own view is somewhat based on what has happened in many other developing countries and what is happening on the Mainland, namely, that urbanization and the growth of cities is one of the most profitable frames of reference. I have been at conferences which deal entirely with the whole problem of cities and urbanization. It seems to me that the thing that Arnold Feldman said in some of his remarks on his findings amounts to a rather sharp change between rural and urban differentials. All of this sets the stage somewhat, I think, for problems of policy, which I have seen a number of you bring in. Some of these policy questions, of course, whether the continued concentration of population in the San Juan area would not continually facilitate the development of these problems that you talk about. I think an examination of many of the things mentioned here would find them, of course, concentrated also in Ponce, Mayaguez and the San Juan area, and these are problems of urbanization; whether you want to continue with attempts for more decentralization. This could be done in many ways. In Sweden, for example, they have actually built the factories right out in the rural areas in order to maintain or try to break the hold of continued migration to the cities. This brings up questions I mentioned earlier about the housing projects, about their nature and about the kinds of situations that they precipitate in urban settings. Some of the problems of delinquency, in sanitation and health, and other problems, are due in part to the fractionalization of life that takes place in an urban setting, particularly in the form of peer groups, and age generation conflicts that break off the family relations. I recently was in Bogota and Caracas, and everything you'd ever say here, I also heard there. I think this problem of Puerto Ricans going to the Mainland, even being encouraged in some places to go to the Mainland as an attempt to relieve local problems, is a very serious one, particularly since they go to some of the worst slums of all the world

-210and then come back with norms acquired there. The Mexicans coming into our country, many of them rural labor, migrant labor, do not have to face this kind of situation. In the case of Puerto Rico, this problem of migration may, in the long run, and particularly for the returnees, be enhancing a problem that might be reducing some of the economic problems, but may be causing a great deal of others. This would be provocative of research. But I would like to point out that urbanization and migration furnish a frame of reference that I find extremely useful. In many countries in the world a great number of policy decisions that can be made on the basis of the problems of urbanization, and a peculiar one for Puerto Rico is a policy in relation to its people going to a slum and returning, whether this in the long run is an advantage to the country or a disadvantage. Hansen:- In just a moment I would like to suspend the session, but I would like Mr. García-Rodríguez to make his intervention if he wishes. Garcia-Rodriguez:- I want to state that I have been impressed by several interventions that have taken place this morning while I have been here, and I am happy to acknowledge the fact that Mr. Cochran seems to have taken the cat out of the bag, and referring to some of the interventions that have taken place after Mr. Cochran and which I think tend to solve the main issues that Mr. Cochran raised vis-a-vis the limitations involved toward economic development and toward planning in general, as a result of the particular political situation and relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. I, of course, agree with Mr. Pabón and I would like to say that what Mr. Muñoz-Amato said is correct in manifestations that were made in the past by research groups and studies concerning the limitations of present relationships between Puerto Rico and the United States. They were statements of fact, probably a true statement of fact, a very good analysis. I have read also Doctor Friedrich's introduction to that work. But I am afraid that what happened then may happen now if we do not take seriously the issues in the economic field that Doctor Cochran has raised and many others; that have been raised by Pabón, Nieves and so many others.

give

It would seem that we have to consider the kind of research that has to be made in two different levels. Is it going to be a level that we may call within the framework or is it going to be a research that deals with matters that may go out of the immediate framework? Now, I am not posing this an an "either or" question. I realize that many of the researches that are going to be made will have to be made on the basis of what I have called within the framework, but it so happens that this framework which is so very important and to which we must and careful attention, 1S a framework which everybody seems to reject because within the

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three solutions that have been raised by the Puerto Rican Status Commission, everybody--and the question of the plebiscite that is before us now--everything seems to be geared to a sort of solution in the political field and, naturally, as a result or, necessarily for attaining that result would have to develop along the economic and other lines--seems to be geared to the elimination of the limitations in the economic field that Doctor Cochran raised in his intervention. The Independentists certainly want to eliminate those limitations. The Statehooders want those limitations imposed or applied under a wholly different scheme, and those who are in favor of Commonwealth supposedly gear their whole planning and their whole political vision precisely to the elimination of these elements, which reflect themselves not only in the economic field but also in the social and cultural fields, which Mr. Corrada has raised. Therefore, I think that it is essential that while not forgetting the immediate problems that our society confronts and the need for research within this framework, we must realize that this framework is rejected, openly rejected, clearly rejected by everyone who speaks about it and that planning must be geared also along those changing lines, whichever of the three may be. They have to be geared and taken out exclusively of the immediate framework. Otherwise, we will be just registering a fact, as I am afraid the study about the limitations of the present status did in the past, without being able to carry out anything concerning it. I will just give one example concerning this particular problem of the status. Let us take, for example, what concerns this particular study that Múfioz Amato has mentioned and which is very good. I wonder how much research, how much investigation, has been made on an issue so vital on these particular problems as the constitutionality of such an arrangement whereby the people of Puerto Rico consent to an eternal delegation of its representative powers. This is an arrangement whereby we, the people of Puerto Rico, consent to a very legal referendum or electoral process and we consent that the people of Puerto Rico renounce forever and forever such powers, such vital issues as representative government which is of the essence, in my opinion, of American Constitutional set up. Now, this is a very elementary question in constitutional law and I do not see why problems like that have not been raised, not in the courts--I am not talking now about a brief; I have written many of those--I am talking about serious research in the plan that corresponds to people of this level, people who will be willing to demonstrate that while we open ears to the needs of government, that while we open ears to the needs of the society and the people who live in the society in which we live, we also have open minds and open mouths to express the fundamental limitations of that society no matter what, and without having to excuse ourselves to any

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particular political or ideological point of view. It is life which is going to determine the limitations that we may each have as a result of our particular political points of view. But our research and our work can be objectively judged, and I ask for that. Muñoz-Amato:- Just a brief comment for two reasons: to argue with my friend, and second, because it is necessary, I think, to point out what has been the main policy in the University, with exceptions, of course. I remember that it was Governor Muñoz Marín's idea that the vote on Law 600 should be interpreted as a generic consent. Those were the words he used, meaning a consent for the future permanently, and I remember very clearly that our reports to the Constitutional Convention, from this groups of professors, pointed out that this was very similar to Hitler's plebiscite on the democratic nature of his coup d'Etat in taking power in Germany, and that it was not within the democratic traditions to give this type of generic consent and renounce or resign the opportunity of having representative institutions continuously. We proposed that there had to be improvements of the Federal Relations Statute in the specific terms of representative institutions in Puerto Rico to negotiate and to agree with representative institutions in the United States. Now, this was a very controversial and publicly debated issue, and I always remember the headlines in the newspapers saying: "Muñoz Marín thinks this is a bilateral permanent agreement" and in small print: "A group of professors from the University argued in the hearings that this should not be interpreted in such a way." I think we can be independent now and for the future. We will get into a lot of trouble, no question about it. Rodriguez-Bou:- What I was really thinking about when I made the remarks a few minutes ago, probably it could be better summarized if we take as one of the subjects of discussion here: what strategy should independent, free research people follow to have some action taken on objective and sound research made by these people? Because it gives me the impression that we are content to have a book published with the results of our research and let it die there, with our ideas and our findings, and nothing else done afterwards. I think it is time in our milieu to be thinking, and that would be a great help to us, what sound strategy could we follow besides just publishing reports on research, what can we do to influence public policy to a higher degree than what we have been able to do in the past, regardless of the examples given by Muñoz-Amato of some of the things in the context of so many other things that had been lying dead in drawers of our government and our agencies. Hansen:- It is late and reluctantly I must suspend the sessions until 9:00 o'clock in the morning.

-21322 FEBRUARY 1967: Hansen:- I think we can begin our third session. As the agenda specifies, we will turn our attention today in the first instance to a paper by Robert W. Anderson, the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences. Subsequently, if it is found convenient, I will ask Professor Clinard to initiate further discussions of some urban questions which are of interest to him. Tomorrow, again on the assumption that it will be found convenient, we will have some commentaries on the probable economic consequences of decisions about political status in Puerto Rico upon which Mr. Díaz Alejandro and Thomas Cochran will collaborate. I think with these few announcements we can begin, and I ask Dean Anderson to deal with his paper as he chooses. He may read it or review it or comment on it, and if he puzzles about that decision he might remember my difficulties on Monday. I did a little of all three, I think. Anderson:- Thank you, Millard Hansen, I think your difficulties of Monday will pale before mine. It was said about half an hour before the session ended yesterday that the conference was beginning to warm up, and I hope that I can add fuel to the fire in my reflections on "Focus and Approach" for a study of Social Change and Public Policy in Puerto Rico. As I was reading the comic strips this morning in preparation for getting into the car to come to the seminar I saw a comment in the strip called "B. C." in which two of our Neanderthal ancestors are leaning on a rock with a smoking volcano in the background, one of them saying, "I wish I were in politics" and the other one is saying, "why?" can't seem to decide between right and wrong, and in politics there is no wrong." This seemed to set the theme for some of the things that I would like to say today in regard to this paper about which I would insist on underlining the idea of reflections which I have added to the formal topic. It is a rather illusive paper, and I think I will read it, at least part of it, and as I read it make my own comments which I think might be germane to what the paper has to say. I am concerned in the paper with the relative emphasis which should be given in a project on social change in Puerto Rico to what degree public policy should be emphasized in our planning and in the focus for the research. I am concerned also with the relevance of and meaningfulness of social science techniques in the particular context in which we will have to work and in which I have been working more or less over the past eighteen years; that is, in Puerto Rico. It was said yesterday at the beginning of the meeting that the penal code which was adopted here in Puerto Rico in 1902 had very little impact on Puerto Rico, and I think we should be very careful that the social science research which we can develop in 1967 will not fall into the same criticism sixty years from now. When I wrote this paper, rather hurriedly (I'm sorry it didn't get to you before yesterday), I consciously tried to anticipate what I thought might be brought out spontaneously in a conference of this kind. I am not sure

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that I have succeeded completely, but I am confident that, at least to a degree, some of the things which I state in this paper seem to have turned out to be relevant to some of the discussions which we have had over the past two days. Since the subject of this seminar hints very broadly at the desirability of beginning a research project in social change related to public policy, I wish to direct myself here to the relationship between these two purposes, science and policy, which we must make every effort not to convert into the horns of a frustrating and insoluble dilemma. López-Rey:- Mr. Chairman, I have followed with interest the exposé made by Dean Anderson and I have also read his paper. He raises a question which is of particular importance, and I would like to put to him a question; which I wish to explain first. If I understood him correctly, social change has more or less an ambivalent character; good and bad. Because of this and of the difficulties involved in policy making and politics, apparently he advises or suggests that the social scientist should de-emphasize the policy orientations of social research. And he made a clear distinction, which I agree with, between the adviser and the social scientist. He also points out the inability of social science to influence or to do something beyond its own limits in order to change the attitudes or trends of a policy making body. He thinks that the important matter is to determine what social change is. I agree with him to some extent, that we have to do social research for the sake of social science or other science related to sociology. But it seems to me, that at the present historical juncture, the social scientist should go beyond that. Accordingly social policy requires a greater participation of social scientists in policy making; I don't want to imply as policy makers but that required to influence as participants policy making. Take for example planning. Planning is becoming more and more important in every country. Planning cannot bo done only by civil servants or governmental officials. It has to be done, at least to some extent, by social scientists of many sorts and as far as possible they should be members of the planning bodies. If so the social scientist has not only knowledge but also influence inasmuch as he participates in policy mafcing and even may implement what is planned or part of it. This function, however, is not that of a politician or a policy maker. There is another question, particularly important which also means certain participation in policies and perhaps even in politics. At the present historical juncture we are interested not only in the discussion of problems like social change, but also in the functioning of institutions and systems: i.e., with the functioning of the state machinery and the implementation of social programs. Theoretically it will be difficult to agree on what social change is. Social change is only an accommodating label covering quite a number of processes which defy classification. In sum, the social scientist, not all but many of them, is supposed to play a definite ,ole in polity ma.King. From a practical point of view, the only required by public policy nowadays, it is extremely difficult to separate science and politics.

-215Anderson:- . . . The thrust of what I had to say was more a matter of emphasis on what the social scientist can realistically expect in terms of results. I agree that social scientists can and do play an important role in influencing policy, in planning organisms, within the universities, within the government. I would suspect, however, to the degree that they do affect in any measurable sense public policy, it is not in the role of social scientists but in their roles as part of the political process itself. It is exactly the need to distinguish at the very beginning of a research project on social change between these two roles which I think is so important. Mr. Rodriguez-Bou mentioned at the end of the hour yesterday that the social scientist should see to it that his recommendations are followed. But if he is in a position to do this, he is doing so as a politician, and I don't use this term in a pejorative sense; after all I am a political scientist by upbringing. If he is able to influence public policy, he does it because of the position he occupies within the political structure. I think we must take into account the nature of this political structure in any kind of research on social change, or any other relevant abstraction which we wish to deal with in social science research. This is why I think it important to emphasize something that has been mentioned already by Professor Feldman in his researches and his descriptions of them, and something that Professor Nieves-Falcón mentioned yesterday in going through his list of research priorities; the fact of the diffusion of the meaning of change as it is experienced throughout the different strata of the society. Change does not mean the same thing to all groups, and it seems that one must study this to find out exactly what is the beast that we wish to dissect, and perhaps discover after we have killed him that it was not worth dissecting. But the point I wish to emphasize is the public -policy-versus-science aspect of this, because I feel there is a tendency perhaps to assume that the political structure is beyond our immediate sphere of interest as social scientists, and that as we feed recommendations in, that they will be automatically accepted. We have to find out how decisions are made in the political arena, it seems to me, before we can realistically speak of a research project on social change and public policy. I simply wish to plead for a certain kind of emphasis. I certainly don't wish to assume that our social science is pure in some kind of a holy abstract way because the way that we define our problems is set by the society in which we live. Feldman:- I would like to extend some of Dean Anderson's remarks and present some of the ideas as they occurred to me as I was reading his paper. I think that one of the things that the title of the conference does is that it may unfortunately suggest to its participants some arbitrary and perhaps not useful distinctions. I think when we talk about social change in the role of social scientists, we tend to pitch it at an exceedingly high abstract level and think of it as something up there that is happening in some vague way, and we almost tend to talk about social change, I think, the way the physicists used to talk about ether; there

-216must be something there, but we really perhaps cannot grab it. I think this is not the case; I think the most basic principle of understanding what social change is, is that nothing, nothing can change in a society unless some member of that society changes his behavior. If the society is going to change, somebody has to do something differently or think something differently, or behave in a way that previously was not present in a society. It is a very immediate, it is a very everyday kind of thing, and it is capable of observation. On the other hand, when we talk about public policy I've been impressed by the extent to which we talk about it at the highest concrete Level, I say, rather than keeping it very abstract. We talk about public officials in the sense of cabinet ministers or their equivalent of high level influentials, etc. etc. And this is also just empirically and just on a counting basis, not the case. I say most public officials are school teachers, case workers, and welfare agents. These are people at quite mundane Levels of operation, concerned in the daily carrying out of various kinds of programs. So then I think we can say: now Look where these two things intersect. Then we can talk about the ways in which the experiences of people are changing relevant to their interaction with the polity and relevant to their interaction with public officials. Therefore we might talk about what might be called the experience of participants with changing micropolicy , and this might be an efficient level at which to pitch research. If for example, out of research we can discover something that teachers might do differently that will change the daily experience of school for their pupils, the overall impact, the aggregate impact on any society, Puerto Rican society included, will be much more than any influence, or any large scale report is likely to have on a Secretary of Education or on a Superior Education Council. I think it is this immediate and empiric kind of tone that might best inform a series of studies of change. I think what this suggests is to emphasize one of the things Dean Anderson was saying, and that is to say that what one needs here i$ a consortium of studies, really. I think, for example, the researches for which the University and the Social Science Research Center are best known, researches that perhaps have been criticized, but which nevertheless constitute an amazing record of productive research, (you will all understand I am not unselfish in this appraisal), were very important. I think it would be a mistake to repeat them. I think, for exemple, they were mostly gauged at determining what the parameters of social Life in Puerto Rico were. I think that this might better be done today by working out a more effective liaison with the agencies in Puerto Rico that maintain social bookkeeping records. I think that, rather than repeating the large scale surveys, a great deal of the information these surveys generated is perhaps available in sufficient quantities in the so-called social bookkeeping agencies, and that if some more effective liaison were established between the academic community and the agencies like the Bureau of Labor statistics, the Census, etc., etc., there might b4 great mutual benefit. I don't know if it has changed in the last month and a half, but I know that there are some real problems, for example, today, or there were last month in getting breakdowns, two

-217or three variable breakdowns from the 1960 Census results, they apparently are as yet not ready to do that. One of the things that, by provision of personnel and of energy and effort, the academic community might do, is that it might generate information that would be terribly useful, and that, I think ought to be one of the things that a group of social scientists from the University might well do. Secondly, I think we ought to look at, as I say, a series of studies that attempt to assess and understand the impact of public policy on what American sociologists are increasingly calling "everyday life". That is to say, how do different segments of the population experience the different aspects of the social system, as well as specific programs? What do the welfare agencies do, how do they affect the lives of the people in whom or with whom they participate in these welfare programs? What do they teach these people? Some American social scientists are increasingly concerned that the relationship between case worker and client, and this is an example of what I call social change and public policy, that this relationship increasingly teaches dependence of the client on the case worker. That is to say, it is an important social process that is going on that has an end result, and whether or not this is the goal of the Commissioner of Welfare is not all that relevant as to whether or not the participant, in terms of the interaction of his case work, comes out learning how to depend on that case worker. Now whether such teaching, such education is good or bad is a matter of other kinds of judgment, but it would be important to establish where those things get taught. We are all familiar with the idea that reform schools teach children now to be more efficient criminals; that is perhaps one of the more obvious examples of the kind of thing I am talking about. I think, for example, that hospitals teach people how to be sick, but if you go to a hospital, you don't know, maybe, how to perform the sick role before you get there, but you sure know what the obligations and responsibilities of the role are when you come out. It may be true of drug addiction; that is to say, maybe the role gets crystallized in a way in which we teach, and in which we handle drug addicts. Maybe, as we arrest them and treat them, you know, we teach them that a good drug addict behaves this way; this is really good conforming behavior for a drug addict. This, it seems to me, is social change and public policy. One of the things I'm saying here is that, ten, fifteen years ago researchers in social change and public policy in Puerto Rico were directed toward the problem of recruitment, that is to say, where do we get the people to staff various industries, where do we get people to work as skilled laborers, where do we get the people to come to the University, etc., etc., I think the rhetoric of ten, fifteen years ago, was a rhetoric of recruitment, and I think recruitment problems are still very germane and very relevant; but in part I think now perhaps we must think of shifting to include, along with the problems of recruitment, what I would call the problems of people-processing, that is to say there are recruiting and acting agencies today in Puerto Rico in the sense that there were not fifteen or twenty years ago, and they cast a much wider net. I think it is

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intervention,

time to look at how these agencies and institutions process the people who fall into their nets. This is not, I would stress, and I want to keep repeating myself, a problem of what are the superordinate goals of the society; it is the problem of what is the society doing to its members. Let me suggest some examples. What I am saying is that I'm asking for us to try to locate the so-called efficient and ubiquitous points at which public policy intervenes in people's lives; points of points at which a difference can become still more of a difference. There are many such points of intervention. One of the ones raised yesterday is that there will be an important political decision and in that sense the society is going to intervene in people's lives by asking them a question. In talking to some of the participants last night, it seemed to me interesting to say; what are the terms in which this question is considered in the lives of the people to whom it will be asked? Is there any evidence at all, on the basis of a relatively small, but intensive number of cases, as to what is the rhetoric of politics, the rhetoric of political status outside the university, because this intervention is going to be minimal vis-a-vis university personnel after all, and it is going to be a maximum intervention vis-a-vis the lives of the rest of the members of the society. Is there any evidence as to what their rhetoric of this problem is, and might not the intervention be more interpretable if the study of social change (and this is going to be a major change after all, as a major change can considerably come from this intervention) is keyed to the rhetoric of discussion in people's everyday life. I think that the courts are another point of intervention in a significant number of people's lives. I don't think we ought to study statuses, such as delinquent statuses. I think we ought to study processes; that is to say, you don't understand delinquency, I think, until you understand how delinquents relate to the police. Who is it that police call delinquents, what happens when the initial contact is made? This is as much a processing problem as the socialization of a freshman to the university community, and until, I think, we understand this as a problem in social change because it changes people's behaviors and it changes them vis-a-vis public officials, we don't really know the immediate nature of the relationship between the change and public policy. Finally, I think a most efficient agency of intervention is, of course, the educational institution. We intervene and affect more lives, I think, through the fact of taking them into school and presumably doing something there, than perhaps in almost any other institution in all societies. And even in the United States, mostly in the United States, we really don't know what goes on in the classroom, and it would seem to me to be interesting. If we think of this kind of research here, Puerto Rico again might lead the way in terms of the kinds of research in social change that is most efficient and most informative. For what I think this argues for is what I was trying to express yesterday, and I think what is implicit in Dean Anderson's paper: a set of what I would call field experiments, a set of researches that have some control over the processing situation. Perhaps we can work

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with one or two schools to start with; that is to say, if you try doing this rather than this and see if the classroom situation changes, see if the behavior of the students changes. If we get very ambitious, we could think of one, or two or three schools, so that we call one school the placebo, in which let us say something is done that we think won't have any effect, but just to make sure that something is done. We can call one school a treatment group, and one school a control, and the language already starts communicating some rigor of thought and some rigor of conception. But we are still only necessarily talking about three schools, which is not an inordinate scale for research. I think that if we can think of a research on social change and public policy as what is it that people are going to be doing differently vis-a-vis the kinds of programs that their lives are affected by, the kinds of social programs,political programs that their lives are affected by, all the way from plebiscite to what goes on in the classrooms, then perhaps we give some concrete context to the notion of the study of social change and public policy. Hansen:- Mr. Anderson, do you want to make a further comment? Anderson:- No, I will wait to hear some more. Frankenhoff:- I would like to speak for a moment in defense of the "and" in the title of our seminar. I think we all agree that we are beginning with this everyday life; this is where we begin, this is the point of our departure. And we or society determine that there are some problem areas, there may be many problem areas, and there are, I am sure; but there are some which society has deemed more crucial than others. If you want to find those you'll look in the budget, I thin1,much more perhaps than at this descriptive report to the Governor. The budget indicates the concern of the society for these problem areas. I don't want to down-grade public policy, but it seems to me that if we do begin with this everyday life and these problem areas such as education, health, and then the breakdown which follows, public policy is trying, in a small little way, to make more rational our understanding and our approach to these areas. I don't think that it is a question of living differently, and that is why this notion of public policy intervention doesn't move me too much. I think we want the people and ourselves to live more humanly, understanding better what is happening. In terms of education, long ago Socrates said that knowledge was power, and there are still a Lot of people who believe that, but I am less and less convinced. To make that point a little dearer; if public policy is an attempt to bring rationality into a problem area, for example in economics, In the depression, a kind of Hoover approach was a belief that this is a kind of act of God and if we let nature take its course, surely the boat would right itself. And of course it didn't, it took the war to bring that boat out of the water. So one of the first things that the country did, in a highly significant action, was done by a society faced with what was considered a problem, because you may remember that economists during the war predicted

-220that at the end of the war there would be a depression which would make this great depression seem rather small. So an Employment Act of 1946 was passed, in which the society for the first time said, "we really don't believe that this is beyond our control; we can do something and we will", so that we find a government under a highly conservative president like Eisenhower running into a $12 billion deficit in its public policy. In juvenile delinquency we believe that we can control much more; we are not willing to accept this as a kind of "act of God" again. In housing, which is my particular interest, we have a public policy now which is based on a kind of invisible hand, it is I should say at least sixty years behind. The public policy in the caserio has horrified people coming here from Brazil, for example. But in any event we are beginning to realize that what we do, what the public does, expresses amore rational or a less rational, a more coordinated or a less coordinated, a more integrated or a less integrated approach to every day life. I don't think we should undersell the tremendous momentum of this everyday life. This brings us to a point then that we really can put a versus science versus policy. In the old days, of thinking of the academic life as pure research and then the political dirty man outfront, I don't think that makes much sense. Now we realize that the politician should be a person capable of understanding technical reports, and that the scientist should be a person capable of having a commitment to a policy, of not being afraid to make a commitment, so that we have a kind of moving together from the politician as a kind of line function and scientist as a staff function, we have that moving together so that more and more we find line aspects, executive aspects in the scientist and more and more we find scientific aspects, and I think this was of the essence of the so-called "New Frontier" in the politician, and we expect that. And this brings us to, I think, a very important insight of Professor Anderson; this notion of constituency. Who is the constituency? It seems to me that the day has passed The politician that the scientist can ignore his constituency. never has and remained a politician. I should think that one important concern of this group and others who treat more specific problems is, who is this constituency with which we work to bring policy to life? I spent two months in the"favela" in Rio this summer, and it is a rather perfect example of this artificial public policy division which is really to exterminate the favela, to take these people out one way or another and put them in the country; they would be out of the way and perhaps productive, and the tremendous needs of these people and their contribution to that urban development. This kind of dichotomy, this failure to realize the constituency, I think the politician doesn't have it, the scientist does have it, and perhaps now in a Little more meaningful sense we are realizing that this constituency is an essential part of research, that it involves a commitment to implementation and not just Like Will Rogers who gave advice to the admiral in World War I that he had the solution to the submarine menace and "that, what is that", "well, you boil the ocean", and "how can you do that", "well, I gave you the general principles". Well, we

-221can't merely give the general principle. This constituency, I think, is the key to responsibility to be reflected upon in regarding social change and public policy. As social change and public policy which recognizes the tremendous momentum of everyday Life and in which we recognize our own humble vocation if you will, to raionalize, to make intelligible, to make human certain key areas. Muíioz Amato:- I don't know if I have anything to say after what has already been said, but I'd like to try. I think Bob has very provocatively raised the inevitable question of how much the social scientist can do in terms of descriptive or interpretative knowledge about social reality, and how much people engaged normally in this type of activity can participate in policy programming or leadership. I think Arnold Feldman's approach is the only possible one. If we have experience and a certain degree of knowledge as to these concrete realities and the problems they present, if we want to do something about them in terms of knowing the facts, interpreting the facts, or even beyond that facing the problems, it is impossible to assume that we are going to make a complete diagnosis in terms of social sciences, even in a very minor detailed problem. You must realize there is a tremendous complexity and variability in human situations, and also you must remember that the methodology of the social sciences is very inadequate. Take for example one concrete case: there was a meeting in the Administrative Board of this Rio Piedras Campus to discuss whether we should change a little rule as to whether the student has nine weeks to drop a course or whether he should have the whole semester. Some member of the Board immediately said: "Let us use the scientific approach, let us get all the facts and interpretations of the facts." So we looked for the facts and the interpretations of the facts and we had statistics on how many drop before the rule was put into effect the five years previously, and how many drop five years after the rule was adopted. But of course, that doesn't say anything because there are so many variable factors, so many other things that affect whether a student drops out or not; the quality of the teacher, the personal problems of the student, the fact that he may have a girl friend or more than one girl friend, and so on and so forth, and you cannot compare the students who dropped before the rule with the students who dropped after the rule no matter how many statistics you get. There were some studies made by the Superior Educational Council in which the attitudinal techniques were used. There were interviews of students and professors in courses in which there had been drops, and the students gave answers such as this: "I dropped out because I have problems with my studies", or the student would say, "I did not have a good dormitory". Now what are problems with his studies, how many different degrees and possibilities there are in the type of the problem, or how ambiguous is the answer "I did not have a good dormitory". There are many possibilities. Now, if you take the changes over time and the comparisons between one student and another student, they do not

-222give you any answers. How would you go about getting more facts and more interpretations of facts to answer the question whether the rule would be changed? You have to get something from the experience that you have. You must positively think that it is good anyway to improve the quality of teaching. You have to improve the quality of the advisors with respect to the students when they come to the critical point of whether they leave the course or not. You must risk some hypotheses and do the best you can as a policy-maker who appreciates the offerings of social sciences. So the best hypothesis we have is that we have to train teachers becter, to improve their pedagogical techniques, their evaluation methods. We need advisors for our students because we do not have any advisors in the Rio Piedras Campus to speak of. We must get some people to help these students along in the concrete particuLar problems that each one may have at a certain point and this is a continuous process. And, as to the rule, it seems better to let the student stay in the course until the end of the semester because at least this rule gives more opportunity for the teacher and the other fellows to work with the student and for the student himself to try to come up to the required standards over the whole term, instead of getting him to make a decision after nine weeks. The resources are better used because if you have already a classroom committed and if you have a teacher assigned to a certain number of students, and if you let the students drop out in the first nine weeks, then your fixed resources are not given as much opportunity to be used in the improvement of the students. It may be that the better students are sacrificed a little bit if there is a large group with some bad students in it, but what do you decide? You let the medium or worse students get out without any constructive work for them, or do you sacrifice a little bit the opportunity of the better students? I think that concrete cases like this can only be handled in terms of experimentation: finding out what happens if you change this factor, if you change that other factor, and gathering the experience you have. The knowledge you have about reality, even though it may not be completely researched and quantified and measured as some people think everything has to be done in the social sciences. Anderson:- I think that, well, I know that I exaggerated a good deal the distinction for purposes of being provocative between social science and public policy, science vs. policy, and I would not want to exaggerate, continue to exaggerate this matter of the "versus". I think the problem that I wanted to emphasize is that of making the social scientist in Puerto Rico define his own problems in terms of the various disciplines of the social scientist and not in terms of an imposed pattern, value pattern, which is defined by factors external to himself in the public policy realm. It has been said, for example, in the first session of this conference, that public policy as of 1940 or 1942 in Puerto Rico has been successful. It was good public policy. This is an article of supposition, of faith, of value, and I think what the

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social scientist has to do whatever his disciplinary background might be, is to push as far into the background as possible the threshold of value assumptions of this kind of general political nature, political in the bad sense of the word, I suppose I have to use it. Now, I think Professor Feldman's suggestion is very useful in terms of strategies and techniques in order towed the idea of policy and the important influence which social science can have in policy through a series of possible experiments to bring policy into relevant contact with behavior via institutions which, as he put it, impinge upon behavior patterns and which are supposed to influence them in one way or another. I think we have to search for ways of making public policy relevant to our concerns but insist upon our defining the terms. By using the pronoun "our" I'm referring to the social scientists and not the policy makers. r

Mueller:was very impressed with Dean Anderson's presentation but find myself sharing some of the concerns expressed around the table by Mr. Feldman, Mr. López-Rey, and by Mr. Reimer. As lawyers we are supposed to have been in the business of stimulating behavior changes and forcing conformity for 2,000 years. But we have worked in the dark in the past. This is the first opportunity we have to work, with scientifically determined criteria. I wonder, therefore, whether we are at this point not almost committed to a stratified approach to modifying social change or controlling it. It seems to me that Dean Anderson emphasized, overemphasized, only the first level of this approach. The first level is, of course, an inventory-taking level: "what is," I think you have done a superb job in classifying the four most relevant points of inquiry; behavioral, attitudinal, populationelite, and the policy institution inquiry. Does it not follow automatically, however, that our next sphere of inquiry would have to be an inquiry into effects? We may not be very good at that yet, but it seems to me we are committed to find out what forces are correlated with what effects and why. And then comes an axiological inquiry, it seems to me, a value inquiry. We have to identify effects as either negative or positive. On that too, we cannot be clear in all cases. Nor may we be able to agree. But it seems to me that we have done some yeomen service in identifying effects, starting with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Bill of Rights, and so on. We could perhaps agree that unemployment is negative, that high property loss through crime is negative, and so on. We should not worry too much about those questions that we cannot possibly identify as positive or negative. They simply remain a subject of debate until we make a policy decision. But when we come to the fourth point of inquiry, we are dealing with the most significant aspect of social change: How to change these various effects? We have to agree on a policy of stimulation. We've got to get to work at this point. We can no

-224longer be satisfied with having social scientists be inventory takers. There comes a point when the recruit is ready to shoot and you have to send him out into the field. Whether social science feels itself ready at this point or not is irrelevant, somebody must intervene. There is nobody else who can do it. It's got to be the social scientist who does it. That is why I was so particularly happy when Dr. Feldman mentioned his various points of intervention. There is some tentative agreement on these points of intervention where stimulation is possible. I fully realize that I may sound too optimistic. I'm fully aware that a society whether Puerto Rico or any other, is like a mobile which starts swinging all over when you touch only one of its parts. But we've got to start swinging, or else the thing will just stagnate. I hope I have not been too severe, but I was quite concerned about any over-emphasis on mere inventory-taking. Anderson:- I have very little to say. I think that what Professor Mueller is talking about are the final purposes, the reasons for engaging in this enterprise in the first place, and I don't think that I meant to express the idea that social science is simply inventory-taking. It's just that when you define your term "social change" you are trying to express an area about which there is very little agreement and upon which one, including the social scientist, has to take a position of one kind or another and commit oneself for good or for ill to a path of action. My only admonition is that we be very careful as to what we can do as social scientists in directing this change. Gorrada:- It seems to me that there is another alternative to approach this. I am particularly concerned about the strategy of the research as such, and borrowing a phrase from Mr. Lopez-Rey at this particular historical junction, as he said, I think that this research has to play a very important role, and I see that role in terms of an evaluation of the social change in Puerto Rico, vis-a-vis public policy and vice-versa. That is, that this research ought to evaluate the performance of the government in connection with the development of Puerto Rico, and not simply concern itself with social change as such, but analyze the nature of the Puerto Rican society at a given point. Then analyze the set of public policies that have been adopted to carry on the national development of Puerto Rico, and then evaluate to what extent that public policy has affected the Puerto Rican society, has brought about some social changes that we know, some are ill, and some are good, and that that interchange will occur always, but I think that the performance of government in Puerto Rico for the past 20 years deserves a careful analysis now, and that a social science research center is in the best position to conduct that analysis. In terms of analyzing what these representatives of the body politic that we have, legitimately expressing the social goals of the Puerto Rican society according to the democratic process that we have, analyze if the social goals they set are the ones that should have been set, analyze whether those goals that were

-225set had been properly implemented, and what changes have been brought about as a consequence of them, and analyze what change has been brought about because they were well considered to begin with, and analyze to what extent public policy is contradictory in itself. Let me cite one example: if we take one of the so-called aims of the Puerto Rican society, according to our legitimate representative: Housing, they say that one of the goals of the Puerto Rican society is to have every Puerto Rican family own its own home. Now at the same time you see a public policy implemented that is based significantly upon public housing. It is not owned by the families. Now to what extent we find here a level of ideology that is rather detached from the reality that is taking place or vice-versa. A level of ideology that claims to pursue something but a machinery that does something else, and does something else because other circumstances affect the situation of Puerto Rico, So, mainly, my point is that the research has to be oriented at this historical juncture, again. As an evaluation of the performance of the government to plan and to achieve national development in Puerto Rico. Ferracuti:- It seems to me that there are two main trends in the discussion, so far. I would certainly go along with Dr. Anderson's plea for staying away from a single grand research-design, and for having a set of coordinating studies, and he lists some. One is a stock-taking value assessment, and the second is what action would derive from this stock-taking or what action should be derived by someone else, the powers that exist in the society, and I would like some comments to both points. We keep talking about values, and this term occurs very frequently in our conversation. Perhaps we should define it a little better, what we really mean. Basically, it's an individual belief, but it can be explored at three levels. One, existential level, what the value is. Another level is the desire-level, what the individual really wants; and the third level is what is desirable, what he should want. Now unless we keep this in mind we may be studying three different things. Also we keep making some sort of confusion between value and norms. Now, presumably behind each norm there is a set of values if we are in a democratic society, but we are not very sure about it. A value has no power, is not enforced by anything but the satisfaction of the mental health, the well-being of the individual. A norm has power, has been sanctioned, for or against and to break a norm carries penalties which come from the outside. To break a value carries only some degree of anomie perhaps, some degree of confusion, of mental ill, but nothing more. Now how much identity is there in Puerto Rico between norms and values? How many different sets of values? Are we addressing our public policy to the norms or to the values, and if to the values at what levels of the values? These, it seems to me, are questions that we have to answer, so I would give the highest priority to point one of Dr. Anderson's list, i.e., the stocktaking level. We need to know more about the distribution of the value systems in the Puerto Rican society. Although this is a

-226small society, an insular society, call it anything you want, there will be subcultures with different sets of values. How much do we know about them, how much is the iíbaro a subculture, or are we a subculture here? Who has the power, the culture or the subculture? How much information is there between the policy-maker's subculture, if such a thing exists, with out current academic subculture, for example? We certainly have a set of values that are our own because we are here in this University. Again, how are these values learned, is the learning process the same as it used to be a generation ago? Isn't there a chance for a tremendous lag which will reflect in the lag between values and norms and again will affect our adjustment to the change? How much of this learning takes place in the family? Now in Europe, after the family comes the school immediately and the set of values is complemented by the school, particularly our Lyceum type of school, would correspond basically to your Bachelors. Is the University implementing any set of values, is there any conflict between the values of the family and those of the University and those of the policy makers, any confusion? Are we creating anomie in our students? Again, these are questions that we have to answer, at this very first level without which the others don't have much meaning. How much of the socialization process takes place in adherence to the norms which the Puerto Rican society has accepted as its norms? Are we socializing for something different in our own norms? Unless we answer these questions, we may be studying external change without any real information about the internal change taking place in our subjects. Now I don't want to enter into a question of how much a social scientist becomes a promoter. Personally I don't agree. Provide the information. Thank God we don't take many of their decisions. They are for someone else. But I would maintain an M.D. approach to this. If a patient calls me in, then I'm allowed to take action. Have we been called or aren"t we assuming that the patient has asked for us? And I would change this a little. How much right do we have to change values without being too sure, and even a marginal look at contemporary American society would show that we aren't sure that's the optimal society. How much right do we have to change towards that society? Nieves-Falcón:- I am very much worried about the suggestions of a possible and greater involvement of social scientists in public policy. My worriedness comes, or emerges, perhaps from a belief that perhaps we, university professors, are too naive regarding the realities of power and policy. To start with, public policy is not an abstract entity, it's merely the result of public officials, people who are there making policy. And it seems to me that we have been looking at this taking for granted some premises which I would like to question. It seems to me that we have been looking at policy makers as if they were waiting for scientists to give them information. We are looking at them as some sort of passive recipients. The truth is, that policy-makers are far from being passive recipients, and that sometimes they look at

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social scientists as a resource of how to justify, how to make scientific something that they want to do, a point of view, a way of doing things that they want to justify scientifically. In this sense, it's because they are merely human beings and they also think and they have their ideas. So in these things, to me it's very dangerous, this greater involvement of the social scientist. And, secondly, we seem to talk as if public policy is a very highly intellectual process. It is perhaps sometimes, but many times it is not a highly intellectual process. It is not a situation in which one problem is taken, is analyzed, the alternatives are discussed and the best alternative is chosen. Sometimes the worst alternative is chosen, because there are other reasons besides, other factors affecting it. So in this sense, it lacks the basic instruments of what one would call the intellectual processes in the academic environment. And, thirdly, we seem to ignore that policy makers constitute in themselves an ingroup which reinforces itself, is a closed one with power. They are conscious that they have power and they hold it and they want to keep it. All this in a sense is detrimental to all this espousing of a greater participation of the social scientist in public policy.

Hansen:- I think everyone would enjoy a cup of coffee.

Hansen:- I think we can resume our sessions.

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Inkeles:- I'd like to address myself to both sides of what I feel is the dialogue which has been developing this morning around the issues of research, public policy and politics, and I would like to stress what I think are, or attempt to highlight the character of certain positions which I think represent either overstatements or misstatements or misconceptions of what is in fact possible in the resolution of, or the development of a position with regard to these issues. Now in stating this position I may in fact be distorting the actual position of the people I am addressing my remarks to, or whose comments stimulated mine, so we might assume that I'm really addressing myself to two more or less abstract models. We can dissociate them from the individuals who gave me the impression that this was their position. One of these models, or one of these approaches, is characterized by intense fear about the unfortunate consequences of the over-politization of social research, and indeed tends for this reason to assert not merely a tension but essentially an incompatibility between the extent to which there is a political element in a research program and the extent to which that research can meet reasonable standards of scientific performance and objectivity. And I think that this is not a necessary, although it's often a factual condition, but not a necessary one. I'd like to attempt to clarify the issue by indicating that we must always in social research distinguish between the motivation that leads a research program which can be

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as highly one-sided as you like, as deeply committed as you please, and the actual form, content, and execution of the research which can be as objective, as _pure and as scientific as you please. Now this is not to say that this is a situation achieved easily, but I'm asserting it was a possibility. In other words, I'm denying the necessary degeneration of the quality of research because of its political motivation. Indeed I would argue that very often political motivation can be amongst the most fruitful kinds of pointer or indicator which help us to identify problems of great scientific interest. Now I'd like to cite from the recent discussion we have been having one issue of this kind that I feel is a good example of what I have in mind. There appears to be a very strong feeling about the vote which is about to take place, the ±rind of plebiscite which is about to be conducted. It's based on a set of assumptions. It starts with the belief, I think that the present programmed action is quite bad. That it's politically condemned by some people in a very fundamental way. Now that has nothing to do with research, it represents a political judgment. But if you examine it more closely there seems to be an underlying assumption where research does begin to be relevant because there is a second line of proposition which says that we are relatively firmly convinced that the people who are going to vote in this forthcoming election do not truly understand the alternatives which are being presented to them, and that therefore, third, one can draw the conclusion that the people are therefore somehow possibly being tricked into taking an action which might represent the selling of their birthright. Now, this is what I'm describing as a purely political position. I don't know if anybody exactly holds it, it's an imaginary one if you like, but it's one that anyone can easily imagine holding. Now, I'm asking, if you start with a position of that kind, is it ruled out that any meaningful social research could be done in a context like Puerto Rico? And I would say no, it does not follow automatically. On the contrary, the second part of this proposition, not the first one or the third. Those have nothing to do with research (that's the point I'm going to come back to), but the second part of this proposition points to an area where one can do research of very high order. This research would take the form of an effort to discover the structure of the thins<:ing, if you like, the idea-system which characterizes the mind, of the average, or typical, or stratified Puerto Rican with regard to the issues concerned. I can suggest many simple ways one can go about it. For instance, it is the nature of a plebiscite that all one has to do is say "yes" or "no", one makes a choice from alternatives. No one even knows through ordinary politics what it is that the person who says "yes" or "no" to something really meant by the "yes" or "no". So one obvious kind of descriptive research one could conduct, one cannot do it in the course of the election because it would make chaos out of the election, would be to present to a sample of the electorate in advance the plebiscite and ask through a free probing question system "Can you tell me that paragraph which you have just read, what

-229do you think it means?" and from this one could discover a great deal about the actual mentality and the meaning, therefore, of the ultimate vote. Now, there are many other variants one could play on this game. For example, a plebiscite cannot present purely hypothetical alternatives. A plebiscite can only present alternatives that are realistic, practical possibilities, politically at the moment. But in fact, prior to the development of the plebiscite one can, by research, discover alternatives other than those that might be incorporated in such a program. For example, one could get people to talk about what to them seem meaningful alternatives. Or one could ask for forced choices of the sort that would not be meaningful. If you take an issue like language policy, what language should you adopt. That's a political issue and you can vote on it, one does it by values, but one cannot play the game of asking people, "If you are forced to choose one or the other, which would you choose?" You ask for one another, but you can get various quite rich personal impressions by dealing with people in the context, and also discover the motivations for the choice. So I would say that in our discussions, and I'll try to point some out when I tomorrow present my model, we have discovered a number of areas where research which is motivated politically still can lead to very interesting problems from a general social research point of view. This doesn't mean one doesn't need many safeguards to make sure that as the research is conducted it is not predeterminated, that the answers will come out according to the political dispositions of those who put the problem. Anyone who is reasonably clever at formulating questions knows how to formulate questions which thereafter look as if the research has been conducted in a purely objective way, which predetermine the outcome. And for that you may need outside observers, you may need in fact to have an agreement to turn the problem over to some third party who is not committed to the outcome. The outcome is the premise chosen on the basis of political discussion, but some third and neutral party from the outside is actually asked to conduct the research. Now from the other pole, I sense a different kind of a confusion. This is the confusion which asserts that not only does politics have a role in research, which I have now asserted it can have that's very productive, but that it has a particular role which I think cannot properly be assigned to it. Now here I'm obviously addressing myself to the list of themes that Dr. Corrada presented to us, and with regard to some of these as was true in the other example, I think there are some instances where one can proceed without difficulty, and others where one has to say no, with regard to this particular question it is not possible to proceed with scientific research. Now, amongst the questions which Dr. Corrada posed were the following: Can you tell me whether the goals actually set by a political entity have in fact been achieved? Now that question is, to an exceptional degree, appropriate for social science research. So long as the goals have been defined with any reasonable degree of precision and clarity. For example, supposing you've declared you want equality of education or you want to maximize equality of

-230the distribution of income; and those were stated ten years ago as goals for the program for the development of Puerto Rico. Sometimes even if you stated something that is more subtle and hard to get at; like you want to bring peace of mind to the average Puerto Rican. That's a sticky question to explore, but even that can be gotten at by social research. There's absolutely no question there. There is a second type of question which was put where I think the role of social research becomes much more questionable although it is not excluded. This is the question. Are the goals contradictory? Now when asked a question of this kind, to a certain extent this has nothing to do with what we now mean by social research. This is essentially a problem in logic where the goals are contradictory. For example, if you say that we are interested in one part of your platform in maximizing the amount of open space in Puerto Rico, and in preserving our open spaces, and in another part of the platform you say "we understand that the Puerto Rican, each one, each man, wants nis own house therefore we are committed indefinitely no matter what the rise in the population of Puerto Rico is to giving each man not only his own house but a substantial garden-area all around it, there is obviously a logical contradiction in that program. You cannot, because the logic ultimately depends on limits of space. You cannot within the same space do more than a certain amount. You don't need to do research for that. That's done on the basis of logic. There are other kinds of contradictory goals where research is relevant, however. For example, you might have two parts of a program. One which calls for an enormously rapid increase in housing. Then another part of the program which describes the general investment pattern, and by a careful analysis of the input-output type you can show that in fact you could never attain that level of housing unless you substantially increase the amount of investment you were making, let's say in the direction of what would ultimately produce your cement industry. Unless, of course, you make other kinds of substitutions, and research would make this kind of contradiction evident. There research can play a role. There is, however, a third level, which if I understood Dr. Corrada, I would assert you cannot insist on research, and I understood him to ask for it, and that is with regard to the question: should the goals which had been set have been set? Should we had adopted those goals or some others? That I do not believe can be determined by research. Nor do I believe, to make the question more contemporaneous, you can get an answer through research to the question, what should be our goal? This is by its very nature a problem in value. Nobody can tell you what your goals should be except your conscience, your god, your church, or your political party, but certainly not your researcher. You have to tell him what are your goals, and then he can tell you what are the technical means that may be required toward this implementation. I believe there may be a confusion in the discussion. It's a very interesting issue. NOW, I believe we certainly ought to

-231feel free to discuss it if you want, I'm only trying to point up to the possible confusion between the role of the general intellectual and the role of the research social scientist. Now these are not necessarily mutually exclusive roles. It is especially the case that the research scientist can always be a general intellectual. Some general intellectuals are research social scientists, but not all; and many of the things that are done in the capacity of intellectual are, and have to be, different from those that are done in the capacity of research social scientists. Now, the intellectual can simultaneously, as the research social scientist, deal with questions like whether the goals set were achieved and whether the goals are contradictory, but it is only in his role as general intellectual and not in his role as research social scientist when he asks the question "should we have adopted the goals we did or some others?' or "should we adopt now one set of goals as against another." Hansen:- Mr. Inkeles attempted to set up a non-man, an abstraction, a straw-man, whom he could hang, but Mr. Corrada is here and does not wish to be hanged; and so I ask Mr. Corrada to speak. Corrada:- Well, I think that we have to thank Mr. Inkeles for a very pinpointed clarification of some of the issues. I want to withdraw from the impression that I wanted this research to establish whether the goals which are set, are the ones that should have been set. What I meant to say was precisely the other two areas that he mentioned. Namely, that the research-study ought to analyze on the one hand what the government, the public policy, the stated public policy set out to do. On the other hand, what the social structure of the society, which the government started to work with, was; and then to see to what extent that public policy that was set had been achieved and to see to what extent that public policy has created some other problems, and solved other problems. Now, the question of goals as such, I agree with him that it is a question of values. Nevertheless, I think that there is another area that he is discussing that to me also belongs to the social science researcher. Namely, whether the public policy is taking adequately the goals that the people voted according to the platform of the party. That is, we have as definite data a party that has a given platform, and establishes, therefore, certain goals for those who are willing to follow the party. That's concrete data that can be evaluated by the social science researcher. On the other hand, we have the government setting goals that may depart from those goals that the public party indicated to attract the voters. Now, in this area I think that belongs also to the social science researcher. I'm not suggesting by this that we are trying to determine whether the goals are well set or not, but whether the public policy reflects the goals that took the party to power according to the political platform that was given to the people. Mufioz-Amato:- I like very much the effort made by Dr. Inkeles in

-232this field of how we distinguish social research from social policy or the role of the general intellectual, but we have to face inevitably some difficulties in this approach. Well, it seems to me that if we speak of the social sciences we must remember that there are different approaches to the problem of reality, and it is not true that the only approach which can be termed systematic or scientific is the approach of fact-finding. It may be one part of social research. It may be more developed in economics or in sociology, but there are other disciplines included in the social sciences, like political science or public administration, which do not rely so much, and which do not have developed as much, the methodology of fact-finding, but which, nevertheless, have a lot to contribute to the problems of reality, to the solution of the problems of reality; and then the question appears whether if you are trying to solve problems in social reality you must distinguish so rigidly between the fact-finders and the other who may be injecting a hypothesis of what should be done either in terms of means to ends, or even sometimes in terms of the ends themselves. Take for example the case of having an attitudinal study as to how the people understand the plebiscite alternatives. The first question would be who would dare now, among the social scientists, to start such an attitudinal study. Many would not dare, and that would involve a value judgment, a value judgment concerning how you can damage the accepted traditional political processes with findings that may not be very relevant or very clear in terms of the facts. Suppose that somebody will dare to do this type of research. That also includes the value judgment as to how the particular researcher interferes with these political processes. Now this man who dares will get all sorts of answers. Suppose that somebody says or some group says "we vote for the Free Associated State alternative because we have more confidence in Mufioz Marín as our leader". Now, how would the research man value or judge this type of answer? Just to present it as a fact? What meaning does it have as a fact? There are many possible interpretations of this fact. And there you always have the difficulty of the researcher facing these possibilities of value appreciation in himself or in the people who are going to read the results of his research. Now, the goals in the government, they are to be judged in terms of performance if they have been defined concretely enough, understandably enough. How many of the goals of the government agencies are so well defined that you can test the performance quite accurately? Each person should be the owner of his home. Now, that seems to be very concrete and very specific, but if we enter the realm of financing the homes and the economic capacity of the person and all the rest, and what type of home, then we get involved in all the complications of this type of research. It is not easy to do such a thing. There were other examples which always fall in the same question whether you as a social scientist can only do factfinding in order to deserve the name of social researcher, or whether you can be a social researcher combining fact-finding with some appreciations that inevitably involve a certain degree of

-233value judgment. I think the important aspect to me, considering the immaturity of the social sciences, the difficulties over methodology, is to find ways of contributing to the problems that social reality presents in terms of human welfare.

iviy

manner

Inkeles:- I'd like to say a word. I don't think it's a reply because I don't think there is a disagreement between us. I think I meant much the same thing that you did when I spoke of the linkage of the concept of social research scientist and general intellectual. I think that any difference between us is only a matter of semantics in the sense that you incorporate more broadly than I do; or to put it the other way, I interpret more narrowly that part of man's activity which I call his role as a research social scientist. You approach that somewhat more broadly, and include in that some of the things that I incorporate in the idea of being a free intellectual. For my part, I don't really think it makes a great deal of difference whether a man is called one or the other at different times. I do think it makes a great deal of difference when we judge a man's work that we are able to discriminate between that part of what he does, which as you say, falls in the category of fact-finding, and fact-finding should be done in a way that another man looking at the same problem agrees that these are in fact the facts. We can't have any systematic science at all unless that's true, but clearly not everything that the social scientist does is limited to fact-finding, at least in the narrow sense that you. suggest of economics or sociology, at least of some types of sociology. If you are doing historical research, inevitably a great deal of your work is somehow evaluative and judgmental. The further back in time you go the more that becomes the case. It also is the case, this I think the most important thing, that the fact that you do research in as objective and scientific as you can, does not mean that you should be denied the right after that work is done to give an evaluation of the implications and consequences of it. So in a sense I see this and that's in a sense what I meant by my intervention as the possibility of a circle in which the entry point can perfectly well be a very strong political or value position. That is often rejected as being inherently likely to produce non-science, and I don't agree with that, and if I was putting, I think, Dr. Anderson in the straw-man position there of perhaps asserting that, so I could make my point that these two were in fact incompatible. I believe they can often be compatible, but then once that is the case, once one has identified one's problem by this means, then I become very strongly insistent on maintaining the maximum possible standards of objectivity given the nature of the problem one is studying. But then, I do not insist that the social scientist, now you're being the behavioral social scientist, should be bound like Prometheus or tied to this Procrustian bed. Once he has completed his research I feel he has a right then to reenter the arena, we are closing the circle, as a citizen, or if you like, as a general intellectual to comment on the value implications of his work. points of disagreement were about the entry point. I think you can enter politically, and then at the midpoint where I was arguing, that, I

-234think, even if you enter politically, there is a time when you become subject to the rules other than those of just interest, vitality, aliveness and so on, when you are presenting yourself mainly as a person who is technically a competent individual. At that point you must be judged, and you should try to perform, mainly in terms of your scientific capacity. Now I recognize the difficult role to play, but I propose it. Mufioz-Amato: - I think the analysis made by Dr. Inkeles is very instructive because perhaps we can think of a division of work and a coordination of work which is not limited to research or, even more, to research in the University. It is possible that out of this planning, which has to go through different successive stages, we may come to the conclusion that not only a series of research-projects in the University, or elsewhere, but that something could be done along the lines of training personnel or technical assistance to government agencies, with respect to how to train that personnel, or even there could be advice as to how policy-making agencies can organize institutions and processes of either research or policy-making or both so any such activity done from the academic side might be useful in not only the research terms that we keep thinking of, but in other ways as well. We must confess that originally the group that organized this seminar had mainly the idea of research in mind, but this may be one of the things we learned from this seminar, that we can extend our program, our activity. Hansen:- I wish to ask a procedural question and mare a procedural comment. We have another hour, and many people have things that I want to hear. So if the interventions can be rather brief, rather than long, this would be good. The question is this. I hope the seminar will agree that we are at the moment discussing a question of very considerable interest. They might also agree that coherence in the discussion is a good thing. So I'm putting coherence at the moment against the simple justice that everybody get his turn, and I would wherever I can see this, perhaps on Thursday and Friday do the same thing. This leads to my question to Mr. Clinard and Mr. Díaz Alejandro. It is as to whether your comments bear on this issue or on a different issue, and the same question goes to Mr. Thorne and Mr. Reimer. I would like to call on people in the proper order. I would also like to call on them if they want to talk on the issue which I think is before us and which is important. Mr. Clinard, how would you answer my question? Clinard:- I think this bears on it. Hansen:- Díaz Alejandro? . . . Thorne? . . . Reimer? . . . which case I'll call on Mr. Clinard.

Clinard: We've been on this for about an hour so I don't know whether what I have to say is useful. My own feeling is that, whether we like it or not, the social scientist is increasingly going

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to be drawn into the arena of policy decision-making, call them consultants or whatever you will. You have seen some precedents for this in the field of economics. Perhaps some of you have seen the new book by Walter Keller on the new economy. He points out the tremendous power of the Council of Economic Advisors. It actually makes policy, and at the end of most of its reports its takes the policy consideration. He also pointed out that two secretaries are professional economists (we're talking now about those with Ph.D.'s) and I think it was three assistant secretaries who are professional economists. I think five of our ambassadors are professional economists and he has a long list of others. Now, we have no council of sociological advisors, and I don't know whether we're quite ripe for it, but I come from a profession in which most of us do very little in the way of policy. We have service consultants on research grants, things of that type. I have gotten into it myself, somewhat, doing consulting work for the government of India for quite a bit of time and some consulting for the United States government agencies. Recently I was in Washington on something they asked me to say about this peculiar role that a man has as a policy advisor in areas where his decisions might have considerable consequences. Now I might add that one of the problems most sociologists have is, they say, we haven't done sufficient research. The thing is not research. The idea, somehow, the back of their heads is that if the problem is completely researched it should be possible for the professional man to make a decision. It is my contention that none of our areas will probably ever be completely researched. I don't think that a social scientist should ever, on the basis of a single study with which he is acquainted or one he has done himself--I don't think he has to do it himself, if he is acquainted with it--make necessarily a profound policy of judgment, but there is reasonable material on which he can make some decision. In fact, he has almost a professional obligation to do this. In other words, I don't think he'll ever have it completely researched as some people say. At least I always loo!c at it this way in my own field with those who are reluctant to make policy decisions as social scientists and not as citizens. We have now one of the youngest disciplines, much younger than economics, but we have certainly tens of thousands of books. I'd hate to see how many articles it must run up into if you would put it on IBM cards, certainly thousands of dissertions and all kinds of things. In most areas we have many studies, in some cases perhaps even several hundreds. Now, I think that it is not the role necessarily of the social scientists to make a policy of what is right or wrong. His role is largely to ask someone, for someone else to take that kind of judgment and in turn try to help the person with the policy decision. In some cases it may be simply ideas of implementing a policy already decided on; in other cases it may be an effort to arrive at a policy. Probably no place in the world are social scientists used more extensively than in Sweden. Here committee after committee of professors, and some of them, of course, hold rather prominent posts in the government, are appointed to look at the problem from all angles. I think some of you know about the recent

-236revision of the Swedish Penal Code, which is a rather drastic one. It involved an extensive weighing of the values of the Swedish culture, and how the values have changed and possibly, in some cases, logical values. The social scientists can weigh all of the value situations much as Myrdal did in An American Dilemma. The Swedes do it so frequently, looking at all the values and coming up with some kind of a position which would be, I suppose, a new value, a new goal, and so on, but I think in most of our consulting, the values have already been decided. Another thing that always bothers me about social scientists is their lack of acquaintance and familiarity with the data in which they profess to be experts. It seems to me that politicians often sense the real situation in many areas of policy decision better than professional experts. A professor, after all, is of a certain class. His friends are of a certain class, he conceives of himself in a certain way and while he may be doing research with, let's say lower class people and really looks at them carefully, it is from another perspective. I think the politician and particularly the government bureau head who has had wide experience with the kinds of phone calls, letters, visits from congressmen, and different kinds of reports that he gets, often has a much greater feeling of appreciation for the data. As an illustration here very briefly, let's take the Civil Rights movement in the United States. As far as I know no sociologist was brought in on the policy decisions involving the Civil Rights movement. No sociologist was brought in even at the height of it, at the time of the riots at Selma when, as you will recall, Martin ,ing said: "I could no longer hold my people" and this and that legislation was proposed in, I think, the next 48 hours. Now you ask, with all the research we have had, could we have improved certain kinds of decisions that went into the Civil Rights movement as well as its timing? Frankly, I. am not sure. How much does the social scientist really know about the slum? Although he claims he knows, how much does he really know about the Civil Rights movement? How much does he really know about public housing. It is in terms of actual feel for it that the politician gets all day with the phone calls, telegrams, the visits from congressmen and all that kind of thing. Now, one of the things that I think is an advantage in social policy consulting is, of course, that I suppose that most persons in authority would get a variety of opinions. I understood that Cennedy was superb in that, having an ability to get a variety of opinion. I gather the present situation is not quite like that, but he would try to get all kinds of opinions and then weigh them because I think most social scientists on any position, like a psychiatrist in trials of insanity, you can get them on almost any kind of position. I suppose there is the protection of a given person that presumably asked somebody else and then weighed the evidence. Now, just two other things, I was very much impressed with

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Mr. Falcón's remark about the exploitation of the social scientist. This bothers me. I know in my own case I have refused to be a member of an advisory committee on the ground that by being a member of the advisory committee and with the use of my name, this somehow would mean that I endorsed the particular political position that had been taken by a given governmental administration. The danger of exploitation is one of the things that should be of concern because in some cases the name is used and the person's knowledge is used in the wrong way. Perhaps he may be appointed to an advisory committee, that's the one I'm mostly worried about, where he actually is never even called on for decisions, as I've heard in a number of cases. On the other hand, of course, the social scientist can gain from working with the problems of the policy makers. A closer link between the social scientist and the policy makers may mean that the social scientist can do research on more significant theoretical topics. I do not mean he should do research and apply it, but the theoretical topic that he chooses may be perhaps a more significant one or a more shrewd one than he had thought of. I would like to make a suggestion along this line. When I was at the Universities of Zagreb and Ljubljana in Yugoslavia I was impressed a great deal with the fact that the various government agencies submitted various problems that they had to these universities. The problems are submitted, and if research is carried out on them they might be of significance in terms of government policy decisions. I gather the universities do not have to do research on the problem. One study was of worker councils that are widely used in Yugoslavia. The problem was that worker councils seemed to present different problems of effectiveness dependent on whether it is a guild situation, an ordinary industrial plant, or whether it is a rather completely automated industrial situation. This problem was then recast in highly theoretical terms for university research. Now that was the request. And so I suggest that perhaps greater involvement of social scientists on questions involving important governmental policy considerations might mean that some of the topics on which they might do theoretical research might be a lot better than what sometimes are dreamed of in their own isolated faculty studies. Diaz Alejandro:- I fear I am going to sound like a bit of a traitor to some of my fellow social scientists. Let me first say that I agree with Professor Clinard's praise of the Council of Economic Advisers; in particular, I admire greatly the role played by my colleague Walter Heller. Hie represents one of the best examples of fruitful cooperation between academics and government, a cooperation so well analyzed in his recent book New Dimensions in Political Economy. But•we should also notice other experiences in the U.S. and in other countries, in which cooperation between the universities and the government have not been as fruitful. In fact, some experiences have been disastrous and we are all familiar with recent unfortunate scandals in this area, some of which have resulted in setbacks for objective research in the social sciences

-238in Latin America. Perhaps these unfortunate incidents have been exaggerated by irrational reactions of the general public, but here is a field in which, like Caesar's wife, the academic must not only be independent but also appear to be independent, if we are going to keep the trust of students and public opinion. I think that most academics would slap the face of anyone who tried to bribe us in any obvious sort of way. I also agree with Professor Inkeles that there is no necessary link between doing some work for a public agency and "selling-out". Yet, excessive contacts between academics and government may give rise to subtle links which endanger academic objectivity. These links grow very slowly, but sooner or later the academic who becomes very active in this type of research may begin to accept too readily the "rules of the game" imposed by the government. He will say to himself: "Well, if I want to do this, I have to accept certain things"; at the beginning what is accepted may be very "reasonable", but then later on he may find that to get cooperation from the officials who have the data he may have to take another step and not to begin saying some other things, and so on, to the point that before you know it he becomes very circumscribed. It's still true that what he may write can be considered independent research, but in this atmosphere of having to depend on government grants and having to depend on cooperation of government officials, the scholar becomes highly vulnerable to the whims of public officials and therefore may begin to avoid controversial areas. So this is one danger which I think is always present, and for which one should watch out in. considering c]..ose cooperation between universities and the government. There is also the danger, which I notice in some Latin American countries, that some people who are really interested in politics, will go first into universities to cloak themselves with the mantle of academic objectivity and there develop positions which gain them a certain respectability, and from there they jump to high government positions. This problem cannot be handled by examining individual motivations. I think the real solution is to set up institutions, whose organizations minimize these dangers. Perhaps the ideal situation would be to have besides government and universities, something in between like the Rand Corporation, whose clear objective would be to consult for the government. They could get very good people, and they could do very good objective work, but there would be no doubt that they are not doing any research which comes into their hands but that this research is aimed at satisfying certain needs of the government. I think one really has to be on guard in any academic research center, to keep short run pressures from eating you up, not in any obvious way, bi.it nibble by nibble. The politicians know the easiest way to buy an academic is not with any materialistic reward but by offering him the smell of power, and unfortunately the temptation often seems impossible to resist. So my recommendation, Mr. Chairman, is to remain a bit skeptical of the gains to be achieved from close cooperation with public institutions. I like to think of the University as a place where you can be terribly "irresponsible" and do whatever you please with your research. My strategy for research is:

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"get a good scholar and turn him loose". The danger, of course, is that you can get pseudo-academics who are not very good and just act irresponsibly, and think therefore they are academics. And ideally,,if the government needs and the society needs a certain type of research done, set something intermediate like the Rand Corporation. I don't know if that's feasible in Puerto Rico. These remarks may apply only in countries which are rich enough to afford these two types of institutions, but I think even here people should aim at that goal. Consulting does enrich the research and teaching of academics, but even that should be kept within bounds in universities. Thorne:- I think it is probably convenient, Mr. Chairman, accidentally, that I come in with my small quota at this time. I think that there's a role for the social scientist, in this tremendously important matter, in developing theories. I don't think that there would be any controversy over the well-known statement that we can't well expect to influence trends and control, if we can't predict. We've got theories within sociology and within economics, and so forth. It seems to me that one of the important areas for research could well be relationships between variables across present disciplinary boundaries. In the case of Puerto Rico we have certain changes taking place which are apparently acceptable and welcome. There are other changes taking place which are not welcome. In this case, in Puerto Rico, it seems to me that we can embark on a good deal of research involving theory building without waiting for the more difficult research that Dr. Ferracuti suggested earlier. We don't have, I think, a great problem in trying to know what has been apparently the main aim of the Puerto Rican society that has resulted in a number of these changes that have taken place, some of which we don't like. The Puerto Rican people voted predominantly for economic development a long time ago, twenty-five years ago or so, and they have repeatedly voted for economic development. It seems then that we can perhaps begin research with a shorter range project that might yield some quicker results, if we try to identify those changes that have been taking place in the society, that are a necessary consequence of economic development of the kind that Puerto Rico has been having, and those changes that do not necessarily have to accompany economic development. Some of these changes, I think, are going to be difficult to avoid, and therefore the next step would be to find out what can be done, after we have found these relationships, to reduce or accommodate the undesired effects of the changes that come from economic development. I don't think that we can, for example, expect the same level of personal security in a society which i increasingly developing greater opportunities for more personal initiative and drive. It seems that if we are going to have development on the individualistic basis, which most of us, I think, accept as a basis that brings with it not only pretty rapid rates of development, but a basis that is accompanied by certain political advantages in terms of freedoms of choice, not only economic but other kinds of choice, then it seems to me that we are confronted with trying to find out to what extent we can

-240accommodate the development and indeed, stimulate the development of an increasing number of entrepreneurial persons of drive and initiative, while at the same time reducing some of the insecurity that results, especially among those who fall by the way side. Reimer:- I think I cannot accept the idea that research is not relevant to such questions as should we adopt this goal or should we have adopted this goal. I seems to me while obviously not sufficient, nevertheless, research is a necessary part of any answer in almost all cases. There are very few goals so simple, even personal goals, but that a little research is required in order to deal with the questions: should I or should I not. When you come to typical public policy questions, e.g., "should we adopt an agricultural policy which will provide employment in an agricultural setting for such and such a proportion of our people", you have to do research in order to answer that question. Now, admittedly the research won't answer the question completely. It comes finally to a question "do you want to" or "don't you want to". On the other hand it seems to me that research is a necessary part, an indispensable part of coming to an answer. Similarly, although this is perhaps less important, questions of "should we have done so and so" can also frequently be very much illuminated by research. There are extreme instances in which, I think research can indicate quite clearly "yes", or "no". Take as an example the Latin American countries which 15 or 20 years ago adopted advanced employment security provisions guaranteeing employment to industrial workers. One can say quite clearly, on the basis of what has happened, that they should not have adopted these goals because they haven't been able to even approximately achieve them, and in the process of attempting to achieve them they have created many problems, many evils, for themselves. Again, research won't give a final answer, but it will certainly go a long way towards doing it. Muífoz-Amato:- Just briefly to agree with Mr. Reimer and thinking that many times we social scientists or general intellectuals, when we talk about the methodology of our disciplines are very much afraid of getting into problems of goals or values. To some extent, we do this anyway all the time and we keep telling other people what they should do in one way or another, and it is very little what we can do in terms of fact-finding and perhaps it is only a dichotomy between what we say in theory and what we do in practice; besides although there are many value judgments that cannot be based on any factual findings or interpretations, there is also a realm of goals which are not really value judgments, but are social necessities; they are imposed by the circumstances or the possibilities. Like, for example, I doubt very much that at this stage we could have the value judgment that we should not have economic development in Puerto Rico or that we should do away with this rapid advance of science and technology. There are many such goals which have a lot of significance for human life, for

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good or for bad, and we are, with respect to them, very limited in terms of the value judgments that we can make. And I wonder, I don't know very much about this, if other values for goals that seem less dictated by the social setting are not really also social or personal needs, personal necessities, and not so much matters of belief. I think there is a realm there where what you believe in as a value judgment may be also a psychological need or a cultural need which can be investigated without the distinction necessarily of putting values in one side and science in the other side. Roselló:- I would like to make a few remarks in relation to what has been said here, which to me is very revealing, especially the paper by Dean Anderson and the remarks by Drs. Feldman, Ferracuti, ivIuííoz Amato and others. A few years ago, I decided to experiment to see how an organization can be changed, and the Department of Psychiatry, or rather, the School of Medicine, decided to take over the Psychiatric Hospital. We had many ideas when we began working, but the thing is, that to change an organization is very difficult, and one thing is to theorize and another is to apply these theories in the fact of resistance from within the organization and also from the community. Now, the thing is, that as Dr. Feldman said, we are very much aware of many of the sociological forces that resist change in organizations. For example, we know, or rather, we have the idea, that drug addiction, for instance, is just a symptom of something that is happening in the community. We know that addiction will reach only a certain level, that it probably will not go beyond ten or twelve thousand drug addicts here in Puerto Rico because of the social forces involved, and that eventually it will decrease and then something else will come up, like LSD is beginning now to come out. Maybe drug addiction will begin to go down. And we have many problems, like the problem of the very illogical things that we do, for instance, in a State hospital. We know that people in Puerto Rico are very much afraid of State hospitals. But what do we physicians do when some body becomes anxious or delusional? We put him in the very place which he fears most. So what we do is make him sicker. We put him in an institution which degrades dignity and where all the people who work there try (unconsciously, of course) to make this patient sicker. If we discharge the patients too fast, people working there will resist because this is going to interfere with their job. If we cure all the patients we will all be out of a job. This creates a lot of anxiety, so we have to keep patients in the hospitals. What I'm trying to say is that we need the help of more social scientists to work with these problems. We psychiatrists have an inkling of what the situation is, but we need somebody that can really study these things and spell them out for the people in the government. For example, we tell the people in the government that we want money for programs, not for buildings, but politicians like to have their own monuments, and if they build a psychiatric hospital, they can have a place built, say in 1966, by so and so, and that's very good. And then we have

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-242to comply and put patients there, as happens in the Veterans Hospitals in the United States. There, when the State Veterans Hospital is not full, congressmen will all become anxious because the government might close the hospital, so then the staff retains patients in the hospital. So we are very much interested in finding out all about these sociological forces, and how we can deal with them and interpret them to the community. The other thing would be how to train people for change; train people to deal with change constructively and not be afraid of it. Whenever you try to mace a move such as opening a new out-patient clinic, all the personnel becomes very anxious, and this is basically due to people's insecurity in relation to change. The sad thing is that research in Puerto Rico is still a bad word, and when we ask for money for research we're always turned down. In fact, the Personnel Office doesn't even have a name for anybody who does research. If there isn't even a position for Research Assistant, how can we deal with all these forces in the community against research and against social research? Well, there are many, many problems in relation to this, so we need more and more professionals to deal with these problems and to interpret them to the proper authorities. Cochran:- I'd like to return to the discussion that Clinard and MuHoz-Amato were having. I can say nothing new, but my experience with the difficulties of communication suggests that if you can say something in a different vocabulary and apply it to a different situation, very often somebody gets something from it that they didn't learn from the previous discussion. So I'll apologize for going over pretty much the same ground that Mr. Clinard went over, but from the standpoint of business rather than from the standpoint of politics. There is a distinct difference between the academic or social science type of decision-making and that used in practical affairs. If we use decision-making symbolically, as well as behavioralLy, we can say that every academic study is a series of decisions. In developing a middle level or a high level theory continuous decisions are made as to where this datum fits, what certain data support and so on. In the academic world we make these decisions rather easily. After all, we're working on a big theory, and we are not much worried about a little mistake in the proper assignment of data here and there. The historian runs into this problem of off-hand decision making all the time. He has to handle periods with thousands of events, most of which he really isn't very interested in and doesn't know very much about, he simply assumes they are not going to effect the hypotheses that he's trying to develop. In contrast, my experience with this process in big business, is that when a decision has to be made about a specific situation that is all important at that particular moment, management is willing to do a great deal of what they think is useful research. In other words, they are willing to get the opinions of all kinds of people, bearing entirely upon this one decision. The decision may have many common characteristics, but it's also bound to have unique ones. And the kind of data that the social sciences cari supply is usually too general, it inspires

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thought, it may open up aspects of the decision that executives hadn't thought about before, but it is almost never adequate in itself, because the social scientist in developing his hypothesis wasn't dealing with that particular situation. My experience is that a business decision is a sort of computer-like affair where all these different elements, as Dean Muioz-Amato has been bringing out in relation to politics, are fed in and the ultimate decision depends upon a lot of experience, and a lot of rather intuitive thought, as well as on anything that we as social scientists can hope to supply. Feldman:- Very simply, Mr. Chairman, I think that some of the issues might be phrased in terms of whether one is talking to and trying to analyze the research process, or whether one is talking to and trying to analyze the research organization. And one way of showing this difference is whether you talk about the research process which is, I think, a process that does have any given points of entry, that does have in its carrying out certain rules whose compliance with is actually necessary for any kind of understanding or any kind of ability to communicate the results, or we talk about the research organization which has as its business, I think, the sale, the communication of a research product, and I think that this product is not just the results of any give - process, but the results of a number of such processes, and in that sense is likely to be much more programmatic, it's likely to involve much more than just the rules that go into the process itself. Let's say, other rules, and other norms become relevant, the norms of how one relates to other organizations, to other products, and obviously when you talk about the organization or the product these become very, very salient indeed. Whereas, if you talk in terms of the process, any given research process, other things become salient. And this has a footnote to this. I think the product of a research organization is always much more than research findings, and I think that one might keep well in mind that one of the products of research organizations are skilled personnel that are likely to go into other organizations, and this may turn out to be a most valuable product, and one of the ways in which the research organization has the greatest amount of impact on any given system. In a final caveat I think the problems of accountability of the research organization are quite severe. I think we have talked about, and perhaps quite correctly, what some of the outsiders can do to us; I also think we must be concerned with our own accountability to the outside. I always try to remind myself, as I'm sure we all do, that when we spend money on research its other people's money, not ours, and very often it's public moneys, and that at the organizational level, at the level of the research product or organization, I think one of the things that's being said here, and I think quite correctly, is that this accountability has to be met and there are demands that I think the organization has to satisfy. Nor, I must say, am I convinced that one way to satisfy them is to say, "Well, let's just put up another organization and let them satisfy them." I

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organization

sanguine

must say I am much less about the advantages of a Rand than is Dr. Díaz Alejandro, having looked at some of the social research that's come out of Rand. I am sure I would not want them done in one organization I belong to, but I'm not sure there must be an to do that kind of thing. García-Rodríguez;T I have been very impressed with the interventions this morning. I regret that I had to go out and missed part of Mr. Munoz-Amato's and Mr. Inkeles but I am, as I said, very impressed and particularly by Mr. Inkeles' definition of the terms and also by Mr. Clinard, as well as by the shaking intervention of Mr. Díaz Alejandro, and I really have not anything new to say after that and other comments that have been made afterwards. I just would like to remind you and remind myself that there are things that a government council like, say, the Council of Economic Advisors, for example, can do that could conceivably also be done at the University, but there are things that the University can do and should do that cannot be done in a council of economic advisors, for example. And I think that we are dealing here and for the purposes of the seminar, with the second kind of organization and not with the first. Torruellas:- It seems that the discussion this morning has centered around three things. One, the content of the research that we are intending to go into; second, the methodology; and third, the relevance of the research for policy, our main interest being centered on public policy. Dr. Cochran has insisted on the fact that private policy should also be taken into account since many decisions are made by the private sector of the society. It seems to me that if the research is going to have any relevance for policy, it needs to be diffused at the right time. This will require a speedier release of results, and even discussions and dialogue without waiting for the research to be completed and the report published. Most of the research on problems like the one we are interested in takes from four to six years to be concluded, and in a rapidly changing society I think there is need for the diffusion of the findings much before the research is concluded. Ways of ensuring this effective communication will have to be found if the research findings are to have influence on the policy makers, be these public policy makers or private policy makers, at the right time, at the time that it may more effectively interfere with the process to produce the end results that we want to produce. The experience we have had thus far with the research on social change at the Center is that this does take, on the average, from four to six years to appear in final publication form, and by the time it is released, even though the findings might still be relevant, they do not have the impact as much as they would have had if released at a much earlier phase. Dialogue and discussion, while the research is still in process, may also benefit the research itself, because it may open the eyes of the researcher to many of the facts about daily life that Professor Clinard mentioned earlier. This is one thing that we will have to keep in mind in deciding about the strategy of the research, which I think is the subject of tomorrow's discussion.

-245Anderson:- Just a very few final remarks. I'm very pleased with the way the discussion has gone on this morning. It makes me think that perhaps what I had to say earlier was rather relevant. This has been, I think, one of the principal, or should be the principal preoccupation of a seminar such as this, the problem of relevance. I'm glad to see that we have in the course of the discussion rewedded again in a quite satisfactory way what I have rather artificially separated in my paper, and we have come around to talking about public policy in terms of the policy which, or the decisions which the social scientist should made as social scientist within a particular context. We make policy decisions all the time as social scientists, and the problem is how do we make relevant decisions regarding the nature of our concerns. Are they to come from the society outside of us or are they to come from within us as citizens or as free-floating intellectuals or as people with certain particular values or political positions? Somehow or other we must define the relevance of the problem and to the degree that it's possible, define them on in the terms of social science. There is a distinction, and I accept this completely, that Mr. Inkeles has made between the motivation of the research and the research itself, and there is also a distinction, I think, which is implicit in all of this discussion, on the other end, between the research itself and the results of the same in terms of implementation, in another instance. There would be nothing more salient at this particular moment, in my opinion, than the kind of study which Professor Inkeles has mentioned hypothetically, the study of what a plebiscite vote, for example, would mean in terms of the people who are consulted in terms of their own frames of reference and not in terms of the official frames of reference necessarily or to what degrees these vary. The practicability and the feasibility of this kind of a research, this time will be enormously difficult as Mr. Mufio2-Amato has submitted. The practical constraints which limit the possibilities of research limit our capabilities as social scientists to be relevant to the society, and somehow or other we must attempt to bridge this gap in so far as it is possible, and I sympathize wholeheartedly with, not necessarily the specific recommendations which Professor Diaz Alejandro made, but certainly with the spirit of his remarks, to the degree we can define our own terms as social scientists rather than as servants of other people who are more obviously policy makers than we are. Hansen:- I have been uncommonly silent during the day. It has given me a sense of indigestion. There's one thing that I would like to mention. Dean Anderson talks about these elites or groups or constituencies, and he ranks them in two alliances. On the one hand, there are disenchanted intellectuals and others. On the other hand there are planners and others, and he speaks of the importance of a careful examination of the members of these particular elites because on the one hand they or people like them will be doing the research, and on the other hand, they or people like them will be consuming the research. And I think that the point of being very self-conscious about these matters is one of the highest aspects

-246of the rational human life. I often think that at least if we can be a little self-conscious we could advance ourselves to a certain extent. Now, to append to that an idea that grows annually with me, and that is that the researcher should be quite self-conscious about himself and about the subject he is studying and about the interactions which are going on, and I think he is not and I think he should be. Much of the research that we all do, as you know, is done from a higher position of status and knowledge and money than the subject. So we sit with great ease and look down upon these subjects: delinquents, the poor, the underdeveloped, or anybody else; and it's a very comfortable thing to do. One rarely sees. It is occasionally seen where you look up and do research about the person higher up. That is much more difficult. We tried it once; it was impossible. It broke down. I became an unofficial and an unlicensed psychiatrist for the research team which just couldn't manage this. In addition to that, research has consequences in a way which I think has not been mentioned here. When you do research on a schizophrenic, you do something to that schizophrenic. One of the first ones we did, Dr. Roselló, we called this attractive lady in and said in effect, "I have to be brief here, you don't mind if we look into your mind a little bit." "Not at all; this is academic; this is neutral, nobody will hurt anybody. You are in the University. You have my confidence". And after we had lootced, she went downstairs, she wrecked her car, she left her husband, and she went to New York. And I think that researchers who are unaware of the fact that you are dealing with people are making a very ;rave mistake. Tomorrow we will turn principally to the questions of goals and strategy, but as today I do not wish to imply that that is a strait jacket. In addition, tomorrow, I am going to adk Diaz Alejandro and Mr. Cochran to bring an issue which concerns them. They want to raise the question of some of the economic consequences of political status. I'll see you all at nine then in the morning.

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23 FEBRUARY 1967: Hansen:- I think we can begin our session. The Chancellor, Abra—D ha az GonzLez, invites us to lunch with him tomorrow at 12:45, We have two items on our agenda for today's session and, in addition, of course, the continuation of the general discussion we are having. The first item on the agenda is the question of strategy and goals, a paper prepared by Rafael de Jesus and Franco Ferracuti. The second item will be a comment on the economic consequences of three alternative political statuses which will be made by Tom Cochran and by Díaz Alejandro. We will begin with the paper by de Jesús and Ferracuti on goals and strategy of research on social change. De Jesús:- Mr. Chairman, since our paper was circulated two days ago or so, I take it, it has been read. Therefore, my comments will be really very, very brief. Since we have had already three meetings, and this was to be expected, of course, much of what our paper contains has been said here. Now, it seems to us that in the last generation or so the degree and the rate of social and economic change in PuerY.o Rico has been really very, very great. What most people will regard as positive facts and as well as less positive ones, from an intellectual point of view, and of course, we are all academicians around this table, it is of great interest I think, to try to determine, as far as this can be done by the social sciences, what is the real relation between given changes in economic life-operations, and its social effects. This, as I say from the purely intellectual point of view, is of interest. However, there is another level in which this is very important as well. This has to do, of course, with planning. Insofar as these relationships can be established, this should facilitate the derivation of expected social effects and of expected changes in the economy of the country. For example, it is expected that the percentage of the population living in urban areas will go up from about 49 per cent where it is now to something like 61 per cent in little less than 10 years. What is the consequence of this for housing policy? What is the implication of this for the expected increase, if any, in juvenile delinquency and for the treatment of juveniles and others? Insofar as the methodology is concerned, we think that this, of course, would be of an interdisciplinary kind not only in the carrying out of the research but even in the planning and in the conception of the research. Furthermore, we think that instead of carrying out large broadly conceived research projects, it will be more feasible, and perhaps more fruitful, to develop a number of more limited projects that would allow us, as I said before, to try to determine the relationship between the different socio-economic variables. I think that this is about all we have said in our paper, of course, there is more detail contained in it, but I think that this would perhaps be best if it comes up through questions and comments from around the table in general.

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Hansen:- Mr. Ferracuti, would you like to say anything in addition before we open the general discussion? Ferracuti:- No, I would second what Rafael just said. A large part of the paper has already come out in the discussion. Perhaps we can diverge from the usual procedure and we can answer questions. Hansen:- Is there any objection to this procedure by the Seminar? Clinard:- May I ask if the authors of this paper might enlarge on this change-prone versus change-resistant? Perhaps I followed it here, but I think they had in mind possibly more than is stated here on paper. Hansen:- I take it that you mean these four categories of persons listed on page 8. Clinard:- That's right. The question in my mind is how much these are mutually exclusive and what they had in mind in their own thinking . Ferracuti:- They are not mutually exclusive. This should be considered as a continuum. This applies to any typology. It says in little boxes where it fits people and this is a continuum from a maximum of being open to change to a minimum of being open to change, or vice-versa, if you take the other dimension. Now, you can derive this with an approach similar to Dr. Inkeles' approach and then, through modern factor-analytic techniques, you try to isolate a type which you have defined through some external elements, and you give psychological meaning to that type. Or else, you can postulate it in purely theoretical terms and see if it exists. Whatever way you use, I think that the question we were trying to underscore is the following: any attitude toward change, any psychological approach to change, must take into account both values and ability to change. You may have a maximum of openness to change and be unable to do so. I would refer to the intellectual ability as the easiest to grasp, but there are others, of course. What is, for example, the age limit past which you cannot change? Is that 21 years? Roughly the age at which our intellectual abilities begin to decline? Can it be extended a little longer? When do we act on one person so that he can use the maximum of his potentiality toward change? That is attempted at the school level; can we wait a little longer? The person over 50 years of age whom we transplant or is transplanted by his children, as it happens, from the rural to the urban; is there any hope for him to be able to change, or will he be always left behind? There are two sets of psychological terms. One is the attitude toward change, to accept it or not, and this is a value element. The other is the ability to change. Clinard:- And the ability is primarily psychological? Ferracuti:- It is a psychological factor.

The modern man of Inkeles'

-249I don't think, is very far from our change-prone man. Inkeles:- Readiness for change is one of the big elements in the syndrome of the science of modern man. Hansen:- Are there some other questions concerning the paper? Inkeles:- I would appreciate it if de Jesús and Ferracuti would be kind enough to pursue a little further than they did in their paper some of the implications of their typology, which I find of interest. I am not so concerned about the problem of locating those men, but rather the problem of deciding on what would be appropriate policies that one ought to adopt to deal with these types once we locate them in the system. For example, just to choose a perhaps unusual perspective: I have been reading most of the documents that have been given to me about Puerto Rico at this conference, and I have been learning a great deal, and it has been for me, therefore, of great benefit, even though I may leave very little of value in Puerto Rico when I go. One of the problems that keeps emerging, it has been referred to many times in this conference, Dr. Feldman is especially interested in it, is that there are clearly substantial pockets in the island, mostly in the rural areas, and mostly in some of the areas that have very little productive future, in which there are large groups of people who are substantially being left behind by the progran that's being achieved or enjoyed in other parts of the island, and especially in the great urban centers. There are two quite different places, I think, in which you would find a high concentration of people of both change-resistant and change-unfit. Now, I am not clear what the policy implication of the location of them may be, because I introduce another fact; namely, the high level of unemployment in the island, and the fact that there are large numbers of people with relatively good education who are not, in fact, able to find jobs which are commensurate with the education that they have achieved. One policy orientation, once we located this pocket of change-resistant and change-unfit people, might be to follow the usual development philosophy and say it is wrong if these people should be left in that condition; we should do everything we possibly, can to make them more change-prone and more change-fit. The consequences of doing that, though, would be largely to throw them into an already very heavily strained employment market. You are not bound by this particular dilemma that I have tried, on the horns of which I have tried to place you, but I give that as an illustration of the kinds of issue I would like to see explored a little bit with regard to the typology. Ferracuti:- There is a basic reason why we did not expand about this in the paper. We have no facts. Some of the very first facts are in the Stanton-Albizu-Matlin paper. But I question those facts on the basis of previous experience with psychometric instruments in the island. Let me try to make this clear. One person can be change-resistant because he is change-unfit, and, because of both

-250things existing in him, he can be left in a pocket where he protects himself. Now, he may deteriorate; he may break down; he may end up in Doctor Roselló's care. Is it advisable to force him into a market which is already strained and for which he will never be prepared? I am not a Puerto Rican, and my experience here is very limited, but we have a very similar situation in southern Italy, in Sardinia. We have a chronic unemployment figure at a time in which all over Europe there is a terrific shortage of workers. And these are not really unemployed; they are unemployable. And some of our change-resistant change-unfit here in the island are unemployable in modern technology; we change it too fast for them to cope with it. And what do we do about them? Do we throw them into the arms of the Welfare State, as we seem to be doing? Then we make them even more misfits. Do we create little hovels for them up in the mountains where nobody goes, and they are protected until they die off? Do we force them to change and, therefore, make them candidates for mental illness? or maladjustment? Broadly, this is a loose term, but the best we can call this. Why not expand on it? We don't know how many, no one does. You keep talking about little isolated villages, but this is a small island with lots of communication. The "públicos" run all over. Return-migrants return to small villages. They do tend to concentrate in the urban areas, but some do go back to villages. This is not a large country at all, so some change must take place even in isolated rural areas. Another point I would like to expand a little bit; the Albizu-Stanton-Matlin Study is the first one of any magnitude on the intellectual ability of the island. We have had some experience with standardizing an intelligence instrument for a population of convicts. We came up with a fact which I think is interesting. I will bring it to your attention. If we use an American non-verbal type of intelligence measurement, we come up with the fact that something like one-third of our population is feeble-minded, the same data as in Stanton's case. Then we restandardized the test, that is, remade the norms with Puerto Rican subjects. Therefore, we get a normal curve. The feeble-minded are, as they should be 2-3 per cent. Then we use this test, and a strange thing happens. If a Puerto Rican has had 6 years or more of schooling, the distribution is skewed to the right; we are giving too high an IQ. If we use the U.S. norms, it is skewed to the left. This is a bi-modal population. Now, the difference in IQ terms is 16 IQ points between the two distributions, quite a lot, you know. I do not know how the selective service people deal with this, and I would very much like to know. But the facts of the matter are that if we use Continental norms for Puerto Rico we are penalizing a part of the population. If we use Puerto Rican norms, we are overestimating the part of the population which has had an education. This may be a way of finding the fit-unfit distribution. About the change-resistant change-prone, well, that is a much more complicated thing to assess. That involves values, that involves how much you accept and really understand how much you are projected toward the future, how much you are happy with what you have got. You cannot be change-prone without

-251some level of anxiety. How much anxiety are you willing to take in order to better yourself? And then the usual question: is change really better? But that is almost a question without answer. De Jesús:- There is another side to the question. The spotting of these individuals insofar as they are of the first type that we mentioned, might also be useful for other purposes. I am sure Dr. Cochran will be interested in this aspect, in the development of entrepreneurs. What measures can be taken to encourage the development of local entrepreneurs, for instance? Well, if you can apply psychological and other types of tests, and you can determine what individuals of the population are more likely to react favorably to this sort of thing, you might offer, perhaps, kinds of aids or training programs or what not. Rodríguez-Bou:- I also should like to know a little more about the methodology of several research experiences here in Puerto Rico since the turn of the century. For one thing, I was sorry I wasn't here yesterday when Dr. Roselló presented the fact that there are certain habits and actions in our community that are hindering some of the progress in some areas, as health and education. For example, one of the things in education that we have found is that there is a provision in law that teachers may have twenty days for sick leave, but now they claim it as a right, and they use those twenty days as a right, and they are absent from school. In agriculture, for example, the same welfare measures are put into practice by the government militating against the farmers. For example, they come and work two days for the farmers, and then three days in the emergency program because it is less work and better paid. So the government, in all of these instances, is competing in its welfare measures with the best social practices. Now, coming back to this matter of tests, I think that in all this matter of testing our population we begin from a false premise, and it is: we are always adapting tests. And right there, no matter what we do about norms, we are off beam immediately. We have been trying to devise our own tests, because I haven't read yet one of these studies with adaptation of tests that holds water, and this matter of having such a high population of mentally retarded people is just hog-wash. I think I can prove it. Then, this matter of unemployable people, chronically unemployable people, I don't think that is the case, really. If we believe people in this small island to be unemployable chronically, I think we start from a false premise. Also that people are not, educationally speaking, so they can be educated. We have found, in a vast program of literacy in Puerto Rico, that really people, everywhere we established this program, that the level of aspiration rose immediately as soon as they were taught the elements of reading and writing and the elements of health and better living. Besides that, we found, in a research we did when the Office of the Coordinator of the Inter-American Affairs was functioning, we found in Ecuador, and in Honduras and in the rural areas of Mexico, when we were faced with the question, especially in Ecuador, do Indians learn? When we proved by the results of the vast program of literacy that they really learned and changed

-252their habits when somebody took some interest, personal interest in their well-being, that they really, without anybody teaching them about changing, they changed, just by having somebody interested in them. So that's why I should like to know a little more about what is to be done in this type of research about testing and of some of these premises also. There is another angle in this scheme. I think according to what Rafael said just a few minutes ago, I think any research project of this type should have an overall framework, but we should not aim at too vast and extensive research because, as they state in the paper, human resources, economic resources and facilities will not be available for an unlimited amount of resources in any way. But, whatever a small short-range research is done, it should be within this general framework, so that it could later be put together with all the care that the circumstances might permit. Hansen:- I have a list of persons who wish to speak, but I think that if either Franco Ferracuti or Rafael de Jesús would wish to intervene after any one of these this would be appropriate. Ferracuti:- I suppose that we should give a chance to Stanton because he may have something important to say on the Stanton report. Hansen:- It is hard for me in any convenient way to pick people out of the list and reorganize the sequence in order to fit the argument. Ferracuti:- The point is that the study keeps being mentioned time and time again. No one can discuss it better than he could. Hansen:- I think the suggestion might be acceptable to the group. I would take Stanton then, now. Howard Stanton:- I suppose the major conclusion of the study in terms of the :kind of topic discussed here is that the bulk of the Puerto Rican population is fit in using the concept of the Ferracuti-de Jesús study. The bulk of the population is fit, from the point of view of intellectual capacity for change. I suppose I should say a couple of things about the assumptions of intelligence testing that lay behind the study. This always creates a great problem. I take it is largely an identity problem, from the type of response that comes. There is a page earlier in the report that lists the per cent who would be called mentally retarded by a series of definitions; it varies from three per cent to 30 per cent depending on the definition, and I think the definitions are fairly clearly stated, and it seemed to me at the time reasonable, that you can say, for each given definition, as long as it is clear, what the percentage would be and the per cent of mentally retarded, in the popular sense of the term, would be about three per cent. The 30 per cent figure comes basically from agency regulations. The study Was financed by the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation, which has a definition of mental retardation in terms of who is eligible for vocational rehabilitation services, and wanted to ask

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for, and were entitled to get, some estimate of the per cent of the population eligible for their services. It is an interesting case of social research and public policy; if the agency definitions have one function and popular meanings have another. But these are fairly clearly stated in the report, and I take it that some of the reasons why there is so much excitement is because other people may define intelligence differently than we do and, in any case, there may be some impact on people's identity. I have never written anything that got as much excitement as that did. I hate to go down in history as a man who said that one third of all Puerto Ricans are mentally retarded, but this may be my fate. I liked the one letter to the paper that said if one in three is retarded, which one of the three authors is the retarded? The answer is me. I took the test in Spanish, and I thought I was fairly fluent in Spanish, but I'm mentally retarded, too. But, this does not surprise us and I don't think any of the three of us is so unsophisticated as to know that this is the situation with intelligence testing, but apparently, we never made it very clear in the report. Any intelligence testing, when you start to compare countries, or even groups within countries, as Franco points out, very accurately, is a Lot like comparing income figures. It is very hard to compare them across countries, and it is hard to compare within a country if you have very different bases of operation in different parts of the country. It is even difficult to compare them over time in the same country, for some of the same reasons. But it does not mean you do not use intelligence figures at all. It means you presumably use them with some understanding of what they reflect. If you treat intelligence as in some way reflecting the moral value or inherent genetic capacity of the individual; our income was once treated this way, at least in the Puritan ethic, I understand that if your income was relatively comfortable, it was taken to prove that you were a very moral person, that you were doing all right in the eyes of God, and if your income was low, this meant that you were probably immoral, lazy, or genetically unfit. We do not take intelligence to reflect any of those things any more than we take income to. We take intelligence to reflect a composite of a person's opportunity, past experience, which aspect of a culture he may have been participating in, but we recognize that intelligence, even though it is confusing why a person's tested intelligence is at a given point, accounts in general for about half of the variance in scholastic achievement or in success even in adult retraining programs. So, it is not an unimportant piece of information, but since it accounts for only half of the variance, it is not even for its most specific use, for scholastic, or other testing purposes, it is not even a total answer. Some of the more technical problems, like the variation from one population to another, get into the kind of detail that Franco was mentioning; that sometimes what works for one part of the population does not for another. On the whole, school achievement tends to be slightly better than test results if you use U. S. norms for areas outside the U. S., as the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and other places where we have done some work. With children, school achievement runs higher than what you would predict from the test

-254if you use U. S. test norms. But those are, in a sense, the complications, and I don't think they are what most interests the group here, although they are very interesting from the point of view of the use, internationally, of the measure itself. We conclude that the bulk of the population, the adult male population, is fit for re-training or fit for modern industrial types of occupations despite the low intelligence level.

institutions

The study began essentially with the observation, one day, that most work with mental retardates deals with children. Most associations are associations of mentally retarded children, most institutions are for children, and the bulk of the research which is sponsored by the Federal Government, according to the listing, deals with mentally retarded children. The question arose, what happens to these children when they grow up? Why don't we have more institutions of mentally retarded adults? Why don't we have associations of mentally retarded adults? And the popular image, which I shared at the time, was that a mental retardate would have great difficulty in making out in life, and you would certainly have to worry about what would happen to him as an adult at least as much, or perhaps more than what happened to him as a child when he had a family to help support him. We found two sources of information on this. One comes from the Selective Service, which is today about the only mass adult testing program which the United States has had, and those are obviously males, and of a particular age group, and don't even include all of that age group for various reasons, so that the Selective Service isn't really a totaL adult population testing program. The other is follow-up studies of children who have been in institutions for the feeble-minded and those tend to show that most of the people who leave feeble-minded as adults, function perfectly well in the community. We know from the Selective Service that people who flunk the selective service test, the intelligence portion, like Cassius Clay, may actually be doing quite well in life. And this raises a problem as to what intelligence level the adults really have in a population. We know a lot about what level children have, but what level do adults really have, and what kind of work are they doing? Jastek had done a survey in Delaware, as far as I know the first adult screening program, testing program in the world. It wasn't published at the time we began, but its results are somewhat similar to ours. We began one here. We screened the adult population on a random sample basis, and the design is fairly elaborate to try to avoid errors in the screening, that is, sub-groups of all groups, whether they are screened in or out, are tested, and so on, so as to check whether there are errors of exclusion-inclusion. There is duplicate testing, a fourth of all the tested people were tested by non-verbal tests as well as verbal tests. A second test, the WEIS, which is being standardized in Puerto Rico, we overlapped part of our sample with part of their group, and so on, and, in terms of what you can do with the research design. I think that it was, by and large done, although there are always things after the fact which you can think of,

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which you might have added to what you did do. The conclusions, I think, are fairly valid in terms of the IQ level if you will listen seriously to each definition. If you define it this way, if you use this kind of norm, you will have this level; if you use another kind of norm, you have another level; I think the conclusions are fairly accurate, actually. So what we found is that it doesn't matter much what a person's IQ is in terms of how successful he is in life within the kind of community that he lives in, we use a community reference. We did fairly large segments of about 150 families in each segment, so that we could establish a norm for the area in which the person was found. We have a person of an IQ of 60, let's say, and we have around him 150 families whose income and work history we know; we also interviewed employers to get the employer's rating of how good he was on the job, and how satisfied they were with his work; we have information about his friends, his sociaL activities, and a number of other areas of life. On the whole, and partial studies in the States have shown the same thing, and in other countries, there is not very much relationship between intelligence and social success in life; you tend to have as many friends; delinquents are no more mentally retarded than other groups and non-delinquents; divorced people are no more mentally retarded than non-divorced people; women with illegitimate children are no more mentally retarded than women who don't have illegitimate children. This has been shown in general and with some variation from study to study, but I would say if you had to make a single simple statement, there isn't much relationship between intelligence and social functioning of that kind. It comes out very strongly at times in occupational areas, and we established a cut-off point for different areas, below what level of intelligence that a person begins to be less likely to be successful occupationally. The level is about 40, using the kind of norms we were using, the leveL is about 40 for the rural population in the Island, and for a good deal of the urban population. People below 40 normally had difficult work histories and low income levels. People above 40, say someone with an IQ of 60, unless he had a correlated problem, such as being blind, or crippled, or something of this sort; the two seemed to interact together, so if you have a physical disability and you have a low intelligence, then your likelihood to be fit goes down; but if you don't have a physical disability and you have an IQ of around 60, in most areas of Puerto Rico your income will be about the same as someone who has an IQ of around 90. It doesn't matter much what your IQ is within some limits; there is a small difference, but it doesn't seem to be an important one. We reached two kinds of conclusions from this. I should also add that some of the people with low intelligence have fairly good jobs. I remember that one study found that a university professor was mentally retarded, according to the exams. We didn't run across any university professors; I could think of a couple who might have been included, but we didn't find any. But we did find some fairly technical jobs like a foreman of an electric light and power crew, a cook for a well-known political figure in Puerto Rico, an owner of a restaurant, a quite successful restaurant, actually; a number of people

-256whose occupation level did not really seem to fit their IQ level. And we did some study on how they operate, how they actually function. The restaurant owner, for instance, clearly adapted the operation of a restaurant to what can be done by a mental retardate. He has a number of possible meals to offer, but they are ordered by number. This is true of other restaurants, too, not necessarily run by mental retardates, but more necessarily in this case; but you order number 2, number 3, and number 4, or something. He has a change making system which I have also seen other people do, in which he breaks a dollar bill into three quarters and five nickels. One of the things with mental retardates is they learn, but learn slow. What the IQ tends to mean is not necessarily that you can never learn, but it takes you longer to learn, although it also could mean other things. But if you can learn to break a dollar bill into three quarters and five nickels, with quite a low tested IQ, and simply take out the pieces of change that represent, let's say, the bottles of beer that were purchased, and hand the rest to the customer, it is a system which enables a slow learning person in a certain amount of time, to learn to make change without being able to answer a question on an IQ test. He simply cannot. This same man was asked how many children he had. He turned to his wife, and said: "how many children do we have?" And she said, "two". You can see why he has difficulty with an IQ test, and also see why he runs a successful restaurant. The two don't seem incompatible. Three things seem to enter into occupational situations relative to tests of intelligence: one is threshold requirements, what we call threshold requirements. In order to get a job, sometimes, you have a certain level of intelligence, regardless of how little intelligence it may take to carry on the job. These are simple things, for instance, requiring a high school education (which means, by and large, you have to have a certain level . of intelligence, though you are very unlikely to be a high school graduate), but the job may not require that much intelligence to do, at all. It is possible to increase, to some extent, the prestige of an occupation by increasing its threshold requirements, although if you get unrealistic, as in some jobs, this may lead to recruiting problems, and you can't find personnel to fill the vacancies; but in the kind of day in which janitors become engineers, many kinds of jobs increase the threshold requirements, and many employers prefer to have a work force who look and sound like more educated people. They just feel more comfortable with the work force, they feel that their company as a whole loois better, and they do not necessarily increase the threshold requirements in terms of job requirements, but in terms of the social factors involved, and their own satisfaction in that kind of work force. It is essentially discriminatory to people whose intelligence does not enable them to meet the threshold requirements and reduces a number of opportunities available to them, and doesn't really give them a chance. The shift to modernity is said to be a shift from ascription to achievement, and at least in this kind of area, I think it is a shift the other way around. To some extent we don't allow the person to take the job

-257to see whether he can do it, but we simply say he is not going to be allowed to try. In addition to these threshold requirements, and partly as a result of them, there are certain peripheral requirements added on to a job. If you run a restaurant, you may have to fill out certain forms for the government. It has nothing to do with running a restaurant basically, but since the government assumes,and is normally right, that anyone who can run a restaurant is able to fill out these forms, they simply require all restaurant owners to do so; or in any job you may have you may be asked to do certain things, fill out time sheets, read certain kinds of notices, information as to changes in regulations may come in written form and not necessarily in simple language, and you are supposed to respond to these, which we treat as peripheral requirements of the job. They are not the job itself, but things which a job holder is assumed to be perfectly able to handle, and so is handed the material in that form. A person who would test low on an intelligence test may do the job well but may not be able to handle these peripheral things. He may not understand when this meeting is supposed to be held from the somewhat unclear language in which the memorandum is passed around, but he may be running the machine perfectly fine. He just may not show up at the meeting. The way organizations tend to run, especially in the government area, but to some extent in the private area, if you come on time and do some of the things like come to the meetings when you are supposed to, you are probably not going to be fired, and sorne of these people may not do well at jobs simply because they can't handle the peripheral requirements, not the core ones. But even taking core requirements of the job, and analyzing those in terms of reports we have of how satisfied employers are with employees of varying intelligence level, it seems that it is possible to organize the core work of the job in such a way that it can be done by people of low intelligence, or that it cannot be done by people of low intelligence. To go back to the restaurant example, you can set up the meals so they are ordered by number and a waiter of less intelligence can handle the orders perfectly well; he can have a cashier who collects the bills, or he can have the waiter do something about making change himself; you can have variations in exactly how the core job itself is set up. Some of these variations, if they require changes in procedures or if they are more complex, take longer to learn, and a person who would test low would be unlikely to do them as well. But the same core requirements of the job can be broken down in different ways and, as all of you who have worked with computers know, one of the most excruciating experiences is to try to break down a job so that the stupid computer can do it. And computers are more stupid than the stupidest retardate that we have. It is an exceedingly trying job to explain to the computer what to do in such a way that it will do it right. We don't complain that computers are unfit for the modern world because they are too stupid; we have taken on ourselves the obligation of breaking down the work in such a way that a computer can do it. It is much easier to break down the job so that the mentally retarded can do it than it is so that the computer can do it, in some senses; it

-258is a little harder than others, because they are less standardized, but it can be done, and some of the job experience histories we have, I think, indicate that it can be done with this group in Puerto Rico. I would say on the whole that the group from about 40 IQ up, and if you will excuse me again, using the 40 in saying this is according to the kind of numerical designations that we use in the study, and you can translate it to 90 if you want to, you can add 50 points to everyone's score, and this would have saved the whole identity problem, I think if we had done that. But if someone with a 40 and up seems to live perfectly well in his neighborhood, and he is as likely to vote "popular" as anyone else and no more so, and I might say, he is not particularly likely to be delinquent, or divorced or a drug addict or any of the other of the social problems that begin with "d" for some odd reason, he probably can take on almost any job that modern industry is likely to even dream of offering him anyway, if you will take a little care, and if you don't obliterate them by raising the threshold requirements so they couldn't possibly be accepted, if you don't load him with tasks that don't really fit his skills, and if you just take a little time to break down the core of the job in such a way that he could learn it. And if he is going to be on the job for 10 years it doesn't matter so much that it takes him 3 months to learn it and someone else might learn it in a week. You can spend a little time training him and he is likely to stay and do his job well. The conclusion of the initial puzzle which began a series of studies was, what happens to these kids when they grow up? What happens is, they seem to turn out fine. We don't need institutions for mentally retarded adults except in a very small number, because it requires much more intelligence to be a child than it does to be an adult. A child has to go to school, and school is probably the most demanding intellectual experience in his life. And those who can't make it are problems, and there exist all kinds of special classes, and special institutions to deal with them. But once he can get through that, then he enters an adult Life in which intelligence is no longer nearly as important a characteristic as it was in school, and he has no trouble at all, as nearly as we can see him making out. Some question as to why we do this, and one of the explanations which Louis Dexter has written in his typically acerbic and humorous style, is that we, who more or less run the show, are very worried about how bright we are, because all through life we feel on the verge of falling off the edge if we cannot pass the test, and pass the courses, and get high scores, and so on, and we have come to believe that this is an essential quality of redemption of a human being; a person who is not bright, just doesn't have it; and we are really worried about how bright we are. So, it makes us very nervous to talc about people's IQ scores, and it is very hard for us to believe that a person who cannot pass the same test we can pass is just as good as we are. And we are unlikely to want to believe that, no matter how that information is put. And, among other reasons, this explains Why we think that

-259people with social problems are probably stupid when we probably have as many social problems as anyone else. In any case, I would not say that the results of the study indicate that a third of Puerto Ricans are unfit for modernization. They may have other problems, but it is not their intelligence level which makes them unfit. Feldman:- I think that the dichotomy suggested by de Jesús and Ferracuti is one that in one form or another shows up in most people's thought with regard to social change. That is to say, we tend to look for the blockages and the barriers to change in the population itself in the characteristics of the individuals, rather than trying to treat some of these blockages institutionally, or at least as social scientists. Very often, it is almost like a displacement mechanism, that is to say being frustrated by the kinds of institutional blockages that exist in almost all societies, we say, well, the problem is, there is something about the nature of the population, and so that very often we talk about, well, there are two things that you have to talk about, and you can use various words. They usually come down to, I think, some notion of those that desire change, some goal notion, and those that have the means or the capability of taking advantage of any given change opportunity, that is to say, some means notion. And so I think one of the things one could mean by change-prone is, that you have people who desire very much change, and one of the things you might mean by change-fit is that they are capable, not only intellectually, perhaps not even mainly intellectually, but they are capable for at any number of bases of taking advantage of whatever opportunities there are. And the problem comes how to operationalize these two things a little further, and in our study of social change one of the ways we have tried to operationalize, and I stress this is only one, and it has utility for some things but not for others, is to more or less say, well, by change-prone what we mean is the kinds of values they have vis a vis aspirations for themselves, for their children, and we will mean by change-fit a knowledge factor, a cognitive factor, the kind of information and knowledge that they have vis a vis what the society is like and, particularly, what their parts of it is like, and what they would have specifically to do in order to change their position. Now, one of the real problems in the literature here is the assumption that the fitness part of it is really the blockage; whereas, I think, in earlier years, if you look at the way these two notions have developed in the literature of the study of change, of modernization, you had a great deal of talk about proneness, talk that was imbedded in notions called the dual society notion, etc., etc., that people were unwilling to participate in change. It gets harder and harder to maintain that a proneness or a goal problem is the principal blockage in the face of wide-scale demand for, and participation in- change in various societies and cultures of the world. And so increasingly, I think, students of change and of modernization, have shifted their attention to the fitness dimension, and say, well, they may want to

-260change, but there is something about what they are like that is keeping them from fully exploiting the opportunities for change that are available to them. And one of these things, presumably, is knowledge, which is why we operationalize it this way. To our surprise, our data on social change on these few unfortunate cases that we have exploited quite ruthlessly is that almost the opposite is the case, that is to say, if we look at how people have changed in the last 10 years, it turns out there is a much lower rate of change with regard to whatever one tries to mean by proneness variable, that is to say, the way in which these verbalize a lot of their attitudes, and a lot of their values and their goals. I was talking about it the other day with regard to how they judge whether life has been fair to them or not. There seems to be a sharp distinction here, and a distinction that continues, between those who express their ambitions in instrumental terms in job, education, and income terms, and those who express their ambitions in more what I call role-fulfillment terms, and that this continues to be a relatively stable line-up so that, with regard to this as an example of the measure of proneness, the ability to become anxious about job, then you could say that there does not seem to be a great deal of change here and those who at least have been rural, etc., in the last ten years. But if you look at knowledge you find that there is very little distinction between the participant in change and the nonparticipant. That is to say, if you look at those who have been occupational-mobile, who are either in the industrial labor force or in the white-collar part of the labor force, and who are urban, over the last ten years, and those who have not been any of these things, and you ask them about how have the occupational composition of the various status levels in the society shifted in these ten years and how have the income and educational correlates of this occupational composition shifted, you get relatively a great deal of change in alL segments of the population, and even those who participate least in the process that has characterized Puerto Rico in the last ten years, have become amazingly sophisticated from an informational, from a cognitive point of view, about what the occupational system is like now and how it differs from the occupational system, you know, ten years ago, so that you can do this just on a language basis. So that I would argue that perhaps we want to return to the proneness variable and try to specify it somewhat more exactly. Instead of talking about proneness now in terms of a state of affairs that is received from previous cultural provisions, which is, I think, the kind of tone that informed the literature of desire to change in the past. Perhaps we talk about proneness as something that is generated by a person's conditions at any given time, and it is not so much a matter of traditional versus modern culture, etc., etc., it is a matter of how one copes with a status, with a position in life at any given time. It is maybe that in proneness we are getting a reaction to reality. It may be a very reality-oriented response to say, well, you know, I really don't want to judge myself on a basis of job and I don't want to have ambitions about these things because

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it would not be very realistic for me. One of the things people are saying is what you have now in the upper-middle class are people like minor government bureaucrats of the following type, a phrase that one wouldn't associate with a backward peasant and these are the kinds of phrases and languages they are using. Finally, I think, to be even more specific, one of the ways to operationalize both fitness and proneness may be with regard to the generational change; that is to say, so much of what an adult, and particularly an adult over 40 or 50 in any society, in Puerto Rican society, is likely to give you on an answer to such questions, any attempt to operationalize these variables, no matter how, is we find, the results of an aging phenomenon. That is to say, Puerto Rico has changed a lot in the 12 years between our first wave of interviews and our second wave of interviews. But also, our sample is 10-12 years older, and no matter in what context they may have been imbedded, and no matter what society they may have been part of, the fact of being 10 years older makes a great deal of difference to the way in which they will aspire, and to the way in which they will express what their aspirations and their wishes, their desires, as well as their definitions of the society. That is to say there is in an aging phenomenon regardless of the level of modernization of the society as a whole, and regardless of the kind of participation any given individual or segment of that society has experienced. And this is going to be a terribly difficult problem for any study of social change as it has been for ours, and one of the suggestions for handling this problem is to try to see or to judge proneness or fitness, or whatever words we want to use, in a cohort of generational context, to see the extent to which one's actions vis a vis his children are maybe very different from one's verbalization, vis a vis his own position in life, and this may be a somewhat more predictive way at assessing these variables than assessing them relative to the individual respondent himself. Ferracuti:- Mr. Chairman, the interventions answered each other, but there are some comments I would like to make, and the last one in the order of presentation, I think, is the first. In the very preliminary stage of the planning for this meeting, Arnold, we discussed methodology, and we also came up with a cohort as the only possible approach. So this, perhaps, should be the object of further discussion. A modified cohort approach seems to me, for the little I know of this society, to be the only possible way we can amass a sufficient amount of data. Now, let me start with Dr. Bou's remarks. Yes, I agree with you almost entirely. I don't go as far as to call "hog-wash" all testing; that is, perhaps too strong. But certainly they are misused all over the world, and here they have been seriously misused. I would also state that not only the psychometric ability approach is misused, but also the questionnaires. We keep using questionnaires on the Puerto Rican population without any knowledge of their ability to understand the questionnaires. And they are phrased in terminology that the average Puerto Rican finds too alien. You state people can be

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educated for employment; I agree. But it depends again on the basic line; what are you starting from, and how far you can go. We have come very far in this society, so the Ecuadorian Indian example may not apply entirely, it may apply only in part. I agree that tests should be created for Puerto Rico. Let me give you a very small example. This study by Miner of intelligence in the United States, and there is a large Italian study of army draftees, in both cases, between North and South, there is one and a half standard deviation in favor of the North. This does not lead us to claim that the South in the United States and in Italy is populated by feeble-minded. It does lead us to the need to compensate for this fact. How? By a different set of norms, by taking into account, somehow by raising artificially, the way Dr. Stanton proposes, let us add a few IQ points. We don't know. At this stage we have no solution. Perhaps we need regional standardization of tests. Perhaps we need to go out of the quartophrenia of psycometrics into something more flexible vis a vis these populations. There is an old story, what kind of test would you take, if you were going to go to India, speaking none of the languages of India. You are a psychologist. You are packing yourbags to India. What do you take along? There is a survey of this. Only two tests, three tests, really. The Rorschach, the Bender-Gestalt and the Portus-Mesus. And that is about all. All the rest are too culture-bound. As to Dr. Stanton, well, I was waiting for your comments for a long time. There is one point I would like to make concerning your comments. It is quite true that it is difficult to train a computer to break down a job for a computer. But there is compensation. A computer does not get frustrated. A human being does, if you expose him to a task for which he is totally unprepared. Or if you show, by the way you handle him, that he is not as well off as the others. And that is one difference we should keep in mind. Yes, we take longer and we finally train that, in quotation "feeble-minded" person, but in this process we may frustrate him. You talk of your interest in other elements of unfitness, I can only strongly underline this. By all means we were not referring only to mental ability in the concept of fitness. There is a lot more than that. Ego strength is an element. How much anxiety, how much anomie can you take before you break down? That is certainly an element of fitness. Another element of fitness, and again I'm glad Dr. Roselid is here, well, this country has a rate of epilepsy which is twice the continental rate. This country has a rate of abnormal electro-encephalograms which is way above the continental rate. We have had a mass maternity program. How many Puerto Ricans have we made to live that are damaged? No one knows. We have no figures. Some of those unfitnesses are simply linked to some pin-point defect, not an overall intellectual defect. It can be a defect of memory, it can be a defect of abstraction ability, it can be an element of the learning process. It will not affect the IQ to any large extent, but it may affect specific tasks. Just drive around the island and you will see this. Is the reaction time adequate in the island population, or is it not? The impression one gets is that it is not, and other physical

-263elements of this kind are certainly around. The massive health programs always produce this kind of problem; you make people survive who are not entirely fit. Now, there is no value judgment here, you must make these people survive, of course, But you must be prepared to face the consequences. Now, as to Dr. Feldman, well, I can only say again, I agree. Capability is not only intellectual. I agree with you that we should return to proneness a little more. I would maintain that we should keep separate the existential desire I was trying to postulate yesterday as to proneness. Those are the values of proneness, but which type of value is important, because it has to do with how you operationalize it. And unless you are very clear about that you may be confusing different types of values and different types of norms, and norms with values. It has to be kept very clear in the design, as I said before, the cohort approach, the only one feasible, in my very modest views on this point. Another element, two very brief comments. Maybe the welfare state encourages non-proneness. Do we have any data on this? Now, fellow, your check is coming in; why s rry? And another element. The little bit we discussed about this, and we did not introduce it because we thought it was too technical at this stage: the Wilkins approach. The social value definition of abnormal. You talk about the increase in knowledge. I would be very much interested in seeing the increase in tolerance of abnormality as a result of the change of the Puerto Rican population. This has always been a very tolerant society towards abnormals, and this may have increased. Now what you define as a saint, saintly, or bad act has a lot to do with what kind of norms you apply to those acts. This is almost inevitable. I would maintain there is a psychological base-line of change in terms of values, as there is a psychological base Line of ability, in terms of fitness. Those are only terms for discussion, they are not meant as typology in the classical sense. We are all past that. We may try to return to a typology via factor-analysis. But even then this has to be considered as continual, not as dichotomies. And I suppose that is all, that is all that I can comment at the stage. Thanks. Hansen:- Let me roughly suggest the structure of where I think we are. Charles Frankenhoff, López-Rey and Rodríguez-Bou are awaiting an opportunity to make comments which I think they should have in the immediate future. But because the time is going, it will be necessary that they be somewhat brief. We have also ahead of us two items on the agenda which I regard as important and for which I wish to reserve time. Alex Inkeles is going to talk on a model concerning the nature of the discussion we are engaged in, and I want time for this. Díaz Alejandro and Cochran are going to raise the question of the economic consequences of political status, and I wish to reserve time for this also. Frankenhoff:- When Millard first mentioned this seminar and the problem to me, I thought it was most appropriate, because I had a

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now

feeling which I never had the opportunity to express, that we are at a crucial moment in the life of Puerto Rico. And one thing, perhaps, in all this discussion which has been a little slippery for me, we are all aware of social change as an ongoing, flowing phenomenon, or complex of phenomena. Why are we entering at this point? And at least for me the justification is, that at this point, to some degree, Puerto Rico is entering into its maturity. It is in a state of transition. It is coming out of an adolescent phase in which, at least economically, it could do very little wrong. So many houses were needed, so many factories were needed, so many industries were needed, so many financial structures were needed, that they could come in and nobody was too concerned about the coordination of this kind of growth. And I think that we are at a stage when we realize that the economy of the country can longer afford this kind of "Topsy" growth. And it is most obvious, economically, and perhaps politically. But let me concentrate for a moment on the economics; the recent tight money situation in the States which affected our construction here considerably. GATT for example: this general agreement among the nations in Europe which resulted in suspending the flow of chickens to Europe, a flow which came here, invaded our market, and really did a great deal of damage to our chicken market. We are finding ourselves much more susceptible, much more sensitive, which is part of growth, to economic events in all the world, and not just in the United States, although the repercussions may flow through the United States. And we find too, for example, that as far as change-prone goes, we find that probably the majority of our immigrants have been not from our urban areas, in the sense of the metropolitan area, but from our "campo". They have gone to the United States to work either temporarily or for good. I think it is a little difficult to localize this kind of change, but at the same time, in terms of transition, we are noticing the flow has slowed down, and that Puerto Ricans are returning. For example, we seem to have passed a certain high water mark. In tourism now, we have grown to a size that we are concerned about the Mafia coming in. We were not big enough before to be of interest. In the "caserío", again, we find our whole public housing development very much under control by the federal government. Now, to put that at the side of the minimum salary controversy, you remember here, this was applied to Puerto Rico in a way which many, including myself, felt would be of great damage. Before there was no great problem. l'ow we have come to the point in our own salary level growth, this is a real problem, and again, part of this transition, so that the impingement of federal decisions on Puerto Rican development is probably more significant now than it was. We had so far to go before in our adolescence that you could hardly make a mistake; we could just grow freely, as a child grows. And we cannot afford that now. We rebelled, and we spoke vigorously against minimum salary, because it was pretty obvious that it was going to hurt, or affect, in some way, Puerto Rican development. We have not spoken at all about federal funds coming in and dominating our public housing, and which has, I think, a far more harmful effect on family life than many realize. I think the urban-rural distinction

-265is of much less value here. You can speak of the "campo" and you notice it when you go out, but the people in the "campo" will come here to work. People from San Lorenzo will come here to work or they will have relatives in New York and go there. There is a kind of urban "ambiente" which, I think makes this urban-rural split less and less meaningful in scientific terms. Again, the agricultural problem which, as some of you may know, has come to the fore again. We have come to the point that we cannot afford to ignore that important sector of our economy with all the implications for chasing people out of the "campo" into San Juan, which this involves. My point then is that I think this moment in Puerto Rico's growth is especially significant. It is not only a moment of change but of a changing momentum of change which I would like to call transition, and which others might identify much more precisely. López-Rey:- Mr. Chairman, I shall try to comply with your suggestions as much as possible, but I don't want to be the first casualty. What I would like to say first, is that, in dealing with social change there is a tendency to stress too much the individual behavioral approach. It seems to me that de Jesus and Ferracuti have presented us, not with particular choices, but with an exposé of strategies that we are discussing now. I refer to this because I got the impression that they are not particularly recommending it, I am very much afraid that I do not agree with them, but I do not think they are recommending it. They are putting, simply, it forward. The difficulty of dealing with types, even if we do not use the term typology, is that, to a great extent, types are always scientific fakes. We know very well that they represent very little. My first remark is we are presented with a dichotomy; prone and resistant, and we deduct, or it has been deducted, four different types but why only four? But we can at pleasure multiply them. All of them however are empirically abstracted extremely useful for theoretical exposés but of doubtful sociological value as far as policy purposes are concerned. According to my calculations no less than 30 types may be classified and subclassified. My second point is that even if valid these types are purely situational in the sense that they represent simply certain psychological situation at a particular moment. If so the use of the term type is not quite justified. I don't think we can talk of types when referring to a specific trend or condition of a definite character, but not when referring to a situation. The third point is that if admitted as types the psychological aspect of these situations is not the only to be considered. There are others as important in the configuration of these situations. This is particularly the case with the pockets of resistance to social change which cannot be explained only by psychological factors. The question is that past and present social reality, shows that the so-called resistant pockets have always existed and will always exist for the simple reason that social policies, public policies, whatever policies you are dealing with, cannot set up a uniform level. We have the case of the United States and many other countries, and this dif-

-266ference of level does not necessarily mean resistance to social change. Another question is that, if we are dealing, as the typological classification indicates, with individusl.s, should not we admit also a certain right to resist social change, particularly certain social change for other reasons than psychological? Dr. Ferracuti made yesterday an interesting remark when he referred to values. To what extent policies are entitled to change values? On the other hand values change to some extent but seldom completely. Who is the agent of the change? To a point, I agree with Dr. Feldman when he said that somebody has to change so that social change takes place, but social change goes far beyond the individual area. Social change embraces far more than individuals: institutions, systems, and structures, and so on. Therefore, it seems to me that if we want to clarify research about what we call social change, we have to make a distinction between national development, which is quite different from social change, although it can provoke social change. And in dealing with national development we are dealing with planning. We are dealing with the formulation of policies. Actually, we are not dealing with individuals, we are dealing with needs and these needs are the things that national development takes into account on national planning. It is to say the formulation of policies. And this satisfaction of needs has sometimes to be satisfied with an absolute disregard of the attitudes of certain individuals or groups. I still remember the resistance that welfare policies met in Sweden when they started many years ago. Nevertheless, they were introduced and nowadays, although there is still some grumbling from the conservative side, welfare policies are accepted not only in Sweden but everywhere. In sum, public policy, social change and individual indifference, proneness and resistance to change are three different things. The two first may be carried out whether or not the three individual characteristics are taken into account. These three characteristics may be significant in the individual application of policies or in the study of individual conflicts due to social change but not in the formulation of public policies or in the explanation of the delusive term social change. Rodriguez-Bou:- I have a good number of notes, that I confess I don't know where to begin, but I should refer first to what I said about this research piece, about the'Ihog-wash's. I did not refer to the testing or to the study as such. I was referring, when I said "hog-wash" to the vision that a third of the Puerto Ricans were mentally retarded. I am very conscious that even mistaken studies are very useful, and I should say that what I mean to say with the remark is that from now on we should be exceedingly careful in planning research because the situation now, I gather, is different from what it was 10, or 15, or 20 years ago, within this framework of social change we have to point out that in our milieu now there is a respectable group of scholars that were not present 10 or 15 years ago, and that criticism of research is going to be increased because this group of scholars no longer are going to follow submissively any cultural colonialism or research colonialism. And that we have to be more careful from now on how we de-

-267vise this research work. Another point that I want to clarify for the record is, that our criticism of the Albizu-Matlin-Stanton study is not that it is not useful. It is a useful study, but I think it is to simplify things to say that the reaction to the study is an identity problem. To begin with, to state that intelligence is what the particular tests measure, is to begin with a false premise when the tests in themselves are adaptations of tests. Then, to accept that the sponsoring agency limited the scope of this test is just limiting a type of research to specifications of this sort which are again what they were trying to find out. And this brings me to another important point, and it is that we find now within this matter of social change in Puerto Rico and especially in the field of research work, that the abundance of federal funds is leading too many people in Puerto Rico to do research just to comply with the abundance of money. And we are running a very serious risk in this respect. Several years ago I found, while doing an extensive study of the educational system in Puerto Rico, that almost all the agencies in Puerto Rico that were receiving federal funds, the directors of those agencies framed the norms and the rules in which the federal funds were going to be used. They submitted these norms to the federal agencies for approval, and then whenever a change was suggested they said, no, the federal agency does not allow it. It was protecting their own "predio" as we say here. The federal agencies were always more amenable to changes than the directors of these agencies in Puerto Rico are willing to admit, so that nobody interferes with them. Another good example is housing. The rules and the norms for federal housing have been applied here without discrimination, without concern for the cultural and the environmental differences. One key example is the matter of extended family relations in Puerto Rico in contrast to the nuclear regulations of federal housing. Now, one additional point I want to stress is that I come to be somewhat skeptical about research instruments when intercultural societies, inter-cultural efforts are made. I do not want to get into details of that because I want to keep within the time limit. But when we work in the development of inter-cultural tests that might be meaningful, comparing one culture to another through tests, developed expressly to test those situations, we found so many variables that in 20 years of trying to develop these tests, still we are in the path of trying to find out ways of bridging this gap. I remember an example in India, when we were in a seminar there: one of the participants from the western world was explaining how to prepare reading material for the newly literates and one of them brought up a small pamphlet. They said, this should be the size of the pamphlet produced, because they are easy to carry in the pockets and people do not throw them away. Then one old man from India raised the hand and said, in what pocket are we going to put that pamphlet? Now one important aspect of change in Puerto Rico that I think is useful to mention, and I know you are very conscious of it, is that there are two aspects

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that may mislead people here. One is that external changes may confuse people with changes in values and attitudes. Another thing is that we have been so busy in action, all of us in government, and in the University, and in public life, somehow in business, everybody has been so busy doing things that there has been very little time to evaluate, very little time to think, and to weigh what is happening, really happening in Puerto Rico. How much of it is just external, how much of it is just super-imposed ways of doing things by a technological and industrial effort, and how much of it is real through deep changes in values and attitudes. Now, the other thing I should like to point out is that, even the tests that Dr. Ferracuti mentioned, that are non-verbal, the frame of reference for interpretation on which these non-verbal tests were framed and worked are alien to different cultures, the frame of reference of interpretation although they might be non-verbal. And our experience in developing these inter-cultural tests, even in language that we think that is so simple at times, misleads us. I remember that once we tried to picture a "tortilla" in Mexico. For some it was everything else but a "tortilla", it was a fried egg, it was human feces, it was everything but a "tortilla". So, even in trying to picture test items we have to be very careful what we are doing and what we are getting. So, what I mean to say with all of this, is that the situation has changed considerably since the first effort to do research in inter-cultural environments. And that we have to take into consideration these changes and these changes in attitudes toward these inter-cultural aspects. Ferracuti:- I will start with Dr. Bou first, as it is easier. Well, the research colonialism you are talking about is not only Puerto Rican, you know, it is all over the world. There is a European research colonialism towards the United States. Maybe it is the fault of the Fulbright program. If I had to isolate one element, I would speak on the Fulbright program. It is not so,much a matter of colonialism as long as we can keep some freedom in thinking. Now, in Europe, we maintain rightly or wrongly that this freedom is allowed us by our humanistic education. We maintain that as much of the pragmatic approach we can take in trying to compensate for it with the way our lyceums are structured. I do not know about Puerto Rico, possibly the situation here is more dramatic in terms of colonialism, but as long as we do not come up with a Spanish edition of the psychological abstracts or the sociological abstracts we are bound to this colonialism unfortunately. Now, one thing about the federal funds; you are undoubtedly right. There is a serious danger there. They are willing to phrase your research in terms that are acceptable to that mysterious entity known as "the board" which has to pass judgment on your life. But, that is a question of funds. Now here in the island I have found, in about 10 years of research work, an exceptional level of freedom from this kind of external "board". I hope we can continue for this particular study. One more comment. Values are learned early in life, by age 6 or 7 your basic values are there. All the rest are instruments of actualization of those values. What you learn -

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after that is how you achieve those values, how you fit your value system. So, it is at that age level that we should concentrate our attention. About the non-verbal tests, I can only agree, but the instruments I was referring to, the Midas, the Bender-Gestalt, and the Rorschach do take into account these cultural differences, and they can be studied in local terms. Now in answer to Professor Lopez-Rey, well, I'm sorry, I am a behavioral scientist. Dr. de Jesus is a behavioral scientist. That is the only language I can use. After this, I will apologize for it, but we are dealing with a behavioral science project and the only way to arrive is by adhering to the rules of the game. We never aimed to recommend a dichotomy; I tried to make it clear. We are talking of a continuum. Typologies are a relic of the past. We all agree on this, except that we now try to get back, and I hope Dr. Inkeles will get to this point through other approaches through factor analytic approaches to something better than a typology. We are not postulating anything like the introvert-extrovert type of thing. That is out. We can derive 36 or more different types. We have no interest in them. This is a continuum and we use the terms we have used only as a convenient way to describe the kind of continuum we are talking about. Concerning the pockets of resistance, I can only repeat they should not be eliminated; they should be cared for, they should be provided for. Something should be done to minimize the negative effect of the existence, otherwise they become sub-cultures with which we have to deal. They may retreat into addiction, they may come out and become aggressive. There are several ways in which they can negatively react and hamper the progress of a society. Pockets have always been with us, now what might be with us, is an attempt to do something constructive about them. It is only to that extent that I would dare to turn to the public policy part of the seminar, that is something that of course will be, that the selection of what to do comes from one's own professional background. Now we are concerned with anomalies. What to do about them. Can we do anything to minimize the damage of these pockets without trying to eliminate them? Resistance, you postulate indifference instead. In my view, resistance is just a convenient term that will include many other things. The same as fitness includes other things than intellectual ability, so resistance will summarize different traits, if you like, including indifference. Hansen:- We will suspend the meeting at this point for an intermission. INTERMISSION Hansen:- We will resume our session at this point. We have three items on our agenda for the remainder of the morning. We will have an initial presentation. I would like this to be followed by brief comments and criticism so that we can maintain a certain coherence in the discussion, and then I will have to outrage everybody by

-270saying, as I look at the clock, we will have to move to the second initial presentation and a bit of comment, and to the third. We are going to begin with Alex Inkeles. I will turn, then to Cochran and Diaz Alejandro, and third, I will turn to Marshall CLinard, and each will inform us of the things that he has spoken to me about and which concern him, and which concern us in the seminar, and we will try to fit this into our available time. Tomorrow the agenda specified the role of public policy. The cellor will be with us, Mr. Abrahán Díaz González, We will suspend that session at 12:00 o'clock, not at 1:00, in order to have lunch with the Chancellor at 12:15 immediately afterwards. And I think that almost everyone here has expressed his acceptance of the Chancellor's invitation for lunch. Inkeles:- I have spent some of my time, while participating in this conference, attempting to create some kind of an order out of something which I do not mean to suggest was disorderly or chaotic, but which rather had an extremely complex structure like a living thing. Being a social scientist of the behavorial variety, I was strongly impelled to attempt to place some kind of a form or structure on this thing; in the process I may destroy its life, but I had thought it might be interesting to share it with you. I am not sure if this is actually the best time to present it; in a way it might have been better to wait until tomorrow morning when we attempt our summary, but perhaps by presenting it now, and even though we will not have much time for discussion of it, we could have the advantage of giving you the opportunity to think about it a little bit so that it may shape our discussion tomorrow morning, to a certain degree. I have not attempted in this little scheme any evaluation. It is simply an effort in classification. I hope it does not upset Dr. López-Rey too much because at least it is not a dichotomy. But it is also not quite so dignified as a model, which I think Millard Hansen referred to in this meeting at one point, it is more a little map which I have developed, an accounting-scheme if you like, that now reports back to you the flows of information and ideas that have been taking place up to now. It is a very simple scheme. I have merely developed six main headings into which I classified the things that have been said, and I have tried to note some outstanding examples from the discussions so far of each of these. Now, inevitably, in making such an arrangement, one must place some themes arbitrarily under one or another heading when clearly they are applicable under several, and I have not tried the more complex problem of crosscutting. There is no special logic in the order in which I will present these, although I think you will see that there is some developmental quality in the presentation. The first general type of research problem that seems to have been mentioned here is of a variety which I have labeled ''insti-

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tutional process", and I mean by this reference very broad aspects of social structure as they may have been undergoing change or may have been maintaining stability in the course of the development of Puerto Rico. These would include most obviously the process of industrialization, the process of urbanization, this is, incidentally not a theoretically derived list, these are themes that have been mentioned here in this conference, as being important issues. That of social stratification and social mobility in which, of course, Dr. Feldman has a very substantial interest, and the processes of social mobilization, that is to say, the extent and form or degrees in which the population has been incorporated increasingly in a more complex, and some might say a more modern society. And then finally on this list, I think there was a good deal of discussion of something which is an institution and process but could also be in different terms, namely the whole mechanism whereby policy decisions are made, whereby a government action is attempted or undertaken. Now, with regard to this list, I would make the following observations as to what has taken place in the conference. I have noticed a widespread tendency to feel, and much evidence given in support of that feeling, that in these realms the level of research in Puerto Rico is very far advanced, very extensive, and very high. There has been an unusually large amount of attention to these processes, as in part evidenced by some of the government documents, and others, that have been presented which show that this is a country which is in this point of view quite far advanced by world standards. On the other hand, however, I note the possibility of one very important reservation in this connection, and that is that a great many assertions have been made around this conference table as to facts concerning these institutional processes which are treated by the person making the statement as more or less obvious and thoroughly well established which seems to me sometimes in the very nature of the case questionable and in other cases are clearly challenged by facts which I have found in the documents that I have been spending most of my time on at the beach in the afternoon and in evening reading. I cited one example to Archie Feldman the other day where it may have been only a matter of the style of expression or the refinement of his statement, but he made a statement in the conference saying that it was reasonably clear that there was despite general improvements in the life conditions of the people a tendency for the spread between high and low incomes, and high and low status, to maintain itself or actually become aggravated or exaggerated under the conditions of general development in Puerto Rico. I found the statement in one of the documents which seemed quite directly to challenge that. He was able to clarify it when I discussed it with him. I think it is a problem that a future research program might well address itself to. Now, to go back, and I am not talking about collecting new information, but now go back over this very substantial body of material and attempt to state in a coherent and readily accessible form, and one that attempts to answer the big question that people raise, of which I would consider iMr. Feldman's an outstanding one because of its many so-

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cial implications, and address oneself to the document to see how far the evidence supports one or another position. In other words, what is the best statement we could make now reviewing all the evidence, with regard to the actual rate of economic development, growth and per capita income, the relative distribution of it, and so on, with regard to the available evidence, couched in such a way as to have policy implications and also to have the implications for evaluation because we feel very differently about the improvement in the general level of income, if Dr. Feldman's assertion is correct; we feel quite differently about it if it is incorrect. I\ow the second major realm or set of themes that has come through I have referred to as the problem of mapping the social reality of Puerto Rico. I think the formula which has most often been used in discussing it, the form when someone has made such a statement, it has taken the form of a plea for studying the concrete and specific real conditions of the life of people in Puerto Rico and their situation, rather than the more abstract kind of thing, that is often involved, let's say, in my own study of modernization, which is not at that level of concrete reality. It does not do justice to the unique conditions of the society. For example, here I would say a typical illustration would be Nieves Falcon's question. What are the actual values that are held by Puerto Rican ;people, and what are the degrees of differentiation in that value system? And secondly, and this is more ieves-Falcón's question, how far have we attempted seriously to study which of the values of the Puerto Rican people have persisted in time? The idea here, of course, being that most studies are interested in showing value change. Therefore inevitably they may give you the impression because you can show that there are many new thoughts in Puerto Rico that necessarily all the old ones have disappeared. And this is a question which I do not think we know the answer to. What is the self-perception of the Puerto Rican? What does he see himself as mostly being? Does he see himself as a very advanced, progressive person? Is he superior? To whom? To the people in the country side, to the man in New York, to the people in other islands, relative to South Anerica, relative to his Latin tradition? I do not think we now the answer to this. This is an example of the kind of question that was put about self-conception that falls in this category. One of the questions placed here was of this form. We {now that there have been many changes in Puerto Rico, but we would like to know how do Puerto Ricans really feel about the process of change that they have been affected by. 'In other words, would they judge that not only evaluating their own life, which of course, Feldman's study deals with, but evaluating the whole course of Puerto Rican development. Do they feel it has been very good or that there are serious deficiencies? Do they have the sense that things are working well or that there are very serious problems? Compared to progress in the past, do they have a feeling of progress in the future, will it be as great or perhaps will it begin to diminish? Do they, in fact, have a sense of mal-

-273aise, the issue to which, I think Dr. Muloz Amato addresses himself very much? Have they developed a confusion concerning their identity? These qre questions which we do not have the answers to which involve dealing with the concrete reality. Or, Dr. Lopez Rey asks what are the actual forms of penology and justice which are executed in this island. Not merely by studying the formal arrangement of the law but by asking, in fact, day by day, how many people are sent where and for what reasons. Now, I would consider this a kind of behavioral measuring, and for that reason Dr. Lopez-Rey might not accept it; but if we could find some neutral term, I thin{ he and I would agree that it is very important to study this phenomenon, we won't call it behavior, these actions of the judges, day by day, to find out what is the extent to which they send individuals, how many, under what conditions, to what places. Dr. Roselld's interest concerning the mental health practices would be another example. Are we, in fact, keeping large numbers of people in hospitals who perfectly well could be out in the community, because there are many factors which make it to the advantage of those who deal with these people if their own families or the hospital administration should keep them? One of the questions put here is the question: what is the actual nature of mass media exposure in this society and what are the extent and forms of the control of them? How far is it really true that the mass media in Puerto Rico--here I think, everybody is ready to answer immediately but it would be nice to get the factual answer-how far is it true that the images that are presented are exclusively those of the Mainland and that there is not a major form of advertising which attempts to deal with more indigenous themes, and how far is it true that the average Puerto Rican is really much influenced by these images in his interpersonal relations, in his dress, and in many other questions of this kind. Or another issue that was raised here, what about our political leaders? Where have they come from? What do they actually do in the actual conditions? Whom do they know? What chains of connections do they have? How far, if you like, does the power elite concept apply concretely, realistically in Puerto Rico? These are examples and there are others that were given, that I would classify as in the mapping category. Now a third type of problem, or theme I should say rather, is the one that I have labeled by putting together several different types of material, I have Labeled it the social problem focus. It is characteristic of the points that are made in this connection that there is a feeling that something is wrong in the society, that there is a substantial defect or deficiency. That this defect or deficiency has either the form of suddenly arising or developing when it did not previously exist under the conditions of change, or this social defect has the form of being a residue from the past which has not adjusted to the demands of the immediate time and the requirements of the contemporary situation. The most obvious example here I think is the one with which the conference began, because Millard Hansen said in Puerto Rico there is a great problem about performance. We are not performing at an adequate level, and

-274he gave several illustrations of what he thought were the facts here. I would like to stop at this point, and I do not mean to be picking on Millard at all in doing this, to say that one thing that is very characteristic of all these so-called problems, is that they have an analog. It is often not to me obvious that what is identified as a problem has, in fact, been sufficiently researched so that one could make a reasonably good case on a comparative basis that it is quite the problem that the person sensitive asserts it to be. And this is a blanket statement I would make about everyone of the things on the list. I can see a great deal of research focused around these or other issues in order to begin with the question how far is it really true that we are failing in certain very important ways. That doesn't mean you accept the standard. You say supposing anybody gives you the standard, still how far is it true that we are not, in fact, doing well. The second problem that I have on the list, and as I said, these are not in any especially logical order, but as they came up, is the problem of delinquency. Here, again, I think is one of those realms where asking what are the real facts is enormously important because as we all know in the case of something like delinquency and crime, it is very easy to create crime merely by changing the definition of what you consider a crime. Secondly, it is very easy to create increases in crime by doing things that have different meaning when we study the impact of crime from what you assume is the meaning of crime when you make the judgment that the crime is a quality mainly in the person rather than something intimately related to his situation as well as what is in him. For example, in the United States the enormous rise in juvenile delinquency does not exist if you exclude the taking of automobiles. The taking of automobiles in most cases is done by very young boys who are interested in the joy-ride. Now I don't ordinarily thinK of the desire for a joy ride as a clear evidence of a criminal disposition, and I don't think most people really do, and it has been quite seriously proposed now by the Russell-Sage Foundation, I mean this quite seriously now, they have proposed that a Hertz type automobile depot be established in the areas from which the largest number of boys who run off with cars come from, because they generally come from certain districts of the city and they got to others where the cars are available, and under this arrangement, any boy who is willing to be trained as a mechanic so he shows respects for automobiles, gets a car which permits him a certain number of hours every week to draw an automobile from the pool and take it out for a joy ride and it is perfectly possible that this may made an enormous difference in the frequency of so-called juvenile delinquency. So, I think we have many problems of this find to investigate; what are the meanings of these so-called figures. To see whether or not, in fact, actions have changed more. Now, in a city for example, throwing rocks at structures is juvenile delinquency. In the countryside if the same boy throws rocks at a tree, especially if it is not your fruit tree, it is not delinquency. So, whether in fact there has been a rise in the number of boys who are sort of shook-up which is what we really mean by the juvenile delinquency idea, who somehow have behavior disorders or whether there has been

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a transformation in the social context in which they operate is an important question with which to start when you are discussing the rise of juvenile delinquency. I don't mean by this to suggest that by rechanging the definition you eliminate the acts. Throwing rocks through train windows is a problem to society and must be dealt with, but I think it makes a great deal of difference if you are assuming that this has come about because the society's changing social relations are deteriorating and boys are different. Or if you possibly consider the boys are the same but their contexts are different. Another problem that was on the list: it was asserted to be the low productivity of labor in Puerto Rico, which I would like to see more information about, perhaps it has been extensively studied. Fourth, is family disorder, which I think may well be a problem of visibility because a great many studies have shown, recent studies at least, have shown that family instability is most common in those conditions where economic processes are at their lowest ebb and where the man cannot maintain his dignity and adequacy as a human being because he cannot earn and fulfill the classical role in all of western civilizations of the head of the family. It could well be, therefore, that in fact, the rise in family disorder is western. Often family disorder is not so visible when it takes place in the countryside because the extended family or othermear►s may be absorbing the impact of that, whereas in the city it becomes a welfare problem and has to be treated quite differently. There are many thoughts about personal psychic damage that goes with social change, and there have been many assertions around the table to that effect. Indeed, someone I think said you cannot be change-prone without becoming anxious. I don't believe that's true. I am much concerned with this issue, and I have been spending a lot of time in my personal research on it, as a matter of fact. And the evidence is much more complex than they suggest. I am not prepared to say, I don't have a good instrument for measuring it, and I'm not prepared to say yet what the definitive answer will be; but we have found that the typical image of the man who comes to the city, leaves the stability of the village, the countryside, and all the rest of it as being terribly shaken-up psychologically, is not borne out by our data in six different countries. There is the highest amount of psychic disturbance in the period immediately after departure from the countryside and arrival in the city, which I think makes very good sense from many points of view. It doesn't have to be a Freudian psychologist to figure out why it might be so. But we find to a striking degree that the more a man becomes integrated in the urban community, that is to say, if he finds a good job and earns a decent living, his psychological profile, even though he is changing very rapidly, becomes highly stabilized. And when we made comparisons we found that the poor man in the country with all the advantages of the village as a stable environment but with his poverty, is not better adjusted psychologically than the urban industrial worker, if that urban industrial worker is well integrated in the urban community. In other words, we have found the relationship goes like this: a comfortable adjustment in the countryside, a decline under the impact of early experiences and a substantial rise subsequently to a

-276comparable level, with the critical fact being in most cases your earning power. The men who are not able to find industrial jobs in the city and who are not able to get stable employment and good earning power, continue to be and, indeed, become very shaken-up in the urban environment. And those people who are suffering the biggest economic upset in the countryside being deprived of jobs, losing their land, finding their family is getting too large for their possibility of support, are also very shaken-up. It is not the change process in the broad sense of machinery, television, the many things that we blame, but the conditions of life with regard to a man's ability to fulfill his fundamental roles. But that's at the side; I didn't really mean to get into that. Another problem focus is the impact of the American community; how far and in what ways has this penetrated the life of Puerto Rico? And here one has an enormous amount of anecdotal material, but I see very little evidence of systematic research which concretely across a large number of situations give evidence a) of the infusion of this influence and I would like to see along with it, b) the evidence concerning what the nature of its impact is. For example, how many people feel less or more advantaged if they have English along with Spanish? It is a complex question and by finding out, as I suspect you would, that those who have English don't feel more disadvantaged, you don't resolve the question. There are other issues that are very important. But it is a suggestion of a line along which we might go. Another social problem focused, illustrated, brought up, was the problem of weak management. Are indigenous managers inefficient, and what is the relative distribution of these qualities accross the island. For example, just in our conversation in the coffee hour, some rather startling illustrations were given of the under-utilization of printing resources in Puerto Rico. It would be very interesting to make a catalog of such incidents and then to attempt to find out what are the places in the society where they most often occur and what seem to be the factors that account for their presence or absence. Closely related to this is the whole problem of the lack of indigenous capital. Why are more people who are starting from Puerto Rican roots notable somehow effectively to introduce enterprises which will reasonably compete with those which come from Mainland capital? And again, I think this would be very interesting to study because I'm sure we will find some instances of outstanding success, and if one found them they might serve as models which would help us increase the frequency of this phenomenon. Another type of problem cited here was the school drop-out problem, which seems to be troubling many people. I think that's about eight or nine, I think the richness of that area suggests the extent to which that has been very important in the conferences, I think. Now, a fourth type of theme which I have heard has to do with what I call the implementation of public policy or the consequences of action programs. And I would say that the central feature of these problems that have been introduced is the following: People are able to cite illustrations of public policy which seems to have

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effects quite to the contrary of what the agency taking the action apparently really intended or, at least, had incidental consequences which far outweighed any of the evident advantages of the immediate program as instituted. And the feeling about these is that this condition might have been avoided if there was a different kind of connection between research and the taking of public action. Now, this involves sometimes post hoc sometimes prior study as the intended program of response by the social scientist. Probably the most outstanding example and one which is apparently a live issue immediately because programs are now being undertaken of this kind, has to do with the approach being taken to housing. I don't understand this problem fully because the reference to "caseri ' and things of that kind have no rich content for me. I have no apperceptive mask to go with it, but I strongly suspect from things that I have heard, that what is in issue here is something which is a very widespread problem all around the world and also inside the United States, and that is, that often the so-called public housing programs that are supposed to advance the welfare of the people who are forcefully moved, seems to lead to a disaster in every respect other than the physical transfer of the individuals. It is to say the people are not happier in their new housing, crime rates go up rather than down, juvenile delinquency tends to increase, nervous breakdowns tend to become magnified more and more rather than less, and everyone has a general sense of malaise. And yet the public authorities go right on building exactly the kind of housing that they have, from somewhere, got the idea was appropriate to build. And the feeling is that only if they would call on the social scientist and let him shape these programs, we would do better. (Now, I can't resist the temptation here to point out the idea of why not do studies in advance.) That in many ways this particular housing program is itself caused not by us, because we were from a later generation, but from an earlier generation of social scientists. Because the first studies that were done on juvenile delinquency startled the world by showing in a way that seemed absolutely conclusive, that 70 to $0 per cent of all the juvenile delinquency in all the big cities in the United States and, in fact, much can be shown in many other parts of the world, come from very small pockets of the community. When they examined the characteristics of those communities they were all slums. (This is the Chicago School of Sociology in particular.) They were characterized by deteriorated housing and by the invasion of industry into areas that previously had been housing areas and by the flow of immigration from outside the community into the community who settled in that one place, so the idea was: well, if it is all concentrated in this area which is a slum, let us destroy slums and in the process we'll destroy delinquency. And, in fact, this had clearly not been the outcome. But social scientists played a big role in that. I mean, not everything that we have done has had positive effects. Now, another illustration of an action program here has been the discussion of the problem of the open promotion system. It is not clear who started this thing, but there seemed to be some suggestions that we should either have more of this because that increases equality, or we should have

-278less of it because it reduces performance. I am not taking a position on it. I just cited this as an example of where we apparently feel we ought to do something and we ought to know a little bit more about what the consequences of our action will be before we take it. Another example is the call for increased participation. There seems to be a feeling that in Puerto Rico there has not been a sufficient involvement of the common man in many of the most important social processes of change. And, especially, the levels of his political participation have not been those that might be desired, and there are, I gather, various programs which are involved in going out more to the people and getting them to participate more directly in the process of change rather than having it imposed on them. But before this is undertaken, I assume that some kind of research might be relevant. There is a plea for decrease in bureaucracy. We would like to have less bureaucracy. Now, that's an almost universal plea, but it is an example of where someone feels that an action program is required, perhaps is about to take it, but we don't know exactly what would be the appropriate measure. Still another example would be the appeal to train people more to constructively accept change in the institutions in which they are located. This is especially illustrated by Dr. Roselló's point about what happens in many hospitals, for example. He would lice to have a big action program to train people to more freely and fully accept change in the institutional environments in which they live. Of course, that is connected with the problem of decrease in bureaucracy. Well, that ends my list; it doesn't exhaust those that were mentioned about action programs. Now, a fifth theme that I have heard I have labeled the (I'm not sure if this maybe shouldn't have come first) philosophical, or if you like it, the definitional, to put it in less grandiose terms, problems; these are instances in which, as a rule, very broad orientations have been opposed one to the other and the kind of characteristic of the statements that have been made have either been of the order of saying: you speak in favor of such and so, for example, modernization. What do you really mean by modernization? Can one meaningfully use such a term in the Puerto Rican context, and what would be the form which it would take in our immediate environment? Can we carry over the concepts from outside or will we have to abandon such ideas altogether? And then, after this has been clarified, there is often a tendency to pose one major orientation as against another, and a philosophical issue, therefore, often becomes a moral one. For example, we have had a lot of discussion of the theme welfare versus productivity. What happened here was that some people spoke a great deal about problems like productivity and interest in performance, others came along and said Aha, yes, but aren't you just really too quickly assuming that productivity is a good thing and what we wanted is perhaps in conflict often with welfare considerations? Or the theme was posed: can you really harmonize social change with economic change? And here the interesting idea waspresented

-279that perhaps Puerto Rico, in contrast to all other places,(and I'm not sure if it's all of the places, but certainly most others) should pioneer in a program of planned social change in which the social goals are established first and the economic goals should be adapted to what those social goals are. For example, one might accept the relatively low rate of economic growth in order to minimize certain impacts on family or value considerations. This is an issue which I think has run through the theme. Or the problem of values and goals. Can we define what are the goals which Puerto Rico really wants and should want, and how far do the goals which are established incorporate, encompass, or express the actual values of people? We had a substantial amount of discussion of this. Now, my sixth set of themes I call methodological issues. And the kind of problem that comes up here has been of this order. The most vigorous and, I think, clearly formulated position has been that of Dr. López-Rey, if I understand him, who feels that in the past the study of social processes and social change has been, or at least in the recent past, excessively behavioristic. He questions whether that is the best way of understanding the social processes in Puerto Rico, and I take it is much more in favor of what I, perhaps, would mislabel, institutional, hierarchical, historical types of analyses. A second type of issue that has been presented has been the problem of the long-term delay in getting research results out to the point where they can, in fact, be used in a meaningful way in affecting policy. The four to six year lag, I think Dr. Torruellas described it as being, which I think is generous. I have found in my experience, and I consider myself a well-organized researcher, that between the actual conception of a major piece of research and the publication of the definitive values on it, the lag tends to be 10 years, not 4 to 6. Now, that doesn't mean that there are not resolutions of this problem along the way, but one could discuss how one could combine the interests of the researcher who has abstract, long-range goals, which are sometimes personal, sometimes connected with his discipline, which generally lead him to undertake research which people support not because they are interested in him, but because they want to advance policy objectives. Elow do you get a pay-off, that will advance policy purposes without waiting until the cautious academic writes his final, thoroughly defended book, anticipating a conference like this where there will be 20 participants and 19 attacks on what he has done. Sometimes 20 because he may be self-critical. So, I see this is a very interesting issue which I will place in a methodological category. We discussed the problem of whether or not research should be more or less political, more practical or more value-focused which is, I think another one of these problems that could be reinterpreted as a methodological issue. There was raised the question, a very interesting one, I think, about research colonialism, which is the more loaded label for this, but certainly it is a very important problem in the Puerto Rican context, it is a problem that is manifested in all developing countries, about how far it is true that the forms of participation starting from the very

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conception of what you consider an important problem, is defined domestically or from outside. Furthermore, what are the forms of exchange between inside and outside, in terms of equality of power, in terms of command of resources? There is the old issue which is always brought up about exportation of data, which I gather to my surprise, is a problem in Puerto Rico not only for people who are Puerto Ricans, for those who are from abroad, but for Puerto Rican residents here because they don't have, for example, at the University a computer facility. So if you want to process IBM cards you must send them outside. This doesn't seem to me right; this University should have its own computer facility. That is suggesting an institutional way of making a change. But this is a problem that ramifies in all directions. Now I think very often here it is true about this issue that the emotional value and political considerations often may override the considerations of efficacy, productivity or relevance for policy considerations. It does not follow that research which has a large element of colonialism in it, may not in the end be the research which brings about the most change in Puerto Rico in the directions that those who have been colonially exploited as researchers, in fact, as political men wish to see advanced. It is a very complex isuse, and sometimes the other way around. The research that one can do domestically, that advances one's own interest and reduces the extent of actual colonialism, may have the least impact on those values or goals that, as a political man, one wishes to see advanced. For example, after listening to many of the discussions here, I would argue that Puerto Ricans should try to have most stories about Puerto Rican social research placed in stateside magazines and newspapers because those are likely to influence the people upstairs who buy Time and Newsweek, and if they see that story there they may have to do more about it than if it is somehow circulated only within Puerto Rican channels. I have a very important experience on that in my own research life because when I worked on the Russian studies, I was supported by the Air Force. I prepared a very big report, I worked years on it, I submitted it to the Air Force, and a friend of mine said to me: "Well, kiss that good-bye, you will never hear from it again." I said, "what do you mean? They have spent a fortune supporting this research. They told me over and over again how vital it is to them. They must pay attention to it." He said, "well, just wait and see". But absolutely nothing happened. So finally I went to him, and I said, "well, all right, I give up. There is no reaction. What do I do?" He said: "send it to the Harvard University Press and tell them they must print it immediately, and when they print it, have a big news release put out by the Harvard University Press. Distribute it to all the newspapers saying Harvard University study challenges government's conception of the nature of the Russian system. Well, we got remarkable responses. We had requests from every major agency of the federal government including the President's office. I have attempted to maintain a neutral position and simply to map what 1 have heard. Now, in doing that I have only, you

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know, one set of ears and my mind and that's not too good. So I may in fact have given differential weight to some of the themes that have been presented as compared to others and I may not have truly represented either the intellectual, or the emotional, or the political position behind various views that have been presented. I don't claim to any omnipotence, and in the discussion we will have a chance to correct these views. But I thought it might be useful to the conference to have this little map of what I have seen come through because I thought that might help us, then, in putting our finger down on either one type of problem or theme or some sub-units within those types which we are especially interested in. Because I rather doubt that we can do them all.

noon

Hansen:- I think we are all very much indebted to Alex Inkeles. I think we will have to go on to the other two presentations without discussion unless the group itself would like to consider the procedure issue. There is not time left to talk about what Inkeles has just said and then turn also to Cochran and Díaz Alejandro on the question of economics and status, and Clinard on urbanism. I see one possibility. We could have these two presentations in the time at our disposal and then, after all, one is free this afterand there will be some freedom perhaps also tomorrow to take up these general questions. My own predilection is to get what these men have to say before us and then, hopefully, more discussion can occur informally or later. If we stop now for a discussion of what Inkeles has had to say, it is easy to predict the other two questions can't come on the floor. I would rather have the presentations and hope they will pick-up the discussion at coffee, or bar, or tomorrow morning. Well, then I turn to Mr. Cochran followed by Díaz Alejandro on economic consequences of political status. Cochran:- In looking over the research in Puerto Rico over the last dozen or 15 years, I find that the various economic alternatives of different courses have never been comprehensively pursued. Probably, it is like the girl in Agapito's bar who said: "my status is not at issue". There has been an understandable reluctance on the part of scholars to delve into this question, because it involves problems highly charged with emotion. All I'm going to do is to suggest possibilities that might come from two possible changes in status, and suggest them very tentatively because, I think, Luz Torruellas knows more about this than I. Perhaps the only virtue of my speaking about it at all is that I speak as an outsider who isn't involved in any of the politics. In suggesting different economic alternatives, I will avoid discussion of the political mechanisms by which they might come about. If somebody were to look at present Puerto Rican statistics without knowing where the place was, and saw a country with 13 per cent unemployed, plus considerably more concealed agricultural unemployment that Barton estimates as high as 25 per cent, and saw a fairly poor income distribution that is heavy at the top, saw a good part of the Large

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savings that come from such an income distribution being invested in real estate or fleeing the country through the purchase of the securities of outside corporations, saw the major industries not taxed, the observer would probably say, oh, well, this is the usual thing, a country with a corrupt, reactionary government, where the landed class have gone into business, are running the industries and are avoiding taxation, and, as usual, shipping the money that they don't use for real estate speculation out of the country. But, of course, all of us Know, this is not the case. Puerto Rico has had a people's government, a good government that has not been corrupt, and has tried to pursue a progressive policy of internal taxation. The paradoxes point to the fact that Puerto Rico is in process of moving, rather rapidly, from one economic status to another. In other words, the present situation doesn't have great elements of economic stability in it, perhaps, even of economic desirability, for any length of time. I will take up two of the possible alternatives, either independence or modification of the commonwealth status and then Mr. Diaz will take up the commonwealth status as it is, and possible statehood. Let me say at the start that if you could really institute birth control all of these economic problems could be approached quite differently. If the child population could be reduced present school expenditures might become adequate and other burdens could be to=:en off the economy. I won't go into that. But, with things as they are, one result of independence would be a more flexible wage level. The Puerto Rican entrepreneur is caught now in a squeeze between trying to manage a mass-production technology which didn't come from his own devising, or arise from local needs, one which is partly exotic and anachronistic, while meeting the cost of an artificially high wage level, again one not resulting from the local labor market. Under these conditions the businessman must operate with a rather high degree of efficiency or else he is in trouble. Independence would probably be accompanied by more elasticity in wages and this ought, according to generally accepted economic principles, to be followed by an increase in employment. At least, we do know that artificially high wage levels have caused drastic decreases in employment in home needlework. The loss of employment in all needlework from 1950 to 1965 was 44,000 workers. The gain in employment from all forms of manufacturing, except home needlework, was 66,000 workers during the same period. Net gain in employment, 22,000 workers or about 7/10 of a aer cent of the population. I don't mean to equate these two things in a strictly economic way because of course the home needlework income was marginal, while factory employment produces a much better income. But I will say that Moscoso, when he was the head of Fomento, was so alarmed by the effect of minimum wage that he asked me to go to the Secretary of Labor and present the case for allowing a wage that would maintain home needlework. As you can well imagine, this all came to nothing, but, at least, you see in this an example of what I am getting at, that an artificially high wage can cut out areas of possible employment. Judging by the his-

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tory of other nations, I don't think that an independent status would be followed by wage cuts in Puerto Rico. What I would expect would be a devaluation of the Puerto Rican dollar in relation to world currencies, which uld reduce Puerto Rico prices in relation to export possibilities and then, probably, the initiation of some new types of employment which wouldn't have any existing wage levels at the time and, therefore, could, let's say, reach some kind of a normal level. On this basis, world mar1cets could probably be cultivated in textiles, in some forms of light machinery, and in sugar. The latter depending probably on cane cutting machinery which has been held back by difficulties in Puerto Rico but is said to be on the edge of successful introduction. Remember, I am not trying to go into the many difficulties of the process of this transition. There are two things that would ease the transition a little: an independent state would have tariff bargaining power which would get Puerto Rican products into places they don't go now, and Puerto Rican Consular offices which would be permanent trade missions. At the present time, there are no such missions for Puerto Rico, I believe, outside of the United States itself. Because of independence, a number of United States companies would probably leave Puerto Rico. It would not be economical, however, for them to ta:e what they have developed here along with them. kovement of heavy machinery does not pay in most cases. Some machinery could be moved, but in many cases the property would stay here, and then would raise the question: are there enough Puerto Rican entrepreneurs available to take over the vacant places left by the departing Americans? From the standpoint of procedure, all of these things are tied up in a kind of vicious circle. Because of the need of shifting markets and supplying entrepreneurs, the change shouLdn't be rapid. But if the change isn't rapid and there is a long period of impending independence there can be a little of the worst of both worlds, that is, withdrawal of United States enterprise at a point in time when Puerto Rico would not have tariff bargaining power and would not have a maximum ability to penetrate foreign markets. The other possibility of status change is some modification of the Commonwealth Act. I have already implied one modification which would be valuable to Puerto Rican enterprise, permission for Puerto Rico to set its own tariffs, provided the goods brought into Puerto Rico under those tariffs, or products made from them, were not re-exported to the continental United States. On this basis, Puerto Rico would not become a leak in the U.S. tariff wall, but Puerto Rico would be allowed to enter into trade bargaining for the purposes of selling its own products in other markets. Possibly, more power could be given Puerto Rico over its own finances, but it would be very difficult to get the United States Congress to agree to this. It is a possibility, that is, that the Puerto Rican currency could be set free from the U.S. currency and that Puerto Rico could be allowed to run its own fiscal affairs. I think this is so remote a possibility that it is not worth pursuing here. The real possibility of modification is probably in regard to tariffs.

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Díaz Alejandro:- Mr. Chairman, I will be also very brief, mainly because I don't know much about the Puerto Rican economy. I just can offer some general comments and hope that our Puerto Rican colleagues will amplify and express their ideas on this point. My instructions are to look at two alternatives open to Puerto Rico: the continuance of the present status, or Statehood. Let me say first that a good, comprehensive and up-to-date summary of the economic experience of the Last 25 years seems to be lacking in the literature on Puerto Rico. Here I go along with the comments of Professor Inkeles decrying lack of facts and an excess of "conventional wisdom." It will not be too complicated a project to put together available data in a systematic way to summarize the experience of the last 25 years. It could become a very interesting book, and one which would have a large public, not only here, but throughout the world.

Puerto Rico has a very interesting economy. Even a casual reading of the economic document which was distributed shows some facts which are known to most of the Puerto Ricans here, but which I found startling. Let me just run very quickly through some of them. We find a very open economy with imports being more than 50 per cent of the GNP (The Gorss National Product). The structure of exports shows heavy dependence on one market. Ninety-five per cent of the exports go to the U. S. and nowadays, apparently, 75 per cent of these exports are manufactured products. . The present structure of the manufacturing sector is also extremely interesting and quite different from that of most Latin American countries. About 60 per cent of the labor force in manufacturing is in just four "light" sectors: foodstuffs, tobacco, textiles and clothing. The service account in the balance of payments of Puerto Rico also shows a very striking fact. Tourism, until the last five years, was a negative entry, in other words, Puerto Ricans spent more abroad in tourism that foreigners or Mainland people spent in Puerto Rico. Given these and other facts, how can one visualize the future? Eiow will the economy change in the future if Statehood comes, or if the present status is continued? As a very broad generalization, one could for either case predict: "more of the same". Statehood would essentially mean the loss of the tax privileges. In the long-run, and I stress long-run, this is Likely not to be as important as it has been suggested. One could also guess, just on the basis of the economic history of other countries, that in the future, there will be more of what is generally called import-substitution. I was very strucx by the figures on the composition of the supply of some consumption goods. Even in such things as meat and its products, in 1)66 local production contributed less than 1/3 of the total consumption in Puerto Rico. Some figures strike me as being misprints; for example, in shoes, something which is considered light manufacturing, only produced domestical16 per cent of total Puerto Rican purchases ly. Luggage, only 9 per cent; jewelry, 3 per cent; even for tobacco products, the percentage produced in Puerto Rico is very low; the total consumption and this figure may be wrong but according to this source, only 5 per cent of the total consumption of tobacco

-285products in Puerto Rico is produced domestically. Hansen:- I think the figures are correct. wrong.

The economy is what's

Diaz Alejandro:- So there are a lot of branches of production into which the economy almost naturally will move, sooner or later. Of course, some protection for these industries would mean a tremendous expansion of their output, but I think that even without that, one will see a substantial expansion in the output of the light manufacturing which has been bypassed by the industrialization of the last 20 years and perhaps some growth in selected heavy industries. Now, how efficiently this will be done, and how fast, will, of course, depend on government policy and circumstances. But if we look at manufacturing in Puerto Rico 15 years from now, it seems like a. safe bet that the great increases in output and employment will come primarily from these sectors which up until now have been relatively neglected. I am not so bold as to predict what impact this will have on employment and on other economic variables, much less on social aspects, but one thing is certain. Some agency, and here I don't know whether this is the job for the social research center or for Fomento or for let's say, a Broo_cings-type institution, should be worrying about this' forecasting problem. Finally, let me mention that something s.hich should come with either Statehood or Continued Status is the development of new export lines. This is the point to which we already have referred when discussing new agricultural exports. It is very striking that now, according to these figures, only about 25 per cent of the exports of Puerto Rico are, according to the terminology of this book, agricultural. But this includes value added, I suppose, by manufacturing in sugar, value added by manufacturing in tobacco, so that purely rural exports must be, what, 10, 15 per cent? And for an economy like the Puerto Rican which has a weather which gives it the ability to produce fruits and vegetables all year around, it is a strikingly low percentage of rural exports. ansen:- Let me say that it is quarter to one. A few brief questions only. Mr. Clinard will then have the remainder of the session. Muíioz Amato:- I am sorry. I can wait and make the questions afterwards, I didn't inow that Mr. Clinard . . . Hansen:- It depends on how long they are. They are more convenient here and, on the other hand, I don't want to use Clinard's time. Munoz Amato:- Well, if he was waiting I think I should keep my question, and if there is time afterwards, tomorrow perhaps . . . Hansen:- Or if there is time, at one o'clock. ready.

We'll hold ourselves

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Mufioz Amato:- As you like. -iansen:- Yes. At this point, it seems to me equity is more important than coherence. Clinard:- I have a feeling that sometimes we have talked without recognition of the realities of the world we live in. Somehow, as I sit here, I think of La Perla, Buenos Aires, and little Tokyo out here, the "caseríos" I visited last time, my trip around the island, the small communities, and the Large ones. I suppose as an urban sociologist and a person interested in the community and in the group, I somehow think this way, and somehow I have seemed to have heard these last few days, with here and there an exception, tali of Puerto Rico that has little meaning to me. Talk of individuals and studies of individuals, of samples drawn from the whole island, and somehow, if I were planning change or planning research, I suppose my views would be a little different. I think in terms of local communities and perhaps of larger communities within the island. I think not of delinquents, not of individuals, but I think of groups of families. I think of groups; I suppose this is my approach. I think of the realities of the situation which we sometimes don't think of. If you are doing research, and if you are doing planning, the first and fundamental thing that seems to strike me in the island is urbanism, and urbanization. This island is now something like 49% urban and is estimated to go to 61% or two-thirds, and you are getting then almost as urban as many parts of the world in European countries. It presumably may even go higher. I saw one recent estimate of something like a hundred thousand families estimated moving to urban areas within a short time. You also realize that practically all the people who leave the Island go to areas of heavy urbanization and, I presume, return to a certain extent affected by this. I think this is important. What is taking place on this Island is a change in what I would call local community and social relations. There is a spatial and a territorial basis which involves, as I see it, not only a change in social relations but in terms of the heterogeneity of values. If you look at it this way, then, there is change in terms of communities and neighborhoods more than the larger urban collectivity. Many of the problems such as crime and delinquency of this Island seem to be focused primarily in the San Juan area and in two other large cities. It seems to me that these problems are related to the growth of slums and the growth of living in public housing or "caseríos". I think the discussion of neighborhood, of social class, of urban and rural differences, brings a seminar of this type down into the nature of realities. We can talk about these things in the abstract, but to me something should be said in the way of realities. One of these realities is the slum, the slum of Puerto Rico. This problem of slum life, which I gather is not limited just to the San Juan area but to some of the other cities in this island, may be a better frame of reference for examining the resistance to change and facilitation to change in terms of groups than in terms of talking continuously about individuals.

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My view of the slum, as I have seen it in many parts of the world, is that it is characterized by a certain degree of alienation, of powerlessness, of a resistance in many cases to change, largely because of attitudes towards outside public authorities and dependence upon welfare. It is also characterized very frequently by pronounced norms of sanitation and health concepts, family commonlaw relationships, and of prostitution, drug addiction, delinquency and so on. When we talk about the Puerto Rican we must realize that, as far as I can gather, a large proportion of Puerto Ricans live under these conditions or have lived under them in other parts of the country, namely in New York and Chicago. The urban world, as I see it, brings tremendous changes, and I don't know whether these need to be studied here. But as a frame of reference, I don't think that urbanization is necessarily linked with industrialization. We have evidences in other parts of the world where there have been extensive and catastrophic changes in tribalization without industrialization, without tourism, without Americanization or Europeanization, just by the presence of large collectivities of human beings in the form of cities. In an urban world, when a migrant comes in he adapts to new and unfamiliar ways of making a living, he has to become familiar with the new money economy, he has to learn to worn regular hours, he often has to become accustomed to the absence of close family and kinship living, he has to learn new forms of recreation, he has to adjust to quite a different physical setting, involving new kinds of housing, sanitation, and governmental regulation, which I call the institutionalization of governmental relations which the migrant has to face within the city. Now, as I see it, a problem of this type needs to be studied. I am very much impressed with some writing of Professor Frankenhoff on the social function of the slums. There is no question that the slums of San Juan, as the slums of the United States and the slums anywhere, perform an actual function in the economy, in furnishing certain kinds of labor at cheaper prices because of the housing conditions and other kinds of facilities for the readjustment. Urbanization appears to have its greatest effect upon the youth, in developing certain rinds of behavior, largely because of the breakdown in social control. I think I have to correct my distinguished colleage Inkeles about auto theft being the most common. It is by no means the most common offense; it is far less than the extent of burglary and of other kinds of larceny. I myself feel that any kind of study on delinquency must do much as Se11in and Wolfgang have recently recommended; that is, that we only consider those acts delinquent which if committed by an adult, would be a crime. This, I think, makes a much more meaningful analysis, and I gather, from my examination of Puerto Rican statistics, that it is this kind of offense we were talking about, not the throwing of bric.Ks, not the vandalism, but the actual commission by youths of acts which if committed by an adult would be called a crime, which I think have considerable seriousness. I also gather that these acts have become, in many cases, more and more of a violent and serious nature in the form of armed robbery, etc. Now, in the urban world these values are primarily

-288picked up in the slum areas and the "caseríos". The social control, then, should be primarily on a local community basis. Peer-groups under urban conditions have sets of norms and values which are much more receptive to norms and values of a form of recreation, or excitement, or fun, than they would have under rural conditions. There is need to study it. On the Mainland 4/5 of all auto theft is committed by boys under the age of 18. One-half of all burglary and one-third of all armed robbery is committed by boys under the age of 18. In the case of larceny, about 45 per cent of all theft is committed by youths under the age of 18. This kind of a problem is practically all urban, and I think this means that urbanization lies behind this, rather than poverty or a concept of anomie, or similar concepts like that. I suggest here very briefly the emphasis in my own paper on the study of the community. I was down in the old city last night, and while I didn't go down there as I have in the past, in the daytime, there I see the world of reality. I see it in these slums, I see it in the "caseríos", I see it in the small communities that I saw as I drove around the island. What you are talking about is different kinds of norms, values, and changes which are not those of individuals or families but, to me, of local communities. The impact of social change, in my own paper here, could be studied not only in the lives of individuals in cohort groups but also through local communities. There is need to study the extent of normative and communicative integration in local communities and their consequences on behavior. Slum areas, both old and new, and particularly new housing projects, should be studied in terms of their effects on migrants to the city and on the lives of persons who have lived there for longer priods of time. It would appear that slum norms and values are spread to new housing projects and the latter, because there may be little community feeling, may also facilitate the development of deviant behavior. The constant interplay between Puerto Ricans going to the Mainland and then returning, either temporarily or permanently, presents an interesting and important focus of community study. Such persons living as they do in large cities on the Mainland, and primarily under slum conditions, individually bring back with them new norms and values. I suggest, then, that the emphasis on urbanization and studies of communities is very important focus that perhaps we have not studied. I believe that this kind of emphasis brings us back to the realities of human life, what I call the ability to raise significant questions, to see life as it is, and the way people secure most of their norms in these small subcultures rather than in terms of an island as a whole, or of the individual as a whole. Hansen:- Muñoz Amato, I think you have time to ask your question, and I would like to make a suggestion about the sessions for tomorrow, and then, I think, we can suspend the meeting. Muñoz Amato:- Yes, I would like to answer Dr. Cochran or Dr. Díaz Alejandro or Luz (Torruellas) or Thorne, any of them, regarding

-289what things are relevant in the history of our economic development during the last, let's say, 20 years in terms of the problems that this seminar is facing with respect to what can be done by social scientists or social policy men to help in a similar type of process of improvement in other aspects of life. In other words, I think that we have had a great deal of success in terms of accelerating our economic processes. I think the measures from any point of view, despite all the defects, are there to prove this success we have had. Now, I know that there have been certain very valuable types of research, a certain degree of planning, which has been relevant. I also know how many lacks there have been in terms of both research and planning, and even in the field of policy decisions. I wonder whether you as economists and as students of these realities can help us with these other problems that we face by reviewing what it was that made this economic development possible, especially from the point of view of research, or planning, or promotion, or administration, or trial and error, or social forces, social determinism, resources available, opportunities that were present, all these things. Hansen:- There is no time for an answer. tay I suggest the following. Tomorrow the idea of the role of public policies will be our principal agenda. We will hear from Pedro Muñoz Amato, and I'm sure we will hear something from the Chancellor, Abrahán Díaz González. I will ask the following question. Is it possible that after these presentations and, perhaps, to relate them to what has been going on in this morning's session, that we could pursue general ideas about public policy in the direction of political status and the growth of the economy and in the direction of a housing policy with regard to cities and slums and the consequences of these on deviates or pathology, crime, and the administration of justice. I don't see it very clearly, but I would ask all of you to help me to put together a very interesting and somewhat coherent discussion. I would hope, at the same time, we could do a disparate thing, which would be to reserve some time for the very interesting comments of Alex Inkeles. López-Rey:- Mr. Chairman, in connection with what you have said, it seems to me that the exposé that Dr. Muñoz Amato is going to make tomorrow will raise some comments. In fact the question of public policy has not yet been discussed. We have been discussing social change, research, and quite a number of things. Therefore, I would like to suggest to start a bit earlier. Why don't you convoke the meeting at 8:30? Muñoz Amato:- In any case, we will have very little time for everything that is left. I don't want to take very much of that time, but you have listed a series of important questions and if we start at 9:00,then have a long recess, then stop at 12:00, is not this the schedule? Inkeles:- Perhaps the spirit of renunciation is in order.

I would

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like to support Dr. López-Rey in his suggestion that we will probably need the entire morning for discussing the issues which, I am sure, will arise from the presentation of Dr. Muñoz Amato. I am quite ready to give up any claim to time to discuss the model that I have presented if the people who are interested in having a further discussion of urbanism and crime as a special problem would also give up that special problem, allow this to come, as it may in the course of the discussion and have one single focus for tomorrow's presentation, which is Dr. Muñoz Amato's statement and then whatever comments we want to make about the problems in social change policy. Hansen:- Any objection to that? That would certainly add to the coherence and efficiency of the meeting. Let us then set out to do that, and with all this renunciation on the part of Mr. Inkeles and others, we don't have to get up earlier to start at 8:30. We can start then at 9:00 o'clock . f4uñoz Amato:- I appreciate very much the spirit of renunciation, but perhaps we are going to miss very important contributions by Dr. Inkeles and by the persons who are interested in the delinquency aspects. Maybe I'm trying to complicate things too much, but is it possible to have as much time as necessary tomorrow morning? Hansen:- Let us suspend the meeting with the suggestion that we all give it a pretty serious thought, and I would like to hear all your advices separately and perhaps also tomorrow morning just before the session begins. Secondly, o~ie can, after all, do the things empirically and see how we will go. We can all be conscious of trying to do something in three hours that accomplishes somewhat different purposes. We'll see what the questions are. L& ez-Rey:- About a quarter to nine? Hansen:- We will start at 9:00 o'clock. I think there are too many arrangements that have already been made in other ways.

-29124 FEBRUARY 1967: Hansen:- We can begin our last and fifth session of the seminar. I should like first to say that the Chancellor, Mr. Abrahán Díaz González, cannot be with us during the session. There is a meeting of the Board of Trustees of the University at 2:00 o'clock. Urgent questions have come up prior to the meeting which require that he call some of them and deal with them, and there is just no way to do that and to attend our session as he intended to do. We will have lunch with him at 12:00 o'clock and, therefore, we will suspend our meeting at 12:00 o'clock today instead of at 1:00 o'clock. Our principal issue today, to which Pedro Mufioz Amato, in the first instance, will address himself, is the question of the role of public policy, the relationship between science and politics, it might be put. We all recognize that this question has been coming up day after day; it has been in the sessions already. I think that as in the preceding four days, having first addressed ourselves to the principal issue of the day, we will then try, with some flexibility, to compare our var~us positions and ideas. I shall do my best as the Chairman to follow the two criteria I have followed all wee'z. One, of course, is to provide adequate time for each in his proper order, as he requested to speak, and at the same time, the contradictory principle of trying to find coherence in the discussion and to put together coherent statements. It should be perfectly clear that a Chairman can do little about this or as the speakers can do much about it, but as before, we will do what we can. Mufioz-Amato : - First, I would lii:e to say what is my frame of reference. The basic purpose of this seminar has been to explore in a preliminary way how we should plan, in the Rio Piedras campus of the University, research and other related academic activities on social change and social policy. Very much has already been said, since Monday, in the seminar on the relations between social science and social policy. I will try not to repeat, but it is inevitable that I have been instructed by these previous contributions. It is my prejudice to belong to what we may call the social policy group in terms of research, education, and perhaps some orientation of planning processes. With this prejudice, I will try to see how we can organize these activities in the University, trying to make possible the marriage between social science and social policy. In order to follow the trend of the previous discussion, I would lice to remind you of what Doctor Inkeles said about what he finds a possible order, a possible scheme of order in our discussions. -ie listed six main headings. First, what he thinks could be considered the study of institutional processes. Second, what could be called mapping social reality in Puerto Rico. Third,

-292focusing social problems. Fourth, implementation of public policy. Fifth, philosophical or definitional types of speculation or thinking. And sixth, methodological issues. Of course, there are different ways to approach or to appreciate what has been said. I think this is a useful, very useful scheme, and I think there is, of course, an idea behind it of the inter-relationship between all its parts and the continuum from what could be called more scientific or more descriptive analytical research, and at the other end what could be called more value-oriented or even simply value judgment type of analysis. In this continuum there may be many things depending on other aspects and other phases. I think that we look at reality, social reality, in Puerto Rico, not necessarily limiting ourselves to social change, but social reality, and we find that problems present themselves in such a way that it is inevitable to run the complete course from fact-finding to value judgments. These problems are never, I think, amenable to one's specialized, closed type of treatment, although it is possible to make a division of labor, certain people insisting more on fact-finding, perhaps of the study of individuals, others doing the same thing with groups, the interaction of people in groups; others analyzing larger communities, even some generalizations as to sub-cultures or the whole culture of Puerto Rico. But, at the other end, I repeat, there is always the problem of what relations there are between means and ends, and what problems of value judgments you find inevitably. It is instructive to loot at our experience in economic development. There was a decision to accelerate our economy in Puerto Rico because it was felt, in terms of value judgments, that it was a good means to provide for the poor people, for the majority of the people, the things that were assumed necessary for their lives. This decision was not taken after very detailed analysis of attitudes or preferences, or even patterns of behavior of the people. This was felt as a political necessity, as an inevitable opportunity in terms of available resources in the Mainland, the relationship with the United States, and other such factors. But it was a sort of value judgment and a priori decision in terms of experience, including the experience not only of Puerto Ricans here, but the experience that we get from other parts of the world, from similar desires and similar processes in other parts of the world. We wanted our industrial revolution, we wanted our social justice, as it has been wanted in so many other places. Now, this was not done in the beginning through very careful planning. There was not a programming of all the things that had to be done. There was a conjunction of leadership--Muñoz Marín, his Popular Democratic Party, and Tugwell, who was an experienced man in economic and social planning. What did they do, in the first place, before they had any plans? They set up institutions, they organized the Planning Board, the Bureau of the Budget, the Development Corporation, and other agencies in the government.

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They brought together in those institutions people with experience and leadership, and they also got advice from the economists. The economists, I remember, discussed at length all the plans that had to be carried out. But it was a very approximate, a very loose, a very ambiguous type of planning, as it had to be. Then they started devoting resources to this promotion and attraction of capital and .know-how from the Mainland. In the beginning, they did not want very much to do this, as I said before, because they were afraid of absentism, logically, of colonialism, and you must not forget that these slogans were very important in the elections of 1940. The Social Science Research Center started doing economic research within this circumstantial framework. The selection of projects was to a large extent oriented by these social forces growing up in Puerto Rico; and the first accounts of gross product and national income were made in the Social Science Research Center, to be continued afterwards in the Bureau of the Budget. It was a first start of research, a training of personnel and a transfer of these activities, which had to be kept up to date, to the government. These accounts clarify to a great extent the planning picture of economists. The profits going out of Puerto Rico were less than 1%. I think it was something like one-half of one per cent. The government reconsidered its policy of not wanting capital from the Mainland. There was a policy also of direct ownership and administration of enterprises, of new enterprises--the famous factories for the production of clay products, glass, cement, paper, and also the famous stores of the Agricultural Development Corporation. This was another policy that had to be revised, eliminated, as a matter of fact, by the government because of lack of capital, because the capital was not enough and administrative problems were very complicated. Here you have the lesson of administration, teaching the planners, as obstacles and difficulties were found in the action side, in the administration, of economic development. The planners were constantly learning, because planning and administration are two complementary activities, and planning depends very much on what goes on continuously in administration, as administration has to be guided continuously by renewed planning. Now, to a very high degree, economic development in Puerto Rico has been done by administration, by promotion, by trial and error, not knowing all the factors of social or human reality. I never forget all the efforts made at establishing some models in order to study labor productivity in a comparative way. Now, Si Rottenberg is a very good scientist. He tried very hard to establish some models for analysis of labor productivity comparing Puerto Rico with different parts of the Mainland and why it was that Puerto Rican workers could not produce as much and could not be as ef-

-294ficient as their Mainland counterparts. After much statistics and mathematics, it was obvious what could have been learned from previous experience, that labor productivity depends very much on management, on mechanization, on the interaction of people in a factory or in a group of work, and the possibilities of interaction are so many and the constant variability so high, the complexity so overwhelming, that you have to leave these to the trained supervisors and managers, to their adaptation to local political-cultural-psychological circumstances, to the continuous everyday, day by day, minute by minute adjustment, mutual adjustment of these people. Now, the workers in the beginning did not respond to incentives, economic incentives. They were absent from the factories after they got to the level of wages to which they were used, or perhaps a little above. And this was called absenteeism again-the word recurs. But, after a certain time, we no longer heard about absenteeism because the workers were beginning to respond to incentives. Supervisors were very crude in terms of their cultural conditioning and their personalities, as brought from the Mainland, but in time they were adjusted to these new situations. And there was more and more efficiency. It was always very interesting in the Minimum Wage Committee to find out that a Puerto Rican, producing in the needlework industry here a certain number of units per hour, would produce two or three times as much if moved to New York City, without any training, without any other change except this movement to new York City and to certain factories, with certain machines and certain supervision. My point is that you do not have to :snow all these details of human behavior. You have to rely on certain interactions in groups, certain leadership, certain factors of management, of promotion, of mechanization, and so forth and so on. Now, I repeat, my main theme is that economic development was done to a large extent through promotion and administration, training of people, attracting know-how and capital; and economic planning, even today, is very limited. Diaz-Alejandro was shocked by the news that we do not have as good economic planning as we seem to have, but this has been true all the time. If you go back and read all the economic programs of the Planning Board, now called the four-year program, those are not plans; they are just compilations of facts. They are not plans in any sense of the word. The annual budget is a better plan. There is more effort to state objectives and means and organization and allocation of resources, but it is not, as the planning process is not, an economic plan for national goals as Corrada has been saying.

All through this process we have become very much interested in economics. Remember that Muiíoz Marin even postponed the discus-

-295sion of our political relations with the United States in order to achieve economic development, and we have been so much influenced by this trend of economic development that we have forgotten to pay attention to other aspects of social reality, for which economic development is a means, although economic development has a lot of importance in itself. Now, we have come to a stage in which we are not so happy, not so enthusiastic. Why? Because we are beginning to realize the complications coming out of intensive economic development and social change. And even though social change is a normal process that goes on almost inevitably in any society, it is also true that social change can be more intensive, more accelerated in certain stages, in certain places, in certain periods of time, and we have been going unquestionably through a period of very intensive economic and social change. Now, we see the symptoms: we see increasing rates of delinquency. The statistics of delinquency are a mess, and nobody mows what is going on in the statistics; and it is not possible to make comparisons even between the present five years, the last five years and the previous five years, because they have changed the system of statistics. But, in spite of all the errors, we Know there is a trend of increasing delinquency. Now, how much do we know as to the factors, the causes of delinquency? What does criminology have to say in terms of prevention of delinquency? Is it true that we can predict who can be a delinquent? Is it true that we can isolate factors and think they are causes of delinquency? Or isn't it true that there is a combination of many factors, in many possible inter-relationships, and that we do not know enough as to how to prevent delinquency? How do we do it? Through the schools? By putting all children in schools? Half of the juvenile delinquents are in schools. I understand that the other half is out of school and out of work. How do we do it? Do we provide work for them? Is it true that the highest rate of unemployment is, I think, from age 15 to 21--33%? Isn't that right, Mr. Reimer? Reimer:- It is around there. Munoz-Amato:- 33% unemployment, while in the rest of the population it is about 10%. So we .now there are a lot of children out of school, especially from 12 to 18. I understand only half of the population between 12 and 18 go to school. Check me, Reimer. Reimer:- I think it is more than that. ured, are dropouts.

A hundred thousand, I fig-

Mufioz-Amato:- But it must be close to 50%. These are the same kids that do not have any work. But unemployment is higher, and these are the ages of more intensity, of more incidents in delinquency.

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What is it, 16 to 18, where the most intensive delinquency rates are? Reimer:- Fourteen (14). Mufíoz-Amato:- Okay. So, we have these gross appreciations, but the details of individual behavior or small groups, the family, or the neighborhood, the community--that we do not know, and it will take a long time, a lot of researches to find out, and it is a dynamic process, changes continuously, the variability factor is enormous. So we cannot wait to do certain things. We now that the administration of justice is very inefficient; that is evident. You see it in the dilapidated buildings, in the lack of resources for anything. There is one training official for the whole administration of justice, the personnel force is about 1,500. One person in charge of training. There is no training. Now, lawyers are not trained to become judges. There is no special training for judges in Puerto Rico. The judges sent to the Minors Court are not specialized. They are not trained. Some of the worst judges in the other secto:rs are sent to the Minors Court because this is supposed to be easier, not so complicated, not so important. Now, the directors of the Minors Court are constantly complaining that they do not have the resources; they do not have the psychologists and the psychiatrists and the tests and the social workers. They do not have the means with which to work. That is evident, and that is very well known. Then, what about our institutions for the correction of juvenile delinquency? Well, you know that these places probably are factors of delinquency. They probably complicate things even more, and there is a mixture of different types of sickness with other types of deviation like delinquency and homosexuality, and these institutions do not have the personnel, the psychiatrists, or the psychologists, or the social workers. It is a very sad picture of neglect, of lack of resources, of lack of personnel, of lack of leadership, in contrast to the success of economic development at which we e looking before. The same story goes as to the penitentiaries, the correctional institutions for adults. There is no planning and no coordination worth speaking of among all these agencies. In the hearings of the Civil Rights Commission, we asked the President of the Planning Board whether there had been any research or any planning to improve this situation of the prevention and correction of delinquency and he said: not in the Planning Board. He said so very frankly. Why? He argued that it belonged to the specialized agencies, the specialized agencies being the Department of Justice for adui.t correction, the Department of Health for juvenile correction, the Judicial Branch for adjudications, the Police and others for aspects of prevention, like the Department of Education,

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the Department of Labor, the Department of Health itself. So, there in no coordination, no central planning, no integrating planning. And why--we asked him--have you not thought of the need of coordination, which is there for everybody to see? He said: because we do not have trained personnel in the Planning Board to do social planning. We have tried and we have failed. The Planning Board failed very notoriously when it tried to make a master plan for the Metropolitan Zone and stopped all new projects of urbanization for a period of, first, six months, and eventually about three years. At the end, after a lot of expenditure and bringing together a lot of people, there was no master plan. There were only a small set of guide lines for certain requirements inside each housing project, but that is no planning of the urban processes in Puerto Rico. So, we have a very sad case in general of lack of social planning in the Planning Board, and we can see it in the delinquency sector in a very concrete, very dramatic way. Of course, the criminology aspect may be the worst part of our situation. But you can find similar things going on in terms of mental health, not because the government does not have such good programs, not because the government does not have such good planning, because there is a lot of effort, especially being done by Roselló and his group. But in the Planning Board, what do we have about these things? In the Bureau of the Budget we have more, but not in the Planning Board. Now, you take the other social aspects. How much do we know about the Puerto Rican family? We make generalizations, but what do we know about these processes of social change and the continuous need for readaptation and the strains of re-adaptation which are inevitable by-products of social change? This to me is the importance of social change. It is not that you call it good or bad, because there are many things involved in this complexity. It is not that you try to make a modern man who is always adapting to change, because sometimes it is better not to adapt to change. It is better to try to re-orient or modify change or even to preserve your traditional patterns, your traditional values. The modern man that Doctor Inkeles has found may have preserved some traditional values. I am sure of that. The appreciation and care of children is not a new thing in human life. Now, the desire to fulfill a role is very old. The economic drive to get the material things of life is also very old. These are not modern things. I think modernization is a misleading word. What we really have is a very intensive period of transition and change all over the world in terms of Western culture, and we are having the repercussions of that intensive transition in Puerto Rico. And we are having it, with a lot of influence from outside because of our dependence with respect to the United States and because there are such easy ways of communicating in the whole

-298world, and economics transcends national and political barriers. We are driven by science, by technology, by economic development, by all these material improvements in life, and we are driven at a very fast pace, and we do not understand very well what is going on. And most people do not know what is going on, and they cannot adjust always. They have to be re-adjusting so intensively, and so many times, that sometimes they do not know how to re-adjust, and sometimes they should not re-adjust in terms of accepting destructive values or destructive patterns of behavior. They need leadership, they need instruction, they need education, and sometimes they need treatment, as delinquents or as mentally ill, or as physically ill, whatever it may be. Now, with these considerations in mind, I think that we should be very flexible and very eclectic in terms of our methodology. It is not true that the social sciences have advanced so much in the descriptive aspect of their task. We should strive to do it. We should work always very hard, and we should devote a lot of resources to this aspect of our methodology, but we are very much lagging behind the natural sciences, as it has to be. Our problem is more complex and more variable, and we are always involved in our own personal projections and preferences as human beings. And there are other difficulties that we do not know. While we strive to improve our scientific, in the sense of natural sciences, methodology, we have systematic ways of dealing with problems which are not irrational, which are not completely ambiguous, which are not abstract, because we can learn from the experience of other countries through many centuries, and we can learn from our own experience; I do not think any government today can do without planning, and without a central coordinating plan, specifically. I do not think anybody would argue that we do not need a budget, a central coordinating budget in government. Nobody would argue that training managerial know-how and supervisory techniques is not essential in economics and administration. Yet, you find that in other aspects of human activity, like education, there is almost no planning. The Department of Education has been without a central coordinating office of planning until about two years ago. It had a physical planning office, but there was no substantive academic institution to gather leadership and to concentrate on programming, what had to be done in terms of educating the children, from there to derive the physical plan. It was the other way around: physical planning dictated the substantive decisions in many instances. There was some planning going on in the decisions of the Secretary, in the groups he has there for curriculum revision and other offices. There was some planning, but there was no central coordinating, intensive work of looking at the whole picture and trying to make a sensible program. Now there is an office of planning in the Department of Education.

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In the University, we have had very little planning of the substantive type. With all this Social Science Research Center and other research units like the one we had in the Superior Educational Council, which was very useful also, with a lot of people who know about planning, there was no central office of planning in the University. There was an office mostly devoted to physical planning. The same situation of the Department of Education. Now, there could be other examples, but I am taking too much time. My point is that we should learn from these experiences, that we should use all the possible approaches to the problems as they appear in reality. Something, as has been said by Franco Ferracuti and Rafael de Jesús-Toro in their paper, which was discussed yesterday: that we should organize a unit in the University, in the Río Piedras Campus, not only for research, but also for planning research projects that can be carried out outside in other parts of the University or in other parts of the government. Now, this unit could perhaps help the Research Center they have in the College of Education to plan the educational research that is needed in so many different aspects, combining with other research projects dealing more with social reality. It could also give technical assistance to the Planning Board or the Bureau of the Budget, or again to other parts of the Department of Education and the University, technical assistance in terms of what they should do to find out, to understand these processes and to orient their programs. It is not that we are going to dictate the values. Do not worry. There is not such a risk. There will be enough opposition. There will be enough competition, but we should give all our informed judgment and let it be considered as others want, as others have to decide. We are educators, we are not only researchers; we have to teach. Now, we teach as we know, presenting different alternatives. We can present our honest value judgments and they can judge; those that have to make the authoritative decisions. They check them with their political leadership or with their political constituents. They have to do it. There is no other way in our system. Now, Franco Ferracuti, who is very scientific and who is finding out a lot in terms of individual behavior of juvenile delinquency, who has already a very good hypothesis as to damage in birth or mental illness, he also goes around teaching. Let us give him the credit for that. He is not only a researcher. He goes to the Department of Justice and he proposes training programs, and he is going to organize in his criminology _program a training program. And López-Rey goes to check the project they are drafting now for the new Penal Code and criticizes many things that are adopted by the people who are developing this model, although it may not turn out to be as good as he hopes; but these

-300are value judgments, these are the norms of criminal justice. That systematic, academic, Legitimate activity, we cannot be afraid of that. Now, how are we going to study the political processes? That is playing with fire, but if we are going to study a constitutional problem of academic freedom, or if we are going to study a constitutional problem of civil rights, there is no attitudinal research, there is no opinion po11, there is no participant observation or cohort technique to use. It is an analysis of norms in the cultural context because law is always a factor of social control in a social context, and we all know about sociological jurisprudence and the living law type of analysis. But we do not resign ourselves not to make anything, not to do anything, not' to present value judgments in terms of these norms. We are constantly arguing in the University what the norms of academic freedom should be and we argue that with our students and we try to bring changes in the University regulations and laws in terms of academic freedom. Now, if we have a unit in the University with this flexible approach doing research, planning of research, advisory work for the planning of research in other places, training of people, technical assistance, are we outside of our scope of academic work? Are we transforming ourselves into something that we really are not? I do not think so. This is the experience in the program of criminology. This is the experience in the Planning School, which was created two years ago. It is training planners, planners for the government and other institutions. It is the experience in the College of Education, that trains the teachers, most of the teachers for all the schools in Puerto Rico, for better or for worse. And there is need of improvement in that field. Now, I do not now where these units should be located. Probably in the Social Science Research Center, perhaps, provided that it can be a center of promotion, stimulus, and to some extent collaboration with other parts of the University. If it cannot do that type of interaction, then it is not going to fulfill its purpose. The series of activities and research projects that are needed in this field of social change and social policy cannot be done in one single place. It would be foolish to attempt that. There has to be a utilization of all available resources and institutions. There has to be collaboration also with the School of Medicine, the Program of Psychiatry, the School of Social Work, the other graduate schools of the College of Social Sciences, Economics, Public Administration; also collaboration with History and the Humanities. I have already mentioned the College of Education, the School of Planning, the Department of Education, the Department of Labor. It is only a center of activity that we want to create. Now, I may be all wrong, but that is what I have to say. Hansen:- Thank you, Mr. Muíioz-Amato. requests to speak.

I already have a number of

-301Clinard:- I find myself very much intrigued with the remarksthat I have just heard. I think some comments that I would Like to make are quite relevant. This, of course, is only my second trip here and perhaps I speak without knowledge. I feel that to accomplish some of the objectives you have mentioned about using the University for more basic research and for planning and developing of the Social Science Research Center, something has to be done to develop a wider expansion of University activities. I feel that the persons who do this kind of research, for the most part, are graduate students. Most professors cannot do it themselves. I think myself that there is a great need for the expansion of graduate work. I would hope that it would proceed into the Ph.D. level here at Puerto Rico. If not that expansion, begin at the M.A. level. I fear also that without this graduate expansion, there probably is, I suspect, a brain drain that takes place here in Puerto Rico in the sense that many of the students getting their graduate work go to the Mainland, and I fear in many cases do not return. That they possibly might stay here more if there were more graduate work, in particular, of course, in the social sciences. I know there is graduate work in social work, in the Medical School and Law, but in the Social Sciences and I had hoped that it would go through to the Ph.D. level. I think again from what I can see, the Social Science Research Center carries an unnecessary difficult burden here. Not unnecessary, I mean, a difficult burden in attempting to do research without graduate students. I can think of the Mainland where we have a great deal of this. Now, it is not only the research done under the direction of a given professor, a research-professor, but it is also the fact that their studies, the M.A. and Ph.D. dissertations, build up a body of research which would be relevant to Puerto Rico. I think sometimes that the total number of these done by different graduate students is rather enormous, no matter whether the professor undertakes such things at all. There is another aspect that bothers me and that, of course, is the problem of modern research quipment here at the University and on the Island. I suppose in some way this is a vicious circle because things are sent out to be processed, either taken by Mainland professors home, to use there some equipment or, as I understand, using the facilities of IBM. It means that there is not adequate training of eithe the professors, I think, at the University or, perhaps better still, the students in programming of research, statistically, sing statistical technique and so on. I think again the need for computers and other high level statistical machines is quite important to accomplish the objectives you mentioned of the University being a research center and

-302a policy planning center. Now, I see this as a major problem: the expansion of graduate work in the social sciences and the providing of equipment to build up both research assistance to men who wish to do research, to building up data research studies of their own. Now, I think, of the need for more equipment. It seems to me that among the professors themselves there is perhaps more of the kind of thing that we have in Wisconsin--men who are virtually research professors. I myself feel it is a great mistake to make a man completely that, because I think he gets most of his ideas in the classrooms. But I mean professors perhaps only are two-thirds in research and only one-third teaching. I certainly think that a complete research professor would be a rather stagnant man. Furthermore, if you loot: over the social research studies, most of these studies, while extremely impressive, have been done by men from the outside, practically all of them. Looking down the list, practically all of them are from the outside. A man like Rogler, who was at one time in Puerto Rico but actually, of course is an outsider. I think this is regrettable. A man coming from an outside semi-cultural situation does get hypotheses, he does see things in a different light and possibly has in some aspects, at least, a framing of certain hypotheses, sees the situation somewhat differently than a person in it. I know from my own research in India, I sometimes saw things completely different from an Indian, being an outsider. But, on the other hand, I think what is gained there is lost in the real familiarity with the situation by persons actually in a culture. These studies need to be worked out much more here at the University, and I think graduate expansion seems to be partly the secret for this. Another thing that bothers me in what we have talked about here, particularly the very stimulating remarks that I have just heard, and that is one of the first things we need to find out: just how much is Puerto Rico really unique. We have really, I think, a massive amount now of research on the problem that you were talking about of delinquency on the ^Mainland, really a massive amount, and this is being supported through government grants. Now, I don't know whether Puerto Rico in some cases really has to study everything in Puerto Rico, with Puerto Rican data, Puerto Rican studies, or whether much of this is not applicable. Looked at from a conceptual and theoretical point of view, much of the basis of human behavior is fairly much the same the world over. There are certain cultural variations. I have done research in Sweden, and I have done research in India, and I do not find there is great shift between the two. One of them, of course, does not have the Protestant ethic, the case of India. There are

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things I have to watch for, but on the whole there are many, many things that seem to be the same. I have tried to write in a recent book about the slum as though it was in Latin America, in Africa, in the United States, and I think there are many common things about it. One of the first things that seems to me in your stimulating remarks is to find out really what is different about Puerto Rico. If we find out that there is not as much that is really basically different about Puerto Rico from the Mainland after all, some of these things we have talked about values are not quite that important. And it seems to me that what we have is to go back to your policy application, the application of massive amounts of information that we would gather and collect, and apply it to a Puerto Rican situation. Perhaps a lot of this research that we have talked about is unnecessary. I myself feel that way, and comparative research in other places might add to that. In other words, I think this is an important problem to think out and discover. Now, I suppose this would really mean what you-I think you put it very nicely--what is the Puerto Rican family like. If it turns out that some of these things are not of the character that we thought they were, perhaps then the material on the changing family, research from the Mainland, would be then immediately applicable. Hansen:- Pedro, do you want to make a reply'? Frankenhoff:- I will comment briefly on something which many here are much more qualified to speak of, and I hope that we can discuss this briefly during the morning. And that is: that it would seem that in some sense the Social Science Research Center as an institution focuses this science policy attention, which we have been discussing, or can focus it or can distort it, and we have developing--again coming back to this notion of transition--we are now perhaps in the University in the same period of transition reflecting the transition in the country itself. So many things needed doing before. But now we come to the point where coordination is completely necessary so that the growing Planning School, the growing research center, the growing elements of a graduate school-because, unfortunately, we have no graduate school except in hope,--all of these are beginning to clash more and more, which is good, because I think that problems are being brought to the fore which were pretty well ignored before. Unfortunately, we need a disease or a pain before we do something about it. At the same time, I would be afraid--using a kind of Occam's razor--to multiply institutions unnecessarily. It seems to me it would be much better to evaluate the institutions we have. And I would like again to focus this on the Research Center. How can this serve the cause of social planning, so well emphasized by Doctor Muffoz-Amato, and how can it serve too, as a kind of founda-

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tion if you will? Díaz-Alejandro mentioned a kind of bridge between the academic community and the government and your agencies, so that here is not the great design institutionalized, but a point of focus, a point where the academic and the non-academic technical people feel at home. So, I would just like to present this as an open question, but it seems to me that it is an important one at this time. López-Rey:- I was very much impressed by the exposé made by Doctor Muñoz-Amato, and I would like to comment on it briefly and to the point. The exposé he has made shows the typical trajectory of social policies in practically every country and not only in Puerto Rico. I would like to say this: As moving forces in Puerto Rico as elsewhere, we have, first, political policies and interests, secondly, vested interests for financial and economic reasons some compatible or incompatible with political programmes and thirdly, needs which are supposed to be attended to and satisfied by political programmes and financial resources. As recipients and actors, we have the individual, the groups, the community and also the institutions. As far as mobile forces are concerned, too much stress has been granted to financial and economic problems, the question of production and the question of consumption. Regarding recipients and actors, the individual has received far more attention than groups, communities and institutions. This is partly the sequel of the prevailing individual behavioral approach to the study of social problems. The fact that in some respects Doctor Ferracuti and I have different views is advantageous in the sense that we supplement each other and what one misses is supplied by the other. Regarding public policies mostly favouring economic progress I should say that in all countries, developed or developing, the increase of social and welfare policies, higher standards of Living, greater production has no parallel in physical security which is lacking more and more in cities, towns and even in the country. One of the contemporary characteristics: the greater social security, the less physical security. We are making enormous progress in many respects, but we are losing ground as far as the protection of human rights and physical security are concerned. I still remember the recent case of the opening of the museum of Cleveland. The engraved invitation informed that unless by bus guests should not cross the park which separated the hotel from the Museum because of the vandals and risk involved. This is the case not only in the United States but in many other countries. The truth is that progress in quite a number of directions has not brought at the same time greater physical security and more respect for human dignity. This lack of balance implies a unilateral conception of progress and the need that criminal policy occupy its place in public policy.

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I should say that here in the University I have noticed that between the Social Research Center, for example, and the Planning School there is no connection and even less coordination. We have here two institutions that know each other, greet each other, but do not go beyond that, and since we are thinking of the convenience of better planning and performance and of injecting criminal justice in social policies and programs, it seems that a certain approach has to be made. In bringing criminal justice into social policies three main aspects should be considered. First the way to bring criminologists, in the planning and formulation of social policies; secondly, how to make more effective and less expensive criminal justice in Puerto Rico; and third how to reduce the concept of crime. As example of the latter point I should refer to the necessity of reducing the meaning of juvenile delinquency instead of inflating it constantly. In this connection Sellin has been mentioned but in fact he merely refers to the recommendations of the United Nations Congress of London in 1960. In Puerto Rico the concept of juvenile delinquency is grossly inflated, exaggerated and distorted. Consequently the statistics on juvenile delinquency are terrifying particularly to those who are not in the secret, but the truth is that you have a problem which to a great extent is inflated. This does not mean that juvenile delinquency is not a problem in Puerto Rico but simply that it has to be understood first and secondly reduced to its own proportions. In this respect I regret to say that most of the studies, surveys, discussions, papers and conclusions on juvenile delinquency in Puerto Rico follow patterns that inevitably lead only to generalities. As for research, obviously more is needed provided it is not that undertaken to prove a particular theory. More specifically criminological research has to be re-evaluated before it is encouraged. In this respect the Social Research Center should play a primary role. I agree with Professor Clinard that what has been done in certain countries is applicable here. But the question is what should be chosen from outside to be applied here. Somebody has to make the selection, to make an analysis and this somebody has to know at least to some extent, what has been done outside and what has been done here and what Puerto Rican reality needs. This brings back again the question of performance and this time from an individual point of view. This means that personalism should be avoided, also as mentioned by our Dean of Studies the need of coordination. This coordination is still lacking here. Hansen:- In each case, I think, MufSoz-Amato, I will just proceed unless you would like to reply. Muffoz-Amato:- I agree with everything so far.

So I think.

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Hansen:- This is an exceedingly tranquil morning. Let us all enjoy it at least until this characteristic should change. Ferracuti:- Only two very brief comments: One, the criminality aspect, and I really would like this to be off the record, if possible. (OFF THE RECORD) Hansen:- We are now on the record. Ferracuti:- Again, for the reasons that professor López-Rey expressed, it is not my place to say where this program should be. I agree, incidentally, there should be such a Social Research Center. That much I will say, but how to structure it, that is r ie of my business, luckily. I would question the uniqueness of Puerto Rico. In this I would back Professor Clinard. There are other countries around the world where the experience is very similar to the Puerto Rican one. Sardinia in Italy is a very, very close example. But there are certainly many others. The problem becomes to select from what is available. Now, it is a task for this center or program or whatever it could be called. There are several tasks. One is coordination, obviously. We tried to make a plea for it in our paper, and I do not know how much of that is acceptable to the group as such. There is an obvious function, apart from coordination, for inter-discipline in this kind of studies. Nowadays no single discipline can claim the patronage of all the answers. Another function is a matter of selection and of priorities in terms of available opportunities, available staff, and that is a crucial point here in the Island. Another function is that of clearing house of available information. There is a feeble attempt on the part of the Planning Board to do something Like this in a report of existing research, but it is always outdated, very short and depends entirely on the goodwill of the researchers. The facts of the matter are that we duplicate research very frequently, even in Puerto Rico. There is another function in methodology, adequate methodology. And this, of course, ties in with the need for graduate work. But, occasionally, the methodology leaves some of the things to be decided and there is an obvious need for centralized computer facilities. It is strange that the only available computer of any size here belongs to the racetrack. I do not want to belittle the importance of the racetrack but aren't we as important as the racetrack? Mufioz-Amato :- I would like to clarify that it is very difficult,

-307Franco, for any plan envisaging this center as something with authority to plan or to coordinate or to dictate anything in the University. It is absolutely impossible because of social reality. You know that. It would be perhaps good to have a center for stimulating, persuading, trying to coordinate through persuasion, through collaborations with different other units in the University and the government, but authority . Ferracuti:- Pedro, I did not notice your direction in the thoughts of this thing. I am sorry. I agree with you entirely. It would be impossible. Muñoz-Amato:- All right. agreement.

I thought so.

So, we happen to be in

Padilla:- Well, I must confess that I have been in the University only about a year and a half now. So, maybe some of the remarks relative to research and to the inner workings of the University might be incorrect, but as a person who came in on a new position, trying to get the Planning School organized and trying to get a lot of research going on, because we felt that we could not have a graduate program of planning organized unless we had a strong back up in terms of research, I found out and I think that in terms of research something has to be done at the University and I--although I believe, I agree that most of the research activities will have to be done through coordination and stimulation and so on--I, however, feel that much more than that has to be done. I think that the University has to establish a very clear-cut policy as to the need for researchers, especially if we are going to have good graduate schools. I do not think we can afford to keep on having graduate schools work with a very limited amount of research going on. So, therefore, I think that if the University recognizes the need for graduate schools, that then it must give a clear-cut direction to the research effort because this would also require resources, and there will be competing demands for the resources, between just plain classroom activities and research activities, and somebody in the University hierarchy will have to decide. So, I feel also that if we are going to have good research in the University, we must decentralize the research activities in the sense that a lot of freedom must be given at the lower levels, at the different faculties and programs, and opportunity for the professors to generate research. So, therefore, I do not think that we can have a highly centralized research activity, although I think that we must give some direction to it and that every faculty should be in a sense responsible for carrying our research. Therefore, the possibility of having one body, be it what it might be, belonging to one faculty of the University, controlling the whole research effort, I think should be studied carefully.

-308Perhaps, if there is going to be a central committee or coordinating research body for policy determination, I think it might well be that it belongs to the Dean of Studies. Maybe also this coordinating effort and direction belongs to the Office of the Dean of Studies rather than to a specific institution within a department. Because what might happen is that then the other departments, the other faculties do not really get interested or involved in research. However, I feel that the crucial things that should come out of this research . . . I mean, of this seminar or conference, is the fact that before we can really go into this coordinating effort, I would venture to say that the first issue that presents itself to us is the fact that studies should be carried out to determine what are the major issues in terms of social policy in Puerto Rico. So that this should be the guiding effort in having the Faculty of Education, the School of Planning, the Faculty of Social Science, the Faculty of Law. They all are going to have research activities, but before we can go about coordinating them or even giving some kind of direction to them, I think the first attempt in any kind of research activity should be to try to delimit what are the fundamental social policy questions that we face now in terms of social change and this, I think, the Planning Board has not given us. I do not think that there is any agency in Puerto Rico that can provide this information, and perhaps this should be the first research in the sense of defining what areas of social policy are so crucial at this time and what is the order of priorities, because there will be competing demands. The amount of funds we are going to have are not going to allow us all the research we might want to do, especially if we integrate more local people into the research, which I think is mandatory, and I do not think there is any other way about it. Then this means that both in terms of financial resources and manpower resources, we are going to be limited. Some kind of a priority allocation must be made, and I believe that this first effort should be directed in that direction. So that once we have this defined, then it could be carried out later on. It could be through persuasion, through financial strings and through other ways. It should be then directed through some kind of an agency high up in the hierarchy of the University, and I think, personally, the best place might be the Dean of Studies for this. Muííoz-Amato:- I think these are very good remarks. First, as to coordination or a center of direction, it is not possible to have it, certainly not in the Office of the Dean of Studies. The Dean of Studies is one more Dean trying to find his way around, sometimes persuading, sometimes not persuading. It is not possible to centralize research in this way, but these are the other possibilities:

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Now, we have the criminology program taking care of the whole of criminal justice. So we do not have to think that this new unit would have to take very much of this sector of delinquency and criminal justice. But take, for example, the education processes. There is a new Research Center in the College of Education. Very much can be done in collaboration with the Department of Education which, incidentally, must intensify very much research and planning. I think it is doing very little in research. Perhaps the lack of resources accounts for that, but there are very interesting experiments going on in the Department of Education with some Model Schools. Now they want to set up some centers of demonstration, of teaching methods and perhaps of training teachers, practice, and we can help them, Millard, in terms of analyzing the location of these centers, cultural factors around them, and there can be a three-way collaboration between the new unit, the Research Center of the College of Education and the Department of Education. Of course, the College of Education does many other things for the educational system of Puerto Rico, but we are talking now of research and planning. Now, the School of Planning is training personnel for planning in the governmental agencies, including the Planning Board. There should be research in the Planning School. There is already research, and Rafael Corrada and others are advising the Department of Education on its general overall planning, with a mutual agreement with the University. Now, let us take these studies of the family, o£ the Puerto Rican family. Those have belonged in the past to the Social Science Research Center, not in any specific unit. Would they be in our new unit of social change and social policy? How much could be done? How much help from the Department of Health or the Psychiatry Program of the School of Medicine? For many of these things we will have to go outside of the Río Piedras Campus. But we are not thinking, we are never thinking of one centralized place where everything is to be done. It is only a small, tiny cell to stimulate other programs and carry on research of its own in certain aspects. Would you agree, Millard? Hansen:- I would certainly agree, but I was bemused at the statement about family planning and where it ought to be and what we need. This is an old story. We had all the coordination in the world of everybody in Puerto Rico by 1.959, the enthusiastic cooperation of everybody but one, and since he was Governor, there was nothing. So I think that I am concerned with who is Governor if you are talking to me about family planning, as well as the other agencies you have mentioned who were very friendly to this planning. As to the direction and authority of any unit or center or fomenter of social planning research and activity, I would agree with what you have said. Ferracuti has 2greed also. No unit of

-310that kind could have authority, could direct authority. It would have, it seems to me, to stimulate, to encourage and to facilitate. These are the words that would come to mind, it seems to me.

Feldman:- Some very brief comments. When Doctor Muíioz-Amato described the situation that gave rise to the economic development concerned, what it suggested the distinction between purpose and planning, and if I understand what he was saying, he was saying there was a great deal of purpose in the various people concerned and involved, but that that purpose did not translate into planning and that we have, with regard to some of these other issues today, perhaps, a comparable situation that we perhaps are a little earlier in the game and, therefore, can begin questioning the way in which one can translate purpose into planning. And it would seem that the intermediate step might be the kind of research that we have been talking about, so that in a sense one of the ways we can perhaps conceptualize some of these things is the interaction between these three broad factors. On the one hand, purpose and the intervening of social sets of researches leading to the ability to define, to enunciate, to articulate, specific plans. Now, these three factors--that it seems to me were also contained in Doctor presentation--are then related to two other factors. The first is levels of immediacy. That is to say that it is not just a matter of any single problem or any overall issue, but rather the issues are presented at various levels of immediacy all the way from the enunciation of broad terms; long range goals, to particular decision. That is to say, that if two years from now people are meeting and there is a question that must be answered, in this area that is unanswerable, then we will have failed, regardless almost of how the question today is asked. The second issue it seems to me that runs through this is more a content issue, and that is the general theme that was suggested to me in what Doctor Muíioz-Amato was saying, the theme of the utilization, and particularly the waste of human resources and the labels, I think, we have been giving them, we have been using, are labels referring to different kinds of wastes, so that what we really mean by delinquency may be, on the one hand, the specific problem of treatment, but, on the other hand, certainly, we mean the overall social problem that here is a relatively large number of Puerto Rican citizens who are moving in ways that are increasingly wasteful. Nor is it clear that those who are labeled and processed by the society as delinquents are among the most wasted. That is to say, I think, implicit in what Doctor Muíioz-Amato was saying, is that it is easy to talk about delinquents as a kind of waste because societies tend to do something about them. At some point there tends to be a designation of them as delinquents, but there are perhaps larger numbers of people at the various age

-311groups than perhaps the delinquents that get wasted and never get labeled as one or another label. Perhaps the fact of placing one or another label on them is the first step in doing something about them, and perhaps we ought also to be terribly concerned about those resources that get wasted because no such label is applied to them--the problem of apathy, of alienation--and then even our language becomes increasingly ambiguous. It is easy to talk about delinquents. It is not very easy to talk about those who are just left behind in one way or another. And finally, it seems to me--I find it very difficult to think of these things without thinking of them in a very specific research context, with regard to very specific research concepts. One concept that ought to be present in the research that will attempt to translate purpose into plan is, I suggest, the concept of career, as a useful one for the problem of assessing the nature of waste in human resources. That is to say, we tend to think of what are the characteristics of X Group, Y Group, Z Group, and these are not easily ascertainable, but there are techniques for ascertaining. I suggest that one of the re-orientations that research might take is, rather than think of characteristics at any given moment in time, to investigate what the careers of the different segments of this population are, what happens to them over time. Are there typical careers that delinquents go through? Are there typical careers that school dropouts go through? Let us say from the age of 10 or 12 until they are 20. And perhaps on the basis of generating information about career, we can then decide what label ought to be most appropriately applied to them at what age. Because I think, otherwise, no matter how much we know about what seventeen year-old kids are like or what twenty-year-old kids are like, I suggest that that information is in itself not nearly as valuable for deciding a basic definition as is the idea of what happens to them between, let us say 15 and 20. Are there trajectories? Are there paths that they tend to follow, and do these paths have empirical disjunctions that a society might utilize? And perhaps we want to look at the delinquent career as contrasted to different kinds of 'ninon-delinquent' careers that are equally wasteful. And this might then generate the kinds of information that one could use to satisfy questions at a great many different levels of immediacy. To satisfy programmatic, educational questions, questions of the kinds of school, as well as to satisfy questions of, at what age should we put them in jail and at what age should we send them home, if indeed that is the proper way of asking the questions. Hansen:- I would suggest that we suspend for only ten minutes and not more, to stretch and have a cup of coffee, and I would like to call the meeting to attention once more very quickly.

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Hansen:- I think we can resume our session at this point. We have fifty-five minutes, which I would like to spend with as much coherence and effect as se can and, consequently, the permissive attitude which I have been praised for by López-Rey all along will have to be restrained a little bit and I should become somewhat more tyrannical. I am going to call on a series of persons who have requested an opportunity to speak, and I have tried to group them to a certain extent. At the same time I shall have to ask all those who do speak to recognize the shortness of time and to give me some permission to say the time is going over. I would first call on Mr. ttodríguez-Bou. Rodriguez-Bou:- I should try to mention a few things within the scheme of this seminar that I think could be of some relevance to the purposes which have got us together. Some of them may have been mentioned, but if I mention them again it is a matter of stress. I think that before we embark on a series of additional research work on the grounds of social change and public policy, that there is an urgent need to put together the different studies which have been conducted and published in Puerto Rico in different agencies to see what they mean when put together and more than that, what do they mean now in the actual content or context of the development that has ta'cen place in Puerto Rico. This may lead to making more sense out of these studies. It may lead also to fill gaps in what has been done and point some ways for further research work, research that needs to be done in the near future. Then it has been mentioned here that really we need to know more if there is uniqueness in our situation, in our conditions. Well, I think that in that respect, I think, that it is important that we use what studies have been done in other places and to see what relevance they have in our situation. And I would add that there is great need at the University of Puerto Rico, in our research work, to take notice of research done in other places than in the United States, to take notice of what is being done in Latin America, for example. We have had in Puerto Rico, I should say a disrespectful attitude toward work done in Latin America. We have somehow, maybe due to inferiority complexes, I do not know what, but we have always looked over the shoulder at what has been done in Latin America that may be of relevance to our work in Puerto Rico. We have almost exclusively Looked to what is being done in the United States. As a third point, I think we need to dislodge government-image development from true accomplishment. We need to dislodge what really has been accomplished all along from false images that bureaucrats have been intent on deveLoping. This does not mean that a great effort and great accomplishment has not been made. They

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-313have been made, but there has been a lot of image-building that research in Puerto Rico and serious study and comparisons need to do in order to lead the way to what really must be done. I should say that this is due in part--and I may be wholly mistaken--that there has been fear to criticize this image-building in Puerto Rico. There is also need to analyze what has happened to government policy in regard to different areas. There have been shifts in economic policy, shifts in educational policy, shifts in different other areas and no explanation, no adequate explanation has been offered to give better insight into why these things have happened. If we trace even the platforms of the governing party, we will see there the best evidences of shifts in policy without any adequate explanation. And I think we need to study that type of thing also. This leads me to point out also that we need to stimulate more faculty people to enter the field of research. We have been noticing in the last few years a tendency of University people to form private corporations to do research outside of the University that could have been done more efficiently within the University. At the same time, we know that there is also a good number of teachers at the University that have been released from classwork to do research, without these teachers having any training in research whatsoever, and then with very little supervision of what they are doing. I think that this type of arrangement should be stimulated if people are capable of doing this type of work. Consonant with that is the type of work that is being done in graduate studies, most of these master theses and the just beginning Ph.D. dissertations, but most of the master theses are, at times, are supervised by people whose only training in research has been the work they did in their own master thesis and in their own Ph.D., without any other additional training, to have this research be of help in the problems that we face. Now, that is another thing that should be done, I think, in this matter of re-orienting research in social change and public policy. We have found over and over, and this seminar is no exception, that as we bring people from the outside, especially from North American universities, to work with us, we always present them summaries or give them papers written in English. Whatever has been done that has been published in Spanish never shows up. So the impression is given always that these are the only research work that has been done and that has any worth. I think it is also important, at this stage in our development, that we not only are deficient in planning, we are deficient in research-planning. We have to establish certain priorities when funds and personnel are not abundant. It is very important that we establish certain priorities to utilize as best we can the meager funds that we have and the few able people that we have to do that type of research.

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Another thing that I think is prior to undertaking new ventures is to bring together within the University, and within the other agencies, and from other Universities, people from different fields of work to lay down their experiences, their information, their ideas, and hypotheses about what has been going on. I think there has been too much of the development and the creation of islands of activities within our milieu. This may be part of cur psychology. Opportunities have been few in Puerto Rico, the opportunities to go to important positions, opportunities to have power. So people have tended to develop islands of power in anything they are entrusted with, and that has prevented adequate communication between the people and the work that they have been doing. There has been little, very little fertilization, so to speak, and too much inbreeding within an island. Hansen:- Mr. Bou, will you terminate very quickly? Rodríguez Bou:- Yes, I will. Then we need at this stage to develop more adequate instruments of research. We have been most of the time, almost all of the time, just adapting instruments of research. It has been mentioned also, and I want to stress this, that we need a bank of information together with more communication between people doing work. I have found constantly people repeating studies just to get information that is already available. There is also need of utilization, better utilization of the facilities that are available. I point out the example of the printing facilities in Puerto Rico. If these facilities, owned by the government, owned by the University, were adequately put together for adequate utilization, many of our problems of research will be solved. Now another area of observation . Hansen:- Mr. Rodríguez-Bou, you are using up time which will deprive many people of their opportunity. Rodríguez-Bou:- All right, I will stop here. Hansen:- Will you please, do not just stop, terminate. marize your position.

Please sum-

Rodríguez-Bou:- I think we need to know some more about government policy, who really traces government policy, how free are the executive people, free to trace, to develop these policies. Are they always depending upon umbilical cords for somebody to tell them what is the policy? And this has the difficulty that policy will change with the person that is in the position of power at a particular time, so the research schemes suffer from that type of insecurity in policy-making. Then there is a matter of strategy, and with this I will finish. No matter that we have progressed in research work in Puerto Rico, there is really not a very strong tradition of research in Puerto Rico. When you start doing research, people begin imme-

-315diately asking for results. They want to know what you are doing, what you are getting. We have gone through the experience of being forced to present to whoever decides on policy and who offers the money to develop short-range research, and to just feed them this short-range research when we want to do long-range research, because otherwise they won't foot the bill. So, this is a matter also of strategy that we have to bear in mind when planning new ventures in research of social change and public policy. Hansen:- Just a very few brief comments. Alfonso Villa Rojas of Mexico is not here because he is in Peril, with very urgent questions of social policy and social planning. He has done, I think, some of the most interesting work of this sort. I personally, at any rate, am not unaware of these things, and it is merely the pressure of his own research that keeps Mr. Villa from being with us. A very brief comment also, I think, by Mr. Thorne. Thorne:- Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sure this will be my last intervention. I want to thank you very much indeed and also to say that it is the first time that I have ever had the privilege of attending such a high level conference of people outside my own discipline, and I feel very much educated by this.

What I wanted to get to very briefly, Mr. Chairman, was--I wanted to have a chance to express a very little bit of anxiety, not too much, that we might not give enough emphasis in our research to the attempt, ambitious I agree, but I do not think too ambitious, for Puerto Rico now, to build theories, new theories. I think that there is danger coming out of our long tradition, perhaps, that we might think that in Puerto Rico, the University of Puerto Rico, we should do research applying existing theories and not developing theories. But I think the latter activity rather appropriate for this university. One of the reasons I mention this--I am not suggesting that previous research did not try to build or did not build theories--is that I want to stimulate development of across-discipline theories. One thing that worries me, for example, is that we might have something similar to what I recently read. Not too long ago, we were told, at least those who look after young infants were told to feed their infants at regular hours, every three hours, and this was a prescription made on the basis of theory of biology only, without considering psychological theory. Now there has been discovered, that if you feed children regularly, regardless of whether they cry or not, then you fail to establish in their personality, or consciousness, a link between effort and reward, and this may have far-reaching consequences in terms of producing forms of inertia. It may seem very far-fetched, and this is why I am trying to stress the need at this University that at same level or other we try to examine the available small theories dealing with particular

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issues within certain disciplines, and bring them across the not just good suggestions for policies board and try to put in trying to solve particularly Puerto Rican problems, but on the basis of what Professor Clinard said, we might find ourselves reaching the very high levels of contributing to the solution of problems in many countries. Thank you very much, Mr. Clinard. Nieves-Falcón:- I will be very brief because some of the things I was going to mention have already been hinted at. First of all, in relation to the planning problem that Doctor Muñoz-Amato posed, it seems to me that this also, this planning problem gets complicated because, as far as I can see, planning in a sense tries to give stability to the things that are being done, and in Puerto Rico planning takes a personal character, a personal character in the sense that in the different agencies or at different levels, whoever is ''in", thinks that he has to do something new. So sometimes things that have been evolved very carefully are discarded because they do not suit the new incumbent in a position. So this is also a problem with which planning has to cope in Puerto Rico, that trends and plans are to be followed up by whoever comes in, that there is a certain stability that needs to be kept in the system. And second, in relation to planning, you all have mentioned that Puerto Rico is one of the societies that has been most studied but, on the other hand, is one of the few societies where, for example you do not find the raw data of the previous studies. For example, it would be very interesting, taking Rogler's study on Comerio when he administered a questionnaire to high school students in the early forties, to be able to administer the same questionnaire to students now. I urge that we at least try to have a central file of data of the same studies that have been done in Puerto Rico, and that the University take the initiative to do this in order that we can have this, we can compare it, and we can even make secondary analyses of the available data. In relation to the idea of Doctor Muñoz-Amato concerning a to stimulate research, I am very hesitant about another admiunit nistrative unit to stimulate research. I think that really what our faculties need are facilities, less teaching load, secretarial assistants to cut the stencils or the instruments, the little things that cannot be done because there are not the facilities, the teachers do not have the facilities, a technical expert on sampling or so. I think that we have to make the baseline wider in relation to facilities, to stimulate research, and with the establishment of the graduate schools (I do not know if it is possible) to have a master plan, of areas of research for the master's theses students. They can take little aspects of the big problems, but in this way you will be getting accumulative data that after a while

-317can give you some idea, . . . some concrete ideas, in relation to a problem instead of having all these students dispersed with no effort to integrate what they are doing. Then my last comment has to do with extrapolation of conclusions and data. I welcome the cross-cultural and comparative studies, but in order to extrapolate and to select the things that we would like to see in Puerto Rico, we do need a very careful and very adequate knowledge of the local reality. As a social scientist, I am telling you, and as a Puerto Rican I am sick and tired of being studied under foreign theoretical concepts that really do not apply. We have been studied even in our sexual relations. We have been studied under foreign theoretical concepts. I welcome cross-cultural comparison, but in order to have that we must have an adequate knowledge of our social reality. Munoz-Amato:- May I make a joke'? Hansen:- May I also?

Go ahead.

Munoz-Amato:- We were thinking of the same thing. Hansen:- Not the same. I was thinking of the remark about new men when they start off on new roads. Nieves now has the idea that we should have an archive of material for the replication of studies. We have it; we kept it. We had no clients for five years and finally it went to the dead stack file. If you go to the dead stack file clerk in the University you will find it; it is still there. This was my joke. What was yours, Pedro? Mufioz-Amato:- I was reminded of the anthropologist who went to Lajas, a very small town, and made all these studies of sexual behavior without, of course, identifying the people, but saying "the owner of the drugstore" and so on and so forth. Now, the town organized a committee to study the anthropologists. Hansen:- I would strongly support that town's committee. Stanton.

Mr.

Stanton:- I would lice to make a couple of fairly concrete suggestions on the subject of coordination between University research and government agency policies, and my suggestions do not differ much from what has been mentioned here before, but I would at least like to underscore my agreement with those I do agree with. I suppose the first point is not a suggestion, is that coordination brought into the area of research is always somewhat difficult, there is a lot of caution, and I think quite rightly, as Mr. Diaz-Alejandro said, you get a Qood man and let him go. And this is one of the best things you can do in research. Also there is some question in my mind about whether the function of the Uni-

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versity research is not primarily to contribute to the understanding of social processes and whether it is not a rather awkward instrument to try to use to influence government policy. But if you leave those aside, and accept for the moment that the University should try to coordinate its research, or some parts of it, with government agency policies, the initial problem, at least today, seems to be the time lag between the research request and the research report, as Professor Torruellas pointed out and others have agreed with. This lag is quite long, and when some unnamed high official of the government calls you in, he wants the answers quickly. It is something like six years later when you come back. He is probably long since gone, and whoever followed him in office knows nothing about it. If he is still there, he forgot that he asked you the question, and if he does happen to remember he asked you the question, he does not think the information is up to date anyway. So, the report does not get as much attention as it really deserves. It is a little liLLce a drowning man who yells "help" and you run out to get a tax exemption to open a factory to build life preservers. When you finally, six years later, come back with the life preserver, if he was still there, he would probably be angry. How do you get around this sort of problem? Some years ago I recommended to the Planning Board that they have someone there who could prepare position papers on problems when they come, when problems come up on age of delinquents or whatever it is, and someone could put together, with the help, perhaps, of local or outside consultants, or whatever, where theory stands on the matter, what kind of thought there is on the matter, what some of the parameters are of Puerto Rico, what some of the possibilities are, and perhaps within, say, thirty days get him a position-paper on the subject. But this requires certain facilities to carry out. It simply cannot be done unless you have some standing machinery which you can use. The two kinds of standing machinery that seem to be most important, and where I think the University might well participate in collaboration with, say, the Planning Board, or some other agency, in preparing and maintaining it is some type of data file. I recognize that these things are often not used, but one of the reasons they are not used is that they are often not well organized for use. They exist as files, but they do not exist in a shape which is readily available for someone to get access to. I think this has been mentioned again and again in the conference, as a major problem in Puerto Rico, just to find out what has been done. Some of the filed material--I remember, I went one time and got the original material on the Roberts and Stefani study which is

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the first really island-wide picture of family-community life. During the years it had been sitting in a closet in the Home Economics Department, the termites had decided to dine on the Home Economic Department's product and apparently had found it as tasty as some of the others. Since these are IBM cards, this causes untold amounts of confusion when they are put into the machines. I started an elaborate analysis to screen the noise out, which I must say was fun, and I would have liked to have a couple of years worth of money just to just sit and do it. It is a very interesting problem and sort of fun to work on, but I was persuaded by my employer to do something else. I remember the fate also of the Stykos' interview material, which one time, when the Research Center was being moved in the face of an impending hurricane, some janitor, I think, moved the Stycos' interview to the incinerator. I do not know this is a critical judgment or whether it was purely accidental. I think a data file is quite possible, and I have talked to people in Washington about some of the technical problems involved, and sources of financing for it, and there is neither time nor need to go into them here, but they exist in other areas, and I think it is possible to do them here. I think it's a Kind of project the University might cooperate on. Related to that is the type of master sample or perhaps panel of communities or neighborhoods which represent the Island on which cumulative data might be gathered and maintained in some card form, and for which, when you wanted a specific question answered you could rather quickly get information from those dozen or two dozen, or whatever number is reasonable, to be analyzed against the material which is already in the panel of communities. The final point, before I am shut off, is the question of indicators: more and more attention is being paid to the problem of social indicators relative to the problem of agency changes. As agencies tend to react fairly quickly to evaluations of their work and evaluations depend in part on indicators of progress or change, one of the things that a University can do is study how better to measure things like delinquency or family life or other areas that reflect on the output of agencies. This is my second fairly concrete suggestion: that the University work on the problem of how to measure social change in the sense that applies to the effort of agencies. Inkeles:- I would like to take only a minute or two and not for what I had originally intended to talk about, but rather to lend support to the points which I believe Howard Stanton was making. If it were the rules of the game, I would give him the two or three minutes that I am allowed, but since that is not permitted, maybe I can play the role of extending what I suspect he would have said if he had gone on to say it.

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I had hoped to talk a little bit about some of the points that were raised, which are very interesting and which, I think, probably you will continue to discuss: problems like the loss of data, for example, which are very complex, and as Howard Stanton's example suggests, are not always what they appear to be, they are not always products of finality, but they are part of the general process of pressure of time and the normal attrition that affects everybody. I think Puerto Rico should certainly attempt to participate as much as possible in sharing in the universal data banks which are being established everywhere and which give you an opportunity to recapture, often, materials which may have left the country and are no longer available here. I think that is one way of compensating and also as you accumulate data in the future, one can use the data one has as a bargaining point with regard to the conditions of the exchange. This is, however, a problem which is very general. In my experience, loss of data is a very pervasive phenomenon in the social sciences and even with the best of will--and I am not saying that this existed in the past--it tends to get lost. But, I am not sure the losses in the past have always been the product of ill will. I think very often it has been a lack of awareness of the value of these materials and a lack of a tradition for storing them. Librarians, for example, do not understand IBM data, and they do not see it in the same sense they do valuable historical documents. They spend a lot of money on the one, none on the other. In this way, I suppose, one thing that one could say, it has come up here as a theme, there is no reason why Puerto Rico should always be a follower. I can see many ways in which Puerto Rico could be--because it has certain freedoms, is not tied in with certain other systems, but yet it has a high level of economic development--it could be a model for other places in developing new styles, new approaches for doing things within the framework of the kind of resources there are available. But the main burden of my point, which is, I feel, an extension of Howard Stanton's, which I would like to make, has to do with the use of the resources already existing. I was very impressed by the example which was given, I believe by Rodríguez-Bou, about the discovery that in this University there are extensive facilities for printing that are available, but in fact are enormously underused. There are machines here that could turn out very, very large amounts of printed matter, which in some cases are used an hour or two a month. ¡\!ow, I think this can be taken as a concrete example of a general problem which exists in the social sciences and in their relevance to policy making.

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Many of the things that have been discussed here as desirable, such as the accumulation or review of what has been happening in the past in Puerto Rico, a summary of where we stand now with regard to certain kinds of knowledge, a presentation of the issues which are most problematic, as to what the actual facts are, the preparation of policy papers that would utilize this material and make projections into the future, the suggestion of new programs. We tend to forget very often, when we talk about the need for resources, that the biggest resource in the world is a new idea, and it does not require a lot of money or big interviewing staff or even that thing most precious to most academic men, additional sabbatical time, in order to generate them. There are possibilities which exist within us at all times, and I feel that one critical element in an assessment of a forthcoming program should be a review of the unused capacity--the use of this term is very popular with the economists--which exists now within Puerto Rico, and which permits people to be independent of the requirements of large and bureaucratic structures. I do not mean to say that a secretary is undesirable. It is a wonderful thing to have, and someone to do one's coding is also, but the other side of it is, at least in my experience: I usually cannot keep a secretary busy more than half-time, and I find she uses a quarter of my time worrying about how to keep the other half of her time busy. So, I sometimes think I am better off without any secretarial help at all because then I have to concentrate on the thing which is before me, which is my intellectual task and not the administrative one. And I feel that in our discussion many, many illustrations of the under-utilization of resources has come about and I hope we won't handle this mainly by increasing the administrative apparatus--that is not a productive way of doing it--but that individually, and in small groups people in this room and others like them, with common interests and with a clear idea, should organize themselves. This is one of the wonderful things of a university. It is one of the marvelous things about the fact that in our type of system it is an entity relatively--not absolutely, but relatively--free of government intervention. The time that an academic man has, that is not actually spent in classes, unless he uses it up in committees or administration, is available to him and his colleagues. You can freely associate yourself in small groups, for intellectual purposes which do not depend heavily on external resources, and I imagine if in fact it was critical to get a secretary for a few hours, the Dean of Studies would provide it under such circumstances. And that from such groups, small entities within the University, policy papers of great interest and substantial intellectual significance and, I think, ultimately of ,great policy importance, could be developed and evolved, and if anyone of the existing institutions in

-322the University seems to constrain one from that point of view, then my advice--I am coming back to the theme of free intellectual work which I introduced before--is disassociate oneself from these activities in order to gain the intellectual freedom that permits one from the base of knowledge already accumulated to make new formulations that can he jresented somewhere. The one technical advice I would give is: capture one of those underused printing presses. But, for the rest, I think the technical problems are not great. Mueller:- The more minutes have been requested, the more of you have spoken, the more pages of my last intervention I could discard, and that is the way it ought to be, because it seems to me we have developed a surprising amount of consensus during this last week, enough consensus, indeed, to permit Millard and his resident colleagues to come up with a pretty ,good blueprint. The purpose of my last intervention, therefore, can only be to once again plead the special case of law. What has been said here is largely not applicable to law because a sociology of law is as yet quite undeveloped on the Mainland, and practically non-existent in Puerto Rico, with the exception of a few studies in the delinquency area. Here you have that unique opportunity of which Dr. Inkeles spoke just a second ago: you have squeezed into the scan of three ,generations the experiences that other nations have had in twelve generations. You have witnessed in legal development in these last three generations what four-fifths of the world's population will experience in the next one hundred and fifty years. This will permit you to make policy. This, indeed, is the principal question which you will have to decide in the next half year, during the time of making the blueprint. Do you want to be followers, primarily, or do you want to be leaders? If you won't propose to lead, somebody else will do the leading. You do have enough resources to become engaged in studying the sociological problems of the law. You have an excellent Law School here. You could do what Northeastern University proposes to do and put your law students on an extended basis for their law degree (in four years rather than three years) and require them, with pay, to participate in studies directed and participated in by sociologists. This is only one of many possible suggestions. There are plenty of opportunities to engage in research. Fifty states in the United States have adopted compulsory inspection laws in hopes, thereby, of reducing traffic fatalities. None of these fifty states has ever studied what happened when these inspection laws were introduced. You will have an inspection law, I predict, within two or three years. Why not study and find out what happens if law intervenes in the ordinary blind happenings when control by men takes over for blind casual happenings? Thank you.

That is all.

-323Hansen:- There is a clarification of fact about printing facilities that Mr. Rodriguez-Bou wants on the record. Would you put it on the record, please, Rodriguez-Bou? Rodriguez-Bou:- Yes. Professor Inkeles said that I said that the University has adequate facilities. I said that the government, including the University, has more than adequate printing facilities to do an excellent job of providing facilities for professors and for studies to be printed here and to provide, more than that, to provide practically most of the books that we need in the school system. Hansen:- Thank you.

Mr. Cochran.

Cochran:- At Dean Munoz-Amato's suggestion, I want to answer his two questions at the end of yesterday's session. One was: what were the factors that brought about this great industrial upswing in Puerto Rico? And secondly, what ought we to do about economic study at the present time? Now, the lateness of the hour makes an answer to this first question impossible and Dean Muífoz Amato knows the answer anyhow. For the rest of you, I am going to be very immodest and suggest that the first two chapters of my Puerto Rican Businessman, available both in Spanish and English, are an áconomic history of the Island from 1898 to 1955 and can be read, I think, within a reasonably short time. The chapters show that this development was more indigenous in its beginnings than is generally thought. It depended very much upon the great skill of Puerto Ricans at hand needlework, superior to that of the Mainland, and their ability quickly to learn machine needlework. With the post-war labor shortage in the United States, needlework and garment making would have increased on in any case. Similarly, rum was an extremely important resource, particularly during World War II, when whiskey became scarce. Other important local products were sugar, cement, and certain types of iron work. Another element in the industrial upswing during the 1950's, was the leadership of a gifted individual, Teodoro Moscoso, in attracting American industry. As is inevitable in a promotion, the results were not spectacular during the 1950s, when he was doing his hardest work. The real pay-off from his promotion came from 1960 or '61 on to '66, and it has come with alarming rapidity. Fomento-induced industry is now almost double non-Fomento industry in dollar volume of output. This is an alarming statistic because it means dependence for prosperity on tax-exempt industry to a very large extent, or what may be called industry borrowed from the Mainland. This does not seem an easy situation. It requires thought about where you are going to go from here, and how you are going to protect yourself from shifts in Mainland policy.

-324This leads me to the other part of Dean Muíioz Amato's question. I think there is a lot of background material for Puerto Rican economic studies. Any economist coming into the situation and really going to work could become quite familiar with all of the factors involved, and I might add that, at the Planning Board and Fomento, if they have not changed from the old days, he could find people who have practical experience in dealing with the entrepreneurs here and who could direct him to good sources of information. But studies do not make policies, as we have heard over and over again today, and perhaps the thing needed for policy is to import an objective and respected economist. By objective I mean, preferably, neither Puerto Rican nor North American. By respected I mean somebody mature enough and with enough international reputation as an economist, so that his findings will receive governmental and business respect. I could name a few people: English, German, Swiss, or Italian, but this would take too long and this is not my business. I think that an economist of this type, attracted here for at least a year of study, interviewing and discussion could put all of this economic material into focus, could spell out the alternatives in some detail, and produce a work which might have effect upon public policy. But, I believe, my colleague Mr. Diaz-Alejandro is going to go somewhat further with this and I will turn the floor over to him. Diaz-Alejandro:- I would just like to reinforce the plea to the Center not to neglect research in economics. There are a lot of economic topics, which as far as I know, have not been studied thoroughly and which are both intellectually interesting and socially important. For example, I have read that in Puerto Rico, in spite of the tripling of the per capita income in the last twenty-five years, family savings are negative. All of the increase in the per capita income of families seems to have gone into consumption. Now, this is a very strange fact when compared with the experience in other countries, and it certainly has some implications for economic development and also for social and national development. If local family and businesses do not generate enough savings, growth will have to be financed by foreigners. There are other matters--of which I learned at a seminar in the Department of Economics of this University last night,--which could be researched. Employment of males seems not to be increasing as fast as previously, for example. There is also the whole problem of future trade patterns, and again I would support the suggestion made for comparing the Puerto Rican experience with those of Latin American countries. Besides the intellectual and social importance of this research, I think that it would also help to decrease the feeling of claustrophobia, which seems to exist among intellectuals in Puerto Rico. Using a fashionable

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phrase, the research center could be helpful in building bridges from Puerto Rico to sister nations which have a similar cultural background. Finally, I would like to emphasize that attention should also be given to pure teaching and research, pure in the sense that it may not be aimed at fulfilling an obvious and immediate need. The Council of Economic Advisers has been mentioned as a good example of applied social science. Talking to some economists who have worked there, one hears that many of the people who performed best in the Council of Economic Advisers were scholars who, before they went to Washington, were pure academics and as theoretical and "impractical" as they could be. Yet they performed extremely well in the real world. This suggests that the more roundabout way of training scholars, and letting them work on what they want, may be in the long run more productive socially than attempting to train people in "practical" subjects to tackle immediate problems. Let me suggest one reason why that may be so. Professor Inkeles has urged that a distinction be made and maintained between the academic who is presenting the results of his patient research work and the academic who is making general and superficial comments about the social-political-economic situation of a country. While it is impossible to keep that distinction perfectly neat, I think that it is a very good goal to drive at. The intellectual discipline which the academic gets from doing what one could call solid research, may in the long run make him a much better potential public servant. He may be a better contributor to discussions of social policy. If on the other hand all the academic does is to comment on current events, he tends to turn into the proverbial one-eyed man in the kingdom of the blind. So even though my favorite research policy is: "all the power to the professors, all the money to the professors", I agree that we have the duty of providing this self-check, which would come through the Inkeles' principle of always making sure, at least to ourselves, of differentiating in our lectures and writings the occasions when we are reporting on a specific piece of solid research, from those times when we comment on current events as social philosophers or citizens-intellectuals. Hansen:- I think we have to close the conferences leaving many unsaid things. I had told Professor Luz Torruellas that I would call on her if I could. There might be others who want to speak, but the time is in fact now gone and it cannot ,be done. I would like first to speak personally and express my gratitude to all of you who have come here. I think that what has been said, especially when it is seen later in the transcript, will be of very great value to us all. As to the transcript and its use, we have transcribed the meetings or are transcribing them now actually. As soon as possible, I will put that on stencils, mimeograph it, and circulate it to all of the members of the seminar

-326with the following request: that you look it over as promptly as possible and return it to me with any revision or correction that you deem advisable. As the original invitation said, you should be quite free in your discussion here, on the pledge, which I am repeating and will maintain, that you may take out of the record something which you feel should not be there. However, of course, one cannot say two weeks from now: I have a good idea I wish I had said it there, and write it into the record. So, the revision is, of course, to make a correction or to eliminate it. Secondly, I would Like permission to make some editorial changes of the same order. I shall bind myself, of course, in the same way exactly. I think in particular about repetition. We all have heard things repeated here. When you read the record that becomes more obvious, and if there is much repetition which does not need to be there, it can be reduced. My estimate is that we may have something like five to six hundred pages of transcript in paper, and I want to publish that as soon as possible and, consequently, not only will it require correction, but it will require reduction and this, I think lies ahead. I hope that there will be many post-conferences, individual, small-group, and otherwise. I am quite certain that most of the value perhaps will come in these informal ways in the days and in the months after the conference. I know that I shall be in touch with all of you in one way or another. I shall write to you. I should Like your comments. I think many of you will be in touch with one another, to great mutual advantage. So, in a way the seminar will have this very great advantage. Like all exceedingly rich people, they think money is unimportant, as Ar. Inkeles, of course, has enormous research sums and therefore is quite certain that money and secretaries are not very necessary. I remember one of our richest men not long ago used to write columns in the newspaper. I found it was always the same column, namely: money is not really of any importance at all. I think that some money will be needed, and I think some money will be looked for in all of this particular enterprise. With that I would like to thank you all and suspend the meeting.

-327INDEX OF PERSONS

Anderson, Robert W., 5, 7, 17, 213-15, 222-24, 245. Bobonis-Díaz, Augusto, 7, 161. Clinard, Marshall B., 6, 8, 24, 133-34, 146-47, 148, 160-61, 168,

170, 182-84, 209-10, 234-37, 248, 286-88, 301-03. Cochran Thomas C. 6, 8, 37, 139, 141, 159-60, 162, 171, 186-88, 1~5-96, 242-i3, 281-84, 323-24. Corrada Guerrero, Rafael, 9, 155-56, 163-64, 184-86, 204-05, 224-25, 231. Cunningham, Ineke, 4, 6, 9, 44, 160. De Jesús Toro, Rafael, 1, 5, 9, 74, 247, 251. Díaz Alejandro Carlos F., 6, 10, 84, 158-59, 188-91, 237-39, 284-85, 324-25. Feldman, Arnold S., 10, 174-76, 196-98, 215-19, 243-44, 259-61.

Ferracuti, Franco, 1, 5, 10, 74, 141, 147-48, 155, 177-79, 225-26, 248-50, 252, 261-63, 268-69, 306. Frankenhoff, Charles A., 11, 133-34, 219-21, 263-65, 303-04. Garcia Rodríguez, Pablo, 12, 210-12, 244. Hansen, Millard W., 4 5 6, 12 91 132-65, 169-70 179 184, 195, 207-08, 213, h4, 24~, 2f3, 270, 281, 28~, 291, 309-10, 312, 317, 325-26. Inkeles, Alex, 1, 12, 136-39 144-46, 161-62, 201-04, 227-31, 233-34, 249, 270-81, 29-90, 319-22. López-Rey y Arrojo, Manuel, 6 13, 105, 134, 142-43, 151-52, 163, 171-73, 214, 265-66, 30t-05. Mueller, Gerhard 0. W., 6, 13, 118, 162, 165-73, 223-24, 322. 1, 5, 14, 133-34, 152-54, 176-77, 207-09, 212, 221-22, 231-33, 234, 240-41, 288-89, 291-300, 306-07, 308-09, 317.

Mufioz-Amato, Pedro

-328Nieves-Falcón, Luis, 14, 135-36, 138-39, 149-50, 180-82, 201,

226-27, 316-17. Pabón, Milton, 14, 148, 200-01. Padilla, Salvador, 15, 140-41, 198-200, 307.08. Reimer, Everett, 15, 150-51, 169, 179, 240, 295. Rodríguez-Bou, Ismael, 15, 156-58, 161, 163, 206-07, 212, 251-52,

266-68, 312-15, 323. Rosselló, Juan A., 15, 241-42. Stanton, Howard, 15, 252-59, 317-19. Thorne, Alfred P., 16, 142-43, 191-95, 239-40, 315. Torruellas, Luz M., 16, 205-06, 244.

-329SUBJECT INDEX Americanization, 53, 125, 136, 154. Behavioral Approach on the Social Sciences, 105, 107, 111-12, 265. Bibliography of Research on Puerto Rico, 66-73.

Business Managers, 39-40, 57. Capital Imports 37 55 87 293. Community, 27, 9, 2-33, 3 , 63, 183. Criminal Law, 112-15, 118-19, 124, 128, 165-67. Culture Conflict, 126, 267-68. Decision-Making, 39, 171, 215 242-43. Definition of Social Change, 75, 92-94, 105-08, 109, 111, 265. Deviant Behavior, 24-26, 28, 31, 33, 62 109, 118, 193. Economic Growth, 55, 75-76, 119, 197, 323.

44,

Economic Growth and Public Policy, 84, 139-40, 153, 158, 161,

179-80, 184-86, 191-92, 196, 292-94. Economic Structure, 37, 42, 54 58, 88, 159, 186-88, 195-96. Elites, 18, 22, 90, 140, 150, 137, 245-46. Employment and Unemployment, 54, 56, 151, 159-60. Equality or Equal Opportunity, 97, 150-51, 155.

Foreigners, 159, 181, 185, 190, 202, 267-68. Housing, 28, 31, 63, 225, 264, 277. Industrial Man Project, 94-96. Interdiscipline on the Social Sciences, 79-82, 306

Juvenile Delinquency, 31, 178-79, 274, 295, 305, 310-11. Learning and Socialization, 42-43, 48, 51, 107, 114, 134, 151,

192, 217, 226. Legal Change, 118-30, 166, 168, 170. Methodology, 182, 261-62, 279.

Middle Class, 140, 150, 157. Migration, 58, 148, 209. Modernity - defined, 95, 138, 186. Modernity - Modernization, 17, 19, 24, 91-96, 133-34, 136-39, 142-47, 181, 271. National Culture, 49-54, 79, 101-103, 156. National Planning, 164, 185-86, 189. Penal Codes, see also Criminal Law. Penal Policies, 110, 177-79. Performance of a Social Role, 96-98, 133-34, 141-44, 149-50, 155, 175, 188, 205, 256, 258. Personality and Social Change, 78, 136, 180, 248-59. Planning, 166, 170, 179, 188 198, 214, 296-99. Political Status, 48, 154, 204-05, 210, 281-83. Population Increase or Growth 54 58-61. Procedures of the Seminar, l3~L, 135, 158, 161, 165, 180, 213, 247,

269-70, 281, 289-90, 311-12, 325-26. Public Policy (definition), 44, 110. Public Policy as a Dependent or Independent Variable, 17-18, 109-11, 120, 130, 161, 200, 219-21. Public Policy (ill-conceived), 156, 205-09. Research and Politics, 18, 150, 200-01, 205-10, 212-13, 221-22,

227-39, 312.

-330Research Previously Done, 45-63, 98-103, 160, 163, 191. Research to be Done, 21-23, 34-36, 43, 63-64, 78, 119-123, 126, 128, 140 154, 156, 167, 175, 180-82, 190, 193-95, 199, 202-03, 215-19, 239, 245, 247, 270-72, 307, 310, 315, 324. Self-Image and Identity, 34, 47, 49-50, 53, 147, 180, 253, 258, 272. Social Change - definition, 18 44, 92-93, 108-09, 265. Social Change (Tempo of Change$, 154, 161, 247, 297. Social Change Affecting Crime, 19, 105, 109-11, 121, 304. Social Change and Personality or Personality , Social Change, 78, 136, 172, 180, 248-51, 252-59. Social Change - Statistics, 65. Social Class as a Variable, 140, 182, 184, 197. Social Mobility, 47, 107, 149, 175, 198, 271. Summary of Seminar Sessions by Inkeles, 270-281. Tourism, 187, 264. Tradition, 91, 149, 180, 297. Traditional-Modern (Dichotomy) 91. Urbanization, 19, 25-28, 209, 1 X 86-88. Values and Legal Change, 177, 183. Values and Public Policy, 19, 44, 89, 124, 146, 159, 199, 205, 222-26, 240, 300. Values and Social Change, 18-19, 46, 56, 79, 108-09, 141-42, 145, 147-48 167, 175, 188, 198, 225, 266-67, 271. Wages, 38, 54-55, 264.