IN-DEPTH BRIEFING // #90 // MAY 25 An Honest John of 24 Missile Regiment Royal Artillery is readied to fire during Exercise Spear Point (9-13 October 1961). Courtesy of Soldier Magazine
AUTHOR
‘HONEST’ ASSESSMENT
Sam Cranny-Evans Associate Fellow RUSI and director of Calibre Defence
The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research is the British Army’s think tank and tasked with enhancing the conceptual component of its fighting power. The views expressed in this In Depth Briefing are those of the author, and not of the CHACR, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Ministry of Defence or British Army. The aim of the briefing is to provide a neutral platform for external researchers and experts to offer their views on critical issues. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk
LESSONS FROM THE COLD WAR
F
ROM the 1960s through to 1989, the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) maintained a corps-sized force in Germany held at high readiness. Built of four divisions, the 1st British Corps (1 (BR) Corps) was expected to face off against the 3rd Shock Army. In the event of war with the Soviet Union, 1 (BR) Corps would push a screening force forward using well-rehearsed drills into preprepared – but hopefully secret – positions to establish the main line of effort. This would shape the deployment of the four armoured divisions, which would aim to delay the Soviets and force them to cycle to the second echelon made up of the 20th Guards Army. Artillery was expected to play a central and defining role on both sides, and was positioned to contribute extensively to the close battle.
The soldiers of 1 (BR) Corps knew they were exposed, the Belgian corps to their right was a suspected weak link that the Soviets might target to force a collapse. They also lacked the numbers to properly resist the Soviet forces, which is why the Royal Artillery maintained three regiments of nuclear artillery for most of the Cold War. Armed with Honest John unguided nuclear rockets, the Royal Artillery’s regiments were expected to deploy tactical payloads into the path of the 3rd Shock Army once it became clear that it could not be stopped. It was assumed that fallout from those nuclear weapons, as well as the Soviet chemical weapons, would catch friendly units. Those contaminated units were expected to ‘fight dirty’, continuing the battle without coming into contact with friendly units to limit the spread of contaminants.
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Beyond that critical point, 1 (BR) Corps was not expected to play much more of a role. It was widely anticipated that strategic nuclear weapons would come into play after the tactical, and that nothing that they could do would matter after that. For 40 years, the soldiers of 1 (BR) Corps prepared for this scenario or variants of it, focusing on little else beyond the 3rd Shock Army. And, perhaps unsurprisingly, the BAOR is often held up as an example of what the British Army should be doing now, at least in terms of size. Naturally, more British armoured divisions held at high readiness in Europe would certainly help deter and defeat Russia in the event of a war, but the costs would be immense and prohibitive. That is not to say, however, that we cannot learn from the Cold War generation of soldiers. So, for this