IN-DEPTH BRIEFING // #86 // JANUARY 25
AUTHOR
Sam Cranny-Evans Associate Fellow RUSI and director of Calibre Defence
THE MOVE FROM MASS TO MASS-PRECISION
R The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research is the British Army’s think tank and tasked with enhancing the conceptual component of its fighting power. The views expressed in this In Depth Briefing are those of the author, and not of the CHACR, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Ministry of Defence or British Army. The aim of the briefing is to provide a neutral platform for external researchers and experts to offer their views on critical issues. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk
USSIAN counterbattery fire has evolved from a model that favoured mass in February 2022 to one that places emphasis on the mass use of precision-guided munitions to engage Ukrainian indirect fire systems. Russian units are now fast and efficient when engaging Ukrainian fires, leading to the adoption of tactics, techniques and procedures that limit their efficacy. This is important for the British Army and its allies as the available evidence indicates that Russia has moved away from the Soviet roots that informed its counter-battery doctrine, towards one that is precise, lethal and operable at scale. These changes are likely to remain, indelibly printed onto the psyche of Russian commanders and soldiers who have decisively contributed to
turning the stakes in Ukraine in Russia’s favour. When Russian forces first entered Ukraine in 2014 their firepower quickly became a key topic of conversation as it became clear that they were able to close targeting cycles in minutes. In 2014 a strike on Ukraine’s 24th and 72nd Mechanised Brigades and the 79th Airmobile Brigade, who had established a camp near Zelenopillya, became the stuff of legend; the three battalions had been observed with drones and their tactical radios reportedly jammed a few minutes before a combined barrage of cluster munitions, thermobaric rockets, and howitzer rounds fell on them. The barrage reportedly lasted three minutes and left more than 100 Ukrainians dead and wounded and dozens of vehicles destroyed at a time when Ukraine was struggling to maintain its
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forces in the field. The strike was a demonstration of Russia’s reconnaissance-fires contour; essentially the integration of tactical fires with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in real time. The coordination of drones and fires was portrayed, at the time, as a universal adaptation across the Russian Armed Forces, seemingly indicating that NATO would face a whirlwind of very accurate and coordinated fires coming down on its forces within minutes if it entered into a Russian area of operations. However, the likelihood is that Russia was experimenting with dronecoordinated fires; a presentation supposedly leaked from the Russian Ministry of Defence indicated that it was gathering data on the coordination of Orlan-10s with the 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled
Picture: Mil.ru, CC BY 4.0
A RUSSIAN REVOLUTION: