IN-DEPTH BRIEFING // #83 // NOVEMBER 24
AUTHOR
Christoph Harig Associate Professor, Royal Danish Defence College
The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research is the British Army’s think tank and tasked with enhancing the conceptual component of its fighting power. The views expressed in this In Depth Briefing are those of the author, and not of the CHACR, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Ministry of Defence, British Army or US Army. The aim of the briefing is to provide a neutral platform for external researchers and experts to offer their views on critical issues. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk
THE FUTURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN NATO
A
S NATO and its member states are reviving their focus on territorial and collective defence, there is a growing awareness of the need for effective co-operation with non-military actors. Flagship documents such as the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept explicitly mention the need for “better day-zero integration” that requires partnerships with “non-governmental organisations, civilian actors and industry”.1 NATO’s current conceptual definition of multi-domain operations equally highlights the crucial requirement to integrate nonmilitary actors into military operations, particularly in the cyber and space domain, where private actors’ capabilities often surpass those of the military.2 Hence, the Alliance and its member states are facing the challenge of re-designing their engagement with non-military actors to make it suitable for the contemporary security environment. When looking at
the current existing toolkit, the joint function of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) appears as the obvious way of working together with non-military actors. However, CIMIC suffers from an image problem within military institutions across the Alliance. It remains associated with the expeditionary phase of operations after the end of the Cold War, and many still equate CIMIC with digging wells and its contributions to winning over the ‘hearts and minds’ of local populations in foreign countries. However, tasks for CIMIC have always been much broader than this narrative would reflect and are likely to expand even further. While still widely misunderstood and under appreciated by large parts of NATO militaries, CIMIC as a joint function has the potential to help meet the demands of situations that require close cooperation with nonmilitary actors. This requires appropriate preparation of military personnel that should be able to flexibly use CIMIC in
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various aspects of planning and executing operations. WHAT IS CIMIC? History professor Thomas Mockaitis once quipped that “defining CIMIC is like nailing jello to a wall”3 and conceptual confusion continues to reign in the area of civil-military cooperation. Civilians have always been directly affected by armed conflict and have contributed to military operations in different ways throughout the history of warfare, but doctrinally incorporating civil-military cooperation in military operations is a relatively new phenomenon in NATO ACT, ‘NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept’ (Norfolk, 2021).
1
Ian Bowers, ‘Multi-Domain Operations – The NATO and US Approach’ (Camberley: The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (CHACR), 2024).
2
Mockaitis 2005, cited in Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, ‘Countering Insurgent-Terrorism: Why Nato Chose The Wrong Historical Foundation For Cimic’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 17, no. 4 (December 2006): 399–420.
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