AUTHOR
Dr Alex Neads Assistant Professor of International Security in the Durham Global Security Institute, part of the School of Government & International Affairs at Durham University
The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research is the British Army’s think tank and tasked with enhancing the conceptual component of its fighting power. The views expressed in this In Depth Briefing are those of the author, and not of the CHACR, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Ministry of Defence, British Army or US Army. The aim of the briefing is to provide a neutral platform for external researchers and experts to offer their views on critical issues. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk
THE ROLE OF SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD
T
HE British Army has recently begun to institutionalise Security Force Assistance (SFA) in its force structures and doctrine, as part of a wider commitment to assist partner forces overseas. This can be seen in the establishment of 11th (SFA) Brigade, as well as the creation of the new Ranger Regiment as the core of the Army Special Operations Brigade.1 These changes mirror similar investments in SFA among UK allies, most notably in the US Army’s establishment of its own Security Force Assistance Brigades in 2017, and the adoption of new NATO doctrine for SFA a year earlier.2 While far from a new practice, the training of partner forces has acquired a particular association with counterinsurgency and stabilisation activities in recent years. During campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, the British Army made extensive use of military partnering to develop host
nation armed forces and improve local force densities.3 However, the contemporary security landscape has changed substantially since the socalled War on Terror and is now increasingly characterised by intense geopolitical competition and interstate rivalry.4 The recent initiation of a new Strategic Defence Review thus presents a timely moment to appraise the utility of SFA for UK Defence in the current international climate. In the years since 9/11, SFA has been used for a bewildering array of other tasks, from peace-building to counterterrorism. Indeed, the NATO definition of SFA includes all “activities that develop and improve, or directly support, the development of local forces and their associated institutions in crisis zones”, encompassing virtually all aspects of the constitution and employment of partner military force.5 For some, this breadth of scope and application has leant SFA a kind of everything-and-nothing
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quality, obscuring its practical utility.6 Others have even argued that UK SFA has become more performative than substantive – about shoring up national insecurities over the UK’s place in the world more than developing genuine military capabilities On the wider context informing these changes, see Captain Ben Tomlinson, ‘Anniversary Analysis: Assessing the Ongoing Development of the Ranger Regiment’, CHACR In-Depth Briefing 68, November 2023.
1
NATO, AJP 3.16: Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (Brussels: NATO Standardization Office, 2026), UK MOD version published 14 August 2017.
2
Robert Johnson, ‘Upstream Engagement and Downstream Entanglements: The Assumptions, Opportunities, and Threats of Partnering’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25:3 (2014), pp. 647-668.
3
HM Government, Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a More Contested and Volatile World (London: HMSO, 2023).
4
NATO, AJP 3.16, p. 1-1. According to this definition, SFA includes activities to generate, organise, train, enable, advise and mentor partner forces, see p. 2-1.
5
Patricia L. Sullivan, ‘Does Security Assistance Work? Why It May Not Be the Answer for Fragile States’, Irregular Warfare Initiative, 15 November 2021.
6
Picture: UK MOD © Crown copyright
IN-DEPTH BRIEFING // #81 // SEPTEMBER 24