IN-DEPTH BRIEFING // #79 // AUGUST 24
MIDDLE POWERS
AND THE WEST
AUTHOR
Miras Zhiyenbayev Senior Fellow and Head, Foreign Policy and International Studies Program, MIND Institute* *Maqsut Narikbayev Institute for Networking and Development at Maqsut Narikbayev University
The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research is the British Army’s think tank and tasked with enhancing the conceptual component of its fighting power. The views expressed in this In Depth Briefing are those of the author, and not of the CHACR, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Ministry of Defence, British Army or US Army. The aim of the briefing is to provide a neutral platform for external researchers and experts to offer their views on critical issues. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk
T
HE rise of middle powers is both a result of the successes of the liberal world order and a symptom of its flaws. While many of these powers have ascended within the current global governance system, they are increasingly frustrated with its limitations and are pushing for its reformation. This growing discontent is reflected in this InDepth Briefing, which questions whether value-based diplomacy has outlived its usefulness. The article explores how the effort to promote a ‘free’ world can have unintended consequences that may undermine global security. The concept of ‘middle power’, initially conceived within a great power framework, typically referred to a hierarchical structure of power: great powers at the top of the political food chain, middle powers below them and small powers at the bottom. As the global arena has become more diverse, and the range of relative power with it, this definition has grown increasingly obscure. However, if we look
at middle powers outside the traditional hierarchy, it is much easier to understand them in a horizontal rather than vertical definition. In this view, great powers and middle powers exist in a more balanced relationship. Rather than merely occupying a lower rung on the ladder, middle powers serve as crucial intermediaries. If we envision the global order as a structure, the great powers are like massive slabs of rock, while the middle powers are the concrete between them, preventing them from clashing directly and providing shape to the structure as a whole. Middle power is no longer just a category; it has become an identity. To be recognised as a middle power, a nation must declare itself as such, act accordingly, and be acknowledged by both peers and great powers. Middle powers are innately diverse and have no ‘unifying ideology’, but this title serves as a sign of affinity for those who share the same broad notion of worldview: steering the
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world away from great power rivalry while pushing for a more inclusive and just system of global governance. This identity is not rooted in a single political or economic ideology but rather in a commitment to multilateralism, stability and the equitable distribution of power and resources on the global stage. The liberal world order provided the framework within which middle powers could grow and gain influence. It has facilitated economic development, international trade and political engagement, allowing countries previously on the periphery to assert themselves on the global stage. However, as these middle powers have become more assertive, they have also become more aware of the system’s shortcomings. They see the inconsistency in the application of rules and the disproportionate influence of major powers, which often results in a system that benefits a few while marginalising others. This is where the rift in understanding between middle