IN-DEPTH BRIEFING // #66 // SEPTEMBER 23
NATO AT AUTHOR
Captain Ben Tomlinson Visiting Fellow, CHACR
75
WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE BRITISH ARMY
I The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research is the British Army’s think tank and tasked with enhancing the conceptual component of its fighting power. The views expressed in this In Depth Briefing are those of the author, and not of the CHACR, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Ministry of Defence or the British Army. The aim of the briefing is to provide a neutral platform for external researchers and experts to offer their views on critical issues. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk
N 2024, NATO will mark its 75th anniversary, thereby overtaking the Greek, city-state focused, Delian League as the oldest alliance in history. However, NATO’s landmark birthday comes at a tumultuous point in its history. Although Russia’s 2021 invasion of Ukraine validates its raison d’etre, after an uneasy period of unilateral counter-insurgency campaigns, big questions remain around the organisation’s stability, commitment, and capability. In line with a recent presentation by Peter Apps at the Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (NATO at 75: What it means for the British Army) – and the speaker’s latest book, Deterring Armageddon: A Biography of NATO – this article will seek to extract the five key points of analysis highlighted by the visiting expert, before exploring the implications of them to the British Army as one of NATO’s premier component militaries. The first point highlighted by Apps for consideration, is that
although NATO provides the vital framework for the defence of Europe, the organisation has never been truly tested in an existential fight. Previously blighted by political deadlock and differing opinions, there are concerns that member states may not actually ‘turn up’ in a crisis. Such a concern is, of course, as old as the alliance itself. Originally described by Michael Howard in the early 2000s as an “unhappy marriage”, Apps suggests that NATO might be better analogised as a “polyamorous commune of thirty plus, with nuclear weapons”.1 Having bloated from its original 12 members to its current 31, NATO’s ambitions can prove divisive to a varied group of member states with disparate domestic policies on national defence. Conversely, however, the actions of individual members can also result in friction amongst the wider organisation. In 1956, the French and British response to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser resulted in a humiliating Anglo-French withdrawal under pressure from the US and the UN. As William
1 // IN-DEPTH BRIEFING // CHACR
Lewis wrote: “Britain colluding with France, her historic rival in the Middle East, and Israel, the state formed against British wishes in 1948, against Egypt, Britain’s long-time ally in the Middle East... would present enough issues, were it not for the United States and the Soviet Union joining in the United Nations against the Anglo-FrenchIsraeli attack to finally ensure the failure of the expedition.”2 Aside from the US’ role in the Suez Crisis, its dominance within NATO and enthusiasm to degrade the colonial enterprise would prove too much for France and, in 1966, France took unprecedented steps to formally withdraw from NATO’s Integrated Military Command. However, internal division amongst NATO is not a thing of the past. In 2003 members were split over their willingness to support the invasion of Iraq, 1 Howard. M., (1999), ‘NATO at Fifty: An Unhappy Successful Marriage: Security Means Knowing What to Expect’, Foreign Affairs, accessed. 13/09/23. 2 Lucas W.S., (1992). ‘NATO, Alliance, and the Suez Crisis’, in: Heuser B., O’Neill R., Securing Peace in Europe, 1945 – 62’, Macmillan, London.