CHACRDIGEST
MAY 30th, 2026
AUTHOR: Professor Andrew Stewart, Head of Conflict Research
#56
The views expressed in this Digest are not those of the British Army or UK Government. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. chacr.org.uk
In Europe, military rearmament in Germany and the UK is hindered by a persistent focus on legacy platforms over modern technologies, contrasting sharply with Poland’s successful structural rebalancing. Concurrently, the protracted conflict in Ukraine is experiencing a major battlefield inflection; the Ukrainian Armed Forces appear to be actively breaking the positional deadlock by leveraging advanced AI-enabled strike drones and deep logistics interdiction. Facing these tactical setbacks and severe operational shortages, the Kremlin is pre-emptively drafting propaganda to frame a potential peace settlement as a victory, while at the same time utilising the war to finalise its transition into an entrenched authoritarian state. It is doing this whilst also, and despite the performative ‘no-limits’ partnership, facing an historic geopolitical inversion in its relations with China; isolated by Western sanctions, Moscow has reverted to an unequal, severely subordinate dependency on Beijing. Meanwhile, in the United States, discussions continue about its recent military interventions and the limitations these appear to highlight, specifically a tradition of deploying overwhelming tactical force without setting clear, achievable political objectives or definitive exit strategies. Within the Middle East, post-conflict restructuring is taking place despite the absence of any firm evidence of long-term conflict resolution. Lebanon’s internal power dynamics are shifting as Hezbollah’s influence drastically wanes, enabling a US-backed, technocratic government to pursue fragile but unprecedented stability talks. For the Arab Gulf states, aggressive attempts are being made to replenish their depleted air defences, though global supply-chain bottlenecks are forcing them to adopt lowercost, local alternatives. Finally, concerns continue to grow about future technologies as current AI safety protocols possess a dangerous, unsolved vulnerability regarding the cumulative trajectory of autonomous systems.
EUROPE The Kiel Institute has published a report analysing military procurement trends in Germany, the United Kingdom and Poland from 2020 to early 2026. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, all three nations significantly increased defence spending. In 2025 alone, Germany ordered €85 billion in military equipment, while the UK and Poland ordered roughly €26 billion each. Despite this financial surge, the report evaluates whether these nations are adapting to modern warfare realities or merely buying legacy systems. A central theme is the tension between massive spending and lagging innovation. The war in Ukraine highlighted a shift toward a ‘new paradigm’ of warfare involving autonomous drones, artificial intelligence and networked air defence. However, an analysis of 736 procurement orders reveals that all three nations allocate broadly the same share – around 11-12 per cent – to these disruptive technologies. The vast majority of budgets remain tied up in established, platform-centric conventional systems like tanks, traditional artillery and manned aircraft. While aggregate numbers look similar, the report also uncovers sharply diverging national priorities over time. Germany exhibits the slowest transformation; despite having the largest budget, its proportional spending on new-paradigm technologies has plummeted from 22 per cent in 2020-2021 to just nine per cent in 2024-2026. The UK has doubled its absolute spending on modern tech, but because conventional spending grew just as fast, its overall innovation share stagnated. In contrast, Poland has executed a genuine structural rebalancing, surging its new-paradigm procurement share from two to 16 per cent, reflecting a proactive doctrinal shift and new military formations. Another key theme is the persistence of fragmented European defence markets. Across Germany, the UK and Poland, there is a pronounced ‘home bias’ toward domestic suppliers and localised foreign partnerships. Genuinely pan-European cross-border procurement remains virtually non-existent, which points to heavily
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