CHACRDIGEST
MAY 5th, 2026
#55
AUTHOR: Professor Andrew Stewart, Head of Conflict Research
The views expressed in this Digest are not those of the British Army or UK Government. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. chacr.org.uk
Against a backdrop of repeated drone strikes that have targeted Russia’s oil industry and mounting evidence that this could prove a decisive exploitation of a critical Russian centre of gravity, the conflict in Ukraine continues to drive forward European security responses. These encompass both the physical and conceptual levels of fighting power and, while the announcement by Germany of its military strategy is seen as representing a significant step, discussions about a potential establishment of a French-led panregional nuclear deterrent have also attracted attention. For the war that began in February 2014 with the covert military invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, there is no evidence that it is nearing a conclusion but suggestions are growing that the position is improving for Ukraine. In the other current major conflict, a strategic pause in the Arabian Gulf has led to reflection on what lessons can be learned and what the outcomes will be for Iran and the United States. China, which has provided military support to Iran whilst encouraging a peaceful resolution, has meanwhile revealed a newly updated national strategy document which has been described as having the potential to significantly grow its combat capability. Finally, two essays published by leading US online defence and military commentary sites warn about the dangers of failing not just to study in depth the conflict in Ukraine but, more critically, not identifying and responding to its most critical lessons.
EUROPE As concerns grow about the potential inability of the United States to act as guarantor of Europe’s security – Lithuania and Estonia have been warned of possible delays in the delivery of military equipment because o f the Iran war – a long essay written for Engelsberg Ideas has raised questions following recent speculation about a potential continental nuclear deterrent. With “the rapid reorientation of American foreign policy” during President Donald Trump’s second term in office, including questions about future NATO commitments and promises of US military support including its nuclear forces, President Emmanuel Macron has reiterated his previous intent to extend protection of France’s nuclear arsenal to European allies. With its promise that there is now no threat to European security that would not prompt a joint response from their respective nuclear arsenals, the 2025 Anglo-French Northwood Declaration provided some structure to these ideas. Last month the French leader went further, announcing a new policy, termed ‘forward deterrence’, expanding and possibly extending the French deterrent. Nuclear-capable jets could be deployed to allied countries as part of a broader collaboration with the United Kingdom and a group of select European nations to develop this concept in practice. In its detailed historical discussion, the essay presents some scepticism about the potential for an extended French deterrent, or the viability of an Anglo-French nuclear capability. Arguing that the preservation of US extended deterrence is the most effective and economical solution for European security, it calls for Britain and France to consider the development of stronger sovereign nuclear capabilities with a broader development and deepening of European long-range precision strike and air and missile defence capabilities. It also proposes a key step in any regional strengthening would be France agreeing to accept at least observer status in the NATO Nuclear Planning bodies, something which it has refused since it withdrew from these in 1966, and that it should join Britain and the US in the NATO nuclear strike plan. Such steps would not impact on the independence of its nuclear decision-making but would enhance co-ordinated planning. It concludes with the suggestion that instead of Anglo-French or Anglo-American cooperation, London’s Trinity House Agreement and Germany’s indications that it is prepared to make significant investment, may prove most significant in strengthening European nuclear security.
1 // WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND UKRAINE // CHACR DIGEST