CHACRDIGEST
DECEMBER 1st, 2025
#50
Concerns about European security have grown as Russia continues its illegal war in Ukraine while also showing heightened interest in testing NATO’s resolve. Described as ‘Phase 0’ activity, drone incursions and acts of apparent sabotage are increasingly forcing responses beyond simply investing more in the manufacture of military equipment. A number of states have announced some form of increase in reserve or volunteer forces, which can also be seen as early indicators of possible conscription. Meanwhile, Ukraine fights on but faces mounting pressures, notably in regard to ammunition supplies and manpower. At the same time, instability and potential conflict are not limited to eastern Europe with the potential for a resumption of conflicts in Lebanon and Ethiopia along with the more long-term fears about Chinese intentions in the Indo-Pacific. And as the global community rearms, waning support for humanitarian assistance and long-term development programmes offers a clear indication that soft power is being abandoned by many Western states, even if this carries the potential for longer terms security challenges.
AUTHOR: Professor Andrew Stewart, Head of Conflict Research
The views expressed in this Digest are not those of the British Army or UK Government. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. chacr.org.uk
EUROPE Preparations continue to advance across Europe in response to Russia’s challenge to regional security. As Lt Gen Alexander Sollfrank, head of the German armed forces’ Operational Command, warned at the Bundeswehr’s annual conference in Berlin: “After the end of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and if its rearmament continues unchecked, a large-scale attack on NATO could become possible – and soon… That means we have to deal with the possibility of an attack against us, whether we like it or not. And beyond that, we have no time to lose.” His comments formed part of the announcement of ‘Operation Plan Germany’, a new national defence plan aligned with NATO’s regional strategy – described as not a war plan but rather “a war-prevention plan at its core” – which organises how up to 800,000 alliance troops could move through Germany within 180 days as reinforcement for the eastern flank. This was followed later in the month by confirmation that Poland has launched ‘Operation Horizon’, deploying troops to protect critical infrastructure and key transport hubs. This was in response to a section of track on the strategic Warsaw-Dorohusk rail line used to transport Western aid to Ukraine being destroyed, reportedly by individuals working for Russian intelligence. Working in support of civilian services, the operation will be run by the Operational Command of the Armed Forces, which will have up to 10,000 troops at its disposal from various branches, including the Territorial Defence Force, Special Forces, Cyber Defence, engineers and drone units, to monitor rail and road networks. And in France, President Emmanuel Macron’s announced a restoration of military national service, albeit, at this stage, entirely made up of volunteers completing ‘serious’ combat training. The reported aim is to train between 2,000-3,000 voluntary recruits in the first year and up to 50,000 per year as the programme evolves. With further drone incursions into Romania, travelling 100 kilometres into the country’s territory in what the authorities in Bucharest called “a Russian provocation”, tensions continue to rise. With the conflict in Ukraine remaining a constant theme for global media and think-tanks, there is continuing interest about how the war is being fought and the questions it has raised about how future wars are conducted. The Modern War Institute at West Point has considered what can be learned about interoperability and standardisation, with a focus on how huge Ukrainian ammunition expenditure, particularly in terms of 155-millimetre artillery rounds, has threatened to overwhelm NATO’s long-standing production agreements. This is not surprising: Ukrainian forces operate 17 different types of 155-millimetre howitzers and an even wider variety of sources of ammunition, including nearly 50 models of high-explosive shells. As a result, howitzers and munitions are not truly interoperable. A detailed examination of how fires has evolved in response to this challenge argues that if true interoperability is to be achieved, four lines of effort are crucial. The last requires NATO members to investigate ways to further standardise not only the technical specifications but the ballistic characteristics of 155-millimetre ammunition. As the author – a US field artillery officer – concludes: “If NATO or other US allies find themselves in a major war, they won’t just need to have enough artillery ammunition. They will need to be able to fire it, safely and effectively, in whatever gun and ammo combination is available.” The role played by artillery in the Ukraine conflict and the potential for future NATO shortages of ammunition are also considered by The National Interest, the American bi-monthly international relations magazine published by the Center for the National Interest. It notes that the German manufacturer Rheinmetall has started construction of a large 155mm artillery shell factory in Lithuania which should be completed by the second half of 2026 and will produce annually tens of thousands of shells. This, it is suggested, is evidence that NATO European members once again see Russia as posing a threat to regional security and that they are rearming
1 // WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND UKRAINE // CHACR DIGEST