CHACRDIGEST
AUGUST 1st, 2025
#46
The views expressed in this Digest are not those of the British Army or UK Government. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. chacr.org.uk
UKRAINE / RUSSIA Understanding how Russia actually functions is proving increasingly difficult and therefore Carnegie’s recent podcast episode and article, What a minister’s death reveals about the Russian power vertical, are fascinating insights. They conclude that Cabinet Minister Starovoit’s demise shows how Putin’s system, built on controlled fear, is now entering a phase of uncontrolled fear and, as a result, initiative will grind to a halt, governance is falling into disarray and given the level of repression and mistrust, Russians will focus on survival, not change. In an article for Chatham House, Keir Giles continues his focus on the lack of understanding of Putin’s Russia within NATO and across the world. Interestingly, he highlights that the Moscow stock exchange rose after President Trump’s ‘big announcement’, suggesting Moscow had anticipated far more drastic and immediate steps and priced in the risk accordingly. However, Giles also acknowledges President Putin may have spurned Trump’s overtures once too often – a view echoed by Sir Alex Younger, former Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service on BBC’s Newsnight. This is also reflected in a Lowy Institute article that suggests Russian soft power is declining in the Caucasus and a succession of Russian overtures across Europe have failed, with Albania now firmly pro-EU and Serbia now less willing to do Moscow’s bidding. Meanwhile, Russia’s summer Ukraine offensive looks like its deadliest yet, according to The Economist’s algorithm and satellite data from a NASA programme originally designed to monitor forest fires. The title’s analysis reveals Russia has gained about nine acres per dead Russian soldier and, by that and other measures, it would take another 89 years to conquer all of Ukraine. However, Russia is recruiting 10,000-15,000 more troops per month than Ukraine, a factor which suggests the war is not going to end any time soon. This is highlighted by Jack Watling, writing for the Royal United Services Institute, who indicates that a concerted effort by European states over the next 12 months could lay the foundations for the enduring security of Europe, suggesting that “if Ukraine can hold on for another year… Russia may be pushed beyond its ability to readily recover”. Equally, Orysia Lutsevych argues that “the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine is one of the most significant long-term economic and political challenges facing Europe today” and whilst the war is ongoing, planning for recovery cannot wait until Russia’s invasion is over. More broadly, the RAND paper Evolving Russian perceptions of the British and French nuclear deterrents argues it is essential to understand how Moscow evaluates the deterrents of European countries and concludes that while Russia perceives the UK’s deterrent as a credible threat, the credibility of British capabilities is considered relatively weaker than France due to the UK’s greater reliance on the US. Equally, it maintains the importance of the deterrent effect (or lack thereof) of strategic conventional capabilities such as long-range missile systems.
1 // WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND UKRAINE // CHACR DIGEST