CHACRDIGEST
MARCH 28th, 2025
#42
The views expressed in this Digest are not those of the British Army or UK Government. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. chacr.org.uk
WHITE HOUSE STORM’S SHOCKWAVES On the last day of February, the world changed, live on television, as the President and Vice President of the United States, in what appeared to be a pre-arranged ambush, bullied an embattled ally, repeated, and seemingly reinforced, the Russian narrative and raised doubts over the dependability of a US security guarantee that has been the basis for European security for nearly 80 years. Commentators from across the world have spent the month trying to understand what happened during those crucial ten minutes in the Oval Office and what the implications for global peace and security may be. Rym Momtaz, writing as editor-in-chief, Strategic Europe, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was clear: “There is little more U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration could do to signal that their objectives in Ukraine radically differ from those of Europe. And yet, Europeans continue to be in denial.” Tom Nichols, writing for The Atlantic, a publication gifted increased visibility later in the month when one of their journalists was inadvertently added to a Signal Group including the Vice President and National Security Advisor, was damning in his condemnation for Trump and Vance who “acted like a couple of online Kremlin sock puppets instead of American leaders”. This was also the view of the podcast The Rest Is Politics. The Economist added that the fullblown shouting match was a disaster for Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukraine and subsequently asked the question whether Europe can confront Vladimir Putin’s Russia on its own, concluding that paying for the assessed 50 new brigades would be hard enough but translating increased defence spending into capability, free from US dependence, will be slow and painful. Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London, concluded that “what Russia wants, the US can’t deliver and the Ukrainians won’t accept” but that “none of this should have come as a surprise”. This was echoed by John Foreman, former UK Defence Attaché to Kyiv and Moscow, writing in The Spectator that Trump’s plans to cut a deal with Putin and take a back seat in Europe emerged a year ago but Europe didn’t listen or thought Trump would resile from his campaign rhetoric. Equally, waiting for Trump’s term to end in the hope for a change in direction fails to recognise that the US shift in focus to China is both ‘generational and bipartisan’.
UKRAINE The potential implications for Ukraine were covered by Foreign Affairs in an article that concludes the unfolding peace process “appears to replicate specific weaknesses from the Minsk [accord] process (excluding major parties to the conflict and rushing to an undefined cease-fire with little enforcement and security guarantees)” and that “Europe needs a unified position on the provision of security, military, and economic support to Ukraine; and alignment with Ukraine’s negotiation strategy”. Keir Giles, writing for the Baltic Defence College, considers that Ukraine is faced with “submitting to a ceasefire on unfavourable terms or fighting on and losing US support”, although this may be a blessing in disguise as it would remove US operational constraints and enable Europe to partner with Ukraine as a contributor to European security rather than consumer. Ukraine’s ability to regularly outpace Russia’s innovation cycle is a model for other countries to maintain their military readiness in the 21st century, writes Joyce Hakmeh for Chatham House.
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