CHACRDIGEST
SEPTEMBER 5th, 2024
Picture: Mil.ru, CC BY 4.0
#35
Back in the line of fire: Russian territory is currently occupied by foreign forces for the first time since the Second World War. Soviet troops are pictured counter attacking behind T-34 tanks at Prokhorovka during the Battle of Kursk – the single largest battle in the history of warfare.
The views expressed in this Digest are not those of the British Army or UK Government. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. chacr.org.uk
UKRAINE’S KURSK OFFENSIVE Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk is the first time Russia has been invaded by foreign troops since the Second World War. Ukrainian forces now control an estimated 1,000 square kilometres of enemy territory, however, Mike Kofman – a military analyst and expert on the Russian Armed Forces – describes the offensive as a gamble. Speaking with the Center for a New American Security’s Brussels Sprouts podcast on the 16th August, Kofman suggests Ukraine will face a series of key decision points in the next few weeks, including how far to extend the operation and where to establish defensive fortifications. Ben Barry, senior fellow for land warfare at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, argues that the Kursk offensive may force Western observers to recalibrate some of their assumptions about the fighting in Ukraine. Crucially, Ukraine was able to achieve strategic, operational and tactical surprise despite the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems and other remote sensors. Writing for the Atlantic Council, Peter Dickinson suggests that Putin’s control over the Russian media means he is unlikely to come under significant domestic political pressure as a result of Ukraine’s offensive. However, Dickinson believes that the Ukrainian operation has successfully undermined Putin’s “strongman image” and exposed his threats of escalation as “bluster”.
RESTORING MANOEUVRE WARFARE IN UKRAINE Since its failed attempt to rapidly seize Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has reverted to a strategy of attrition in order to leverage its numerical advantage. With Moscow willing to absorb enormous casualties, Ukraine’s forces – their surprise recent incursion into Kursk and the Kharkiv counter-offensive in autumn 2022 aside – have struggled to break the current pattern of positional warfare. A new report by the Institute for the Study of War, written before Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk, argues that “restoring operational-level manoeuvre remains the central problem in this war”. Using maps and tactical diagrams, the report explains the effects attacking forces must achieve in order to penetrate and exploit breaches in defensive fortifications.
A GROWING PROXY WAR IN AFRICA? In late July, Tuareg separatists claimed to have killed 84 Wagner Group mercenaries and 47 Malian troops in a series of ambushes in northern Mali. Videos shared on social media showed Tuareg rebels posing with captured vehicles and equipment. The Wagner defeat is a significant tactical-level setback for the group; however, speaking as part of a Brookings Institution panel discussion, John Lechner, an expert on Russia’s growing influence in Africa, cautions against claims that the defeat amounts to a broader failure of Moscow’s strategy in the Sahel. The Wagner defeat at Tinzaoutene has also increased concerns among African leaders of a growing proxy war between Ukraine and Russia on the continent. On the 29th July, Andriy Yusov, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, hinted that the organisation had provided intelligence to the Tuareg rebels in advance of the attack on the Wagner convoy. In response, Mali’s junta severed diplomatic ties with Kyiv, accusing it of “complicity in acts of terrorism”. Paul Melly, a consulting fellow with the Africa Programme at Chatham House, argues that Kyiv risks paying a serious diplomatic price for its alleged support to the Tuareg separatists. However, James Horncastle, an assistant professor at Simon Fraser University, suggests that Kyiv is willing to accept the diplomatic costs of its special operations abroad in order to boost morale at home.
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