CHACRDIGEST
FEBRUARY 23rd, 2023
#16
FOREWORD After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the so-called end of history, it became almost unthinkable to talk about nuclear weapons as a serious strategic threat to Western militaries. The 2000s and 2010s – which were largely dominated by Western asymmetric warfare against weak states, insurgencies, and non-state actors – only reconfirmed this notion that the nuclear age was long past. But in 2023 the issue of nuclear security is once again at the forefront of key global security concerns. In this edition we take a look across the piste at some critical issues affecting the world today.
The views expressed in this Digest are not those of the British Army or UK Government. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk
A NEW NUCLEAR (DIS)ORDER? 2023 promises to be a year in which nuclear issues – nuclear weapons, nuclear safety, and nuclear energy – will be high on the agenda for policymakers and security professionals around the world. The Iran nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, appears to be all but dead, once again raising the question as to if and how Iran can be prevented from building a nuclear weapon. Meanwhile, Russia’s war against Ukraine has a twofold nuclear dimension: the possibility that a desperate Russia could resort to using nuclear weapons, and the threat that Ukraine’s nuclear power plants could be catastrophically damaged. Finally, there are a growing number of people championing the potential for nuclear energy to play a part in the global energy transition away from fossil fuels. In early February, Chatham House hosted International Atomic Energy Agency Head Rafael Mariano Grossi to talk about all things nuclear; the recording of the event is worth watching.
WAS UKRAINE WRONG TO GIVE UP ITS NUKES? Ukraine inherited a significant slice of Moscow’s nuclear cache following the collapse of the Soviet Union but decided to surrender that arsenal in 1994 in exchange for assurances from Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States that its sovereignty and territorial integrity would be respected. The agreement, known as the Budapest Memorandum, is one that many Ukrainians have come to regret. In this article Mariana Budjeryn argues that it was never so simple, Ukraine did not inherit a workable deterrent, more a “proliferation starter-kit”, with Moscow still holding the briefcase containing the codes. The author’s argument is that Ukraine’s leadership chose sensibly not to pursue a full deterrent, but that means the conventional security of Ukraine’s borders is fundamental to upholding nonproliferation norms. Should Ukraine be forced to back down by Putin’s nuclear bullying this could set a dangerous precedent.
ATOMIC STRAIT: HOW CHINA’S BUILD-UP AFFECTS THE SECURITY DYNAMICS WITH TAIWAN Beijing is rapidly modernising its nuclear arsenal. Changes include an increase in warhead numbers from more than 400 today to potentially 700 by 2027 and more beyond, consolidating a nuclear triad, developing new delivery systems, and digging at least 300 new missile silos. In this report CNAS analyst Jacob Stokes argues that it is clear China’s upgraded arsenal is designed to fulfil new roles, primarily by backstopping China’s increasing presence in South-East Asia, and offering it an umbrella of security should it choose to test US resolve in Taiwan. In the face of this increasing danger the report asserts that the US must modernise its own nuclear force but avoid an arms race. Instead, nuclear contingencies should be built into all security scenarios in Taiwan, and that Taiwan’s conventional military capabilities be substantially upgraded to dissuade Taipei from seeking its own nuclear deterrent.
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