Picture: Martijn Beekman / NATO
IRAN – SO WHAT? CHACR COMMENTARY // MARCH 2026
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BY: Major General (Retd) Dr Andrew Sharpe, Director CHACR RESIDENT Donald Trump has made it clear, in both his business life and his political life, that he believes that ‘unpredictability’ is one of his strongest assets. Whether one agrees, or not, that this is a helpful approach to the delicate business of international relations, it is the reality behind the pivotal effects that the US leadership currently has on world events. Keeping his opponents (and friends) off-balance, confused and unclear about his end-game, and therefore likely intended actions, has long been central to how he plays his cards. By contrast, philosophers and theorists of the use of war as a tool by political leaders have, for centuries, been equally clear that clarity of the intended ‘end game’ has both moral and practical imperatives. Whether one considers the problem through the lens of Just War Theory, or Clausewitzean philosophy, it is vital to understand the ‘ends’ behind the ‘ways and means’. Just War Theory tells us that war, as an instrument of national
policy, is only justifiable if, among other things, the person choosing to use war to realise their aims has ‘a reasonable chance of achieving success’. Of course, it is impossible to judge what might constitute ‘a chance of success’ if one has no clarity about what ‘success’ looks like. In both moral and practical terms, Clausewitz reminded us that because war is an extension of policy by other means, it is both morally and practically vital that the aims and desired outcomes are clearly understood and articulated before the decision to use violence is taken. There is no point in using war, he explained, if one does not clearly
understand, in advance, what one wants to happen after war has been used and a return to more normal relations achieved. In the lead-up to the Iraq campaign in 2003, Donald Rumsfeld, then the US Secretary of Defense, agreed with the ‘Neocon’ view that air-delivered regime change (or, if air-delivery alone fails, then a rapid and conclusive ground campaign, just to make sure) would inevitably lead to the uprising of the oppressed and disgruntled people of the state in question, who, through the unstoppable power and efficacy of democracy, would deliver a new, stable, happy and
prosperous state that would be benign and beneficial both to its inhabitants and neighbours, and thus, thereafter, globally. Colin Powell, then the US Secretary of State in the same administration, held what he called ‘the pottery barn’ view of regime change, which is to say he quoted the notices in such establishments that say “If you break it, you own it!”. So, he believed that those bringing about regime change needed to understand (and thus plan for) their responsibility post-change to be involved, to conclusion, in the internal stateof-affairs in the changed country until the desired conclusion was reached. The resulting muddled
“KEEPING HIS OPPONENTS (AND FRIENDS) OFF-BALANCE, CONFUSED AND UNCLEAR ABOUT HIS END-GAME, AND THEREFORE LIKELY INTENDED ACTIONS, HAS LONG BEEN CENTRAL TO HOW [TRUMP] PLAYS HIS CARDS.”
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