CHACR COMMENTARY // JULY 2026
BY: Major Laurence Thomson and Nick Reynolds
T
HE debate surrounding the utility of armoured forces on the modern battlefield is not new and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has only brought the topic into sharper focus. Whilst both critics and advocates use the ongoing war to validate their respective positions, the British Army’s Chief of the General Staff is unequivocal: there is an enduring necessity for armoured heavy forces. Armour has pride of place within NATO’s strengthening deterrence posture and a central role in the Eastern Flank Deterrence Line. The British Army has been directed in the Strategic Defence Review 2025 to “modernise the two divisions and the Corps HQ
that it provides to NATO as one of the Alliance’s two Strategic Reserves Corps”. Both divisions – the 1st and the 3rd – are to be equally capable but nonetheless different. 1 (UK) Div, as has already been examined, is to be light and built for speed, with the operational flexibility to intercede in NATO’s first-battle. 3 (UK) Div is armoured and mechanised, centred around “heavy metal” and designed to fight in NATO’s second-battle and fight to ‘restore’ its territorial integrity. 3 (UK) Div is the focus of this CHACR Commentary, which considers how it will simultaneously optimise and modernise for war. Section one considers the reality of contemporary war on the battlefields of Ukraine and draws lessons relevant for those
formations seeking to optimise legacy equipment ready for a ‘fight tonight’ scenario. Section two examines what priorities are needed for transformation programmes for ‘fight tomorrow’. Section 3 recommends what 3 (UK) Div can do in the near and medium-term, including priorities for rapid procurement and refining the multi-year Programme of Record. WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM UKRAINE? The Russo-Ukrainian War provides evidence for understanding armoured forces’ contemporary utility in highintensity warfare. However, it offers limited insight in to how British armour might fare on a battlefield characterised by pervasive surveillance, precision fires and integrated air defence
– operating in a NATO context of multi-domain combined arms manoeuvre is more nuanced. Regardless, Ukraine has validated that armoured forces are indispensable, whilst revealing how their employment must adapt: the tank is not dead but its tactical role must change. The indispensability of armour Ukraine’s defence and counteroffensive operations have demonstrated that armoured forces remain essential for territorial defence and offensive manoeuvre. During the initial invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian armoured and mechanised units provided the mobile firepower to blunt Russian advances and conduct effective counterattacks. Admittedly, light forces with anti-tank guided missiles proved invaluable in
1 // HEAVY METAL A MUST FOR ARMY’S PLAYLIST // CHACR
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HEAVY METAL A MUST FOR BRITISH ARMY’S ‘PLAYLIST’